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University of Greenwich

School of Social Science

Methodology Unit
(MA)

Essay:

“Prior to the coming of glasnost and the end of the


Cold War the study of Soviet policy raised serious
methodological problem for Western scholars.”
What were these problems and to what degree have
they been resolved?

Abdisalam M Issa-Salwe

September 1996
Contents

1. Introduction -------------------------------------------------------------------------1
2. The Cold War Era ------------------------------------------------------------------2
3. The Ideological Biased Tools -----------------------------------------------------3
4 Soviet: Information Control -------------------------------------------------------4
4.1 Publishing and Censorship ---------------------------------------------------------6
4.2 Propaganda and Its Influence------------------------------------------------------7
4.3 Testing Peoples’ Mood ------------------------------------------------------------8
4.4 Data Manipulation------------------------------------------------------------------8
5. Glasnost and Information Control ------------------------------------------------11
5.1 The Burden of the Past-------------------------------------------------------------13
6. The Foundations For A New Era In Soviet Scholarship -----------------------13
7. Conclusions -------------------------------------------------------------------------15
References------------------------------------------------------------------------------------16
Tables:
Table 1: Growth rate estimates, 1965-1985 ----------------------------------------------9
Table 2: Soviet economic growth, 1951-1985 -------------------------------------------10
List of Abbreviations

CIA Central Intelligence Agency


USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

GNP Gross National Product


KGB The Soviet Unions secret service.

CPSU Communist Party of the Supreme Soviet


1. Introduction

Traditionally, Russians were secretive people. In Tsarist times not only military but
also quite harmless social information was withheld from the population as well from
foreigners. In fact in recent years it has become even more obvious how much of pre-
Revolutionary Russia there was in Soviet thought, emotions, and basic attitudes. The
Soviet Union, and Tsarist Russia before, had been secretive, unaccountable political
regimes. Many Western students of Soviet affairs had problems getting statistical data
or on how to get information from the Soviet Union.

West and East had also great influence on the study of Soviet policy. Western
perceptions of the Soviet Union distorted by an approach which focused on the
ideological function of the state, thus, neglecting other aspects of the Soviet life.

Western journalists have generally been compelled to live within a separate foreigners’
compound and operate under great restrictions. This fear was not only based on their
paranoia for being spied, but control information concerning many important aspect of
the Soviet Union. For example, Soviet official statistics, until recently, left out whole
areas of social and economic life, from crime and mortality rates to balance of payment
and road accident data (White, 1992c: 76). However, with the advent of Gorbachev’s
accession to power, things began changing in the Soviet Union. From the outset
Gorbachev committed himself to a policy of openness or glasnost.

This changing environment geared a new situation where students of Soviet affairs
could re-evaluate Soviet studies. What were the obstacle which faced the Western
political analysts studying Soviet studies? How this development came about and how
it was shaped will be the theme of this essay.

To examine the reason behind these problems it is important to look both the internal
factors  how government controlled and manipulated information  and the
methodological faults which hampered the study of Soviet policy. Without the help of
one to the other, it is difficult to imagine to explore the said difficulties.

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It is important to look also other elements which influenced the East/West relationship
which hampered or contaminated the study of Soviet policy.

2. The Cold War Era

The main element of the Cold War of the two post-war superpowers lied in the mutual
hostility and fears of the protagonist. This animosity had its roots in their several
historical and political differences as they were strongly stimulated by the myths which
at times turned hostility into hatred (Calvocoressi: 1991: 23; Kissinger, 1994).

In Soviet Union eyes the West was inspired by capitalist valued which aimed the
destruction of the Soviet Union and the annihilation of communism by any means
available but above all by force or the threat of irresistible force. In West eyes the
Soviet Union was dedicated to the subjugation of Europe and the world for itself and
for the communism and was capable of achieving, or at least initiating, this destructive
and evil course by armed abetted by subversion. Both judgement were dramatised by
the lack of understanding towards each others’ historical and political backgrounds
(Ibid: 3; Kissinger, 1994: 201). The acceleration of hostility was fed by growing
tension between the West and East in the early years which followed the Second Word
War. The Cold War protagonists sough to extend their influence of sphere.

Following World War Two western European countries were in a state of physical
and economic collapse. The European economic and military powers were reduced to
rubble by the effect of the war. The only real powers who began victors out of the war
were the Soviet Union and the United States a as they both enjoyed immense
superiority over other contenders (Roberts, p.525).

In July 1944, representatives of the Western countries established an international


economic system which gave the United States, which was the strongest economic
country, the role to assume the primary responsibility for establishing a post-war
economic order. This followed an economic aid program, known as Marshall Plan,
which was offered to all Europe. The offer included also Soviet Union, however,
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Stalin refused the offer, and instead began to create his own version of economic aid
institutions for Eastern Europe (Spero, 1990: 121; Hogan, 1987: 45). This period
was a time when the West was experiencing economic hardship build up by the impact
of the war and the collapse of the international monetary system in the 1930, which
was caused by economic nationalism  competitive exchange rate devaluation,
formations of competitive monetary blocs (Ibid: 103).

3. The Ideological Biased Tools

In the study particular political event, there must be a methodological choice to be


used with. Different broad ontological and epistemological choice resulting in different
methodological orientation (Marsh and Stoker, 1995: 13-4). Historical animosity and
political differences of the West and East had great influence on the study of Soviet
policy. Western perceptions of the Soviet Union and its prospects were seriously
hindered by a cognitive approach which prevented practitioners from studying the
Soviet Union in a realist way. For example, some prevailing conception in the field of
Soviet studies concentrated the ideological function of the state as a “totalitarism”
state, which took total control of the population by ‘massive use of indoctrination,
police and ideological brainwash, monopoly of sources of information and exercise of
power as well as direct control of the economy” (Lewin, 1989: 2-3). This approach
falters when it comes to answered were the system from.

The followers of this schools had many reason for their approach as the Soviet Union
the state controlled all aspect of the Soviet live. According to Marx, the state is an
important instrument of the domination class whose function is to co-ordinate its long-
term interest. Departing from this perspective, Marxists thinkers argued that the
‘executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the affairs of the
whole bourgeoisie’ (quoted in Marsh and Stoker, 1995: 249).

In the 1960s a number of Western scholars revise the ideological biased tools, as
serious scholarly methods were began by leading political analysts, economists,

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historians. Again these new school did not differ much from the ‘totalitarian school’ as
they also focused to the state and the state-run political and economy.

By focusing on the state, probably as the sole actor, may have obstructed other
important factors, e.i. the complex social fabric of the USSR. A political system
without a social one is difficult to imagine. Furthermore, the interrelation of society
and culture with the economy, the state, and the party lost focus (or remained
unexplored). In Lewin opinion, what had been missing was “... the conceptualization
of a dynamic historical process in which all the subsystems interacts in time and space,
yielding ever more complex and intricate pattern.” (Ibid: 5). Lewin goes further by
reiterating that because Soviet society has not been studied in all its manifestation, the
Soviet historical and political experience continues to be poorly understood. (Ibid: 5).
“Until broadened perspective enter into Western thinking about the USSR, constant
and costly errors of judgement will be made” concludes Lewin.

Leading Western sovietologiests represented by Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel


Huntington, focused more the kind on the top of the hierarchy or the “oligarchy” as is
commonly known. Observations confined to the hierarchy could yield fruitful analysis
for researchers. This approach, commonly also obscured Jerry Houg’s perceptive
discussion of institutional pluralism (Ibid: 103).

4. Soviet: Information Control

The quality of public information had steadily deteriorated over the Brezhnev period as
problem after problem was ‘resolved’ by simply discontinuing the publication of
information about it. The census in 1959, for example, which was published in sixteen
volumes in 1962-63, was reduced to one in 1979. The first official statistical
handbook, published annually since 1956, which in the beginning was composed of
more than 880 pages, in 1980 reduced to less than six hundred pages (White, 1992c:
85). Statistics were manipulated, e.g. the rise in alcohol consumption was disguised by
merging the figures for sales of drink with those of foodstuff.

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A Soviet political analysts trying to write the political history of his country could face
insurmountable difficulties. He could not write about the 1930s as access to the
archives was minimal. Neither could he write about the post-war period because some
leaders feared it would be critical of their leadership. The ideal history book was one
which mentioned no names. For example, in a television interview in December 1987,
Andrei Voznezenski drew attention to a book published in that year which managed
not to mention either Khrushchev or Brezhnev and there was hardly anything about
Stalin. Instead of writing about substance, many historians engaged in methodology
(Laqueur, 1989: 56).

A member of the Estonian Academy of Science writing in Izvestiia compared Soviet


historians with arithmaticians who knew the solution from the beginning and worked
their way back (Laqueur, 1989: 57). A group of high-level agricultural experts were
arrested on Stalin’s order in 1931 and accused of political conspiracy (Laqueur, 1989:
59) after it was believed that they attempted to publish a survey they made on the
country’s agricultural output. Their survey was feared by the regime, and the only way
to stop its publications was to arrest them on false charges and thus undermining their
findings.

Other branches of knowledge which Stalin had suppressed included political sociology
as sociologists tended to “seek out problems”. In the 1960s some sociologists had
cautiously begun to reassert the importance of sociology. In 1968 the Academy of
Science created an Institute for Concrete Sociological Research and Rumiantsev as its
director. Social surveys appeared on many subjects, but before long, Rumiantsev had
been sacked and the adjective ‘concrete’ disappeared from the institute’s title (Keep,
1995: 279).

Political science (politologiia) which was called previously “state and law” itself
implied a privileged subject or discipline which only party sympathisers could venture
to write about.

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4.1 Publishing and Censorship

Although in modern world the press has an important role to play, the Soviet Union
used it primarily for spreading its political ideologies. This was true even in tsarist
Russia. To curb competing ideology or rival political ideas from within or outside,
they introduced censorship which shaped the characteristics of the Soviet press in the
following decades (Kenez, 1985: 22).

Russian censorship was as old as educated public opinion. In the 1860s, at the time of
the great reforms, the harsh censorship laws were ameliorated somewhat.
Nevertheless, the regulations of 1865, which remained in force until the 1905
Revolution, prescribed precensorship, from which only certain categories of printed
materials were exempted. Publishers of book and some newspapers and journals
required the censure's approval only after printing (Ibid: 32). The Ministry of the
Interior periodically sent out a list of subjects that could not be discussed. For
example, V. M. Doroshevic, a well-known journalist of the period, complained that his
paper, Rash Slovo (The Russian word) had to hire a specialist to keep up with the over
13,000 copies dealing with forbidden matters (Kenez, 1985: 22).

The government justified their action by arguing that this would protect people from
subversive ideas. It followed from this paternalistic attitude that the Soviet
government was most vigilant in censoring material aimed at a mass audience.

The Soviet leadership feared that allowing freedom for private enterprise in the trade
and production of books would cause ideological and therefore political damage. The
state system was geared toward regulation and control.

The KGB maintained its own research network, as it had infiltrates among the student
and institution's staff. Academics who showed an independent spirit would be denied
promotion or the ‘privilege’ of attending scholarly conferences abroad (Keep,
1995:280-1). Their research and findings would be delayed or prevented from being
published. The most obstreperous would be summoned before a meeting and would
be forced to retract their opinions. One of the leading academic dissidents was Andrei
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Sakharov who was denied receiving the Nobel Peace Prize which he was conferred in
1975. Sakharov became a symbol of the Democratic movement which sprang up later
in the Soviet Union.

4.2 Propaganda and Its Influence

Propaganda is more than the attempt to transmit social and political values in the hope
of affecting people’s thinking, emotions, and thereby behaviour. They include
manipulating and distorting information, lying, and preventing others from finding out
the truth.

The Soviet state was more permeated with propaganda than any other. One of the
unusual elements was the attitude of the communist leaders toward indoctrination.
The Bolshevik regime was the first to set itself propaganda goals through political
education to aim to create a “new humanity suitable for living in a new society”
(Kenez, 1985: 4). The origins of these institutions, and to a considerable extent the
mentality of their leaders have their roots to during the difficult days of the Civil War.

To fight back against their enemies, the Bolsheviks created an massive propaganda
apparatus to indoctrinate the Soviet people. In spite that many observers believed that
the indoctrination campaign failed to achieve their purpose, they were impressed by the
Soviet method.

Soviet propagandists depicted their society in terms of mechanistic images as they


portrayed the Party as a motivator and engine which provided society the force
necessary for change and development. Ideas generated by the Party come in the
“masses” by “transmissions belts”. These transmission belts were the mass
organisations such as the trade unions, the Zhenotdel, and the Komsomol (Kenez,
1985: 84). In the eyes of the Soviet leaders, publishing had a far greater importance
than any other mass media. They considered books the chief vehicle of culture, and
the printed word as an essential method of propaganda.

4.3 Testing Peoples’ Mood


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In June 1983 the CPSU Central Committee approved the establishment of a national
opinion poll centre, based at the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Science. In
the event it was not until 1988 that the All-Union Institute for the Study of Public
Opinion (VTsIOM) was established in Moscow under the auspices of the trade union
council and the State Committee on Labour and Social Question. The polls covered a
wide range of topics, from assessments of work organisation to the future of
perestroika, and individual members of leadership.

However, the reasons for sanctioning public opinion polls was of narrow scope as
these was mainly for the party chief to know how people lived and what they thought.
Questionnaires were also limited to particular subject away from such issues as
people’s opinion about the government.

To find out public responses to perestroika studies were made as new advanced and
techniques of opinion polling were introduced during 1980s. The first reasonable
representative surveys were carried out in the 1960s, particularly through the youth
newspaper Komsomol’skaya pravda. Its findings, however, were based upon the
written responses of readers. The surveys of later years were based to a greater extent
upon professionally conducted polling.

4.4 Data Manipulation

By looking at the record of Soviet economic management one can find a very
impressive achievement. Russia in 1913 was a backward country by the standards of
other European countries. The overwhelming majority of the Russian people were
engaged in agriculture, and only a quarter of them were able to read and write (White,
1992c: 104).

It took only seventy years for USSR to become one of world’s economic superpowers,
with a level of industrial production that was exceeded only by that of the United
States. According to official sources, Soviet national income increased 149 time
between 1917 and 1987, and over 18 times between 1940 and 1987. The rate of
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growth between the late 1920s and 1950s and was 6 per cent a year. National income,
58 per cent of that of the United States in 1960, increased to 67 per cent. Industrial
production increased to more than 80 per cent, and agricultural production was about
85 per cent of the US total. Soviet industrial production, about 3 per cent of the
global total in 1917, had increased to about 20 per cent by 1987. The USSR by this
date produced more than the whole world had done in 1950 (White, 1992c: 104-6).

Although the USSR did make very impressive development, it cannot be proved that
the figures were genuine. It is difficult to make any real assessment as the data
available for analysis have been open to manipulation and distortion.

Table 1. (White, 1992c: 106)

The figures tend to exaggerate the true level of Soviet achievement. One of the
striking issues are that it left out the growth of population, about 0.9 per cent annually
during these years. According to a highly controversial reassessment of official figures
published by the economists Vasilii Selyunin and Grogorii Khanin in early 1987, taking
such faction into account Soviet national income from 1928 to 1985 increased six to
seven times (White, 1992c: 106; Keep, 1995: 223). Selyunin and Khanin showed how
officials had wilfully manipulated and falsified data, creating of what Keep called “veil
of illusions” to conceal the contradictory reality (Keep, 1995: 223).

Western observers had always to adjust published Soviet figure to reassess Soviet
situation. In such situation for a Western researcher this may not help.

Other obstacle included the dissimilarity of the structure of Soviet scholarship to that
of the West. In the Soviet Union many disciplines were neglected or dismantled by
Stalin. Only recently have some disciplines begun to develop subfields. For example,
sociology has begotten a variety of subfields such the sociology of knowledge, of law,

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of culture, of art, parallel to those practised in the West (Lewin, 1989: 86-7). In such
a situation it would have been a difficult task for scholars to read Soviet studies.

Table 2:
(Keep, 1995: 223)

A large share of Soviet GNP was allocated to investment and by 1980 this had reached
33 per cent, although the annual rate of increase was slower than it had been earlier:
less than 3 per cent against 7.6 per cent in 1965/70. Much of it went on defence
(Keep, 1995: 222-3).

Exactly how much went to the defence expenditure cannot be assessed as this matter
was a contentious issue, which at one time led to a cold war between Western
intelligence experts as well as between the superpowers. In 1967 the CIA revised its
estimate upwards to 12-13 per cent of GNP (1970) and put the annual increase at 4-5
per cent (Ibid: 223).

The evolution of Soviet social science in the last two decades is a manifestation of
deep structural change. Social science was not accorded the same prestige as the
natural science (Lewin, 1988: 85-6). Social scientists were handicapped by numerous
restrictions on the kinds of topics deemed fit for investigation and publication.
Another problem which this branch of science met was the scarcity of raw material
such as social statistics which in the vaults of the Statistical Agency. In the opinion of
one author, such data were not accounted as social statistics (Ibid: 86). Only with
special permission by the security authority could one access such data.

Tatiana Zaslavkaia, an outspoken sociologist and member of the Academy of Science


published an article in Pravda in February 1987 criticising the restriction of the debate
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about Soviet social problems without theoretical reflection and explanation. She
claimed that if sociology is to help “unearth the root causes of complex social
problem”, sociologists must “not be blocked by signs reading ‘Enter to Strangers
Forbidden’” (Lewin, 1988: 86-7).

5. Glasnost and Information Control

Glasnost which meant self-criticism aimed to reduce the ever-widening gap between
words and deed. However, for the Russian intelligentsia glasnost was a spiritual event
of enormous importance, a breath of fresh air after decades of stifling censorship. For
many other Russians it was an important device to let off steam, to give vent to their
frustration. Largely the story of glasnost was the account of the revelation of
shortcomings and failures in the recent political history of the Soviet Union.

As any new social or political development has its pro and cons, glasnost has enemies.
In March 1987 Yegor Ligachev, a one time a Central Committee Secretary and
Politburo member, said that the re-examination of history should emphasise above all
the “period of the triumph of socialist construction.” (Laqueur, 1989: 250). He
emphasised that history should provide an “honest and open look back,” and not a
“portrait of our history as a series of continuos mistakes and disappointment.” (Ibid:
250).

In June 1986 Gorbachev told a group of leading writers that one of the aspects still
off-limits to glasnost was the Soviet past. He argued that “If we start to deal with the
past, we’ll dissipate all our energy. It would be like hitting the people over the head.
We’ll have to go forward. Eventually we’ll sort out the past and put everything in its
place. But right now we have to put our energy forward” (Laqueur, 1989:53). What
Gorbachev was picturing was that the Soviet history did not portray the full truth
about the country. But before the Soviet Union begins to tackle this the past, it has to
face the present and the future.

In spite of this perhaps honest reiterating, what this meant was postponing the
historical debate for some decades as such debate would stir up many passions and
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would produce a great deal of dirty linen. Opponents of glasnost argued that it could
mirror the negative view of Russian history as this could have destroyed the mythology
of great achievements which had been constructed over many decades (Laqueur, 1989:
53).

However, because of the new mood it seemed impossible to keep the past out
altogether from the new development. By February 1987 Gorbachev seemed to have
reached the conclusion that glasnost should also be extended to Soviet history and to
the academic as well. The statistical administration was named as the USSR State
Statistics Committee (White, 1992c: 86). Glasnost led to change also in the creative
arts and literature, cinema, television and political fiction writings. The work of émigré
writers of various generations also began to be published in local papers.

The call for glasnost made little impression on Soviet academics during 1985 and
1986. There were no major changes in the professional literature. Soviet academics
either thought that there was no need for revelations or, more likely, having no clear
lead from party authorities, they preferred to wait and see. However, the initiative of
confronting the past was taken up by professionals like journalists, filmmakers,
playwrights and novelists (Laqueur, 1989: 56).

With the advent of Gorbachev a new approach to the provision of information began
to emerge. It was not only Soviet academics who were cautious about the events
which led to glasnost, even some Sovietologists counselled prudence not to oversell it,
as détente had been oversold in the early 1970s which gave way to a bitter
disappointment later.

5.1 The Burden of the Past

The difficulties of accepting true glasnost were nowhere more obvious than in science.
For many decades the leadership of the CPSU had found it impossible to come to term
with its own past. For example, the writing of Soviet history under Stalin “wasn’t
history, but wrote something completely different.” (Quoted in Laqueur, 1989: 52).
This has changed since Stalin, but not very much. Professor Yuri Afanasiev, head of
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the state institute of historical archives, reiterates, “As far as coming to terms with
Stalinism is concerned were are still living under Stalinism even though we are saying
that were are living in a great time” (Laqueur, 1989: 52). Afanasiev was criticised by
several colleagues for distorting facts and providing comfort to anti-Marxist. Those in
Afanasiev’s favour was usually non-academics as leading academics and heads of
institutions preferred to stay out of the debate (Ibid: 59-60). Why so? They knew
from long experience that in their field silence was golden (Ibid: 60). All important
development and new revelations,  e.i. about the purges and trials  come not from
the leading academics but from journalists.

6. The Foundations For A New Era In Soviet Scholarship

With the advent of Gorbachev coming to power, a new approach to the provision of
information began to emerge. Influential researchers laid the foundations for a new era
in Soviet scholarship. This followed the creation of institutional settings such as
academic institutions which promoted quantity and quality of research in political
studies and its sister discipline.

However, things did not begin to ease as it was hoped. In spite the collapse of the
Soviet Union, there are still some restrictions which can pose obstacles to scholars.

In 1987 the Politburo appointed a special committee to examine a list of books which
were kept in sections not open to the public. These books are believed to number
hundreds of thousands. The following year the committee released only those books
believed sympathetic to Communism. The list excluded books by critics of the
Bolsheviks, the Mensheviks, the Socialist Revolutionaries as well as books published
outside the Soviet Union (Laqueur, 1989: 300)

In 1988 a law was introduced which covered access to archives. The decisions of how
to deal with declassification of a document were left to the head of the institution
concerned. Documents in the archives of the ministries of foreign affairs, foreign

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trade, the Communist Party, the army and the KGB are still not all easily accessible to
foreign researcher.

Recently, changes began to shape Soviet social science fields. Influential researchers
laid the foundations for a new era in Soviet scholarship. The creation of a more solid
institutional setting such as academic institutions improved schooling and promoted the
quantity and quality of research in social science. One of the most pioneering
enterprises and reform-oriented intelligentsia is the monthly review Sotsiologicheskie
Issledovaniia (Sociological Inquiries) which addressed a readership beyond the
professional public (Lewin, 1988: 87-8). It published research findings (published and
unpublished), book reviews, material written by sociologists, philosophers, historians,
and artists. Another field which is in development is political science (politologiia)
which was previously called “state and law”. This new development is beneficial for
Soviet study students.

It is worth mentioning a newly founded branch called system analysis which came
under one of the branches of the Academy of Science. This new field became
beneficial to all the social sciences as it supplies useful analytical tools to its sister
disciplines (Lewin, 1988: 90). By promoting a different ontological conception,
system analysis uses language largely untainted by conventional ideological jargon.
This approach enabled its researcher and theoreticians to confront problems that still
face natural science.

When presenting different laws of system, for example, the system analyst can explain
that “laws do exist in social system, but that, as in the natural science, these laws are
conceptualised as being irregular...” (Lewin, 1988: 90). System analysis helps to
surmount the dogmatic hurdles that once made serious thinking impossible.

7. Conclusions

To do field research such conducting poll or survey was impossible for the western
scholar. On the other hand, scarcity of Soviet statistical data in the West libraries or in
the Soviet Union was exasperated by other methodological problems. They could not
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rely on the official data on one hand, on the other hand they could not carry out
research in the Soviet Union because of various restrictions. There was always
suspicious of the activities of Western researchers.

Available data could help the scholars do some assessment (Manheim and Rich, 1981).
However, data were being manipulate and distorted, which further could confuse and
undermine the result. For example, according to some Western studies the impact of
the great purge of the 1930s had been greatly exaggerated although it had affected the
upper and middle echelons of the party. Now under glasnost it became known that life
did not go on as usual, that there was a climate of general fear, that, in fact, more
people disappeared, temporarily or forever, than had been commonly assumed
(Laqueur, 1989: 241)

In spite of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new state from the
rubble, it is yet difficult for the Western scholar to study either the former Soviet
Union or Russia. As Russia took the mantle of the Soviet Union, partially, it is
information attitude still reminiscent of the defunct Soviet state.

On the other hand, some of discipline or discipline subfield we have in the West are not
found in Russia today as they are still in the developing stage embryonic stage.

Nevertheless, the evolution of Soviet social science in the last two decades is already
reshaping Soviet studies which turn will resolve the methodological problem.

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References

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Crystal, David; ed., The Cambridge Encyclopaedia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
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Hogan, Michael J.; The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the reconstruction of Western
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Keep, John L H; Last of the Empires: A History of the Soviet Union, 1945-1991, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1995).

Kenez, Peter; The Birth of the Propaganda State: Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilization,
1917-1929, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

Kissinger, Henry; Diplomacy, (London: Simon & Schuster, 1994).

Laqueur, Walter; The Long Road to Freedom: Russia and Glasnost, (London: Hyman) 1989.

Lewin, Moshe; The Gorbachev Phenomenon: A Historical Interpretation, (London:


Hutchinson Radius, 1988).

Manheim, Jarol B.; and Rich, Richard C; Empirical Political Analysis: Research Methods in
Political Science, 4th edn, (New York: Longman, 1981).

Marsh, David and Stoker, Gerry; eds.; Theory and Methods in Political Science, (London:
McMillan Press ltd, 1995)

Spero, Joan Edelman; The Politics of International Economic Relations, 4th Edn., (London:
Routledge,1990).

White, Stephen; Gorbachev and After, 3rd edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1992)

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