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Humanitarian/Disaster
Relief Operations
Joint Warfare Publication 3-52
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JWP 3-52
Director General
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CONDITION OF RELEASE
i
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JWP 3-52
AUTHORISATION
The Joint Doctrine & Concepts Centre (JDCC), is responsible for publishing Joint
Warfare Publications (JWPs) and Joint Doctrine Pamphlets (JDPs) and maintaining a
hierarchy of such publications. Users wishing to quote JWPs or JDPs as reference
material in other work should confirm with the JDCC Doctrine Editor whether the
particular publication and amendment state remains extant. Comments on factual
accuracy or proposals for amendment should also be directed to the Doctrine Editor at:
DISTRIBUTION
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JWP 3-52
PREFACE
SCOPE
1. Background. There will be occasions when it will be appropriate to deploy
military assets to assist in a foreign humanitarian emergency or disaster relief effort,
either on a national basis or as part of an international effort. Work resulting from the
post - Op BARWOOD Humanitarian Relief Study (Mozambique) highlighted the lack
of national guidance for the provision of military assistance to foreign humanitarian
emergencies and disaster relief efforts. It was determined that Joint Doctrine was
required in order to provide the necessary guidance.
4. Given the nature of the subject matter, JWP 3-52 has been produced in close co-
ordination with other government department (OGD) stakeholders and acknowledges
the input of international and non-governmental organisations (IO and NGO). As such
it should be of value to ‘head-office’ and ‘field-worker’ elements of the Department
for International Development and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, as well as
being of utility to the wider humanitarian community.
1
For example: Operation BARWOOD in Mozambique (Feb/Mar 00) (Tropical Cyclone) or Operation TELLAR in
Central America (Nov 98) (Hurricane).
2
For example: The provision of humanitarian assistance by ISAF to humanitarian effort in response to the earthquake in
Afghanistan (Mar 02) or by KFOR in response to the KOSOVO refugee crisis.
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JWP 3-52
3
A Joint Doctrine Pamphlet (JDP) on ‘Joint Civil-Military Co-operation’ is currently under development and is planned
for publication in 2003.
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JWP 3-52
CONTENTS
Page No
Title Page i
Authorisation, Distribution ii
Preface iii
Contents v
Joint Warfare Publications vii
Record of Amendments viii
Chapter 1 Overview
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Terminology 1-2
Operational Environment 1-3
Characteristics of Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operations 1-4
Disaster Types 1-6
Annex 1A - Types of Disaster
Assessment 3-1
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JWP 3-52
Chapter 4 Planning
Planning 4-1
Planning Considerations 4-4
Mission Analysis and Estimate Process 4-6
Forces 4-6
Annex 4A - MOD/DFID Planning Process Framework
Annex 4B - HDR Planning Checklist
Glossary of Abbreviations
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JWP 3-52
Joint Doctrine Pamphlets (JDPs) are published as necessary to meet those occasions
when a particular aspect of joint doctrine needs to be agreed, usually in a
foreshortened time scale, either in association with a planned exercise or operation, or
to enable another aspect of doctrinal work to be developed. This will often occur
when a more comprehensive ‘parent’ publication is under development, but normally
well in advance of its planned publication.
vii
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JWP 3-52
RECORD OF AMENDMENTS
Amendment No. Date of Insertion Initials
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PART 1
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JWP 3-52
CHAPTER 1 – OVERVIEW
101. The Global physical environment is changing and the consequence of this is
likely to be an increase in environmental failures (droughts, floods, famine).
Increasing pressure on the World’s physical resources linked with an increased interest
from the world media and concern from leading nations and donors make it likely that
UK Armed Forces may be called upon to support humanitarian and disaster relief
efforts more frequently in the future.1
DEFENCE MISSION E
‘To contribute forces to operations designed to prevent, contain and resolve conflict, in support of
international order and humanitarian principles, and to contribute to efforts to deal with humanitarian
crises and disasters.’
MILITARY TASK 20
Humanitarian Operations and Disaster Relief Outside the UK and Overseas Territories
‘Humanitarian crises and disasters, if not addressed rapidly and effectively at an early stage, can
often lead to potentially serious conflicts. When appropriate, and at the request of the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office or the Department for International Development, the Armed Forces
contribute to humanitarian and disaster relief operations, either on a national basis or as part of a co-
ordinated international effort.’
104. The utility of military forces to support UK and international relief efforts is an
important function for which UK military forces should be prepared.
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1
The Strategic Context 2000 (The Physical Dimension).
2
Military Task 20 from the JETL (Version 4.1) maintained by JF Trg & Stds, DCJO (OPS SP), PJHQ. This is further
broken down into subordinate tasks throughout the operational levels.
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JWP 3-52
SECTION I – TERMINOLOGY
105. British Defence Doctrine (BDD) differentiates between support to foreign
emergency/disaster relief efforts, and the provision of humanitarian assistance, based
on the security situation and the mission of the involved military forces, namely:
the situation resulting from a catastrophe. The aims of disaster relief are to
save life and lessen suffering, limit damage and restore essential services to a
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JWP 3-52
level that enables local authorities to cope. Disaster relief demands the total
integration of the relief effort with the life-support assets and infrastructure
available within the disaster area.
c. Rapid Onset Disaster.3 Rapid Onset Disaster is any disaster that has
not been predicted or if predicted the scale of the disaster is far greater than
anticipated. Examples are hurricanes, earthquakes and floods.
inherent resources are insufficient to absorb the impact and deal with the event’s
consequences. Many humanitarian emergencies and disasters are prolonged. Their
effects can be mitigated by international aid and development programmes designed to
address the immediate needs of a stricken population and to build capacity enabling
local society to better cope with humanitarian emergency/disaster situations.
108. Rapid Onset Disasters. Events can occur that have a relatively sharply
defined start, pose an acute, generalised threat to life, livelihoods, or basic societal
well-being and overwhelm local capacity to deal with the effects.5 These types of
humanitarian emergency/disaster are termed Rapid Onset Disasters.6
110. Unpredictability. Each HDRO will take place in a unique and unpredictable
environment. HDROs will normally be undertaken in a dysfunctional environment
with varying degrees of chaos. There will be a mismatch between necessary resources
3
This is a DFID term. UN OCHA use the term ‘ Sudden Onset Disaster’.
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4
NATO definition as articulated in MC 411/1.
5
This includes a sudden change in circumstances in the midst of a slower onset or protracted emergency/disaster.
6
E.g. An earthquake occurring in the midst of an ongoing humanitarian emergency based on drought/conflict
(Afghanistan Mar 02).
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111. Responsibility. Notwithstanding the above, the overall responsibility for all
relief actions rests with the stricken state. UK military forces may undertake a HDRO
to support the relief effort, either bilaterally or as part of a wider international effort, at
the request of DFID following an appeal for assistance by the stricken state.
112. Permissive Environment. Given that HDROs are conducted at the request of
a stricken state, albeit through DFID, and therefore ‘by invitation’, they will to all
intents and purposes be conducted in a permissive environment. Security issues,
including policing functions, remain the responsibility of the stricken state. However,
depending on the internal situation, and taking account of any local tensions and the
functionality of the state security system, there may be a requirement to provide
sufficient security for essential asset protection.
113. Co-ordination Requirement. National bodies and recognised organisations
such as the United Nations (UN), International Federation of Red Cross and Red
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timely manner both Departments must recognise the requirements and needs of the
other and should wherever possible take them into account when planning and
decision making. In responding to humanitarian emergencies/disasters DFID will
usually channel its assistance through its traditional partners – the UN, ICRC, Red
Cross/Red Cresent Movement, and NGOs – and wherever possible utilise local and
regional civilian resources. DFID will utilise military assets when the scale and
timeliness of the assistance needed by vulnerable populations cannot be met by
civilian resources alone. Given that all military assets work within particular readiness
criteria, it is important that DFID provides MOD with as much advance warning as
possible, even if the use of military assets is only anticipated. This facilitates the early
provision of informed advice on available military resources and the identification of
potential cost effective relief effort ‘multipliers’, the inclusion of military
representation on the DFID led in-country needs assessment, timely planning (if only
contingency) and suitable force generation (if MOD are ultimately engaged).
However, the early engagement of military assets needs to be considered against the
potential raising of expectations, both national and international, which may then
necessitate the employment of military assets when their use may otherwise have been
unnecessary.
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7
Contemporary military support to humanitarian emergency/disaster relief is generally offered bi-laterally.
8
A table summarising the main ‘rules’ that should be observed by States in response to international disaster relief
efforts is included within UN OCHA Guidelines on the use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (May
1994) – commonly referred to as the ‘OSLO Guidelines’.
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induced military involvement. The media will have the ability to make uncensored
live global broadcasts and file instant reports from within the Joint Operations Area
(JOA). There is therefore the risk that politicians, international leaders, the stricken
society and the general public, both at home and abroad, may receive direct and raw
information upon which inappropriate perceptions may be based and unrealistic
expectations raised. To ameliorate this it is necessary to have a coherent and co-
ordinated Media Ops plan linked to the UK Government’s Information Campaign9 and
able to convey the UK’s policy to different audiences. This should be developed in
consultation with the DFID Press Office.
b. Man made.
(1) Chemical, industrial or major transport accidents, and
environmental incidents.
(2) Mass Population Movement.
120. Details of the factors contributing to the various disasters and the typical needs
post-disaster onset are at Annex 1A.
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9
See JWP 3-45 ‘Media Operations’, Ch 1, Sect 2 and JWP 3-80 ‘Information Operations’, Ch 1, Sect 2.
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ANNEX 1A – TYPES OF DISASTER
1. The following disaster types are listed below in more detail (This list is not exhaustive, but rather more illustrative to
highlight the potential issues.):
a. GEOLOGICAL: Earthquake, Landslides, Tsunamis and Volcanic Eruption.
b. CLIMATIC: Drought, Flood, Tropical Cyclone, Wildfire.
GEOLOGICAL HAZARDS
Factors Contributing to Typical Adverse Effects Possible Risk Specific Typical Needs Post-
Vulnerability Reduction Preparedness Disaster Onset
Earthquake a. Location of settlements a. Physical damage - damage to key a. Hazard a. Earthquake a. Search and rescue.
in seismic areas. structures and infrastructure. mapping. warning and b. Emergency
b. Rigid structures not b. Casualties – Often high, b. Public preparedness medical assistance.
resistant to ground motion. particularly near epicentre or in highly awareness programmes. c. Damage needs and
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Factors Contributing to Typical Adverse Effects Possible Risk Specific Typical Needs Post-
Vulnerability Reduction Preparedness Disaster Onset
Landslides a. Settlements built on a. Physical damage - anything on top a. Hazard a. Community a. Search and rescue.
steep slopes, soft soils, and of or in the path of landslide will mapping. education. b. Medical assistance.
cliff tops. suffer damage. b. Monitoring. c. Emergency shelter.
b. Settlements built at the b. Casualties - Fatalities due to c. Warning and
base of steep slopes, on landslide. evacuation
mouths of streams from system.
mountain valleys.
c. Roads, communication
lines in mountain areas.
d. Buildings with weak
foundations.
e. Buried pipelines, brittle
pipes.
Tsunamis a. Location of settlements a. Physical infrastructure damage - a. Protection of a. Hazard a. Warning and
(Seismic Sea in low- lying coastal resulting from the initial force of water buildings along mapping, evacuation.
Wave) regions. and follow on flooding. coasts; houses planning b. Search and rescue.
b. Lack of tsunamis b. Casualties and Public Health – on stilts. evacuation routes. c. Medical assistance.
resistant buildings. deaths principally by drowning and b. Building b. Establish
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d. Conduct disaster
c. Lack of timely warning injuries from battering by debris. barriers such as warning systems. assessment.
systems and evacuation c. Contamination by salt water and breakwaters. c. Community e. Water supply and
plans. debris or sewerage may make water education. purification.
d. Lack of public unpotable.
awareness of destructive d. Crops and food supplies - Harvest,
forces of tsunamis. food stocks, livestock farm
implements and fishing boats may be
lost. Land may be rendered infertile
due to salt-water incursion.
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JWP 3-52
Factors Contributing to Typical Adverse Effects Possible Risk Specific Typical Needs Post-
Vulnerability Reduction Preparedness Disaster Onset
Volcanic a. Settlements on the a. Settlements, infrastructure and a. Land use a. National a. Warning and
Eruption flanks of volcanoes. agriculture – Complete destruction of planning for volcanic education.
b. Settlements in historic everything in path of pyroclastic, mud settlements emergency plans. b. Medical assistance.
path of lava flows or mud. and lava flows; collapse of structures around b. Volcano c. Search and rescue.
under weight of wet ash, flooding, volcanoes. monitoring and
c. Structures with roof d. Provision of food,
blockage of roads or communication b. Protective warning system.
designs not resistant to ash water and shelter.
accumulation. systems. structural c. Training in
b. Casualties and health - Death from measures. e. Relocate victims.
d. Presence of search and rescue
pyroclastic flows, mudflows and and firefighting. f. Provide financial
combustible materials.
possibly lava flows and toxic gases. assistance.
e. Lack of evacuation plan Injuries from falling rocks, burns,
or warning systems. respiratory difficulties from gas or ash.
c. Crops and food supplies -
Destruction of crops in path of flows,
ash may break tree branches, livestock
may inhale toxic gas or ash; grazing
lands may be contaminated.
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CLIMATIC HAZARDS
Factors Contributing to Typical Adverse Effects Possible Risk Specific Typical Needs Post-
Vulnerability Reduction Preparedness Disaster Onset
Droughts a. Location in an arid area a. Reduced income of farmers. a. Drought and a. Development a. Measures for
where dry conditions are b. Reduction of spending on famine early of inter- maintaining food
increased by drought. agriculture. warning system. institutional security; price
b. Subsistence farming. c. Increase in price of staple foods. response plan. stabilisation, food
c. Lack of seed reserves. subsidies, food
d. Increase in inflation rate. distribution.
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Factors Contributing to Typical Adverse Effects Possible Risk Specific Typical Needs Post-
Vulnerability Reduction Preparedness Disaster Onset
d. Lack of agricultural e. Loss of livestock. b. Develop livestock
inputs to improve yields. f. Deterioration of nutritional status. programme.
e. Area dependent on g. Famine, illness and death. c. Develop
rainfall weather system. h. Reduction in drinking water supplementary feeding
f. Area of low soil moisture sources. programme.
retention. d. Develop
i. Migration.
g. Lack of resources to complementary water
cope with drought. and health
programmes.
Floods a. Location of settlements a. Physical damage - Structures a. Flood a. Flood a. Search and rescue.
on floodplains. damaged by washing away, impact by control. detection and
b. Medical assistance.
b. Lack of awareness of floating debris and collapsing. warning.
Landslides from saturated soils. c. Disaster assessment.
flooding hazard. b. Development
b. Water supplies - Contamination of of master plan d. Evacuation/
c. Non-resistant buildings
wells and ground water possible. for floodplain relocation.
and foundations.
c. Casualties and public health - management. e. Short term food and
d. High risk Infrastructure
Deaths from drowning but few serious c. Floodplain water supplies.
elements.
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JWP 3-52
Factors Contributing to Typical Adverse Effects Possible Risk Specific Typical Needs Post-
Vulnerability Reduction Preparedness Disaster Onset
warning system. debris, or flooding. Water flood plain plans. d. Water purification.
c. Lightweight structures, contamination may lead to viral management. c. Training and
outbreaks and malaria. e. Re-establish
old construction, poor c. Reduction community logistical and
quality masonry. c. Water supplies - Ground water may and structural participation. communications
d. Infrastructure elements, be contaminated. vulnerability. networks.
fishing boats and maritime d. Crops and food supplies –Standing d. Improved f. Disaster assessment.
industries. crops, food stocks and tree plantations vegetation
ruined. cover. g. Provision of seeds
for planting.
Wildfire a. Location of wildfire a. Effects can be very destructive, a. Hazard a. Fire-fighting a. Provision of fire
prone areas. especially in loss of buildings, timber mapping. resources. fighting resources.
b. Wildfire threat tends to and livestock. b. Accurate risk b. Disaster b. Provision of
be seasonal. b. Recovery from the effects on the assessment. management temporary shelters in
environment may take several years. plan. safe havens.
c. Speed of onset may vary c. Monitoring
depending on the climatic c. Public health - effects of smoke and warning c. If required the
conditions. and burns. systems. provision of smoke
d. Evacuation of d. Fire masks.
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MAN-MADE HAZARDS
Factors Contributing Typical Adverse Effects Possible Risk Specific Typical Needs Post-
to Vulnerability Reduction Preparedness Disaster Onset
Chemical a. Those persons, a. Physical damage - Damage or a. Development of a. Hazard mapping.
and structures, livestock, destruction may occur to a disaster response b. Hazardous
industrial crops and environment structures and infrastructure. plan. materials
accidents closest to the scene of an Transportation accident damage
identification.
accident are most vehicles and other objects on
vulnerable, large-scale impact. Industrial fires may be c. Inspection of
releases of airborne killed or injured and require chemical plants and
pollutants may spread medical treatment. storage facilities.
for hundreds of b. Casualties - Many people may d. Monitoring of
kilometres. be killed or injured and require toxic waste disposal
b. Lack of safety medical treatment. procedures.
features or lack of c. Environmental - e. Improve
evacuation plan. firefighting capacity.
Contamination of the air, water
c. Unawareness by supply, land, animal life may f. Monitoring
vulnerable persons of occur. pollution levels.
the potential danger.
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g. Capability to
physically contain
pollutants.
h. Prepare and
practice evacuation
plans.
i. Test warning
sirens.
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JWP 3-52
Factors Contributing Typical Adverse Effects Possible Risk Specific Typical Needs Post-
to Vulnerability Reduction Preparedness Disaster Onset
Mass a. Unwillingness of a. Local destabilisation due to: a. Address causes a. Institutional a. Emergency shelter.
Population responsible authorities to of population education.
• Overbearing on host b. Provision of food and
Movement take measures to movement. b. Community water.
infrastructure.
mitigate vulnerability. b. Famine early education.
• Increased tensions as a result c. Medical assistance.
b. Inability to act to warning system.
of ethnic imbalances. c. Monitoring. d. Support to host
mitigate their own c. Accurate risk
vulnerability. • Impact on economy and infrastructure.
assessment.
c. Limited or late staple food supply. e. Amelioration of
d. Awareness
acknowledgement of b. Increased mortality rate due to impact on host
programmes. population.
their plight by poor food, sanitary and health
International conditions. f. Medium-term food
Community. security measures.
c. Malnutrition.
d. Limited self- g. Medium-term
d. Secondary diseases as a result
sufficiency. feeding programme.
of conditions.
e. No supporting h. Medium-term water
e. Increasing health requirements
infrastructure. and health programmes.
with worsening situation.
f. Limited means to
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202. Within DFID the lead responsibility for dealing with Rapid Onset Disaster
relief rests with the Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD). This
is done in close collaboration with DFID geographical departments and overseas
offices. CHAD maintains an emergency response capability through an Operations
Team (CHAD OT), operating on a round-the-clock basis throughout the year. A duty
officer provides out-of-hours cover, but during a major crisis the headquarters is
staffed on a 24-hour basis. The core team can be supplemented by a larger roster of
humanitarian experts on a call-down arrangement. Humanitarian emergency/disaster
relief operations are controlled from the CHAD operations room in London. CHAD
OT participates in regular training, liaison and briefing, with the Permanent Joint
Headquarters (PJHQ) and Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ).
CHAD(DFID) PRINCIPAL TASK
For many developing countries, the ability to promote development and reduce poverty is regularly
affected by conflict, by natural disasters and by those created by human action or inaction. The
CHAD principal task is
‘to prevent conflict and disasters, or to mitigate their effects’.
203. DFID’s priority is to improve and strengthen international disaster response
capacity under the overall co-ordination of the United Nations (UN). This mechanism
is described in Chapter 3. It is DFID policy to integrate disaster preparedness and
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1
As set out in DFID’s White Paper on International Development (1997) – ‘Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for
the 21st Century’.
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JWP 3-52
response work into their country and thematic programmes where possible. This
allows for better transition from the emergency phase to recovery, rehabilitation and
reconstruction.
205. Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The FCO holds overall political
responsibility for engagement with other nations. MOD support to a DFID response to
a humanitarian emergency/disaster situation takes place within this overall political
responsibility. The FCO is responsible for obtaining political approval for UK military
deployment into other nation states, including the stricken state. Political advice on
the circumstances for a potential Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operation (HDRO) will
be provided by the FCO, including aircraft routing and negotiating diplomatic
clearance requests for over-flight, staging and the operation of a Forward Mounting
Base (FMB), if necessary. Assistance will be provided in the provision of visa (which
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may be required at short notice) and in the arrangements for the provision of Host
Nation Support (HNS) and local resources for the support of the Joint Task Force
(JTF).
206. HM’s Representative. British Embassies, High Commissions and DFID
Country Offices play a key role in providing early information of emerging crises and
situation assessments following disasters. Their links with host Governments and in-
country humanitarian agencies makes them an important information source and part
of the co-ordination system in the affected country. They may also be able to facilitate
some UK disaster response activities, including local procurement of relief goods
funded by DFID.
207. Ministry of Defence. In conducting HDRO, the MOD operates in support of
the lead government department (DFID). Such support to humanitarian
emergency/disaster response is undertaken on an ‘as requested’ basis and within means
and capability of core military capacity and readiness. This principle will help to
ensure that any necessary military support is made by ‘demand pull’ rather than
‘supply push’. Notwithstanding the onus lying with DFID to request MOD assistance,
the MOD must anticipate likely requests at the onset of any humanitarian /disaster
situation and should offer timely advice on suitability and availability of military
support.
and thus it is important that the balance of responsibilities between military and
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disaster response staffs is understood by all those involved when planning and
executing such operations.
relief.
b. A request from the FCO to the MOD. Whilst a less likely route, DFID
would still lead, including co-ordination of funding, and require consultation.
This would most likely be as part of a UN or multinational initiative.
211. Evacuation. In circumstances where UK ‘entitled persons’ are at risk as a
result of a disaster, the FCO may request military assistance to conduct a Non-
combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) of UK entitled persons from the affected area.
The Embassy/High Commission’s Civil Contingency Plan (CCP) would be used as the
basis for any evacuation. UK military assistance would be arranged in accordance
with JWP 3-51 ‘Non-combatant Evacuation Operations’.
a disaster response effort. The CHAD Civil-Military Advisor will make initial contact
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with the appropriate MOD Secretariat Regional Desk (MOD point of contact (POC))2
to register the possibility of a formal request for military support. Should a crisis
emerge out of working hours then the nominated CHAD Liaison Officer (LO) to MOD
will make contact through the MOD Resident Clerk. The following information will
be relevant and may be requested/exchanged:
214. Focal Point of Contact. DFID’s focal POC/LO to the MOD will normally be
the CHAD Civil-Military Advisor,3 will be located with the CHAD OT emergency
response planning team and will provide continuous liaison/feedback to the MOD
POC4 on the emerging disaster situation.
215. Approval. Once DFID make a formal request for the use of military assets
and MOD approve military assistance then direct liaison can take place with PJHQ.
Liaison with PJHQ will initially be through J3 Ops Support5 and a CHAD Military
LO. Subsequently there may be a requirement for ongoing liaison between CHAD
and various PJHQ Divisions, especially J2, J4 and J5. It may also be appropriate for a
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2
The default fallback contact is the appropriate MOD Directorate Regional Desk.
3
In the event of the Civil Military Adviser being unavailable or contact being made out of working hours a member of
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the CHAD OT will be designated POC for initial liaison with the MOD.
4
This will normally be the MOD Secretariat Regional Desk unless out of working hours when the MOD Resident Clerk
will become the POC.
5
The DFID/CHAD Liaison officer is the SO2 J3 (Ops Spt) CIMIC.
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JWP 3-52
219. The production of cost estimates should be an integral part of the operational
planning process; it is therefore important for the costing process to match the pace of
operational planning. The costing process for HDRO, whilst similar to any other
operation, is likely to be influenced by the need for speed, a customer/supplier
relationship with DFID, and close political, media and public attention. The estimated
cost of the use of military assets is likely to be a critical factor in DFID’s decision on
whether, or not, to engage military support for a particular disaster.
220. Charging Policy and Offsets. Director Finance Policy6 (D Fin Pol) is the lead
authority with respect to levels of charge and offsets. Costs submitted to DFID should
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normally be on a ‘no-loss’ basis. This approach ensures that the defence budget does
not suffer as a result of unscheduled activity and that it makes no gains either. No-loss
costs cover those additional costs that would not have been incurred if the support had
not been undertaken. The determination of charging policy, including the scope for
offsets, and the basis of the best estimates of the cost to complete requested tasking
should be transparent and aim at a quick desk-level understanding with DFID.
However, whilst ‘best’ cost estimates are provided to aid decision making, the eventual
charge to DFID is normally on the basis of ‘actuals’.
221. Rapid Costings. PJHQ J8 has responsibility for initiating and co-ordinating
the HDRO cost estimate when PJHQ has lead planning responsibility. 7
Notwithstanding time constraints, Top-level Budget (TLB) holders and the Defence
Transport and Movements Agency (DTMA) should wherever possible be included in
the process and receive timely planning information from PJHQ J5/J3 as appropriate.
The dissemination of current planning assumptions will ensure coherence of the cost
estimate baseline across the process. The resulting submission to MOD should
include the consolidated cost estimate and any associated caveats.8 The production of
rapid and accurate cost estimates is an iterative process requiring a suitable balance of
urgency and reliability. The following factors will effect the reliability of a cost
estimate:
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6
In consultation with the appropriate regional secretariat.
7
Single Service Commands have responsibility when leading single Service HDROs.
8
In submitting cost estimates, costing staffs should NOT automatically deduct potential offsets but rather highlight them
for MOD consideration.
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JWP 3-52
a. Urgency of requirement.
civilians. Given the limited warning-time associated with disaster response and the
imperative of timely reaction, agreement will normally be achieved, in the first
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225. The following issues should be addressed (the list is not exhaustive) in the
formulation of any SOFA:9
b. Jurisdictional arrangements.
e. Wearing of uniforms.
f. Issues and carriage of personal weapons and ROE (for self-defence).
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9
The time available may not allow for a SOFA to be negotiated. Accordingly, these issues should be included in the
negotiated document which may take the form of Memoranda of Understanding (MOU), Military
Technical/Implementing Arrangements and Exchanges of letters between governments.
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supporting Guidance Card10 issued. PJHQ11 will be responsible for providing a draft
ROE profile and submission, and for providing advice at the operational and military
strategic level, on the military, legal and secretariat aspects of ROE. The nominated
commander is responsible for the promulgation of authorised ROE profiles to theatre.
Careful consideration should be given to the crafting of ROE and account should be
taken of the legal basis for the operation, the prevailing security conditions, Host
Nation capabilities and arrangements and any Host Nation agreements on the
provision of security.
10
In accordance with JSP 398.
11
Although drafts may also be produced by single-Service Commands.
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Details of the emergency response roles of key UN agencies and members of the
International Red Cross movement are at Annex 2A.
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a. Ensuring that health needs are properly assessed and are reflected in
requests for international assistance;
2A8. The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) responds to food and
agricultural emergencies through:
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However, these stages are unlikely to be discrete and will often need to be undertaken
concurrently requiring a flexible response.
normally occur after the physical impact of a disaster are important factors in
assessing the most appropriate assistance to be provided. In most cases donors
provide humanitarian assistance through civilian agencies, whose experience, cost-
effectiveness, reliability and ability to connect relief to development are superior to the
military.
303. Evaluation of past disasters suggest that however urgent the crisis, time and
effort spent on initial assessment results in a better designed, co-ordinated and more
cost effective relief effort. Disasters often seriously disrupt such local infrastructure as
transport (including airport landing and cargo handling capacity), communications,
food supply and shelter provision. Under these circumstances, relief supplies and
personnel (often unfamiliar with the area) sent into a disaster zone without a request
based on a sound assessment can hinder rather than help; this can cost further lives
through enthusiastic, but possibly inappropriate or inadequate response. An early
assessment of the nature and extent of the disaster and the type of aid needed is an
essential requirement.
SECTION I - ASSESSMENT
304. Early assessment of the nature and extent of a humanitarian
emergency/disaster and the type of relief required is an essential element of any
response. The overall purpose of an assessment is to provide information and to make
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305. Several factors contribute to the design of a successful and accurate assessment
including: identifying the user/identifying the information needed/timing of the
assessment/use of recognised terminology. Key amongst these factors are:
sectors.1 Assessment teams must differentiate between what is normal for the
location and what is occurring as a result of the disaster so that the relief effort
can be directed to those most in need.
b. Assess Needs and Vulnerabilities in Relation to Capacities. ‘Needs’
are immediate requirements for survival. ‘Vulnerabilities’ are potential areas
for harm and include factors that increase the risks to the affected population.
Needs are assessed after an emergency has occurred, whereas vulnerabilities
can be assessed both before and during an emergency. Needs are expressed in
terms of requirements (food, water, shelter, etc); vulnerabilities are expressed
in terms of their origins (physical/material, social/organisational, or
motivational/attitudinal). The solution to needs and vulnerabilities are
‘capacities’. Capacities are means and resources that can be mobilised by the
affected population to meet their own needs and reduce vulnerability.
Assessing vulnerabilities and capacities as well as needs provides a way of:
1
‘Sector’ is a term used to describe Humanitarian Relief activities within a functional area, such as Water & Sanitation
(WATSAN), Shelter, Medical, Food, Logistics and Communication. Each of these areas is a ‘sector’.
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306. The government of the stricken state bears primary responsibility for disaster
assessment and will normally accomplish an initial needs assessment, conducted by
national or local authorities within 12-72 hours depending on access to the disaster
site. However, in the case of major disasters the national authority may often request
international help from the United Nations (UN) (e.g. the UN Organisation for the Co-
ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) can mobilise its UN Disaster
Assessment and Co-ordination (UNDAC) mechanism) or from donor nations.
307. In parallel with this process, an initial broad appraisal will also be made by
HM's Representative in order to advise the Department for International Development
(DFID) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) of the facts and any
recommended action. Based on this information and information from a wide variety
of other sources2 an initial assessment will be made by DFID’s Conflict and
Humanitarian Assistance Department (CHAD). If it is apparent that UK military
assets may be required then Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) participation within
the assessment should be a priority in order to facilitate the timeliest support.3 A
detailed breakdown of the information necessary for assessment is at Annex 3A.
2
E.g. Disaster warning organisations, internet sites, information from in-country humanitarian actors.
3
PJHQ representation will be provided by J3 Ops Support.
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information from a variety of sources, following crises, which are analysed quickly
and decisions taken on whether an UK response is necessary. Such responses would
normally form part of an internationally co-ordinated response. There may, however,
be cases, e.g. British Overseas Territories, where it is necessary to undertake direct UK
led intervention.
313. There are four key steps in DFID/CHAD’s response to a rapid onset disaster:
a. Initial information gathering and assessment. The onset of new
emergency events are monitored through the internet, media, and contact with
humanitarian agencies and in-country contacts. DFID/CHAD have early
warning systems through subscription to meteorological forecast and
geological services. Once DFID/CHAD is aware of a disaster, further
information is sought through:
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(3) The poverty status of the country (i.e. there is a lower threshold to
respond where the country is poor and overwhelmed by the disaster).
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In deciding how to respond, preference is given to using the Red Cross and UN
OCHA to channel the initial response. Funding to NGOs with a track record in
the area affected, or with a special competence particularly needed, is also
considered. Direct operational response is less common, as the aim is to build
capacity of the local or international humanitarian system. The decision to
respond operationally is taken if there are deemed to be serious gaps in
operational resources available locally or regionally. For example, if specialist
items are required and it is cost effective to supply them.
Other Considerations
314. In providing humanitarian assistance to disaster affected populations, DFID
works in conjunction with, and seeks to support, the international disaster response
system. In determining the balance between different forms of disaster relief, speed to
meet assessed life preserving needs and value for money will be important
considerations.
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relief needs.
e. UN Disaster Assessment and Co-ordination System. The aim of the
UN Disaster Assessment and Co-ordination (UNDAC) system is to meet
international needs for early information during the first phase of a sudden
onset emergency. UN OCHA is able to deploy UNDAC teams at short notice
for these purposes. UNDAC teams support the UN RC/Humanitarian Co-
ordinator or local Government following predefined methods for the collection
of information on needs for international disaster relief assistance. The teams
may also provide structures for co-ordinating support during the first phase of
a sudden onset emergency.
317. In principle, military assets should be considered only when civilian capacities
have been or will become over-stretched, and in certain circumstances, where the use
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a. Phase 1 – Reconnaissance/Assessment/Survey.
4
This includes those forces permanently stationed overseas (e.g. Cyprus Sovereign Base Areas) and those deployed
temporarily on operations or exercise (e.g. APT(N)).
5
Immediate Emergency Life Saving Relief is the provision of small scale supplies (e.g. food, clothing, medical and
accommodation stores) and services (e.g. rescue, urgent works, transport and necessary equipment), which are needed as
a matter of extreme urgency to save life or to limit physical damage and prevent serious suffering. These may be
resourced from available Service sources provided that Service requirements are not compromised. Any such relief
should not exceed one week’s supplies and should normally be provisioned from on-the-spot stores.
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6
Any proposal by a Commander to offer support to disaster relief efforts from Service sources abroad are to be reported
by signal to the MOD, through the chain of command, using the Subject Indicator Code (SIC) EFO. The signal should
indicate the scope of the proposed aid, the estimated cost, and whether the concurrence of HM’s Representative has been
obtained.
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However, given the potential concurrency of the various stages to disaster response, it
is possible that the phases of any military support to disaster response will also have to
be undertaken concurrently.
320. Cost Effectiveness. Following the immediate relief stage there may be a need
to provide transitional rehabilitation support and later reconstruction assistance to steer
the affected country towards recovery. DFID will determine the UK’s involvement in
the post-disaster phases. It is unlikely that the military will have a role in post-disaster
assistance but if this is required the cost of military involvement and extent of their
role will be agreed by DFID and the MOD.
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323. Scope of the Military Role. Notwithstanding specific missions, under all but
exceptional circumstances, UK Forces will be deployed in support of disaster relief
efforts and should therefore not assume leadership of the overall disaster response.
This does not preclude UK Forces supporting civil Command and Control (C2) or
providing C2 infrastructure when necessary. However, wherever possible, maximum
use of established infrastructure should be made in order to preclude UK Forces
becoming a hub upon which other responding agencies become reliant, thereby
creating the potential for longer-term dependency and making it more difficult to
redeploy at the appropriate moment. The generic military role is to support and enable
the effort to relieve emergency needs until such time as disaster coping capacities no
longer require UK military support. This decision will be taken by DFID in
consultation with MOD. The direction of military activities on the ground will be
determined by the senior DFID representative and the JTFC. Should circumstances
require a substantial review of the envisaged operation and/or are likely to incur
significant extra costs, then guidance should be sought from DFID and MOD in
London.
324. Presentation. In disaster situations there may well be underlying tensions
which may be exacerbated by the intervention of UK Forces. To reduce this potential
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effect it will be necessary to communicate a clear, simple and repeated intent for the
Joint Task Force (JTF) which will ensure that the purpose and scope of UK actions are
understood by all involved actors, ranging from the stricken state government through
humanitarian actors to JTF personnel. Transparency of intent and operation will be
crucial to a successful co-ordination process.
325. Media Handling. Media handling in theatre will need a careful and sensitive
approach. It is almost inevitable that the conduct of HDRO by UK military forces will
become a focus for the UK media, some of whom may well have been transported to
theatre by military assets. This is not inconsistent with DFID having the overall media
lead, but DFID should be kept fully abreast of what is being done. Whilst following
agreed media lines, media handling in theatre should avoid giving the impression that
the UK military is the ‘only game in town’. It should expound a ‘hand in glove’
approach to humanitarian emergency/disaster response, recognising that UK military
assets are present in support of other agencies, normally DFID, responding to the relief
effort. The dignity of the stricken population should be borne in mind at all times.
326. Continuum of Effort. Within the international relief response there will be a
continuum of effort throughout the 3 stages of a humanitarian emergency/disaster (see
Para 301). The objective of military support should be to move this continuum
forward from immediate life saving towards conditions that may allow reconstruction,
enabling ‘marginal self-sufficiency’ but not becoming entangled in long-term
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infrastructure projects. The aim should be to assist but not create dependency or false
expectations.
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327. Unity of Effort. Unity of effort recognises the need for a coherent approach to
the common objective of relieving human suffering, between military and civilian
actors and between various military contingents, in response to a humanitarian
emergency/disaster situation. In contributing to this the commander must identify
DFID’s main effort in support of the international response and allocate his resources
accordingly, as well as maintaining sight of the UK’s end-state.
HDRO limited to providing support to the relief effort and preclude the inadvertent
creation of a parallel military relief effort setting its own priorities. It should therefore
help to establish and maintain the necessary unity of effort.
SECTION V – EVALUATION
329. The evaluation of the humanitarian response, including military support, to a
humanitarian emergency/disaster will help gauge the effectiveness of the relief effort
in meeting victim’s needs and provide an underlying basis for quantifying progress in
moving the continuum of effort forward.
7
The Sphere Standards, as part of the Sphere Project, are a set of universal minimum standards in the core areas of
humanitarian relief. The project is supported by the majority of the main NGOs and by the ICRC. Their purpose is to
increase the effectiveness of humanitarian relief and to make humanitarian agencies more accountable.
(http://www.sphereproject.org)
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used as the basis for the provision of support to the relief effort, particularly if
involved in the direct delivery of aid to a stricken population.
8
For example: Changes in morbidity/mortality rates, if available, are good indicators of progress in relieving human
suffering. The amount of water supplied to a refugee camp (verses the total requirement) or the number of tents erected
(verses people without shelter) are good indicators of the sufficiency of support toward overall relief effort objectives.
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9
See JWP 3-00 ‘Joint Operations’.
10
For a more detailed explanation refer to JWP 0-10 ‘UK Doctrine for Joint and Multinational Operations’
(UKOPSDOC).
11
The HQ responsible for deploying, sustaining and recovering the force.
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will be responsible for passing advice on the provision of support to DFID’s disaster
response effort. Whenever possible, either the JTFC or his deputy should collocate
with the senior DFID representative to ensure detailed co-ordination of the military
input to the wider relief effort. However, the JTFC remains responsible for the
execution of the UK military operation.
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Cabinet Office
DFID/PJHQ
LO
PJHQ
Supporting
Commands JTFC/UK NCC
Deployed Forces
Political Direction
2
Military C
DIFD Direction
Liaison
Figure 3.3 – Command and Control and Tasking Chain for HDR Operations
340. In certain circumstances, such as when DFID only require strategic sea or air
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transport, the Military tasking chain will shorten as shown at Figure 3.4:
Cabinet Office
1
PJHQ
Supporting
Commands
1. PJHQ kept informed in case requirement escalates and commitment becomes a Joint Operation
Figure 3.4 - Command and Control and Tasking Chain for Single Service
Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Operations
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Search and rescue • Has the disaster caused structural collapse (percentage?)?
(SAR) • What type of structures have collapsed (eg. hospitals,
requirements schools, government buildings, multi-storey housing units)?
• What type of materials are they constructed from
(concrete/brick etc)?
• Are the local authorities requesting assistance with SAR?
• Who is conducting/co-ordinating the present rescue effort,
and for how long has this been underway?
Information on Initial Responses
Assessments • What assessments have been made/planned?
• By whom, what outcome?
Government • What has been the Government response so far?
response • Which is the lead Government ministry/body?
• Is there a well-established in-country emergency response
mechanism? Was it effective in previous disasters?
• What is the role of other relevant structures (Military,
Emergency Committee, Civil Defence Structure)?
• What are capabilities of above to respond?
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posts can play a key role in providing this information quickly to DFID/CHAD.
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1
‘Sector’ is a term used to describe Humanitarian Relief activities such as Water & sanitation (WATSAN), Shelter,
Medical, Food, Logistics and Communication. Each of these areas is a ‘sector’.
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• Is UK equipment compatible?
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(4) How can UK military assets best be integrated into overall effort?
f. Other Country Military Assets in Theatre. Other nations may well
offer military support by way of response in support to international relief
efforts. The following information should wherever possible be obtained from
contributing 3rd party military forces (as and when they arrive in-country):
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ANNEX 3C – MILITARY CAPABILITIES
UK military forces have certain inherent capabilities that may be of use in a humanitarian emergency/disaster situation. The
following capabilities may be appropriate in the undertaking of HDRO in support of UK’s response to such disaster situations,
subject to DFID requirements:
Sector/ Assessment/C2 Comms Search & Infrastructure Support Transport, Supply & Public
Assets Support Rescue Distribution Health/Medical
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Air a. Airspace /Air a. Airborne a. Co-ordination a. Tactical delivery of a. Casualty
Traffic Control. comms link. and conduct of relief stores and aid. evacuation.
SAR, both fixed
b. Aerial b. Strategic delivery of b. Aeromedical
and rotary wing.
Survey/ Recce. relief stores and aid. evacuation.
c. Airhead Management.
Ground a. Engineer a. Provision a. Provision of potable water, a. Aid distribution a. Environmental
Survey/ Recce. of limited either by well drilling or Health Advice.
b. Stockholding of aid.
b. Engineer comms purification from source.
c. Port management. b. Field Hospital.
infrastructure.
GEO support. b. Route improvement and
maintenance. d. Limited route marking
and traffic control.
c. Repairs and support to
airhead/seaport infrastructure.
d. Limited provision of power.
e. Limited EOD capability.
f. Repairs to power, water and
sewage treatment plants.
g. Emergency bridging
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capability.
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2. Terminology. Previously these relief stores were termed Disaster Relief Packs
(Larger) and Hurricane Relief Packs (Smaller). To avoid confusion caused by
different titles and to recognise the broad utility of the stores, packs have been
renamed as Emergency Relief Stores (ERS).
3. Allocation. There are two scales, large and small. The number of kits needed to
fulfil operational commitments are 4 large-scale and 8 small-scale kits. These will be
allocated to ships by CINCFLEET N3, based on the operational requirement and the
perceived risk of disaster in the operating area. In general, a large ERS kit will be
made available for AFSH, AOR, CVS/LPH/LPD(R)1 deployments and small kits will
be embarked on ships conducting APT(S), APT(N)2 duties and their supporting
tankers. One large and two small-scale kits will be held in the UK for contingencies
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and maintenance.
6. Review Process. To ensure that ERS are allocated to the correct priority, are
effectively managed and that the content remains relevant, an annual review will be
conducted by CINCFLEET - N3/N4. The point of contact for any queries relating to
ERS and for items to be considered at the review should be sent to SO2 N4 (Log Ops)
in CINCFLEET (NWD 46172).
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1
For example: RFAs Fort Austin/George/Grange/Victoria, HM Ships Ark Royal, Illustrious, Invincible, Ocean, Albion,
Bulwark.
2
Typically frigates and destroyers.
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CHAPTER 4 - PLANNING
SECTION I – PLANNING
401. Contingency Planning. The requirement for UK contingency planning for
military involvement in disaster relief operations is determined by the Ministry of
Defence (MOD), in consultation with the Department for International Development
(DFID) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). DFID is the lead
Department of State for disaster relief and humanitarian aid and hence has lead
responsibility for the UK’s response to disasters overseas. It could include one or
more of the following:
a. Civil Plans.
1
UKEP are British Citizens, British Overseas Citizens, British Dependent Territories Citizens and others for whom the
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402. These civil and military plans are supported by two intelligence publications
prepared and updated by the DIS; Defence Profiles (DP) and Infrastructure Briefing
Memoranda (IBM). The DP includes military intelligence information including local
force composition/capability whilst the IBM covers data such as climate, topography
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3
Operations such as NEOs or HDROs.
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4
A fuller explanation can be found in JWP 0-10 ‘UKOPSDOC’ and JWP 3-00 ‘Joint Operations’.
5
A SPG may be formed at the discretion of the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Commitments). The life-span of the SPG
and the periodicity of its meetings will be governed by the situation. It will inevitably be bespoke, its remit and exact
composition being dependent on the scale and nature of a crisis.
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DCMO command chain and form the basis for the Grand Strategic Estimate
(GSE).6 This analysis will also provide initial strategic planning guidance to
PJHQ. DFID as the government lead for UK response to international disaster
relief efforts is likely to take the lead in developing UK’s intent with the MOD
in support.
6
The GSE is a cross-government process and is not therefore the sole responsibility of any single department but will be
formed from a number of contributions. It seeks to facilitate definition of UK’s national intent and objectives in
addressing the crisis situation.
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7
Determination of the preferred course of action will lead to the identification of the required capabilities and will
support any recommendation for a reduction in the Notice to Move (NTM). This may be of particular importance in
support to disaster response efforts where speed of response is a key factor with the significant deterioration of conditions
on the ground with time.
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407. Timeliness. The utility of military HDRO is the ability to deploy quickly once
the decision has been made that the support to the international relief effort and
stricken state coping mechanisms is required. Account must be taken of the Readiness
Preparation Time (RPT) required for the JTF. RPT includes NTM, deployment time
(including re-assembly of equipment) and any training/familiarisation required in the
Joint Operations Area (JOA) prior to the JTF being ready to conduct operations.
for the constitution of the force will therefore be tight and force generation will need
to be carefully managed to ensure that capacity additional to requirement is not
overlooked. Conversely, there may be discrete capabilities that can make a significant
impact in the disaster situation and which represent considerable ‘value for money’.
These discrete capabilities should be brought to the attention of DFID during the
planning process.
409. Exit Strategy. A coherent exit strategy should be formulated at an early stage.
This should be based on the assessed ‘humanitarian gap’, i.e. the difference between
needs and disaster response resources, the capacity of the capability being funded by
DFID and delivered by UK military forces in support of the relief effort, and the
amelioration rate of the disaster impact. This may be expressed as a date or the
achievement of certain criteria. However, the exit strategy will need to be constantly
reassessed as the operation progresses. Any potential extension to the operation will
involve funding and concurrency issues which will need to be addressed by both DFID
and MOD, as well as the need to take account of the expectations of the International
Community and the damage that a perceived premature withdrawal could cause to
UK’s reputation.
410. Host Nation Support. The amount of Host Nation Support (HNS) that a
stricken state is able to offer will depend on the type, extent and scale and impact of
any humanitarian emergency/disaster. The requirement to support deployed forces
should not impact on the stricken state’s mechanisms for coping with the humanitarian
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the size and make-up of the deployed force and therefore raises ‘footprint’ and funding
issues. The availability of HNS should be determined at an early stage.
and the relative timeliness required of the various forms of communication. Whilst
operational security will not normally be an issue in this type of permissive operation,
there may be a need to pass sensitive data, particularly in less stable conditions. In
addition to the need to communicate within and between military forces, there will be
a critical need to be able to communicate with the civilian actors with whom UK
military forces will need to integrate in order to support the relief effort. Commercial
bearers, particularly within a disaster stricken state should not be relied upon as the
primary means of communication. The identification and provision of military
communications in support of HDRO will be co-ordinated by PJHQ and supported, as
necessary, by the single-Service Commands.
413. Media Operations. Media Operations will be a key facet in HDRO. Ideally,
all involved departments, including the Cabinet Office, should agree a set of media
lines that set out the government’s policy on the disaster response. Within the MOD
this should be undertaken by the News Release Group (NRG). Regular inter-
departmental contact and dissemination of these lines throughout the chain of
command will be necessary to ensure that a coherent message is communicated to the
media and the listening world as a whole. HDROs are dynamic situations and agreed
media lines will need to evolve with the operation to enable personnel to react
appropriately to any media call – any changes to media lines will also need to be
communicated throughout the chain of command. Notwithstanding this, in all but the
most routine factual issues, press statements should be at least co-ordinated and
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wherever possible cleared with the lead department (normally DFID) before being
released.
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SECTION IV – FORCES
415. Force Generation. Forces will normally be drawn from those assigned to the
Joint Rapid Reaction Force (JRRF) which incorporates maritime, land, air and logistic
forces with a wide range of capabilities and are held at NTM ranging from 24 hrs to 30
days. However, there may be small specialist units or sub-units that are outside the
JRRF but which would be able to make a significant impact thereby offering increased
cost-effectiveness.
416. Notice to Move. MOD is the authority for the promulgation of NTM for all
military assets. Early ministerial agreement to a reduction of notice, the redeployment
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of potential responding assets, advance sailing of ships and the recovery of RAF air
transport aircraft may be essential for the timely support to the international disaster
response effort. The cost implications of this should be considered early and the cross-
departmental financial costings should be agreed.
417. Capability Requirements. The composition of a Joint Task Force (JTF) will
normally depend on the tasks identified and agreed with DFID to be conducted in
support of the international disaster relief effort. In addition to C2 (see Chapter 3
Section VI) the following capabilities may be required and should be reflected in the
task organisation:
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HM Rep/ Assessment of Monitor stricken state coping mechanisms/international disaster response effort
FCO Disaster
FCO warn
DFID/CHAD
CHAD OT field
DFID Reg’l DFID/CHAD make DFID assessment (incl MOD
Constant review Execute
DFID Desk/CHAD all source initial PJHQ element)/ support HDRO
OT Monitor assessment drawing in FCO/MOD approve MOD confirmed
request for recce
DFID DFID/MOD
warn agree to initiate
MOD HDRO
DIS
Form Form CDS HDRO
MOD input to
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ANNEX 4B – HUMANITARIAN/DISASTER RELIEF PLANNING CHECKLIST
4B1. This annex offers a number of questions that will provide a framework for the planning and conduct of HDROs,
highlighting issues that may need to be addressed. This framework may be used to facilitate the operational dialogue between
‘humanitarians’ and military forces that must precede successful and appropriate support to any disaster relief effort. It is
formatted along similar lines to the Estimate.
Question/Consideration Supplementary
Situation What information is available? • Has an assessment been conducted?
• Is the information complete?
• On what is it based (substantive or anecdotal)?
• What information gaps are there?
What is the nature of the humanitarian
emergency/disaster?
Are the stricken state response • What is the state of civilian administration, infrastructure,
mechanisms/international relief effort coping and national organs?
with the impact of the emergency/disaster? • Is there a lead ministry/body?
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4B-1
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JWP 3-52
Question/Consideration Supplementary
Mission What is the HDRO mission? • Is it stated in terms of working towards pre-
emergency/disaster status?
• Is the situation at the desired end-state sustainable by the stricken
state and remaining humanitarian organisations contributing to
the international relief effort?
• What are the criteria for mission accomplishment?
Disaster What are the environmental impacts on the • Where and how big is the disaster area?
Environment HDRO? • What is the level of continuing or emerging hazards?
• What is the accessibility to and within the disaster area?
- Roads/bridges?
- Airfields?
- Sea-ports?
- Anchorages and beaches?
• What are the impacts of weather and climate?
- On the humanitarian emergency/disaster situation?
- On aviation and air movement?
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- On Maritime operations?
- On deployed equipment?
- On logistics?
4B-2
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JWP 3-52
Question/Consideration Supplementary
Factors/ How has the emergency/disaster impacted • What is the effect on/situation with respect to:
Impacts/ (Effect vs Coping Capacity)? - the population,
Needs - law and order,
- public health,
- housing/shelter,
- water and sanitation,
- transport infrastructure,
- food,
- communications and power supply?
What is the perceived need? • Has a formal request for international assistance been
lodged?
• What has been requested?
Disaster What are International Community • What other agencies are responding?
Response interests/aims? • What is their capability and level of response?
• Is there a lead UN agency?
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4B-3
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JWP 3-52
Question/Consideration Supplementary
What in-theatre co-ordination is required? • What are the humanitarian co-ordination mechanisms,
hierarchy and responsibilities?
• What are the liaison requirements – with the stricken state,
other nations HQs, humanitarian mechanisms?
• Are interpreters required?
How will the HDRO get into theatre? • Can the stricken state infrastructure support the force?
• Is a regional FMB necessary?
What HNS is available? • Can HNS be achieved regionally (from the FMB)?
• How self-sufficient will the force need to be?
• How long will the logistics pipeline be?
Force What are the Force Protection issues? • What needs to be protected and to what level?
Protection • Are ROE appropriate?
• Whilst a nominally permissive environment, do ROE
reflect any civil tensions caused by the disaster, criminality
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4B-4
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JWP 3-52
Question/Consideration Supplementary
Info Ops Is an Information Campaign be necessary? • What Info Ops are necessary to support this?
• How will this tie-in with DFID and UK’s overall response?
• How will it tie-in with the stricken states Information
Campaign?
Time and What are the necessary timelines to meet the
Space humanitarian emergency/disaster response
requirements?
Legal and What is the legal status of the HDRO? • Is there a SOFA in effect/Is there a need for an exchange of
Political letters?
• What are the Regional requirements e.g. FMB, SOFA?
• What are the security implications for the HDRO?
What are the political constraints?
Media What are the media handling principles and • Are these agreed with DFID?
procedures? • Have coherent press lines been agreed?
• Has the media handling requirement been assessed?
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4B-5
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4B-6
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JWP 3-52
Civil Actor
A non-military element potentially impacting on the situation within the Joint
Operations Area.
Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as
well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.
(MC 411/1)
Disaster Relief
The organised response to alleviate the situation resulting from a catastrophe, the aims
of which are to save life and lessen suffering, limit damage and restore essential
services to a level that enables local authorities to cope. Disaster relief demands the
total integration of the relief effort with the life-support assets and infrastructure
available within the stricken area. (JWP 3-52)
Base, including C2, logistics and administration support elements. (JWP 0-01.1)
Glossary-1
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JWP 3-52
Humanitarian Assistance
The provision of humanitarian relief by military forces deployed for the conduct of
combat or security related operations. (JWP 3-52)
Humanitarian Emergency/Disaster
A serious disruption of a society’s ability to function effectively, causing widespread
human, material, or environmental losses which exceed the ability of an affected
society to cope using only its own resources. (JWP 3-52)
Humanitarian Gap
The difference between humanitarian emergency/disaster needs and the relief
resources available to meet them. (JWP 3-52)
Glossary-2
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JWP 3-52
Stricken State
Any state within which a humanitarian emergency or disaster has occurred.
Stricken Population
The people or peoples of a Stricken State affected by the effects of a humanitarian
emergency or disaster.
Supported Commander
A commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by
higher authority. (JWP 0-01.1)
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Supporting Commander
A commander who furnishes forces, equipment, logistics or other support to a
supported commander, or who develops a supporting plan. (JWP 0-01.1)
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Glossary-3
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JWP 3-52
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Glossary-4
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JWP 3-52
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS
APT Atlantic Patrol Task
LO Liaison Officer
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Abbreviations-1
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JWP 3-52
UN United Nations
UNDAC United Nations Disaster Assessment and Co-ordination System
UNDP UN Development Programme
UN DMT UN Disaster Management Team
UNHCR UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF UN Children’s Emergency Fund
UN OCHA UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UN RC UN Resident Co-ordinator
Abbreviations-2