While we all seem to agree that violence is bad, there is disagreement on the question of how to

analyze violence. They locate violence in structures such as the federal government, biopolitics,
capitalism, George Bush. And while these structures might facilitate violence, they do not cause
or enact violence. People, like alex, cause violence. He constantly beats his partners until theyre
an emotional wreck. The aff incorporates this type of logic– we use a behavioralist model to
suggest that the 1AC is a terrible in its analysis of violence for the following reasons:
A. It causes more violence because of the distance to the people they discuss – for the
affirmative these subjects are faceless others who are dispensable because of the lack of more of
a local understanding of others.
B. It exonerates people of their duty to alter their violent behavior. Institutions often mediate
the action of people; the heart of our claim is that people need to reclaim their agency and act in
accordance with ethical principles. Specifically, Nazi soldier’s ethical principles should have
precluded them from acting upon the directions of Nazi leaders. However, their separation of
ethics from politics allowed for violence to occur.

The antagonist Rory Smith proves our point: toward the end the main character, whose name
happens to be ALEX, confronts Rory who he kills in order to save his own life. He realizes this
person had a family, a story, beautiful read hair. He reflects on the numerous people who die
without a second thought. More of a face-to-face engagement with others is precisely the sort of
change that is necessary for actively pursuing an ethical way of being in the world. You should
really learn from this kritik goldy.

Ultimately, we are a gateway argument– our evidence is pretty good in suggesting that we can’t
discuss how to act on violence prior to a discussion of where we should locate violence.

Onto the Line By Line:

First: Kappelers critique in not disempowering -

Their Keith piece of evidence is in the context of Kappeler’s fan base – his central
argument is focused on the effects the reader has on reading Kappeler’s analysis
not on the individual who has commited these acts of violence in the first place.

Our alternative is best suited for change insofar as it can actually be engaged.
Their suggestion that political action is critical neglects that the end result of their
project is political passivity.
ANTONIO IN 1995 [Robert Antonio; Professor of Sociology at the University of Kansas;
“Nietzsche’s Antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History”; American Journal
of Sociology; Volume 101, No. 1; July 1995]
According to Nietzsche, the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This
prototypic expression of ressentiment, master reification, and ultimate justification for slave
morality and mass discipline "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a
neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum;
there is no `being' behind the doing, effecting, becoming; `the doer' is merely a fiction added to
the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's "objective" foundations
makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For example, the subject is a central
focus of the new human sciences, appearing prominently in its emphases on neutral standpoints,
motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets of care
(Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that subjectified culture weakens the
personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "remarkable antithesis between an interior which fails to
correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche
1983, pp. 78-79, 83). The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the
longest time. "12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena
and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While
modern theorists saw differentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity,
Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations overidentify
with their positions and engage in gross fabrications to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly
to the opinion of others, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are so
thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but
actors "The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or
simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly
amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integrity, decisiveness,
spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about possible causes, meanings,
and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect,
say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4,316-17). Nervous
rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts,"
or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a
stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or
that which is represented? ... [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so
pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the
copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 23233, 259;
1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose
genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or
participate in enduring networks of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor
able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94).
Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One
thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the
latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always `might miss out on something.' `Rather
do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in
a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion
in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling,
improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the
fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most
mediocre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche
respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socrates, and praised their ability to
redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the
new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors amplify
the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming, fawning,
cringing, arrogant, all according to circumstances." Social selves are fodder for the "great
man of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more ur-
gently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely a god, prince, class,
physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience." The deadly combination of desperate
conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a new type
of tyrant (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213).

NEXT THE ALT DOES NOT FAIL:

Extend the alternative from the 1NC – Kappeler indicates that we must interrogate
our own will to violence to take seriously the will of others would mean
recognizing one’s own will at the centre of political reflection
Our alternative solves best. The politics of individual choice is the foremost
political question in that it is the only question over which we have the
agency to act.
KAPPELER IN 1995 [Susanne Kappeler, The Will To Violence: The Politics of
Personal Behavior, pg 19-20]

Instead, we could consider that even our thinking is an opportunity for action, that it can be
determined in this way or that, that it is the first opportunity, the first political
situation, in which to exercise political choice. `We make the war possible, we allow it to
happen', says Drakulic . `We only have one weak protection against it, our consciousness. There
are no them and us, there are no grand categories, abstract numbers, black-and-white truths,
simple facts. There is only us - and, yes, we are responsible for each other.'" And if we find this
too minimal to satisfy our aspirations for political action and change, why don't we do it anyway,
for a start? So I begin from the assumption that all of us, regardless of our relative positions
within the social power structure, do permanently have to decide how we are going to act in a
given situation. We have described in some considerable detail the many limitations on our
freedom of action - it is the first thing (and often the only one) that occurs to us in justifying our
actions. But each situation, save that of the absolute and ultimate violence of our destruction,
leaves scope for action, however minimal, which permits the decision to consent to violence or
to resist. The question remains how we use the opportunities for action we have, and how we
deal with the relative advantages which offer themselves. Here we face the decision to (ab)use
our power in our own interests and to our own advantage, or not to; here we face the choice to
do violence to others, or not to. It is a most political question, and a most political decision.

Next the aff’s strategy is flawed – only the alternative can break down violence

Action is secondary to the question of how to analyze violence. This means

our criticism is a gateway issue.
KAPPELER IN 1995 [Susanne Kappeler, The Will To Violence: The Politics of
Personal Behavior, pg 18-20]
The question which poses itself, then, is rather how we act in situations in which we do have
(relative) power, not only the space to reach our own understanding of the situation, but also a
choice, even if it is a limited choice, of action. To ask this question is not to shift from the
political to the personal, from the social to the individual, or even psychological. Rather, it
concerns the most crucial moment of our political commitment, the point where we ourselves
are in a position to initiate and effect change. Moreover, it also largely determines in what
manner and by what means we think that our political aim of a non-violent egalitarian society
will be reached. It implies a conception of politics which sees the process of social change here
and now and everywhere, and thus also in our decisions here and now to act in the interests of
our political aims. Political action, in this view, is not something which will take place only in a
more propitious future when circumstances have changed so much, or a revolution is already so
far under way that it can take its course, and we as the 'politically active* people can join it. Nor
can political action mean something we engage in only on condition that there will be enough
others, or better, masses of them, who think as I do, and do what I want to do. Political action
does not necessarily imply public mass actions whose massiveness will guarantee their success.
For such individual conceptions of political mass action reflect the power thinking of generals
commanding the troops of the 'masses' to suit their own strategies. Nor does it help to wish for
the masses voluntarily to think as 1 do and to want what I want — that they be like-minded (like
me), thus helping to fulfill my dream of a mass action. Even this has happened in. the history of
generals. My dream remains the dream of a commander who has like-minded masses of
volunteer troops at his disposal. Instead, we could consider that even our thinking is an
opportunity for action, that it can be determined in this way or that, that it is the first
opportunity, the first political situation, in which to exercise political choice. 'We make the war
possible, we allow it to happen*, says Drakulic. 'We only have one weak protection against it, oar
consciousness. There are no them and us, there are no grand categories, abstract numbers,
black-and-white truths, simple facts. There is only us — and, yes, we are responsible for each
other.'11 And if we find this too minimal to satisfy our aspirations for political action and
change, why don't we do it anyway, for a start? So I begin from the assumption that all of us,
regardless of our relative positions within the social power structure, do permanently have to
decide how we are going to act in a given situation. We have described in some considerable
detail the many limitations on our freedom of action — it is the first thing (and often the only
one) that occurs to us in justifying our actions. But each situation, save that of the absolute and
ultimate violence of our destruction, leaves scope for action, however minimal, which permits
the decision to consent to violence or to resist. The question remains how we use the
opportunities for action we have, and how we deal with the relative advantages which offer
themselves. Here we face the decision to (ab)use our power in our own interests and to our own
advantage, or not to; here we face the choice to do violence to others, or not to. It is a most
political question, and a most political decision.

To justify violence contributes to the very cycle of violence.

KAPPELER IN 1995 [Susanne Kappeler, The Will To Violence: The Politics of
Personal Behavior, pg 256-257]
Rather than analysing the violent action proposed (from personal violence through to war) and
its adequacy as a means to a defined political end, we tend instead to adduce examples - say, of
armed liberation struggles in the Third World, the armed uprising of the Warsaw ghetto, or a
woman's self-defence in a life-threatening situation - to prove the justifiability of violent self-
defence. Far from clarifying the question at hand, namely how we propose to act, why, and to
what end, in which situation, such comparisons suggest the self-evident comparability of our
own situation (oppression) with the situations (oppressions) in these historical precedents.
Questioning the usefulness of women arming ourselves here and now or of beating up select
men in the park thus becomes equivalent to suggesting that the Jews in the Warsaw ghetto
should have nonviolently awaited their destruction. Such comparisons, however, mean abusing
the suffering (and the resistance) of other people in the interests of justifying our own actions.
Our situation is alleged to be comparable to that in the examples, the analogy having to stand in
for an analysis of our own situation. The proposal to use violence is derived not from an analysis
of our situation and a definition of our political aims; rather, violence is the chosen means, for
which justification is now being sought.

NEXT THEY SAY PERM DO BOTH:

Our link arguments are disadvantages to the permutation: (a) their
conception of violence as somewhere out there prevents them from
engaging it on an everyday level and (b) they’ve reduced us to cogs within
the system, without agency we can do nothing more than sustain a system of
oppression.

The perm offers no net benefit: their harms are constructions founded on
destructive representational practices. They are part of a structure that
help form a larger ideology that is likely to cause material harms, however
their impacts are nothing more than an attempt to exonerate their selves
for doing violence to others.

UTOPIANISM TURN:
A. The politics of the 1AC privileges globality. This mechanism of ordering
undermines human experience and short-circuits utopian possibilities.
FASCHING IN 1993 [Darrell J Fasching, THE ETHICAL CHALLENGE OF AUSCHWITZ AND
HIROSHIMA: APOCALYPSE OR UTOPIA?, 1993; pg 193]
Utopians seem to offer vague hopes for some unrealizable future. Realists want to know where they
are going. Realists like to be in control of their destiny and thus prefer clear strategies,
unambiguous goals and "final solutions." But after Auschwitz and Hiroshima we can no longer
afford such final solutions. When the end is too clearly defined it too easily justifies the means.
Utopians prefer to live in an unfinished world of proximate goals and partial solutions. Utopians
prefer to keep the future ambiguously open to transcendence. The maxim of a utopian ethic
could well be Ellul's, "think globally but act locally." When it comes to action, one must not be
distracted by the global orientation of mass media. The place where the world can be
transformed is precisely where it intersects with the experience of actual individuals and their
particular communities. Utopians prefer to love their neighbor rather than "the world,"
understanding that the neighbor is, as the story of the good Samaritan (Luke 10:25ff) suggests,
primarily the stranger, even the enemy, who by chance crosses our path. Utopians prefer an
antibureaucratic ethic in which every means is measured by the unseen measure of human
dignity. They are convinced that the utopian good is a good internal to the practice of creating
community. If the means do not respect human dignity neither will the end. To the realist, all of
this remains hopelessly utopian. Such utopianism has absolutely no chance of being effective or
successful. And yet, even were that true, we ought to welcome the stranger. For being human is
more important than exercising a will to power to be in control. We ought to act without clinging
to the dharmas, a Buddhist might say, for we cannot stop time and control the destiny of the
universe. Or to put it in the language of Paul, we ought to live every day as if our time was short,
thus "buyers should conduct themselves as though they owned nothing, and those who make use
of the world as though they were not using it, for the world as we know it is passing away" (1
Corinthians 7:30-31).
B. These utopian possibilities are critical to preventing nuclear apocalypse as well as
genocide.
FASCHING IN 1993 [Darrell J Fasching, THE ETHICAL CHALLENGE OF AUSCHWITZ AND
HIROSHIMA: APOCALYPSE OR UTOPIA?, 1993; pg 4-5]
The best way to describe the "style" of the theology of culture proposed in these books is to suggest
that it is a "decentered" or "alienated theology." Alienated theology is the opposite of apologetic
theology. Apologetic theology typically seeks to defend the "truth" and "superiority" of one's own
tradition against the "false," "inferior," and "alien" views of other traditions. Alienated theology,
by contrast, is theology done "as if" one were a stranger to one's own narrative traditions,
seeing and critiquing one's own traditions from the vantage point of the other's narrative
traditions. It is my conviction that alienated theology is the appropriate mode for theology in an
emerging world civilization-a civilization tottering in the balance between apocalypse and utopia.
There are two ways to enter world history, according to the contemporary author John Dunne:
you can be dragged in by way of world war or you can walk in by way of mutual understanding. By
the first path, global civilization emerges as a totalitarian project of dominance that risks escalating
into a nuclear apocalypse. By the second path, we prevent the first, creating global civilization
through an expansion of our understanding of what it means to be human. This occurs when
we pass over to an other's religion and culture and come back with new insight into our own.
Gandhi is an example, passing over to the Sermon on the Mount and coming back to the Hindu
Bhagavad Gita to gain new insight into it as a scripture of nonviolence. Gandhi never seriously
considered becoming a Christian but his Hinduism was radically altered by his
encounter with Christianity. One could say the same (reversing the directions) for Martin Luther
King Jr., who was deeply influenced by Gandhi's understanding of nonviolent resistance in the
Gita. When we pass over (whether through travel, friendship, or disciplined study and
imagination) we become "strangers in a strange land" as well as strangers to ourselves,
seeing ourselves through the eyes of another. Assuming the perspective of a stranger is an
occasion for insight and the sharing of insight. Such cross-cultural interactions build bridges of
understanding and action between persons and cultures that make cooperation possible and
conquest unnecessary. "Passing over" short circuits apocalyptic confrontation and inaugurates
utopian new beginnings -new beginnings for the "postmodern" world of the coming third
millennium. Gandhi and King are symbols of a possible style for a postmodern alienated theology.

THEY SAY INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITIES CAN COEXIST WITH STATE

RESPONSIBILITIES:
The permutation can’t solve because it emerges from the same paradigm of
domination.
NAYAR IN 1999 [Jayan Nayar, School of Law, University of Warwick, “RE-FRAMING
INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY”, 9 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 599,
Fall of 1999; L/N]

The mutuality of "professional" sensibilities between the "criticized" and the "critic" brings with
it a considerable degree of closure. Primary among the consequences of this familiarity and,
therefore, similarity between the "professional" location of both, is that emancipatory
imagination is contained within the same aspirational "languages" that are commonly
understood. Through this closure of language and, therefore, imagination, emancipation itself
becomes absorbed into an enclosed conceptual space for articulation. The standpoint of the
same rhetorical devices of civilizational projections become the tools for entitlement claims. Put
differently, what we might see as direction for emancipation is itself "ordered" by our own
conceptual frameworks that we derive from ourselves as subjects and objects of ordering.

Now alex you can either complain to your partner or listen to this card:

They didn’t read their Nussabum evidence but Alex is going to complain about it in
his 1AR so I will answer it here:
we obviously don’t assume that only individuals can cause violence – our kritik is
just based on the premise that violence is inherent in human beings and that we
are all capable of violence. WE, THE INDIVIDUAL, are the ones who commit
crimes not the federal government or the military as a whole. The individual
soldier is responsible for raping women, for expressing his orientalist mindset to
women in south korea.

Structural Analysis of violence that does not attend to one’s role in the violence
causes greater domination and suffering.
NAYAR IN 1999 [Jayan Nayar, School of Law, University of Warwick, “RE-FRAMING
INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY”, 9 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 599,
Fall of 1999; L/N]

My questioning is not of intent, or of commitment, or of the sincerity of those who advocate

world-order transformations. Rather, my questionings relate to a perspective on "implications."
Here, there is a very different, and more subtle, sort of globalized world-order that we need to
consider--the globalization of violence, wherein human relationships become disconnected from
the personal and are instead conjoined into distant and distanced chains of violence, an
alienation of human and human. And by the nature of this new world-ordering, as the web of
implication in relational violence is increasingly extended, so too, the vision of violence itself
becomes blurred and the voice, muted. Through this implication into violence, therefore, the
order(ing) of emancipatory imagination is reinforced. What we cannot see, after all, we cannot
speak; what we refuse to see, we dare not speak. So, back to the question: to what extent, for
this, "our world," do we contemplate change when "we" imagine transformed "world-orders?" In
addition to the familiar culprits of violent orderings, such as government, financial institutions, transnational corporations, the
World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO (as significant culprits they indeed are), do we, in our contemplations of violent orders, vision
our locations within corporate "educational" institutions as "professional academics" and "researchers," our locations within
corporate NGOs as "professional activists," our locations within "think-tanks" and "research organizations" as "professional policy-
formulators," and whatever other locations of elite "expertise" we have been "trained" to possess, as ordered sites, complicit and
parasitic, within a violent "world-order"? Do we see in our critiques of world-orderings, out there, the
orderings we find, right here, in our bodies, minds, relationships, expectations, fears and hopes?
Would we be willing to see "our (ordered) world" dismantled in order that other worlds, wherein
our "privileges" become extinguished, may flourish? These concerns are, then, I believe, the real
complexities of judgment and action. Consideration should be given, not only to those of the
political-structural, so often honed in on, but also to the [*628] issue of the political-personal,
which ultimately is the "unit" of "worlds" and of "orders." If "globalization," as a recent
obsession of intellectual minds, has contributed anything to an understanding of the ways of the
"world," I suggest, it is that we cannot escape "our" implication within the violence of "world
(mis)orders."
Our argument is a criticism of how they relate to the resolution. Their framework
argument destroys human agency as well as meaningful change as it presumes that
change doesn’t occur in the everyday at an individual level. Our evidence suggests
this mode of criticism induces more violence. With that said, this debate is about
education and how to promote change in a productive and fair way. Our
contention is that we ought to be able to respond to the affirmative in any way that
links to their speech act as well as present an alternative methodology, which is
why our methodology which provides fairness as well as nonviolent ground. It
should be preferred.

1. The affirmative should be ready to defend the way they engage the topic as
well as their particular policy. Without the ability to test these questions the
debate is a ton less educational because there isn’t as thorough of a
discussion of all of the specific aspects of their speech act.
2. We’ll readily concede that the affirmative gets to pick the framework for the
affirmative’s arguments; however the negative should be able to pick their
own framework to compete in. A permutation would check non-competitive
alternatives; however the net-benefits we read guarantee that there is topic
specific education some level.
3. Their interpretation is most unfair because they arbitrarily exclude
literature that they do not desire to debate. This jacks our ability to
effectively strategize against their affirmative.
4. They over-limit! Given that they define the scope of what they’re willing to
defend, we should be able to have a diversity of ways to answer their
arguments. Bear in mind, that we do not dismiss the policy aspect of their
affirmative; rather we engage it in a direct way that provides sufficient
limitations as we use literature in order to garner warrants for why their
affirmative is disadvantageous.
5. Their framework justifies the use racist, sexist, or homophobic language
without a test of whether or not that is beneficial. All of these questions are
important ones to discuss the framework by which the plan is constructed
insofar as the language we use describes what we actually believe as well as
constructs the lens of fiat and is hence a prior question.
6. Framework is a substantive question. They need to be able to win that their
framework does not produce more violence in order to win this debate.
Meaning that if we win that policy debate as it exists endorses a violent
ideology, then it is impossible for them to win. Hence, they must win the
substance to win framework.
7. We allow for greatest argument choice because we allow them to propose a
policy question or a critical question, but they neglect our right to choose
what arguments we defend.
8. Debate has evolved to include critical arguments, which makes the need for
a critique as well as an alternative integral in order to account for possible
ways the affirmative can morph in the future.
9. Their framework is not resolutional. There is no reason the resolution can’t
be critically responded to. With that said, even if they win that the
affirmative must be a plan, there is no reason the negative has to be a policy
proposal. On the contrary, different avenues of critique might be superior.
The affirmative should win that their reading of the resolution is productive.
10. No impact because Framework just is a reason they can weigh the plan, but
 the impacts of destroying the value to life as well as recreating their harms
provide strong rationale for negation that outweigh the affirmative’s
benefits.

Transformative politics feed into a cyclical process of critique that further order
the world in destructive ways.
NAYAR IN 1999 [Jayan Nayar, School of Law, University of Warwick, “RE-FRAMING
INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY”, 9 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 599,
Fall of 1999; L/N]

The description of the continuities of violence in Section II in many ways is familiar to those
who adopt a critical perspective of the world. "We" are accustomed to narrating human wrongs
in this way. The failures and betrayals, the victims and perpetrators, are familiar to our critical
understanding. From this position of judgment, commonly held within the "mainstream" of the
"non-mainstream," there is also a familiarity of solutions commonly advocated for
transformation; the "marketplace" for critique is a thriving one as evidenced by the abundance
of literature in this respect. Despite this proliferation of enlightenment and the profession of so
many good ideas, however, "things" appear to remain as they are, or, worse still, [*620]
deteriorate. And so, the cycle of critique, proposals for transformation and disappointment
continues.

Rightly, we are concerned with the question of what can be done to alleviate the sufferings that
prevail. But there are necessary prerequisites to answering the "what do we do?" question. We
must first ask the intimately connected questions of "about what?" and "toward what end?"
These questions, obviously, impinge on our vision and judgment. When we attempt to imagine
transformations toward preferred human futures, we engage in the difficult task of judging the
present. This is difficult not because we are oblivious to violence or that we are numb to the
resulting suffering, but because, outrage with "events" of violence aside, processes of violence
embroil and implicate our familiarities in ways that defy the simplicities of straightforward
imputability. Despite our best efforts at categorizing violence into convenient compartments--
into "disciplines" of study and analysis such as "development" and "security" (health,
environment, population, being other examples of such compartmentalization)--the
encroachments of order(ing) function at more pervasive levels. And without doubt, the
perspectives of the observer, commentator, and actor become crucial determinants. It is
necessary, I believe, to question this, "our," perspective, to reflect upon a perspective of violence
which not only locates violence as a happening "out there" while we stand as detached observers
and critics, but is also one in which we are ourselves implicated in the violence of ordered worlds
where we stand very much as participants. For this purpose of a critique of critique, it is
necessary to consider the "technologies" of ordering.

Their attempt to solve is terrible insofar as it is part of a systematic process by

which progressivism is celebrated for no apparent worthwhile reason.
NAYAR IN 1999 [Jayan Nayar, School of Law, University of Warwick, “RE-FRAMING
INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY”, 9 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 599,
Fall of 1999; L/N]

The discussion in this article thus far on the technologies of ordering may be regarded by some
readers as being quite irrelevant to our current concerns of addressing the ills of the world.
However, I must disagree. My purpose in engaging in this discussion has been to relocate
ourselves, the "critics" of world (mis)orderings within the social sphere of ordered violence. As
we contemplate transformations, therefore, it is essential that we do not detach ourselves from
the "worlds" which are the objects of our critique and imaginations.

To some, those who might have the occasion to read this current article, the changes brought
about by the advent of the so-called post-colonial, post-communist, post-ideological, post-
modern period may indeed have been beneficial. Some of us--the expert intellectual community,
the development planners, the security strategists, the bureaucratic elites, even the "students"
who might have been encouraged to refer to the insights contained in this Symposium--are, to
some extent or the other, the beneficiaries of this [*626] order(ing). From this location, then, it
becomes not too difficult to rationalize the limited successes, if not defend the fundamentals, of
"our world" within a transnational, global reality. n49 It becomes not too difficult to
intellectualize pleasure and pain and to project toward ever-more "new beginnings" in which the
virtues of "our world" may be extolled. For this is the "truth" of the "world" as experienced
within these locations of privilege.

Others among us, without the comforts of such complacencies and with the best of intentions,
may seek to extend and apply the benefits of the world that we know, that is "our" truth, to those
who we identify as being "excluded." The politics of inclusion then dominates our attention--
inclusion of the poor in "development," inclusion of the terrorized in the framework of
"security," inclusion of all those thus far marginalized into the "world." n50 The keyword for this
new politics of inclusion, we often hear, is "participation." So we might struggle to bring the
excluded within the fora of national, international and transnational organizations, articulate
their interests and demand service to their cause. And yet, so much inclusion has done little to
change the culture of violence. However sympathetic, even empathetic, we may be to the cause
of the "subaltern," however sophisticated and often self-complicating our exposition of violence,
one thing is difficult for us to face: when all is said and done, most of us engaged in these
transformatory endeavors are far removed from the existential realities of "subaltern" [*627]
suffering. For "them," what is the difference, I wonder, between the violence of new orders and
that of the old, what is the difference between the new articulations of violence and those of the
old, when violence itself is a continuing reality? But we push on, keeping ourselves busy. What
else can we do but suggest new beginnings?

I am not suggesting that all "new beginnings" of world-order, past and present, were envisioned
with cynical intent. Quite the opposite is the reason for the point I wish to make. The persistent
realities of violence within "ordered" worlds are all the more glaring when we acknowledge that
they arise in the name of human aspirations that were mostly articulated by progressive forces,
in the wake of real struggles, to contribute to the transformation of the inequities and violence of
the then existing "orders." Yet more and more talk of universal human welfare, transformed
world-orders, new beginnings and the like have only given us more and more occasion to lament
the resulting dashed hopes.