University of Greenwich

School of Social Science

Methodology Unit
(MA)

Essay:

What problems do we face in applying quantitative methods to

the study of political phenomena?

Abdisalam M Issa-Salwe

May 1996

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 Contents
Pages
Introduction 3
Why these Arguments are Appropriate to the Main Topic? 4
The Problems Facing The Research 4
How Quantitative Analysis is Applied 5
Case One: Peace-Making Endeavours of Contemporary Lineage Leaders 6
Evaluating the Data 10
Table 1: Major Elders Reconciliation Conferences in Somaliland, 1991-93: 6
Type of Conflict 5
Case Two: Brief Background of the Traditional Authority 8
Political Leaders Overtakes Traditional Elders 10
Sixties leaders still in charge: 11
How the People Feel About The Crisis 11
Conclusion 12
Notes 13
References 13

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Introduction

As politics is a widespread activity which take place in all sphere of human activity, it requires a structured
study method. The different approaches to political science are associated with particular ways of producing
knowledge. The fundamental purpose of theory is to explain, make easy to comprehend and interpret “reality”.
Without theory, it is impossible to comprehend, understand or interpret the “reality”.

Naturally, observation is an important part of political analysis. However, without a supposed theoretical
framework political studies are not possible.

In this essay I will examine two different aspects of the current Somali crisis. In the first I will explore a peace
survey in the North-Western Somali region (a region which unilaterally seceded from Somalia, calling itself
the Somaliland Republic). In the second part I will look at the Somali leadership crisis. This analysis leads on
to the second problem where I will look a research conclusion made by Somali scholars. The study makes a
statistical analysis, concluding that after six year of conflict the Somali have no more appetite for war.

Why these Arguments are Appropriate to the Main Topic?

Both case studies are based on statistical data which draw conclusion about the feeling of the Somali people
after a traumatic civil war. By quantifying the political process, in both case the researchers apply the same
methods. On the other hand, both are related to each other, as in the first they are the elders or community
leaders, who are the decision makers of the society.

In the traditional society, elders were able to solve their own disputes, by dealing or negotiating with each
other. However, they were unable to solve the problem at national level as this did not within their sphere of
influence. At the national level we have the modern politicians who are the main authors of the current
Somali plight.

As quantitative methods are based upon the analysis of quantity and related statistical evaluations by applying
data that are highly political in content, these studies uses quantitative data.

How Quantitative Analysis is Applied

As the name implies quantitative methods are another approach to the study of political processes where the
primary concern is quantitative data analysis. Quantitative approaches are most strongly associated with
Behaviourists work and Rational Choice theory.1 Behaviourist, given their concern with aggregate individual
behaviour, find quantitative methods more suitable.

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Although such experiments can be conducted under observation process, at the end experiment involves
manipulation, thus creating a situation where data cannot be authenticated. Much of the value of data analysis
begins when the prospect of data collection and analysis forces researchers to clarify their concepts and
distinguish between researchable data on one hand, and non- researchable on the other.

The Problems Facing The Research

Laboratory experiment can be handled in a closed environment where the outcome can be studied carefully.
However, when it comes to a political observation, the researcher has a limited control on the situation. On
other the hand, there may be various other situations or factors which can affect the political events.

Another important argument is whether the data is first hand (or primary analysis) or second hand data
(secondary analysis) or even third or fourth and so on. Although primary analysis can be made by holding a
direct observation and experiment, it cannot be fault proof.

How about second or third hand data analysis? At this stage the researcher has a “limited freedom and
responsibility.” The researcher is bound to use the existing data as he/she may not be able to free her/himself
from the “conceptual framework, the mind-set, the priorities and perspectives” created by the needs of the data
concerned.

Undertaking first hand research may be very expensive and time consuming. Available data (secondary
analysis) has the advantage that it may not require the time and attention demanded by primary analysis.
However, its disadvantage is in the outcome of the analysis.

Quantitative data at a given time cannot be applied to another similar situation. Other political events may
alter the situation.

In the second case study the author (authors) try to use sampling as a conclusion. Sampling involves using
small, carefully chosen samples to represent a much larger population and is one type of quantitative data
processing. This type of data collecting, however, cannot be mistake proof.

CASE ONE

Peace-Making Endeavours of Contemporary Lineage Leaders

The survey was concentrated only to Sanaag region, a region in the north-west part of Somalia  former
British Somaliland (see map). Since the advent of the collapse of the Somali state, this region declared itself
independent.

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The survey was funded by Action Aid, an NGO (non-governmental organisation) based in Britain. The
objectives of the survey were to help the Action Aid and other NGOs to manage better their help and work in
this region. Other objectives included the justification of Action Aid’s help, to demonstrate that this part of
Somalia is worth helping and that its aid was helping to reinforce the reconciliation and peace process which
had been going on for some time.

The researcher, Ahmed Yusuf, a native social anthropologist, undertook a six week field trip in Erigavo
(Sanaag capital region), Hargeisa (the self-proclaimed Somaliland Republic’s capital), Awdal region, another
northern Somalia region.

The scholar wanted to start by observing a peace conference which at the time of his research was going on in
Borame (Awdal region principal town). Unfortunately, he was denied the chance. He compiled the data on the
Borame Peace Conference from people who were engaged in the secretarial work of the conference. The
researcher claims to have obtained valuable information through informal and open discussions with lineage
leaders at various levels of political segmentation, and other social groups, among them, intellectuals,
politicians, poets, religious men and some women.

The peace conference, which began on 24 January 1993, was initially started to solve disputes between local
clans. But later into developed to a regional conference and continued until mid-May.

Type of Conflict

The types of conflict which the study examines are: (1) pastoral conflicts over pastureland, (2) conflicts over
arable land in settled areas, and (3) political conflicts as a result of competition for political dominance and
access to limited resources among major Isaq groups.

In the North-Western Region (the self-proclaimed Somaliland republic, see map), live three main clan-
families: Dir, Isaq, and Darod. The Isaq form the largest of the groups, and occupy the central part of the
region. The Dir group reside in the west, and the Darod in the east.

The traditional system of governance that relies primarily upon moral authority of lineage leaders and the good
will of their kinsmen, had limited power to effectively maintain peace and prevent the occurrence of crime and
violence.

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Table 1: Major Elders Reconciliation Conferences in Somaliland, 1991-93:

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The researcher acknowledges the constraints on the traditional peace making process. These pressures also
hinder the practical implementation of many useful items that are formally agreed by the reconciling parties.
Nevertheless and quite surprisingly, he concludes that these formidable constraints, have, so far, failed to
derail the impetus for reconciliation and peaceful coexistence between the local communities.

Driven by a nationalistic endeavour to salvage the self proclaimed state of "Somaliland" from unprecedented
and senseless ruinous turmoil, and to escape from the shame and disgrace that ensues from the failure of a
cause supported by the public at large traditional elders strive, under considerable pressure and against arduous
difficulties, to maintain peace. This grassroots local level approach to peace, started with a series of inter clan
reconciliation conferences as early as 1991. Then it gradually progressed to district, regional and national
levels in which the collective service of the elders of the major clans reconciled particularly difficult cases that
had failed to be resolved by the parties concerned.

For instance in the Sheikh district the reconciliation conference represented the turning point of the elders’
peace effort, which reached its height at the Borame conference. In the latter, a national peace charter that
incorporated the provisions of the series of compacts between the local clans, was formulated. Because of the
realisation that their peace functions cannot effectively succeed without effective support of a modern
administration, the elders expanded their natural peace functions to tackle the complex task of building an
executive interim government and a national charter, an unprecedented event in modern Somali history.
Considering these laudable achievements, as the observer claims, it is no wonder that the elders installed
themselves in the structure of the interim government, which consists of three councils: the council of elders,
constituent assembly (elected council) and council of ministers.

The sustained effort of lineage and clan leaders firmly established an encouraging tendency, in which peaceful
dialogue is favoured as a means to settle legitimate grievances in lieu of the use of force. Individual acts of
violence are constrained not only by the legal ruling which places responsibility upon the offender, but also by
the predictable condemnation of kinsmen and opposition of implicated social units. Legal contracts
promulgated by a series of peace conferences, define political and socio-economic relations between local clans
in contemporary northern Somalia.

The following summarises the general achievements of the peacemaking process. The particular achievements
of the peace endeavour in the nomadic areas were presented early in the text.

Evaluating the Data

By evaluating the various tables and data, Ahmed Yusuf examined the achievements which the traditional
peacemaking process promised which had been agreed between the reconciling parties from different groups
and locations, concluded that peace would prevail henceforth. However, the facts do not speak for themselves

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but only make sense in the context of a framework of investigation. His conclusions were disapproved by
subsequent events.

CASE TWO

Brief Background of the Traditional Authority

Like many African nations at the end of the eighties, Somalia faced economic, social and political problems. But
Somalia could not solve its problems as a healthy nation. Instead the problems which led to its disintegration and
dismemberment with a bloody civil war.

The crisis created a void of social norms, which consequently led the individual Somali into total disarray, as well as
mental and moral confusion. This socio-political chaos has caused the breakdown of Somali institutions.

The research was looking the role of both the Somali traditional and the modern leadership and how they respond in
modern Somali social life to the changing socio-political realities. The central topic was, the Somali and the modern
state: the contradiction between the Somali clanship system and the principle of a nation-state.

In my quest for the answer, I have concentrated on the kinds of leadership and their role. Then I have postulated the
assumption that the behaviour of man varies according to the type of political order. To determine the social crisis to
look the role of social institutions in determining man's behaviour was very important. To examine the social crisis,
to look at the role of social institutions in determining man’s behaviour was very important.

For Somalis the clan is the most important political unit in the traditional system. It is traced through males to a
common male ancestor from whom they take their clan name. The traditional political loyalties are reinforced by a
political-legal contract, by which Somali society settles its legal and political disputes.

The Somali pastoral-nomads have no hierarchical system, unlike their brethren the agro-nomads. Before the creation
of the modern state, political authority was spread throughout the community as a whole. As there was no centre for
political control, authority was never institutionalised.

Any vital issue concerning the nomadic community is discussed in the institutionalised shir (assembly), where, after
deep discussion and analysis of the matter concerned, decision in the assembly is decided by consensus.

What role does the leader play in the community? In fact, the clan-head presides over the assembly of elders but does
not make decisions. All adult males are elders and they are empowered by contractual treaty to direct the policies of
the lineage.

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Clan leaders deal with people politically only on a face-to-face basis hence weakening the authority. This weak
traditional authority might extend over people with whom they do not normally come into contact only if kinship
relationship exists between them. Clan leaders are responsible for all affairs concerning the clan and its relations with
other clans. They claim no rights as rulers over their people. They preside, rather than rule over people to whom they
are related. Lewis reiterates this matter in A Pastoral Democracy, "... even the office of clan-head is
generally little more than a nominal title corresponding to the degree of social and territorial exclusiveness which the
clan more than other orders of grouping possesses."2

When the clan-head dies, an assembly is held to select another leader. Most of the time the succession is peacefully
elected. But sometimes he might not. Somali oral history is full of conflict for the office of the clan-head between the
various lineage. This happened especially when the challenging lineage claim their superiority of manpower. This
has often led to bloody confrontation or ended with the challenging lineage making their own lineage-head.

With the advent of modernity and the nation-state, political parities were introduced. However, the system fell short
of what the Somali people expected to get from the democracy exercise. Instead, party politics generated intense
hostility among clans and lineages throughout the whole country.

Political Leaders Overtakes Traditional Elders

Once in old age, any Somali is qualified as an elder. However, elders do not traditionally exercise authority by virtue
of their position, but only by virtue of their personal qualities. Except for a few percentage, I found that the
majority of the most prominent faction or regional leaders are politicians of the early fifties and late sixties.

Sixties leaders still in charge:

Mohamed Farah Aydiid
Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed
Mohamed Ibrahim Egal
Mohamed Abshir Muuse
Abdulqadir Adan Mohamed
Ali Mahdi Mohamed
Mohamed Rajir
Abdirahmaan Mohamed (Tuur)
(South Muqdisho and part of Central Somalia, former army officer)
(Central regions, former army officer)
(former Prime Minster, Western Regions - Somaliland )
(North-Eastern Regions, former police commander)
(Bay regions, riverine area, former political party leader)
(South Muqdisho, former parliamentarian)
(Old Muqdisho, former law officer)
(North-Western Somalia, former political activists)

By detaching themselves from the traditional kind of leadership, the political ambitions of the old generation
are still alive.

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How the People Feel About The Crisis

Ninety percent wanted the war to be over. Except for 5.5 percent, the majority believed the culprits and the
responsible politicians, should be brought to justice. How can culprits be defined and who will define them?
This is the thorniest issue, as every group justifies its action as self-defence, therefore creating perpetual
conflict and violence.

The striking feature of the research was the conclusion that the Somali conflict was at an end. However, the
quantitative analysis of the statistical data drew the wrong conclusion. Why was this conclusion false?

Despite the research being handled by a group experts, the evidence showed a different outcome. What the
researcher missed was the methodical observation. The data which took for more than a year to collect, and
covered a vast area of land and time, was not even partially methodical. Some data was based on ‘second
hand’ hearsay information, while the other was based on the personal interviews. How the questions were
drawn is never clear in the report.

The majority of these interviews were taken from people who came to take part in some internal or regional
meetings. Did they consider the other variables (for example, the feelings and the influence which these
people could bring during international meetings or negotiation?) I doubt this was ever considered.

By looking critically at the aim and the effect of the research one may conclude that the authors had other
things in mind: to show the people (those in conflict) and the international community that the people were
honourable and peace-loving.

By analysing the data collected, I found a common feeling among the people: a desire for the end of the
conflict and the rehabilitation of the state. However, the desire of the leaders to show themselves in a
favourable light tended to make data based on interviews with them unreliable.

Conclusion

Quantitative methods are criticised for being too narrowly focused, like a search-light on a dark night that only
illuminates a very small part of reality.

It is also criticised for alleged casual inadequacy.3 A good theory should have both statistical justification and
plausibility. Without a plausible explanation, one can conclude that the statistical link is mere coincidence.
Conversely a plausible theory unsupported by statistical evidence is at best speculative, and at worst
paradoxical. Politics is full of theories about how people should behave but, alas for the theory, do not. And
that applies to empirical descriptive as well as prescriptive theories in politics.

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One of the pitfall of the survey is the conclusion from the various peace meeting as a measurement to the
people’s need to settle their disputes. People do not always give a clear view of their ideas. Correlation may be
established quite easily but their causal nature remains in doubt. Surveys show a high correlation between
peoples' readiness for peace and what action they think about.

Another criticism of quantitative methods is their failure to reveal meaning. Can quantitative methods do
anything to establish meaning? Critics argue that quantitative methods may establish 'what' and 'when', but not
'why': motivations and meanings are inevitably hidden. It is a criticism that is either universal or invalid: if
motivations can be established in relatively unstructured qualitative conversations then, in principle, they can
also be established in the more controlled interviews typical of quantitative research - provided those
interviews cover the right ground and ask the right questions.

While asking people directly about their motivations is as possible in quantitative studies as in any other, it
remains highly suspect because people are not usually very good at introspection.

Notes:
1
Miller, “Quantitative Methods”, in Marsh and Stoker, eds, Theory and Methods, 1995, p.155
2
I M Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy, p. 38.
3
Ibids., p.168.

References

W. L. Miller, “Quantitative Methods”, in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, eds., Theory and Methods in
Political Science, (London: MacMillan Press, 1995).

Somali Democratic Republic, Analytic Volume: Census of Population 1975, Ministry of National Planning,
Central Statistical Department, Mogadishu, January 1984

Ahmed Yusuf Farah, “Somalia: The Roots of Reconciliation”, 1993.

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Issa-Salwe, A M; The Collapse of the Somali State: The Impact of the Colonial Legacy, (London: Haan
Associates, 1994).

Manheim, B. Jarol and Rich, C Richard; Empirical Political Analysis: Research Methods in Political Science,
4th ed., (New York: Longman, 1981).

Laitan, David D; and Samatar, Said S; Somalia: Nation in Search of a State, (London: Westview Press, 1985)

Lewis, I M ; A Pastoral Democracy.

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