The South China Sea/East Sea Dispute: A Strategic Choice Analysis of The Dispute Between Viet Nam and China From A Period of Escalating Tensions (2007-09)

The South China Sea/East Sea
Dispute:
A Strategic Choice Analysis of the Dispute between the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam and the People‟s Republic of China from a Period
of Escalating Tensions (2007-2009)
Craig Jeffries
University of California, San Diego
Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Affairs
Prepared at Trường Đại Học Hà Nội (Hanoi University)
December 2009
1 The South China/East Sea Dispute: A Strategic Choice Analysis
Introduction
China and Vietnam
The Sino-Vietnamese relationship is arguably the world‟s most complex, and certainly
one that gives international relations scholars and security analysts the most trouble when
seeking to examine such ties. For example, casual observers most likely assume that relations
between the two Communist states are full-bodied and stable, due to the two States‟ vast
similarities. Yet, most serious scholars would point out the 2,000 years of shared animosity
between the two neighbors, encompassing events such as the Chinese invasion and subsequent
thousand-year rule of Vietnam; the Chinese withdrawal of military aid to Vietnam during the
latter‟s war with the United States; and the 1979 Chinese invasion of Northern Vietnamese
provinces—Beijing‟s response to Hanoi‟s role in toppling the Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge in
Cambodia.
Still, 21st century world opinion regarding Sino-Vietnamese relations comes off rather
positive; with many describing the two states as vibrant Asian “tigers”, whose economies have
outpaced all others in the region while enjoying a “big brother-little brother” relationship, where
one supposedly learns from the other successful development strategies—Beijing presumably
plays the role of the teacher in this perceived bond. Yet, it is perhaps a justifiable conclusion to
suggest that the two are heading toward mutual success after a cursory examination of the two
state‟s economic, political and social developments is conducted. However, there is at least one
issue that has the potential to derail such desires for joint peace and prosperity: both China and
Vietnam claim sovereignty over two archipelagoes in the South China Sea/East Sea (SCS/ES).1
Referred to internationally by their English names, the Spratly and Paracel Islands are claimed
both by China and Vietnam, as well as a number of other states, including: Brunei, Malaysia, the
Philippines and Taiwan. Even as the SCS/ES dispute is now seen by both Beijing and Hanoi as
the final outstanding bilateral dispute in their states‟ long and turbulent relationship, the saliency
of the issue, evidenced by events documented in this paper, demonstrate its potential to derail
recent successes in the Sino-Vietnamese relationship.
1
While most commonly referred to as the South China Sea (SCS), Vietnam objects to this labels and instead calls
the body of water the East Sea (ES). To maintain political neutrality, I reference the body of water as the SCS in
sections about China and as the ES in sections about Vietnam.
Craig Jeffries 2
Briefing on Spratly and Paracel Archipelagoes:

Trường Sa/Nansha and Hoàng Sa/Xisha
Spratly
The Spratly archipelago, known as Trường Sa to the Vietnamese and Nansha to the
Chinese is a group of over 100 reefs, islet, atolls, and islands representing five square kilometers
of landmass and spread across 400,000 square kilometers in the SCS/ES. Although the Spratlys
are inhabited, the sea that lies around it is fertile fishing ground. Additionally, this area is seen as
potentially rich in oil and gas. Approximately 45 islands are occupied by small military
contingents from both China and Vietnam; Malaysia, the Philippines and Taiwan also maintain a
troop presence.2 Politically, China administers its occupied islands through the provincial
government on Hainan;3 while Vietnam oversees its occupied islands in the Spratly chain from
Khánh Hòa province.4
Paracel
The much smaller Paracel archipelago, known as Hoàng Sa in Vietnamese and Xisha in
Chinese consists of only about 30 islets and reefs, covering a mere 15,000 square kilometers in
the SCS/ES. Though no inhabitants live on these islands, they are still claimed by China,
Vietnam and Taiwan. Yet, only China has military personnel on these islands. As with the
Spratlys, the Paracels are prime fishing grounds that also potentially hold underwater deposits of
oil and gas.
Historical Sketch of Bilateral SCS/ES Dispute

Both Hanoi and Beijing utilize vague and unreliable historical documentation to lay claim
to both archipelagoes. For instance, Hanoi puts forth the notion that their ancient maps, dating
back to the mid 17th century prove their territorial sovereignty over islands off Vietnam‟s central
2
Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook: 2009”, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/pg.html
3
“Vietnam Protests China’s Establishment of Authority on its Islands”, Nhân Dân, 17 November 2009.
4
Thanh Niên, “Provincial House Confirms Sovereignty Over East Sea Islands”, 19 December 2007
coast described as Bấi Cát Vàng (or the Golden Sandbanks). The Vietnamese also point to texts
of this era, suggesting the Lê and Nguyễn dynasties were commercially active in the East Sea.5
China‟s evidence is just as ambiguous; with Beijing citing Han (23-220 A.D.) and Ming
(1400sA.D.) dynastic records, describing Chinese occupation, and the conduct of commercial
activities on islands throughout the South China Sea.6
The 20th century saw various periods of documented violence in the SCS/ES. Early on in
the century, France, Vietnam‟s colonial power occupied most of the Spratlys, and all of the
Paracels in 1933, losing control to the Japanese in 1941 as a result of World War Two.
Following the First Indochina War, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), then in power
in Hanoi and allied with communist People‟s Republic of China (PRC), relinquished all claims
to both archipelagoes, sending formal correspondence recognizing the former‟s sovereignty in
the SCS/ES in 1956. Consequently, the Chinese were able to take control over the entirely of the
Paracels that year. However, the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) based in Saigon remained adamant
of its claim of sovereignty over both archipelagoes. Tensions rose further between the RVN and
the PRC in 1968 with the discovery of oil, climaxing in 1974 with battle of the Paracels, a clash
that effectively ended all Vietnamese presence on these islands. Today, China continues to
occupy all islands in the Paracel archipelago.7
When Vietnam was unified in 1976, the Communist government in Hanoi reasserted its
sovereign claim over the two archipelagoes. Two incidents during this period show the renewed
intensity of the dispute between the two Communist states: first, was the 1988 sinking of a
Vietnamese transport ship by a Chinese naval vessel off of Johnson‟s reef in the Spratlys; and
second was the 1992 oil exploration row between both states and a pair of U.S. energy firms
5
Kelly, Todd C., “Vietnamese Claims to the Truong Sa Archipelago [Ed. Spratly Islands], Explorations in Southeast
Asian Studies, Vol.3, Fall 1999
6
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Historical Evidence To Support China's Sovereignty
over Nansha Islands”, 17 November 2000.
7
Kelly, Todd C., “Vietnamese Claims to the Truong Sa Archipelago [Ed. Spratly Islands], Explorations in Southeast
Asian Studies, Vol.3, Fall 1999
Craig Jeffries 4
cooperating with each on separate, but overlapping exploration contracts in the disputed waters.8
While no military clashes ensued, a war of words between Beijing and Hanoi highlighted the
deterioration of relations between the once allies.
Analyzing actions, Gauging Preferences and Predicting Outcomes

using the Strategic Choice Approach
This paper will attempt to analyze the evolution of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship with
regard to the SCS/ES dispute. Utilizing the strategic choice approach (also known as rational
choice theory), this paper will show—using recent developments from 2007 to 2009—the extent
of which both China and Vietnam‟s capabilities and resolve influence each is actions, beliefs,
perceptions, and overall strategy concerning the disputed maritime claims. Finally, this paper
will gauge the likeliness of certain outcomes to the SCS/ES dispute, concluding with brief policy
recommendations.
Before this can be done, however; an introduction of the strategic choice approach is in
order. The strategic choice approach is a way of understanding events by extracting and
analyzing its most important features: the players, the preferences and strategies involved.
Theorists in this field point out that all players are equal in that they are rational; yet the goals
they seek to maximize are not identical, as their preferences are different.9 Still, when
analyzing a state-to-state conflict, where central governments hold significant power—as is the
case in this examination—the sole preference of these actors is to maintain political power.
Thus, in order to preserve this power these actors will pursue a strategy based upon: 1) the
actions available to them; and 2) the beliefs they have about their opponent. The actions
available to an actor depend on how powerful they are relative to their opponent. While their
beliefs are based on the how they feel their opponent will react to any such action they pursue.
Of course, it is not always easy to discern what the other side is thinking, thus any
rational actor will study all available information they have regarding their opponent,
8
Energy Information Administration (EIA): United States Department of Energy (U.S. DOE), “South China Sea
Territorial Issues”, December 2009.
9
Walter, Barbara F., “Explaining the Intractability of Territorial Conflict”, International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 4,
Dissolving Boundaries (Dec., 2003), pp. 137- 153.
including intelligence gathering, historical actions and diplomatic and political signals sent out.
Once an actor is able to secure this information, they can then attempt to determine what the
other side is trying to maximize, what preferences it has, and ultimately what strategies they
are likely to employ. With this knowledge, the actor can then adjust their own strategy to
secure their preference.
However, even superior knowledge about your opponent may not be enough to alter their
behavior. To do this effectively, an actor must also be relatively more powerful than their
opponent. An actor‟s power, according to rational choice strategists is the sum of its
capabilities (amount of raw materials, size of population, technological sophistication, military
size/quality, and strength of national leadership) and resolve (the willingness of the leadership
to follow through with threats). Additionally, relative power determines the amount of strategic
tools available to a given actor.
The strategic choice approach dictates that actors have three broad mechanisms for
influencing other international actors. The first, available to all international actors, whether
weak or strong, is persuasion. This tool involves campaigning for a course of action by
appealing to sentiments, shared values, ethics, and morals; and by providing information—both
of the rewards and consequences of acting in favor or against. In short, this is diplomacy.
Still, simply persuading an opponent to change its behavior is seldom effective. Thus,
actors with a relative power advantage can typically employ a second set of tools in the form of
offering rewards. Examples of reward inducements are: offering entry into international
organizations, bilateral free-trade agreements, increased foreign direct investment, as well as
military cooperation. If neither persuasion, nor reward inducements effectively alter another‟s
behavior, then the truly powerful actor can utilize a third tool: punishment, coercing the
weaker actor to relent and change course. Punitive actions range from economic sanctions to
military action.
Having discussed the basic principles of the strategic choice approach, it can now be
applied to the SCS/ES dispute to identify the players, determine their preferences and understand
their strategies. Looking at primary evidence from the foreign affairs ministries of China and
Vietnam, as well as news material from state-owned media outlets, the following two sections
Craig Jeffries 6
will look at specific actions taken by each state regarding the SCS/ES dispute during the years
2007-2009.10 Additionally, an effort is made to calculate the proportion each strategic tool (e.g.
persuasion, reward inducement and punishment) was utilized during the three-year period, as
well as its intended target area (e.g. diplomatic, domestic-political, economic and military).11
Uncovering China’s Preferences and Strategy in the South China Sea:
Rational Choice Application for China in the SCS Dispute
Who are they? And what are they trying to maximize?
Firstly, it must be noted that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) acts as a unitary actor
while conducting the People‟s Republic of China‟s (PRC) international relations.12 Thus,
subsequent sections of this paper relating to China should be understood to view the CCP as the
sole Chinese actor representing the “national interest” over the whole of the Chinese state and its
people. While most would find it hard to accept that the CCP has its people‟s “true” interest in
mind; it should be accepted here, simply because no other player in China does or has the ability
to exercise the sort of power that the CCP wields. However, one should not overlook the fact that
the CCP does need to keep certain segments of the Chinese population satisfied. These groups
include the armed forces, as well as the ever growing business community. Additionally, as the
CCP maintains political control over more than a billion people, it is vital that it to pay particular
attention to popular perceptions of its policies.
Having recognized that the CCP is the sole actor representing the PRC, one must then try
to understand what interest or goal it is trying to maximize regarding the SCS dispute. Although
this task would seem quite difficult, it is in fact, rather simple because like all rational political
actors, the CCP ultimately seeks to retain political power. To accomplish this, the CCP needs to
10
While it might seem that the events included in this examination have been arbitrary selected, in fact, most, if
not all actions described here were deemed significant enough to have been mentioned by both state’s foreign
ministries and/or state news agencies, signifying the salience of the particular event.
11
Acknowledging the fact that a three-year time series, encompassing just 49 events is quite basic and ultimately
less consequential, it should not preclude from the true purpose of this examination; which is to observe recent
policy trends in order to more accurately predicted future behavior.
12
It should be noted that throughout this paper the terms CCP, China, PRC and Beijing are synonymous and all
refer to the same actor.
placate the aforementioned societal groups. The party-state does this in several ways and
employs different approaches for each of the groups. Regarding its SCS maritime claims, the
CCP has courted the People‟s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) by increasing the amount and
frequency of military exercises in the SCS‟s disputed waters, as well as building naval facilities
on several disputed islands, constructing a submarine base on the southern Chinese island of
Hainan, and most importantly increased the PLAN‟s budget.
Similarly, the CCP has sought to placate China‟s growing business sector by
demonstrating its commitment to ensuring that Chinese businesses have the resources it needs to
continue China‟s breakneck economic growth, while also guaranteeing that sea lanes vital to the
economy‟s export-driven industries remain stable. Lastly and perhaps most salient—given the
sheer size of this group—is the CCP‟s attempt in maintaining favor over the general public.
Lately, the party-state has been ensuring its citizens that the country‟s current prosperity,
economic growth and rapidly improving international image will be sustained well into the
future. These sorts of promises please the Chinese people not only because they are aimed at
improving their lives, but also because the average Chinese citizen is extremely nationalistic and
any message that highlights the grandeur of the Chinese state or its culture is met with immense
passion. Therefore, the CCP sees the SCS maritime dispute as an issue that can help it maintain
political power, as it is a strongly nationalistic issue and a potential source of immense economic
benefits.
What are the CCP’s preferences for a possible outcome to the SCS dispute?
Now that the CCP has been identified as the primary actor, and that it seeks to use the
SCS dispute to bolster its political legitimacy, an examination of the specific preferences
regarding outcomes it would like to see come from the SCS dispute with Vietnam can be
conducted. Due to space limitations and for the sake of clarity, only four preferences are listed;
by doing so, each is meant to be as diverse as possible. China‟s preferences, from most favored
to least favored are:
1) Since the CCP claims nearly all of the islands in the SCS, clearly its most preferred outcome
would be to achieve internationally-recognized de-jure sovereignty over all of its claims;
which, most recently include around 80 percent of the disputed waters. Additionally, China
Craig Jeffries 8
would prefer to achieve this with the absence of military action and without losing face
domestically and internationally.
2) If the CCP cannot achieve its first preference, which seems very likely, Beijing would have to
settle for some sort of bilateral recognition of its maritime claims with the other parties in
the dispute—most crucially with Vietnam. In this scenario, China would have to make some
concessions to Vietnam; perhaps entering into a joint development agreement. For China,
however; it would be more advantageous to conclude numerous bilateral deals rather than
entering into a single multilateral deal with all the SCS claimants; reasons for which will be
discussed later.
3) In the event that the CCP is unable to obtain recognition for its SCS claims under international
law, Beijing would most likely be forced to accept a multilateral deal with all other claimants
in the SCS. However, Beijing would most likely insist on a joint exploration pact, where it could
reap the economic benefits, even though it would lose significant political sovereignty over areas
in which it currently controls.
4) The least favored outcome for would look something like an acceptance of a limited
military skirmish with Vietnam, if it meant the outright de-facto control over its disputed
maritime claims. Of course, this outcome would incur great costs to the CCP—both
internationally and domestically. Also, to occupy the very large territory that it claims, Beijing
would be required to conduct a rather ambitious and potential costly military confrontation.
Thus, a truly successful military confrontation would require the deployment of several PLAN
vessels, and perhaps involve nuclear submarines. All in all, this option seems quite risky and
could prove to be very costly for the CCP, making them vulnerable both to U.S. retaliation
and/or the relinquishment of power domestically.
What are the CCP’s Capabilities?
Having looked at the preferences for outcomes in the SCS, an examination of the Chinese
capabilities that drive those preferences must now be conducted. When analyzing capabilities
using the strategic choice approach, one must look at each actor‟s relative power in regard to its
opponent. As such, the following seeks to lay out the capabilities available to the CCP in both
absolute terms, but more importantly, how they stack up relative to those of Vietnam.
Military
Much has been written about the rapidly developing military capabilities at the CCP‟s
disposal. One striking feature is that the Beijing directs the world‟s second biggest military in
terms of expenditures at $84.9 billion in 2008—a figure that is growing larger year by year, an
alarming trend to most outside of China.13 These capital expenditures undertaken to modernize
the military are bolstered by the world‟s largest standing fighting force at about 2.2 million
men.14 Particularly worrisome for regional neighbors, especially Vietnam, is the overt expansion
and modernization of the PLAN, coupled with a desire by Beijing to build a truly “blue-water”
navy, capable of exerting Chinese military influence throughout the region. No doubt, China sees
this endeavor as a means to consolidate its claims in the SCS. Finally, China wields the ultimate
military deterrent: nuclear weaponry. Such weapons, transported and placed into submarines
seem to give the CCP an overwhelming military advantage in any SCS dispute with the
Vietnamese.
Economic
A great deal has been said about China‟s economic transformation and rapid development
over the last decade. What is known is that Beijing is now the third biggest economy in world—
soon to pass Japan to take second position. While the Chinese economy is nowhere near the size
of the United States, Beijing does hold the world‟s largest share of foreign reserves, currently at
$2.27 trillion, a fact that shows the strength of China‟s economic capabilities, and the potential
damage it could cause rivals.15 Again, even though Vietnam‟s economic growth has in recent
years kept pace with its northern neighbor, it is China who has the relative economic advantage;
for if Beijing so chose, it could use this advantage to either reward or punish Vietnam in an
attempt to influence the latter‟s behavior with respect to the SCS dispute.
13
Figure and ranking from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2009, pg. 182,
accessed at: http://www.sipri.org/yearbook on 15 December 2009.
14
Estimated figure as of 2006, of which 255,000 was naval personnel. Cordesman, Anthony H. and Martin Kleiber,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, “The Asian Conventional Military Balance in 2006: Overview of
Major Powers”, 26 June 2006, p24
15
Poon, Terence and Li Liu, (Dow Jones Newswire), “China: To Keep Way Of Managing Forex Reserves”, 4
December 2009.
Craig Jeffries 10
Diplomatic
As a veto-wielding permanent member on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC),

Beijing has the ability to shield itself from international sanction. Additionally, being an
influential player in international bodies such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), as well as a prominent observer within the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Beijing is well-placed to fend off any diplomatic attacks
directed from Hanoi regarding the SCS dispute.
What is the Strength of the CCP’s Resolve Surrounding the SCS dispute?
While identifying China‟s capabilities and how those capabilities could be used to
provide an advantage in the SCS dispute appears to be a straightforward exercise, the task of
discerning the level of the CCP‟s resolve is much tougher; and one that cannot be accomplished
from a simple quantification of the core elements of the state. Rather, a more thorough
examination is required to assess the risk-calculations taken by Beijing with regard to the
particular strategies pursued in the SCS. In order to do this, scrutiny must be paid to the tools and
mechanisms employed by China. Consequently, the following examination will look closely at
actions taken by the CCP from the years 2007 to 2009. The conclusion of this section will
address the strategic shifts taken by Beijing during the three years under examination, and what
that demonstrates about its resolve, as well as the actions likely to be taken by the CCP in the
future.
Strategic Mechanisms Employed by the CCP (2007-2009)
As noted, strategic choice analysis pays particular attention to the types of mechanisms
(or tools) used by one actor in hopes of altering another‟s behavior. Here, attention is paid to
three types of strategic tools: 1) Persuasion; 2) Reward inducements (e.g. economic incentives,
cooperation and engagement); and lastly 3) Punishment—both economically and military. As
noted, Beijing‟s enjoys an overall power advantage relative to Hanoi; due primarily to the
aggregation of its capabilities. Therefore, the CCP is able to effectively utilize all three types of
strategic tools. In addition to focusing on the strategic tools employed, it also important to
identify where they are aimed; specifically, whether it is at a domestic-political audience, the
diplomatic arena, economic forums, or rather militarily strategies.
2007
In 2007, five events were observed that shed some light on the types of strategies
employed by Beijing; and more interesting provides an opportunity to study the resolve of the
CCP with regard to the SCS dispute with Vietnam. Of the five events, four were seen as seeking
to persuade, whereas one was identified as punitive.
Two particular strategies pursued by the CCP throughout 2007 are continuations of much
older strategies, dating back to ASEAN‟s Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea (DOC) in 2002. The first is Beijing‟s desire to develop the PLAN into the region‟s
preeminent naval force, capable of forward deployment throughout the region. As such, the CCP
has year-by-year increased its military budget, while not hiding its desire to field a “blue-water”
navy, equipped with at least one aircraft carrier.16 This military strategy, seeking to add to the
CCP‟s already advantageous set of military capabilities, is clearly aimed at securing a chokehold
on sea lanes in the SCS, as well as establishing a permanent Chinese presence on the two
disputed archipelagoes. Secondly, 2007 saw the Beijing continue its diplomatic policy of
pushing for bilateral negotiations with each of the concerned ASEAN members in the SCS
dispute. China favors this bilateral approach to an ASEAN-China negotiation because it allows it
to play each state off with each other. In other words, a bilateral negotiation including only China
and Vietnam, would allow the former to exert its relative power advantage; whereas an ASEAN
negotiation would see Vietnam gain bargaining power relative to China.
In January 2007, the CCP, keeping with the values and commitments of 2002‟s DOC,
sent its coast guard into the Paracel islands to rescue a group of Vietnamese fisherman, whose
boat sank off the disputed archipelago.17 This event demonstrates that at this stage in the dispute,
China was interested in maintaining cordial diplomatic relations with Vietnam, in hopes of
persuading the latter to accept its maritime claims. However, the CCP appeared to shift strategy
16
According to Wu Huayang, deputy political commissar of the Navy, quoted in the China Daily on 3 March 2009:
“building an aircraft carrier is the will of the people and is necessary for the development of our navy, as well as
being a symbol of China's position in the world.”
17
“Chinese Coast Guard Rescue Vietnamese Fishermen”, Thanh Niên, 14 January 2007.
Craig Jeffries 12
later that year, as in November it conducted military exercises throughout the Paracel islands.18
This action shows that even though Beijing ultimately desires a peaceful resolution, it still felt it
needed to demonstrate to Hanoi that its military capabilities alone were sufficient enough to
secure what it sought in the SCS.
At the end of the 2007, the CCP, shifting its focus inward in an attempt to win over its
domestic constituents appointed administrative control over the disputed archipelagoes.19 This
strategy was almost certainly taken by Beijing in an effort to tap into the nationalistic tenacities
of the Chinese people by demonstrating that the CCP leadership was committed to protecting the
“interests” of the Chinese people.
2008
In 2008, ten events relating to Chinese SCS maritime claims were observed. Of the ten
events, five were seen as seeking to persuade, two identified as reward inducing, and three as
punitive. It must be remembered that 2008—the year China hosted the Olympics—was to be the
time when China would officially be elevated to “world player” status. As such, one could
predict that Beijing would act more aggressively; curtaining any developments in the SCS that
would cause it to lose face either internationally or domestically.
As such, one policy that Beijing continued in 2008 was its efforts to split its ASEAN
SCS rivals by seeking to bilaterally engage with each, thus ensuring it maintained the relative
bargaining advantage. Specifically, early on in the year, China pushed the idea of the Pan-
Tonkin Gulf Cooperation onto other SCS disputants. The idea—originating from the ASEAN-
China Free Trade Agreement discussions—was put forth by the southern Chinese province of
Guangxi, and sought to promote cooperation in fisheries, maritime energy, environment
regulation and tourism. Having eventually won the support of the CCP leadership, Beijing
subsequently floated the idea to other ASEAN states, with most of them voicing lukewarm
approval, while Vietnam rejected it outright.20 Even though China was not able to secure
18
“Vietnam Protests Chinese Military Exercise in Hoàng Sa”, Thanh Niên, 25 November 2007.
19
“Vietnam Affirms Sovereignty Over East Sea’s Archipelagoes”, Thanh Niên, 4 December 2007.
Vietnam‟s approval for the Pan-Tonkin plan, it did engage with its southern neighbor during
the 2nd Vietnam-China Guiding Steering Committee for Bilateral Cooperation. Begun in
2006, this mechanism was set up by the two states in order to develop a long-term strategy for
bilateral cooperation covering a broad set of issues—including the maritime dispute. As such, it
should be seen as a reward inducing action by Beijing because it provides Hanoi with a forum to
extract economic and cooperative agreements with his northern neighbor. For example, the 2nd
meeting in Beijing resulted in a joint-statement, stressing that any resolution to the SCS dispute
would be handled properly and fairly.21
In March of 2008, signaling the CCP‟s strong desire to play off its smaller rivals in the
SCS dispute, foreign minister Yang Jiechi openly pushed for a joint-exploration pact with
Vietnam and other claimants.22 This economic strategy, seeking to persuade Vietnam and
others to give up their unilateral claims in return for “joint” prosperity actually hinted that China
may not truly believe it could achieve its favored preference of internationally recognized de-jure
sovereignty over its SCS claims, but may be willing to settle for something less to avoid a costly
military confrontation.
Yet, the following month, satellite imagery displayed evidence of China’s clandestine
construction of an underground submarine base in Sanya, Hainan province, demonstrating
that Beijing was indeed intent on strengthening its military capabilities so that in the event of a
military confrontation, there would be no doubt who would prevail. International security
analysts suggest that the base, when completed, could have the capacity to house nuclear
submarines and any future aircraft carrier the PLAN acquires.23
Indicative of the multiple strategies available to China, the CCP flexed its diplomatic
muscle in April, when Beijing hosted Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) General Secretary
20
Li Mingjiang, “Pan-Tonkin Gulf Economic Cooperation Scheme: Making a 'lake' of South China Sea”, Straits Times
15 January 2008.
21
“The Second Meeting of the Guiding Committee for China-Vietnam Bilateral Cooperation Is Held”, The Embassy
of the People’s Republic of China in Lithuania, 24 January 2008.
22
Yang, Jiechi, “Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi Meets the Press”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the People’s Republic
of China, 3 March 2008.
23
“Secret Sanya - China's new nuclear naval base revealed” Jane's Information Group, 21 April 2008.
Craig Jeffries 14
Nông Đức Manh. What resulted from that meeting was the following joint statement regarding
the SCS dispute:
“The two sides agree to strictly abide by related common understanding of the two
countries‟ leaders, to keep the situation in the [South China Sea] East Sea stable,
continuously maintain negotiation mechanisms on sea issues, through peaceful
negotiations, persistently seek a basic and long-lasting solution that can be accepted by the
two sides while actively studying and debating cooperation issues for mutual development
in order to reach proper models and sectors”.24
Even as diplomatic strategies seemed to be working for Beijing, on July 2, 2008, the
joint China-Philippines-Vietnam seismic study was allowed to expire.25 What this event
shows is the lack of resolve on the part of all parties—including China—to ensure the initiative
continued. Interestingly, following the expiration of the joint project, Beijing demands that
foreign oil firms, BP and Exxon-Mobil sever cooperation with Vietnam‟s state energy firm
Petro-Vietnam in the SCS or risk losing future Chinese business. Although, both firms rejected
China‟s threat, this action showed that the CCP was willing to use punitive economic threats to
have its way in the SCS.26
The following month, Beijing received high-ranking VCP cadres at the CCP’s
International Liaison Department signaling that Beijing continued to hold the attention of its
Vietnamese comrades.27 Another interesting development was the fact that Beijing allowed a
libelous article, describing a CCP-planned 31-day invasion of Vietnam, to remain on more
than four different websites during the month of September.28 The article stressed that
Vietnam was a major threat to China, and the only thing that stood in the way of the latter‟s
24
“Vietnam, China issue joint statement” Vietnam News Agency, 1 June 2008.
25
Sutter, Robert and Chin-Hao Huang, “China-Southeast Asian Relations: Small Advances, Troubles with Vietnam”,
Comparative Connections, October 2008.
26
Torode, Greg, “Diplomatic Balancing Act For Oil Exploration” South China Morning Post, 23 August 2008.
27
Sutter, Robert and Chin-Hao Huang, “China-Southeast Asian Relations: Small Advances, Troubles with Vietnam”,
Comparative Connections, October 2008.
28
Ibid.
domination over Southeast Asia. What is remarkable about this incident is not the article‟s
content itself—almost certainly not a product of state officials—but rather the fact that the CCP,
notoriously known for its strict policing of the internet, allowed the post to remain on numerous
websites for that length of time. It is this fact that many in Vietnam have pointed out, and why
this incident should be regarded as a punitive measure directed toward Hanoi. At the same time,
this event should also be seen as a tool used by the CCP to shore up domestic support by again
tapping into the nationalistic nature of various actors within China.
2009
In 2009, 12 SCS-related events were observed. Of these 12 events, five were seen as
seeking to persuade, with two identified as reward inducing, and five as punitive. The increase in
punitive actions may reflect Beijing‟s increased capabilities as well as a sharpening of CCP‟s
resolve regarding the SCS dispute. Yet, it would be a mistake to say that all of the actions taken
by Beijing in 2009 were unilaterally inspired, as will be addressed later, Hanoi raised the stakes
on its own in 2009—most notably by submitting a unilateral claim to the United Nations
requesting an extension of its continental shelf; thus some of China‟s acts are retaliatory, and will
be identified as such.
As during the previous two years, in 2009, Beijing continued to pursue the strategy of
enhancing its naval capabilities in order to project its military power throughout the SCS.
Additionally, the CCP maintained the policy of seeking bilateral engagement with individual
ASEAN members to discuss and settle its maritime disputes. The year started with the Chinese
State Oceanic Administration calling for Chinese businesses and individuals to move to
uninhabited islands in the Paracels and the Spratlys in order to bolster China’s sovereign
claims; a strategy that appears to be an attempt by Beijing to sustain and possibly strengthen
domestic support for its SCS policy.29
The PLAN’s harassment in March of a U.S. naval vessel U.S.S. Impeccable said to be
in Chinese territorial waters off Hainan continues to show that Beijing‟s military capabilities, as
well as its resolve to use it, were increasing.30 The incident also signals to China‟s regional foes
29
“Ministry Responds to East Sea Claims”, Vietnam News Agency, 9 January 2009.
Craig Jeffries 16
that Beijing is perhaps even willing to confront the United States in order to protect its perceived
maritime sovereignty. However, in an attempt to cool rising regional tensions, the CCP appeared
to shift strategy yet again, as in the following month, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao met with his
Vietnamese counterpart, Nguyễn Tấn Dũng to say that the two sides should keep an eye on
long-term interests and the overall situation. Additionally, the two agreed that both sides should
limit actions perceived to be provocative in hopes that the two could enjoy the mutual benefits of
joint development in the SCS.31 This strong signal send to Hanoi, seems to be a careful attempt
by Beijing to lay out the risk, rewards and consequences for any Vietnamese action regarding the
SCS dispute.
However, Sino-Vietnamese ties began to seriously deteriorate in April and May of 2009.
Three incidents show the different strategies used by Beijing, with a further strengthening of
resolve, especially evident with regard to the use of its military superiority. First, Beijing,
responding to Vietnam‟s unilateral submission to the United Nations Commission on the Limits
to the Continental Shelf (UNCOLCS) to extend its continental shelf to incorporate both
archipelagoes, sends the UN a “u-shaped” map showing its own maritime claims in the SCS,
along with a diplomatic note, asking them to reject Vietnam’s claim.32 A second and more
troubling incident was the CCP‟s unilateral decision to impose a three-month fishing ban in
the SCS, effectively punishing the economic activities of Vietnamese fishermen at the height of
their fishing season.33 The third and final action by Beijing during this tense period was the
deployment of eight fishery and PLAN vessels from southern China to the SCS to enforce
the ban on fishing activities.34 Obviously, the deployment of Chinese vessels to enforce its ban
was response by Beijing to Hanoi‟s own “raising of the stakes” with regard to the latter‟s UN
30
Thayer, Carlyle, “Recent Developments in the South China Sea, International Workshop on The South China Sea
Cooperation for Regional Security and Development” 26-28 November 2009.
31
“Chinese Premier Meets with VN Counterpart”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the People’s Republic of China, 17
April 2009.
32
A copy of China’s response and “u-shaped” map can be found at:
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm.
33
Cooperation for Regional Security and Development” 26-28 November 2009.
34
“FM: South China Sea Fishing Ban ‘Indisputable’”, Xinhua, 9 June 2009.
submission; but what is particularly salient though is that this time, Beijing saw it less useful to
diplomatically engage with Hanoi, rather finding it easier to return to its position of superiority in
the SCS via punitive measures.
China continued to assert itself as it arrested Vietnamese fishing vessels throughout the
summer of 2009. Hanoi‟s protests fell on deaf ears, as Beijing’s insisted that it was within its
right to “protect” the fishery stocks in its “own waters”.35 However, in September, drawing
on its preference to avoid a military confrontation, the CCP continued to push the idea of a
joint exploration pact with Vietnam and other claimants—ideally bilaterally. A Chinese
envoy speaking in the Philippines stated that all parties in the SCS dispute “should join hands in
development” and refrain from taking provocative unilateral actions, thus signaling that China
was again willing to provide economic incentives to solve the maritime quarrel.36
In November, Beijing continued the now routine strategy of shoring up domestic support
for its SCS policy. This time, the CCP established village communities on several disputed
Paracel islands claimed by Vietnam; specifically, Phú Lâm and Đảo Cây.37 Finally, as Hanoi
hosted an International Workshop on the South China Sea, Beijing dispatched three vessels to
the disputed archipelagoes, as well as to the Tonkin Gulf.38 Surely, this action was meant to
remind Vietnam that no matter how much international support it could garner for its maritime
claims, Beijing still possesses a vastly superior military capable of nullify such diplomatic
achievements.
Discernable Strategic Shifts and Implications for Resolve
Observing Trends
With a clearer sense of the actions, strategies and tools employed by CCP during the last
three years regarding the SCS dispute with Vietnam, it is now possible to try and discern trend
35
Ibid.
36
“China Proposes to Move on with Joint Development Formula in SCS”, Xinhua, 22 September 2009.
37
38
Hương Giang và Mỹ Loan, “Phản đối Trung Quốc đưa tàu đến Hoàng Sa”, Tuổi Trẻ, 28 Tháng 11 2009.
Craig Jeffries 18
patterns, and what those shifts signify for future Chinese policy in the SCS. Appendix A
quantifies the observed events and identifies the strategic tools used, as well as their intended
targets. Thus, with that knowledge, the following assessments can be made:
First, it is notable to point out that the percentage of actions perceived as being persuasive
fell from 80 percent in 2007 to 42 percent in 2009. Admittedly, this conclusion is drawn from a
very small sample set of major events. Nonetheless, coupled with the rise in perceived punitive
actions taken by the CCP—20 percent 2007 to 42 percent in 2009—China is no doubt feeling
more comfortable using its military and economic advantage to punish its southern neighbor.
Looking now to the areas in which Beijing has directed SCS actions; one should be
reassured that, on average, Beijing has preferred to use diplomatic methods, as 40 percent of
their actions were identified as such, while economic measures ranked second with an average
use of 27 percent. Military actions ranked third, ahead of domestically-targeted political actions
with 20 and 13 percent respectively.
Future implications
There should be no doubt that the CCP—being a rational actor, primarily seeking to
retain political power—desires to achieve its goal of securing and strengthening its maritime
SCS claims via persuasive diplomatic behavior. Additionally, based on the evidence presented
here, it should be noted that Beijing is also willing to provide economic rewards to Vietnam,
specifically, in the form of joint exploration projects, an example being the Pan-Tonkin Gulf
Cooperation. Thus, one should be hopeful that additional reward inducements will continue to be
offered by Beijing to Hanoi.
Even though China has recently flexed its military muscle, displaying its increased naval
capabilities, and perhaps also signaling a greater resolve to use them—both to Hanoi and to a
domestic audience—it is not likely that the CCP will actually threaten military force to solve the
SCS dispute. This is precisely because any military action taken by China to end the dispute
would be seen as unjust not only by regional players, but also to the wider international
community; something Beijing is not keen to let happened, evidenced by its carefully-managed
image during the 2008 Olympics.
Yet, it would be a mistake to conclude that China will suddenly stop developing its armed
forces, particularly its navy. For it is vital that Beijing maintain a sufficient military deterrent,
capable of patrolling the SCS, not just to defend against threats from Hanoi but also to counter
the decades-old U.S. naval superiority in the region. Additionally, China requires a strong
navy—especially one with “blue-water” capable—to allow it to protect SCS sea lanes vital to its
economically strategic export-sector.
Lastly, it must be known that punitive economic measures such as sanctions, boycotts or
embargoes will only be counterproductive to Beijing, as its southwestern provinces of Guangxi
and Yunnan depend on trade with Vietnam. Therefore, it should be concluded that although
tensions in the SCS have risen lately, with Beijing seeming more keen on punishing Vietnam, it
is also not likely that the CCP will threaten or use overly harsh punitive economic measures to
attempt change Vietnam‟s policy in the SCS.
Uncovering Vietnam’s Preferences and Strategy in the East Sea:
Rational Choice Application for Vietnam in the ES Dispute
Who are they? And what are they trying to maximize?
Like China, Vietnam is ruled by a single dominant party. As such, it must also be noted
that the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) acts as a unitary actor while conducting the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam‟s (SRV) international relations.39 Thus, it should be understood
that it is the VCP that is the lone Vietnamese actor representing the “national interest” in
Vietnamese foreign affairs. Again, similar to China, it should be accepted that no other player
within Vietnam does or has the ability to exercise the same level of power the VCP does in
influencing the foreign policy decisions of the state. However, the VCP does have to placate
certain segments of society in order to maintain political power. Just as the CCP is beholden to
certain societal groups, so too is the VCP.
Since strategic choice theory mandates that all actors are rational, it is subsequently
known that what the VCP ultimately desires is to preserve political power. Thus, the VCP must
39
It should be noted that throughout the remaining of this paper the terms VCP, Vietnam, SRV and Hanoi are
synonymous and all refer to the same actor.
Craig Jeffries 20
conduct ES policy in an effort to please its domestic constituents: specifically, the small but
influential business lobby, and more broadly the whole of the Vietnamese populace. Similar to
the CCP, the VCP has chosen to pursue an ES policy that strikes at the nationalistic tendencies of
its citizens.
What are the VCP’s preferences for a possible outcome to the ES dispute?
Now that the VCP has been identified as primary actor, and that it seeks to use the ES
dispute to bolster its political legitimacy, an examination of the specific preferences regarding
outcomes it would like to see result from the ES dispute with China can be made. Vietnam‟s
preferences from most favored to least favored are:
1) Since the VCP claims nearly all of the islands in the ES, its most favored preference would be
similar to its Chinese opponent, in that it seeks internationally-recognized de jure sovereignty
over all of its claims—achieved peacefully, without losing face domestically nor internationally.
2) If the VCP cannot achieve its first preference, which, like China, appears unlikely; Hanoi will
likely have to settle for a multilateral agreement with all other parties in the dispute, which
recognizes most of its claims. A multilateral settlement is preferred by Hanoi over a bilateral
deal with China because it gives Vietnam significantly greater bargaining power with respect to
China, as it will be harder for Beijing to push around a grouping of states. Additionally, in this
scenario, Vietnam would also be keen on reacquiring some of the islands in the Paracel
archipelago that it lost during the 1974 battle of the Paracels with China.
3) In the event that the VCP is neither able to secure internationally recognized de-jure
sovereignty for all of its ES claims, nor a multilateral agreement for sovereignty over partial
claims; Vietnam would consequently have to give in to Chinese diplomatic pressure and agree to
a bilateral understanding with Beijing over how to split up control of the disputed
archipelagoes. This scenario would most likely have to include the promise of joint-
development in the areas of fisheries, sea patrols and most importantly, oil and natural gas
exploration for it to truly be a serious option for Hanoi.
4) The least favored preference for Hanoi would look something like a continuation of the
status quo, which means the absence of de-jure sovereignty for its ES claims and only limited
de-facto control in the Spratlys, with no control at all in the Paracels. A continuation of the status
quo would also mean that Vietnam would remain beholden to the punitive actions of its much
stronger northern neighbor. Additionally, since the VCP must soothe popular opinion, a
continuation of the status quo in the ES—where Vietnamese fisherman are harassed, beaten and
arrested—will cause great damage to the regime‟s reputation amongst an extremely nationalistic
population who view the ES dispute as the most important foreign policy issue for its country.
What are the VCP’s Capabilities?
Military
Vietnam maintains a diminutive-sized military when compared to its northern neighbor,
with Hanoi spending only $1.3 billion on military expenditures in 2008.40 Relative to the Chinese
PLAN, Vietnam‟s navy would require significant international assistance if it truly desired to
mount a serious military challenge to China in the ES. What the lack in relative military
capabilities shows for Vietnam‟s ES policy is that to achieve what it wants in the disputed
waters, it cannot rely on punitively-aimed military actions to be effective in altering Chinese
behavior.
Economic
With the world‟s 58th biggest economy, measured in nominal GDP, and economic
growth second to only China in Asia, Vietnam is no doubt on its way towards enriching the lives
of its citizens.41 Yet, this economic growth, while impressive, is not enough to influence Chinese
ES policy. Hanoi does not, at this stage—or perhaps never will—be able to influence Chinese
foreign policy via economic means, due to the sheer magnitude of the capabilities gap in this
area. This is not to say that Vietnam can never attempt to provide economic inducements to
China, or that the latter will not readily accept them; but rather, it should be noted that the
economic tools available to Hanoi relative to Beijing‟s own does not allow one to conclude that
the use of such would be overwhelming effective.
40
Information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),
http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4.
41
World Bank, World Development Indicators database, “Gross Domestic Product”, 7 October 2009.
Craig Jeffries 22
Diplomatic
As a non veto-wielding non-permanent member on UNSC, Vietnam has been able to
build its reputation as a serious and committed player in international relations. Yet, with regard
to influencing China, this two-year assignment—set to expire next year—does nothing to alter
the balance of diplomatic power between the two communist states. With China holding veto
power and the right to vet the council‟s agenda, Hanoi is in no position to challenge Beijing
within this forum. The same can be said for other international organizations where the two
coexist. Still, there is one multilateral forum where Vietnam may have an edge over China: that
is ASEAN. Soon to take over rotating chairmanship of ASEAN in 2010, Vietnam will then be
able to chose whether to proceed with China-related negotiations or delay them for an entire
year, thus giving itself some, albeit temporary, bargaining leverage.
What is the Strength of the VCP’s Resolve Surrounding the ES dispute?
As previous noted while examining the CCP‟s actions and beliefs, the task of assessing
an actor‟s resolve is quite more difficult than identifying its capabilities. Nevertheless, the
following section will attempt to gauge the resolve of the VCP by observing actions it took from
2007 to 2009 regarding ES policy. The conclusion of this section will address the strategic shifts
in VCP policy regarding the ES during the three years under examination; and what any shifts
demonstrates about its resolve, and/or future ES policy.
Strategic Mechanisms Employed by the VCP (2007-2009)
Although, Vietnam can and does employ all three strategic tools (persuasion, reward
inducements, and punishment) to try to influence China, the effectiveness of each is determined
by the overall power equilibrium relative to Beijing. In other words, even though Hanoi has the
basic capabilities to send its naval vessels into the ES to patrol, Beijing—having the far superior
navy— would surely respond by sending its own, thus nullify the Vietnamese action. Thus, what
should be predicted in this three-year examination of VCP ES policy is the higher frequency in
the use of persuasive actions, coupled with the limited use of punitive measures. Additionally,
focusing on the target areas, one would likely predict that Hanoi would more often than not focus
on diplomatic mechanisms, due to the inferiority of its overall capabilities relative to Beijing.
2007
In 2007, seven events were observed. Of the seven events, six were seen as persuasive,
whereas one was identified as punitive. By analyzing these events, one should have a better
picture of not only the strategies that Hanoi sought to employ but also the potency of the VCP‟s
resolve with regard to the ES issue.
Throughout 2007, Vietnam‟s foreign ministry, responding to Chinese actions taken in the
ES, repeatedly stated that the dispute between the two communist states could and would be
solved peacefully under the guidelines of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLS) and 2002 DOC. Thus, Hanoi routinely sent a clear signal to Beijing that it did not
want to risk war over the ES dispute.
Yet, the foreign ministry time and time again in 2007 stated that Vietnam had the
historical and legal evidence to back its claims of sovereign control for both the Spratly and
Paracel archipelagoes. In one such incident, Vietnamese foreign ministry spokesman, Lê Dũng
said as much, while protesting Beijing‟s construction of sovereign markers in the ES.42 The
reaffirmation of Vietnam‟s possession of historical and legal evidence over its ES maritime
claims should be seen as an attempt by the VCP to appeal to its domestic constituents with the
purpose of maintaining their political allegiance.
Signifying the strength of the VCP‟s resolve in seeking to uphold peaceful relations with
its neighbor, the Vietnamese coast guard, in a tic-for-tac response, rescued 15 Chinese
fishermen off of Khánh Hòa province’s shoreline.43 This action was then followed up with a
goodwill trip to Beijing in April by Vietnamese National Assembly chairman Nguyễn Phú
Trọng; again showing Hanoi‟s resolve and commitment to a peaceful settlement. His visit
marked the tenth round of expert-level negotiations on the ES dispute between the two states.44
42
Lê Dũng, “Vietnam once again reaffirms its sovereignty over Hoàng Sa and Trường Sa archipelagoes”, Bộ Ngoại
Giao, 28 December 2006.
43
“Chinese Coast Guard Rescue Vietnamese Fishermen”, Thanh Niên, January 14, 2007.
44
“NA Chairman Trong leaves for official visit to China”, Vietnam News Agency, 13 April 2007.
Craig Jeffries 24
Yet, relations between the two states over the ES dispute began to deteriorate in
November, as a direct result of Beijing conducting military exercises throughout the Paracel
islands. Consequently, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyễn Tấn Dũng met Chinese Premier
Wen Jiabao on the sidelines of the annual ASEAN summit to convey his concern over
escalating ES affairs.45 This diplomatic action signaled both that Hanoi recognized the
superiority of Chinese capabilities—especially militarily, and that its resolve in maintaining
peace with Beijing remained strong. What it also shows is how very few effective strategic tools
Vietnam has at its disposal for dealing with China.
What must have been a response to both the Chinese military exercises in the Paracels, as
well as Beijing‟s appointment of administrative control of the disputed archipelagoes to Hainan;
Vietnam, in December, allowed yet condemned anti-China protests in Hanoi and Ho Chi
Minh City.46 This action or “non-action” shows that the VCP is more than willing to use the ES
dispute with China as a way to incite the nationalistic tendencies, as well as the historical
loathing of the Chinese by the Vietnamese people for its own political gain. Likewise, the
provincial resolutions by Khánh Hòa and Đà Nẵng, declaring political control over Trường
Sa (Spratly) and Hoàng Sa (Paracel) respectively, on the surface appeared to be a response to
the Chinese administrative appointment; yet, knowing that the VCP ultimately seeks to maintain
power, it must of calculated that these moves would additionally bolster its support amongst its
population.47
2008
In 2008, five incidents relating to Hanoi‟s ES policy were observed. Of the five events,
three were seen as seeking to persuade, while two were identified as reward inducing, and none
as punitive. The absence of a recorded punitive action show either that Hanoi‟s resolve in
maintaining peaceful relations with Beijing remained strong, or that the VCP recognized that
45
“PM meets Chinese counterpart on sideline of ASEAN Summit”, Bộ Ngoại Giao, 22 November 2007.
46
“Protests In Front Of Chinese Diplomatic Buildings in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City Sunday Were Unapproved By
Local Governments, Said Lê Dũng” Thanh Niên, 11 December 2007.
47
“Provincial House Confirms Sovereignty Over East Sea Islands”, Thanh Niên, 19 December 2007.
punitive measures will only cause itself harm thus be counterproductive. Of course, both
calculations could have been made, as the two are not mutually exclusive.
The Vietnamese foreign ministry sought to keep the ES issue on the public‟s radar, as it
consistently stated that Vietnam had the historical evidence to support its claim of
sovereignty over the two archipelagoes. The VCP thus, sought to continually signal to its
domestic public that it would not back down to China. Yet, on the diplomatic front, the VCP
began to use the very clichéd Socialist motto of “friendly neighborliness, fraternity and
comradeship” developed with the CCP in discussing a way forward in the ES.48 Even though
such talk is in line with Hanoi‟s desire for a peaceful settlement, this sort of diplomatic banter,
emphasizing shared bonds and Socialist allegiance is most certainly unappealing to the truly
nationalist individuals in Vietnam, who wish for their leaders stand up to China. Yet, the VCP
most likely concluded that at the present time, a signal of friendly intentions to Beijing was more
pressing than an attempt to shore up domestic support.
Yet, even as Hanoi tried to soothe ties with Beijing, things turned sour again in 2008, as
Hanoi summoned senior Chinese diplomats twice in September to protest Beijing‟s
allowance of an article outlining a Chinese invasion of Vietnam.49 In an attempt to further ease
tensions, another meeting between the two state’s prime ministers took place in October,
where both sides again signaled their shared desired to reach a peaceful conclusion based on the
guidelines and principles enshrined in the UNCLS, the DOC and—at China‟s insistence no
doubt—through future joint development.50 Specifically, both sides engaged in what should be
identified as dual reward inducing actions, as the two states signed a cooperation agreement
on behalf of the two state-owned energy firms, CNOOC and Petro-Vietnam. In addition,
48
Lê Dũng, “Vietnam’s policy of resolving all disputes in the Eastern Sea through peaceful negotiations”, Bộ Ngoại
Giao, 18 February 2008.
49
Torode, Greg “Vietnam Protests Over Chinese Invasion Plans; Beijing Dismisses Online Threats”, South China
Morning Post, 5 September 2008.
50
“China-Vietnam Joint Statement” Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the People’s Republic of China, 9 January 2009.
Craig Jeffries 26
Beijing and Hanoi set up a hotline where the two capitals could communicate quickly in an
attempt to diffuse any escalating situation in the disputed waters.51
2009
In 2009, ten events were observed; where seven were identified as seeking to persuade,
two were seen as reward inducing, and one as punitive. More fascinating than the overall
increased volume of Vietnamese actions, was Hanoi‟s first “unilateral” punitive action regarding
the ES dispute; as in April, Vietnam filed two submissions—one jointly with Malaysia—to
the United Nations Commission on the Limits to the Continental Shelf, requesting that it be
allowed to extend its continental shelf beyond the 200 nautical mile limit to incorporate all of the
Paracels and part of the Spratlys.52 53 This action is described as punitive because it is an effort
by Hanoi to circumvent the influence of Beijing by seeking international recognition for its
maritime claims; thus causing the latter to lose diplomatic face by having to aggressively
respond, as it did by sending its own correspondence to the UN maritime body, protesting the
Vietnamese action as a breach in its sovereignty, and recommending that the UN not consider the
submission.54 Overall, Hanoi‟s UN submission signals to both its domestic and international
audiences that while not looking for war, it maintains committed to securing de-jure sovereignty
over its ES claims.
Yet, even as Hanoi seemed to be stepping up pressure—albeit diplomatically— on

Beijing, Prime Minister Dũng reiterated Vietnam’s policy of seeking a peaceful outcome to
the dispute in April, suggesting that the Sino-Vietnamese maritime dispute could be resolved
51
“Vietnam, China vow to deepen cooperation”, Vietnam News Agency, 27 October 2008.
52
A copy of Vietnam and Malaysia’s joint proposal can be found at:
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission _mysvnm_33_2009.htm.
53
A copy of Vietnam’s partial proposal can be found at:
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission _vnm_37_2009.htm.
54
A copy of Vietnam’s reply to China’s reply and “u-shaped” map can be found at:
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_
09/vnm_chn_2009re_mys.
peacefully, just as the Tonkin gulf and land border demarcations have shown.55 However, in the
face of increasing tensions between the two states due to Beijing‟s unilateral three-month fishing
ban, and most likely out of fear of losing public support on the issue, the VCP in April appoints
an administer to govern the Paracels, even though it has no physical presence on the
archipelago.56
The following month, foreign ministry spokesman Lê Dũng, bluntly responding to

China‟s unilateral fishing ban in the ES, states that any activity in the ES or within Vietnam’s
exclusive economic zone would be seen as a violation of its sovereignty, thus signaling to both
the Vietnamese domestic audience, as well as to China, that its resolve remains firm, and that it
will not be bullied.57 A particular event involving the arrest and alleged maltreatment of
Vietnamese fisherman by Chinese military personnel stationed on the disputed islands prompted
Vietnam to send a diplomatic note to the Chinese embassy in Hanoi, demanding that they
look into the incident and punish those responsible.58 This rather weak response clearly
demonstrates the lack of effective tools available to the Vietnamese to hit back at a blatantly
aggressive Chinese action.
Yet, the current inability for Vietnam to meaningful hurt China may be about to change,
as in October, Vietnam unveiled its goals for its 2010 ASEAN chairmanship. On the agenda
were a multitude of projects relating to China, such as the ASEAN-China Free-Trade Area, the
strengthening of the DOC and the continued development of the ASEAN-China Strategic
Partnership.59 Vietnam, with the ability to control the ASEAN agenda will enjoy a rare moment,
where it will have the capacity to either reward or punish China in an effort to influence the
latter‟s behavior on ES policy.
55
Torode, Greg “Hanoi Hopeful Over Maritime Row with Beijing; Disputes Can Be Solved, Says PM”, South China
Morning Post, 20 April 2009.
56
“China Says Vietnam’s Appointment of Official in Xisha islands ‘illegal’’’, Xinhua, 28 April 2009.
57
Lê Dũng, “Concerning the Fishing Ban by China”, Bộ Ngoại Giao, 26 May 2009
58
“Vietnam’s reaction to inhumane acts by Chinese Armed officers toward Vietnamese Fisherman”, Bộ Ngoại Giao,
21 October 2009.
59
“Deputy PM: Vietnam to successfully assume ASEAN Chair”, Vietnam News Agency, 25 October 2009
Craig Jeffries 28
However, doing what it could until 2010, Hanoi continued to send diplomatic notes to
protest actions taken by Beijing in the ES, as it did in November, voicing its disapproval over
the Chinese establishment of district-level administration on Hainan for both the Paracel and
Spratly archipelagoes.60 However, Hanoi did demonstrate that it could still offer reward
inducements to Beijing, as it finalized the land demarcation and border management
agreement with its northern neighbor, shortening the latter‟s long list of pending land border
issues.61 This agreement also makes clear that both sides are willing to engage with other, and
that with time, both states are able to solve tough bilateral issues.
Even with the VCP realizing that it could achieve diplomatic victories via engagement in
other areas, it sustained its commitment to employing unilateral initiatives for it maritime claims;
an example of which was Hanoi hosting numerous international scholars and experts
assembled to provide recommendations on the ES dispute.62 The international workshop on
the East Sea dispute as it was called, no doubt was an attempt by Vietnam to strengthen its
claims through the support of international “experts” and to counter the vast strategic capabilities
of China.
In a similar, yet more noticeable vain to shore up international support, Hanoi sent its
defense minister, Phùng Quang Thanh to Washington, D.C. in December to meet his U.S.
counterpart, as well as other prominent American politicians to discuss strengthening military,
as well as political ties.63 As both the U.S. and Vietnam fret about China‟s military buildup, this
action should be seen as mutually beneficial to both Washington and Hanoi, as it is clearly
intended to enhance Vietnam‟s military capabilities, in the form of a military partnership with
60
61
“Major Accords End Vietnam-China Land Border Negotiations”, Nhân Dân, 19 November 2009.
62
Hương Giang, “Bế mạc hội thảo quốct tế về biền Đông”, Tuổi Trẻ, 28 Tháng 11 2009.
63
Bowen, Ernest, “Vietnamese Minister of Defense General Phung Quang Thanh”, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, 14 December 2009.
the region‟s preeminent naval force—the United States; and to add another U.S. ally in the
region should hostilities ever break out between the U.S. and China.
Discernable Strategic Shifts and Implications for Resolve
Observing Trends
Having now scrutinized actions taken by Hanoi, both unilaterally, and in response to
Chinese actions, it is now possible to try to discern trend patterns, and how those shifts could
affect future Vietnamese policy in the ES. Appendix B quantifies the observed events and
identifies the tools used, as well as their intended targets. Thus, the following assessments can be
made:
Since it is known that Hanoi possesses far fewer capabilities to effectively alter the
behavior of Beijing via reward inducements or punitive actions, it is no surprise that throughout
the three years under examination, Vietnam used persuasive methods 73 percent of the time.
Additionally, focusing on areas in which Hanoi directed ES actions, it is again no surprise

to see that Vietnam—relatively the weaker actor in the dispute— used diplomacy 58 percent of
time. Demonstrating the importance of nationalism in this dispute, the VCP sought to influence
its domestic audience 35 percent of the time. Finally, again showing the relative weakness of
Hanoi, actions regarded as being directed at economic targets counted for a mere eight percent,
while the VCP did not once utilize its military during the three years under examination.
Future implications
Recognizing that it is at a several capability disadvantage relative to its Chinese

opponent, Vietnam has been attempting to influence China the only way it can: through
diplomatic channels, trying to demonstrate both to the Chinese, as well as others, the virtues of
the Vietnamese position regarding its disputed ES claims. Playing up the two states‟ shared
historical values, cultures and ideologies, Hanoi has been trying—mostly unsuccessfully—to win
over Beijing. However, since both states have competing interests in the ES dispute, it is not
likely that Hanoi can secure what it desires through persuasive means alone. Yet, Vietnam does
not have the capability to effectively threaten China with military action, nor does it have the
Craig Jeffries 30
economic weight to impose unilateral sanctions. Thus, if the VCP is to achieve some sort of
victory here, it will be from a combination of persuasive and reward inducing actions.
Particularity, Vietnam could offer its cooperation in securing transport routes, or lend its
support to the plethora of proposed ASEAN-China cooperative agreements. Most importantly, as
Hanoi takes over the ASEAN chairmanship in 2010, it will have the ability to set the agenda to
either favor or punish China by either implementing Chinese-related initiatives or postponing
them for a year. Lastly, Vietnam, as evidenced by Defense Minister Phùng Quang Thanh‟s visit
to Washington this December, appears to be more aggressive in its pursue to strengthen its
military capabilities vis-à-vis China.
Conclusion
The Future of the Dispute
Any attempt to predict future outcomes regarding the SCS/ES dispute must first
recognize the vast capability advantage that Beijing possesses relative to Hanoi. With a military
far more advanced and with many more troops, China certainly will prevail in the event of a
naval confrontation with Vietnam. Additionally, the CCP, with a relative power advantage in
both economic and diplomatic capabilities is also able to shield itself from any attempt by Hanoi
to punish it within these areas. Furthermore, as both the CCP and VCP are rational actors within
one-party authoritarian states, strategic choice theory states that both actors primarily seek to
preserve political power; as such, neither actor will be very likely to risk war with the other over
this dispute for fear of losing power domestically. However, that is not to say that both states will
cease to publicly rebuke each other; as both Hanoi and Beijing, seeking to sustain public support
for their regimes will want to tap into the nationalistic tendencies of its respective citizens by
appearing to be protecting the sovereign interests of their respective states. It is also likely that
China will continue to increase its naval presence in the disputed waters for the reasons of
showing off its enhanced military capabilities to Vietnam and others, as well as to measure
American resolve in the region.
What this paper has shown through the examination of the capabilities, strategies and
preferences of both players—the CCP and the VCP—is that regardless of what each has said in
public, both are most likely willing to settle for something much lower than their first, or even
second preferences regarding an outcome in the SCS/ES dispute. Specifically, some sort of joint
governance and development pact will most likely be reached to resolve this dispute. The
question though then is: what type of agreement will be reached, and by whom? Also, will there
be numerous bilateral agreements between China and the other SCS claimants, or will there be
one multilateral deal to settle the dispute? Moreover, it is uncertain what role multilateral
organizations, such as the UN and ASEAN will play in its resolution. What is certain, however;
is Vietnam‟s longing, and China‟s aversion to outside intervention, as this would shift each
actor‟s relative bargaining power one way or the other.
Yet some scholars are not convinced that a negotiated agreement for partial sovereignty
will succeed. For example, Vietnam defense expert, Carlyle Thayer believes that although China
will most certainly continue to press Hanoi to accept a joint-exploration pact for the SCS, such a
policy will fail for the simple reason that Hanoi will not be able to sell such a deal to its own
citizens, due to the intense nationalism that has been attached to the issue—many times
exacerbated by the VCP themselves.64
Recognizing the lack of options available to Vietnam, stemming from its relative
weakness with China, Hanoi does not have much bargaining space. As such, the VCP
desperately needs to change the status quo, as current power dynamics in the SCS/ES leave
Vietnam vulnerable to future punitive actions by China similar to 2009‟s fishing ban. As noted,
Hanoi will hold the ASEAN chair in 2010, and will then have the capability to either reward or
punish Beijing. In all likelihood, VCP will chose the former policy route to keep from rising
tensions; that is of course, assuming China does not take a foolish action requiring Vietnam to
retaliate from within ASEAN. What is clear is that Beijing will lose some autonomy over its SCS
strategy during 2010, as its relations with ASEAN will be effectively controlled by Hanoi.
Recommendations
It is felt that both sides should resist the temptation to continue to use the SCS/ES dispute
as a tool to incite domestic nationalism for their own political gains. Rather, what is needed by
64
Cooperation for Regional Security and Development”, Hanoi, 26-28 November 2009.
Craig Jeffries 32
both China and Vietnam is a refocus on engagement that is more than just fluffy rhetoric and
empty gestures, but rather a serious and genuine dialogue, producing realistic goals and practical
solutions to the dispute. Furthermore, both states must continue to enhance and build upon the
DOC formula to ensure that is fair and equal to all sides—not just Beijing and Hanoi.
Both states also need to agree not to take unilateral actions that risk escalation in the
SCS/ES, as well as punish citizens who undertake actions that seek to inflame the situation.
Finally, both China and Vietnam must be willing to utilize existing institutions and mechanisms
to solve the dispute, and refrain from creating overlapping conferences, dialogues, roundtables
and workshops that do nothing but seek to delay and hamper substantial progress—and are seen
as nothing more than window dressing.
Specifically, Beijing needs to realize that in order for its neighbors to truly be convinced
of its “peaceful rise”, it needs to stop throwing its weight around, both diplomatic and militarily
with regard to the SCS dispute. The best way for China to do this would be for it to enter into a
multilateral dialogue with all SCS claimants.
Conversely, Hanoi must accept that its current maritime claims are unrealistic; and that
no matter how much international support it receives it will still be at the mercy of its more
powerful northern neighbor. Therefore, Vietnam first has to adjust its claims, followed by entry
into an authentic dialogue with both China and other claimants to discuss what steps are needed
to truly achieve the shared peace and prosperity in the ES, which all sides claim to want.
Appendix A: Mechanisms employed be CCP
China's use of strategic tools during SCS dispute (2007-2009)

Type of tools employed Target Areas
Year Persuasion Reward Punishment Total Domestic (Politics) Diplomatic Economic Military Total *
2007 4 0 1 5 1 2 0 2 5
(%) 0.8 0 0.2 1 0.2 0.4 0 0.4 1
2008 5 2 3 10 1 5 5 1 12
(%) 0.50 0.20 0.3 1 0.08 0.42 0.42 0.08 1
2009 5 2 5 12 2 5 3 3 13
(%) 0.42 0.17 0.42 1 0.15 0.38 0.23 0.23 1
Total 14 4 9 27 4 12 8 6 30
(%) 0.52 0.15 0.33 1 0.13 0.40 0.27 0.20 1
*Some actions were identified as being directed at more than one target
Appendix B: Mechanisms employed by VCP
Vietnam's use of strategic tools during SCS dispute (2007-2009)

Type of tools employed Target Areas
Year Persuasion Reward Punishment Total Domestic (Politics) Diplomatic Economic Military Total*
2007 6 0 1 7 4 5 0 0 9
(%) 0.86 0 0.14 1 0.44 0.56 0 0 1
2008 3 2 0 5 2 2 1 0 5
(%) 0.6 0.4 0 1 0.4 0.4 0.2 0 1
2009 7 2 1 10 3 8 1 0 12
(%) 0.70 0.20 0.10 1 0.25 0.67 0.08 0 1
Total 16 4 2 22 9 15 2 0 26
(%) 0.73 0.18 0.09 1 0.35 0.58 0.08 0 1
*Some actions were identified as being directed at more than one target
Abstract:
This paper will attempt to analyze the evolution of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship with regard
to the South China Sea (SCS) /East Sea (ES) dispute. Utilizing the strategic choice approach this
paper shows—using recent developments from 2007 to 2009—the extent of which both China
and Vietnam‟s capabilities and resolve influence each state‟s actions, beliefs, and perceptions
concerning overlapping maritime claims. Finally, this paper will gauge the likeliness of certain
outcomes in the SCS/ES dispute, concluding with brief policy recommendations.
Craig Jeffries 34
Reference Notes
A copy of Vietnam and Malaysia‟s joint proposal can be found at:

http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission
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A copy of Vietnam‟s partial proposal can be found at:

http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submissionvnm_37_2009.htm.
A copy of China‟s response can be found at:

http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm.
A copy of Vietnam‟s reply to China can be found at:

http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/vnm_chn_2009re_mys.
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The South China Sea/East Sea Dispute: A Strategic Choice Analysis of The Dispute Between Viet Nam and China From A Period of Escalating Tensions (2007-09)

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The South China Sea/East Sea Dispute: A Strategic Choice Analysis of The Dispute Between Viet Nam and China From A Period of Escalating Tensions (2007-09)

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The South China Sea/East Sea

Briefing on Spratly and Paracel Archipelagoes:

Historical Sketch of Bilateral SCS/ES Dispute

Analyzing actions, Gauging Preferences and Predicting Outcomes

Uncovering China’s Preferences and Strategy in the South China Sea:

Rational Choice Application for China in the SCS Dispute

Who are they? And what are they trying to maximize?

What are the CCP’s Capabilities?

As a veto-wielding permanent member on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC),

Strategic Mechanisms Employed by the CCP (2007-2009)

Discernable Strategic Shifts and Implications for Resolve

Uncovering Vietnam’s Preferences and Strategy in the East Sea:

Rational Choice Application for Vietnam in the ES Dispute

Who are they? And what are they trying to maximize?

What are the VCP’s Capabilities?

What is the Strength of the VCP’s Resolve Surrounding the ES dispute?

Strategic Mechanisms Employed by the VCP (2007-2009)

Yet, even as Hanoi seemed to be stepping up pressure—albeit diplomatically— on

The following month, foreign ministry spokesman Lê Dũng, bluntly responding to

Discernable Strategic Shifts and Implications for Resolve

Additionally, focusing on areas in which Hanoi directed ES actions, it is again no surprise

Recognizing that it is at a several capability disadvantage relative to its Chinese

The Future of the Dispute

Appendix A: Mechanisms employed be CCP

China's use of strategic tools during SCS dispute (2007-2009)

Appendix B: Mechanisms employed by VCP

Vietnam's use of strategic tools during SCS dispute (2007-2009)

A copy of Vietnam and Malaysia‟s joint proposal can be found at:

A copy of Vietnam‟s partial proposal can be found at:

A copy of China‟s response can be found at:

A copy of Vietnam‟s reply to China can be found at:

Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook 2009”,

Energy Information Administration: United States Department of Energy,“South China Sea

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Historical Evidence To

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “China-Vietnam Joint

Nhân Dân, “Vietnam Protests China‟s Establishment of Authority on its Islands”, 17

Xinhua, “China Proposes to Move on with Joint Development Formula in SCS”, 22

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