Professional Documents
Culture Documents
97 (1914)
Carson, J.:
The appellant in this case was convicted in the court below of the theft of the caraballa and her calf, and sentenced
to imprisonment for the period of five years, to suffer the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay his
share of the costs of the proceedings.
Counsel for the accused contends that the trial court erred in giving probative value to the testimony of one Dagsa,
the principal witness for the prosecution; in accepting proof as to certain extrajudicial admissions alleged to have
been made by the accused, including an offer to compromise the case by the payment of a sum of money; and in
declining to accept as true the testimony of the accused in his own behalf at the trial. We find nothing in the record,
however, which would justify us in disturbing the findings of the trial judge as to the degree of the credit which
should be accorded the various witnesses called at the trial.
Counsel rests his contention that the evidence as to the extrajudicial statements made by the accused should have
been excluded on the ground that, as counsel insists, there is no formal proof n the record that they were made
voluntarily, and that they were therefore inadmissible as proof in so far as they can be construed as admission or
confession of guilt. In answer to this contention it is sufficient to say that there is no suggestion in the record in the
court below that these extrajudicial statements were not made voluntarily, and we are satisfied that if the evidence
as to the circumstances under which these incriminating statements were made be accepted as true it clearly
rebuts the possibility that they were made involuntarily, or extorted by force, threats, or promise of reward. The
record clearly discloses that these extrajudicial statements were made in the course of offers to compromise and
that they were made by the accused voluntarily, though doubtless these offers to compromise were made in the
hope that it accepted he would escape prosecution.
The question as to the admissibility of offers to compromise in criminal cases has frequently been discussed in the
courts of the United States, and the practice there does not appear to be wholly uniform. We think, however, that
the weight both of authority and of reason sustains the rule which admits evidence of offers to compromise, but
permits the accused to show that such offers were not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid
the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the
offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt and an attempt to avoid the legal consequences
which would ordinarily ensue therefrom.
Satisfaction to the owner of the goods stolen is admissible, as evidence against the accused, but if made merely to
avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment, and not under a consciousness of guilt, it is not evidence. (U. S. vs.
Hunter, 1 Cranch, C. C., 317.)
In a prosecution for seduction, evidence that the accused had sought an adjustment with the prosecutrix is
inadmissible, if such offer of adjustment did not contain an admission of guilt. (Wilson vs. State, 73 Ala., 527.)
On a prosecution for assault with intent to commit rape upon a married woman, evidence is admissible on behalf of
the prosecution to show that the defendant sent a third person to the father of the prosecutrix to ascertain if the
case could be compromised. (Barr vs. People, 113 Ill., 471.)
In a larceny case, evidence is not admissible to show that defendant stated that he would pay $50 if it could be
settled, in reply to threats by the owner of the goods stolen that he would be prosecuted for damages, and a
solicitation to settle. (Frain vs. State, 40 Ga., 530.)
In a prosecution for larceny, evidence is not admissible that defendant paid a sum of money in settlement of a civil
action brought to recover the property alleged to have been stolen. (State vs. Emerson, 48 Iowa, 172.)
An offer of compromise, voluntarily made by the accused, without threat or promise, and the reply thereto, are
admissible in evidence upon his trial for a crime. (State vs. Bruce, 33 La. Ann., 186.)
An offer of compromise of a crime, unaccepted by the prosecutor, may be proven by the state as an admission of
guilt, or as disclosing possession of the property which is the subject of the burglary and larceny charged in the
indictment. (State vs. Rodriguez, 45 La. Ann., 1040; 13 Southern, 802.)
It may be shown that the prisoner sent a massage to the prosecutor, proposing to take a whipping and to be let go.
(State vs. DeBerry, 92 N. C., 800.)
We are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, but we are opinion that in imposing the
penalty the trial court should have taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance the manifest lack of
"instruction and education" of the offender. It does not clearly appear whether he is or not an uncivilized Igorot,
although there are indications in the record which tend to show that he is. But in any event, it is very clear that if
he is not a member of an uncivilized tribe of Igorots, he is a densely ignorant and untutored fellow, who lived in the
Igorot country, and is not much, if any, higher that are they in the scale of civilization. The beneficent provisions of
article 11 of the Penal Code as amended by Act No. 2142 of the Philippine Legislature are peculiarly applicable to
offenders who are shown to be members of these uncivilized tribes, and to other offenders who, as a result of the
fact that their lives are cast with such people far away from the centers of civilization, appear to be so lacking in
"instruction and education" that they should not be held to so high a degree of responsibility as is demanded of
those citizens who have had the advantage of living their lives in contact with the refining influences of civilization.
It is true that this court has quite uniformly held that convicts of the crimes of theft and robbery are not entitled to
the benefits of the provisions of article 11 of the Penal Code prior to its amendment by Act No. 2142, this on the
theory that under the provisions of the article prior to its amendment the ground upon which the courts were
authorized in their direction to mitigate the penalties prescribed by the code was "the circumstance of the offender
being a native, mestizo, or Chinese." As to crimes of this nature we declined to hold that the mere fact that one is a
native of the Philippine Islands, a mestizo or a Chinese would justify a claim that upon conviction of crimes such as
theft or robbery he should be treated more leniently than the members of any other race or people, no sounds
presumption arising from the mere racial affiliation of the convict that he was less or to resist the temptation to
commit them than are they.
Under the provisions of the article as amended by Act No. 2142, the ground upon which the courts are authorized
to mitigate the prescribed penalties is not racial affiliation of the convict, but "the degree of instruction and
education of the offender;" and while mere ignorance or lack of education will not always be sufficient to justify the
mitigation of the prescribed penalties for crimes such as theft and robbery, there can be no doubt that cases may
and will arise wherein under all the "circumstances attending" the commission of these offenses the exercise of a
sound discretion will justify a more lenient treatment of an ignorant and semicivilized offender, than that which
should be accorded one who has the advantage of such a degree of instruction and education as would justify the
court in believing that he was capable of fully and properly understanding and appreciating the criminal character of
the offense committed by him.
We conclude, therefore, that under the provisions of article 111 as amended by Act No. 2142, the courts may and
should, even in cases of theft and robbery, take into consideration where it appears that under all the
circumstances attending the commission of the offense, he should not be held to the strict degree of responsibility
prescribed in the code for the ordinary offender.
The larceny of large cattle and falls within articles 517, 518, and 520 of the Penal Code, as amended by Act No.
2030. According to those sections, as amended, the value of the animals stolen being 650 pesetas, a penalty one
degree higher than arresto mayor in its medium degree to presidio correccional in its minimum degree should have
been imposed; in other words, presidio correccional in its medium degree to presidio mayor in its minimum degree.
Giving the convict the benefit of the provisions of article 11 of the Penal Code, as amended, this penalty should be
imposed in its minimum degree — that is to say, the penalty applicable in this case is that of presidio correccional in
its medium degree.
Modified by imposing the penalty prescribed for the offense of which the defendant and appellant was convicted in
the minimum degree — that is to say, by, imposing upon the accused the penalty of two years four months and one
day of presidio correccional, in lieu of that of five years' imprisonment imposed by the court below — the judgment
convicting and sentencing him should be and is hereby affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the
appellant.
his employment, it was admissible. The appellee offered evidence that the passenger claimed
the appellant was liable to her for injuries inflicted by the appellee through its agent. Appellee
then showed that the appellant paid the passenger's claim. Appellee offered this as an
admission on the part of the appellant that the driver of the car was acting as appellant's agent
and within the scope of his employment.
The court below admitted the testimony as an admission that the driver was appellant's agent
acting within the scope of his authority. The appellant offered no evidence whatever that it was a
hypothetical admission only; that is, merely a compromise. The appellant having offered no
evidence, the trial court was correct in admitting it for the purpose offered, namely, as an
admission rather than as evidence of a compromise for the purpose of purchasing peace.
The judgment should be affirmed.
MELO, J.:
Accused-appellant Yip Wai Ming and victim Lam Po Chun, both Hongkong nationals, came to Manila on vacation on
July 10, 1993. The two were engaged to be married. Hardly a day had passed when Lam Po Chun was brutally beaten
up and strangled to death in their hotel room. On the day of the killing, July 11, 1993, Yip Wai Ming, was touring
Metro Manila with Filipino welcomers while Lam Po Chun was left in the hotel room allegedly because she had a
headache and was not feeling well enough to do the sights.
For the slaying, an Information was lodged against Yip Wai Ming on July 19, 1991, which averred :
That on or about July 11, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill with treachery and evident premeditation, did
then and there attack, assault and use personal violence upon one Lam Po Chun by then and there
mauling and strangling the latter, thereby inflicting upon her mortal and fatal wounds which were the
direct and immediate cause of her death thereafter.
On May 15, 1995, Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Manila
and presided over by the Honorable Lolita O. Gal-lang rendered a decision in essence finding that Yip Wai Ming
killed his fiancee before he left for the Metro Manila tour. Disposed thus the trial court:
WHEREFORE, in view of the forgoing established evidence, judgment is hereby rendered convicting
the accused Yip Wai Ming beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as charged in the
information and as defined in Article 248, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, and in accordance
therewith the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation which attended the commission of
the offense, the said accused Yip Wai Ming is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided for by law.
Accused is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Lam Po Chun of Hongkong the death
indemnity for damages at Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos; Moral and compensatory damages of
Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos each or a total of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00);
plus costs of suit.
The accused being detained, he is credited with the full extent of the period under which he was
under detention, in accordance with the rules governing convicted prisoners.
SO ORDERED.
(p. 69, Rollo.)
There was no eyewitness to the actual killing of Lam Po Chun. All the evidence about the killing is circumstantial.
The key issue in the instant appeal is, therefore, whether or not the circumstantial evidence linking accused-appellant
to the killing is sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The evidence upon which the prosecution convinced the trial court of accused-appellant's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt is summarized in the Solicitor-General's brief as follows :
On or about 7 o'clock in the evening of July 10, 1993, appellant and his fiancee Lam Po Chun who
are both Hongkong nationals, checked in at Park Hotel located at No. 1032-34 Belen St., Paco,
Manila. They were billeted at Room 210. Angel Gonzaga, the roomboy on duty, assisted the couple in
going up to their room located at the second floor of the hotel (p. 14, tsn, October 13, 1993, p. 66, tsn,
September 1, 1993). When they reached Room 210, appellant got the key from Angel Gonzaga and
informed the latter that they do not need any room service, particularly the bringing of foods and
other orders to their room (pp. 67-69, tsn, September 1, 1993).
After staying for about an hour inside Room 210, the couple went down to the lobby of the hotel.
Appellant asked the front desk receptionist on duty to call a certain Gwen delos Santos and to instruct
her to pick them up the following day, July 11, 1993, a Sunday at 10 o' clock in the morning (pp. 21-
25, tsn, September 8, 1993).
At about past 8 o'clock in the same evening of July 10, 1993, Cariza Destresa, occupant of Room 211
which is adjacent to Room 210, heard a noise which sounds like a heated argument between a man
and a woman coming from the room occupied by appellant and Lam Po Chun. The heated
discussions lasted for thirty (30) minutes and thereafter subsided.
In the following morning, that is, July 11, 1993, at around 9:15, the same Cariza Destreza again heard
a banging which sounds like somebody was thrown and stomped on the floor inside Room 210.
Cariza, who became curious, went near the wall dividing her room and Room 210. She heard a cry of
a woman as if she cannot breathe (pp. 23-24, tsn, August 30, 1993).
At about 10 o'clock a.m., Gwen delos Santos, together with two lady companions, arrived at the
lobby of the Park Hotel. The receptionist informed appellant by telephone of her arrival. In response,
appellant came down without his fiancee Lam Po Chun. After a while, he together with Gwen delos
Santos and the latter's companions, left the hotel. Before leaving, he gave instruction to the front desk
receptionist not to disturb his fiancee at Room 210. He also ordered not to accept any telephone calls,
no room cleaning and no room service (pp. 37- 43, tsn, October 18, 1993).
When appellant left, the front desk receptionist, Enriquieta Patria, noticed him to be in a hurry,
perspiring and looking very scared (p. 32, tsn, September 22, 1993).
During the whole morning of July 11, 1993, after appellant left the hotel until his return at 11 o'clock
in the evening, he did not call his fiancee Lam Po Chun to verify her physical condition (p. 44 tsn,
October 18, 1993, p. 18, tsn, November 23, 1993).
When appellant arrived at 11 o'clock p.m. on that day, he asked the receptionist for the key of his
room. Then together with Fortunato Villa, the roomboy, proceeded to Room 210. When the lock was
opened and the door was pushed, Lam Po Chun was found dead lying face down on the bed covered
with a blanket. Appellant removed the blanket and pretended to exclaim "My God, she is dead" but
did not even embrace his fiancee. Instead, appellant asked the room boy to go down the hotel to
inform the front desk, the security guard and other hotel employees to call the police (pp. 8-27, tsn,
October 18, 1993).
When the police arrived, they conducted an examination of the condition of the doors and windows
of the room as well as the body of the victim and the other surroundings. They found no signs of
forcible entry and they observed that no one can enter from the outside except the one who has the
key. The police also saw the victim wrapped in a colored blanket lying face down. When they
removed the blanket and tried to change the position of her body, the latter was already in state
of rigor mortis, which indicates that the victim has been dead for ten (10) to twelve (12) hours. The
police calculated that Lam Po Chun must have died between 9 to 10 in the morning of July 11, 1993
(pp. 2-29), tsn, September 22, 1993).
Dr. Manuel Lagonera, medico-legal officer of the WPD, conducted an autopsy of the body of the
victim. His examination (Exh. V) revealed that the cause of death was "asphyxia by strangulation."
Dr. Lagonera explained that asphyxia is caused by lack of oxygen entering the body when the
entrance of air going to the respiratory system is blocked (pp. 6-19, tsn, December 14, 1993).
Prior to the death of the victim, her brother, Lam Chi Keung, learned that her life was insured with
the Insurance Company of New Zealand in Causeway Bay, Hongkong, with appellant as the
beneficiary. The premium paid for the insurance was more than the monthly salary of the deceased as
an insurance underwriter in Hongkong (Exh. X).
It was on the bases of the foregoing facts that appellant was charged before the Regional Trial Court
in Manila for the crime of murder committed against the person of Lam Po Chun.
(pp. 3-7, Appellee' Brief, ff. p. 176, Rollo.)
In his brief, accused-appellant offers explanatory facts and argues that the findings of fact of the trial court are based
mainly on the prosecution evidence displaying bias against accused-appellant. He contends that the court made
unwarranted and unfounded conclusions on the basis of self-contradictory and conflicting evidence.
Accused-appellant, at the time of the commission of the crime, was a customer relations officer of Well Motors
Company in Kowloon, Hongkong. He met Lam Po Chun at a party in 1991. Both were sportsminded and after a short
courtship, the two began to have a relationship, living together in the same apartment. The two toured China and
Macao together in 1992. In April, 1993 the two decided to get married. In May 1993, they registered with the
Hongkong Marriage Registry. The wedding was set for August 29, 1993.
An office-mate of accused-appellant named Tessie "Amay" Ticar encouraged him and Lam Po Chun to tour the
Philippines in celebration of their engagement. After finishing the travel arrangements, the two were given by Ticar
the names (Toots, Monique, and Gwen) of her cousins in Manila and their telephone number. Photos of their Manila
contacts were shown to them. In addition to his Citibank credit card, accused-appellant brought P24,000.00 secured at
a Hongkong money exchange and HK$4,000.00. Lam Po Chun had HK$3,000.00.
The two arrived in Manila on July 10, 1993 at about 5:40 P.M. on board Cathay Pacific Flight CX 903. They arrived at
Park Hotel around 7 P.M. From their hotel room, accused-appellant called their contact, Gwen delos Santos, by
telephone informing her of their arrival. The two ate outside at McDonald's restaurant.
Accused-appellant woke up the following morning — Sunday, July 11, 1993 — at around 8 o'clock. After the usual
amenities, including a shower, the two had breakfast in the hotel restaurant, then they went back to their room. At
around 10 o'clock that same morning, accused-appellant received a phone call from the hotel staff telling him that
their visitors had arrived.
He then went to the lobby ahead of Lam Po Chun, introduced himself to the delos Santos sisters, Gwen and Monique,
and their mother. A few minutes later, Lom Po Chun joined them. Two bottles of perfume were given to the sisters as
arrival gifts.
Gwen delos Santos invited the couple to tour the city but Lam Po Chun decided to stay behind as it was very hot and
she had a headache. She excused herself and went up to her room, followed later by accused-appellant to get another
bottle of perfume.
Accused-appellant claims that before leaving, he instructed the clerk at the front desk to give Lam Po Chun some
medicine for headache and, as much as possible, not to disturb her.
Accused-appellant, Gwen, Monique, and the sisters' mother took a taxicab to Landmark Department Store where they
window shopped. Accused-appellant states that from a telephone booth in the store, he called Lam Po Chun but no
one answered his call. From Landmark where they had lunch, the four went to Shoemart Department Store in Makati.
Accused-appellant bought a Giordano T-shirt at Landmark and chocolates at Shoemart. Gwen delos Santos brought
the group to the house of her aunt, Edna Bayona, at Roces, Quezon City. From Roces St., Gwen delos Santos brought
the group to her home in Balut, Tondo. Using the delos Santos telephone, accused-appellant called his office in
Hongkong. The PLDT receipt showed that the call was made at 6:44 P.M. on July 11, 1993. Accused-appellant claims
that, afterwards, he called up Lam Po Chun at their hotel room but the phone just kept on ringing with nobody
answering it. The group had dinner at the delos Santos house in Tondo. After dinner, Gwen delos Santos' brother and
sister-in-law arrived. They insisted in bringing their guest to a restaurant near Manila Bay for coffee, but it was full so
they proceeded to Tia Maria, a Mexican restaurant in Makati.
Finally, the delos Santos family brought Andy Yip back to the Park Hotel, arriving there at around 10:30 PM. Before
the delos Santos group left, there was an agreement that the following morning accused-appellant and Lam Po Chun
would join them in another city tour.
After accused-appellant's knocks at the door of their room remained unanswered, he went back to the hotel front desk
and asked the hotel staff to open the door for him. The room was dark. Accused-appellant put on the light switch. He
wanted to give the roomboy who accompanied him a P20 or P30 tip but his smallest bill was P100. He went to a side
table to get some smaller change. It was then when he noticed the disordered room, a glass case and wallet on the
floor, and Lam Po Chun lying face down on one of the beds.
Accused-appellant tried to wake Lam Po Chun up by calling her name but when she did not respond, he lifted up her
face, moving her body sidewards. He saw blood. Shocked, he shouted at the roomboy to call a doctor.
Several people rushed to Room 210. A foreigner looked at Lam Po Chun and said she was dead. The foreigner placed
his arms around accused-appellant who was slumped on the floor and motioned for him to leave the room. Accused-
appellant refused, but he was made to move out and to go to the lobby, at which place, dazed and crying, he called up
Gwen delos Santos to inform her of what happened. Gwen could not believe what she heard, but she assured accused-
appellant that they were going to the hotel. Policemen then arrived.
In the instant appeal, accused-appellant, through his new counsel, former Justice Ramon C. Fernandez, assigns the
following alleged errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS
ARRESTED WITHOUT WARRANT, WAS TORTURED AND WAS NOT INFORMED THAT HE
HAD THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT AND BE ASSISTED BY INDEPENDENT AND
COMPETENT COUNSEL DURING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAD THE
VICTIM APPLE INSURED AND LATER KILLED HER FOR THE INSURANCE PROCEEDS.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT COMMITTED
A CRIME OF MURDER AGGRAVATED BY EVIDENT PREMEDITATION.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF OFFICER
ALEJANDRO YANQUILING, JR.
V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON THE TESTIMONY OF CARISA DESTREZA
WHO INCURRED SERIOUS CONTRADICTIONS ON MATERIAL POINTS.
VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON THE TESTIMONIES OF THE OTHER
PROSECUTION WITNESSES THAT CONTRADICTED EACH OTHER ON MATERIAL
POINTS.
VII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TESTIMONIES OF THE WITNESSES
OF THE ACCUSED ARE INCREDIBLE.
VIII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAS ESTABLISHED
THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT BY PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
IX
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT COMPLETELY ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION.
(pp. 80-82, Rollo.)
The trial court, in arriving at its conclusions, took the various facts presented by the prosecution, tied them up together
like parts of a jig-saw puzzle, and came up with a complete picture of circumstantial evidence depicting not only the
commission of the crime itself but also the motive behind it.
Our review of the record, however, discloses that certain key elements, without which the picture of the crime would
be faulty and unsound, are not based on reliable evidence. They appear to be mere surmises and assumptions rather
than hard facts or well-grounded conclusions.
A key element in the web of circumstantial evidence is motive which the prosecution tried to establish. Accused-
appellant and Lam Po Chun were engaged to be married. They had toured China and Macao together. They were
living together in one apartment. They were registered with the Hongkong Marriage Registry in May 1993. Marriage
date was set for August 29, 1993. This date was only a month and a half away from the date of death of Lam Po Chun.
In the absence of direct evidence indubitably showing that accused-appellant was the perpetrator of the killing, motive
becomes important. The theory developed by the prosecution was not only of a cold-blooded crime but a well-planned
one, including its timing up to the half hour. It is not the kind of crime that a man would commit against his wife-to-be
unless a strong motive for it existed.
The trial court would have been justified in finding that there was evident premeditation of murder if the story is
proved that Lam Po Chun insured herself for the amounts of US $498,750.00 and US $249,375.00 naming accused-
appellant as the beneficiary.
There is, however, no evidence that the victim secured an insurance policy for a big amount in US dollars and
indicated accused-appellant as the beneficiary. The prosecution presented Exhibit "X", a mere xerox copy of a
document captioned "Proposal for Life Insurance" as proof the alleged insurance. It is not a certified copy, nor was the
original first identified.
The authenticity of the document has thus not been duly established. Exhibit "X" was secured in Hongkong when
Lam Chi Keung, the brother of the victim, learned that his sister was murdered in Manila. It is not shown how and
from whom the information about any alleged insurance having been secured came. There is no signature indicating
that the victim herself applied for the insurance. There is no marking in Exhibit "X" of any entry which purports to be
the victim's signature. There is a signature of Apple Lam which is most unusual for an insurance application because
the victim's name is Lam Po Chun. To be sure nobody insures himself or herself under a nickname. The entries in the
form are in block letters uniformly written by one hand. Below the printed name "Lam Po Chun" are Chinese
characters which presumably are the Chinese translation of her name. Nobody was presented to identify the author of
the "block" handwriting. Neither the prosecution nor the trial court made any comparisons, such as the signature of
Lam Po Chun on her passport (Exh. "C"), with her purported signature or any other entry in the form.
It needs not much emphasis to say that an application form does not prove that insurance was secured. Anybody can
get an application form for insurance, fill it up at home before filing it with the insurance company. In fact, the very
first sentence of the form states that it merely "forms the basis of a contract between you and NZI Life." There was no
contract yet.
There is evidence in the record that the family of Lam Po Chun did not like her relationship with accused-appellant.
After all the trouble that her brother went through to gather evidence to pin down accused-appellant, the fact that all
he could come up with is an unsigned insurance application form shows there was no insurance money forthcoming
for accused-appellant if Lam Po Chun died. There is no proof that the insurance company approved the proposal, no
proof that any premium payments were made, and no proof from the record of exhibits as to the date it was
accomplished. It appearing that no insurance was issued to Lam Po Chun with accused-appellant as the beneficiary,
the motive capitalized upon by the trial court vanishes. Thus, the picture changes to one of the alleged perpetrator
killing his fiancee under cold-blooded circumstances for nothing.
There are other suspicious circumstances about the insurance angle. Lam Po Chun was working for the National
insurance Company. Why then should she insure her life with the New Zealand Insurance Company? Lam's monthly
salary was only HK $5,000.00. The premiums for the insurance were HK $5,400.00 or US $702.00 per month. Why
should Lam insure herself with the monthly premiums exceeding her monthly salary? And why should any insurance
company approve insurance, the premiums of which the supposed insured obviously con not afford to pay, in the
absence of any showing that somebody else is paying for said premiums. It is not even indicated whether or not there
are rules in Hongkong allowing a big amount of insurance to be secured where the beneficiary is not a spouse, a
parent, a sibling, a child, or other close relative.
Accused-appellant points out an apparent lapse of the trial court related to the matter of insurance. At page 33 of the
decision, the trial court stated:
Indeed, Yip Wai Ming testified that he met Andy Kwong in a restaurant in Hongkong and told Yip
and Lam Po Chun should be married and there must be an insurance for her life . . . .
(p. 33, RTC Decision; p. 66, Rollo.)
The source of the above finding is stated by the court as "tsn hearing Sept. 22, 1992." But accused-appellant Yip Wai
Ming did not testify on September 22, 1992. The entire 112 pages of the testimony on that date came from SP02
Yanquiling. The next hearing was on September 29, 1993. All the 100 pages of the testimony on that date came from
Yanquiling. The next hearing on October 13, 1993 resulted in 105 pages of testimony, also from Yanquiling. This
Court is at a complete loss as to the reason of the trial court sourcing its statement to accused-appellant's alleged
testimony.
Lam Po Chun must have been unbelievably trusting or stupid to follow the alleged advice of Andy Kwong. It is
usually the man who insures himself with the wife or future wife or beneficiary instead of the other way around. Why
should Lam Po Chun, with her relatively small salary which is not even enough to pay for the monthly premiums,
insure herself for such a big amount. This is another reason why doubts arise as to the truth of the insurance angle.
Another key factor which we believe was not satisfactorily established is the time of death. This element is material
because from 10 A.M. of July 11, 1993 up to the time the body was discovered late that evening, accused-appellant
was in the company of Gwen delos Santos, her sister Monique, and their mother, touring Metro Manila and going
from place to place. This much is established.
To go around this problem of accused-appellant being away from the scene of the crime during the above mentioned
hours, the prosecution introduced testimonial evidence as to the probable time of death, always placing it within the
narrow 45-minute period between 9:15 and 10 A.M. of July 11, 1993, the time when Cariza Destresa, the occupant of
the adjoining room, heard banging sounds coming from the room of accused-appellant, and the time accused-appellant
left with his Filipino friends.
The prosecution alleges that at 10 A.M., Lam Po Chun was already dead. However, Gwen delos Santos who never
saw the couple before was categorical in declaring that she met both of them at the lobby before the group left for the
tour (tsn, Feb. 14, 1994, p. 64; p. 20, RTC Decision; p. 150, Rollo), but Lam Po Chun asked to be excused because of
a headache. In fact, delos Santos was able to identify Lam Po Chun from pictures shown during the trial. She could
not have done this unless she really saw and met the victim at the hotel lobby at around 10 A.M. of July 11, 1993.
The prosecution introduced an expert in the person of Dr. Manuel Lagonera to establish the probable time of death.
Dr. Lagonera, medico-legal officer of the PNP Western Police District, after extensive questioning on his
qualifications as on expert witness, what he discovered as the cause of death (strangulation), the contents of the
deceased's stomach, injuries sustained, and the condition of the cadaver, was asked to establish the time of death, to
wit:
Q. If we use thirty six (36) hours to forty eight (48) hours, will you agree with me
that it is possible that the victim was killed in the morning of July 10, 1993?
A. I cannot, I have no basis whether the victim was killed in he morning or in the
afternoon
(tsn, Dec. 14, 1993, p. 31.)
Dr. Lagonera's testimony on the number of assailants was similar. He had no basis for an answer, thusly:
ATTY. PASCUA:
Q. Would you be able to determine also based on your findings your autopsy
whether the assailants, the number of the assailants?
WITNESS:
A. I have no basis, Sir.
ATTY. PASCUA:
Q. You have no basis. And would it also have been possible, that there were more
than one assailants?
WITNESS:
A. It is possible also.
ATTY. PASCUA:
Q. It is possible also, who simultaneously inflicted the wounds of the victim?
WITNESS:
A. It is possible.
ATTY. PASCUA:
Q. Based also on your autopsy report, were there signs that the victim put a struggle?
WITNESS:
A. There were no injuries in the hand or forearms or upper arms of the victim. So,
there were no sign of struggle on the part of the victim.
ATTY. PASCUA:
Q. And your basis in saying that there was no struggle on the part of the victim was
that there were no apparent or seen injuries in the hands of the victim?
WITNESS:
A. Yes, sir.
ATTY. PASCUA:
Q. But you did not examine the fingernails?
WITNESS:
A. No, I did not examine, Sir.
ATTY. PASCUA:
Q. Were there also injuries at the back portion of the head of the victim?
WITNESS:
A. No injuries at the back, all in front.
ATTY. PASCUA:
Q. All in front, meaning in terms of probability and based on your professional
opinion, the attack would have come from a frontal attack or the attacker would have
come from behind to inflict the frontal injuries of the victim?
WITNESS:
A. It can be the attack coming from behind in the front or both, sir.
ATTY. PASCUA:
Q. But in your professional opinion or in your experience, based on the injuries
sustained including the location of the injuries on the body of the victim, would it be
more probable that the attack came from in front of the victim?
WITNESS:
A. Yes, it is possible, Sir.
(tsn, Dec. 14, 1993, pp. 60-63.)
Dr. Lagonera placed the probable time of death as July 10, 1993 (tsn, Dec. 14, 1993, p. 108). It is undisputed that at
around 8:30 A.M. of July 11, 1993 accused-appellant and Lam Po Chun took breakfast together at the hotel restaurant.
She could not have been killed on July 10, 1993. The autopsy conducted by Dr. Lagonera and the testimony of
accused-appellant coincided insofar as the food taken at breakfast is concerned. The couple ate eggs, bacon, and
toasted bread. But the doctor was insistent that the death occurred the previous day.
Where a medico-legal expert of the police department could not, with any measure of preciseness, fix the time of
death, the police investigator was bold and daring enough to establish it. Surprisingly, the trial court accepted this kind
of evidence. SP02 Alejandro Yanquiling testified that he arrived at the Park Hotel at about 11:25 o'clock on the
evening of July 11, 1993 to conduct the investigation of the crime. At the time, the victim showed signs of rigor
mortis, stiffening of the muscle joints, with liquid and blood oozing from the nose and mouth. On the basis of his
observations, he declared that the victim had been dead for 10 to 12 hours.
The trial court stated that if the victim had been dead from 10 to 12 hours at 11:35 o'clock in the evening, it is safe to
conclude that she was killed between 9 and 10 o'clock on the morning of July 11, 1993. The mathematics of the trial
court is faulty. Twelve hours before 11:35 P.M. would be 11:35 A.M.. Ten hours earlier would even be later — 1.35
P.M. Since accused-appellant was unquestionably with Gwen delos Santos and her group touring and shopping in
megamalls between 10 A.M. and 11:35 P.M., the assailant or assailants must have been other people who were able to
gain entry into the hotel room at that time.
The trial court stated that there was no sign of any forcible entry into the room, no broken locks, windows, etc. The
answer is simple. Somebody could have knocked on the door and Lam Po Chun could have opened it thinking they
were hotel staff. Unfortunately, Detective Yanquiling was so sure of himself that after pinpointing accused-appellant
as the culprit, he did not follow any other leads. In the course of his interviews with witnesses, his purpose was simply
to nail down one suspect. His investigation was angled towards pinning down Yip Wai Ming. In fact, Gwen delos
Santos testified that Yanquiling talked to her over the telephone almost daily urging her to change her testimony.
Officer Yanquiling testified on cross-examination that he did not apply any mode of scientific investigation. If a
medico-legal expert of the same police department who conducted an autopsy had no basis for giving the probable
time of death, the police officer who merely looked at the body and saw the blood oozing out of the victim's nose and
mouth must have simply guessed such time, plucking it out of thin air. The trial court accepted the erroneous timing,
conveniently placing it where a finding of guilt would follow as a consequence.
Before a conviction can be had upon circumstantial evidence, the circumstances should constitute an unbroken chain
which leads to but one fair and reasonable conclusion, which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, of
the guilty person (U.S. vs. Villos, 6 Phil. 510 [1906]; People vs. Subano, 73 Phil. 692 [1942]). Every hypothesis
consistent with innocence must be excluded if guilt beyond reasonable doubt is based on circumstantial evidence
(U.S. vs. Cajayon, 2 Phil. 570 [1903]; U.S. vs. Tan Chian, 17 Phil. 209 [1910]; U.S. vs. Levente, 18 Phil. 439 [1911]).
All the evidence must be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent
with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt (People vs. Andia,
2 SCRA 423 [1961]).
The tests as to the sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt have not been
met in the case at bar.
The chain of circumstances is not unbroken. The most vital circumstantial evidence in this case is that which proves
that accused-appellant killed the victim so he could gain from the insurance proceeds on the life of the victim. Another
vital circumstance is the time of death precisely between 9:15 and 10 A.M. Both were not satisfactorily established by
the prosecution. Where the weakest link in the chain of evidence is at the same time the most vital circumstance, there
can be no other alternative but to acquit the accused (People vs. Maaborang, 9 SCRA 108 [1963]).
Since the sentence of conviction is based on the crime having been committed within a short time frame, accused-
appellant cannot be convicted on the strength of circumstantial evidence if doubts are entertained as to where he was
at that particular time and reasonable conclusions can be had that other culprits could have entered the room after
accused-appellant left with the delos Santos family. Other people could have killed the victim.
The trial court also relied heavily on the testimony of Cariza Destresa, a 19-year old cultural dancer occupying with
her Australian boyfriend Peter Humphrey, the adjoining Room 211. Destresa testified that while she was in Room 211
at about 9:15 o'clock on the morning of July 11, 1993, she heard banging sounds in Room 210, as if somebody was
being thrown, and there was stomping on the floor. The banging sounds lasted about thirty (30) minutes, an
improbably long time to kill a woman. Destresa stated that she placed her ear near the wall and heard the cry of a
woman having difficulty in breathing.
The witness heard the banging sounds between 9:15 and 9:45 A.M. of July 11, 1993, not before or after. The
unreliability of Destresa's memory as to dates and time is shown by the fact that when asked as to the date of her
Australian boyfriend's arrival in the Philippines, she stated, "July 29, 1993." Pressed by the prosecuting attorney if she
was sure of said date, she changed this to "July 16, 1993." Pressed further:
Q. Are you sure that he arrived in the Philippines on July 16, 1993?
A. I can't exactly remember the date of the arrival of my boyfriend here in the
Philippines because his coming was sudden, Sir.
(tsn, Sept. 30, 1993, p. 10.)
On July 16 and July 19, 1993 Lam Po Chun was already dead. If Peter Humphrey was still in Australia on July 11,
1993, how could he occupy with his girlfriend the next door room, Room 211, on that date at the Park Hotel. If
Destresa cannot remember the date her Australian boyfriend arrived, how could the trial court rely on her memory as
to the 30-minute interval from 9:15 A.M. to 9:45 A.M. of July 11, 1993 when the alleged murder took place. Asked
what time on July 13, 1993 she gave her sworn statement to the police, Destresa answered, "I am not sure, may be it
was in the early morning between 2 or 3 o'clock of that day, Sir." Destresa was asked how she could be certain of July
13, 1993 as the date of her sworn statement. She answered that this was the day her boyfriend left for Australia (tsn,
Aug. 31, 1993, p. 29). In her testimony given on the same day, Destresa states that she stayed in Room 211 for 3
months. She later changed her mind and said she stayed there only when Peter Humphrey was in the Philippines.
According to the witness, Peter left on May 29, 1993; arrived in June and July; left in June; arrived in July; left on
July 13, 1993. Destresa was confused and evasive not only as to dates, but also as to her employment, stating at the
start of her testimony that she was jobless, but later declaring that she was a dancer with the "Rampage" group and
performed in Dubai.
Destresa testified at one point that she heard an argument between a man and a woman in a dialect she could not
understand. This was supposed to be on the evening of July 11, 1993. At that time, the victim had long been dead.
Destresa gave various contradictory statements in her August 30, 1993; August 31, 1993; and September 1, 1993
testimony. To our mind, the trial court gravely erred in relying on her testimony.
Accused-appellant was arrested on July 13, 1993, two days after the killing. There was no warrant of arrest. Officer
Yanquiling testified that there was no warrant and he arrested the accused-appellant based on "series of circumstantial
evidence." He had no personal knowledge of Yip Wai Ming having committed the crime. Accused-appellant stated
that five police officers at the police station beat him up. They asked him to undress, forced him to lie down on a
bench, sat on his stomach, placed a handkerchief over his face, and poured water and beer over his face. When he
could no longer bear the pain, he admitted the crime charged. participated in a re-enactment, and signed an
extrajudicial statement. All the while, he was not informed of his right to remain silent nor did he have counsel of his
choice to assist him in confessing the crime.
The custodial interrogation of accused-appellant was violative of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. The
Constitution provides that "(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this section or Section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible against him." Section 17, Article III provides: "No person shell be compelled to be a witness
against himself." Any confession, including a re-enactment without admonition of the right to silence and to counsel,
and without counsel chosen by the accused is inadmissible in evidence (People vs. Duero, 104 SCRA 379 [1981]).
This Court notes that accused-appellant did not file any complaint or charges against the police officers who allegedly
tortured him. But he was a foreign national, a tourist charged with a serious crime, finding himself in strange
surroundings. In Hongkong, there would have been family members and friends who could have given him moral
support. He would have known that he was being questioned in his own country, being investigated under the laws of
that country. The degree of intimidation needed to coerce a person to confess to the commission of a crime he did not
commit would be much less if he is in a strange land. Accused-appellant states that his lawyers told him not to file any
charges against the policemen. He followed their advice, obviously not wanting to get into more trouble.
This Court has carefully gone over the record of this case. We simply cannot state that the circumstantial evidence is
in its entirety credible and unbroken and that the finding of guilt excludes any other possibility that the accused-
appellant may be innocent.
Most of the circumstantial evidence in this case came from the investigation conducted by Officer Alejandro
Yanquiling or from the prodding by him of various witnesses. The desire of a police officer to solve a high profile
crime which could mean a promotion or additional medals and commendations is admirable. However, an investigator
must pursue various leads and hypotheses instead of singlemindedly pursuing one suspect and limiting his
investigation to that one possibility, excluding various other probabilities. The killing of a tourist is a blot on the peace
and order situation in the Philippines and must be solved. Still, concentrating on pinning down an alien companion of
the victim and not pursuing the possibilities that other persons could have killed the victim for her money and
valuables does not speak well of our crime detection system. It is not enough to solve a crime. The truth is more
important and justice must be rendered.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Yip Wai Ming
is acquitted of the charge of murder on grounds of reasonable doubt and his immediate release from custody is
ordered unless he is being held on other legal grounds.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Parker v. Randolph
No. 78-99
442 U.S. 62
Syllabus
Respondents were convicted, after a joint trial in a Tennessee court, of murder committed
during the commission of a robbery. None of the respondents took the witness stand, and
their oral confessions, found by the trial court to have been freely and voluntarily given, were
admitted into evidence through police officers' testimony. Respondent Pickens' written
confession was also admitted into evidence over his objection that it had been obtained in
violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona,384 U. S. 436. The trial court instructed the
jury that each confession could be used only against the defendant who gave it and could not
be considered as evidence of a codefendant's guilt. Ultimately, the Tennessee Supreme Court
upheld the convictions, holding that admission of respondents' confessions did not violate the
rule of Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123, which held that a defendant's rights under the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment were violated by the admission, at a joint trial,
of the confession of a codefendant who did not take the stand. Respondents subsequently
obtained writs of habeas corpus in a Federal District Court, which held that respondents'
rights under Bruton had been violated, and that introduction of respondent Pickens' written
confession had violated his rights under Miranda. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: The judgment is affirmed as to respondent Pickens and reversed as to the other
respondents. Pp. 442 U. S. 69-77; 442 U. S. 77-81.
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and III,
concluding that, since the grant of certiorari was limited to the Bruton issue, the Court had no
occasion to pass on the merits of the ruling that respondent Pickens' rights
under Miranda had been violated. Pp. 442 U. S. 76-77.
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE STEWART, and MR.
JUSTICE WHITE, concluded, in Part II, that admission of respondents' confessions with proper
limiting jury instructions did
Page 442 U. S. 63
not infringe respondents' right of confrontation secured by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Pp. 442 U. S. 69-76.
(b) Nor does the natural "motivation to shift blame onto others," recognized in Brutonto
render the incriminating statements of codefendants "inevitably suspect," require application
of the Bruton rule when the incriminated defendant has corroborated his codefendant's
statements by heaping blame onto himself. P. 442 U. S. 73.
(c) The Confrontation Clause does not bar admission into evidence of every relevant
extrajudicial statement by a nontestifying declarant simply because it in some way
incriminates the defendant. And an instruction directing the jury to consider a codefendant's
extrajudicial statement only against its source is generally sufficient to avoid offending the
implicated defendant's confrontation right. Pp. 442 U. S. 73-74.
(d) When the defendant's own confession is properly before the jury, as here, the possible
prejudice resulting from the jury's failure to follow the trial court's instructions is not so
"devastating" or "vital" to the confessing defendant as to require departure from the general
rule allowing admission of evidence with limiting instructions. Pp. 442 U. S. 74-75.
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN would not find the rule of Bruton to be inapplicable simply because
interlocking confessions are involved. Rather, even where the confessions of nontestifying
codefendants overlap to some degree, he would follow the analysis indicated by Bruton and
then determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. On the facts of
this case, he concludes that any error was clearly harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Pp. 442 U. S. 77-81.
REHNQUIST, J., announced the Court's judgment and delivered an opinion of the Court with
respect to Parts I and III, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, WHITE, and BLACKMUN, JJ.,
joined, and an opinion with respect to Part II, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART and
WHITE, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment, post, p. 442 U. S. 77. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
Page 442 U. S. 64
in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 442 U. S. 81. POWELL, J., took no
part in the consideration or decision of the case.
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court (Parts I and III) together with an
opinion (Part II), in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE STEWART, and MR. JUSTICE
WHITE joined, and announced the judgment of the Court.
In Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123 (1968), this Court reversed the robbery conviction
of a defendant who had been implicated in the crime by his codefendant's extrajudicial
confession. Because the codefendant had not taken the stand at the joint trial, and thus could
not be cross-examined, the Court held that admission of the codefendant's confession had
deprived the defendant of his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.
The issue before us in this case is whether Bruton requires reversal of a defendant's
conviction when the defendant himself has confessed and his confession "interlocks" with and
supports the confession of his codefendant. We hold that it does not.
Respondents were convicted of murder committed during the commission of a robbery, and
were sentenced to life imprisonment. The cast of characters playing out the scenes that led
up to the fatal shooting could have come from the pen of Bret Harte. [Footnote 1] The story
began in June, 1970, when
Page 442 U. S. 65
one William Douglas, a professional gambler from Las Vegas, Nev., arrived in Memphis, Tenn.,
calling himself Ray Blaylock and carrying a gun and a deck of cards. It ended on the evening
of July 6, 1970, when Douglas was shot and killed in a Memphis apartment.
Testimony at the trial in the Tennessee state court showed that one Woppy Gaddy, who was
promised a cut of Douglas' take, arranged a game of chance between Douglas and Robert
Wood, a sometime Memphis gambler. Unwilling to trust the outcome of the contest entirely to
luck or skill, Douglas marked the cards, and, by game's end, Robert Wood and his money had
been separated. A second encounter between the two men yielded similar results, and Wood
grew suspicious of Douglas' good fortune. In order to determine whether and how Douglas
was cheating, Wood brought to the third game an acquaintance named Tommy Thomas, who
had a reputation of being a "pretty good poker player." Unknown to Wood, however, Thomas'
father and Douglas had been close friends; Thomas, predictably, threw in his lot with
Douglas, purposefully lost some $1,000, and reported to Wood that the game was clean.
Wood nonetheless left the third game convinced that he was being cheated and intent on
recouping his now considerable losses. He explained the situation to his brother, Joe E. Wood,
and the two men decided to relieve Douglas of his ill-gotten gains by staging a robbery of the
upcoming fourth game.
At this juncture, respondents Randolph, Pickens, and Hamilton entered the picture. To carry
out the staged robbery, Joe Wood enlisted respondent Hamilton, who was one of his
employees, and the latter, in turn, associated respondents Randolph and Pickens. Douglas
and Robert Wood sat down to the fourth and final contest on the evening of July 6, 1970. Joe
Wood and Thomas were present in the room as spectators.
Page 442 U. S. 66
During the course of the game, Douglas armed himself with a .38-caliber pistol and an
automatic shotgun; in response to this unexpected development Joe Wood pulled a derringer
pistol on Douglas and Thomas, gave the gun to Robert Wood, and left to tell respondents to
move in on the game. Before respondents arrived, however, Douglas reached for his pistol
and was shot and killed by Robert Wood. Moments later, respondents and Joe Wood broke
down the apartment door, Robert Wood gathered up the cash left on the table, and the gang
of five fled into the night. Respondents were subsequently apprehended by the police and
confessed to their involvement in the crime.
Respondents and the Wood brothers were jointly tried and convicted of murder during the
commission of a robbery. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-2402 (1975). [Footnote 2] Each defendant
was sentenced to life imprisonment. Robert Wood took the stand at trial, admitting that he
had killed Douglas, but claiming that the shooting was in self-defense. Thomas described
Douglas' method of cheating at cards and admitted his complicity in the fraud on Robert
Wood. He also testified in substance that he was present in the room when Joe Wood
produced the derringer and when Robert Wood shot and killed Douglas.
None of the respondents took the stand. Thomas could not positively identify any of them,
and although Robert Wood named Hamilton as one of the three men involved in the staged
robbery, he did not clearly identify Randolph and Pickens as the other two. The State's case
against respondents thus rested primarily on their oral confessions, found by
Page 442 U. S. 67
the trial court to have been freely and voluntarily given, which were admitted into evidence
through the testimony of several officers of the Memphis Police Department. [Footnote 3] A
written confession signed by Pickens was also admitted into evidence over his objection that
it had been obtained in violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966).
The trial court instructed the jury that each confession could be used only against the
defendant who gave it, and could not be considered as evidence of a codefendant's guilt.
The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals reversed respondents' convictions, holding that they
could not be guilty of felony murder, since Douglas had been shot before they arrived on the
scene, and, alternatively, that admission of their confessions at the joint trial violated this
Court's decision in Bruton. The Tennessee Supreme Court, in turn, reversed the Court of
Criminal Appeals and reinstated the convictions. Because "each and every defendant either
through words or actions demonstrated his knowledge thatkilling may be necessary,'" App.
237, the court held that respondents' agreement to participate in the robbery rendered them
liable under the Tennessee felony murder statute for Douglas' death. The Tennessee Supreme
Court also disagreed with the Court of Criminal Appeals that Bruton had been violated,
emphasizing that the confession at issue in Bruton had inculpated a nonconfessing defendant
in a joint trial at which neither defendant took the stand. Here, in contrast, the "interlocking
inculpatory confessions" of respondents Randolph, Pickens, and Hamilton,
"clearly demonstrated the involvement of each, as to crucial facts such as time, location,
felonious activity, and
Page 442 U. S. 68
"The fact that jointly tried codefendants have confessed precludes a violation of
theBruton rule where the confessions are similar in material aspects."
The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee thereafter granted
respondents' applications for writs of habeas corpus, ruling that their rights under Bruton had
been violated and that introduction of respondent Pickens' uncounseled written confession
had violated his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, supra.The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit affirmed, holding that admission of the confessions violated the rule announced
in Bruton and that the error was not harmless, since the evidence against each respondent,
even considering his confession, was "not so overwhelming as to compel the jury verdict of
guilty. . . ." 575 F.2d 1178, 1182 (1978). The Court of Appeals frankly acknowledged that its
decision conflicts with decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit holding
the Bruton rule inapplicable "[w]here the jury has heard not only a codefendant's confession
but the defendant's own [interlocking] confession. . . ." United States ex rel. Catanzaro v.
Mancusi, 404 F.2d 296, 300 (1968), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 942 (1970). Accord, United States
ex rel. Stanbridge v. Zelker, 514 F.2d 45, 48-50, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 872 (1975); United
States ex rel. Duff v. Zelker, 452 F.2d 1009, 1010 (1971), cert. denied,406 U.S. 932 (1972).
We granted certiorari in this case to resolve that conflict. [Footnote 4] 439 U.S. 978 (1978).
Page 442 U. S. 69
II
Page 442 U. S. 70
This Court reversed Bruton's conviction, noting that, despite the trial court's admittedly clear
limiting instruction, "the introduction of Evans' confession added substantial, perhaps even
critical, weight to the Government's case in a form not subject to cross-examination." 391
U.S. at 391 U. S. 127-128. Bruton was therefore held to have been denied his Sixth
Amendment right of confrontation. The Bruton court reasoned that, although in many cases
the jury can and will follow the trial judge's instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence,
"there are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions
is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and
human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored. Such a context is presented here,
where the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who stands
accused side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately spread before the jury in a joint
trial. Not only are the incriminations devastating to the defendant, but their credibility is
inevitably suspect, a fact recognized when accomplices do take the stand and the jury is
instructed to weigh their testimony carefully given the recognized motivation to shift blame
onto others. The unreliability of such evidence is intolerably compounded when the alleged
accomplice, as here, does not testify, and cannot be tested by cross-examination. It was
against such threats to a fair trial that the Confrontation Clause was directed."
Id. at 391 U. S. 135-136 (citations and footnotes omitted). One year after Bruton was
decided, this Court rejected the notion that erroneous admission at a joint trial of evidence
such as that introduced in Bruton automatically requires reversal of an otherwise valid
conviction. See Harrington v. California, 395 U. S. 250 (1969). In some cases, the properly
Page 442 U. S. 71
admitted evidence of guilt is so overwhelming, and the prejudicial effect of the codefendant's
admission so insignificant by comparison, that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that
introduction of the admission at trial was harmless error. [Footnote 5]
Page 442 U. S. 72
Petitioner urges us to follow the reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and
to hold that the Bruton rule does not apply in the context of interlocking confessions.
Alternatively, he contends that, if introduction of interlocking confessions at a joint trial does
violate Bruton, the error is all but automatically to be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. We agree with petitioner that admission at the joint trial of respondents' interlocking
confessions did not infringe respondents' right of confrontation secured by the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, but prefer to cast the issue in a
slightly broader form than that posed by petitioner.
Bruton recognized that admission at a joint trial of the incriminating extrajudicial statements
of a nontestifying codefendant can have "devastating" consequences to a nonconfessing
defendant, adding "substantial, perhaps even critical, weight to the Government's case." 391
U.S. at 391 U. S. 128. Such statements go to the jury untested by cross-examination and,
indeed, perhaps unanswered altogether unless the defendant waives his Fifth Amendment
privilege and takes the stand. The prejudicial impact of a codefendant's confession upon an
incriminated defendant who has, insofar as the jury is concerned, maintained his innocence
from the beginning is simply too great in such cases to be cured by a limiting instruction. The
same cannot be said, however, when the defendant's own confession -- "probably the most
probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him," id. at 391 U. S.
139 (WHITE, J., dissenting) -- is properly introduced at trial. The defendant is "the most
knowledgeable and unimpeachable source of information about his past conduct," id. at 391
U. S. 140
Page 442 U. S. 73
(WHITE, J., dissenting), and one can scarcely imagine evidence more damaging to his
defense than his own admission of guilt. Thus, the incriminating statements of a codefendant
will seldom, if ever, be of the "devastating" character referred to in Brutonwhen the
incriminated defendant has admitted his own guilt. The right protected byBruton -- the
"constitutional right of cross-examination," id. at 391 U. S. 137 -- has far less practical value
to a defendant who has confessed to the crime than to one who has consistently maintained
his innocence. Successfully impeaching a codefendant's confession on cross-examination
would likely yield small advantage to the defendant whose own admission of guilt stands
before the jury unchallenged. Nor does the natural "motivation to shift blame onto others,"
recognized by the Bruton Court to render the incriminating statements of codefendants
"inevitably suspect," id. at 391 U. S. 136, require application of the Bruton rule when the
incriminated defendant has corroborated his codefendant's statements by heaping blame
onto himself.
The right of confrontation conferred by the Sixth Amendment is a safeguard to ensure the
fairness and accuracy of criminal trials, see Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 400 U. S.
89 (1970), and its reach cannot be divorced from the system of trial by jury contemplated by
the Constitution. A crucial assumption underlying that system is that juries will follow the
instructions given them by the trial judge. Were this not so, it would be pointless for a trial
court to instruct a jury, and even more pointless for an appellate court to reverse a criminal
conviction because the jury was improperly instructed. The Confrontation Clause has never
been held to bar the admission into evidence of every relevant extrajudicial statement made
by a nontestifying declarant simply because it in some way incriminates the defendant. See,
e.g., id. at 400 U. S. 80;Mattox v. United States, 156 U. S. 237, 156 U. S. 240-244 (1895).
And an instruction directing the jury to consider a codefendant's extrajudicial statement only
against its source has been found sufficient to
Page 442 U. S. 74
avoid offending the confrontation right of the implicated defendant in numerous decisions of
this Court. [Footnote 6]
When, as in Bruton, the confessing codefendant has chosen not to take the stand and the
implicated defendant has made no extrajudicial admission of guilt, limiting instructions
cannot be accepted as adequate to safeguard the defendant's rights under the Confrontation
Clause. Under such circumstances, the "practical and human limitations of the jury
system," Bruton v. United States, supra at 391 U. S. 135, override the theoretically sound
premise that a jury will follow the trial court's instructions. But when the defendant's own
confession is properly before the jury, we believe that the constitutional scales tip the other
way. The possible prejudice resulting from the failure of the jury to follow the trial court's
instructions is not so "devastating" or "vital" to the confessing defendant to require departure
from the general rule allowing admission of evidence with limiting
Page 442 U. S. 75
Page 442 U. S. 76
III
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's granting of habeas corpus relief to
respondent Pickens on the additional
Page 442 U. S. 77
ground that his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), had been violated.
Although petitioner sought review of this ruling, our grant of certiorari was limited to
the Bruton issue. We thus have no occasion to pass on the merits of the Court of
Appeals' Miranda ruling. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals as to respondent
Pickens is affirmed.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
[Footnote 1]
"This appeal involves a sequence of events which have the flavor of the old West before the
law ever crossed the Pecos. The difference is that here there are no heroes, and here there
was a trial."
[Footnote 2]
"(4) he commits a willful, deliberate and malicious killing or murder during the perpetration of
any arson, rape, robbery, burglary, larceny, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or unlawful throwing,
placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb."
[Footnote 3]
Each of the confessions was subjected to a process of redaction in which references by the
confessing defendant to other defendants were replaced with the words "blank" or "another
person." As the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit observed below, the confessions were
nevertheless "such as to leave no possible doubt in the jurors' minds concerning
the person[s]' referred to." 575 F.2d 1180.
[Footnote 4]
The conflict extends throughout the Courts of Appeals. The Courts of Appeals for the Third
and Sixth Circuits have expressly ruled that the Bruton rule applies in the context of
interlocking confessions, see Hodges v. Rose, 570 F.2d 643 (CA6 1978); United States v.
DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972 981-983 (CA3 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Lupo v. United States, 429
U.S. 1038 (1977), and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has done so impliedly, see
Ignacio v. Guam, 413 F.2d 513, 515-516 (1969), cert. denied,397 U.S. 943 (1970). In
addition to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, at least four other Courts of Appeals
have rejected the Bruton claims of confessing defendants. Cases from the Fifth and Seventh
Circuits have reasoned that the Brutonrule does not apply in the context of interlocking
confessions and that, even if it does, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Mack v. Maggio, 538 F.2d 1129, 1130 (CA5 1976); United States v. Spinks, 470 F.2d 64, 65-
66 (CA7), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972). Two other Courts of Appeals have rejected
the Brutonclaims of confessing defendants, refusing to concern themselves
"with the legal nicety as to whether the . . . case is 'without' the Bruton rule, or is
'within' Bruton [and] the violation thereof constitut[es] only harmless error."
Metropolis v. Turner, 437 F.2d 207, 208-209 (CA10 1971); accord, United States v.
Walton, 538 F.2d 1348, 1353-1354 (CA8), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1025 (1976). State court
decisions in this area are in similar disarray. Compare, e.g., Stewart v. State, 257 Ark. 753,
519 S.W.2d 733 (1975), and People v. Moll, 26 N.Y.2d 1, 256 N.E.2d 185,cert. denied sub
nom. Stanbridge v. New York, 398 U.S. 911 (1970), with People v Rosochacki, 41 Ill.2d 483,
244 N.E.2d 136 (1969), and State v. Oliver, 160 Conn. 85, 273 A.2d 867 (1970).
[Footnote 5]
In Harrington v. California, 395 U. S. 250 (1969), four defendants were found guilty of
murder after a joint trial. Defendant Harrington's extrajudicial statements placed him at the
scene of the crime, but "fell short of a confession." Id. at 395 U. S. 252. His three
codefendants, however, confessed, and their confessions were introduced at trial with the
instruction that the jury was to consider each confession only against its source. One of
Harrington's codefendants, whose confession implicated Harrington, took the stand and was
subject to cross-examination. The other two codefendants, whose statements corroborated
Harrington's admitted presence at the scene of the crime, did not take the stand. Noting the
overwhelming evidence of Harrington's guilt, and the relatively insignificant prejudicial impact
of his codefendants' statements, the Court held that
On two subsequent occasions, this Court has applied the harmless error doctrine to claimed
violations of Bruton. In Schneble v. Florida, 405 U. S. 427 (1972), Schneble and a
codefendant were found guilty of murder following a joint trial. Although neither defendant
took the stand, police officers were allowed to testify as to a detailed confession given by
Schneble and a statement given by his codefendant which tended to corroborate certain
portions of Schneble's confession. We assumed, without deciding, that admission of the
codefendant's statement had violated Bruton, but held that, in view of the overwhelming
evidence of Schneble's guilt and the comparatively insignificant impact of the codefendant's
statement, "any violation of Bruton that mayhave occurred at petitioner's trial was harmless
[error] beyond a reasonable doubt." 405 U.S. at 405 U. S. 428 (emphasis added) .
In Brown v. United States, 411 U. S. 223 (1973), the prosecution introduced police testimony
regarding extrajudicial statements made by two nontestifying codefendants. Each statement
implicated both of the codefendants in the crimes charged. Neither codefendant took the
stand, and the police testimony was admitted into evidence at their joint trial. Because the
Solicitor General conceded that the statements were admitted into evidence in violation
of Bruton, we had no occasion to consider the question whether introduction of the
interlocking confessions violated Bruton.Proceeding from the Solicitor General's concession,
we held that the police testimony "was merely cumulative of other overwhelming and largely
uncontroverted evidence properly before the jury." 411 U.S. at 411 U. S. 231. Thus,
any Bruton error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
[Footnote 6]
In Opper v. United States, 348 U. S. 84 (1954), petitioner contended that the trial court had
erred in overruling his motion for severance, arguing that the jury may have improperly
considered statements of his codefendant, which were inadmissible as to petitioner, in finding
petitioner guilty. This Court rejected the contention:
"It was within the sound discretion of the trial judge as to whether the defendants should be
tried together or severally, and there is nothing in the record to indicate an abuse of such
discretion when petitioner's motion for severance was overruled. The trial judge here made
clear and repeated admonitions to the jury at appropriate times that Hollifield's incriminatory
statements were not to be considered in establishing the guilt of the petitioner. To say that
the jury might have been confused amounts to nothing more than an unfounded speculation
that the jurors disregarded clear instructions of the court in arriving at their verdict. Our
theory of trial relies upon the ability of a jury to follow instructions. There is nothing in this
record to call for reversal because of any confusion or injustice arising from the joint trial.
The record contains substantial competent evidence upon which the jury could find petitioner
guilty."
Id. at 348 U. S. 95 (footnote omitted) See, e.g., Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U. S.
539, 332 U. S. 552-553 (1947).
[Footnote 7]
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS characterizes our decision as an attempt "to create a vaguely defined
exception" to the Bruton rule for cases involving interlocking confessions, postat 442 U. S.
82, and suggests that the "proposed exception" is designed "to limit the effect of [the Bruton]
rule to the largely irrelevant set of facts in the case that announced it." Post at 442 U. S. 87.
First, the dissent describes what we believe to be the "rule" as the "exception." The "rule" --
indeed, the premise upon which the system of jury trials functions under the American
judicial system -- is that juries can be trusted to follow the trial court's
instructions. Bruton was an exception to this rule, created because of the "devastating"
consequences that failure of the jury to disregard a codefendant's inculpatory confession
could have to a nonconfessing defendant's case. We think it entirely reasonable to apply the
general rule, and not the Bruton exception, when the defendant's case has already been
devastated by his own extrajudicial confession of guilt.
Second, under the reasoning of Bruton, its facts were anything but "irrelevant" to its holding.
The Bruton Court recognized:
"[T]here are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow
instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the
practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored. . . . Such a context is
presented here. . . ."
391 U.S. at 391 U. S. 135. Clearly, Bruton was tied to the situation in which it arose:
[Footnote 8]
MR JUSTICE STEVENS, in dissent, states that our holding "squarely overrule[s]" this Court's
decisions in Roberts v. Russell, 392 U. S. 293 (1968); Hopper v. Louisiana, 392 U. S.
658 (1968); Brown v. United States, 411 U. S. 223 (1973); and Harrington v. California, 395
U. S. 250 (1969). "In all four of these cases," according to the dissent, "the Court found
a Bruton error even though the defendants' confessions interlocked."Post at 442 U. S. 83 n.
3. We disagree.
We think that the dissent fails both to note significant factual distinctions between the
present case and Roberts v. Russell, supra, and to recognize the difference in precedential
value between decisions of this Court which have been fully argued and disposed of on their
merits and unargued summary dispositions, a difference which we noted in Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 415 U. S. 670-671 (1974). In Roberts, "[t]he facts parallel[ed] the
facts in Bruton." 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 293. Petitioner was convicted of armed robbery after a
joint trial in which a codefendant's confession inculpating petitioner was introduced through
the testimony of a police officer. Petitioner's cousin testified at trial that petitioner had
"indicated that he thought . . . Tennessee was an easy place to commit a robbery." App. to
Brief in Opposition, O.T. 1967, No 920, Misc., p. 4. This extrajudicial statement, while
inculpatory, was by no stretch of the imagination a "confession." The District Court denied
petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus, expressly relying on the authority of Delli
Paoli v. United States, 352 U. S. 232 (1957), and the Court of Appeals affirmed. This Court
subsequently overruled Delli Paoli in Bruton, and granted the petition for certiorari
inRoberts to consider "the question whether Bruton [was] to be applied retroactively."Roberts
v. Russell, supra at 392 U. S. 293. The Court decided the question affirmatively, vacated the
judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case to the District Court for further
consideration in light of Bruton, in no way passing on the merits of petitioner's Bruton claim.
Thus, Roberts, contrary to the dissent's reading, neither involved interlocking confessions nor
"found a Bruton error."
Hopper v. Louisiana, supra, came to this Court in much the posture as Roberts.Petitioners'
manslaughter convictions were affirmed by the Louisiana Supreme Court when Delli Paoli was
still good law, but, while their petition for certiorari was pending before this
Court, Bruton was decided. In a two-sentence summary disposition, this Court granted
petitioners' petition for certiorari, vacated the judgment of the Louisiana Supreme Court, and
remanded the case "for further consideration in light of Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S.
123, and Roberts v. Russell, [392 U.S.] 293." 392 U.S. at 658. Not having passed on the
merits of petitioners' Bruton claim, this Court can hardly be said to have "found
a Bruton error" in Hopper.
The dissent, we believe, likewise misreads Harrington v. California, supra, and Brown v.
United States, supra, as our discussion of those cases in n 5, supra, reveals.
I join Parts I and III of the principal opinion and concur in the Court's judgment affirming in
part and reversing in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
For me, any error that existed in the admission of the confessions of the codefendants, in
violation of Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123 (1968), was, on the facts of this case,
clearly harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. I refrain from joining 442 U. S. as I read it, it
abandons the harmless error analysis the Court previously has applied in similar
circumstances and now adopts a per se rule to the effect that Bruton is inapplicable in an
interlocking confession situation.
In Bruton, of course, the Court held that the admission in a joint trial of the confession of a
codefendant who did not take the stand violated the Sixth Amendment confrontation right of
the other defendant. Because in most cases the impact of admitting a codefendant's
confession is severe, and because the credibility of any such confession "is inevitably
suspect," id. at 391 U. S. 136, the Court went on to hold that a limiting jury instruction could
not alleviate the resultant substantial threat to a fair trial the Confrontation Clause was
designed to protect. Id. at 391 U. S. 136-137.
Page 442 U. S. 78
In Harrington v. California, 395 U. S. 250 (1969), however, the Court recognized that
evidence of guilt could be sufficiently overwhelming so as to render any Bruton error
"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt," under Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18(1967).
Reversal of a conviction, then, was not required merely because of the existence of
a Bruton error. The Court applied a similar harmless error analysis inSchneble v. Florida, 405
U. S. 427 (1972), a case concerning the defendant's own confession and a partially
corroborating statement given by a nontestifying codefendant.
In the present case, the principal opinion appears to me to depart from this harmless error
approach and analysis to hold that Bruton simply does not apply in a case involving
interlocking confessions. It concludes that, in circumstances where one defendant has
confessed, the interlocking confession of a codefendant "will seldom, if ever, be of
the devastating' character referred to in Bruton." Ante at 442 U. S. 73. Similarly, it finds that
the fact that the confession of a codefendant is "inevitably suspect" is of little weight where
interlocking confessions are in evidence. Ibid. Thus, it holds that the right protected
by Bruton, i.e., the Confrontation Clause right of cross-examination, "has far less practical
value to a defendant who has confessed to the crime than to one who has consistently
maintained his innocence." Ibid. Accordingly, it concludes "that admission of interlocking
confessions with proper limiting instructions conforms to the requirements" of the
Constitution. Ante at 442 U. S. 75.
The Court has not departed heretofore from a harmless error approach in Brutoncases. It is
unclear where the present analysis will lead in cases where interlocking confessions are not in
issue, but where any Bruton error appears harmless underChapman; for where
the Bruton error is harmless, the error in admitting the nontestifying codefendant's
confession will be far from devastating. I would be unwilling to depart from the traditional
harmless error analysis
Page 442 U. S. 79
in the straightforward Bruton error situation. Neither would I depart from the harmless error
approach in interlocking confession cases. The fact that confessions may interlock to some
degree does not ensure, as a per se matter, that their admission will not prejudice a
defendant so substantially that a limiting instruction will not be curative. The two confessions
may interlock in part only. Or they may cover only a portion of the events in issue at the trial.
Although two interlocking confessions may not be internally inconsistent, one may go far
beyond the other in implicating the confessor's codefendant. In such circumstances, the
admission of the confession of the codefendant who does not take the stand could very well
serve to prejudice the defendant who is incriminated by the confession, notwithstanding that
the defendant's own confession is, to an extent, interlocking. I fully recognize that in most
interlocking confession cases, any error in admitting the confession of a nontestifying
codefendant will be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Even so, I would not adopt a
rigid per serule that forecloses a court from weighing all the circumstances in order to
determine whether the defendant, in fact, was unfairly prejudiced by the admission of even
an interlocking confession. Where he was unfairly prejudiced, the mere fact that prejudice
was caused by an interlocking confession ought not to override the important interests that
the Confrontation Clause protects.
It is possible, of course, that the new approach will result in no more than a shift in analysis.
Instead of focusing on whether the error was harmless, defendants and courts will be forced,
instead, to inquire whether the confessions were sufficiently interlocking so as to permit a
conclusion that Bruton does not apply. And I suppose that, after making a determination that
the confessions did not interlock to a sufficient degree, the court then would have to make a
harmless
Page 442 U. S. 80
Unfortunately, it is not clear that the new approach mandates even an inquiry whether the
confessions interlock. Respondents have argued that the confessions in this case, in fact, did
not interlock. Brief for Respondents 338. The principal opinion, however, simply assumes the
interlock. It thus comes close to saying that, so long as all the defendants have made some
type of confession which is placed in evidence, Bruton is inapplicable without inquiry into
whether the confessions actually interlock, and the extent thereof. If it is willing to abandon
the factual inquiry that accompanies a harmless error determination, it should be ready, at
least, to substitute an inquiry into whether there is genuine interlocking before it casts the
application of Bruton, and the underlying Confrontation Clause right, completely aside.
I merely add that, in this case, any Bruton error, in my view, clearly was harmless. The
principal issue concerning respondents at trial was whether three Negro males identified by a
number of witnesses as having been at the murder scene were indeed the respondents. Each
confession placed the confessing respondent at the scene of the killing. Each confession
implicated the confessor in the Woods' plan to rob the poker game. Each confession largely
overlapped with, and was cumulative to, the others. Corroborative testimony from witnesses
who were in the apartment placed respondent Hamilton at the scene of the murder, and
tentatively identified respondent Randolph as one of the Negroes who received a share of the
proceeds in Hamilton's apartment immediately after the killing. The testimony of five
witnesses to the events outside the apartment strongly corroborated the confessions. In
these circumstances, considering the confession of each respondent against him, I cannot
believe that "there is a reasonable possibility that the improperly admitted evidence
contributed to the conviction."
Page 442 U. S. 81
Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. at 405 U. S. 432. Reversal on the Bruton issue, therefore, is
required.
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL join,
dissenting.
As MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN makes clear, ante at 442 U. S. 77-78, proper analysis of this case
requires that we differentiate between (1) a conclusion that there was no error under the rule
of Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123, and (2) a conclusion that, even if constitutional
error was committed, the possibility that inadmissible evidence contributed to the conviction
is so remote that we may characterize the error as harmless. Because MR. JUSTICE
BLACKMUN properly rejects the first conclusion, my area of disagreement with him is narrow.
In my view, but not in his, the concurrent findings of the District Court and the Court of
Appeals that the error here was not harmless [Footnote 2/1] preclude this Court from
reaching a
Page 442 U. S. 82
different result on this kind of issue. E.g., Berenyi v. Immigration Director, 385 U. S. 630, 385
U. S. 635; Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 336 U. S. 271,336 U. S. 275. But
see opinion of MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, ante at 442 U. S. 80-81.
My area of disagreement with the plurality opinion is far wider, and prompts more extended
remarks. The plurality adopts the first conclusion above -- that no constitutional error was
committed when the confessions of all three respondents were admitted into evidence at
their joint trial. Without purporting to modify the Bruton rule precluding the use of a
nontestifying codefendant's extrajudicial admissions against a defendant in a joint trial, the
plurality reaches this conclusion by attempting to create a vaguely defined exception for
cases in which there is evidence that the defendant has also made inculpatory statements
which he does not repudiate at trial. [Footnote 2/2]
Page 442 U. S. 83
seriously undercut the Court's decision in Bruton by limiting its effect to a small and
arbitrarily selected class of cases. Indeed, its adoption would squarely overrule holdings in
four decisions of this Court that applied the rule of Bruton. [Footnote 2/3]
Page 442 U. S. 84
Evidence that a defendant has made an "extrajudicial admission of guilt" which "stands
before the jury unchallenged," ante at 442 U. S. 74, 442 U. S. 73, is not an acceptable
reason for depriving him of his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him.
[Footnote 2/4] In arguing to the contrary, and in striving "to cast the issue" presented "in
a . . . broader form" than any of the parties felt necessary to dispose of the case, ante at 442
U. S. 72, the plurality necessarily relies on two assumptions. Both are erroneous. First, it
assumes that the jury's ability to disregard a codefendant's inadmissible and highly
prejudicial confession is invariably increased by the existence of a corroborating statement by
the defendant. Second, it assumes that all unchallenged confessions by a defendant are
equally reliable. Aside from two quotations from the dissent in Bruton, however, the plurality
supports these assumptions with nothing more than the force of its own assertions. But the
infinite variability of inculpatory statements (whether made by defendants or codefendants),
and of their likely effect on juries, makes those assertions untenable. A hypothetical example
is instructive. Suppose a prosecutor has 10 items of evidence tending to prove that defendant
X and codefendant Y are guilty of assassinating a public figure. The first is the tape of a
televised interview with Y describing in detail how he and X planned and executed the crime.
Items 2 through 9 involve circumstantial evidence of a past association between X and Y, a
shared hostility for the victim, and an expressed wish for his early demise -- evidence that, in
itself, might very well be insufficient to convict X. Item 10 is the testimony of drinking
partner, a former cellmate, or a divorced spouse of X who vaguely recalls X saying that he
had been with Y
Page 442 U. S. 85
at the approximate time of the killing. Neither X nor Y takes the stand.
If Y's televised confession were placed before the jury while Y was immunized from cross-
examination, it would undoubtedly have the "devastating" effect on X that theBruton rule was
designed to avoid. 391 U.S. at 391 U. S. 128. As MR. JUSTICE STEWART's characteristically
concise explanation of the underlying rationale in that case demonstrates, it would also
plaintly violate X's Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser. [Footnote 2/5]
Nevertheless, under the plurality's first remarkable assumption, the prejudice to X -- and the
violation of his constitutional right -- would be entirely cured by the subsequent use of
evidence of his own ambiguous statement. In my judgment, such dubious corroboration
would enhance, rather than reduce, the danger that the jury would rely on Y's televised
confession when evaluating X's guilt. See United States v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206, 215 (CA2
1966) (Friendly, J.), quoted in 442 U. S. 13, infra. Even if I am wrong, however, there is no
reason to conclude that the prosecutor's reliance on item 10 would obviate the harm flowing
from the use of item 1.
The dubiousness of X's confession in this example -- as in any case in which the defendant's
inculpatory statement is
Page 442 U. S. 86
ambiguous, incomplete, the result of coercive influences, or simply the product of the well
recognized and often untrustworthy "urge to confess" [Footnote 2/6] -- illustrates the
inaccuracy of the plurality's second crucial assumption. It is no doubt true that, in some
cases, a defendant's confession will constitute such convincing evidence of his guilt that the
violation of his constitutional rights is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. E.g., Brown v.
United States, 411 U. S. 223; Schneble v. Florida, 405 U. S. 427. But in many cases, it is not
so convincing. Moreover, such evidence is not inherently more incriminating or more reliable
than other kinds of evidence such as fingerprints, photographs, or eyewitness testimony. Yet,
if these types of corroboration are given the same absolute effect that the plurality would
accord confessions, the Bruton rule would almost never apply. [Footnote 2/7]
I am also at a loss to understand the relevance of X's failure to "challenge" his confession at
trial. Ante at 442 U. S. 73. For there is nothing he could say or not say about his own alleged
confession that would dispel the dramatically damning effect of Y's. Furthermore, even apart
from the general rule that a defendant should not be penalized for exercising one right (in
this case, the right not to take the stand or to introduce other evidence) by having another
taken away (in this case the right to confront one's accuser), e.g., United States v.
Jackson, 390 U. S. 570, it is unclear why X's failure to repudiate it necessarily enhances the
reliability of a self-impeaching "confession" such as the one hypothesized above. Cf. Lakeside
v. Oregon, 435 U. S. 333, 435 U. S. 343-344 (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
Page 442 U. S. 87
In short, I see no logic to commend the proposed exception to the rule of Bruton save,
perhaps, a purpose to limit the effect of that rule to the largely irrelevant set of facts in the
case that announced it. If relevant at all in the present context, the factors relied on by the
plurality support a proposition no one has even remotely advocated in this case -- that the
corroborated evidence used in this case was so trustworthy that it should have been fully
admissible against all of the defendants, and the jury instructed as much. Conceivably,
corroborating or other circumstances surrounding otherwise inadmissible hearsay may so
enhance its reliability that its admission in evidence is justified in some situations. [Footnote
2/8] But before allowing such a rule to defeat a defendant's fundamental right to confront his
accusers, this Court surely should insist upon a strong showing not only of the reliability of
the hearsay in the particular case, but also of the impossibility, or at least difficulty, of making
the accusers available for cross-examination. [Footnote 2/9] And, in most cases, the
prosecution will be hard pressed to make the latter showing in light of its ability to try the
defendant and codefendant separately, and to afford each immunity from the use against him
of his testimony at the other's trial. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441.
Page 442 U. S. 88
evaluating respondents' guilt. The plurality would answer this question affirmatively. But in so
doing, it would repudiate much that has been said by the Court and by an impressive array of
judicial and scholarly authorities who have addressed the issue.
As the plurality sees it, the answer to this question is supplied by the "crucial assumption
underlying [the jury] system . . . that juries will follow the instructions given them by the trial
judge." Ante at 442 U. S. 73. This assumption, it is argued, has been applied in "numerous
decisions of this Court" regarding codefendants' confessions. Ante at 442 U. S. 74, and n. 6,
citing Opper v. United States, 348 U. S. 84, and Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U. S. 539.
But this reasoning was advanced just as forcefully in the case that Bruton overruled -- a case,
incidentally, that relied on the same "numerous" decisions that the plurality resurrects in
favor of its analysis. See Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U. S. 232, 352 U. S. 242.
What Bruton said in response to this reasoning -- despite the plurality's contrary
assertions, see ante at442 U. S. 773 -- is no less applicable in the present context:
"[T]here are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow
instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the
practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored. . . . Such a context is
presented here, where the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant
who stands accused side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately spread before the jury
in a joint trial. Not only are the incriminations devastating to the defendant, but their
credibility is inevitably suspect, a fact recognized when accomplices do take the stand and
the jury is instructed to weigh their testimony carefully given the recognized motivation to
shift blame onto others. The unreliability of such evidence is intolerably compounded when
the alleged accomplice,
Page 442 U. S. 89
as here, does not testify, and cannot be tested by cross-examination. It was against such
threats to a fair trial that the Confrontation Clause was directed."
Rather than falling back on once numerous but now discredited decisions, I prefer to stand by
the observations about this sort of question by jurists like Felix Frankfurter, Learned Hand,
[Footnote 2/10] Wiley Rutledge, [Footnote 2/11] Robert Jackson, [Footnote 2/12] and Henry
Page 442 U. S. 90
Friendly, [Footnote 2/13] and by scholars like Wigmore and Morgan. [Footnote 2/14] In my
judgment, as I think in theirs, the odds that a jury will obey a command to ignore a
codefendant's confession [Footnote 2/15] --
Page 442 U. S. 91
whether or not the defendant has himself confessed -- are no less stacked against the
defendant than was the deck of cards that William Douglas used to Robert Wood's, and
ultimately to his own, downfall in the game of chance arranged by Woppy Gaddy. In contests
like this, the risk that one player may be confused with another is not insubstantial. I
respectfully dissent.
[Footnote 2/1]
"In evaluating the question of harmless error in this case, it is important to point out the
factors which might affect a jury's verdict in relation to these three defendants in separate
trials where the Bruton rule was observed:"
"1) Randolph, Pickens and Hamilton were not involved in the gambling game between
Douglas, the Las Vegas gambler, and Robert Wood, the hometown gambler who got cheated."
"2) They were not involved in originating the plan for recouping Robert Wood's losses."
"3) They were not in the room (and had not been) when Robert Wood killed Douglas."
"4) Indeed, the jury could conclude from the admissible evidence in this case that, when Joe
Wood pulled out his pistol, the original plan for three 'unknown' blacks to rob the all-white
poker game was aborted, and that petitioners' subsequent entry into the room did not involve
them in the crime of murder."
"Additionally, if we return to consideration of the joint trial, that jury, as charged by the state
court judge, had the responsibility of determining whether or not any of the three confessions
testified to by Memphis police was voluntarily given. Assuming that two of the three
confessions had been removed from jury consciousness by adherence toBruton, we find it
impossible to conclude that the jury finding and ultimate verdict would, 'beyond reasonable
doubt,' have been the same."
"These factors serve to distinguish this case from Harrington v. California, [396 U.S. 250,]
and Schneble v. Florida, [405 U.S. 427,] and to convince us that the Brutonerrors found by
the District Judge cannot (as he also held) be determined to be harmless beyond reasonable
doubt."
[Footnote 2/2]
As MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN points out, ante at 442 U. S. 78-79, it is unclear whether the
plurality restricts its analysis to "interlocking" confessions, opinion of MR. JUSTICE
REHNQUIST, ante at 442 U. S. 75 (and, if so, what an "interlock" is), or whether a "broader"
exception is established for all confessions. Ante at 442 U. S. 72. Indeed, its opinion does not
explain how inculpatory a statement must be before it qualifies as a "confession," an
"extrajudicial admission of guilt," or a "statemen[t] . . . heaping blame onto
[oneself]." Ante at 442 U. S. 73, 442 U. S. 74. Moreover, the plurality variously states its test
as applicable "when[ever] the incriminated defendant has [once] admitted his own guilt"
(i.e., whenever he has not "maintained his innocence from the beginning"), or only when he
has once confessed and has left his "admission of guilt . . . before the jury unchallenged" by
any evidence of its invalidity. Ante at 442 U. S. 72,442 U. S. 73.
[Footnote 2/3]
In Roberts v. Russell, 392 U. S. 293, petitioner and a codefendant were jointly tried and
convicted of armed robbery, to which the codefendant had confessed, implicating petitioner.
In addition, petitioner's cousin testified that petitioner made certain inculpatory statements to
him concerning the robbery -- statements that the State Supreme Court relied upon heavily
in upholding the jury finding of petitioner's guilt. App. to Brief in Opposition, O.T. 1967, No.
920, Misc., pp. 4, 6. That court also held that the redaction of the codefendant's confession to
omit the references to petitioner as well as a cautionary instruction to the jury to consider the
confession as evidence against the codefendant alone was sufficient to avoid any problem
under the Confrontation Clause. On habeas corpus, the District Court and the Court of
Appeals agreed. This Court granted the writ of certiorari and summarily vacated the
conviction and remanded for reconsideration in light of Bruton. In so doing, it established
both that the Bruton rule applied to the States, and that it was retroactive. 392 U.S. at 392
U. S. 294-295.
Similarly, in Hopper v. Louisiana, 392 U. S. 658, the Court vacated the convictions of two
defendants, both of whom had made full confessions that were introduced at their joint trial
with the usual cautionary instructions. See 251 La. 77, 104, 203 So.2d 222, 232-233 (1967).
On remand, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the Bruton errors as to both defendants
were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the overwhelming untainted evidence
inculpating both, 253 La. 439, 218 So.2d 551 (1969), and this Court denied certiorari. 396
U.S. 1012.
In two subsequent decisions, the Court held that error had been committed under the rule
of Bruton, although it found the error to be harmless. Brown v. United States, 411 U. S.
223, 411 U. S. 230-231; Harrington v. California, 395 U. S. 250, 395 U. S. 254. In all four of
these cases, the Court found a Bruton error even though the defendants' confessions
interlocked.
The plurality's analysis is also inconsistent with almost half of the lower federal and state
court opinions relied on in Bruton in support of its reasoning. 391 U.S. at 391 U. S. 129, 391
U. S. 135, and nn. 4, 8, 9. In 6 of the 14 cases cited there, the defendant as well as the
codefendant had confessed. See United States ex rel. Floyd v. Wilkins,367 F.2d 990 (CA2
1966); Greenwell v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 43, 336 F.2d 962 (1964); Barton v.
United States, 263 F.2d 894 (CA5 1959); United States ex rel. Hill v. Deegan, 268 F.Supp.
580 (SDNY 1967); People v. Barbaro, 395 Ill. 264, 69 N.E.2d 692 (1946); People v.
Fisher, 249 N.Y. 419, 432, 164 N.E. 336, 341 (1928) (Lehman, J., dissenting).
[Footnote 2/4]
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him. . . ."
[Footnote 2/5]
"I think it clear that the underlying rationale of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause
precludes reliance upon cautionary instructions when the highly damaging out-of-court
statement of a codefendant, who is not subject to cross-examination, is deliberately placed
before the jury at a joint trial. A basic premise of the Confrontation Clause, it seems to me, is
that certain kinds of hearsay (see, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400; Douglas v.
Alabama, 380 U. S. 415) are at once so damaging, so suspect, and yet so difficult to
discount, that jurors cannot be trusted to give such evidence the minimal weight it logically
deserves, whatever instructions the trial judge may give. Seethe Court's opinion, [391 U.S.]
at 391 U. S. 136, n. 12. It is for this very reason that an out-of-court accusation is universally
conceded to be constitutionally inadmissibleagainst the accused, rather than admissible for
the little it may be worth."
[Footnote 2/6]
E.g., Foster, Confessions and the Station House Syndrome, 18 DePaul L.Rev. 683 (1969);
Sterling, Police Interrogation and the Psychology of Confession, 14 J.Pub.L. 25 (1965). See
generally T. Reik, The Compulsion to Confess 267 (1959).
[Footnote 2/7]
Indeed, George Bruton was identified at trial as the perpetrator by an eyewitness to the
robbery. App. in Bruton v. United States, O.T. 1967, No. 705, p. 70.
[Footnote 2/8]
Cf. Fed.Rule Evid. 804(b)(3) ("A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal
liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating
circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement"); Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284.
[Footnote 2/9]
See Berger v. California, 393 U. S. 314; Barber v. Page, 390 U. S. 719; Pointer v. Texas, 380
U. S. 400; Motes v. United States, 178 U. S. 458; Rule 804(b), supra, 442 U. S. 8. See
generally Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for
Criminal Cases, 91 Harv.L.Rev. 567, 582-586, and n. 43 (1978).
[Footnote 2/10]
In his dissenting opinion in Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U. S. 232, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
commented on the recurring difficulties arising in the trial of two or more persons accused of
collaborating in a criminal enterprise when incriminating declarations by one or more of the
defendants are not admissible against others. He observed:
"The dilemma is usually resolved by admitting such evidence against the declarant but
cautioning the jury against its use in determining the guilt of the others. The fact of the
matter is that, too often, such admonition against misuse is intrinsically ineffective in that the
effect of such a nonadmissible declaration cannot be wiped from the brains of the jurors. The
admonition therefore becomes a futile collocation of words, and fails of its purpose as a legal
protection to defendants against whom such a declaration should not tell. While enforcing the
rule of admitting the declaration solely against a declarant and admonishing the jury not to
consider it against other defendants, Judge Learned Hand, in a series of cases, has
recognized the psychological feat that this solution of the dilemma demands of juries. He thus
stated the problem:"
" In effect, however, the rule probably furthers, rather than impedes, the search for truth,
and this perhaps excuses the device which satisfies form while it violates substance; that is,
the recommendation to the jury of a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their
powers, but anybody else's."
"Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007."
". . . The Government should not have the windfall of having the jury be influenced by
evidence against a defendant which, as a matter of law, they should not consider, but which
they cannot put out of their minds."
[Footnote 2/11]
Writing for the Court in Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U. S. 539, 332 U. S. 559-560, Mr.
Justice Rutledge said:
"The grave danger in this case, if any, arose not from the trial court's rulings upon
admissibility or from its instructions to the jury. As we have said, these were as adequate as
might reasonably be required in a joint trial. The danger rested, rather, in the risk that the
jury, in disregard of the court's direction, would transfer, consciously or unconsciously, the
effect of the excluded admissions from the case as made against Goldsmith and Weiss across
the barrier of the exclusion to the other three defendants."
"That danger was real. It is one likely to arise in any conspiracy trial, and more likely to occur
as the number of persons charged together increases. Perhaps, even at best, the safeguards
provided by clear rulings on admissibility, limitations of the bearing of evidence as against
particular individuals, and adequate instructions are insufficient to ward off the danger
entirely. It is therefore extremely important that those safeguards be made as impregnable
as possible."
[Footnote 2/12]
Referring to the passage quoted from Blumenthal in the preceding footnote, Mr. Justice
Jackson made his frequently quoted observation.
"The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury, cf.
Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U. S. 539, 332 U. S. 559, all practicing lawyers know to be
unmitigated fiction."
[Footnote 2/13]
"Not even appellate judges can be expected to be so naive as really to believe that all twelve
jurors succeeded in performing what Judge L. Hand aptly called 'a mental gymnastic which is
beyond not only their powers, but anybody's else.' Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007
(2 Cir.1932). It is impossible realistically to suppose that, when the twelve good men and
women had [the codefendant's] confession in the privacy of the jury room, not one yielded to
the nigh irresistible temptation to fill in the blanks [caused by the redaction of the
defendants' names] with the keys [the other evidence] provided and [to] ask himself the
intelligent question to what extent Jones' statement supported [that evidence], or that, if
anyone did yield, his colleagues effectively persuaded him to dismiss the answers from his
mind."
[Footnote 2/14]
See 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2272, p. 416 (3d ed.1940); E. Morgan, Some Problems of
Proof Under the Anglo-American System of Litigation 105 (1956).
[Footnote 2/15]
Indeed, the judge's command to ignore the confession may well assure that any juror who
happened to miss the connection to the defendant at first will nonetheless have made it by
the time he enters the jury room. Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U. S. 333, 435 U. S.
345 (STEVENS, J., dissenting)