A Restriction for Pictures and Some Consequences for a Theory of Depiction

Author(s): Michael Newall

Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 61, No. 4 (Autumn, 2003), pp. 381-
394
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics
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 MICHAELNEWALL
A Restrictionfor Picturesand Some Consequencesfor
a Theoryof Depiction
Pictures regularly depict other pictures. Paint-
ings or drawingsof galleries, studios, and other
interiors, for instance, often depict pictures
hanging on walls or propped on easels. Like
pictures of other subjects, pictures of pictures
depict their subject matteras having a range of
visually discernible features. For example, a
picturemay be depicted as framedor unframed,
as having a particularconfigurationof shapes,
tones, and colors on its surface, as depicting
particularsubject matter, as composed of one
media or another-canvas, paper, paint, ink,
and so on, as being made accordingto one tech-
nique or another-coarsely or finely brushed,
drawn,glazed, and so on.
I think,however,thatin certaincircumstances
thereis a restrictionto the featuresthata picture
can be depicted as having. Consider Rene
Magritte's painting The Human Condition I
(1934) (Figure 1). This picture depicts a land-
scape paintingon an easel, which standsin front
of a window, the easel placed so that the paint-
ing occludes precisely thatpartof the view from
the window that it depicts. Despite its high
overall effect of naturalism,The Human Condi-
tion I strikingly fails to depict the landscape
paintingas having a rangeof visually discernible
features that, if we were to see such a painting
in life, we would easily visually discern.
These featuresincludethe texture,size, shape,
and direction of brushstrokes,evidence of the
use of a particularmedium or a particulartech-
nique, the texture of the canvas, and even the
flatness of the picture's surface.' I suggest that
the only physical feature of the painting's sur-
face that Magritte does depict is its particular
TheJournalof AestheticsandArtCriticism61:4 Fall 2003
configuration of two-dimensional shape, tone,
and color. Certainly,these are the only physical
features we can definitely attributeto the land-
scape painting's surface by examining the area
of The Human Condition I that depicts the
painting's surface.2
There is an apparentcoincidence here that I
want to draw attentionto. The featuresthat the
landscape painting is depicted as having-the
particular configuration of two-dimensional
shape, tone, and color-are also among the fea-
tures of The Human ConditionI that bear on its
content. The Human Condition I uses shape,
tone, and color to depict its subject matter,and
the area of The Human ConditionI that depicts
the landscapepainting uses a particularconfig-
uration of shape, tone, and color-a configur-
ation thatproves to be precisely the same as that
which it depicts the landscape as having.3 The
Human ConditionI thus conforms with the fol-
lowing restriction,which I shall call "R":
A picture,X, whichdepictsa picture,Y, will only
depictthosephysicalfeaturesof Ys surfacethatare
amongX's content-bearingfeatures.
A range of other pictures, I shall shortly show,
conform with this restriction.Most of the first
partof this essay examines this restriction,and I
argue that with two qualifications it can be
understoodas a general restriction,applying to
all pictures that depict pictures. In the second
part of this essay, I assess the ability of some
currenttheories of depiction to account for the
general restriction. I argue that some theories
that propose a resemblance between a picture
382
FIGURE I. Rene Magritte, The Human ConditionI, oil-on
canvas, 1934. PrivateCollection.? ADAGP Magritte,Miro,
Chagall.Licensed by Viscopy, Sydney 2002.
and the subject matter it depicts will success-
fully explain it. Such a theoryneed not be a trad-
itional resemblance theory, and there are a
numberof recenttheoriesthatI think satisfy this
requirement.I go on to arguethatconventionalist
and "experience-based"theories appearunable
to explain the generalrestriction.The restriction
will thus be shown to supportaccountsof depic-
tion that allow for resemblance, over some of
those that do not.
Before going on, it will be helpful to say more
about content-bearingfeatures, since as well as
figuring in R, they will play a role later in my
argument. For the purposes of this essay, I
understanda picture's content to be the identity
of the depicted subject matter,and the features
the subject matteris depicted as having. A pic-
ture's content-bearingfeatures are the features
of a picture's surface that play a role in deter-
miningits content.Changinga picture'scontent-
The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism
bearingfeaturesin a visually discriminableway
will thus change the content of the picture. For
example,if the configurationof two-dimensional
shape, tone, and color of The Human Condition
rs surface were alteredin a visually discrimin-
able way, then the contentof the paintingwould
be affected. If the outline of one of the whitish
shapes that depict the clouds in The Human
ConditionI were altered,so a particularfeature
of the depicted cloud-its shape-would be
altered. If the color used to depict the cloud
were changed-darkened, for instance-so the
cloud would be depicted as darker. However,
changes to any other features of The Human
Conditionrs surface, such as the texture of its
brushwork, the size, and shape of brush-
strokes-so far as they may be varied without
alteringThe Human Conditionrs configuration
of shape, tone, and color-and the textureof the
canvas would not change its content. To take
anotherexample, in a pen and ink drawing, the
shapes and areas of tone made by the pen's
marks usually bear on the drawing's content,
whereasfeaturessuch as the color of the ink and
the color and texture of the paper are not likely
to bear on its content. The color and texture of
the drawing's paper, or the color of the ink
used, could be changed without changing the
drawing's content, whereasthe configurationof
shapes demarkedon the papercannot change in
a visually discriminableway without changing
the content to some degree. Note too that the
shape of a picture's surface is also not typically
a content-bearingfeature. While most pictures
have a flat surface, some pictures,such as those
painted on church domes, and the panoramas
popularin the eighteenthand nineteenthcentur-
ies, do not. If The Human Condition I were
transferredto such a surface, its pictorial con-
tent would not change.
Many otherpicturesof picturesconformwith R.
Other highly naturalisticpictures, such as the
of Bartholom6EstebanMurillo(Self-
self-portraits
Portrait, c. 1670-1673), Gerard Dou (Self-
Portrait,1655),andWilliamHogarth(Self-Portrait
witha Pug, 1745)-all of which actually depict
not the artists themselves, but paintings that
depict the artists-also conform with R. Much
Newall A Restrictionfor Pictures and Some Consequencesfor a Theoryof Depiction 383

FIGURE II. Adam FriedrichOeser, The Sacrifice of Iphigenia, etching, 1755, frontispieceto JohannJoachimWinckelmann,
Gedanken uber die Nachahmung der griechischen Werke in der Malerei und Bildhauerkunst,Dresden and Leipzig: Im
Verlag der WaltherischenHandlung,1756. Beinecke Rare Book and ManuscriptLibrary,Yale University.

of what I have said about TheHumanCondition
I can also be said of these paintings.Certainless
naturalisticpictures-pictures made using other
media, and other styles-conform with R too.
Adam FriedrichOeser's etching TheSacrifice
oflphigenia (1755), shown in Figure2, and Guy
Bara's sequence of three panels from his book
of cartoons,Tomthe Traveller(1957), areexam-
ples of such pictures. Oeser's etching does not
in fact depictthe sacrificeof Iphegenia,described
by Euripidesin his play Iphigenia in Aulis, but
ratherdepictsthe ancientGreekpainterTimanthes
painting his famous picture of that subject.4
Much as in The Human ConditionI, the area of
Oeser's etching that depicts Timanthes's paint-
ing uses the same configuration of shape and
tone thatit depicts the paintingas having. Oeser
does not depict the painting's surface as having
any other physical features,including color, the
texture of brushstrokes,or traces of the use of
specific techniques,and so his etching conforms
with R.
Bara'scartoon,reproducedin E. H. Gombrich's
Art and Illusion, depicts a characterpainting a
picture of an angry-looking ape; the painting
appears complete in the second and third
panels.5 The areas of the panels that depict the
completed painting use precisely the same
configurationof shape, tone, and color that they
depictthe paintingas having.The content-bearing
featuresof Bara's drawingsare restrictedto the
shapes he outlines with his pen, and so examin-
ing the parts of Bara's drawings that depict the
painting of the ape, we find that it is only the
shapes painted on the canvas that are depicted.
Featuresincludingtone, color, and texture,which
are not among the content-bearingfeatures of
Bara'sdrawing,arenot depicted.Bara'ssequence
thus conforms with R, too.
Many pictures of pictures, however, do not
conform with R. Some pictures,for instance, do
depict textual features of pictures, or depict
evidence of a particulartechnique's use. Glenn
Brown's picturesof FrankAuerbach'spaintings
do both. Brown, a contemporaryEnglishpainter,
uses a very meticulous, photorealistictechnique
to great effect in his depictions of Auerbach's
heavily impastedpaintings,such as The Day the
World TurnedAuerbach (1992). Brown pain-
stakingly depicts the textural qualities of
384
Auerbach'sindividualbrushstrokesby modeling
them like any other three-dimensionalforms,
using tone. The raised parts of the brushstroke,
which aremost stronglyilluminated,aredepicted
using lightertones, and the less prominentparts
of the brushstroke,whichfall intorelativeshadow,
are depicted using darker tones. Brown thus
depictsphysicalfeaturesof Auerbach'spaintings
that are not among the content-bearingfeatures
Brown's pictures employ. That is, Brown
depicts the texture of Auerbach'spaintings,yet
does so without using texture himself-as in
TheHumanConditionI, Brown uses only shape,
tone, and color to depict his subject matter.
Brown's paintingsthus do not accordwith R.
Another example of a picture that does not
conform with R is Pieter Saenredam'spainting
of a church interior, Interior of the Buurkerk,
Utrecht (1644). Saenredam depicts, on the
church's wall in the foreground, a crudely
drawnchild's graffito.The graffitoitself depicts
a horse, mounted, comically, by four riders.
Saenredam's depiction of this graffito fails to
accord with R because it depicts features dis-
tinctive of the graffito's technique.In particular,
it depicts the thick awkwardlines that are dis-
tinctive of the heavy, clumsy movements of the
child who drew it-yet does so using only
shape, tone, and color.
What distinguishes pictures of pictures that
do conform with R from those that do not? One
criterion, which I think is crucial in the case
consideredabove, is this: R holds only if,
X's content-bearing
featuresare among the type
the
employedby systemof depictionusedto makeY.
I will call this condition "Cl." We have seen
that certain features of pictures are content-
bearing.C introducesa furtheridea that needs
some explanation:that pictures are made using
"systems"of depiction. A system of depiction,
for the purposes of this essay, is a practice that
determines the features of a picture's surface
that bear on its content. For instance, one sys-
tem may employ only shape as a content-
bearingfeature,and picturesmade accordingto
that system use only shape to convey content.
Bara's cartoon can be understood as using a
system of this sort. Oeser's etching can then
be understood as employing a system that
uses shape and tone to convey content, and
The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism
The Human ConditionI as employing a system
that uses shape, tone, and color to convey
content.
A particularsystem of depiction, as I have
defined it, is distinguished by the type of fea-
tures it determinesto be content-bearing.Note
that a variety of "techniques"or "methods"of
picture-makingmay thus accord with the same
system, since these different techniques often
manipulate the same type of content-bearing
featuresto the same depictiveends. For instance,
a particularconfigurationof tone, which con-
veys a particularcontent, can be generatedand
manipulated using a range of techniques or
methods,includinghatching,cross-hatching,stip-
pling, by applying strokes of comparatively
darkoil or acrylic paintto a picture's surface,or
by applying a translucentwash of ink or water-
color paint to a picture's surface. Any of these
methods may be used to render tone. So it is
tone, ratherthan any other intrinsic features of
cross-hatching,stippling, darkpaint, and so on,
that is the content-bearingfeature in this case.
Similarly, shape may be delimited in a number
of ways-it can be markedout with a line, or
by a sharp transitionbetween tones or colors.
Particularcolors, too, may be generatedusing a
rangeof techniques-they may be madeby mix-
ing pigments, by glazing or washing one color
over another,by using pointillisttechniquesthat
rely on "optical fusion," or by other methods.
Thus it is shape and color, ratherthan any other
intrinsic features of these techniques, that are
content-bearing.
TheHumanConditionI accordswith C 1. The
depicted painting is made using a system that
employs shape, tone, and color to depict its
subject matter, and we have already seen that
the content-bearing features of The Human
Condition I are a particularconfiguration of
two-dimensional shape, tone, and color. The
Human Condition I's content-bearingfeatures
are thus among the type employed by the
system of depiction used to make the depicted
painting.6
The situationin the case of Oeser's andBara's
pictures is similar. Oeser's etching's content-
bearing features are a particularconfiguration
of shape and tone, which Oeser manipulates
using techniques of line drawing and hatching.
The painting Oeser depicts is presumably
paintedin color and finely detailed in a manner
Newall A Restrictionfor Pictures and Some Consequencesfor a Theoryof Depiction
the eighteenth century thought appropriateto
the ancient Greeks. The painting thus is made
according to a system that uses shape and tone
to the same depictive ends as Oeser does in his
etching (albeit using different techniques) and
adds to this the use of color to depict color prop-
erties, and the use of a finer registerof tones to
depict subtle variations in illumination and
tonal values of colored surfaces. The etching's
content-bearing features are thus among the
type employed by the system of depiction used
to make the depictedpainting.
Bara's panels also satisfy C1. Barauses a par-
ticularconfigurationof two-dimensionalshape,
made using a technique of line drawing, to
depict the surface of the painting. The painting
of the ape too, is clearly made using a system
that employs shape to depict its subject matter.
The content-bearingfeatures of the panels are
thus among the type employed by the system
used to make the depicted painting. Note that,
like the painting Oeser depicts, the painting
depicted by Bara may not only use shape to
convey content,but may well make use of color
and tone too. (The fearful reaction of the car-
toon painter in the final panel perhaps implies
his techniques are rathermore naturalisticthan
Bara's.)
TheHuman ConditionI, Oeser's etching, and
Bara's cartoon all accord with Cl. What of
Brown's and Saenredam's pictures, which do
not accord with R? These, we shall see, fail to
satisfy Cl, for certain of their content-bearing
featuresarenot amongthe type of content-bearing
featuresused by the picturesthey depict.Brown's
picture uses a finer register of tones and more
details of shape to depict Auerbach'sbrushwork
than Auerbach himself uses. Saenredam'spic-
tureuses color, tone, and many more featuresof
shape thandoes the child's drawingit depicts.
On this examination,C1 providesa serviceable
criterionto distinguish between the pictures by
Magritte,Oeser, and Bara, which conform with
R, and the pictures by Brown and Saenredam,
which do not.
III
For brevity, I shall call the conjunctionof R and
C1, "RI." I have discussed a few examples of
pictures that accord with R1. Now I want to
385
suggest an argumentto more fully supportthis
proposal. I think I can best do this by showing
the difficultyof overcomingthis restriction-that
is, showing the difficulty of making a picture
thatwould provide a counterexampleto R1.
I will begin by consideringhow a paintercould
refine a picture in a way that would allow him
or her to depict physical featuresof a painting's
surfacebeyondtwo-dimensionalshape,tone, and
color-the type of features that bear on many
pictures' content. We have seen that paint tex-
ture is often prominentamong the non-content-
bearingfeaturesof a painting'ssurface,so I will
focus on how a paintercould attemptto make a
picture that could depict the texture of another
picture's surface,withoutcontraveningC1.
One way a paintercan depict fine details such
as texture is to use a fine technique. Broad
brushstrokeswill typically not allow a painterto
depict small features such as the details of tex-
ture. For this reason, the characteristicdetails
and textures of wood-grain, fur, hair, and skin
can be difficult to depict with a broad brush.
Using a finer brush, and applying correspond-
ingly finer individual brushstrokes,these tex-
tures are readily depicted. If one uses a fine
enough brush, even individual hairs and the
pores on skin can be depicted.Brown, as I men-
tioned above, uses just such a meticulous tech-
nique to depict the thick impasto of Auerbach's
paintings.He depicts the texture of Auerbach's
brushworkthroughthe use of tone, modeling as
he would any otherthree-dimensionalform. We
have just seen that Brown's paintings do not
contraveneR1 because they do not satisfy Cl.
But could such a strategy,of using finer brush-
strokes to depict smaller features, be used to
overcome R1? That is, could a meticulously
detailed picture successfully depict the textural
featuresof anotherpicture,and satisfy C1?
I do not think any such method can be devel-
oped. Brown's brushstrokesare much smaller
thanAuerbach'sandit is this fact thatallows him
to depictthe characteristicfeaturesof Auerbach's
brushwork.To depict the featuresof any one of
Auerbach's brushstrokes-the varying tones
and shapes of the stroke's shadows, illuminated
areas, and highlights-Brown needs to apply a
numberof brushstrokeshimself. In orderto sat-
isfy C1, the content-bearingfeaturesof Brown's
painting would need to be among the type of
featuresthat bear on the content of Auerbach's
386
painting. However, this is not the case. Where
Auerbachuses a single broadstroketo delimit a
shape, Brown uses many smallerstrokes,and so
is able to intentionallyinclude many more par-
ticulardetails, all of which may convey content,
within a similar shape. Where Auerbachuses a
single broad stroke to lay down an area of tone
or color, Brownagainuses many smallerstrokes,
and so is able to manipulate within the same
area a range of particulartonal and color vari-
ations, which again bear content. Both Brown
and Auerbach use shape, tone, and color to
depict their subjectmatter;but Brown, in virtue
of using finer brushstrokes,is able to manipu-
late finer variationsof shape, tone, and color to
convey content than is Auerbach. Brown's
system thus makes use of a wider range of
content-bearingfeatures than does Auerbach's.
So in this case C1 is not satisfied: not all the
content-bearingfeaturesof Brown's picture are
among the type of content-bearing features
employed by Auerbach'ssystem.
But what if Brown were depicting a painting
that used smaller brushstrokesthan Auerbach's
to depict its subject matter?This will not help.
So long as Brown's brushstrokesremain larger
than those he depicts, the problem remains-
Brown will continue to apply a number of
smallercontent-bearingbrushstrokesin orderto
depicttexturalfeaturesof any one of Auerbach's
brushstrokes.What then if Brown depicted a
painting that used the same size brushstrokes
Brown himself uses? Since Brown needs to
apply a numberof variously toned brushstrokes
himself to depict the features of any one of the
brushstrokes he depicts, it follows that the
smaller the brushstrokes Brown depicts, the
fewer brushstrokeshe will be able to apply in
orderto depict it, and the fewer featuresof each
brushstrokehe will be able to depict in this way.
This reaches a necessary limit when the brush-
strokes Brown is depicting are as small as
Brown's own. At this point, Brown cannot
depict any of the texturalfeaturesof the brush-
strokes using the shading techniques that were
so effective in depictingAuerbach'sbrushwork,
since for each single brushstrokehe is trying to
depict, he can use no more than a single brush-
stroke to represent it. At this point, it will be
impossible to depict the brushstroke's three-
dimensional features using shading techniques,
for one needs a minimumof two brushstrokesto
The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism
model a form using light and shade-one stroke
to denote the lighter, illuminated area, and a
second to denote the darker, shaded area. Cl
may now be satisfied-the content-bearingfea-
tures of Brown's painting may now be among
the type of content-bearingfeaturesused by the
depicted painting's system. But this comes at
the expense of conformingwith R-for no paint
textureis depicted. So even using a system that
determines that the finest variations in shape,
tone, and color bear on content, it will not be
possible to depict texturalpropertiesof a paint-
ing if the depictionis to satisfy C 1.
Perhaps,it mightbe suggested,a paintercould
devise a differentway of depictingbrushstrokes,
which would allow him or her to overcome R1.
Rather than attempting to model the brush-
strokes he or she wishes to depict in light and
shade, the paintercould enlist textureitself as a
content-bearing feature. That is, to depict a
brushstrokeof a particulartexture, the painter
could apply to the canvas a brushstrokewith the
same texture,recreatingthe texturalfeaturesof
the depictedbrushstroke.
A picture that accords with this system will
only satisfy C1 if it depicts a picture that itself
employs texture to bear content. But consider
what would happenif this new system was itself
used to depict a painting that also used texture
to bear content. The brushstrokesof the result-
ant paintingwould reproducethe texturesof the
brushstrokesof the depicted painting, and so
depict its brushstrokesas having those textures.
But since the depicted painting also uses the
same content-bearingfeatures, the textures of
its brushstrokeswill also bear content. (They
will, presumably,reproducethe surfacetextures
of the depictedpainting's subjectmatter.)Thus,
although the method does depict the texture of
the painting's brushstrokes,it will still fail to
depict any of the picture's non-content-bearing
features,and so fail to overcome R.7
Finally,consideran even moreextremecase-
perhapsthe most extremecase-in which exacti-
tude in depiction might be attempted.Consider
a painting that is presented as its own depic-
tion-as a depiction of itself.8 An artist, for
instance, could exhibit a painting titled Picture
of a Painting no. 12, and that same painting
could be listed as no. 12 in the accompanying
catalogue. Picture of a Painting no. 12 then
might be takento depict itself, and since Picture
Newall A Restrictionfor Pictures and Some Consequencesfor a Theoryof Depiction
of a Painting no. 12 and painting no. 12 are
identical, Picture of a Painting no. 12 would
then function as a scrupulousdepiction of itself,
perfect in every respect. That is, each featureof
Picture of a Painting no. 12 would depict paint-
ing no. 12 as havingjust thatfeature.The colors
and details of the paintwork would depict the
paintwork of painting no. 12 as having just
those features;the tiniest detail of each individ-
ual brush mark, even the texture of the canvas
of Picture of a Painting no. 12 would serve to
depict paintingno. 12 as having those same fea-
tures, and so on. In this manner,such a picture
might depict itself as having all the features it
does in fact have. Such a picture would satisfy
C 1-its content-bearingfeaturesmust be among
the type of content-bearingfeaturesused by the
depictedpicture,for the featuresare one and the
same. But would it overcome R? No. For every
detail and feature of a picture-every spot of
paint, thread of canvas, and so on-to depict
itself, it is necessary that each of these details is
content-bearing.So since, in the case of Picture
of a Painting no. 12, every featureof the picture
is content-bearing,it follows that there are no
non-content-bearingfeaturesto depict.Even this
most extreme case of pictorial exactitude thus
fails to violate R.
IV
On this basis, RI appears a plausible claim.
However, a revision is needed, for there are
certain types of pictures that prove exceptions
to R1. I will mention these now, and make a
qualificationto R accordingly.
(i) Picturesthat depict picturesas viewed under
unevenilluminationmayprovidecounterexamples to
R1.
Sometimes a picture is seen in uneven illumin-
ation, so thata shadow falls across its surface.A
painter,if he or she is to depict a pictureunder
these conditions, usually uses tone to depict
such a shadow cast across the picture's surface.
This can effectively serve to depict the picture
surface on which it falls as being flat. This
example contravenesR, since flatness is a fea-
ture of the depicted painting that does not bear
on the depicting picture's content. As tone is
387
used to depict this shadow, C1 will be satisfied
providedthat tone is among the type of features
that bear on the content of the depicted picture.
Thus, the painting of the unevenly illuminated
picturemay give a counterexampleto R1.
(ii) Picturesthatdepictpicturesas viewedfroman
inappropriately oblique angle may providecoun-
terexamples to R1.
Consider a picture that uses a system of depic-
tion that accordswith or incorporateslinearper-
spective to depict a painting viewed from an
oblique angle. Flat surfaces and flat shapes,
when viewed obliquely, appearforeshortenedin
a distinctive way, appearingthinner than they
would from a frontal point of view. A picture
made in perspectivedepicts this foreshortening,
and since this type of foreshorteningis distinct-
ive of flat surfaces and shapes, it will effect-
ively depict an obliquely viewed pictureas flat.
Flatnessis a featureof the depictingpicturethat
does not bear on its content, so this example
contravenes R. C1, too, is readily satisfied by
such an example-for suppose that the depicted
painting is made accordingto the same system
as the picture that depicts it. The two pictures,
because they are made using the same system,
will have the same type of content-bearingfea-
tures. Thus, we have another counterexample
to R1.
(iii) Picturesthat depict visibly damagedpictures
mayprovidecounterexamples to R1.
Consider a picture that depicts anotherpicture
that is damaged-its surface, say, has been
crumpledor folded. Suppose too that both pic-
tures accord with the same system, which uses
shape and tone to depict three-dimensionalform
and the effects of illumination.C1 will therefore
be satisfied, since both pictures'content-bearing
features will be of the same type. However,
since tone can be used to depict shadowscast by
folds and creases in paper, it is a straight-
forwardtask using such a system to depict the
creased or crumpledpictureas having a creased
or crumpled surface. Creases, crumples, and
folds are not among the type of features that
bear on the depicted drawing's content, so such
a picture provides a further counterexample
to R.9
388
I suggest that each of the counterexamplesto
R1 that I have considered involves a real or
apparentdistortion of the content-bearingfea-
tures of the depicted picture.10These particular
distortions are distinctive of flat surfaces that
are subject to uneven lighting, are obliquely
viewed, or have undergone damage including
crumpling or folding. In the case of the depic-
tion of the unevenly illuminatedpicture, areas
of the picture's tones are depicted as darkened
in a way distinctive of a shadow falling over a
flat surface. The obliquely viewed picture is
depicted as a flat surfacein virtue of having the
two-dimensionalshapes of its surfaceforeshort-
ened in a way distinctive of a flat surface
viewed from an oblique angle. The damaged
picture is depicted as having its surface crum-
pled or folded into a particularshape in virtueof
having the two-dimensional shapes of its
surface depicted as distorted by crumpling or
folding, and the tones of its surface depicted as
lightened or darkenedin a way that is distinct-
ive of light falling over a crumpled or folded
surface. It is in virtue of a picture depicted as
havingits content-bearing featuresdarkened,fore-
shortened,or otherwise distorted in these dis-
tinctive ways that we recognize the picture as a
flat surfacethatis unevenly illuminated,viewed
from too oblique an angle, or damaged.I suggest
that it is in virtue of content-bearingfeatures
depictedas distortedin these distinctiveways that
depictionsof unevenlylit, obliquelyviewed, and
damagedpicturesform counterexamplesto R1.
With this in mind, I will qualify R1 with the
following criterion:R holds if,
X depictsY as viewedunderconditionssuchthatno
realor apparentdistortionof Ys content-bearing
fea-
turesoccurs.l
I will call this condition"C2."Together,I suggest
C1 and C2 form a sufficient condition for R.
That is:
A picture,X, thatdepictsa picture,Y, will depict
only thosephysicalfeaturesof Y's surfacethatare
amongX's content-bearing featuresif and only if
(i) X's content-bearingfeaturesare amongthe type
employedby thesystemof depictionusedto makeY,
and(ii) X depictsY as viewedunderconditionssuch
that no real or apparentdistortionof Y's content-
bearingfeaturesoccurs.
The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism
I will call this proposal"R2."
v
In the following sections, I argue that R2 sup-
portstheoriesof depictionthatproposeor imply
that pictures resemble their subject matterwith
respect to their content-bearingfeatures.I shall
show that such theories are able to explain R2,
while some other current theories of depic-
tion-I look at conventionalistand "experience-
based" theories-appear unable to explain the
restriction.
A broad range of theories propose or imply
that pictures resemble their subject matterwith
respect to their content-bearingfeatures. Trad-
itionalresemblancetheoriesof depictioncertainly
do; they make the strongerclaim that a picture
has the content it does in virtue of sharingfea-
tures with its subjectmatter.However, since the
1960s it has become clear that such a position is
untenable. Nelson Goodman, in particular,
arguedpersuasivelythat resemblanceis never a
sufficient conditionfor depiction.12
More recently, other positions have been
developed that allow that a picture's surface
does resemble its subjectmatterwith respect to
theircontent-bearingfeatures,but avoid making
resemblance a sufficient condition for depic-
tion. Flint Schier, for instance, while eschewing
the traditionalresemblancetheory,claims thatit
is a consequence of his "naturalgenerativity"
theory of depiction that pictures resemble their
subjectmatter,and that these respects of resem-
blancebearon pictorialcontent.13DominicLopes
makes a similar claim for his "aspect recogni-
tion"account,proposingthat although"pictorial
similaritydoes not explain depiction,""pictures
undoubtedlydo preserve second-orderisomor-
phisms. There are always correspondences
betweenthe articulationof pictures'design prop-
erties and the articulationof the visual proper-
ties they attributeto their subjects."14Others
have attemptedto be more specific about what
the respects of pictorial resemblance may be.
John Hyman, for instance, has argued that pic-
tures resemble their referents with respect to
their "occlusion"shapes, and that this provides
a necessary conditionfor depiction.15
Schier also introduced the idea that the
resemblancebetween pictureand subjectmatter
Newall A Restrictionfor Pictures and Some Consequencesfor a Theoryof Depiction
may be relative to our own recognitionalabili-
ties, ratherthan residing in some intrinsicprop-
erty sharedby pictureand subjectmatter.Schier
suggested that it is the capacity of a picture to
engage the same recognitional abilities as its
subject matter that determines that it depicts
that subject matter. The "resemblance,"then,
lies in a capacity for picture and subject matter
to trigger"overlapping"recognitionalresponses
in the viewer. A number of writers have fol-
lowed Schier's proposal.16
The following argument could be used to
support any theory that grants that pictures
resemble their subject matter with respect to
their content-bearingfeatures. To this end, I
will now show that R2 is readily explained by
such theories, and in the following two sections,
I argue that in contrast, some other current
theories of depiction-experience-based and
conventionalist theories-do not appear to be
able to explain R2.
The recent theories thatI grouphere stipulate
or imply that the features a picture shares with
its subjectmattermust be visually distinctive of
the subject matter in some way-that is, that
these shared features be features in virtue of
which we are able to recognize the subject
matteror distinguishit from other objects. To
explain R2, it will be necessary to refine this
idea slightly. Pictures, as I have already noted,
do not just depict objects, they also depict
objects as having particular features. For a
picture to depict its subject matteras having a
particularfeature, I suggest, it is necessary that
partof it resembles a visually distinctivepartof
that feature. For example, to depict an object's
textural features, the surface of a picture will
usually use a tonal patternthatis, to us, visually
distinctive of the textured surface (or light
falling across such a texturedsurface). To take
anotherexample, to depict an object as having a
particularthree-dimensionalform, the surface
of a picture will often use a two-dimensional
shape-something approximatingthe shape of a
silhouetteof the depictedobject-which is visu-
ally distinctive of its three-dimensionalform.
Now, suppose a picture, X, depicts another
picture, Y,and Yin turndepicts some nonpictor-
ial subjectmatter,S. According to the theories I
have mentionedin this section, in a resemblance
theory, Yrscontent-bearingfeatures will repro-
duce features of S, and X's content-bearing
389
features, in turn, will reproducefeatures of Y.
Suppose, too, that pictures X and Y conform
with Cl-that is, that the content-bearingfea-
tures of X are among the type of features that
bear on Y's content. It follows thatX's content-
bearing features only reproduce features from
among Y's content-bearingfeatures.
Given that X's content-bearingfeatures only
reproduce features from among Y's content-
bearing features, what content regarding Y's
physical features may we expect X to convey?
Certainly,X's content-bearingfeatures will be
distinctive of those content-bearingfeatures of
Y that are among the type of features that bear
on X's content-for they reproduce those
features exactly. The Human Condition I, for
instance, reproducesthe configurationof shape,
tone, and color on the depictedcanvas, and in so
doing depicts these featuresas well.18
Will X's content-bearingfeaturesbe distinct-
ive of any other of Y's physical features? In
general, no. In Section I, I showed that a pic-
ture's content-bearingfeaturesare not generally
distinctive of a picture's non-content-bearing
features,such as the particularmediuma picture
uses, or the use of particulartechniques.Mostly,
particular content-bearing features-particular
colors andshapes,for instance-can be generated
or manipulatedusing a variety of media and
techniques. There are, as was seen in Section
IV, exceptions to this rule. Some configurations
of content-bearingfeatures-or more precisely,
distortionsof these features-are distinctive of
particulartypes of media. They may be dis-
torted in a way distinctive of a foreshortened
flat surface, an unevenly lit flat surface, or a
damagedsurfacethatmay be crumpledor folded,
for instance, in a way distinctive of paper. But
these cases are excluded from consideration
here by C2. C2 stipulates that X depicts Y as
viewed under conditions such that no real or
apparentdistortion of Ys content-bearingfea-
tures occurs. As was seen in Section IV, it is
these types of distortionsof a picture's content-
bearing features that are distinctive of flat
surfaces that are subject to uneven lighting or
oblique viewing or have undergonedamage.
Thus, given C1 and C2, the content-bearing
featuresof X are only distinctive of those phys-
ical features of Y's surface that are among the
type of featuresthatbear on X's content-in the
case of TheHumanConditionI, the configuration
390
of shape,tone, and color on the depictedcanvas.
As I have mentioned,accordingto theoriesI am
consideringhere, for a pictureto depicts its sub-
ject matteras having a particularfeature,a part
of it must resemblesthatfeaturein some distinc-
tive respect. From this, R follows: X will depict
just those physical features of Ys surface that
are among the featuresthatbear on X's content.
VI
Theories that propose that a picture shares its
content-bearingfeatures with its subject matter
can thus explain R2. I now want to arguethatof
some othermajoraccountsof depictioncurrently
available to us, only the resemblancetheory is
able to explain R2. To this end I will examine
two major theories of depiction, arguing that
they are unable to explain R2. In this section I
shall look at conventionalism, and in the fol-
lowing section examine theories I describe as
"experience-based," focusing on Richard
Wollheim's account of depiction in terms of
"seeing-in."
In general,conventionalisttheoriesclaim that
all representationsrepresentwhat they do in vir-
tue of conventional rules. This view is widely
accepted in the case of symbols and language,
but less so in the case of pictures. The way
words represent provides perhaps the clearest
example of how conventional representation
operates. In English, the word "chair"repre-
sents a chair, but there is no necessary reason
why chairs are known by this name; in other
languagesthey are representedby very different
words. It is only in virtue of a convention,
understood and accepted by a community of
languageusers-English speakers,in this case-
that the word means what it does. Similarly,
conventionalist accounts of depiction propose
that a picturedepicts its subjectmatterin virtue
of conventions that relate the pictureto its sub-
ject matter, and that are understood and
acceptedby a communityof picture-makersand
viewers. "A picture,"writes Goodman,the best
known proponentof a conventionalist account
of depiction, "to representan object, must be a
symbol for it."19
I think a conventionalisttheory of picturesis
unlikely to explain R2. Conventionalisttheories
of representation imply that in principle we
The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism
need have little trouble making representations
of any thing or any featureof any thing. To rep-
resent an object or feature on a conventionalist
account, it is enough that a convention exists
that assigns the object or feature a name or
symbol distinguishable from other names and
symbols.20 Similar statements to R apply to
naturallanguages-for instance, that words or
phrases that refer to other words or phrases are
unable to represent certain of their features-
are thus easily and regularlyovercome. Natural
languageshave conventionsthat allow reference
to all features of inscribed or spoken words,
including those that do not bear on content. For
example, I can talk about features of a printed
or spoken word such as its font, the color of the
ink in which it is printed,the accent in which it
is uttered,and so on. It thereforeseems unlikely
that a conventionalistaccount of depiction will
be able to explain R, for as with language, a
conventionalist account seems to imply that
there ought to be no limit to what features an
object may be depicted as having. All that is
needed for any feature to be depicted is that a
convention exists, or is developed, that assigns
the feature a pictorial symbol-perhaps some
configurationof shape, tone, and color-distin-
guishable from other such symbols. In short, if
depiction was conventional we could expect it
to have the resourcesto overcome R2; as it can-
not, it seems improbablethat a conventionalist
accountcan be correct.
One objection a conventionalistmay make is
that there is a rule-a convention-that is
common to all the methods of depiction I have
looked at and that governs the depiction of
pictures. The rule would determinethat, under
the conditions describedin R2-C1 and C2-a
picture, X, which depicts another picture, Y,
which in turndepicts subject matter,S, is made
simply by using X's system to depict S, in that
partof X thatdepictsY's surface.Thus,to depict
the surface of anotherpicture, a picture-maker
simply lays down the same content-bearingfea-
tures that he or she would use to depict that
otherpicture's subjectmatter.However, thereis
a problemwith this proposal. Since the Renais-
sance, manyEuropeanpaintershave been fascin-
ated by the problems of depicting texture. So it
seems highly likely that, if it were possible to
overcome R2, an alternativeconvention would
have been developed at some time that would
Newall A Restrictionfor Pictures and Some Consequencesfor a Theoryof Depiction
have allowed these artists to depict features
such as a painting's surface texture. No such
alternative convention appears to have been
developed, so it remains unlikely R2 can be
explainedby conventionalism.21
VII
Thetheoriesof depictionI describeas "experience-
based"hold thata picture'scontentis determined
principallyby the viewer's visual experience of
it. On these accounts, a picture gives rise to a
visual experience in its viewer that is in some
way related to the experience of seeing the
picture's referent.It is largely in virtue of such
an experience that we are able to identify a
picture's subject.
Among experience-basedaccounts of depic-
tion, RichardWollheims's theoryholds the most
currency.22Accordingto Wollheim, understand-
ing a picture involves the experience of "see-
ing" the picture's referent "in" the picture's
surface;hence his descriptionof pictorialexper-
ience as "seeing-in."23Wollheim stresses that
thereis nothingthatcan be said in generalabout
the physical features of a picture's surface or
the relation of the surface to the objects seen in
it. He thus denies both resemblance theories,
which hold that a picture's surface is related to
its subject matter by virtue of convention. "I
doubt,"Wollheim writes, "thatanythingsignifi-
cant can be said about exactly what a surface
must be like for it to have this effect [to trigger
seeing-in]."24
Depiction for Wollheim is distinguishedfrom
other types of representationby the experience
of seeing-in. According to Wollheim, seeing-in
is an experience characteristicof, although not
exclusive to, our experience of pictures.Seeing-
in is a type of visual awarenessdistinguishedby
a featureWollheim calls "twofoldness."When a
viewer sees an object in a surface, the viewer
has a "twofold"visual awareness;that is, he or
she is simultaneouslyvisually awareof both the
surface (as a flat, painted, drawn, or printed
thing) and of the object seen-in the surface.25
Can seeing-in explain R2? I do not think so.
Pictures have the content they do partly in vir-
tue of possessing certain features-which I
have called content-bearing.As we have seen,
R2 limits the features a picturecan be depicted
391
as having under certain conditions. Thus, any
theory that proposes to explain R2 will need to
provide some fact that stipulates or limits in
some way the features of X that bear content
regarding Y. The resemblance theory I consid-
ered in Section V does this by stipulatingthat a
picture's content-bearingfeaturesbe featuresit
shareswith its subjectmatter.
Can Wollheim's theory do something simi-
lar?It cannot.As we have seen, Wollheim holds
that nothing "significant"can be said about the
featuresthatbearon a picture'scontent;accord-
ing to his theory it is only the experience that
picturesoccasion thatis distinctiveof depiction.
In characterizingonly this experience, and say-
ing nothingof the featuresof a picture's surface
that occasion it, Wollheim's theory lacks the
resourcesto explain R2.
For the same reason, all experience-based
theories that deny something general can be
said about the physical features of a picture's
surface, or about the relation of a picture's sur-
face to its subject matter, will be unable to
explain R2. As I have said, explaining R2 calls
for just such a generalfact limitingX's content-
bearing features. Any experience-basedtheory
that denies that something general may be said
about what features a surface needs in orderto
depict, will thus be unableto explain R2.
Understandably,experience-based accounts
tend to deny that general conditions for depic-
tion can be given that do not involve experi-
ence. If an experience-based theory was to
allow that facts about the picture itself, and its
relationwith the subjectmatter,played a role in
determiningcontent, it would open up the pos-
sibility of providing a furtherlevel of explan-
ation beyond experience, by explaining the
experiences we have in front of pictures in
termsof physical facts aboutthe pictureand the
picture's relationwith the subject matter.Thus,
despite the fact thathis "illusiontheory"and the
resemblancetheoryare not obviously incompat-
ible, E. H. Gombrich denies that pictures are
"copies" of their subject matter.26Similarly,
RobertHopkins,althoughhe acknowledgesthat
"how things really are constrains what can be
experienced as resembling them," denies that
the investigationof these "realconstraints"can
add anythingto a theory of depiction,allocating
it instead to the fields of "the psychologist,
physiologist and arthistorian."27
392
VIII
Experience-basedand conventionalist accounts
of depiction thus do not appearto explain R2,
while theories that propose a resemblance
between a picture and its subject matter with
respect to the picture's content-bearingfeatures
are able to provide an elegant explanation of
R2. Therefore, R2 can be understood as sup-
portinga theory of depiction that proposes such
a resemblance,in favor of experience-basedand
conventionalistaccountsof depiction.
I mentioned in Section V that traditional
resemblance theories remain untenable in the
wake of the criticisms leveled against them by
philosopherssuch as Goodman.Nevertheless, a
range of theories of depiction have been devel-
oped morerecentlythatI thinkareable to satisfy
the requirementfor depiction I have proposed.
These include the theories of Schier, Lopes,
Sartwell,Carroll,Brook, and Hyman,mentioned
above. Whetherone of these is to be preferred
over the rest is a topic beyond the scope of this
essay.28
MICHAELNEWALL
Departmentof Philosophy
FlindersUniversity
BedfordPark,SouthAustralia5042
Australia
INTERNET: @ iprimus.com.au
cacsa_program
1. It may be objected that in The Human Condition I,
brushstrokesare depicted on the surface of the depicted
paintingin the following way. Since the partof The Human
ConditionI that depicts the painting's surfaceis made up of
Magritte'sbrushstrokes,these strokes could serve to depict
the brushstrokesof the depicted painting-attributing to the
depicted brushstrokesthe same size, shape, and texture as
the real brushstrokes. I do not think this objection is
convincing. The real brushstrokescover Magritte's entire
painting, andjust as they have no special significance there
(the textureof the stroke is not used to depict the textureof
any other depictedobject) we are not inclined to understand
them as depicting the brushstrokesof the depictedpainting.
Note that this is not to say that texture can never bear on
pictorial content, only that it does not in the case of The
Human ConditionI.
2. The only other thing that can be said about the land-
scape painting's surface is that it has particularcontent-it
depicts a landscape.For the purposeof this essay, I will not
treat representation as a physical feature of objects;
although it is clear that a picture's content will be deter-
mined, partly at least, by certain of the picture's physical
The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism
features. Below, I call these features of a picture its "con-
tent-bearing"features. Note, too, that Magritte has con-
trived TheHuman ConditionI in a way that draws attention
to its depictive lacunae. The depicted paintingis positioned
so that it occludes precisely that part of the view from the
window thatit depicts. But for the line of barecanvas on the
depicted painting's side, the transitionas one's eye follows
the path from the "real"landscape across to the depicted
landscape of the painting on the easel would occur seam-
lessly. The transitionis unmarkedby any awarenessof the
"real"landscape-the air, trees, and earth-giving way to
the textural features of the paint, evidence of a painter's
technique, or the flatness of the canvas on which the land-
scape is depicted.
3. Generally, The Human ConditionI uses shape, tone,
and color in the following way: it uses two-dimensional
shapes to depict features of its subject's three-dimensional
form; it uses variationsin tonal values to depict illuminated
surfaces, shadows, and the relative lightness and darkness
of colored surfaces; and it uses color propertiesto depict
local color propertiesof its subjectmatterand the effects of
aerial perspective. The portion of The Human ConditionI
that depicts the painting depicts a much smaller range of
properties-two-dimensional shape serves to depict only
two-dimensional shape, tone depicts only tone, and color
depicts only local color.
4. Oeser'setchingis a detailof the frontispieceto Johannes
Joachim Winckelmann's Gedanken iber die Nachamung
der griechischen Werkein der Malerei und Bildhauerkunst
(Dresden and Leipzig: Im Verlag der WaltherischenHand-
lung, 1756).
5. E. H. Gombrich,Art and Illusion:A Studyin the Psych-
ology of Pictorial Representation(London: Phaidon Press,
1960), p. 289, fig. 279.
6. Note that the landscape painting's system may also
use types of content-bearingfeaturesthat The Human Con-
dition I does not possess. For instance, it could be made
using a more"photo-realistic" systemthatmakesuse of subtle
types of shape,tone, and color featuresto depictfine "photo-
graphic"details of a type that Magritte's less refined tech-
nique does not depict. Certainly, if Magritte had intended
TheHumanConditionI to depictsuch a photo-realisticpaint-
ing, we would not expect The Human ConditionI to look
any different to how it now appears, for-in accord with
R-The Human ConditionI fails to depictjust those details
that would distinguish such a photo-realisticpicture from a
picturemade accordingto the system-that is, using the type
of content-bearingfeatures-that Magrittehimself uses.
7. Note, too, that the system would fail to recreate any
texturaldetails that would distinguish the depicted picture
from that picture's subject matter, for the method would
reproduceonly those texturaldetails thatthe depictedpaint-
ing in turnreproducedfrom that subjectmatter.
8. However, doubts exist over whether a picture can
depict itself. Plato suggests thatan exact replicaof an object
cannot "exactly resemble the thing it names," or it will no
longer represent it, but simply be another instance of it
(Plato, Cratylus [430-432], trans.C. D. C. Reeve, in Plato,
Plato: Complete Works,ed. John M. Cooper [Indianapolis:
Hackett, 1997], pp. 102-156). Certainly, we are not dis-
posed to see a picturein itself.
9. I have not considered ripped, torn, burnt, and other-
wise damaged pictures here. Although features typical of
Newall A Restrictionfor Pictures and Some Consequencesfor a Theoryof Depiction
such damage-tor edges, holes, burs to a picture's sur-
face, and so on-are often readily depicted without contra-
vening C1, I suggest that these featuresare not featuresof a
picture's surfacebut results of the destructionof a picture's
surface.
10. It may be objected that in some cases only a non-
content-bearingpart of a picture's surface is damaged (for
example, when only the edge of the paperon which a draw-
ing is made is folded or crumpled,leaving the parts of the
paper that have been drawn on undamaged)and that this
damage can be depicted. In such cases, I suggest it is not
really the depiction that is damaged, only the surface on
which it is made.
11. This supposes thatthereare prescribedconditionsfor
"correctly"perceiving a picture's content-bearingfeatures.
Such a correct perception occurs when a picture is viewed
undamaged,withoutglare, evenly illuminated,and front on.
These conditions might be thoughtof as set by the picture-
maker's intention. Certainly, damage to a picture, when it
does not result in the picture's complete destruction,is not
usually intended by the picture-maker,but is the result of
accident, neglect, or vandalism. Similarly, picture-makers
generallyintendtheirwork to be viewed undereven illumin-
ation, and usually intend their pictures to be viewed from a
line of sight (roughly) perpendicularto the picture surface,
rather than from oblique angles. (There are some excep-
tions. Anamorphic projections only appear as the artist
intends when viewed from some very oblique angle.)
12. Nelson Goodman,Languagesof Art:An Approachto
a Theoryof Symbols,2nd. ed. (Indianapolis:Hackett, 1976),
pp. 3-5.
13. Flint Schier, Deeper into Pictures (Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversity Press, 1986), p. 186. "The theory of
natural generativity... tells us what kind of resemblance
between S and O is requiredfor S's depicting O" (p. 186).
Schier's account seems to imply that the points of resem-
blance bear on pictorialcontent;see n. 16, below.
14. Dominic Lopes, Understanding Pictures (Oxford:
Oxford UniversityPress, 1996), pp. 190 and 188.
15. John Hyman, The Imitationof Nature (Oxford:Basil
Blackwell, 1989), chap. 3, and "PictorialArt and Visual
Experience," The British Journal of Aesthetics 40 (1999):
21-45.
16. Flint Schier, Deeper into Pictures, particularly
pp. 49-50; CrispinSartwell,"NaturalGenerativityandImita-
tion," The British Journal of Aesthetics 31 (1991): 58-67,
and "What Pictorial Realism Is," The British Journal of
Aesthetics 34 (1994): 2-12; Noel Carroll,PhilosophyofArt:
A ContemporaryIntroduction(London: Routledge, 1999),
pp. 42-49; Donald Brook, "On Non-Verbal Representa-
tion," The BritishJournalof Aesthetics37 (1997): 232-245.
Schier initially speaks against resemblance theories in
Deeper into Pictures (pp. 2-9), and presentshis own theory
in oppositionto them,amongotheraccounts.But in Chapter9,
titled "Resemblance strikes back," he argues that resem-
blance is a consequence of his own "naturalgenerativity"
theory, and states the respect in which he believes a picture
resembles its subject matter."The respect in which [a pic-
ture] S resembles its depictum O is this: there is an overlap
between the recognitional abilities triggered by S and 0"
(pp. 186-187). A picture thus shares its subject matter's
capacityto triggercertainrecognitionalabilities in a viewer.
Note that on this account, it is a picture's capacity to trigger
393
these recognitionalabilities that determinesits content, so it
follows that a picture resembles its subject matter with
respect to its content-bearingfeatures.CompareLopes, who
claims that "identifyingwhat a picture representsexploits
perceptualrecognitionskills" (p. 144), and that "theprecise
forms takenby these articulations[the resemblancebetween
a picture and its subject matter]I would of course attribute
to the processes of recognitionunderlyinghow picturesrep-
resent in differentsystems" (p. 189).It should be noted that
Brook's initial formulationof this idea predates Schier's
account. See, for instance, Brook's "Painting,Photography
andRepresentation," TheJournalof Aestheticsand Art Criti-
cism 42 (1983): 170-180, in which he groundshis account
of depictionin a "perceptualfailure"of the viewer (p. 176).
17. We may presume all the theories that grounddepic-
tion in recognitiontake this view, since our ability to recog-
nize an object depends on the presence of such distinctive
features. Schier, for instance, speaks of a picture sharing
"recognitionallyrelevant features" with its subject matter
(pp. 121-123). Hymanand Hopkins,I imagine, would grant
that "occlusion"and "outline"shape are for us distinctive
featuresof objects.
18. Note that these features will also be distinctive of
S-since the content-bearingfeatures of Y reproducefea-
tures of S, it follows that the content-bearingfeatures of X
also indirectlyreproducefeaturesof S. Thus in The Human
ConditionI we readily recognize the subject matterof the
depictedpainting.
19. Goodman,LanguagesofArt, p. 5. Goodmangoes on:
"no degree of resemblance is sufficient to establish...
reference. Nor is resemblance necessary for reference"
(original italics). This is in clear contradictionto the theo-
ries mentionedin the previous section.
20. In this essay, I have used the term "feature"as a syn-
onym for "property"or "quality."As a nominalist, Good-
man would balk at the use of these terms. Insteadof objects
having particularpropertiesor features,Goodmanspeaks of
objects exemplifying correspondingpredicates (Goodman,
Languages of Art, pp. 52-57). There is no deep reason why
one could not substituteGoodman's nomenclaturethrough-
out this section, as the varying ontologies that underliethis
variation in terms do not bear on the arguments in this
section. I retain"feature"here only for consistency.
21. I have not explored the possibility that Goodman's
conventionalismcould explain R2 using the characteristics
of picturesthat on his account distinguishthem from other
symbols, such as those of language. These characteristics
are "syntacticdensity" and "semanticrepleteness"(Good-
man, LanguagesofArt, pp. 225-232). Althoughit is beyond
the scope of this essay to examine this possibility, I venture
that it is not immediatelyclear how a demonstrationof R2
might be made using Goodman'stwo characteristics.
22. Richard Wollheim, Art and Its Objects, 2nd ed.
(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1980), supple-
mentaryessay 5; Painting as an Art (PrincetonUniversity
Press, 1987), chap. 2. RobertHopkinshas recentlypresented
an experience-basedtheory, in Picture, Image and Experi-
ence: A Philosphical Inquiry (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), that describes pictorial experience
as "experienced"or "perceived"resemblance (see particu-
larly chap. 4). E. H. Gombrichpresents anotheraccount of
pictorial experience in Art and Illusion, characterizing
pictorialexperiencepartlyin termsof illusion (pp. 4-5).
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23. Wollheim, Painting as an Art, pp. 46-51.
24. Ibid., p. 46.
25. Ibid., pp. 46-47.
26. Gombrich,Art and Illusion, particularlypp. 93-94.
Gombrichwrites, "the [pictorial]representation,then, is not
a replica. It need not be like the motif" (p. 94).
The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism
27. Hopkins,Picture, Image and Experience,p. 121.
28. I wouldlike to thankGregoryCurrie,GeorgeCouvalis,
Chris Mortensen, Alan Lee, Gerard O'Brien, Catharine
Abell, and an anonymous referee for The Journal of Aes-
thetics and Art Criticism,who generously criticized earlier
versions of this paper.