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The Merging of Franchise Terrorism and Maritime Crime

Causes of the Rise of Maritime Franchise Terrorism

While we have lived with Maritime crime especially in the Caribbean since the days of the buccaneers
the focus of attention is now shifting to the merging of maritime crime and maritime terrorism.

There is a marked difference between acts of maritime crime such as piracy and mar jacking and
terrorist activity. There is clear evidence however that the two are merging.

An examination of the piracy statistics clearly shows a marked and rapid increase in piracy after 9/11.
One possible explanation for this is that as assets were frozen and funding channels shut down as a
result of arrests and surveillance of known and suspected terrorist associates a rapid increase in piracy
with activity doubling in some areas can be seen.

The increases have occurred in the waters where known terrorist organisations operate. On a very
simple level terrorist activities have to be funded and maritime trade accounting for over 90% of the
movement of the world’s trade provides excellent hunting with an unlimited choice of targets.

Successful terrorist attacks at sea come cheaply because of the relative ease of successfully carrying out
a high profile attack. The increasing ease of attack or the increasing need by pirate and terrorist groups
for funding is illustrated by IMB statistics and their steady rise in almost all the regions covered by
their reported statistics.

In 2001 there were a total of 371 incidents reported and in 2002 a total of 370 and over 450 reported
attacks were reported for 2003.It is important to consider that not all attacks are reported. The IMB can
only report incidents which have been reported to them. The actual number of attacks could therefore
be substantially higher.

We should also not blur the incidences of pirate attacks with those of terrorist attacks. There is however
increasing evidence of collaboration between experienced pirate groups and their loose networks and
more organised franchise terrorist groups who are hiring in expertise and in some instances working
closely together. Reports have been able to identify 4 groups in particular who use piracy and maritime
crime either to fund or supplement funding for their terrorist activities or more worryingly to practise
and perfect technique for other major attacks.

On the one hand International mass casualty events have focused the attention of law enforcement and
the resulting scrutiny has led to a worldwide clampdown on terrorist organisations. Ironically it is the
very reality of the closing net and the relentless pressure that worldwide law enforcement is placing on
the existing funding arrangements and financing venues that force terrorist organisations to turn to
activities like piracy to sustain their operations, raise funds and to work jointly with established
maritime based criminals ‘buying expertise ‘such as people smuggling to deliver terrorists into
metropolitan areas via sea.

In addition to the four identifiable groups employing maritime crime and piracy both as a tool of
financial gain and weapon of effect ;we cannot ignore the possibility that sustained activity in the
emerging hotspots and shipping choke points may also be a ploy to focus attention away from an
intended attack area that is unprepared and complacent. The ingredients for a successful attack in such
an instance is simply an active subversive organisation, the will and the softness of the target. That
apart as the current hotspots harden , like the drug trade the geographical area of activity will also
shift to softer target areas and those that would not normally or traditionally be assosciated with
maritime crime or piracy.

Terrorist groups can include freedom fighters, political and ideological pressure groups
In addition to terrorists turning to piracy to fund activities there are also increasing signs of
collaboration between terrorism and piracy.
The majority of the attacks take place in the Philippines, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Nigeria.

Piracy is loosely defined as maritime crime solely for financial gain and Maritime terrorism is maritime
crime aimed at:

– Attracting publicity, pressuring governments


– Creating apprehension or fear in public
– Discrediting governments
– Extorting money
– Promoting and funding illegal activity

This attack will not come from AL Qaeda, as we know it.

With almost 3000 of their operatives and associates neutralized or under surveillance and their strategic
planner Khalid sheikh Mohammed and their maritime expert Abd Al Rahim al Nishiri out of the theatre
of engagement; al Qaeda is a spent force, but it has accomplished its role, as it set out to do.

Al Qaeda Al Sulbah means the solid base…the spearhead …the pioneering vanguard of the Islamic
movement. Its aim is to show the way….To inspire and inculcate their ideology in other radical
fundamentalist Islamic groups.

• Tongan registered vessel belonging to Al Qaeda delivered explosives used to bomb 2 us


embassies in Africa aug 98
• Dec 2003 US forces in Persian gulf tracked and boarded dhows confiscating 3 shipments of
drugs worth 15 million US
• 7 of 45 crewmen detained had links to al Qaeda and drug smuggling was used to help finance
operations.

Why Maritime Environment

 Increase in global shipping traffic


 Upwards of 90 % of world freight moved by ship: ready supply of targets
 Majority of ship piracy occurs in areas where maritime policing is under resourced
 Growing trend toward skeleton crews on ships- this makes a ship a desirable target
 Boarding and gaining control is simpler with fewer crew
 As dragnet tightens around the financiers of terrorism new means of funding necessary

Ships cargos from hijacked vessels can be very lucrative for terrorist groups to gain access to cash in
the short term. These attacks include hijacking the vessels, beating the crew and in several instances
this year setting the crew adrift and stealing the ship itself. The vessels when found have been repainted
or their names changed and are then in use delivering illegal cargos and then abandoned.

The terrorist threat in this regard is substantial. In particular the trend toward hijacking vessels for one
of several objectives listed below:
-carrying out suicide attacks
-ransoms
Smuggling weapons and explosives
-piracy and cash generation through theft

But it is not just cargoes that attackers want . Other desirable objectives include: Cash from ships’
safes; stolen cargos as with Petro Ranger in 1998 and more recently the Han wei which disappeared
off the Sumatra Coast and rediscovered , repainted and its cargo offloaded and sold.
Very often stolen crew possessions and sometimes the vessel itself; or in the case of the Dewi Madrim
the knowledge of the Master in steering and maneuvering the tanker.
Persian gulf Dhows impounded by US after which followed the arrests of 45 men , 9 of which were
linked to Alqade

Known Pirate and Maritime Criminal and Terrorist Groups

Increasingly maritime and criminal attacks have been taking on more sinister forms .There is evidence
particularly in places like Sri Lanka that gangs rob ships to fund rogue military units and terrorist
groups. In fact Rohan Gunaratna, an expert on maritime terrorism in Sri Lanka indicates that groups
such as the LTTE are the basis upon which all other terrorist groups will model themselves. Although
they are currently engaged in a cease fire a press announcement on July 2nd 2004 asserted that the
LTTE was suspicious of Army manoeuvres and issued a warning that they would be forced to act if
that did occur.

Gunaratna asserts that the separatist sea tigers focused on being a military force and were not just
opportunistic pirates. His evidence indicates their advancement into building submarines to attack
shipping that strays into ‘their waters’. The model of operations that they have successfully developed
is feely available to copy cat organisations and other franchise terrorist networks. Their expertise is
very much in demand in the region and is exactly the kind of merging of political and religious
terrorism experts fear may be taking place around the world as an economic necessity

The most recent example of this type of terrorist related and politically motivated piracy is the 8 day
spate of attacks in Aceh, INDONESIA beginning on June 4th 2004.Eight major incidents involving
Automatic machine guns and grenades were reported. The attacks which resulted in the kidnapping of
several masters and chief engineers followed by demands for their release. The group suspected is the
GAM (Gerakin Aceh Merdeka) The Aceh political separatist movement in Indonesia.

Other groups with marked maritime capability are Jemmiah Islamayya (JI) Lashkar Jihad LaSKar
Jundullah (LJ) and the Rabitatul Maujahadeen.

Despite the arrests of Abu Bakar Bashir, Riduan Isamuddin (the legendary HAMBALI) and the Bali
bombers masterminded by JI the group is still a formidable threat

Other groups who have become synonymous with terrorist and pirate acts include the Egyptian
GAMA’at Al Islamiyah and Abu Sayyaf who in February admitted to smuggling explosives on board
the super ferry 14 ferry in Manila on Feb 27 killing more than 100 passengers and crew. This has not
been verified by the authorities who also suspect that an LNG leak caused the explosion. The disaster
has nevertheless created a ripple of fear in the Philippine community and fear is the ultimate aim of the
terrorist.

There are key areas in the world that are currently considered hotspots as a result of their importance to
oil and petro-chemical maritime transport. These choke points and bottle necks are currently receiving
massive interest from law enforcement .While there have been a significant number of serious incidents
and other terrorist indicator activity going on these hotspots it cannot be assumed that terrorist interest
lies here and here alone.

The increase in activity in SE Asia could potentially be yet another of the successful diversionary
tactics employed by the terror organisations and their special brand of franchise terrorism.

There is no shortage of terrorist groups in the region. It is the prefect, most fertile hunting ground for
these organisations to practice hijacking and to hone their techniques in preparation for the main event.

As vigilance is increased in the practice area they will move their attention to the soft targets lying in
waiting. Terrorist groups are effectively diverting attention from their main interest area by practicing
in one region and moving on to the main event when that target has hardened as is inevitable with both
ISPS code introduction and the magnified attention of world maritime authorities on the current trouble
spots.
This analysis is based on the available evidence of the types of ships being attacked and the frequency
with which they are attacked in ever more sophisticated ways. The attacks are becoming more violent,
more frequent and clearly more organised given the prevalence of mobile phones, automatic guns and
sat nav, with, in some instances, co-ordinated multiple fast speedboats in attendance.

Oil and chemical tankers are becoming the targets at alarming frequency. Conventional thinking
suggests that this is because these vessels are manned by smaller crews due to the computerised
sophistication of the newer increasingly younger fleet of vessels that safety codes require. Even on the
older PCG tankers smaller crews abound compared to other classes of vessel.

Terrorist targeting and build up would seem to be the conclusion taking all factors into consideration In
March 2002 10 intruders took control of the oil tanker Dewi Madrim off the coast of Sumatra and
practised steering and slowing the vessel, a complicated and lengthy process aboard a tanker , for one
hour .At the end of the exercise the left the ship with the Master and XO. In Singapore IMO Chief
Efthimos Mitropoulos stated at the end of May 2004 that that the recorder rise in crew abductions
particularly in the Malacca strait could be evidence of terrorists attempting to learn how to navigate
ships for use in maritime attacks. These instances have been almost exclusively with tankers.

Metropolitan Police in the UK have recently reported that there is sufficient evidence to believe that Al
Qaeda affiliates have recently taken possession of 15 ships flying Yemen and Somali flags. The vessel
is currently believed to be in the Indian or Pacific Ocean. The US had previously acknowledged that 15
freighters were under suspicion as reported by the Washington Post.

Bin Laden is well known to have owned and operated ships for several years. Records indicate that his
operations transported commodity items such as sesame seeds and cement. Another now confirmed
cargo for one of the vessels however were explosives which US officials believe was used to bomb the
two us embassies in Africa in 1998.

• Aceh Independence Movement (Indonesia)


• AL Qaeda
• Real IRA
• LTTE Sri Lanka

• Nov 2001 Irish customs found 20million smuggled cigarettes on Maria M (Cambodian Flag)
from Estonia
• Concealed in timber and worth 3 million pounds (Irish)
• The cargo belonged to Real IRA (terrorist breakaway faction of IRA –opposed to peace
accord)

• In January 2000 al Qaeda attempted to ram a boat loaded with explosives into the USS The
Sullivans in Yemen.

• The attack was aborted when the boat sank under the weight of the explosives.

• Later, in October, al Qaeda suicide bomber in high-powered speedboat packed with


explosives blew a hole in the USS Cole, killing 17 sailors.

• In June 2002, a group of al Qaeda operatives suspected of plotting raids on British and
American tankers passing through the Strait of Gibraltar was arrested by the Moroccan
government.

• Penrider and GAM

• In August 2003, The Penrider was attacked while carrying 1,000 tonnes of fuel oil near the
Malaysian coast.
• Fourteen pirates boarded the vessel, armed with AK-47 and M-16 assault rifles.
• The ship's captain was forced to sail into Indonesian waters, where three of the crew were
taken hostage.
• They were only released after protracted ransom negotiations

• All the activity in the hot spots shown earlier I believe to be diversionary.
• Practice grounds for non maritime terrorist groups to find their feet .(sea legs)
• Once the target area becomes hardened which is happening now in Singapore straits in
particular attention will turn to softer targets.

In 2003 three foreign owned Tonga registered ships have been caught ferrying terrorist, weapons and
explosives for Al Qaeda. US is investigating a shipping company called Nova incorporated in
Delaware and Romania after two vessels were used to smuggle suspected al Qaeda operatives. 8
Pakistanis jumped ship in Trieste from the nova owned Twillinger last February the men falsely
claimed to be crew men and carried false passports and id and very large sums of money.

In august 2003 the Sara also a nova vessel sent a SOS to the Italian maritime authorities after
claiming the ships owners had force him to take on board 15 Pakistanis in Casablanca. The 15 began
threatening the crew with weapons and were later charged with conspiracy to engage in terrorist acts
after evidence confirmed they were linked to al Qaeda.

There have been more than one instanced of this report. While the world is focused on the Malaccan
straits and the waters off Indonesia there are softer targets in the Caribbean and Venezuela and the
Bahamas where the eyes of the world \re not so intently focused and the lower threat level could
conceivably encourage complacency.

Franchise terrorism is now the reality for law enforcement to get to grips with. Al Qaeda has, as
promised, shown the way .The new terrorist agenda is to go beyond ‘the limited territorial agenda and
to wage universal jihad’ according to Rohan Gunaratna, Singapore‘s resident terrorist and Al Qaeda
expert and a British Chevening scholar in terrorism.

The complex problem that now presents itself to Maritime counter and anti- terrorism planners is that
we now do not know where to look nor for whom to look because the real danger is not of Al Qaeda
but of the Al Qaeda way embodied by every new terrorist organisation that sets its eyes on the softer
targets the sea provides.

Successfully dealing with Maritime crime and terrorism is therefore now a function of target hardening.
Both of vessels, crews, ports, offshore facilities and in the acceptance and readiness of the minds of
those whose role it is to enforce maritime law and protect the lives and properties of those who trade on
the sea.

The inherent difficulties in actually carrying out this role to a large extent comes down to jurisdictional
issues best exemplified by Singapore’s Rear Admiral Teo who in June 2004 stated that the
responsibility for ensuring safety lay not just with the littoral states but with users of waterways as
well.

The Admiral was referring to the reality that Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore simply were not
sufficiently resourced to adequately police all of the 900 kms of sea lanes between East Asia Europe
and the Middle East. This problem is exacerbated by the sovereignty issue with territorial waters as
illustrated by the same three countries over the right of the US to jointly patrol their waterways and
apprehend suspicious vessels should the need arise.

This same sovereignty issue was met head on by the Caribbean states in a similar conflict with the US
which resulted in the compromise Ship rider agreement in the 90s.The agenda then was narcotics
interdiction but the lessons learned were invaluable. The cross fertilization of expertise and ‘local
water’ experience and the injection of muscle, co-operation and new and fresh approaches to an age old
problem reaped more than its fair share of results and re-energised local maritime policing by the
brown and green water coats guards of the region.
This approach is the only one that will help make anyway in the fight against terrorism. Terrorism is a
global problem .It is transnational .Terrorists move beyond borders and operates through franchise
arrangements in several hemispheres at the same time in co-ordinated attacks.

Terrorist groups co-operate across the ideological divide and if governments are to win this battle then
they must adopt the same transnational approach sharing information, sharing resources, intelligence
and operational units where possible.

In the Caribbean and in Trinidad an Tobago in particular there is joint operational co-operation, joint
operational units and a joint operations command centre with sweeping radar coverage .These have
been operational for over 8 years.

This is the way of the future and the only way that maritime terrorism can be effectively fought. The
high seas have no borders outside of territorial water and the terrorists and pirates respect no borders,
and those who pursue them must also embrace the spirit of co-operation and think transnationallly. In
this way the advent of the ISA and the Law of the Sea Treaty will foster a new era of International co-
operation. The IMO has also done its part with the new ISPS code.

The new Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) introduced by the US in May 2003 and announced to
the world in Sept at the UN General assembly includes 11 current nations with plans to begin laying
the ground work for co-operation on searching, seizing and addressing interdiction legal issues.
Several Maritime exercises involving the US Exercise Malabar 2003 and Pacific Protector have begun
the process of co-operation and joint operations.

Persistent Problems in Effective Mitigation

It is exceptionally difficult to mitigate against the theft and piracy due to a range of problems that even
the IMO’s new ISPS code cannot address. Issues of territorial sovereignty , restrictions against hot
pursuit and the implausibility of hot pursuit when you are in a tanker that has just been robbed,
jurisdictional responsibilities are especially complex when territorial sea lanes are contested and here
the most recent example of this is the Basra seaways in dispute with Iran and Iraq.

The lack of an International Navy which specialises in patrolling the high seas and with authority in the
shipping lanes is another area that helps pirates and terrorists to ply their trade. This issue will become
even more complex with the ratification of the UN's Law of the Sea Treaty which will expressly
prohibit board and searches by sovereign states in open water. Without a super navy to conduct these
operations under the control of the International Seabed Authority it will virtually be impossible for
acute or hot pursuit in any form.

Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) article 101 defines piracy in a board
sense as acts which take place outside the jurisdiction of a state this will complicate the issue even
more if in a strict legal sense piracy acts which take place within territorial sea of a state are considered
not piracy as defined by the convention but are the responsibility of individual states. The problem then
falls squarely back onto the shoulders of the under resourced, under equipped states of the developing
world where piracy remains prevalent.

While the ISPS code covers vessels 500 tonnes and above in 4 of the 5 ship categories (CRR, PAX,
PCG and OBC) it does not cover the persistent offenders explicitly. Although it does make reference to
the problem area in several areas notably Part A sec 4.45 and 4.46 in which it states that consideration
should be paid to vessels not in the convention categories and requests signatory states to pay due
regard to the measures in their security considerations for other categories of vessel under
jurisdictional control. There is also reference to this in Part B 4.20 and 4.21.

The problems however that the vessels in the most offending categories remain, strictly speaking
outside of International control. The case is complete by consideration of the act that these smaller
vessels are precisely the vessels which perpetrate most pf the reported incidents an are in fact not blue
water vessels but which operate within sight of the coastline and therefore within the territorial waters
of the state in question.

These issues were addressed by the IMO in 1998 in Brazil and in Singapore in 1999 where the
participating states at both seminars adopted resolutions recommending the IMO legal committee
consider developing an international code for the investigation of piracy and armed robbery against
ships and recommending an appropriate punishment for the crime. These were formally adopted in
2001 by resolution Code of practice for the investigation of the crimes of piracy and armed robbery at
sea a922 (22) and A 923(22) Measures to prevent the registration of phantom ships.

Other areas that need addressing are the international harmonisation of the procedures for exercising
jurisdiction for investigating reported cases of piracy on the high seas. Further the punishment and
extradition of convicted and suspected pirates and the agreements necessary to enforce this also needs
to be put in place. When you consider that in majority of the countries where piracy is prevalent there
does not even exist a crime of piracy the problem is then amplified.

Methods of Effective Mitigation

The same close attention placed on the world’s terrorist and piracy hot spots has resulted in a hardening
or perceived hardening of these targets. This will result in the search for softer, less well policed targets
of equal or higher impact value. The threat is as mobile as the pirates and terrorists and the only
winning approach is one of vigilance and of knowledge so that pirate attacks anywhere in the world
and continued attempted high jackings will be met with the same response no matter where they occur.

The objective therefore is an understanding of the threat faced by the region in question. A database of
reported attacks or suspicious activity with easy access to shipping or sea going fraternity is the first
step. Locations and positions of suspicious vessels or attack areas should be broadcast via bulletin
board or marine guidance notices. A compilation of types of events and methods, weapons, and boat
descriptions should be developed.

This information should be shared on a regional basis and cross referenced regularly. One man’s
missing ‘wanted vessel’ is another man’s new harbour arrival.
Coast guards or brown and green water patrol services should regularly work along side each other.
Regular secondments to regional units spread expertise and experience and broadens the knowledge of
individual officers .Regular meetings and familiarity with the shipping community encourages easy
communication and intelligence gathering for law enforcement.

While slim line crews are the new trend with sophisticated ships the new IMO code which demands
preparedness on board vessels as a result of the new ship security plans hardens vessels from surprise
attacks.

Where PCG carriers are concerned harbour patrols and where possible aerial surveillance preferably
helicopters should always accompany vessels entering and leaving ports or when in the vicinity of large
populations.

The more unlikely the event, the softer the target, the more attractive the potential atrocity. Where the
port or sea lane in constant or regular use a regular naval presence must be on standby.

Deterrence and visibility are also target hardeners. Awareness, and readiness coupled with deterrence
and visibility may be the only effective weapons we have against maritime pirates and terrorists. The
new ISPS code will go a long way to ensure that these are implemented.

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