German Proliferation

Arizona Debate Institute 2009 1
Russell/Frappier Research Allied Prolif- Germany
Index
Index..........................................................................................................................................1
Shell (1/2)........................................................................................................................................3
Shell (2/2)........................................................................................................................................4
***UNIQUENESS***....................................................................................................................5
Uniqueness: No Prolif....................................................................................................................6
Uniqueness: No Prolif....................................................................................................................7
Uniqueness: US Confidence..........................................................................................................8
***LINKS***.................................................................................................................................9
Link: German Allied Prolif.........................................................................................................10
Link: CTBT / Consult Solvency-................................................................................................11
Link: No First Use (Japan Rearm Link too).............................................................................12
Link: Deterrence-.........................................................................................................................13
I/L: No E/D -> German proliferation.........................................................................................14
I/L: German perception of insecurity -> prolif.........................................................................15
I/L: US withdrawal -> German prolif and Russian War ........................................................16
I/L: Umbrella Key........................................................................................................................17
I/L: Security Guarantee..............................................................................................................18
I/L & Impact: Germany Proliferation.......................................................................................19
***IMPACTS***.........................................................................................................................20
Impact: Proliferation...................................................................................................................21
Impact: Vertical Prolif, Conventional arms, Russian Disarm.................................................22
Impact: German Civil-war..........................................................................................................23
Impact: Alliance Collapse / Mearsheimer indict-.....................................................................24
***EXT***...................................................................................................................................25
C/P: NATO readiness (TNW’s)..................................................................................................26
A2: German Peace Movements...................................................................................................27
A2: “Germans hate nukes”.........................................................................................................28
A2: European Security Now.......................................................................................................29
A2: German Companies will sell Nuclear Tech........................................................................30
***AFF ANSWERS***...............................................................................................................31
Non-Unique: Deterrence Low.....................................................................................................32
No Link: nukes not needed for deterrence................................................................................33
No Link: Germany won’t rearm................................................................................................34

No Link: CTBT............................................................................................................................35
No Link: No First Use..................................................................................................................36
No Link: De-alert.........................................................................................................................37
No Link: no umbrella..................................................................................................................38
No I/L: Germany won’t pursue nukes.......................................................................................39
No I/L: Iran Prolif........................................................................................................................40
No I/L: Don’t need umbrella.......................................................................................................41
Link Turn: Disarm......................................................................................................................42
Link Turn: German Relations....................................................................................................43
Link Turn: German Relations....................................................................................................45
Link Turn: NFU...........................................................................................................................46
Link Turn: Terrorism.................................................................................................................47
Link Turn: TNWs........................................................................................................................48
Link Turn: Proliferation.............................................................................................................49
Link Turn: Terrorism ................................................................................................................50
Shell (1/2)
Uniqueness- German security is due to American nuclear umbrella- not proliferating now
Rozoff 07/19/09 (Rick Rozoff has been involved in anti-war and anti-interventionist work in various capacities for forty years,
“Germany And NATO's Nuclear Nexus”, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=14437, AD: 7/30/09) BS
The nation has the third largest military budget of all European states, only surpassed by Britain and France. Germany's military
spending is larger than Russia's, for example, even after German spending dropped and Russian increased last year. The numbers were
$46.8 and $40 billion, respectively.It also has the third largest army of any exclusively European state (Russia and Turkey excluded
from this category) with some quarter of a million troops. Though not itself a nuclear power, Germany hosts an
undisclosed (for apparent reasons) number of the estimated 350-480 US nuclear warheads deployed in
Europe to this day under NATO arrangements.According to one report of two years ago "At least 20 US atomic
warheads are reportedly still deployed underground at the German air base in thesouthwestern town of Buechel, where they can be
mounted on German Tornado fighter planes...." [1]According to a statement of the opposition Left Party, an additional 130 US warheads
may be stored at the Ramstein Air Base, headquarters for the United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) and also a North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) installation. The same report adds "German air force pilots headquartered in Buechel will be ordered to
drop nuclear bombs in case of a military attack or war." [2]Regarding Germany's unabashed housing of nuclear weapons, the Director of
NATO's Nuclear Policy Section Guy Roberts said in 2007 that "Each decision in this field is up to national sovereignty. Each nation is
free to decide whether or not it wants to actively participate in the joint management of nuclear devices." [3]Last year German
government spokesman Ulrich Wilhelm made a statement that didn't receive much coverage in the
international news, to wit "For the foreseeable future ... we remain of the view that a deterring
military capacity includes not only conventional capacity but also nuclear components."There is a
NATO policy framework for the presence of US nuclear weapons in Europe. But the security details
and the handling of those weapons are a matter of bilateral arrangements." [4]For bilateral, one is to
understand the United States which placed the nuclear weapons and Germany which stores them and would deliver them if ordered to by
the US and NATO. Among the American nuclear arms in Europe are 200-350 air-launched B-61 bombs stored in air bases in Germany,
Turkey, Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands. [5]Last year an internal U.S. Air Force report, The Blue Ribbon Review of Nuclear
Weapons Policies and Procedures, "recommended that American nuclear assets in Europe be 'consolidated,' which analysts interpret as a
recommendation to move the bombs to NATO bases under 'U.S. wings,' meaning American bases in Europe."The news source cited
above also revealed that "Although technically owned by the U.S., nuclear bombs stored at NATO bases are designed to be delivered by
planes from the host country." [6] If the deployment of nuclear arms at US and NATO air bases in Europe wasn't alarming enough, in
January of 2006 former German Defense Minister Rupert Scholz was quoted as stating "Germany needed to ponder building its own
nuclear deterrence system."
Link- Lack of secure US nuclear umbrella forces Germany to get nuclear weapons-
Campbell 4 (Kurt M. Campbell, Chief Executive Officer and Co-Founder of the Center for a New American
Security; Robert J. Einhorn, Mitchell Reiss 2004 “The nuclear tipping point Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear
Choices” p. 204) BT
To be sure, some observers have speculated that Germany would reconsider its nuclear renunciation if
the US nuclear umbrella were to be withdrawn. Germany still shelters under US and NATO nuclear
guarantees - whatever the real significance of those guarantees under current conditions. In theory, were
US-German policy divisions to increase greatly or the United States to withdraw wholly from NATO and
its commitments to the security of its European allies, there could be pressure on Germany to reconsider
its non-nuclear position, particularly if Russia were somehow to reemerge as a threat in such a context.
Some observers have indeed argued that in the highly unlikely event that United States were to withdraw
from the continent and Germany was no longer able to depend on the American nuclear umbrella, it
would seek nuclear guarantees from the European nuclear allies or might even seek its own nuclear
weapons if it felt threatened.
Shell (2/2)
Impact- Nuclear parity is impossible- German proliferation would spiral into global
conflagration-
Muller, 2000 (Harald- s director of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt in Germany and a professor of
international relations at Frankfurt University . Nuclear Weapons and German Interests: An Attempt at Redefinition.
Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. PRIF-Report No. 55/2000 ONLINE.
http://www.hsfk.de/downloads/prifrep55.pdf DA: 7-31.) [mjc]
Any country which, like Germany, has decided, after careful consideration, to forgo
nuclear weapons, has an interest in ensuring that its status is not adversely affected by this
decision. For this reason alone, it must work to ensure that as many states as possible adopt
the same stance - otherwise, it will be almost impossible to deal with the problem of
discrimination. This in itself means that German renunciation of nuclear weapons and the
German interest in global non-proliferation are two sides of the same coin.
In addition, however, prevailing opinion in the international academic and political debate
assumes that there is no way of reliably universalizing nuclear deterrence as a security
system. On the contrary, depending on the specific conditions underlying the disputes
into which nuclear weapons are introduced, such weapons can aggravate the conflict or
lead to escalation; nor can their actual use be excluded - with horrendous consequences.
Paradoxically, nuclear proliferation has less impact on the parameters of the international
distribution of power than on the parameters of global security.39 The United States would
still be a superpower even if it did away with nuclear weapons. The nuclear capabilities of
North Korea and Pakistan cannot secure these countries a higher status; and Japan and
Germany have become influential by virtue not of their nuclear but of their economic
power. On the other hand, international security is seriously compromised by the danger of
nuclear wars, wherever they occur. Even if such conflicts were by nature regional in kind -
centered in South Asia, for example - their impact on security would be global. The
proliferation of nuclear weapons increases the risk of conflicts being played out by nuclear
means. Hence, for genuine reasons of security, Germany necessarily has an interest in
nonproliferation.
***UNIQUENESS***
Uniqueness: No Prolif
Germany currently wants disarmament
DDP News 9 (“Germany's foreign minister hails Obama's nuclear non-proliferation move” DDP News, April 7, 2009. Via l/n AD:
7/30/09) DCR
US President Obama's promise of a "nuclear weapons free world" has raised great hopes, also in
Germany. Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier (SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany]) said in Berlin on
Monday [6 April] that the window of history "has once again been opened up." The Greens and The Left,
too, welcomed Obama's initiative and, first, called for the removal of US nuclear weapons from Europe. The United States
and Russia play a key role in disarmament. Steinmeier stressed that a first important signal on the way towards a nuclear weapons free
world was a new bilateral treaty between the two "most important possessors of nuclear weapons." He hoped that the negotiations would
be finalized by the end of the year. The Greens called on the Federal Government to present its own proposals
for nuclear disarmament as quickly as possible. The summit meetings of last week [30 March -3 April] had strengthened
the impression that the German Federal Government, but also the European Union had "decided to hibernate," said Greens Chairman
Cem Ozdemir. They should "accept Obama's extended hand and not leave him out in the cold." A first step would be the withdrawal of
nuclear weapons from Rhineland-Palatinate. "We want a world free of any kind of nuclear weapons," the Greens chief stressed.
Germany is pursing disarmament and fast international non-proliferation treaties.
Indo-Asian News Service 7/9 (“India, Germany discuss nuclear disarmament” New Delhi. July 9, 2009. Lexis AD 7/29/09) DCR
India and Germany Thursday held talks on non-proliferation issues and underlined their commitment
to nuclear disarmament, officials said here. Germany's Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control
Peter Gottwald met Vivek Katju, Special Secretary (Political and International Organisations) in the external affairs ministry, and
held talks on a range of nuclear issues. The talks took place against the backdrop of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in May 2010 and multilateral efforts, involving Germany, EU and
its NATO partners, to speed up the conclusion of an international arms control treaty. Besides issues relating to
arms control, the Iranian nuclear issue and enforcement of the UN Security Council resolutions on North Korea also figured prominently
in the discussions. Katju reiterated India's position on the need for universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable nuclear disarmament, but
reiterated New Delhi's opposition to signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). India believes that the NPT is discriminatory
and tends to divide the world into the nuclear haves and have-nots. Gottwald, the first high-ranking German official to visit India during
the second tenure of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, held talks with Deputy National Security Adviser Shekhar Dutt Wednesday.
Gottwald arrived here on a two-day visit Wednesday. Germany backed global consensus for India in the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG) last year enabled the resumption of international nuclear trade with New Delhi. "Germany pursues a balanced
approach aimed at both enhancing and developing the three pillars of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) -
non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy,' the German embassy said
here.
Uniqueness: No Prolif
Germany is committed to non-proliferation efforts in the squo
Reuters 07/10/09 (“India an important partner in non-proliferation, says Germany’s Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms
Control”, http://www.german-info.com/press_shownews.php?pid=1325, AD: 7/30/09) BS
GIC: India has professed the philosophy of peace and non-violence—ahimsa—for thousands of years. Yet she is one of the three
countries that have refused to sign the NPT. In view of the upcoming NPT review conference in 2010, what is your opinion on India’s
concerns regarding signing the NPT? Ambassador Gottwald: We have to distinguish here between two elements. One is the negotiating
history of the treaty, and I am aware of India’s concerns, so to say, grievances, regarding the coming into existence of the present treaty.
The other issue is the general question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. There India, I am convinced, and I know it from my
talks, is firmly on the same side as Germany. Both India and Germany want to prevent any further proliferation
and we need to cooperate. Of course the nuclear non-proliferation treaty is for Germany, as a member
state, a very central element of that security architecture. But it is not the exclusive way of handling
this issue. I will be concentrating in my talks here on other perspectives to have the same objective
promoted. One of them is the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, where India is a full member and where we hope to start a
negotiating process early next year. So part of the reason for my visit is to explore the opportunities to co-operate in that negotiation.
Uniqueness: US Confidence
Confidence in the US has doubled in Germany in the past year
Burns 7/24 (Alexander, Politico Staff Writer, “U.S. global image improves” Politico.com http://www.politico.com/news/stories /
0709/25366.html AD: 7/30/09) DCR
Surveying 25 nations and testing between 750 and 3,169 respondents in each country, Pew
found U.S. favorability
ratings had increased virtually everywhere — and nowhere more sharply than in Europe. It said the higher
ratings were “being driven much more by personal confidence in Obama than by opinions about his specific policies.” Three-quarters of
respondents in France said they had a favorable impression of the United States, compared with just 42 percent a year ago. In Spain, the
number surged from 33 percent to 58 percent. And in Germany, favorable views of the United States more than
doubled, with 64 percent saying they had a positive view of the United States, up from 31 percent in
2008.
***LINKS***
Link: German Allied Prolif

Ratification of the CTBT will kill our credible deterrence and cause Germany to
proliferate
Monroe 7 (Robert R., former director of the Defense Nuclear Agency, December 4, 2007, “Nuclear testing
realities”, Washington Times, L/N) BCT
Reality No. 3 is that U.S. ratification of the CTBT would increase proliferation. Some 30 states (e.g., Japan,
Germany) depend upon the U.S. nuclear umbrella rather than having their own nuclear forces. If we ratify the
CTBT, denying ourselves the ability to transform our arsenal, the failure of our once-credible deterrent will force
our allies and friends to develop their own nuclear weapons.
Link: CTBT / Consult Solvency-
CTBT is a threat to German security- Extended deterrence is key-
MEY 1 (Holger H.- Analyst for ISA. Nuclear Norms and German Nuclear Interests. Institute for Strategic
Analysis. 2001. ONLINE. DA: 7-30) [mjc]
Ensuring a credible and adaptable U.S. guarantee creates certain demands. In order
to maximize the peacetime effects of nuclear weapons, visible peacetime deployments on
German soil are important for Germany. Germany needs to continue providing nuclear
weapons platforms and maintaining its nuclear expertise by collaborating closely with the
United States. It is important for Germany to stay engaged in the nuclear planning process
and to ensure that this is more than just a debating club. Otherwise Germany would
lose influence on nuclear matters and consequently lose interest in this specific form of
arrangement. In this context, Germany’s position with regard to the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty is politically understandable but strategically unsound, because an eroding
nuclear expertise in the United States may be sufficient for central and direct deterrence,
but—in the long run—not for extended deterrence and forward-basing requirements.
Should delegitimization continue in the United States, Germany would be concerned—
and Germany would very quickly have a nuclear debate. Germany’s norm against German
nuclear weapons necessitates a strong stand in favor of a credible U.S. guarantee. As such,
the best U.S. nonproliferation policy is to continue the strategic umbrella for Germany—
and for Japan.
Link: No First Use (Japan Rearm Link too)
No First Use signals a strong shift away from adequate extended deterrent-
J.E.N 5 (Press Release. Japan Economic Newswire. U.S. dropped no 1st-use plan to maintain nuke umbrella for
Japan. March 4, 2005. ONLINE. DA: 7-30. Lexis) [mjc]
But the proposed no first-use policy was not adopted because it might weaken the deterrence provided to Japan
and South Korea that could be attacked by North Korea or other nations, and would not lead the North, Iraq and
other countries to change their activities and stop them from developing weapons of mass destruction. 'If the United
States pledged no-first use, the North might believe that it could more easily attack the South and maybe Japan or
that they could attack airfields in Japan, or maybe with chemical weapons to prevent the use of those airfields,'
Fetter said. 'That was a major element of debate.' Fetter also said, 'Key non-nuclear allies such as Germany and
Japan will be upset because they will view it as weakening of U.S. commitment to their defense, and we don't
want to send that signal.' Janne Nolan, professor at the University of Pittsburg who was also indirectly involved,
said, 'It was implicit in the argument that the whole nuclear umbrella would be eroded if we were to be moved
away.' Nolan served as members of the National Defense Panel, the Defense Policy Board and other defense and
security advisory panels and assessed the review process from an academic viewpoint.
Link: Deterrence-
Erosion of US extended deterrence would cause Germany to proliferate
Liberman 1 (Peter, associate professor of political science at City University of New York, “Ties that Blind: Will
Germany and Japan Rely Too Much on the US?” Security Studies, Winter 2000/2001, Vol. 10, No 2, p. 98) JK
The erosion of the U.S. commitment would be dangerous if Germany and Japan placed too much faith
in U.S. protection. Over-reliance increases the likelihood of deterrence failure, should potential regional
adversaries take a more cynical view of the U.S. commitment. Over-reliance also increases the danger of
crisis escalation once U.S. unreliability is suddenly exposed. Faced with the prospect of war or coercion
without U.S. support, Japan or Germany would abandon their civilian power policies and engage in
crash military— including nuclear—build-ups. Power shifts, however, are more dangerous in foul
weather than in fair. Windows of military opportunity for their rivals would swing open with clear
evidence of U.S. disengagement, and begin to close again as the abandoned ally starts to rearm. The build-
ups and instability that alliance advocates worry would follow alliance dissolution in periods of
international calm would be far more dangerous if an alliance crack-up coincided with a regional
crisis.
Germany is an integral part of US nuclear deterrence- if we win germany, we win

deterrence-
Suzuki, 9 (Eisuke- writer for Business Recorder. US-Japan Talks on Nuclear Deterrence. July 15, 2009 ONLINE.
DA: 7-30. Lexis) [mjc]
Now that the rabbit is out of the hat, and since all nuclear weapons have been withdrawn from Japan since 1992, the
public debate of the three non-nuclear principles should not be difficult to hold and it cannot be avoided as long as
we remain under the US nuclear umbrella. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States is the only nuclear-
weapons state today that continues to deploy nuclear weapons outside its own territory. About 480 nuclear
bombs are placed in Europe for use in accordance with Nato nuclear strike plans, and these bombs are
earmarked for delivery by Nato members which are non-nuclear weapons states such as Belgium, Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey for delivery by their respective air forces. They join with the US Air Force in
practicing nuclear strikes and their aircraft are maintained for the nuclear weapons delivery as part of the
nuclear war planning exercise. Their participation in the US nuclear deterrence regime is not insignificant
even though they are all parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
I/L: No E/D -> German proliferation
Loss of faith in US deterrence would lead Germany to proliferation
Payne 98 (Keith, president of National Institute of Public Policy, “The case against nuclear abolition and for
nuclear deterrence?” Comparative Strategy, Jan-Mar 1998, Vol. 17, No 1) JK
If other major powers, especially Germany and Japan, resented their non-nuclear status to the point of
becoming revisionist and militarily aggressive states with nuclear ambitions, then the marginalist logic
would be undermined. But these powers have reaffirmed their nuclear-free posture through a variety of
international agreements (e.g., the 1995 NPT extension, Germany's commitments under the two-plus-four
arrangements for unification). Public opinion in both countries remains staunchly opposed to developing a
nuclear weapons capability. The principal reason why Germany and Japan can remain sanguine is their
confidence in American security guarantees, with the ultimate backstop of the U.S. extended nuclear
deterrent. Of course, in a truly nuclear-free world, Germany and Japan would not need U.S. deterrence
against a nuclear attack--but neither country can be confident that the process of nuclear disarmament
would not leave them in the worst possible situation: where the U.S. nuclear guarantee is not credible,
but where other powers retain a nuclear capability, actual or latent. The same logic applies to other
American allies and third parties, as long as U.S. military power, including nuclear weapons, continues to
play a role in regional security and stability.
I/L: German perception of insecurity -> prolif

Germany would prolif if they feel insecure
Gose 96 (MAJ. MARK N. GOSE, professor of political science at the US Air Force Academy
“THE NEW GERMANY AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE “,
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj96/spec96/gose.pdf ) BT
ALMOST SIX years have passed since the end of the cold war and the fall of the Berlin Wall, yet active
debate over European security policy and security architecture continues. One of the more sensitive aspects
of this discussion deals with the issue of whether German motivations for obtaining nuclear weapons in
the future existor may develop. This issue is particularly relevant in light of the ongoing withdrawal of US
forces from Europe in general and from Germany in particular. Moreover, the transformed Euro peansecurity
environment reflects the changed nature of military threats on the one hand, while it also highlights the
apparent reemergence of a more assertive German political community on the other. In short, this study
argues that as a result of these massive sea changes in the interna tionalsystem, combined with the
continued integration of the two sides of Germany, there may be new, perhaps stronger, German
motivations for obtaining some degree of unilateral nuclear capability, at least in certain scenarios.
Impor tantly, these motivations include not only tradi tional security concerns but, perhaps, intensified
nonsecurity influences as Germans redefine what it means to be “German.” First, this article explores this
issue by dis -cussing the historical background regarding Ger -man attitudes about nuclear policy—the past
German motivations and resulting debates over obtaining nuclear weapons. Second, it examines possible
motivations in terms of the changed se curity
concerns brought by the end of the cold war. What are the various security scenarios and plausible options
and, in turn, their related effects on German nuclear decisions? Third, this article analyzes the influence of
nonsecurity motiva tions.
German prolif would lead to massive global prolif
Gose 96 (MAJ. MARK N. GOSE, professor of political science at the US Air Force Academy
“THE NEW GERMANY AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE “,
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj96/spec96/gose.pdf ) BT
This option reflects a response to what Robbin Laird calls “disintegration or differentiation,” where
“disintegration would emerge from an in -ability to construct a new European security order to replace the
Western Alliance.” 13 It must also take into account the inability of bilateral ar rangements to provide
the necessary security guarantees for Germany, especially in a high-threat environment. Moreover, in
the presence of credible perceived threats, particularly nuclear threats, the Germans would most likely
pursue their own nuclear deterrent capability in a secu rity environment best described as a “European
anarchy.” In such an environment, each nation-state would become totally responsible for its own
security in a world characterized by increas ing weapons proliferation. Granted, this is rather remote but
possible in the long-term. This option suggests strong security motivations for unilat eral German
nuclear weapons.
I/L: US withdrawal -> German prolif and Russian War
American nuclear withdrawl = German nukes & preventative Russian war
Gholz et al 2k (Eugene, PhD candidate poli sci @ MIT; Daryl Press, same as Gholz; and Harvey Sapolsky,
director of the MIT defense and arms control studies program; 2000 “Come Home, America: The Strategy of
Restraint in the Face of Temptation”, America’s Strategic Choices, MIT Press, ed. Michael Brown, p. 69) BT
Potentially the most complicated transition issue resulting from America’s withdrawal from NATO would be
the closure of America’s nuclear umbrella over Germany. The other major European powers - France, the
United Kingdom, and Russia - have their own nuclear arsenals, but Germany would be left exposed by
an American withdrawal. For many years Germany has had the capability to build nuclear weapons
almost instantly, but has chosen not to, because the United States provided nuclear cover; if American
were to withdraw, Germany would be unlikely to deny itself the protection that nuclear weapons
afford. The primary danger associated with German nuclear proliferation is transition instability.
Russia or another current nuclear power might have an interest in preventive war or at least in
applying nuclear coercion to keep Germany non-nuclear. Facing such a threat, the most dangerous time
for Germany to go nuclear would be during a crisis, but that is a danger the United States can address directly
by helping Germany develop a secure nuclear deterrent now, in a time of relatively low tension. If the United
States maintains its current nuclear guarantee during the German weaponization program, Germany can
develop nuclear weapons without opening a window vulnerability.
I/L: Umbrella Key
Must maintain nuclear deterrent- increasing pressure makes every step important-
Reducing the disadvantages of not being a nuclear power. The disadvantages of not having national
control over weapons of last resort and, hence, to a considerable degree over one’s own fate can and
indeed must be compensated jointly for by the protector as well as the protectee. This includes security,
military, and industrial aspects. Otherwise, incentives to proliferate might be difficult to reduce over the
long run. This would run up against international opposition and
Germany’s own norm against possession of nuclear weapons.
I/L: Security Guarantee
German security is based on US security guarantee-
Nuclear phobia is probably no more pronounced in Germany than in any other Western
country. Certainly there is an antinuclear current, but it is little more than an eddy in
Germany’s political discourse. True, Germany has committed itself in numerous treaties,
most recently the Two-Plus-Four Treaty on German uniŽ cation, to refrain from possession
of all weapons of mass destruction. Yet, maintaining the norm of no “German” nuclear
weapons also is seen by most as necessitating NATO’s nuclear protection, primarily in
terms of a U.S. guarantee.
I/L & Impact: Germany Proliferation

Germany has the capacity to develop nuclear weapons in no time which will lead to
transition instability. Only nuclear umbrella from US is stopping them.
Brown 2000. “American Strategic Choices: An International Security Reader.” Page 69. (Michael E. Brown is the
director of Research for the National Security Studies Program at Georgetown University)
Potentially the most complicated transition issue resulting from America’s withdrawal from NATO would be
the closure of America’s nuclear umbrella over Germany. The other major European powers – France,
the United Kingdom, and Russia – have their own nuclear arsenals, but Germany would be left exposed by
an American withdrawal. For many years Germany has had the capability to build nuclear weapons
almost instantly, but has chosen not to, because the United States provided nuclear cover; if America
were to withdrawal Germany would be unlikely to deny itself the protection that nuclear weapons
afford. The primary danger associated with German nuclear proliferation is transition instability.
Russia or another current nuclear power might have an interest in preventive war or at least in
applying nuclear coercion to keep Germany non-nuclear. Facing such a threat, the most dangerous
time for Germany to go nuclear would be during a crisis, but that is a danger that the United States
can address directly by helping Germany develop a secure nuclear deterrent now, in a time of
relatively low tensions. If the United States maintains its current nuclear guarantee during the German
weaponization program, Germany can develop nuclear weapons without opening a window of
vulnerability.
***IMPACTS***
Impact: Proliferation
German Proliferation will violate NPT and lead to worldwide nuclear proliferation
through massive selling mechanisms.
Krause ‘5. “German Nuclear Export Policy and the Proliferation of Nu-clear Weapons - Another Sonderweg?”
February 26, 2005. (Director of Institute for Security Studies at the University of Kiel).
Thirty years ago German nuclear exports were one the hottest issues in nuclear non-proliferation. At
that time agreements concluded with Brazil and Iran were paving the way for the export of up to 16 nuclear
power plants and – in the case of Brazil – the delivery of nuclear enrichment, fuel production and plutonium
separation technology. German nuclear industry – supported by a Federal Government headed by a
Social-Democratic Chancellor – had just reached a level where it was able to produce cutting-edge
nuclear technology and it was anxious to sell it to whoever might be suitable. The Federal Republic of
Germany as a non-nuclear weapons state had insisted at that time – mainly driven by Social Democrats – that
it was allowed to develop, produce and operate technology encompassing the whole nuclear cycle. In that
regard it was the only non-nuclear weapons state (except Japan) that was pursuing this special path
(Sonderweg in German). In 1975, the U.S. Government as well as the nuclear non-proliferation
community was highly critical of this German Sonderweg and was arguing that in particular the
export of German nuclear technology might further nuclear proliferation. There was a general sense
that the transfer of such technologies by Germany, Japan as well as by France could lead to an erosion
of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty from 1968.
Impact: Vertical Prolif, Conventional arms, Russian Disarm
Lack of nuclear protection means German vertical nuclear and conventional proliferation-
The United States is clearly Germany’s nuclear protector at present, and in all likelihood
will remain so well into the future. The partnership is broad and deep, despite
the perennial but usually petty disturbances. America’s and Germany’s interests remain
intertwined, and the United States has the power to extend deterrence. “Europe’s” role
in Germany’s security is pronounced, but neither the present-day European Union or any
kind of Anglo-French arrangement could in any way replace the U.S. guarantee. Still,
Europe’s future will affect the way in which Germany perceives its nuclear interests.
What might happen if Germany’s nuclear interests no longer were being met? Given
the current security environment, this situation would occur if the existing extended deterrence
arrangement between Germany and the United States within the NATO framework
continued to erode. First, this development would lead to a fundamental new orientation
of the strategic landscape in Europe. All existing NATO arrangements would be put into
question. Germany would necessarily have to begin to search for alternatives, of which
the national nuclear option is certainly only one. Others include a conventional arms
build-up, further disarmament and appeasement policy, and an arrangement, for instance,
with Russia. All these alternatives look much less preferable than a stable continuation of the
current situation. This is particularly true because the future of Europe is anything but
clear.
Impact: German Civil-war
German proliferation risks civil-war-
The very basic question of whether, given the new overall conditions, Germany should
rethink its renunciation of nuclear weapons has a very odd circumstance attaching to it,
namely that it tends to be posed mostly outside Germany and almost never within the
German debate. Amongst the critics of German Machtvergessenheit - or obliviousness to
power - only Arnulf Baring has ventured to tinker with this taboo, albeit without himself
expressing a definitive opinion on it.24 This reluctance to enter into discussion is not in any
way artificial. In fact it is the expression of a powerful conviction, deeply rooted both in
the political culture of Germany - even after reunification - and in an equally strong
emotional repugnance to nuclear weapons, as expressed particularly forcefully in the 1980s
protests against the deployment of medium-range missiles. The consensus against the
‘German option’ is thus grounded first and foremost in an unambiguous stance by the
German public which politicians, even if they wanted to, could only go against at the risk
of damaging their own political futures. Any German government that sought to effect a
change in the country’s nuclear status would risk public protest ranging all the way up to
civil-war-style conditions compared to which the events surrounding the shifting of Castor
containers would probably appear trivial.25
Impact: Alliance Collapse / Mearsheimer indict-
A nuclear Germany means European power imbalance and alliance breakdown-
The third cornerstone on which the Germany renunciation of nuclear weapons rests is
political, and forms the basis of the multifarious legal obligations. I refer to the conviction,
shared both by Germany and by its neighbours and allies, that European stability is best
served by a Germany whose military power is restricted. The fact that an American scholar
- John Mearsheimer - has a different viewpoint on this, and has advocated targeted
proliferation involving Germany (and the Ukraine), merely indicates his ignorance of the
European situation, not any strategic perspicacity on his part.26 A militarily dominant
Germany (for which nuclear weapons would be a prerequisite) would destroy the internal
Western balance - one of the pillars of the co-operative institutions of the West - and the
balance of power in Europe as a whole. Contrary to the expectations of many forecasters
who are unable to comprehend the transformation that has taken place in the fundamental
structures of the European world of states and societal world, issues about alliances,
balance of power, and see-saw politics as they posed themselves in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries do not figure in the current debate. That this is so is due in no
small measure to the judicious self-restraint shown by German democracy. Only in this
way is it possible to maintain the unparalleled state of security that Germany has achieved
for the first time in its history - the state of being surrounded by friends and partners who,
rather than devising alliances against the ‘German giant’, are eager to find ways - or better
ways - of co-operating with him. From this point of view, after a perilous and extremely
bloody century-long quest for stability as a geostrategically median state , the renunciation
of nuclear weapons is, paradoxically, a crucial precondition of Germany’s security and
well-being, and thus at the very core of German national interest.
***EXT***
C/P: NATO readiness (TNW’s)
Text: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization should reduce the readiness level of aircraft
that are intended to deliver the U.S. nuclear bombs to “months.”
This solves the case by functionally ending forward deployment- the permutation is
impossible because it requires nuclear weapons in Europe- the counterplan avoids prolif
because nuclear weapons still provide German deterrence-
Kristensen, 5 (Hans M.- NRDC analyst . Natural Resources and Defense Council. 2005. Nuclear Planning In
Europe Modernized Stratcom To Support European Command. ONLINE. DA: 7-31) [mjc]
The most compelling opportunity to end the forward deployment of nuclear weapons in
Europe may be the announcement by NATO that it has reduced the readiness level of the
aircraft that are intended to deliver the U.S. nuclear bombs to “months.” The very low
readiness level suggests that the electronic and mechanical interfaces that enable the
aircraft to carry and deliver the nuclear bombs may have been dismantled and placed in
storage. Since training at nuclear bases does not require live nuclear weapons but is done
with “dummy” weapons, such a low readiness level calls into question the need to
continue to forward deploy U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe because it allows for plenty
of time to transfer the weapons in a crisis if needed.
The need for these weapons is rapidly eroding. While NATO still talks about their
unique contribution to the alliance, the U.S. Defense Science Board Task Force on Future
Strategic Strike Forces recommended in February 2004 that the nuclear capability of the
forward-based, tactical, dual-capable aircraft should be eliminated because there is “no
obvious military need for these systems….”228 Because the use of nuclear weapons in a
conflict could provoke serious political, economic, military, and environmental
consequences, according to the latest U.S. Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, “allied
as well as adversary understanding of US nuclear weapon policy is essential.”229 Yet the
vague and unspecific role attributed by NATO to the weapons in Europe suggests that the
alliance – and therefore also potential adversaries – is uncertain about the exact role.
A2: German Peace Movements
Germans want US nukes- peace movements are not the consensus-
Contending that there is a norm against nuclear weapons is one thing, defining exactly
what that means is another. Is it a norm against the existence of nuclear weapons?
Speeches by German politicians to members of the “peace movement” might contain
references to the possibility of eliminating nuclear weapons in the context of “general
and complete disarmament,” but consensus remains across the major political parties that
Germany currently requires nuclear protection. Few would criticize the basing of U.S.
nuclear weapons on German soil, nor the maintenance of a number of German Tornadoes
tasked for (nuclear) strike missions, on the basis of long–standing agreements with United
States.
A2: “Germans hate nukes”
Security before global disarmament- as long as nuclear weapons exist, Germany will
always need the US-
UPI 8 (Analysis: Germany wants U.S. nukes out. June 26, 2008. ONLINE. DA: 7-30. Lexis) [mjc]
Eckart von Klaeden, a foreign policy expert with Merkel's conservatives, said it must be guaranteed that
security standards are as high as possible when it comes to storing nuclear weapons in Europe. "But we can't
do without them, as long as nuclear weapons exist in the world. They also protect us," he said. Earlier this week a
Foreign Ministry spokesman said at his regular news conference Berlin would directly not press Washington
to remove its weapons from Germany. "We believe that we have to have a deterrent," the spokesman said,
adding it was and is the goal of the German government to lobby for a "global reduction of nuclear
weapons."
A2: European Security Now
Just because no one is talking about European security doesn’t mean its not important-
nuclear stability is THE key issue in European Security-
Maintaining stability in Europe. This objective does not presume the existence of
a confrontation in Europe. The interest in counterbalancing Russia does not reflect
an actual concern about Russian military ambitions along its western border. Even
if Russia becomes a real partner of the West, the West still would want to be a
strong partner, not a weak one. Stability in Europe always also means nuclear stability—particularly
from the perspective of non–nuclear countries, that is, those most vulnerable to nuclear threat. This is a
key tenet of European security, despite the low visibility of this
item on the present political agenda.
A2: German Companies will sell Nuclear Tech

German companies won’t sell due to merging with French nuclear business.
Krause ‘5. “German Nuclear Export Policy and the Proliferation of Nu-clear Weapons - Another Sonderweg?”
February 26, 2005. (Director of Institute for Security Studies at the University of Kiel).
In coping with the anti-nuclear political attitude of the German government, most companies in Germany
involved in the nuclear business have either given up or have downsized their respective nuclear
business. Some have merged with French companies or have bought up companies in foreign countries and
are operating from there. The largest German producer of nuclear power plants and other facilities,
Siemens KWU merged in early 2001 with the French company Framatome to form the new company
Framatome ANP, which since has become the leading provider of nuclear technology in the world. The
headquarters of the company are located in Paris, not in Munich; 66 percent of the shares today are owned by
the French company Areva, 34 percent by Siemens. The company has a staff of 14,000 world-wide with an
annual turnover of more than 2.6 billions of Euro. By this move, Siemens can circumvent the difficult
German nuclear security regulations which often have no other purpose than preventing any nuclear
related activities at all. In order to better operate their business in the U.S., Siemens had already bought up
in 1987 the Advanced Nuclear Fuel Corporation in the U.S. (later called Siemens Nuclear Power Corp.). In
the field of nuclear fuel production Siemens has cooperated with the French company Cogema and has
outsourced Mox-fuel production to Cogema. The service and nuclear fuel business with Eastern Europe is
run by a company called European VVER Fuels (EVF), which had been founded by Siemens, Framatome
and Cogema. As these examples show, under conditions of globalization there are a couple of opportunities
for companies to circumvent restrictive and anti-nuclear legislation in nation states by mergers, acquisitions
and outsourcing. As in other areas too, foreign affiliate sales are representing a growing share of international
economic activity and are larger in volume than international trade.11 For national governments this
translates into lesser leverage in the field of nuclear export policy. Indeed, the areas where the current Red-
Green coalition might influence nuclear export policy have narrowed down to a few ones: only those items
that were actually produced in Germany and exported from Germany to countries outside the European
Union are subject to German national export control regulations. And it seems that it is the policy of
companies such as Siemens to produce nuclear facilities and items in a way that German export
legislation is circumvented (by exporting components to France and by re-exporting them from there) or
reduced.
***AFF ANSWERS***
Non-Unique: Deterrence Low
European deterrence low now- safety and security-
There is also the issue of safety. Throughout the 1990s, NATO and U.S. officials assured
the public that the nuclear weapons in Europe were secure, only to admit in internal
upgrade programs and inspections that serious concerns existed. At one point in 1997,
they found, this even included the risk of an accidental nuclear detonation.
Despite efforts to improve nuclear proficiency of its nuclear personnel, the U.S. Air Force
continues to experience serious deficiencies. In 2003, the pass rate for Air Force Nuclear
Surety Inspection hit an all-time low, with only half of the inspections resulting in a pass
(the historical pass rate is 79 percent).224
No Link: nukes not needed for deterrence

US would maintain deterrence without the use of nuclear weapons
Perkovich 8 (George, VP for studies Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2008, “Abolishing
Nuclear Weapons: Why the United States Should Lead”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, AD: 7-30-9)
JK
“If the United States removes the nuclear deterrent umbrella it extends over its NATO allies (Japan, South
Korea, and others), these states will develop their own nuclear weapons.” Probably not. The United States
(and other powers) will always insist on retaining deterrent capabilities. But these capabilities need not
include nuclear weapons if all others who possess these weapons implemented verifiable and
enforceable commitments to eliminate them. If Russia, China, Pakistan, et al. eliminated or greatly
reduced their nuclear arsenals and Iran and North Korea no longer posed acute nuclear threats, it would be
politically and strategically unrealistic for Japan, South Korea, Germany, and Turkey to counter such a trend
and acquire nuclear weapons on their own. Indeed, these key non–nuclear-weapon states have
longstanding traditions favoring the global elimination of nuclear weapons. They would welcome being
enlisted in the deliberations over how to proceed incrementally toward this objective in ways that
buttress their security ties with the United States. Enlisting them is something the next administration
should do in any case.
No Link: Germany won’t rearm

If The United States Disarmed, it would be politically and strategically unrealistic for allied
countries like Germany to re-arm
Perkovich 8 (George, Vice President for Studies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2008,
“Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: Why the United States Should Lead”, http://74.125.155.132/search?
q=cache:LwaMIShzXo4J:www.carnegieendowment.org/files/abolishing_nuclear_weapons.pdf+germany+will+acqu
ire+nuclear+weapons+if+the+United+states+filetype:pdf&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-a) BCT
“If the United States removes the nuclear deterrent umbrella it extends over its NAtO allies (Japan, South
korea, and others), these states will develop their own nuclear weapons.” Probably not. The United States
(and other powers) will always insist on retaining deterrent capabilities. But these capabilities need not
include nuclear weapons if all others who possess these weapons implemented verifiable and enforceable
commitments to eliminate them. If Russia, China, Pakistan, et al. eliminated or greatly reduced their nuclear
arsenals and Iran and North Korea no longer posed acute nuclear threats, it would be politically and
strategically unrealistic for Japan, South Korea, germany, and Turkey to counter such a trend and
acquire nuclear weapons on their own. Indeed, these key non–nuclear-weapon states have longstanding
traditions favoring the global elimination of nuclear weapons. They would welcome being enlisted in
the deliberations over how to proceed incrementally toward this objective in ways that buttress their
security ties with the United States. Enlisting them is something the next administration should do in any
case.
Germany will not freak out over a retracted tactical nuclear umbrella-
Another claim is that U.S. nuclear bombs are needed in Europe to dissuade European
countries from pursuing nuclear weapons capabilities themselves. But this is also no
longer a credible argument. All NATO countries are under the umbrella of long-range
U.S. and British nuclear forces, and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe make no clear
difference. Moreover, in the case of South Korea and Japan, countries located in areas
where tension exists – unlike in Europe – that could potentially result in the use of
nuclear weapons, tactical nuclear bombs were completely withdrawn in 1991. Neither
the United States nor its two allies in that region argue that it is necessary to forward
deploy U.S. tactical nuclear weapons.
No Link: CTBT
No link, Germans are upset at the US for not ratifying CTBT
Stanley 7 (Elizabeth, professor for Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown and former US Army
intelligence officer in Germany, February 2007, “International Perceptions of US Nuclear Policy”, Sandria Report,
p. 72, AD: 7-30-9) JK
Germans criticize the US decisions not to ratify the CTBT and the BTWC verification protocols. Before
the US Senate vote on ratifying the CTBT, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder – together with French
President Jacques Chirac and British Prime Minister Tony Blair – bought a full-page advertisement in the
New York Times that warned that a US failure to ratify would “expose a fundamental divergence
within NATO.”269 When the treaty was ultimately rejected by the Senate, this was viewed by these
leaders “as a slap in the face” because they had very publicly laid their credibility on the line in its support.
Earlier, after European leaders had invested a lot of effort negotiating verification protocols to the 1972
BTWC, they viewed the US as “torpedoing” their efforts and felt betrayed.270
No Link: No First Use

No link, NFU maintains extended deterrence and stops allied proliferation
Sagan 9 (Scott, professor of poli sci at Stanford, June 1, 2009, “The Case for No First Use”, Survival, Vol 51, No
3, p. 168) JK
Concerns about extended deterrence have thus often been cited as a reason to maintain current US
nuclear declaratory policy concerning first use options and ambiguity about when nuclear weapons might
be used. But extended nuclear deterrence can be made compatible with a no-first-use doctrine if
changes in US nuclear security guarantees were made to fit current conditions of US conventional military
superiority. Indeed, the term ‘nuclear umbrella’ is highly misleading and should be dropped from the
strategist’s lexicon. The umbrella metaphor implies the existence of a defensive protection strategy (rather
than a retaliation deterrence commitment) and the term also fails to differentiate between a commitment
to use nuclear weapons first, if necessary, to defend an ally attacked by overwhelming conventional
force or nuclear weapons (the Cold War policy in NATO, Japan and South Korea), and the more tailored
guarantee to use nuclear weapons in retaliation against a nuclear attack, but only a nuclear attack, on
US allies. This second guarantee is consistent with a no-first-use doctrine, and would maintain
extended deterrence for nuclear threats to allies and would not therefore encourage them to develop
their own nuclear weapons. This doctrine would also be consistent with a broader diplomatic strategy to
encourage non-nuclear states to devalue the role of nuclear weapons and to see the first use of nuclear
weapons as illegitimate. Finally, since such a doctrine would emphasise conventional responses to
conventional acts of aggression, the credibility of the deterrent threat would be maximised because lingering
fears about whether the United States might renege on its commitments, if they include the use of nuclear
weapons, would be reduced. In short, a no-first-use doctrine would not undermine the part US nuclear
forces play in deterring nuclear strikes and threats to allies in NATO, Japan and South Korea, and
could provide broader diplomatic and non-proliferation benefits.
No Link: De-alert
No link, Germany would support a US policy of de-alerting
p. 82, AD: 7-30-9) JK
Germany would likely support any US moves towards reducing the stockpile, eliminating kinds of
weapons or de-alerting. As Mueller argues, “one can expect that a majority of people and the elite
would welcome such steps and strongly support it.”316 At the same time, Germany is likely to be highly
critical of changes in US nuclear policy that appear destabilizing for international nonproliferation regimes
and seem to reinforce the NPR’s trend towards unilateralism. But US nuclear policy is not viewed in a
vacuum by Germans; they look at all US behavior across policy areas. Thus, the United States could
balance behavior in the nuclear arena that destabilized international regimes with behavior in another policy
area that enhanced international cooperation. For example, the United States could throw its support behind
international efforts to overhaul the UN Security Council to make it more effective.
No Link: no umbrella
Germany no longer relies on United States’ nuclear umbrella. They will proliferate on their
own will.
Peng 7. (Nie Peng. The author is a professor at the School of International Studies, Peking University. “A strong
foundation for China-Germany ties.” August 29, 2007)
The main reason for the relatively lower position of US relations in the order of Germany's national interests
is that the United States no longer sees Germany and Europe as its strategic frontline as a result of the end of
the Cold War. Germany and Europe no longer rely on the US for security assurance; the European Union has
become a global operative, and so on. On the other hand, faced with America's "unilateral imperialist" policy,
Germany's political elite have expressed clearly that the country wants to practice "constructive
confrontation", or "cooperative balance". Anyway, Germany will "cooperate as much as possible", but take on
"confrontation if necessary" because it is no longer willing to take orders from the US unconditionally, no
matter for strategic or moral concerns. China should take note of these adjustments and changes in German-US
relations.
No I/L: Germany won’t pursue nukes

No link, Germany won’t pursue nuclear weapons for security reasons
p. 81-2, AD: 7-30-9) JK
It is unlikely that Germany will change course and decide to pursue a nuclear weapons program. It values its
non-nuclear identity and the multilateral institutional frameworks that undergird its security policy too
much. As Mueller argues, the non-nuclear attitude of the German public “would make it suicidal for any
serious politician to make a political platform out of this subject.” In his estimation, this would only change if
there were an “extraordinary” change in events, such as: The security situation must deteriorate, with a fully
reemerged and ostentatiously hostile Russia pushing westward once more; the institutional framework must unravel,
with NATO dissolved and the European Union breaking down under a fatal German-French divorce; and the
internal balance of political forces must give way to a landmark shift to the far right.315 The likelihood that this
combination of circumstances will occur is highly unlikely.
No I/L: Iran Prolif

Germany proliferation will not cause Iran proliferation.
The Economist 8. (“The Berlin stonewall; Germany’s foreign policy.” November 1, 2008)
That said, Germany is reluctantly shedding its merchant pacifism. If Iran continues enriching uranium,
Germany is edging towards approving sanctions that go beyond targeting goods related to nuclear
proliferation. "Germany is playing a responsible role on Iran," says a senior Israeli official, whose
country has more to fear from an Iranian bomb than any other; Germany’s differences with its allies have
been "tactical, not strategic". On the use of force abroad, Germany has been changing "almost with the
speed of light", says John Kornblum, a former American ambassador to Germany. Before 1992,
German soldiers were deployed abroad on strictly humanitarian missions. Now it has the third-largest
contingent of troops in Afghanistan (rising from 3,500 to 4,500), including a "quick reaction force" ready for
combat, mainly in the north. It has military missions in Lebanon, Bosnia and Sudan. The trouble is, says Mr
Kornblum, that "the world is changing faster." German officials insist that its comparative advantage will
remain its knack for talking to almost everyone. Mr Steinmeier, who will challenge Ms Merkel for the
chancellorship next year, is renowned, and often reviled, for not allowing a foreign government’s
shortcomings to spoil a fruitful relationship.
No I/L: Don’t need umbrella
German doesn’t need the nuclear umbrella- there is no threat-
Kornelius 9 (Stefan- the foreign editor of Süddeutsche Zeitung and holds master’s degree in government from the
London School of Economics . U.S.-European Nonproliferation Perspectives: A Transatlantic Conversation: A
Report of the CSIS International Security Program and Europe Program: the evolution of germany’s
nonproliferation policy. April 2009. ONLINE. DA: 7-31.
http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/csis/0016759/f_0016759_14462.pdf) [mjc]
In the broader sense, Germany’s nonproliferation policies of the 1990s and 2000s were marked by
two events—one internal and one external. Internally, the strong antinuclear movement forced a
change in the country’s policies on both nuclear energy and nonproliferation. Internationally,
however, the collapse of the bipolar system and the demise of the Soviet Union meant that the
extended nuclear umbrella that helped assure German security through the Cold War years no
longer seemed necessary. To many, the nuclear umbrella provided by NATO became an
anachronism. Nuclear energy and weapons were out of fashion.
No one hates Germany- not even terrorists-
Kornelius 9 (Stefan- the foreign editor of Süddeutsche Zeitung and holds master’s degree in government from the
London School of Economics . U.S.-European Nonproliferation Perspectives: A Transatlantic Conversation: A
Report of the CSIS International Security Program and Europe Program: the evolution of germany’s
nonproliferation policy. April 2009. ONLINE. DA: 7-31.
http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/csis/0016759/f_0016759_14462.pdf) [mjc]
Just as Germans enjoyed the fruits of nuclear deterrence in the Cold War without really having to
identify with the logic of using a nuclear force, the country now finds itself without really having
to feel the dangers posed by nuclear terrorism and WMD proliferation. Unlike America after 9/11,
Germans have not been materially confronted with a sense of urgency regarding nuclear
terrorism, the dangers of a dirty bomb, or the strategic impact of a nuclear-armed Iran. Surveys on
transatlantic perceptions regularly show vast differences in assessing the dangers of proliferation,
nuclear terrorism, and the general problems of WMD; Americans see a much higher risk than their
German or European counterparts.
Link Turn: Disarm

German government wants nukes out immediately- they are a cold war relic and useless-
Xinhua General News Service 5 (Germany under pressure to be free of US nuclear weapons. May 3, 2005
Tuesday. ONLINE. DA: 7-30. Lexis) [mjc]
The German government has been under mounting pressure from inside to urge the United States to
pull out its nuclear weapons from country. Among a total of about 480 nuclear weapons in Europe, some
150 are stationed on German soil. In an interview with daily newspaper Frankfurter Rundschau, Gert
Weisskirchen, foreign affairs spokesman for the ruling Social Democrats (SPD) demanded the withdrawal of
the US nuclear weapons from Germany. The German government's peace politics is unbelievable "so long as
the government does not separate itself from the nuclear weapons in Germany," Weisskirchen said.
US nuclear weapons in Germany were "a relic of the Cold War," said SPD's ruling partner Green party
chief Claudia Roth at another newspaper interview on Monday. The opposition FDP leader Guido
Westerwelle on Monday moved a step further by urging Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer to propose the
withdrawal of the US nuclear weapons in Germany at a conference in New York on reviewing the nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Westerwelle said the nuclear weapons had become superfluous since the
end of the Cold War. The 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Nuclear NPT met on Monday at the
UN headquarters in New York. At the conference, which will be held from May 2 to 27, 2005, states will
examine the implementation of the treaty's provisions since 2000
Link Turn: German Relations

Germany is worried about the effect of US nuclear policy on NATO and its own security
intelligence officer in Germany, February 2007, “International Perceptions of US Nuclear Policy”, Sandria
Report, p. 77, AD: 7-30-9) JK
Finally, and most importantly, Germany is concerned that the new US nuclear doctrine could have
profound implications for NATO nuclear policy and German security. In other words, Germans are
worried about what political scientists call alliance “chain ganging” – when one state engages in
aggressive behavior that pulls its ally into a situation against the ally’s own best interests.293 For
example, Uwe Vorkoetter argues that “NATO’s security policy credibility will be seriously shaken if its
leading power acts differently from what the alliance partners are saying.”294 German analysts scoff at the
argument that the United States NPR, NSS and the 2005 draft Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations are US-
only national policy documents that have no bearing on NATO’s nuclear policy. Calling this argument a
“half-truth,” Meier argues: US nuclear doctrine has profound implications for NATO’s nuclear posture:
What if the White House ordered the use of nuclear bombs deployed in Europe to destroy a suspected
biological weapons cache in a Mideast country? Allies might expect Washington to consult NATO in
advance, but the only way they could prevent an actual deployment would be to deny overflight rights for US
aircraft carrying nuclear weapons to their intended targets.295 Similarly, Harald Mueller and Stephanie
Sohnius have warned German foreign policymakers that German armed forces could be drawn into a US-
initiated nuclear exchange if they were part of a NATO deployment abroad. In an article titled, “The
New US Nuclear Doctrine: a dangerous mistake,” they argue that the draft joint doctrine lists several
scenarios in which a US regional commander may request presidential approval for use of nuclear
weapons – without ally consultation – including a situation in which a nuclear weapon might be
necessary to ensure “success of US multinational operations.”296 In another monograph, Mueller and
Sohnius argue further that the NPR “conventionalizes” nuclear weapons use, which goes against the NATO
“de-emphasis” of nuclear weapons put forth in the 1991 NATO nuclear policy.297
Germans don’t like the US nuclear presence in Germany. It threatens their security and
gives way to Moscow’s tactical weapons.
p. 71, AD: 7-30-9) JK
The tension between the two identities is also evident in German views about the continued basing of
US nuclear weapons on German soil.262 These weapons became a point of contention in the week before
Germany’s September 18, 2005 national elections, when reports of an updated US nuclear doctrine – the
draft “Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations” – hit primetime German news. (The doctrine will be discussed
further below.) As presented in German news, the doctrine contains a wide-ranging list of scenarios in which
the US might be prepared for nuclear first-use, which “contradicts NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept, which
states that ‘the fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political’.” During the election run-
up, Claudia Roth, chair of the leftist Green Party, declared: “For us it is absolutely unimaginable that the
German armed forces continue to prepare for the use of nuclear weapons or that a nuclear weapons
mission [could be] initiated from German soil.” 263 Shortly thereafter, the Christian Democrats, a
traditionally right-leaning, pro-transatlantic party, called for a discussion of the draft doctrine within NATO.
(The Christian Democrats are now the only party in the Bundestag that supports the deployment of US
nuclear weapons in Germany and NATO’s nuclear posture. According to the party’s defense spokesman,
they support this because it “guarantees political influence on the use or non-use of nuclear weapons.”264)
German scholars argue that having these nuclear weapons in Germany is not in German strategic
interests, either. As Klaus-Dieter Schwarz argues, these weapons “are not very compatible with the new
partnership with Russia and provide Moscow with an excuse to maintain its arsenal of tactical
weapons.”265

Turn, the plan allows Germany to be taken seriously and prevents it from erupting
Müller 2k (Harald, defense analyst with PRIF, 2000, “Nuclear Weapons and German Interests: An Attempt at
Redefinition”, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, No. 55, AD: 7-30-9) JK
Germany’s well-being is founded on its close links with its friends and allies. These friends and allies
include three nuclear-weapons states, which, despite many a ritual exercise in rhetoric, show no
inclination to relinquish their status. My analysis up to now has indicated a clear German interest in
nuclear disarmament. The country’s partnership-links with France, the USA, and Britain are a countervailing
interest. Anyone who demands of a German government an attitude of uncompromising confrontation with
the nuclear weapons states completely overlooks the fact that the peaceful European relations which have
actually made it possible for us to think seriously about nuclear disarmament are rooted in just the kind of
multilateral relations that could be fundamentally jeopardized by an excessively radical disarmament policy.
This dilemma has yet to be properly appreciated. Policy-making must take it on board. Of course, the
correct response is not anticipatory subservience to the self-interests of the nuclear-weapons states. On
the contrary, such behaviour brings with it the risk that Germany’s own legitimate interests, once
recognized, will repeatedly be pushed to the bottom of the list. For one thing, this will mean Germany
will no longer be taken seriously in the other capitals of the world. For another, a considerable degree of
frustration will build up against Germany’s partners, and this may later erupt. A judicious Germany
policy will set out German interests very clearly, but when it comes to specifics will be ready to
accommodate the divergent interests of nuclear-armed partners.

No link, Germans are upset at the US for its nuclear policy
p. 73-4, AD: 7-30-9) JK
Finally, Germans argue the United States has backtracked from its commitments as a signatory of the
NPT, and especially from the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive implementation of Article
VI, that it signed at the 2000 Review Conference. In addition to the “unequivocal undertaking” by nuclear
weapons states to eliminate their arsenals, these 13 steps include ratification of the CTBT; the principle of
irreversibility as applied to nuclear disarmament and related arms control and reduction measures; full
implementation of START II and conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and
strengthening the ABM treaty; increased transparency regarding nuclear weapons capabilities; concrete
measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons; and a diminishing role for nuclear weapons
in security policies. German analysts point to the ways that the United States no longer considers itself
bound to all of these commitments:274
• The US has not ratified the CTBT.
• Although the US and Russia signed the Moscow Treaty, the treaty does not require the destruction of any
nuclear weapons, but only limits deployed delivery systems, which contradicts the principle of
“irreversibility” for arms control and nuclear disarmament.
• Rather than strengthening the ABM Treaty, the US has withdrawn from it.
• By promoting a qualitatively improved nuclear arsenal and the development of new types of weapons
systems such as earth penetrators, the NPR appears to increase the role of nuclear weapons in US
security policies.
• The NPR does not mention the NPT at all.
** Note: This card has multiple links highlighted depending on the aff you read. So
highlight it down accordingly **
Link Turn: NFU
No-First-Use reinforces the US nuclear arsenal as a deterrent- increases german security-
Graham 6 ( Thomas- Jr. Chairman, Bipartisan Security Group, Global Security Institute. NUCLEAR
NONPROLIFERATION TREATY: capitol hill hearing testimony. Sept. 26 2006. ONLINE. DA: 7-31. lexis) [mjc]
Some have argued that if the U.S. were to change its policy to no- first-use (and NATO change its policy as
well), then close U.S. allies, Germany and Japan, would lose confidence in U.S. extended deterrence (the
nuclear umbrella) and seek nuclear weapons of their own. But here is Germany vigorously arguing for such a
policy change in NATO and there is no indication that Japan's view is different, indeed the conclusion of the Tokyo
Forum study mandated by the Japanese national legislature, the Diet, a few years ago was to the effect that Japan
should support a no first use policy. The United States maintains this policy even though it has no military value and
the United States has formally pledged under the NPT in 1995, as said above, in effect never to use nuclear weapons
against NPT nonnuclear weapon states. No first-use is a particularly significant issue to focus on because it could be
implemented immediately in that it is simply a declaratory policy. Yet an explicit, clearly enunciated policy of not
introducing nuclear weapons into future conflicts would go a long way towards restoring the perceived good
faith of the United States concerning its NPT nuclear arms control and disarmament commitments as it
would reinforce the defensive posture of U.S. nuclear forces and make clear that the sole purpose of the
nuclear arsenal is to deter the use of nuclear weapons by others.
Link Turn: Terrorism
US nukes in Germany pose a major security risk- nuclear theft must be thwarted-
Officials from a German government party and the opposition demand that Germany should be freed from
some 20 or so remaining U.S. nuclear warheads stored in military bases in the country. The discussion was
launched after an internal U.S. Air Force report found security and safety standards at most nuclear weapons
storage sites in Europe fall well short of Pentagon requirements. This concerns politicians in Germany, who
question the need for a nuclear deterrent within the heart of Europe. "The nuclear weapons in Germany are a
hangover of the Cold War and must disappear," Guido Westerwelle, a senior lawmaker of the opposition Free
Democrats, told the Berliner Zeitung newspaper. "If there are indeed security shortcomings, then we have yet
another reason to remove all tactical nuclear weapons remaining in Germany." The Air Force report, which was
posted on the Internet by the Federation of American Scientists, found that sites with U.S. nuclear weapons are
often inadequately protected, with infrastructure in need of repair and security guard personnel
inexperienced or even unqualified to do their job. Gregor Gysi, the head of the increasingly far-left opposition
group Left Party, said the report showed once again that nuclear weapons are a safety risk.
Link Turn: TNWs
Safety concerns mean we must withdraw tactical nuclear weapons from Europe- to not do
this risks nuclear terrorism- it outweighs even improbable terrorism-
In the case of the nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, however, the aircraft shelters that store the
weapons are dispersed across eight different bases in six countries. In many cases, the shelters are located
only a few hundred meters or less from the fence surrounding the base (see Appendix C). The idea of
dispersing the weapons to shelters across the bases instead of storage in a central Weapons Storage
Area at each base emerged in the 1970s as a way of ensuring survival of nuclear weapons in case of a
Soviet surprise attack. With the Soviet threat gone, however, the assessment of security of nuclear
weapons on forward locations must be based on the threats that exist today.
The question is whether the vague and nonessential role that U.S. forward-deployed nuclear weapons
in Europe play today can any longer be argued to outweigh the potential consequences of a successful
terrorist attack – no matter how theoretical that may be. Withdrawing the remaining U.S. nuclear
weapons from Europe would alleviate that unnecessary risk, finish the withdrawal process that was
begun in 1991 but which has been dormant for a decade, and enable NATO to focus on the security
challenges that are relevant for the future. Perhaps changes might be possible under the current U.S. global
posture decision and the impending Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process.
Link Turn: Proliferation
Removing nuclear weapons would significantly embolden global anti-proliferation-
In Germany, an estimated 20 to 30 (the German government doesn't give any figures) remain at a German
Luftwaffe base in Buechel, in the state of Rhineland-Palatinate. This has angered the state government there,
led by Social Democratic Party, or SPD, Chairman Kurt Beck, who has called on Berlin to join forces with other
NATO allies for a reduction of nuclear weapons in Europe. The center-left Social Democrats are part of the
German government -- they form a coalition with German Chancellor Angela Merkel's conservatives -- and belong
to a majority in favor of urging Washington to bring home the nuclear weapons left in Germany. Nils Annen, an
SPD security expert, told the Berliner Zeitung a removal of U.S. nuclear warheads would be a "huge help" to
global anti-proliferation efforts. The former German government led by SPD Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder tried
to persuade Washington to bring home the warheads stationed in Germany, but because of a rather brusque
American rejection, negotiations on the issue were dropped.
Link Turn: Terrorism

Germany needs to build nuclear weapons to deter terrorist attacks
DPA 6 (Deutsche Presse Agentur is a Germany news agency, Germany may need own nuclear weapons: Scholz, January 26th 2006)
http://www.expatica.com/de/news/local_news/germany-may-need-own-nuclear-weapons-scholz-27147.html
BERLIN - Germany may need to build its own nuclear weapons to counter the threat of nuclear bombs
falling into the hands of a terrorist state, a former German defence minister said Thursday. "We need
a serious discussion over how we can react to a nuclear threat by a terrorist state in an appropriate
manner - and in extreme cases with our own nuclear weapons," said Rupert Scholz who served as
defence minister from 1988 to 1989. Germany does not have nuclear weapons and Scholz admitted in a
Bild newspaper interview that his remarks were breaking what is widely seen as a national taboo. Scholz -
who is a member of Chancellor Angela Merkel's Christian Democratic Union (CDU) - said Berlin should
first try to get binding guarantees from the NATO alliance that it would protect Germany in case nuclear
threats were directed at the country. But he insisted if such guarantees were not spelled out in a formal
NATO doctrine, then Germany needed to ponder building its own nuclear deterrence system. Such a move
would clearly violate the 2+4 Treaty which paved the way for Germany's 1990 reunification by formally
ending post-World War II occupation rights in the country for the US, the former USSR, Britain and France.
Under article three of the Treaty, Germany renounces "the manufacture and possession of and control over
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons." Rainer Stinner, a member of the opposition Free Democrats
(FDP) in parliament, sharply criticized calls for German nuclear weapons. "If we start questioning
international treaties, what right do we have to demand that others adhere to them?" said Stinner, adding,
"Germany's security would be reduced - not increased - through the possession of nuclear weapons." Last
week French President Jacques Chirac warned that France could use nuclear arms against state sponsors of
terrorism against his country. Chirac did not name any country but was widely seen to have been referring to
Iran which is suspected of seeking to build nuclear weapons - an allegation strongly denied by Tehran.

German Proliferation

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

German Proliferation

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Arizona Debate Institute 2009 1

Russell/Frappier Research Allied Prolif- Germany

No Link: Germany won’t rearm................................................................................................34

Germany is pursing disarmament and fast international non-proliferation treaties.

Germany is committed to non-proliferation efforts in the squo

Link: German Allied Prolif

Link: CTBT / Consult Solvency-

CTBT is a threat to German security- Extended deterrence is key-

Link: No First Use (Japan Rearm Link too)

Erosion of US extended deterrence would cause Germany to proliferate

Germany is an integral part of US nuclear deterrence- if we win germany, we win

I/L: No E/D -> German proliferation

Loss of faith in US deterrence would lead Germany to proliferation

I/L: German perception of insecurity -> prolif

German prolif would lead to massive global prolif

I/L: US withdrawal -> German prolif and Russian War

American nuclear withdrawl = German nukes & preventative Russian war

I/L: Umbrella Key

I/L: Security Guarantee

German security is based on US security guarantee-

I/L & Impact: Germany Proliferation

Impact: Vertical Prolif, Conventional arms, Russian Disarm

Impact: German Civil-war

German proliferation risks civil-war-

Impact: Alliance Collapse / Mearsheimer indict-

A nuclear Germany means European power imbalance and alliance breakdown-

C/P: NATO readiness (TNW’s)

A2: German Peace Movements

Germans want US nukes- peace movements are not the consensus-

A2: “Germans hate nukes”

A2: European Security Now

A2: German Companies will sell Nuclear Tech

Non-Unique: Deterrence Low

European deterrence low now- safety and security-

No Link: nukes not needed for deterrence

No Link: Germany won’t rearm

No Link: No First Use

No I/L: Germany won’t pursue nukes

No I/L: Iran Prolif

No I/L: Don’t need umbrella

German doesn’t need the nuclear umbrella- there is no threat-

No one hates Germany- not even terrorists-

Link Turn: Disarm

Link Turn: German Relations

Link Turn: German Relations

Link Turn: German Relations

Link Turn: NFU

No-First-Use reinforces the US nuclear arsenal as a deterrent- increases german security-

Link Turn: Terrorism

Link Turn: TNWs

Link Turn: Proliferation

Removing nuclear weapons would significantly embolden global anti-proliferation-

Link Turn: Terrorism

You might also like