A Free Press in South Korea: Temporary Phenomenon or Permanent Fixture?

Author(s): Kyu Ho Youm and Michael B. Salwen

Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Mar., 1990), pp. 312-325
Published by: University of California Press
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A FREE PRESS IN SOUTH KOREA
TemporaryPhenomenon or
Permanent Fixture?

Kyu Ho Youm and Michael B. Salwen

South Korea, which has a history of strongman rule

under authoritarian regimes since its founding in 1948, is flush with the
hope that democracy has at last arrived. This sanguine mood stems from
the democratic policies initiated by President Roh Tae Woo and from a
number of recent political reforms aimed at breaking what has been called
Korea's "cycle of authoritarian rule."' Roh, while chairman of the ruling
Democratic Justice Party (DJP) and a presidential candidate, ushered in
an era of open politics with a package of democratic reforms in his June
29, 1987, declaration, issued at a time of worsening antigovernment dem-
onstrations. Among his proposed reforms was recognition of a free press
with no governmental interference.
There is no question that a number of positive changes subsequently
have taken place in South Korean press-government relations. Some of
these have involved structural changes in the media industry; others have
been institutional, involving sociopolitical and legal systems affecting the
Korean press. As the International Press Institute (IPI) reported in late
1988, "visible and invisible restrictions imposed on the [Korean] press
have been abolished in favor of a greater freedom of information and the
right of the people to know has been guaranteed. It is worth asking,
however, whether these changes are firmly entrenched in the South Ko-
rean sociopolitical system and can withstand future political turmoil,
should turmoil occur. The brief historical survey of the South Korean

Kyu Ho Youm and Michael B. Salwen are Assistant Professors in

the School of Communication, University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida.
? 1990 by The Regents of the University of California

1. Sung-joo Han, "South Korea: Politics in Transition," in Democracy in Developing

Countries: Asia, Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds. (Boulder,
Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), p. 292.
2. "World Press Freedom Review," IPI Report, December 1988, p. 26.

312
 KYU HO YOUM AND MICHAEL B. SALWEN 313
press that follows leaves one to ponder Gastil's observation that "the liber-
alizations that occur from time to time in authoritarian or totalitarian
states, only to be followed by reinvigorated repressions, are best under-
stood as 'grants' of political favor rather than acceptance of political or
civil rights."3
This article considers whether the current state of press freedom under
President Roh is a temporary phenomenon in the traditionally volatile
body politic of South Korea or a permanent fixture of a newly burgeoning
Korean democracy. Three questions will be pursued. First, what socio-
political and legal reforms have been introduced to expand press freedom
since Roh's June 1987 declaration; second, how has the press changed as a
result of these sociopolitical and legal reforms; and finally, what structural
and institutional changes in the press have put it on a more solid footing as
the Fourth Estate of a "democratic" South Korea?

A Troubled Press: 1948-1987

Koreans were first exposed to the Western tradition of press freedom dur-
ing 1945-48 under the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea follow-
ing World War II. But while it introduced the libertarian concept of press
freedom, the USAMGIK was forced to retrench from its own stated prin-
ciples and impose several authoritarian measures, including censorship of
the communist press. The First Republic under Syngman Rhee, estab-
lished in 1948, guaranteed freedom of expression as one of South Korea's
basic constitutional rights and during the first half of Rhee's 12-year rule,
considerable press freedom was allowed. But as the sociopolitical strains
on his presidency increased in the late 1950s, Rhee became more authori-
tarian in his relationship with the press. Indeed, he went so far as to enact
the repressive National Security Act and closed the then leading opposi-
tion paper, Kyunghyang Shinmun. The Rhee regime ended during the
popular student uprising of April 1960 and was replaced by a parliamen-
tary system under Premier Chang Myon. Democracy flourished and the
press under Chang was accorded a degree of freedom usually found in the
Western democracies. This, however, did not continue for long; Chang
was overthrown in a military coup led by General Park Chung Hee in
1961.
Park, who ruled South Korea from 1961 until his assassination in 1979,
was obsessed with modernizing the country, and he would not tolerate a
critical press challenging his grandiose economic plans for Korean self-
reliance. The coup, in part, was a result of Park's concern with the social

3. Raymond D. Gastil, "The Comparative Survey of Freedom," Freedom at Issue,

January-February 1983, p. 5.
 314 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXX, NO. 3, MARCH 1990

chaos during the Chang regime, for which he believed the free and "cha-
otic" press was at least partially to blame. In a speech before Korean
newspapermen in April 1966, Park warned against attacks on the govern-
ment and urged the press to work with the government in "developing a
constructive attitude with which to meet the demands of the new age and
the new situation."4 To accomplish his economic development goals, Park
often mobilized the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) to con-
duct extralegal activities, and he invoked a series of emergency decrees to
muzzle the press.
After Park was assassinated in October 1979, the press went through a
short period of liberalization until General Chun Doo Hwan, backed by
the army, consolidated his takeover of the civilian government in May
1980. Chun carried out an unprecedented "purification campaign" against
the press, forcing a sweeping structural reorganization of the mass media.
As in the Park era, suppression of the press was a crucial element of polit-
ical power and Chun established systematic control of the news media
through daily "press guidelines," some very specific as, for example, di-
recting the press to label antigovernment protesters as "procommunist."
One observer wrote in 1986 that "the hopeless situation facing the Korean
press at present will remain in the future unless there is a sweeping change
in the Korean socio-political and legal system. Unfortunately, the chances
for change are not good as long as President Chun is in power."5

Sociopolitical and Legal

Reforms in Korea
The new South Korean Constitution, as revised in October 1987, explicitly
prohibits censorship of speech and the press while guaranteeing freedom of
expression, which should be a step toward strengthening press freedom in
South Korea. On the other hand, the new Constitution, like its predeces-
sor of 1980, provides that standards concerning facilities of news services,
broadcasting stations, and newspapers should be statutorily set.
In his June 1987 declaration, Roh noted the restrictive impact on the
press of the Basic Press Act of 1980 and suggested that it should
"promptly be either extensively revised or abolished and replaced by a dif-
ferent law."6 The act was repealed in November 1987 and replaced by the

4. Shin Bum Shik, comp., Major Speeches by Korea's Park Chung Hee (Seoul: Hollym
Corporation, 1970), p. 99.
5. Kyu Ho Youm, "Press Freedom Under Constraints: The Case of South Korea," Asian
Survey 26 (August 1986), p. 982.
6. "Special Declaration by the Chairman of the Democratic Justice Party Roh Tae Woo,"
in Working a Miracle: Sweeping Democratic Reforms (Seoul: Korean Overseas Information
Service, 1987), p. 21.
 KYU HO YOUM AND MICHAEL B. SALWEN 315
Act on Registration of Periodicals and the Broadcast Act, legislating im-
provements in several respects. Under the new periodicals law, the Minis-
try of Culture and Information (MOCI) must get a court order to revoke
the registration of a periodical. Among the grounds for revocation are
registration obtained "by deceit or other unlawful means" and a finding
that the publication "repeatedly and flagrantly" infringes the original
objectives of the publication at the time of registration.7 However, the
ministry is still authorized to suspend publication of a newspaper for three
to six months if it violates any of the statutory provisions for suspension.
The registration process also is less subject to arbitrarydecision under the
new press law, which states unambiguously that "when a periodical is reg-
istered [in accordance with the statutory requirements], the [MOCI] shall
promptly deliver a certificate of registration" (emphasis added).8 Accord-
ingly, anyone who meets the registration requirementsis legally allowed to
start a print media business. But the "facilities requirements"in the new
law-for example, general daily newspapers must be equipped with rotary
presses capable of printing at least 20,000 copies of a minimum four-page
tabloid per hour-result in exclusion of financially weak publications, as
did the identical provision of the old press act.
The legislative reforms initiated by the Roh administration led to revi-
sion of the Criminal Code in late 1988, abolishing Article 104-2, Crime of
Slander Against the State, which provided a penalty of up to seven years
imprisonment for a Korean national who defamed the state and its consti-
tutional institutions to the foreign press in and outside of Korea. Even
though the number of criminal convictions under the provision was low
compared with other indirect press laws, Article 104-2 was an effective
weapon for Park and Chun in punishing Koreans for expressing anti-
government sentiments to foreign journalists; indeed, the Supreme Court
of Korea ruled in 1983 that any and all acts of defamation against the state
would violate the code. A more widely known case involving the provision
was precipitated by a New York Times interview, published August 2,
1987, with a leading Korean student dissident who denounced the violent
crackdown on antigovernment demonstrations, comparing the South Ko-
rean government to Hitler's Germany. The student was arrested for slan-
dering the state. Several similar instances vividly illustrate the repressive
effect of the seditious libel provision upon freedom of the press, and its
abolition represents another positive development in the South Korean

7. Act on Registration of Periodicals, Law No. 3979 (1987), Art. 12(2), English translation
in The Korean Press 1989 (Seoul: Korean Press Institute, 1989), pp. 82-92.
8. Ibid., Art. 7(3).
 316 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXX, NO. 3, MARCH 1990

government's avowed intention to "stimulate the constructive criticism of

the public" as a foundation for democratic progress.9
Two American observers pointed out that Koreans should be aware of
the "indispensabilityof institutional reforms made possible, but not guar-
anteed, by the new constitution" to transform their country from a dicta-
torship to a democracy.10 Among the institutional reforms affecting press
freedom have been those that restructure the government through restora-
tion of the checks-and-balances system among the executive branch, the
National Assembly, and the courts, which reduce the likelihood of arbi-
trary or grossly unjust decisions.
In connection with the separation of powers principle in a functioning
democracy, one journalism scholar noted the relationship between press
freedom and the independence of courts thus: "[A] nation's press system
is free, not necessarily because of constitutional guarantee . . . but because
an unintimidated judiciary protects the press against government en-
croachment."1 I In this context, it should be noted that the Korean courts
have recently made visible efforts to ensure that justice is guaranteed in
South Korea's emerging democracy, the result of an opposition-dominated
National Assembly and a more outspoken press. The National Assembly
confirmed Lee Ii Kyu, widely known as a principled jurist, as the Chief
Justice of Korea after rejecting the government's first nominee in the wake
of a "judicial crisis" involving vocal demands by more than 300 judges for
judicial independence and a restructuringof the Supreme Court. The Ko-
rean press devoted extensive coverage to the events and to the judiciary's
demands.
Judicial independence in South Korea is becoming more evident. Illus-
trative of the change is the increasing invocation by the courts of the right
of judicial review. In November 1988 the Supreme Court ruled that por-
tions of the Act for the Protection of Society violated the Constitution and
referred the matter to the Constitution Court for final determination. The
Supreme Court's ruling marked the first time since 1972 that it had struck
down any laws. More significantly, the court questioned the validity of the
Act for the Protection of Society, which had been held constitutional by
the courts nine times since it was enacted in 1980. One month after the
Supreme Court ruling, the Seoul Court of Appeals ruled that Article 3 of

9. June 29 Declaration and Legislative Reforms (Seoul: Legislative Administration

Agency, 1989), p. 67.
10. James M. West and Edward J. Baker, "The 1987 Constitutional Reforms in South
Korea: Electoral Processes and Judicial Independence,"Harvard Human Rights Yearbook1
(Spring 1988), p. 157.
11. Dennis L. Wilcox, "Black African Press," in Press Control Around the World, Jane
Leftwich Curry and Joan R. Dassin, eds. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 222.
 KYU HO YOUM AND MICHAEL B. SALWEN 317
the Act on Assembly and Demonstration was unconstitutionally vague
and overbroad in that it prohibits "assembly or demonstration which shall
be greatly feared to cause social unrest."12 This was further unmistakable
testimony to the increasing independence of the Korean courts; in the past,
laws on political rights or civil liberties had almost never been subject to
judicial challenge.13
In another case pointing to the gradual restoration of judicial authority,
a military court in October 1988 convicted military officers accused of as-
saulting a newspaper editor for publishing a negative story about the Ko-
rean military. The fact that a military court ruled against military officers
was seen as a major breakthrough. The case involved publication of a
newspaper article titled "Military Culture Should Be Eradicated," which
argued that a military culture still pervaded South Korea despite President
Roh's promises for democratic reforms. The military court held that the
assault on the newspaper's editor caused a social controversy and under-
mined the trust and prestige of the military among the people. 14
In the context of a more independent judiciary and an opposition-domi-
nated National Assembly acting as a balance against the executive branch,
it is no wonder that the press control mechanisms of the Chun regime have
been abolished or reformed by Roh. The Bureau of Information Policy
(BIP), which during Chun's rule was in charge of issuing numerous daily
press guidelines, has been abolished and no more coercive instructions are
being issued to the press as to what should and should not be reported.
The BIP's demise also led to the removal from the news media of govern-
ment agents who were in charge of overseeing press activities. Finally, the
press card system, which only permitted journalists with professional ac-
creditation from the government to be employed in the news media, was
eliminated.

New Issues in an Improving Atmosphere

Since mid-1987, when the South Korean government entered a heady pe-
riod of Korean-style glasnost, the press has stretched the limits of freedom.
As a result, news coverage of previously taboo subjects has now become
routine. There is little restriction upon media coverage of antigovernrment
activities, let alone open criticism of President Roh and his party. Most
illustrative of the exercise of press freedom was the live TV coverage in
1988 of the National Assembly hearings on the irregularities of the Fifth

12. Hankuk Ilbo (U.S. edition), December 29, 1989.

13. Dae-Kyu Yoon, "Law and Political Authority: A Study on the Rule of Law in Ko-
rea," Ph.D. dissertation (Seattle, Wash.: University of Washington, 1987), p. 290.
14. Hankuk Ilbo (U.S. edition), October 12, 1988.
 318 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXX, NO. 3, MARCH 1990

Republic, enquiring into the corruption and wrongdoing of the Chun ad-
ministration.
The liberalization under Roh has led the Korean news media to trans-
form itself from a docile mouthpiece to an increasingly aggressive entity in
line with the changing sociopolitics of South Korea. In fact, change in the
degree of press freedom is occurring at such a dramatic pace as to make
some people wary of possible negative ramifications. The bolder, more en-
terprising news coverage, however, is far from being a complete picture of
the changed status of the South Korean media. The explosive expansion of
the media industry is another sweeping departure from the past, especially
in light of the fact that not a single general interest daily newspaper was
registered during the entire term of the Chun administration.15 The rapid
increase in the number of newspapers in 1988 illustrates the government's
view of the press in the "era of democracy." By the end of April 1989, a
total of 65 daily newspapers were being published in South Korea, more
than a 100% increase since the enactment of the new press law in late
1987. The sharp increase in the number of daily newspapersis only part of
the overall astonishing expansion of the print media. Since June 1987,
when Roh proposed expanded press freedom, 3,728 periodicals have been
registered with the MOCI for publication, an increase of 1,492.16 Weekly
and monthly periodicals have been registered as well as daily papers. In
the past, few applicants tried to register publications because they expected
to be rejected, but now that the new press law requires the MOCI to ap-
prove registrations as long as applicants satisfy the basic statutory require-
ments, most of the procedural as well as political obstacles have been
lifted.
One of the new daily newspapers,Han-kyoreh, deserves particular atten-
tion because it is regarded as a test case of Roh's willingness to accept
freedom of the press as indispensable to the new democratic politics of
South Korea. The paper, which amassed its original capital of $7 million
from donations during a nationwide campaign, was founded in December
1987 by a group of dissident journalists to rectify the notion that the Ko-
rean press "has become [the] private possession of a few people or institu-

15. In June 1985 the Chun administration approved the registration of the Daily Sports
Seoul as a "special daily newspaper" to concentrate on sports, leisure, and culture in prepara-
tion for the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympics in Seoul. Throughout its seven-year
rule, however, the Chun regime would not register a new "general daily newspaper," main-
taining its basic press policy of structurally minimizing critical media coverage of the govern-
ment. The Basic Press Act distinguished a general from a special daily newspaper in that the
former would deal primarily with news of sociopolitical interest, while the latter would be
limited to apolitical topics such as sports, religion, science, etc.
16. Han-kyoreh Shinmun (U.S. edition), May 19, 1989.
 KYU HO YOUM AND MICHAEL B. SALWEN 319
tional journalism under the control of political power." 17 The first issue of
the paper was published on May 15, 1988, after a lengthy delay in the
government's issuance of its registration certificate. The Han-kyoreh de-
clared in its code of ethics that it will "serve as a critic of injustice and
iniquity and investigate the human rights violations by the political force."
Besides its center-left editorial stance on socioeconomic and political is-
sues, the newspaper is distinctive from others in several respects: it uses
Hangul (Korean alphabet) instead of the mixture of Chinese characters
with the Korean alphabet that is still prevalent in most daily papers; it
strictly prohibits "envelope journalism," the practice of receiving payment
for publishing or withholding stories, still openly practiced by a number of
Korean journalists; and to demonstrate its structural commitment to de-
fending human rights and the press, the paper maintains "human rights"
and "mass media" departments. As the "most critical above-ground"
newspaper in Korea, the Han-kyoreh had a circulation of 440,000 as of
June 1989, and is emerging rapidly as a progressive alternative to the
largely conservative newspapers that have refrained from criticizing au-
thority.
The recent restructuring of the print media is the most visible outcome
of Roh's press policy, but equally important is the so-called "internal de-
mocratization" of the Korean press itself. 18 An increasing number of Ko-
rean newspapers recognize that press freedom carries little meaningful
value unless it is supported by independence of editorial decision making
from both internal and external pressures. To ensure separation between
the editorial department and management, the Han-kyoreh and many
other newspapers have reporters directly involved in. deciding on the over-
all editorial policy of their newspapers, with managing editors elected by
reporters or selected from those recommended by them. The stronger
voice of the editorial departments of an increasing number of South Ko-
rean newspapers results from reactivated labor unions of journalists. The
new status of the media unions is in stark contrast to the persecution of
labor unions during the Park and Chun regimes.
Notwithstanding the positive developments in the Korean press since
mid-1987, a number of issues have arisen. Some are far from new as long
dormant issues have come out into the open; others are, to a large extent,

17. Ibid., May 15, 1988.

18. Media scholar John Merrill, in his discussion of "journalistic freedom" as distin-
guished from "press freedom," states that "journalistic freedom concerns a relationship be-
tween the journalists working for a news medium and the executives and editors of that news
medium, while "press freedom concerns a relationship between the press and the govern-
ment." John C. Merrill, The Dialectic in Journalism (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State
University, 1989), pp. 34-35.
 320 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXX, NO. 3, MARCH 1990

new in that they were rarely a source of concern to the press. The former
relate to increasing violence by nongovernmental organizations against
certain journalists and publications, and the corrupt practices of some
journalists. The latter stem from a variety of pressures on the press ex-
erted by sociopolitical groups not directly connected with the ruling au-
thorities.
In March 1989 a group of disabled veterans forcefully entered the build-
ing of Kukje Shinmun, a provincial daily, and injured 20 of its employees
after the paper reported that the Pusan Public Transportation Corporation
had awarded several profitable projects to organizations in an arbitrary
fashion reminiscent of the Fifth Republic. The veterans were upset by the
story because their veterans village had a contract with the corporation.
The physical violence was deplored by the Korean Journalists Association
as "an unprecedented intrusion of press freedom."19 Korean journalists
also have been increasingly subject to attacks by the riot police while cov-
ering numerous antigovernment or labor-relateddemonstrations. Another
issue facing the freer Korean press is the growing incidence of "envelope
journalism." According to a recent Korean Press Institute survey of 700
journalists on the question of their professional ethics, 93% said they re-
ceived chonji, or monetary gifts, from their news sources.20 Of course,
chonji journalism is far from new, but what is noteworthy today is that the
public has begun to voice concern about an increasingly blatant abuse of
press freedom in total disregard of press responsibility.21 Consequently,
the government has taken action to deal with the illegal practice; for exam-
ple, in March 1989 the Seoul prosecutor's office arrested several reporters
for extorting about $40,000 from more than 20 chemical factory owners in
exchange for promising not to expose their alleged violations of an anti-
pollution law.
Among the new pressures facing the Korean press is that exerted by
public interest organizations with no direct connection to the government.
One government official was quoted as saying that while the Korean press
"is now free from the coercive pressure of the government . .. it is not free
from the pressure of a particular political organization or interest group.

19. Hankuk Ilbo (U.S. edition), March 6, 1989.

20. Han-kyoreh Shinmun (U.S. edition), November 4, 1989; also Choo Uhn Kim, "Let's
Not Accept Chonji," Wolgan Chosun, June 1989, p. 447. In a paper, Youngchul Yoon esti-
mated that typical chonji would range from $100-200 ("Political Transition and Press Re-
form in South Korea," presented at the International Communication Association
conference, San Francisco, May 1989, p. 27, n.18).
21. Pseudo-journalistsas Seen ThroughActual Cases (Seoul: Korean Ministry of Culture
and Information, 1989), pp. 6-7 (noting public concern about the increasing "violence of
pseudo-journalists" and governmental action to address the concern). An editorial on the
pseudo-journalistcontroversy is in Hankuk Ilbo (U.S. edition), February 10, 1989.
 KYU HO YOUM AND MICHAEL B. SALWEN 321
The Korean press is fiercely aggressive in criticizing President Roh Tae
Woo and his government. But it is passive in its criticism of the two
Kims."22 In a similar vein, an opposition national assemblyman deplored
the "violent" pressure of special interest groups and political organizations
on the Korean news media, disrupting autonomous news reporting.23
Since South Korea has a long history of a timid press that rarely reported
on controversial social and political issues, these groups and organizations
react angrily to a suddenly assertive press.
The recent dispute between the liberal opposition Party for Peace and
Democracy (PPD) and the Chosun Ilbo is a case in point. The unparal-
leled tit-for-tat between the PPD and the country's largest daily newspa-
per, which even attracted attention from foreign media, resulted from
publication of a story in Choogan Chosun, a news weekly owned by
Chosun Ilbo. The weekly reported that during a European tour, several
PPD assemblymen, accompanying the party president, Kim Dae Jung, be-
haved in a manner beneath their dignity. Eight of the lawmakers filed a
libel complaint with the Seoul district prosecutor's office, charging that the
article "disseminated false facts for no justifiable reasons and damaged the
reputational interests" of Kim and the lawmakers. The charge, later
dropped, is a criminal offense in South Korea. In a separate civil suit
against the Chosun Ilbo, the lawmakers sought $12.8 million in damages
and demanded the newspaper publish an apology.24 The PPD did not stop
with legal proceedings, it also launched a boycott of the Chosun Ilbo and
prohibited Chosun reporters from entering PPD headquarters.
The dispute between the most powerful opposition party and the daily
represents a different kind of pressure on the Korean press. Ironically, it
also indicates how authoritarian some self-styled "liberal" opposition lead-
ers are in their views about press freedom. The other leading opposition
leader, Kim Young Sam, in a 1987 statement said he supports press free-
dom "as long as the reporters tell the truth," adding that Korean journal-
ists "would probably need 'guidelines' from any new government to help
them do their job."'25 For a politician who has valiantly striven for free-
dom of the South Korean press for more than 20 years, Kim Young Sam's
remarks sound like Chun defining the parameters of press freedom.

22. Chosun Ilbo (U.S. edition), October 24, 1989.

23. Ibid.
24. Chosun Ilbo, March 9, October 19, 1989; Hankuk Ilbo, March 14, 1989 (all U.S. edi-
tions).
25. Sanford J. Ungar, "Seoul Promises to Loosen News Straitjacket," CPJ Update, July-
August 1987, p. 3.
 322 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXX, NO. 3, MARCH 1990

Further Steps to Institutionalize

a Free Press
There is no denying that the South Korean press has come a long way in
discarding its image as a mouthpiece of government. Now, too, the press
is becoming a more credible alternative to the so-called "groundless rumor
press" that flourished as a source of information before and during Chun's
presidency. Notwithstanding several significant changes since President
Roh took office in 1988, further legislative measures are needed to ensure
that press freedom will become institutionalized and will be maintained
after Roh leaves office. An American journalist recently wrote: "This is a
nation of growing freedom, but not one of laws. It has visions of democ-
racy, but few institutions to guarantee it."26 Of course, as one constitu-
tional law scholar observed, "the press law of a particularcountry is not so
much determined by the existence of a particular type of constitutional
commitment, or by the presence of a special press statute, as by the partic-
ular political philosophy which animates it."27 Nevertheless, a number of
draconian undemocratic statutes and regulations combined with the tradi-
tionally authoritarian political culture have undoubtedly contributed to
constraining press freedom in South Korea, and the repressive laws, which
have long been used by the ruling authorities to legitimize their suppres-
sion of the press, should be abolished or drastically revised.
Among the laws incompatible with the free press principle of a more
democratic South Korea is the National Security Act. It is understandable
that in the unique geopolitical situation on the divided Korean Peninsula a
security law is required to protect the nation against internal and external
threats; the problem is that the law is not necessarily used to protect the
state from such threats. More often than not, it has been employed by past
governments to protect "political security" interests, which in part is re-
lated to the vague language of the law. In defining the activities subject to
it, the act stipulates:
Any personwho has benefitedthe anti-Stateorganizationby way of praising,
encouraging,or siding with or throughother means, the activities of an anti-State
organization,its memberor a personwho had been underinstructionof such
organization,shall be punishedby penal servitudefor not more than seven
years.28

26. Susan Chira, "Korea's Road to Democracy: Paved with Contrary Legacy," New York
Times, March 13, 1989, p. 1.
27. Pnina Lahav, "Conclusion: An Outline for a General Theory of Press Law in Democ-
racy," in Press Law in Modern Democracies, Pnina Lahav, ed. (New York: Longman, 1985),
p. 347.
28. National Security Act, Law No. 3318 (1980), English translation in Laws of the Repub-
lic of Korea, 4th ed. (Seoul: Korean Legal Center, 1983), pp. 3:X-64-X-70.
 KYU HO YOUM AND MICHAEL B. SALWEN 323
Although the government now interprets the "anti-State organization" as
referring to North Korea alone, the vague phrase, "praising, encouraging,
or siding with or through other means," may still provide a legal loophole
for authorities to punish constitutionally protected as well as unprotected
activities. One recent application of the law to the press concerned Lee
Young Hee of the Han-kyoreh editorial staff, who planned to visit North
Korea secretly for purposes of news gathering.29 He was convicted of at-
tempting to escape to North Korea and sentenced to 18 months in prison
with a stay of execution for two years. Another case involved the press
conducting a telephone interview with a South Korean dissident student
who was in North Korea in July 1989 attending the World Festival of
Youth and Students in open defiance of the Seoul government's ban on the
trip. The government stated that such interviews would constitute viola-
tion of the security act. These recent instances of applying or threatening
to apply the security law to the press are ironic in that the government
already has decided to revise the law.
The International Press Institute years ago noted that "the entirely sat-
isfactory law from the point of view of the press is unfortunately the excep-
tion rather than the rule. By and large these [press] laws . . . contain
clauses which are a serious handicap to freedom of expression."30 The
current Korean press law, though somewhat improved over its predeces-
sor, serves as a good example. It still retains registration and facilities
requirements,and these severely regulate press freedom. Making approval
of registrations contingent upon whether a prospective publisher already
possesses the highly expensive printing equipment that is needed, renders
publication opportunities virtually beyond reach for a number of potential
publishers. Although the new press law does not allow the MOCI as much
discretion as the old law did, the ministry is still authorized to suspend
registrationfor three to six months if a publication violates the registration
requirements. All in all, Korean press law is more inclined toward regula-
tion of press freedom than toward protection. The regulatory law obvi-
ously goes contrary to the zeitgeist of a politically advancing Korea.
Indeed, as if to prove that the law is not sufficient for institutionalizing
press freedom in Korea, some 40 public hearings were held in 1988 that
focused on how to improve the press-related laws.31
As Korea steadily moves toward a liberal democracy, the press will ex-
perience a number of changes. The eventual evolution of a free Korean

29. Hankuk Ilbo (U.S. edition), September 29, 1989.

30. IPI, Government Pressures on the Press (Zurich: International Press Institute, 1955), p.
26.
31. "Discussions of Improvement of Press-Related Laws," Shinmun Kwa Bangsong, De-
cember 1988, p. 15.
 324 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXX, NO. 3, MARCH 1990

press may lead to an emergence of an "equal-contender"or "antagonist/

adversary" relationship between the press and government, depending
upon the sociopolitical circumstances. The days in which the South Ko-
rean press served as a "voluntary servant" or a "forced slave" may have
passed,32 and in this context there ought to be a soul-searching examina-
tion of the new press-government relationship. In South Korea, freedom
of the press has been traditionally related to freedomfrom governmental
restraints; this passive notion should now be changed to the positive free-
domfor democratizing Korea.
If the press is to play a positive role by contributing to an informed and
politically active electorate in a democracy, the government should go fur-
ther than abolishing or revising suppressive laws; it should establish insti-
tutional mechanisms for positively enhancing press freedom. Thus, the
freedom of information concept is worth exploring. Indeed, the old Basic
Press Act recognized it as a right of the press, but it was nothing more
than an empty phrase with no practical value because of its several vague
and broad exemptions. Access to information should be the rule rather
than the exception; there should be as few exemptions as possible and,
when needed, they should be specific and justified by the government. The
concept would then carry practical meaning for the press in its role of
providing the public with information beyond that selectively released by
the government. Closely related to the open records concept is access to
sessions of the legislature and other elected bodies, regulatory hearings,
and so on. Obviously, if the press is to serve as a watchdog on behalf of
the public, reporters ought to be guaranteed some degree of access to the
meetings of public bodies. Unfortunately, this has rarely been the case in
South Korea. What is needed is a comprehensive "sunshine" statute with
carefully crafted exceptions, modeled after the open-meetings laws of the
United States.33 Exceptions for closed meetings ought to be statutorily
specified and justified. The adoption of an open meetings law will signifi-
cantly contribute to the development of democratic politics by making the
South Korean government more accessible to people through the press.
If the trend of a feistier Korean press since late 1987 continues, there is
a strong possibility that investigative journalism will emerge in South Ko-
rea. Among the many issues facing potentially enterprising Korean muck-
rakers in the days to come will be how to protect their confidential sources.
One positive approach to dealing with the issue would be to embrace the
shield law concept as more than a sugarcoated phrase, which it was under

32. John C. Merrill and S. Jack Odell, Philosophy and Journalism (New York: Longman,
1983), p. 152.
33. Eric Archer, "Opening the Doors to Government Proceedings: The Citizen as Critic,"
Connecticut Law Review 19 (1989) pp. 561-87.
have protective mechanisms to give reporters the right to protect their
sources, putting the Korean press in a better position to serve the public.

Conclusions
The democratization process launched by President Roh Tae Woo has
brought about a number of significant developments for the traditionally
authoritarian South Korean press. The amended Constitution is more ex-
plicit than its predecessor in guaranteeing press freedom by enumerating
prohibitions against censorship, and the new press legislation is an im-
provement over the repealed Basic Press Act in limiting government au-
thority to revoke registration of a publication. Nevertheless, the law still
retains several restrictive provisions that obviously do not square with a
liberal democracy. The abolition or revision of the repressive press stat-
utes, both direct and indirect, will contribute to promoting a free and in-
dependent press. In the context of the newly defined government-press
relationship, however, the passive concept of press freedom is not suffi-
cient. The press should take an active role in promoting the democratiza-
tion process.
Currently, the Korean press is subject to few direct coercive pressures
from the government. This increasingly salubrious environment largely
stems from the gradual institutionalization of the separation of powers be-
tween the executive branch under Roh, the opposition-dominated National
Assembly, and the now emboldened judiciary. Amid the numerous en-
couraging changes, a new set of issues is emerging with which the press
must deal. These include the mushrooming number of newspapers and
other publications, the unethical practice of "envelope journalism," and
the pressure exerted by special interest groups rather than the government.
Freedom of the press is slowly but steadily becoming institutionalized as
democratization continues in South Korea, and there is a strong indication
that it is being accepted by the government as an important element of
Korean democracy. If the past history of turbulent politics in South Ko-
rea is any guide, however, there is always a possibility that President Roh's
courageous democratic movement may not proceed as smoothly as it
should. But the cautious note of optimism about evolving press freedom is
closely related to Roh's remarkably consistent adherence to his promise to
open a new chapter in South Korea's political history.