Kosal Path - The Economic Factor in The Sino-Vietnamese Split, 1972-75: An Analysis of Vietnamese Archival Sources

Cold War History
iFirst Article, 1–37, 2011
The economic factor in the Sino-

Vietnamese split, 1972– 75: An analysis
of Vietnamese archival sources
Kosal Path
School of International Relations, University of Southern
Downloaded By: [University of Southern California] At: 21:17 19 April 2011
California
Relying on so far untapped Vietnamese archival sources, this article examines

the impact of China’s gradual curtailment of its economic assistance to the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam’s (DRV) war and economic recovery efforts and
its implications for Sino-Vietnamese relations between 1972 and 1975. While
Beijing’s gradual reduction of aid to the DRV during this period was primarily
motivated by the declining importance of North Vietnam to China’s strategic
security combined with the reality of China’s domestic economic hardship which
largely resulted from the disastrous Cultural Revolution of 1966 – 69, Hanoi’s
reactions and policy responses were driven by their deep-rooted perception of
Beijing’s insincerity and hidden intention to keep Vietnam weak. The Sino-
Vietnamese conflict that ensued after 1975 was not inevitable; Hanoi’s leaders
launched concerted diplomatic efforts to improve economic relations with Beijing
throughout 1975 because they clearly recognised the importance of China’s
continued economic assistance and preferential trade agreements to its first five
year plan (1976– 80). However, Beijing’s unchanged position and hasty decision
to totally cut off aid to Vietnam and additionally take punitive economic
measures against Vietnam’s first five-year plan in late 1975 while at the same
time increasing economic and military aid to the Democratic Kampuchea
compelled Hanoi to tilt closer towards Moscow.
Kosal Path, PhD, is Lecturer at the School of International Relations, University of Southern California. He has
taught courses on international relations of the Asia-Pacific. As a senior researcher with Yale University’s
Cambodian Genocide Program and later the Documentation Center of Cambodia between 1996 and 2000, he
collected and documented materials related to the Khmer Rouge regime. After 12 months of field research in
Vietnam, Dr. Path recently completed his doctoral dissertation based on Vietnamese archival materials that
focused on the breakdown of Sino-Vietnamese alliance in the 1970s. Correspondence to: Email: phat@usc.edu
ISSN 1468-2745 print/ISSN 1743-7962 online

q 2011 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/01446193.2010.512497
http://www.informaworld.com
2 K. Path
Introduction
During the Vietnam War from 1965 to 1973, China’s large-scale economic and military
assistance to North Vietnam was indisputably the main instrument of China’s Vietnam
policy, constituting the most important source of Beijing’s influence over Hanoi.1
Beijing’s leaders utilised China’s substantial aid to North Vietnam as their leverage to
resolve the ideological inconsistency and contradiction which involved China’s desire
to achieve strategic cooperation with the United States while seeking to dispel Hanoi’s
fear of abandonment as well as prevent North Vietnam from being drawn into the
Soviet orbit.2 As revealed by Chinese sources, the general trend of China’s aid to North
Vietnam decreased in 1968– 70, then increased in 1971 – 72, and then decreased again
after the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in January 1973, a trend that continued
after 1975 and then took a deep dive in November of that year when Beijing decided to
cut its aid to Hanoi to an insignificant level. Noticeably, as Chinese scholar Li Danhui
among others has pointed out:
[Between 1971 and 1973], although China and the United States greatly improved
their bilateral relations, this was also the period when China provided the most
substantial aid to Vietnam, worth a total of 9 billions renminbi . . . If one compares
the aid packages China provided to North Vietnam between 1971 and 1975 with
their counterparts in the period 1965 to 1970, it is clearly apparent that, far from
China reducing its aid after the Sino-American reconciliation took place, the
amount actually rose.3
Leading scholarly works based on Chinese sources, including Chen Jian’s Mao’s China
and the Cold War and Qiang Zhai’s China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950 – 1975 among
others, supported such a claim. I do not disagree with these scholars’ finding that
Beijing’s aid pledges to North Vietnam substantially increased even after the Sino –US
rapprochement in February 1972. However, their works have revealed little about
the nature and scope of the Sino-Vietnamese dispute over the issue of handling and
delivery of Beijing’s huge aid pledges to North Vietnam after mid-1972. This article, in
fact, complements their finding by showing the rather different picture that emerges
from Hanoi’s account. This reveals that the delivery of Beijing’s aid pledges was not
only far from a smooth process, but also became the main source of their mutual
friction and even the confrontational encounters that caused the already strained
relations between Hanoi and Beijing to further deteriorate during the 1973 –75 period.
The most detrimental effect of this was Hanoi’s suspicion that Beijing’s leaders
were not sincere in their promise to transship vital aid supplies from other socialist
countries, especially the Soviet Union, to North Vietnam, and that they raised China’s
economic hardship merely as an excuse to substantially curtail China-aided projects
and Chinese aid supplies to North Vietnam. When such aid reductions actually
happened, Hanoi attributed Beijing’s reduction of aid to North Vietnam to the
Chinese intention to keep Vietnam weak.
The main contribution of this paper to the existing literature is threefold. First,
although most scholars recognise that the leaders of the two countries escalated their
Cold War History 3
complaints surrounding the issues of China’s aid delivery and Vietnam’s use of
Chinese aid, none of the existing works have thus far provided a substantive and
detailed account of Beijing’s change of mind about its past aid pledges to North
Vietnam after Chairman Mao achieved his paramount foreign policy goal of
rapprochement with the United States in February 1972. Second, the newly available
Chinese and Soviet sources have provided new insights into the Sino-Soviet dispute
over assistance for North Vietnam during the Vietnam War, ranging from their
disagreements over increasing Soviet engagement in Vietnam after 1965 to the issue of
handling aid transshipment from the Soviet Union and other countries via China to
North Vietnam during the 1970 –72 period.4 However, we know little about Sino-
Vietnamese disputes over China’s assistance during the 1972 –75 period, which
remains the murkiest period in the study of Sino-Vietnamese relations. This article
will begin to shed light on this period. Finally, this study provides new insights into
Hanoi’s thinking – something which has been largely absent from existing scholarly
works on the triangular Soviet – Vietnamese– Chinese relationship during the 1972 – 75
period. Vietnamese archival sources reveal that the Sino-Vietnamese dispute over
China’s assistance to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) between 1972 and
1975 was a manifestation of Beijing’s inability to honour its aid promises to North
Vietnam as a result of the disastrous impact of the Chinese Cultural Revolution on
China’s domestic economy and Hanoi’s desperate need of greater assistance to support
its offensive war to liberate the South while at the same time accelerating the economic
reconstruction of the North.
China’s economic hardship at home not only undermined its capacity to increase
aid but also caused Beijing to cut excess aid, eradicate waste of all sorts, and rescind
past aid pledges to North Vietnam after the Sino-US rapprochement in February 1972.
The results of Beijing’s measures to reduce China’s aid burden between 1972 and 1975
caused enormous disruption and hardship on Vietnam’s war effort and economic
reconstruction to the point where Hanoi’s leaders began to see the necessity of tilting
closer to Moscow in late 1975. This article, based on relevant Vietnamese archival
materials, is divided into four sections: first, Hanoi’s reaction to Beijing’s Vietnam
policy shift after President Nixon’s visit to China in February 1972, second, the dispute
over China’s transshipment of aid from the Soviet Union and other countries to the
DRV in 1972 –74, third, the dispute over Chinese aid projects in 1973 –75, and, fourth,
Beijing’s punitive economic measures in 1975 against Vietnam’s first five year plan.
Hanoi’s reaction to Beijing’s Vietnam aid policy shift after the Sino-US
rapprochement in February 1972
Beijing’s Vietnam policy shift after the Sino-US rapprochement in February 1972 was
mainly attributed to Beijing’s perceptions of the waning threat of the American
presence in Indochina, the rising security threat from the Soviet Union in the
North, the declining ability of Chinese aid to pull Hanoi away from Moscow, and
the detrimental economic impact of Chairman Mao’s Cultural Revolution during
4 K. Path
the 1966 –69 period. Beijing’s volte-face also reflected the heavy toll on Chinese
economic strength during the early 1970s exacted by China’s past efforts to provide
generous assistance to support the cause of the world revolution, especially in
Vietnam. Against this background, Beijing’s attitude toward assisting North Vietnam
significantly shifted from a commitment to ‘provide whatever is necessary’ to support
the Vietnamese cause during the war years of 1965 –72 to its emphasis on ‘giv[ing]
China a break!’, to use Zhou Enlai’s own words, after the Paris Peace Accords were
signed in January 1973.
On the impact of the Cultural Revolution on China’s economic health, Frederick Teiwes
and Warren Sun are right to suggest that although enormous resource misallocation
and economic dislocation was caused by Mao Zedong’s order to build the industrial ‘third
front’ to avoid potential attacks from the United States in the mid-1960s and his insistence
on war preparations against the Soviets in 1969, ‘the most destructive impact on the
economy was produced by the Chairman’s treasured Cultural Revolution, not simply
by giving higher priority to revolution [over production], but by his willingness to accept
vast economic damage as an acceptable cost in the effort to transform society’.5
The economic performance of the PRC over the entire Cultural Revolution decade
(1966–76) lagged significantly behind that of the pre-1966 period in terms of gross
economic output.6
By the Ninth Congress held in April 1969, Chairman Mao ordered the return to
economic practices that had been condemned between 1966 and 1968. In September
1970, in a campaign to criticise ultra-left economic practices, Zhou attacked anarchism
in the workplace that undermined production, called for a return to expertise, and
emphasised the need for an efficient use of resources and quality production.7 However,
Mao’s insistence on war preparations against the Soviets and his prioritisation of
strategic and ideological concerns continued to cause great waste and economic
dislocation and undercut his more economics-minded subordinates’ efforts to
rebalance economic practices. As Chen Jian points out, during the 1969 –72 period,
North Vietnam was at the core of Mao’s ideological and strategic concerns – a closer
Soviet –Vietnamese relationship was a threat to China from the southern flank and
Beijing’s reconciliatory overture with Washington contradicted China’s central theme
of ‘struggling against US imperialism’, placing the Chinese Communist revolution at
odds with other nationalist revolutionary movements around the world.8 For these
reasons, Chairman Mao was determined to provide an enormous amount of economic
and military aid to North Vietnam between 1971 and 1972 in order to achieve his dual
strategic objective of seeking rapprochement with the United States against the Soviet
threat while simultaneously increasing China’s economic and military assistance to
North Vietnam against the United States to dispel Hanoi’s fear of China’s
abandonment.9 In 1971 –73, while Zhou Enlai, as premier of the State Council, was
under great pressure to reduce aid to rejuvenate China’s economy, Chairman Mao
continued to emphasise world revolution and press for more aid for revolutionary
struggles abroad. As a result, China’s foreign aid on average accounted for 7% of China’s
GDP in 1971, increasing from 1% of its total expenditure during the first and second
Cold War History 5
10
five-year plan, while its economic health worsened considerably. During this period,
Mao sent Premier Zhou Enlai to Hanoi from 5 to 8 March 1971 to personally assure
Hanoi’s leaders of China’s commitment to supporting the Vietnamese struggle against
the United States, and issued instructions for a huge increase in China’s economic and
military assistance to North Vietnam to dispel Hanoi’s fear of abandonment as a direct
result of China’s reconciliatory approach toward the United States.11 However, after the
Paris Peace Agreement in January 1973, China’s aid policy towards North Vietnam
emphasised a gradual curtailment of aid and disengagement, and Sino-Vietnamese
relations quickly cooled. Beijing’s main explanation for such a curtailment was due to
China’s economic difficulty. This was apparently genuine, as Shen Zhihua, who
personally participated in China’s aid supply arrangements, points out that: ‘From the
early 1970s, the detrimental economic impact of the Cultural Revolution also became
increasingly clear, leaving China genuinely unable to satisfy Vietnam’s growing appetite
for aid’.12 However, to Hanoi’s leaders, this was simply Beijing’s pretext for cutting its
aid to North Vietnam.
From Hanoi’s perspective, signs of Beijing’s changed attitude towards ‘emergency
aid’ to North Vietnam began to appear shortly after President Nixon left China in
February 1972. First, to Hanoi’s astonishment, on 25 February 1972, the PRC Ministry
of Economic Relations with Foreign Countries assigned Lian Dian Jun to replace
Yang Yong Jie who had been in Hanoi since August 1969 as China’s Economics
Representative to the DRV. All previous Chinese Economic Representatives to the DRV
had held office for four or five years. Yang Yong Jie was then promoted to Vice Minister
of the PRC Ministry of Economic Relations with Foreign Countries. From 1965, so as to
meet Vietnam’s urgent need of aid, a centralised ‘goods-delivery’ structure had been
created to assess Vietnamese needs, something that was accomplished largely through
the office of economic affairs at the Chinese Embassy in Hanoi and by sending advisory
groups and ad hoc investigative teams out into the field.13 Hence, as the head of this
important office at the Chinese Embassy in Hanoi, Lian Dian Jun became Beijing’s eyes
and ears in Vietnam. In addition to China’s trade relations with North Vietnam, he was
also responsible for the direct oversight of all China’s aid programmes including
Chinese experts and China-aided projects in North Vietnam. Considering the
enormous importance and influence of this office, the Vietnamese leadership was very
displeased with his appointment because they expected Beijing’s leaders to send one
of their many Vietnam specialists or someone who had established a good personal
relationship with them, as had been the case in the past. A report from the Vietnamese
Ministry of Foreign Trade noted with surprise: ‘Lian Dian Jun has never been to
Vietnam. Before this, Lian Dian Jun served as the Chinese Embassy’s economics
representative in Africa’.14
The most plausible explanation as to why Beijing appointed Lian Dian Jun at this
time was that Beijing intended to send a signal to Hanoi that China needed a break from
its ‘emergency aid policy’ to North Vietnam. During the early stages of Beijing’s
reconciliation with Washington, Mao manipulated its economic and military assistance
to North Vietnam to entice Hanoi to negotiate an early peace agreement with
6 K. Path
15
Washington. However, as Vietnamese sources cited below reveal, after Mao achieved
his highest foreign policy goal – i.e. the Sino-US rapprochement in February 1972 – he
began to yield to his subordinates’ concern that China’s generous aid packages to the
DRV placed an enormous burden on China’s worsening economy. In this context, Lian
Dian Jun’s lack of personal ties with Hanoi’s leaders was specifically desirable because
Beijing purposely sent him to Hanoi to make sure that Chinese material aid would not
be wasted by the Vietnamese. Lian Dian Jun was far more willing than his predecessors
to challenge or confront Vietnamese officials and wasted no time in tightening his grip
on Vietnam’s use of Chinese aid.
Nonetheless, as much as Beijing’s leaders wanted to reduce the increasingly heavy
burden of aiding the DRV, the US bombing of Hanoi and the mining of the Hai Phong
Port in the late spring of 1972 provided Hanoi with yet another opportunity to exploit
Beijing’s guilt over the reconciliation with Washington to extract additional pledges of
military assistance. To Hanoi’s leaders, Chairman Mao’s handshake with President
Nixon was clearly a betrayal of the underlying principles of a relationship between
‘brotherly comrades’, but Hanoi’s leaders showed themselves adept at utilising Beijing’s
sensitivity to Vietnamese charges of betrayal as leverage to not only elicit greater and
more sophisticated military aid, but also demand that Beijing take ‘special measures’
to urgently and promptly deliver such assistance and even accept a very unpleasant
condition – that is to allow Soviet ships to dock in ports in Southern China and then
agree to transship Soviet material aid by train to North Vietnam free of charge.16 On
12 May 1972, the Vietnamese Foreign Affairs Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh requested an
urgent meeting with the Chinese Ambassador Wang Youping in Hanoi, and asked him
to inform Beijing’s leaders of Hanoi’s urgent request that ‘China consider allowing
ships from the Soviet Union and other countries to dock at Chinese ports, for instance
Zhan Jiang Port in Hainan, to unload cargo’, reasoning that the US blockade of the Hai
Phong Port and other ports in Northern Vietnam effectively cut off vital supply lines
from the outside, making Southern China and Chinese ports an indispensable lifeline
for North Vietnam.17 The next day, Zhou Enlai agreed to Hanoi’s special request.
Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister Le Thanh Nghi’s 12 July letter to Chinese Vice-
Premier Li Xiannian restated that on 13 May Zhou Enlai promised Xuan Thuy
that China agreed to provide urgent assistance by repairing railways, opening secret
shipping routes, increasing military aid, rushing supplies of goods and gasoline and
sending mine sweeping experts to North Vietnam. In that letter, Le told Chinese
Vice-Premier Li Xiannian that ‘we are profoundly moved by the generous support
the government and people of China have provided to Vietnam’.18
On 15 August 1972, Prime Minister Pham Van Dong sent another letter to Premier
Zhou Enlai stating that:
We urgently request that in the last four months of 1972, China provide additional
3000 transporting trucks and urgently deliver all the remaining trucks in the 1972
aid plan [to North Vietnam] in the month of August . . . We also realise that such
a huge request cannot avoid causing difficulty to the Chinese Comrades, but we
Cold War History 7
believe that considering our Rear-Front duty, Comrades would sympathise with our
cause and meet our need.19
Thus far, there is no clear evidence to confirm that Beijing actually met Hanoi’s request
in all respects, but a Chinese record indicates that Beijing doubled the number of
vehicles from 4011 for 1971 to 8758 for 1972.20 This shows that Pham Van Dong’s
August 1972 request for a huge number of transporting trucks was largely met.
However, it appears, as indicated by relevant Vietnamese documents cited below, that
Beijing’s delays in the delivery of Vietnam’s vast aid supplies from the Soviet Union
and other countries caused Hanoi to escalate its complaints and even accuse Beijing of
insincerity. From Hanoi’s viewpoint, Beijing’s words did not match its deeds. As it
turned out later, the issues surrounding the delivery of Beijing’s enormous pledges
became a thorny issue that caused further mutual friction and suspicion rather than
improving relations between Hanoi and Beijing in the ensuing years.

Considering that Beijing pledged huge ‘special military aid’ packages in mid-1972,
the appointment of Lian Dian Jun may not necessarily mean that the PRC had changed
its policy toward Hanoi. Lian Dian Jun’s role may well have been to make sure that
China’s aid to Hanoi was used more effectively. I contend, however, that the decision of
Being’s top leadership to provide ‘special military aid’ in mid-1972 does not negate the
fact that, unlike his predecessors, Lian Dian Jun showed uncompromising attitudes
toward his Vietnamese counterparts and had much greater authority and influence
over how Chinese aid was used by the Vietnamese. In addition, his assessments of
North Vietnam’s economic needs were to a greater extent driven by his emphasis on
China’s economic hardship and inability to satisfy Hanoi’s ambitious demands, a tone
that was consistent with top Chinese leaders’ justification for reducing aid to North
Vietnam after 1973.
It appears that during the crucial years of 1971–72, Chairman Mao ordered Premier
Zhou Enlai to provide whatever Hanoi asked for and Zhou personally oversaw Chinese
aid to the DRV, but after mid-1972 they began to delegate the oversight of China’s aid
programmes to the DRV to their subordinates, namely Vice Premier Li Xiannian, Fang Yi
(Minister of Economic Relations with Foreign Countries) and Li Qiang (Minister of
Foreign Trade). Particularly, the PRC Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations with
Foreign Countries had long held the view that China’s all-out support for the DRV during
the war years 1965–72 was wasted by the Vietnamese side. Chinese experts had been left
without assignments for months after arriving in Vietnam, projects had been abandoned
while incomplete, equipment had been lost or damaged, and factory locations had been
frequently changed without sound reason. A more explicit expression of Beijing’s growing
displeasure with Hanoi’s mishandling and misuse of China’s aid surfaced two years
later. On 15 March 1974, Fang Yi conveyed to DRV Deputy Prime Minister Phan Trong
Tue that
Vietnam has changed the locations of some of the projects so many times; for
instance, the paper factory location has been changed eight times since 1959. Also
due to the lack of proper storage facilities, material aid and equipment we sent to
8 K. Path
Vietnam were badly damaged. Other ministries have raised their complaints,
reported these to our top leadership, and expressed their criticism to our ministry of
such waste.21
Based on relevant Vietnamese sources, the significance of the Lian Dian Jun
appointment is twofold. First, his lack of close ties with Vietnamese leaders coupled
with the timing of his appointment immediately after the Sino-US rapprochement
was sealed in Beijing in February 1972, from Hanoi’s viewpoint, was an indication
of Beijing’s changed attitude towards Vietnam aid policy. Second, as Vietnamese
documents below clearly indicate, Lian Dian Jun’s assessment of Hanoi’s need for
Chinese aid and reports of ‘wasteful use’ of Chinese material aid by the Vietnamese
significantly influenced the decision by the Chinese Ministry of Economic Relations
with Foreign Countries and Foreign Trade to curtail the scope of economic assistance
to North Vietnam in 1973 – 75, which in turn caused the mutual friction between the
two sides to escalate into mutual accusation and confrontation.
Soon after his arrival, Lian Dian Jun set a new tone, placing all existing projects
under his office’s tight scrutiny and holding up all Vietnamese proposals for ‘more
studies or research’ as a way of expressing Beijing’s disapproval. He demanded strict
re-evaluation of all existing China-aided projects before supplying equipment and
material aid to North Vietnam despite the fact that many of these projects had already
been inspected and approved by Chinese experts. On 21 April, Lian proposed to the
Vietnamese Department of Foreign Experts that all Chinese experts who were still
awaiting their assignments were to return to China; they would be sent back to
Vietnam when their roles had been clearly determined. Lian told his Vietnamese
counterpart bluntly: ‘what an unnecessary waste! [Chinese] experts continue to stay in
Vietnam without assignments; some of our experts have arrived and stayed in Vietnam
for nine months already’.22 He complained that ‘the Vietnamese side was slow in
addressing this issue’.23 In May, he demanded that the Vietnamese side inform his
office immediately how many experts were needed and how many were to be sent back
to China. Based on the Ministry of Foreign Trade’s weekly reports, the number of
Chinese experts dropped sharply between May and December 1972 from 698 to 73; in
June and July alone, a total of 486 Chinese experts were sent back to China despite
Hanoi’s request for their continued stay.24 The Chinese side reasoned that the
intensified war and American bombing posed a grave danger to Chinese experts as well
as hindering their ability to fulfil their duties.
In response to the Vietnamese request for the rehabilitation and construction of
industrial plants and for general equipment needs for 1973, Lian Dian Jun reported to
Beijing that ‘we (Chinese) have already done research but Vietnamese comrades’
proposal of up to 82 projects [for 1973] is enormous’. It was in the light of this
evaluation that the Chinese Ministry of Economic Relations with Foreign Countries
informed the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Trade on 10 February 1973 that:
We have reviewed your proposal. Based on the reality of the post war reconstruction
and our real capability to provide, we can only help build 45 projects for 1973
Cold War History 9
[cutting nearly 50% of Vietnam’s proposed projects] and supply the rest in 1974.
You have to choose projects that both sides have agreed upon before and to be
more realistic. Regarding the dispatch of Chinese experts to assess and rehabilitate
damaged factories, we can meet your request, but concerning the issue of equipment
and material supplies, you need to have a clear plan and only after that, can we
supply. We will continue to do research on your requests.25
Second, North Vietnam’s strategic importance in Beijing’s security policy began to
decline after the Sino-US rapprochement in 1972. Beijing’s changing attitude did not
go unnoticed by Vietnamese officials who frequently visited China. In his October
1972 report to the Prime Minister’s Office, Van Trong, head of the Vietnamese
archaeological delegation, who had just returned from his visit to many cities and
towns in China between 19 August and 8 September, observed after President Nixon
left Beijing:
[China’s] most favourite socialist friend is North Korea. Besides North Korea were
Albania and Romania [implying that North Vietnam is not among China’s three
most favourite countries]. The People’s Daily reserved the whole page for printing
articles about Comrade Kim Ill Sung; however, articles about Vietnam’s war against
the U.S. are usually half a page, and the news is just one or two columns on page 5
or 6. Various Chinese newspapers cited news sources about the U.S.’s destructive
bombing of Northern Vietnam by explicitly noting ‘based on information from the
Vietnamese press’ or ‘according to Vietnamese newspapers.’ By so doing, it does not
reflect China’s views. Our consulate officials told us that the Chinese have always
avoided pointing fingers at the U.S.’s crimes [in Vietnam]. At the library of
Ethnology Institute in Beijing, Kim Ill Sung’ s writings were placed on the top shelf
compartment while Ho Chi Minh’s writings were placed in the lower shelf
compartment. The portrait of President Ho has disappeared while that of Kim Ill
Sung is on public display.26
Nonetheless, during and after President Nixon’s visit to China, Hanoi’s leaders
cautiously controlled their criticism of Beijing’s reconciliatory policy towards the
United States. The Vietnamese Workers’ Party (VWP) leadership instructed all
Vietnamese delegations to China to restrain their public criticism of Beijing’s policy
and maintain the spirit of fraternal solidarity with the Chinese. Similarly, Beijing’s
leaders advised their own cadres to exercise caution – that is to avoid being
enthusiastic about Nixon’s visit to China in front of Vietnamese visitors. Van Trong’s
report to the Vietnamese Prime Minister also observed that
in Hang Zhou, while taking us to visit a public park, a Chinese local authority leader
made a slip of the tongue and told us that ‘Nixon’s wife also was brought here during
her visit’ and a Chinese comrade from the central government escorted him out
to the side and whispered something into his ear. A while later, this Chinese
comrade talked about Nixon again and he was then ‘reprimanded.’ In short, Chinese
comrades did not want to condemn Nixon. Nor did they want to refer to their warm
welcoming of Nixon back in February. They have always avoided talking about these
two things.27
Third, to offset China’s aid burden to North Vietnam, Beijing urged Hanoi to
diversify its economic ties with capitalist countries, mainly Japan, while advising
10 K. Path
Hanoi’s leaders to request a greater quantity of aid supplies from the Soviet Union.
In early 1972, China offered to provide storage facilities and transportation of the
transited goods from the Soviet Union to North Vietnam free of charge. According to
Li Danhui’s account,
Marshall Ye Jianying, a member of the [CCP] Central Committee’s Politburo and
Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, told Ly Ban and others, for
instance, that Vietnam should ask the Soviet Union to send weapons, food, useful
supplies, indeed everything, the more the better, which could be stored in China
even if they could not be transferred [to Vietnam] immediately.28
As Li Danhui pointed out, Beijing adopted this policy to alleviate its own burdens, and
it also intended to use this opportunity to create conflict between Moscow and Hanoi.
Just a few months after the Sino-Japanese normalisation in January–February 1973,
Beijing’s leaders also encouraged Hanoi’s leaders to establish trade relations with Japan.
Following such advice, Hanoi for the first time began to explore economic relations with
Japan. In early 1973, the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs received approval to
welcome three Japanese diplomats from the Southeast Asia and Asia-Pacific Department
of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to ‘discuss various issues related to bilateral trade
relations between the two countries’.29 Although Hanoi remained very suspicious of
Japan’s political motives at this point, they began to view Japan as an important
economic partner for Vietnam. As the DRV Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted,
Japan’s main motive with DRV is to use their economic influence to capitalise their
political influence, but at the same time, [they] truly want to do long-term business
with us. They want to use North Vietnam as a bridge to expand their economic
activities in Kampuchea, Laos and South Vietnam.30
On 6 April 1973, while in Beijing, Ly Ban, DRV’s Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade and
Hanoi’s senior economic envoy, sent an urgent telegram to the office of the Prime
Minister conveying China’s approval for a Vietnamese delegation of 38 officials from
the Ministry of Foreign Trade to depart for Beijing immediately to study China’s
experiences in economic opening to capitalist countries.31 In March 1974, when Phan
Trong Tue conveyed his Politburo’s request for urgent delivery of fertiliser and steel
which were vital to North Vietnam’s agriculture and industry, Zhou Enlai counselled
him to purchase them from Japan. Zhou told Phan that ‘we have to import a huge
portion of our fertiliser from Japan’, and Li Qiang, who was at the meeting, added: ‘For
our production of fertiliser, we can only meet our domestic need and now Japan
demands higher prices for their supply of fertiliser to us’.32
In short, soon after the Sino-US rapprochement in February 1972, Hanoi’s leaders
became acutely aware of the gradual shift in Beijing’s aid policy to the DRV from its
earlier commitment to ‘provide whatever is necessary to meet North Vietnam’s need’
to an emphasis on the gradual reduction of China’s heavy burden. The ‘China’s
betrayal’ thesis proved to be a useful tool for Hanoi to extract greater military aid from
Beijing, especially after the US mining of Haiphong in May 1972. As it turned out,
although Beijing agreed to pledge enormous military assistance to Hanoi during the
Cold War History 11
second half of 1972, issues surrounding the delivery of such aid became the main
source of mutual friction.
Dispute over the transshipment of material aid from other countries, 1972 –74
Between 1971 and 1972, Beijing’s leaders significantly changed their position towards
Moscow’s increasing engagement in Vietnam from passive collaboration to active
encouragement.33 Beijing took four initiatives to pressure the Soviet Union to accelerate
their shipping: 1) in January, March and April 1972, China signed agreements covering
the transportation to Vietnam during 1972 of special materials from the Soviet Union;
2) China agreed to allow Soviet experts to escort ‘special materials’ that passed through
China; 3) China allowed freight ships from the Soviet Union and other European
countries to unload their contents at Chinese ports; 4) China again began storing aid
materials sent from the Soviet Union and other nations and designated for Vietnam.34
Li Danhui reasoned that
although China adopted this policy to alleviate its own burden, it also intended to
use this opportunity to create conflict between the Soviet Union and Vietnam.
China hoped that Vietnam, unhappy with the Soviet Union’s inability to meet its
requests, would develop a grudge against the Soviets, thereby instigating increasing
dissension and discord with the Soviet camp.35
If this was Beijing’s true intention, then it certainly backfired – it was Beijing’s failure
to follow through such promises that caused Hanoi to question its sincerity and
brought to the surface the deep-rooted Vietnamese distrust of the Chinese.
After the port of Hai Phong was heavily mined by the United States in May 1972,
transportation via China became even more vital to North Vietnam’s war efforts. All
foreign aid to North Vietnam had to pass through ports in Southern China and the
Chinese transported them by small barges along the coast and by train and trucks
across the border to North Vietnam while at the same time trying to avoid interception
by the US armed forces. In mid-1972, Hanoi’s leaders were increasingly concerned
about how to get the most aid from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; so they
asked Beijing to unload goods from these countries in Chinese ports, store them in
China and transport them to North Vietnam. Hanoi’s leaders also permitted Beijing to
use some of the material aid and return it to Vietnam later because they lacked storage
facilities.36 So how did a Sino-Vietnamese dispute over the delivery of this aid occur?
Li Danhui points out the two most significant factors that caused the dispute and
delays in delivering goods. First, the Vietnamese always believed the more aid the better,
and did not restrict their requests to those goods it most urgently needed, while China set
tight limitations on all types of aid supplies to North Vietnam other than food, steel, fuel
and sugar. Relying on a Chinese Railway archival record of the minutes of meetings
between Chinese Minister Li Qiang and his Vietnamese counterpart Ly Ban on 27 June
1972, Li Danhui wrote: ‘Vietnam requested that, in addition to 600,000 tons of these
commodities, China permitted the shipping of 300,000 tons of minerals, a request the
Chinese side immediately refused’. Second, China did not wish goods to stay in China
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long enough to place pressure upon limited storage facilities.37 Vietnamese sources
substantiate Li’s first account, but call into question the second reason, interestingly
revealing Hanoi’s growing doubts about Beijing’s honesty in handling Vietnam’s aid
from other countries, especially a large quantity of fuel from the Soviet Union.38 After
the January 1973 Paris Peace Agreement, as their frustration with Beijing’s delay in
deliveries grew, Hanoi’s leaders began to suspect China of withholding and misuse of its
aid, and they demanded in response that Beijing rush the shipment of all remaining aid
to North Vietnam. Hanoi’s persistent probing and questioning clearly indicated its
distrust toward Beijing, and such an attitude would have been interpreted by Beijing’s
leaders as an insult to their moral superiority, the highest goal they had tried to achieve
through their generous aid programmes to North Vietnam since the early 1950s.
Between May 1972 and May 1973, the quantity of other countries’ goods transited in
Shanghai, Huang Pu, and Zhan Jiang, Hainan (China) was 646,276 metric tons, out of
which 247,487 metric tons was fuel and 398,789 metric tons dry commodities. The Soviet
aid alone totalled 525,882 metric tons, accounting for nearly 80% of the total aid from the
socialist bloc. Based on the DRV Ministry of Foreign Trade’s statistical report, Vietnam
received from China only 317,426 metric tons and 328,850 metric tons remained in China
by the end of 1973. Thus more than 50% of the goods from other countries were stuck in
China (see Table 1). Following Hanoi’s repeated inquiries, PRC Minister of Foreign Trade
Li Qiang and Vice-Minister of Transportation Guo Lu complained to Phan Trong Tue on
7 March 1974 that Vietnam did not have the capacity to transport or to receive such large
quantities of goods and lacked proper storage facilities for them. Li Qiang counselled his
Vietnamese counterpart to address these shortcomings immediately.39 At the same time,
Li Qiang admitted to Phan Trong Tue that the Chinese side had not yet done a very good
job of transporting and delivering goods to Vietnam.40 Beijing’s complaint appeared to be
consistent with Hanoi’s own admission that ‘due to our own poor receiving capacity
[meaning poor transportation and facilities], from the beginning of the year up to now
[June 1973], the transfer of goods from China was slower than before; on average, we can
only receive more or less 15,000 metric tons per month’.41 Blaming the Vietnamese side
for impatience and unpreparedness, Zhou Enlai told Phan Trong Tue during the latter’s
trip to Being in early March 1974 that
all equipment and materials in reality can not reach Vietnam immediately because
they need to be arranged [thus taking time]. The majority of goods reached Yan Yuan
[the Chinese side of the border gate], and you need to prepare more storage facilities
because the rainy season is approaching. If not, these goods will be damaged.42
Concerning the issue of shipping material aid across the western border, Hanoi
asked Beijing to transport their goods from Shanghai to Yunnan province and then
transfer them by train en route to North Vietnam via Lao Cai. In response, Li Qiang
told Phan Trong Tue that ‘your proposal is unrealistic’ because rail links would be too
long and difficult, and said that ‘via Lao Cai we can only transport local Chinese
goods from Yunnan province’.43 Hanoi’s leaders wanted Beijing to take ‘extraordinary
measures’ to hasten the transportation of Vietnam’s goods and materials in aid from
Table 1. Statistics on transshipment via China’s ports (from May 1972 to May 1973). [Quantity unit: Ton ]
Goods Reached China’s Ports
Categories Shanghai Huang Pu Zhan Jiang Total Goods Arrived in Vietnam Goods Remain in China
274,450 94,068 277,758 646,276 317,426 328,850

Gasoline 71,092 3701 – 74,793 – 74,793
Diesel 138,163 – 32,118 170,281 – 170,281
Steel 33,857 13,243 28,004 75,104 46,969 28,135
Fertiliser 6078 36,248 10,761 53,087 48,632 4445
Chemical sub. 2347 6279 896 9522 6539 2983
Ammunition – 1943 – 1943 526 1417
Lubricant oil 4 5353 1905 7262 6539 723
Misc. 618 6355 546 7519 4964 2555
Flour – 1031 144,821 145,852 142,007 3845
Rice – – 17,708 17,708 16,410 1298
Sugar 1872 – 27,425 29,297 18,693 10,604
Other food stuff 15 740 1319 2074 2005 69
Pork fat 1075 970 – 2045 1489 556
Milk 195 172 208 575 420 155
Cold War History
Canned food 231 439 122 792 686 106

Handicraft 105 9 2 116 116 –
Machinery 4070 6409 3790 14,269 7757 6512
Equipments 1094 4014 1797 6905 1100 5805
Groceries 9373 3009 3873 16,255 9428 6827
Wood products – 746 – 746 746 –
Donation 825 913 35 1773 1200 573
Aid for Laos 3024 138 1861 5023 1200 3823
Diplomats’ goods 6 37 2 45 – 45
Source: Nghiem Ba Duc, Vice Minister of Foreign Trade, to the Prime Minister’s Office on 29 June 1973. ‘Report (No 243/BNgt/KV) on the situation of
imported goods via China’s sea ports and proposal to send people to China to cross-check detailed inventory, to discuss a plan to bring the remaining
goods to our country’. National Archive No. 3, Collection of the Prime Minister’s Office, Folder 9004, 119 –22.
13
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other countries that had passed through China’s ports, but when the latter refused,
they suspected that the Chinese side placed more priority on transporting their own
goods rather than those from other countries to Vietnam.44
Besides the delays, the spark of Hanoi’s suspicion of Beijing’s misuse of Vietnam’s
material aid involved the issue of the transshipment of fuel from the Soviet Union. The
DRV Ministry of Foreign Trade raised serious concern about the remaining 247,487
metric tons of fuel that remained in China (see Table 1). It is important to note that
North Vietnam relied heavily on foreign oil supply and the Soviet Union was the
largest supplier of oil in aid to North Vietnam from 1965 to 1972. On 29 June 1973,
the DRV Ministry of Foreign Trade reported to the Prime Minister that:
Concerning fuel, Chinese comrades transferred it to us through the pipelines together
with China’s fuel and mixed up goods of the economic assistance category with that of
military assistance. We need to verify this with them and make things clear. . . . China
would not do that [transporting] for free and therefore, we proposed that a Vietnamese
delegation be stationed at the Chinese ports to coordinate with Chinese officials and
closely monitor the transshipment of our goods in aid from other countries.45
According to DRV Ministry of Foreign Trade’s June 1973 report, the most important
commodities that remained in China were gasoline and diesel (approximately 240,000
metric tons of fuel had been received but over 320,000 metric tons remained in China,
accounting for 60% of the total quantity), steel (over 48,000 tons received, with 28,000
tons, about 30%, remaining), machinery (nearly 8000 tons received and 6500 tons, over
40%, remaining), and groceries (nearly 9500 tons received and nearly 7000 tons, about
40%), still in China (see Table 1). The report noted that ‘the remaining goods in China
were steel, equipment, machineries, and raw materials etc. . . . Among them, there were
the types of goods we urgently need for production, construction and people’s
livelihood’.46 This indicates how frustrated Hanoi’s leaders were over Beijing’s protracted
delay in the delivery of goods so vital to their war efforts in the South and economic
reconstruction in the North.
On 30 July 1973, Hanoi decided to send its own delegation consisting of nine
representatives to work in China for two months to clarify the detailed quantity of
Vietnam’s goods that remained at China’s ports, to collect all logistical documents for
every ship after it arrived in a Chinese port, and to verify the statistical records of
those goods which had been transferred to Vietnam and those that remained in China.
Hanoi also demanded a detailed plan for the timely and quick delivery of important
commodities to the DRV.47 On 23 February 1974, Phan Anh, DRV Minister of Foreign
Trade, met with Chinese Ambassador Wang Youping in Hanoi to discuss Vietnam’s
plan for receiving deliveries of aid for the whole of 1974. Then, from 1 to 12 March, the
Vietnam Workers’ Party (VWP) CC Politburo sent its top official, Phan Trong Tue,
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Transportation, to Beijing where he held
extensive talks with Zhou Enlai, Fang Yi, Li Qiang and Guo Lu.48
The conversation between Phan Trong Tue and Li Qiang on 7 March 1974 in Beijing
revealed Hanoi’s dissatisfaction with Beijing’s handling and delivery of Vietnam’s goods.49
Cold War History 15
Li Qiang: When goods arrive at the [Sino-Vietnamese] border, Vietnamese

comrades should not choose these types of goods first and leave others for later, but
receive them in the order of their arrival. Before there were cases where Vietnamese
comrades only received some goods and left others at the border.
Phan Trong Tue: Such incidents occurred because before this we have not discussed a
common plan adequately.
Li: Before this we have exchanged a plan with Comrade Tuong [Nguyen Bang
Tuong at the Vietnamese Embassy in Beijing], but the receiving authority on the
Vietnamese side did not care. At that time, there was a war and we understood.
Phan: Thank you Comrade for your help. We hope that Comrade Minister could
help ship fertiliser and food supply faster so that it would meet our urgent need. We
proposed 30,000 tons of rice but Comrade delivered only 11,290 tons; we requested
42,500 tons of corn but Comrade delivered only 33,900 tons; we requested 43,500
tons of wheat, but Comrade delivered only 7,000 tons; we requested 3,000 tons of
soy sauce, but Comrade delivered only 830 tons.
Li: That figure is now out-of-date because it has changed. Now our ships carrying
fertiliser have just arrived at your port but have not yet been unloaded. Our three
ships carrying fertiliser were waiting offshore at Hai Phong.
Phan: For the goods and materials for Region 4 (Central Vietnam), we proposed
15,000 tons of rice, but Comrade delivered only 4000 tons. Nowadays, we badly need
rice. As Comrade is well aware, when goods arrived in Region 4, we have to transport
and distribute them to other places along the battle frontline.
Li: Let me tell Comrade that there are two types of goods in extremely short supply,
namely fertiliser and rice. I want to make it clear to you that we have to import a lot
of fertiliser . . . We have to pay higher prices for our import from Japan and other
countries. The main reason is that we are facing food crisis too. The situation up to
the end of this year is very discouraging. As Comrade knows, we took our people’s
rice to export and then imported corn and wheat to distribute back to our people.
Phan: In Hanoi, even at the level of government minister like me, we still have to eat
40% of corn and wheat, except that some Comrades who are certified by doctors as
patients are allowed to eat 100% rice in their daily meal.
Li: Frankly speaking, only 80% of my daily meal is rice although I am from a region
[in China] where we had eaten rice up until recently. The rice issue is really
preoccupying. Rice prices are going up. Comrade, do you know how much it costs
for a ton of tasty rice? It costs over $US 600 per ton on the world market [ . . . ], but to
help you, we charged Vietnamese comrades only $US400. We are short of 10,000
tons of rice for the first quarter [of 1974]. We are not able to adequately supply
rice to you. However, we still have corn and wheat to help you.
Phan: Chairman Mao said that we are one family. If we have anything we speak out
frankly. Your agriculture is very big. A few hundred thousand tons of fertiliser is no
big a deal for you, but for us it is a lot.
Li: Our African friends also said the same thing as Comrade just said. They said
that ‘If Chinese Comrades provide us just the amount of rice that rats in China eat,
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it would be enough to feed our people.’ We sell rice to them and we take hard
currency.
Phan: They have hard currency because they have oil for export. We ask for ‘friendly’
prices of rice from you because we are still at war and we do not have anything to export.
Our rice has to be sent to the South. Our people in the liberated areas have begun
production but if they do not have rice to eat, it will be very difficult. Here although it is
an economic problem, it is also a political problem for us. In the South, people are not
used to eating wheat and we do not have the means to process wheat there.
In the spring of 1974 with military victory in the South within reach, Hanoi’s leaders
were extremely concerned about Beijing’s change of mind about aid; they hence saw the
need to rush the shipment of all remaining material aid by the end of the year. On 4
March 1974, Deputy Prime Minister Phan Trong Tue delivered to Zhou Enlai a letter
from Pham Van Dong with two urgent requests: 1) quick and adequate deliveries of all
equipment for the remaining important China-aided projects, and 2) timely shipment of
the remaining 2.8 million metric tons (including 815,000 tons of commodities left from
the previous years) of general goods, equipment and materials plus the 300,000 metric
tons of material aid from other countries by the end of the year. Thus the total volume of
shipment was 3.04 million metric tons to be shipped out to North Vietnam by the end of
1974. Pham Van Dong assured Zhou Enlai of Vietnam’s ability to receive this huge
quantity of goods from China, and proposed that these goods be transported by three
transportation means: 1.564 million tons by train through Lao Cai, 740,000 tons by sea
(including 177,000 tons to Region 4 – central Vietnam) on Chinese ships, and 511,000
tons of gasoline and diesel via the pipelines.50 On average, Hanoi’s proposal entailed the
transshipment of over 200,000 tons of material aid per month. It should be recalled that
DRV Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade Nghiem Ba Duc had privately admitted to the
Vietnamese leadership on 29 May 1973 that Vietnam’s capacity to receive goods from
China was ‘more or less 15,000 tons per month’ by train. Thus, the Vietnamese side would
have to ramp up its receiving capacity 10 times in a short span of time.
Further evidence of Hanoi’s growing distrust of Beijing’s handling of material aid
from other countries was revealed in Phan Trong Tue’s report in March 1974 to the
VWP Politburo:
Our Chinese friends are not sincere, especially at the Ministry of Foreign Economic
Relations [referring to his meeting with Fang Yi]. However, because we made more
trips to Beijing and talked reasonably, our friends agreed to solve our problems as
follows: continue to deliver complete set of equipment, send experts to help us speed
up the construction, conduct feasibility study and produce designs. . . . However, such
issues can never be about one side’s interest alone because these are our goods and
materials in aid [from other countries]. For this reason, we need to continue to closely
follow the situation and keep reminding our Chinese friends about the delivery plan.51
Phan Trong Tue described his visit to the Politburo as a success in securing Beijing’s
commitment. Li Qiang had agreed to provide more Chinese ships to help ship 400
tons of food supplies per day to Central Vietnam and Guo Lu, PRC Vice Minister of
Transportation, had pledged to increase shipments, provided that the Vietnamese side
Cold War History 17
increased its storage and capacity to receive these goods. Guo told Phan that ‘Vietnam
must pay serious attention to the Vietnamese side’s capacity of receiving goods and
understand that in reality China is also facing difficulties from the shortage of barges
and ships to clogged ports’.52 Thus far, we still do not have a clear record from either
Vietnamese sources or Chinese sources of the quantity of Chinese shipments for North
Vietnam in the second half of 1974, but what we do know is that Hanoi’s complaints
about Beijing’s delays in delivering aid continued well after North Vietnam had
defeated South Vietnam.
Dispute over China-aided projects, 1973 –75

In his meeting with Le Duan in Beijing on 5 – 6 June 1973, Premier Zhou Enlai
promised to provide aid to the DRV at the 1973 level for the next five years.53 To
indicate the importance of China’s continued comprehensive economic assistance to
North Vietnam, Hanoi sent a 17 member delegation comprised of high ranking officials
from important departments and ministries led by Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade
Nguyen Chanh to Beijing in mid-July 1973 to negotiate with his Chinese counterpart
on China’s economic assistance and bilateral trade for 1974.54 However, Hanoi’s high
expectations were met by Beijing’s strong determination to roll back China’s past big
promises. Nguyen Chanh’s delegation remained in Beijing for one whole month, much
longer than expected. The negotiation was rougher than Hanoi had expected and the
result was very disappointing. In contrast, in August of the same year, the Soviet Union
forgave the DRVa debt of $1.08 billion from earlier credit deliveries, and allowed North
Vietnam to import goods worth over 132 million rubles out of which 108 million rubles
worth was on credit. 1973 was thus the year when Hanoi tilted significantly towards
Moscow, as the Soviet embassy in the DRV observed.55
On 24 September 1973, Le Thanh Nghi conveyed the view of the DRV Council of
Ministers to Ambassador Ngo Thuyen and Nguyen Chanh, who was still negotiating
in Beijing:
our common view is that our friend [China] will not address our need satisfactorily.
Although we only raised a few additional big requests as mentioned above, they have
rejected them. If our Chinese friends do not accept our proposal right away, we
should not insist on it, just exchange ideas. Next time if the opportunity presents
itself, we will raise the issue again. Try your best to get the agreement signed so that
our delegation can return home early.56
Thus, as early as August –September 1973, Hanoi anticipated a decrease in the amount
of China’s aid for the following years, but with their diplomatic skills, they also
expected that they would be able to persuade Beijing to increase aid levels at some
point down the road.
In March 1974, the meeting between Phan Trong Tue and Zhou Enlai, Fang Yi and
Li Qiang in Beijing revealed sharp differences between the two sides over the direction
of Vietnam’s economic reconstruction. Beijing’s advice to ‘concentrate more energy
on agriculture than industrialisation’ directly contradicted Hanoi’s aspiration for a
18 K. Path
modern industrial sector. Beijing’s advice underscored the desire to give China a break
from its heavy aid commitment to Vietnam, which directly clashed with Hanoi’s desire
for China to accelerate the completion of all important industrial projects. Fang Yi told
Phan Trong Tue that
107 or 109 projects [for 1974] are too many and these are very big projects; some of
Vietnamese comrades’ projects were too costly for China and generally speaking,
these are very big projects – some as big as China’s own projects. Earlier, Premier
Zhou proposed ‘strike the main target (danh tieu diet chien)’ and Comrade Phan
told me that Premier Pham Van Dong agreed to that.57
Trying to persuade Hanoi not to be too ambitious about its industrial buildup at this
stage, and to concentrate on agriculture, Fang Yi suggested to Phan Trong Tue that:
In my opinion, [Vietnam] should concentrate its energy and resources on the kinds
of projects that have a huge impact on the national economy, such as the Ha Bac
Fertiliser Factory. Every year, this factory produces 110,000 tons of Urea fertiliser
equal to 220,000 tons of Nitrate fertiliser. In China we have this saying, ‘one ton of
chemical fertiliser can increase 4 tons of food supply’. If this factory concentrates on
enhancing agricultural production, it will have a great impact on your agriculture.58
In his rebuttal, Phan told Fang that ‘before this, Premier Zhou advised us to focus on
“important (trong diem)” projects that are vital to the building of economic foundations;
these included “energy, fertilisers, construction materials and steel” projects and this is
what we are requesting right now’.59 Hanoi interpreted Beijing’s advice and redefinition
of what constituted ‘strike the target’ projects as ‘insincere’ and simply China’s attempt
to roll back its past aid pledges.60 After he returned from his two-week trip to Beijing in
March 1974, Phan told the VWP CC Politburo that ‘[our] Chinese friends were not
sincere, especially those at the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations’.61
Since early 1974, Beijing’s leaders had sent a clear and consistent message to Hanoi’s
leaders that the DRV should focus on agricultural development and that all Chinese aid
should be geared towards boosting agricultural productivity (producing fertilisers,
constructing power plants, and improving transportation). Such advice took its crudest
form in Li Xiannian’s lecture to the visiting Vietnamese Science and Technology
delegation on 23 March 1974. Li bluntly stated:
On light industry, without raw materials, you cannot do anything, just like cooking
rice without rice. You put the water into the pot, but if there is no rice to put into
that pot; how can it become rice? From our experience, you must take it one step at a
time from agriculture, to light industry, to heavy industry. [You] must address
agricultural issues first. [You] have to have rice to eat. Comrades, you are scientists
and I ask you this: Can you prove it to me that any invention does not need rice? . . .
On heavy industry too, you should not totally depend on Soviet experts. You have to
ask: Is what they said correct or not? Only now we know that our economy was
heavily damaged because we listened to them about everything. Their economic
model had harmed a lot of people in our country. From the outside, it gave an
impression of sophistication, but in reality it was a recipe for disaster.62
Cold War History 19
Li Xiannian echoed Zhou Enlai’s earlier suggestion to Phan Trong Tue on 4 March
1974 that the Vietnamese comrades ‘should not be too ambitious’. Phan Trong Tue
concluded in his report to the VWP CC Politburo that:
After meeting with the Chinese, we clearly see that there still exist many difficulties and
complex issues, but we have also made some good progress because the two sides have
signed [the economic agreement for 1974]. Regarding the shortage of material aid, we
have directly brought our difficulties and needs to their attention. However, at the
same time, the Chinese suggested to us that we should not be too ambitious in
constructing too many big projects. Although they did not say directly they implied
that cooperating with other countries to have big and modern projects is not
necessarily good and that they would not provide [those big projects] right away.63
The substance of the conversation on 4 March between Phan Trong Tue and Zhou
Enlai, Fang Yi and Li Qiang clearly revealed Beijing’s displease with Hanoi’s ambitious
industrial buildup.64 Indicative of Beijing’s growing displease with Hanoi’s ambition
was Zhou Enlai’s indirect criticism of Hanoi’s plan to build Thang Long bridge in his
conversation with Phan Trong Tue on 4 March:65
Zhou: I heard that you are preparing to build a new bridge, Thang Long Bridge.
How long is it?
Phan: 5.7 kilometres. It is shorter than your bridge in Nanjing. The main part of
Thang Long Bridge is only 1.7 kilometers.
Zhou: If so, your bridge is longer than our Chang Jiang (Truong-Gian in
Vietnamese) bridge over Yangzi River in Nanjing and our bridge in Wu Han.66
For 1974, of 299 China-aided projects which had been damaged by US bombing,
Beijing could only promise to repair 99 and left the remaining projects for subsequent
years. With regard to construction projects, Zhou Enlai advised Phan Trong Tue:
You should not plan too many projects. From our experience, you should not just
make a list of projects, but you need to thoroughly and realistically calculate demand
for labour, materials, capital funds especially for importing equipment, technicians
and skilled workers (do you have enough of all of these?). You should not be too
optimistic about transportation. . . . Besides China-aided projects, you still have
many other projects supported by other countries. One third of some 600 projects in
foreign aid are China-aided projects. You should prioritise what projects are ‘strike
the target (danh tieu diet chien)’ to avoid unnecessary waste.67
Zhou then added:
Of course we understand your need for post-war recovery. However, I want you to
convey [my message] to Comrade Pham Van Dong that [Vietnam] needs to focus
on ‘strike the target’ projects first. Out of the 600 big projects, some projects for
which you do not have sufficient equipment and construction materials should be
postponed to next year.68
Disagreeing with Zhou’s redefinition, Phan again referred to Zhou’s previous definition
that what constituted ‘an important “trong diem” project’ was their potential impact on
economic improvement and argued that Vietnam’s proposed projects met this criteria.
20 K. Path
However, Beijing rejected many of these ‘important’ projects as not ‘strike the target’
ones by Premier Zhou’s definition.69
For 1975, DRV delegation chief Nguyen Van Bien gave the Vietnamese leadership a
pessimistic report: The remaining 144 projects China has agreed to help us build
with their equipment are a huge number and cost a lot of money (500 million
rubles). China wants to have a clearly agreed plan between China and Vietnam for
the next five years and there should be no changes after this, but China’s plan was to
postpone the construction of these projects and spread them over the next five years
from 1975 to 1980. They sent a signal to us that they would not be able to accept our
proposal for new projects.70
Of the 101 projects yet to be constructed, China agreed to build 50, but postponed the
construction of 51 others which were the most important ones from 1975 (as proposed
in Vietnam’s plan) to 1977 –80. Among the 19 defence projects previously pledged,
Beijing agreed to start the construction of only two projects for 1975. Many important
defence projects were postponed from 1974 –76 to 1977 – 79.71
Beijing’s substantial curtailment of its economic and military aid came at the time when
Hanoi felt the most pressing need for greater assistance from China and the Soviet Union
as it anticipated ample challenges in its post-war nation-building. Hanoi’s perception
of Beijing’s indifference to Vietnam’s most pressing economic concerns was primarily
shaped by what China failed to provide rather than what the latter had already given in the
past, while Beijing’s perception of Hanoi’s lack of appreciation and gratitude was largely
shaped by the latter’s lack of recognition of China’s enormous sacrifices for Vietnam
over the preceding 15 years and China’s current economic hardship. The clash between
the Vietnamese negotiator Nguyen Van Bien and the Chinese vice-minister Han Sunzhen
at their meeting on 31 August 1974 at the Chinese Ministry of Economic Relations
with Foreign Countries revealed the two sides’ deep rift over China’s past aid pledges.
Nguyen Van Bien: Concerning equipment and material aid for the 144 projects in
our agreement, Comrade Han also raised this issue, but we think that our two plans
are so far apart. We proposed to concentrate the construction in 1975 and 1976,
but you postponed it until 1980. We want to construct [them] fast, unleash the
economic results early because of our revolutionary demand [in the South]. Based
on our 22nd Party Resolution, we want to be self-reliant but we are short of
everything. We have a bit of this, a bit of that and how can we do anything? . . . Your
assistance is necessary and we need a lot. We have thought about your situation too.
You have made new achievements but at the same time, have new challenges. We
very much understand that, but your difficulty is about how to develop your
economy and you have a lot of favourable conditions to overcome these obstacles.
However, our difficulty is the severe shortage of basic materials.
Han Sunzhen: Our economic cooperation has been going on for a long time now.
During the war, we took special measures to assist you and now during peace time,
to continue to take special measure is very difficult. Now it is not about one or two
projects; we are talking about 144 projects. Our diplomatic relations have expanded
greatly since 1970 – from 10 countries to 40 –50 countries now. We are talking about
our real difficulties here. That is our reality. Following Chairman Mao’s teaching we
need to help other countries that are fighting liberation wars. Our two plans are
Cold War History 21
quite far apart. It would be easy to simply say ‘we agree with Comrades’ idea’. But
then if we could not do it, you would blame us. Out of 144 projects, 43 are being
constructed and 101 have not yet been constructed. We think if we can complete the
majority of these projects by 1980, it would be our big victory already. Our two plans
are far apart; the reason is not that we can do it and we refuse, but the truth is that we
are not capable of doing it.72
In addition, between 1972 and 1974, Hanoi and Beijing clashed over China’s pledged
construction of an oil refinery project. On 5 December 1971, China promised to build
the first oil refinery for North Vietnam so as to reduce the latter’s oil dependence on
the Soviet Union. North Vietnam was heavily dependent on oil imports to meet its
domestic consumption and fuel its industrial productivity. The Soviet Union was the
main supplier of oil to North Vietnam during the war; between 1965 and 1971, the
Soviet Union supplied 1.238 million tons of fuel (gasoline and diesel) at an average of
214,000 tons per year while China provided 156,000 tons with an average of 26,000
tons per year. China’s supply of fuel to North Vietnam thus only accounted for about
10% of the Soviet Union’s supply during this period. However, to dispel Hanoi’s fear of
China’s abandonment in the midst of Beijing’s reconciliatory approach to Washington,
the Chinese leadership decided to significantly increase its fuel supply to North
Vietnam to 116,000 tons in 1971, nearly 50% of the Soviets’ supply of 290,000 tons for
the same year as well as pledging to build a large and costly oil refinery project
consisting of four categories: refinery factory, oil rig, the main storage for transferring
crude oil, and a pipeline, for North Vietnam in a few years.73
Based on the 5 December 1971 agreement, Beijing undertook to help Hanoi build an oil
refinery with the capacity of treating and refining between 1 and 1.5 million tons per
year.74 However, Beijing was not able to honour its promise. According to the Ministry of
Foreign Trade General Chemical Department’s report dated 5 May 1974 to the Prime
Minister’s Office, the Chinese side explained: ‘Vietnam’s demand for construction [of this
oil refinery project] is very big but China’s realistic capacity [to help Vietnam] has
limitations. China has not been able to meet such demand. China needs to make every
effort to develop its domestic economy; at the same time, we still need to help other
countries besides Vietnam.’75 However, the Vietnamese negotiators interpreted the
Chinese side’s motive very differently, as Nguyen Van Bien reported to the Hanoi
leadership:
Our team noticed that it is not about the issue of China facing [economic] difficulty
and technological challenges. That is their pretext for denial and delay. Their real motive
is that they want to narrow our demand and cut their expenses and aid to us until there
was nothing left. Such a motive became even clearer to us when we exchanged our view
with them outside the official meetings. . . . We should act immediately, making
necessary preparation to look for other countries which can provide training to
our engineers and the necessary equipment so that we do not allow China to use their
weight on this issue to drag out and delay the construction of the [oil refinery factory].76
In Ly Ban’s report, the Chinese Feasibility Study Group led by Comrade Wang Ping
Qing, China’s Minister of Chemicals and Fuel, made a trip to examine appropriate
22 K. Path
locations to build an oil refinery factory, an oil rig, an oil storage facility, and pipelines
in Vietnam from 1 to 28 March 1975. On 1 March, Wang Ping Qing met with Nguyen
Trang, General Director of the Chemical Department. Both had sharp disagreements
over the locations of the oil refinery project.77 The Vietnamese side told the Chinese
Feasibility Group that the Vietnamese government had decided to build the oil
refinery at Dinh Mountain (Central Vietnam) and the sea port in Bien Son (Northern
Vietnam).78 The Chinese disagreed by raising technical problems – i.e. building the
pipeline across eight big rivers of between 200 and 400 metres in width, of which four
rivers are 400 metres in width, is not feasible. The Chinese experts also warned that
building a port in the gulf of Bien Son was not sound as the region is prone to natural
disasters.79 Ly Ban later reported that Wang Ping Qing was very unhappy with Nguyen
Trang’s harsh criticism of the Chinese group of experts for their incompetence.80 On
10 April 1975, the Chinese group of experts finished their task and insisted that the
Chinese idea of the Ho Buom– Con Son locations for constructing the factory and the
oil port remained the best choice. The Vietnamese insisted that they would stick to
their idea and that if the Chinese still disagreed with their chosen location, then the
Vietnamese would build these facilities by themselves and all the Chinese need to do
was to just send them equipment and materials. The Chinese side replied: ‘If the
Vietnamese decided to stick to their choice of the Dinh– Bien Son location, they ought
to ask other technologically-advanced countries like Japan for assistance.’81
In short, underlying this dispute was the clash between Hanoi’s demand and
aspiration for large-scale modern projects and Beijing’s need to reduce the scale of
China’s assistance, which was partly driven by its genuine inability to satisfy Hanoi’s
greater demands. When that happened, Beijing attributed Hanoi’s desire for modern
heavy industrialisation to Hanoi’s preference for Moscow’s counselling over its own
advice, while Hanoi’s leaders attributed Beijing’s refusal to the latter’s intention to keep
Vietnam weak rather than China’s inability to provide such aid.
Beijing’s punitive economic measures against Vietnam’s first five year plan,
1976– 80
After Vietnam was unified, Hanoi’s leaders expected more attention and respect from
other socialist countries. As a Vietnamese report noted in 1975, ‘the political position of
our country after reunification has been elevated to an important status in Southeast
Asia and in the world; we have much greater potential and more strength than just the
North’.82 However, Hanoi did not lose sight of how important economically and
geographically China was to Vietnam’s efforts to rebuild the economic base in the
North while bringing the South onto a socialist path. Crucial to this task was its first five
year plan, 1976-80. Hanoi’s leaders were acutely aware that its future exports to
neighboring China’s huge market would have great potential to boost its domestic
productivity and reduce the problem of rising unemployment. As the Ministry of
Foreign Trade noted in its 1975 economic outlook: ‘From 1972 to 1975, our exports to
China were very low, accounting for only 20% of our exports to the Soviet Union and
76% of that to East Germany. However, this presents a good opportunity for us to boost
Cold War History 23
83
our exports to China’. For this reason, Hanoi’s leaders first went to Beijing, hoping to
convince the PRC to support the post-war economic plan, but the results were very
disappointing to Hanoi.
Two important shifts in China’s aid policy to Vietnam in April 1975 were critically
damaging to the DRV’s first five year plan since unification. First, Beijing was
determined to entirely replace its generous aid programmes to Vietnam with purely
bilateral trade transactions. As a consequence, Beijing reduced Hanoi’s proposed
import volume of important consumption goods and raw materials for 1976 to only
20% of that for 1975 because Vietnam did not have the cash or loans to cover the rest.
For 1976, China reduced its loans to Vietnam from RMB 871 million in 1975 to RMB
100 million (roughly US$50 million) to import basic goods while all non-refundable
aid was totally cut off. Second, Beijing not only refused to accept new projects but also
postponed all the construction of the remaining 80 projects (as of mid-1975) to

1978 –80, a few years later than Hanoi’s proposal for completion in 1976.
Between August and November 1975, the Vietnamese top economic delegation led by
Deputy Prime Minister Le Thanh Nghi and Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Ly Ban made
frequent visits to Beijing to persuade China’s leaders to resume economic assistance and
sign long-term trade agreements to assist the five year plan for 1976 to 1980. However,
the result of the four months of tedious economic negotiation was extremely
disappointing. Between 21 August and 20 September a series of bilateral economic
negotiations were underway in Beijing to prepare the ground for General Secretary Le
Duan’s visit to Beijing from 22 to 29 September. However, the negotiations turned
unusually rough and dragged on for one whole month before ending with few of the
results hoped for by Hanoi. On 31 August 1975, Le Thanh Nghi reported to Pham Van
Dong a very depressing development during the first round of Ly Ban’s negotiations with
Han Sunzheng, PRC Vice-Minister of Economic Relations with Foreign Countries, and
Vice Minister of Foreign Trade, Zhen Jie. Le Thanh Nghi reported:
1. Regarding China’s aid for 1976, [China] let us borrow 100 Million RMBs [about
US$50 million] to purchase their general goods. They let us borrow in the form of
loans with no interest.
2. In brief, through these rounds of economic negotiations with China, we see that
from 1976 onward, China will no longer provide general goods in the form of aid to
us. China changed that to loans which are very small (for 1976, an amount of 100
million RMBs accounts for only 20% of the 1975 loan). For important goods,
China will supply these in small quantities.
3. For industrial project equipment, China intends to delay deliveries and postpone all
remaining projects that China pledged to us in the past until 1980. And China
refused to provide any assistance for all new projects we have proposed for the five
year plan, 1976 – 80.
4. China refused to discuss long-term bilateral economic relations for 1976 –80 and
only agreed to discuss bilateral trade for 1976.84
24 K. Path
In Hanoi’s view, China’s intention to use ‘delaying tactics’ to evade its past promises
was clear from the meeting between Ly Ban and Han Sunzheng on 15 September 1975.
Ly Ban proposed that China deliver complete sets of equipment for the remaining 80
projects so that Vietnam could complete the construction during a three year period,
1976 –78, but Han Sunzheng replied: ‘Our view is that [the 80 projects] should be
completed in five years. Thus, our views are far apart from each other. We need to do
further research or maybe we are unable to provide [equipment] the way you want
it’.85 On 20 September, just before the top Vietnamese delegation led by Secretary
General Le Duan was to visit eight socialist countries, Ly Ban gave yet another grim
report to Deputy Prime Minister Le Thanh Nghi, who accompanied General Secretary
Le Duan’s delegation. In that report, Ly told Le that ‘the Chinese leadership’s view was
the same as what Li Xiannian told you before’, suggesting that Beijing would not
pledge any significant aid during Le Duan’s coming visit.

On 24 September 1975, concerning China’s aid to Vietnam, Chairman Mao told Le
Duan that ‘today you are not the poorest under heaven. We are the poorest . . . ’86
Mao’s message to Hanoi was clear: Vietnam should stop looking to China for
assistance. In a meeting with Le Duan on 29 September, Deng Xiaoping expressed his
anger at anti-Chinese statements in the Vietnamese media: ‘We are not at ease when we
get to read Vietnamese newspapers and know [Vietnamese] public opinion. In fact,
you stress the threat from the North. The threat from the North for us is the existence
of Soviet troops on our northern borders, but for you, it means China’.87 As Qiang
Zhai correctly observed, clearly, by this time, Deng had developed a hatred for the
Vietnamese ingratitude. Deng may have been the main supporter of slashing aid to
Vietnam and he had Li Xiannian, who was then in charge of China’s Vietnam aid
policy, as his closest colleague in the State Council. In February 1975, both were
Standing Vice-Premiers. Li was in charge of daily work, finance and trade while Deng
was in charge of foreign affairs and chaired important Politburo meetings.88 Deng was
also influential in the political leadership of the PLA. In January 1975, Mao installed
Deng as Vice-Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee of the PLA.89 In Hanoi’s
view, Beijing’s policy of rolling back its economic assistance was clearly determined in
early 1975, as Ly Ban recalled to Le Thanh Nghi in his November 1975 report: ‘Before
Comrade Nghi flew to Beijing for economic negotiations on 20 August 1975, Comrade
Li Xiannian told Comrade Vinh [Vietnamese Ambassador Nguyen Trong Vinh in
Beijing] that “China’s assistance will be reduced and Comrade Le Thanh Nghi will be
disappointed”’.90 Ly Ban himself became very suspicious of Beijing’s intentions. Such a
perception is not insignificant coming from Ly Ban, who had spent most of his career
working to forge a close relationship with Beijing’s leaders. In his November 1975
report to Le Thanh Nghi, Ly Ban observed:
We know that China has truly faced a number of difficulties, but that is not the main
reason behind their cut of economic assistance to us now. Before this, China faced
even more difficulty but China still provided us with a huge amount of aid,
including military aid, industrial project equipment and general goods. Beijing’s cut
Cold War History 25
of economic assistance to us is not simply because of China’s economic difficulty but

for other reasons.91
Beijing’s attitude towards the anti-Vietnamese Democratic Kampuchea under Pol
Pot stood in stark contrast with that towards Vietnam in the second half of 1975. In
June 1975, Pol Pot visited Beijing and received a hero’s welcome from his ideological
mentor Mao Zedong, who was increasingly eager to encourage Pol Pot’s policy of
seeking independence from Vietnam and to use Cambodia as a counterbalance to
Vietnamese ambitions in Indochina. During Pol Pot’s visit, Beijing promised the
Khmer Rouge leadership more than $1 billion in economic and military assistance.92
In can be inferred that Ly Ban’s report reflected Hanoi’s growing concern about the
increasingly close relations between Phnom Penh and Beijing.
What was the immediate impact of Beijing’s sharp aid cut on Vietnam’s first five year
plan? To assess Hanoi’s economic difficulties, it is important to begin with the reality
that a unified Vietnam remained heavily dependent on China’s multi-faceted economic
and technical assistance and that China’s assistance from spare parts to engineering was
not easily replaced by that from the more sophisticated and technologically-advanced
Soviet Union. With such a drastic aid cut, Beijing suddenly left Vietnam lacking an
enormous quantity of important raw materials for its industrial production, as well as
parts and equipment for the construction of many China-aided projects, and drove
Vietnam into severe shortages of foodstuffs and consumption goods. In his report to
Pham Van Dong on 10 November 1975, Ly Ban gave a grim assessment of the impact of
China’s discontinuation of its aid to Vietnam:
First, China only gave a loan of 100 million RMBs. The items of goods that China
provided for 1975 and completely cut off for 1976 are: 38,000 tons of foodstuff,
20,000 tons of soy sauce, 33 million metres of cloth and silk, 100,000 tons of
fertilisers, 1800 vehicles of all types, 490 tractors, and 140 train carriages. Besides,
items that were in the past within the aid category and now have been transferred
into trade category are: 18,000 tons of coal, 15,000 tons charcoal, 15,000 tons of car
tires, and 2 million RMBs worth of traditional medicine. Regarding bilateral trade,
until now [November 1975] China has not yet agreed to import our main export
categories and China has not yet declared what items China will export to us.
Second, the completion of past construction projects was now delayed to 1980
(with the possibility of further delay. These were the Viet Tri power plant, the Ha Bac
fertiliser factory, and the Thai Nguyen steel factory (hurting our industrial capacity),
the construction of the ship building project in Hai Phong and the railroad line
connecting Hanoi and Hai Phong. The joint oil exploration in the An Chau region
was stalled as well.93
While Beijing was clearly determined to punish Vietnam economically, even refusing
to discuss long-term economic cooperation with the latter, Moscow was quick to turn
the situation to its favour by promising to provide all-out support for Vietnam’s first
five year plan. During Le Duan’s visit, Vietnam signed several agreements on loans and
aid for the five year plan with the Soviet Union, and six socialist Eastern European
countries, Hungary, Bulgaria, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania.94
26 K. Path
Table 2. China’s and USSR’s assistance, 1971 – 75 and 1976 –80.
Country/Period 1971 – 75 1976 –80 (pledged)
China 1200 million rubles (5235 million RMBs) 100 million RMBs or 55 million
rubles
USSR 860 million rubles (including aid from 844 million rubles
six other socialist states
Other countries N/A 830.5 million rubles
Source: Nguyen Xuan Truc, Chief of Office Number 9 [Deputy Prime Minister Do Muoi’s Office].
‘A report on the result of economic negotiations with eight socialist countries for the five year plan,
1976 – 80’. National Archive No. 3, Collection of the Prime Minister’s Office, Folder 9921, 1– 51.
The total value of aid for 1976 – 80 in these agreements was five times as much as that for
the previous five years, totalling 1.626 billion rubles. The Soviet aid alone accounted for
over 50% of all the economic assistance from the Soviet bloc (see Table 2).
Soviet aid for both light and heavy industry surpassed that of China substantially,
and Moscow firmly assured Hanoi that the Soviet Union would fill the gap left by
China. It should be recalled that Hanoi had been greatly displeased with Beijing’s
insistence in 1974 that Vietnam follow the Chinese model of economic development
consisting of three progressive steps from agriculture, to light industry, and then to
heavy industry. Now that Moscow was determined to provide all-out support for
Vietnam’s industrial buildup, Hanoi tilted closer towards Moscow. According to the
report on 28 November 1975, the VWP Central Committee Politburo noted:
The most noticeable thing is that with us, the Soviets have significantly changed their
position. This time, the Soviet leaders have accorded with us on the direction and
pathway of our economic development in the coming decades. Before this, the
Soviets usually counselled us that we should concentrate on improving people’s
living standards, agriculture and light industry, but on heavy industry, [the Soviets]
advised that we should only take it slowly and that we should not yet plan ambitious
projects for refining steel, manufacturing machinery and so forth. This time, the
Soviets have made a big step towards accepting our economic plan. They have also
paid special attention to helping us accelerate the reconstruction of our economy
with an important and huge sum of economic assistance as both sides have
concluded. In contrast, the tendency is quite clear that the scale of China’s assistance
for the next five years will be significantly reduced compared with that during the
war period.95
Conclusion
Most scholars claim that far from reducing its aid after the Sino-American
reconciliation took place, Beijing actually pledged greater amount of economic and
military assistance to the DRV than in previous years, and that compared to the period
between 1965 and 1970, the aid packages China provided to North Vietnam between
1971 and 1975 were substantially greater. However, as Vietnamese sources clearly
indicate, there was substantial discrepancy between Beijing’s words and its deeds after
Cold War History 27
the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in January 1973. Furthermore thorny issues
surrounding the delivery of Beijing’s enormous aid pledges to Hanoi became the main
source of their mutual friction and suspicion, which in turned caused the already
strained Sino-Vietnamese relations to deteriorate in the ensuing years. Apparently,
as North Vietnam was no longer of strategic importance to China’s security after
the Sino-US rapprochement in February 1972, Beijing began to reprioritise China’s
domestic need to rejuvenate its economic health over its commitment to provide
whatever was necessary to satisfy Hanoi’s needs. When that happened, Beijing’s need
to roll back its enormous aid commitment to North Vietnam, which had inflicted a
heavy toll on Chinese economic strength, directly clashed with Hanoi’s insistence that
Beijing expedite its existing huge aid pledges as well as meet even greater demands so
as to satisfy the DRV’s growing economic needs and war effort.
Three conclusions can be drawn. First, during the pivotal years of 1971 and 1972
when China adopted a conciliatory approach towards the United States, Chairman
Mao did not worry about the figures and ordered that enormous aid packages be
pledged to North Vietnam to dispel Hanoi’s fear of abandonment. After Mao achieved
his paramount foreign policy goal of Sino-US rapprochement to counter the Soviet
threat in February 1972, Vietnam was no longer of strategic importance. Mao then
turned his attention to China’s worsening economic health and yielded to his more
economics-minded subordinates’ proposal to cut waste and roll back China’s aid to
the DRV, especially after the Paris Peace Accords were signed on 27 January 1973.
From this point onwards, the Sino-Vietnamese relationship cooled down quickly. Not
only did Beijing reduce its economic and military assistance to the DRV contrary to
Premier Zhou’s promise in June 1973, but also the leaders of the two countries stepped
up complaints about all kind of issues surrounding the rehabilitation and construction
of nearly 300 Chinese-aided projects, many of which had been damaged by the
intensified US bombings in 1972. Underlying the Sino-Vietnamese dispute during the
period 1972 –75 was the divergent domestic priorities of the two countries exacerbated
by Beijing’s promises of aid to the DRV beyond its capacity to honour them and
Hanoi’s sense of profound urgency and appetite for greater aid to meet its soaring
domestic demand.
Second, Hanoi’s reactions and responses to Beijing’s declining enthusiasm and
failure to honour its promises to assist Vietnam especially during the 1973 – 75 period
were primarily driven by the Vietnamese leadership’s deep-rooted suspicion of
Chinese sincerity. When Hanoi’s leaders allowed such suspicion to colour their
interaction with Beijing’s leaders, they were seen by the latter as unconstructive and
unappreciative of China’s past sacrifices to assist Vietnam during the war against the
United States. The fact that Hanoi favoured Moscow’s advice to embark on a massive
industrial buildup over Beijing’s advice to concentrate on agriculture after 1973 caused
further deterioration of the already strained bilateral relations. In retrospect, Moscow’s
intensified economic and military aid after 1973 drove a further wedge between
Hanoi and Beijing; Hanoi’s leaders, unhappy with Beijing’s failure to honour its past
promises and its inability to meet its new requests, developed a grudge against the
28 K. Path
Chinese. Worse, Beijing’s increasing enthusiasm for providing aid to the anti-
Vietnamese Khmer Rouge since late 1974 stood in stark contrast with China’s growing
desire to find every reason possible to curtail aid to Vietnam. This too fed Hanoi’s
perception that Beijing intended to keep Vietnam weak.
Third, in retrospect, 1975 represents an important turning point for better or worse
in Sino-Vietnamese relations. Vietnamese archival sources reveal that China still had
considerable economic clout that could have been used to prevent Vietnam from being
drawn further into the Soviet orbit. Throughout the year, Hanoi consistently reiterated
the importance of China’s continued economic assistance to its post-war economic
reconstruction in the North and its efforts to bring the South onto the path of
socialism, and made concerted efforts to improve economic relations with China,
sending their most trusted diplomats to Beijing. But when these attempts failed, the
window of opportunity for reconciling other differences was closed. In the end, it was
Beijing’s provocative decision to cut off China’s economic and military assistance in
late 1975 while increasing its support for the anti-Vietnamese Khmer Rouge under Pol
Pot that caused Hanoi to seek a closer alliance with Moscow.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Profs. Pham Quang Minh, Daniel Lynch, John Willis, David Elliott,
Christopher Gosha and the two anonymous reviewers for their comments. The author alone bears
responsibility for the views as well as any errors in this article.
Notes
[1] See Qiang, China and the Vietnam War, 136; Chen, ‘China, the Vietnam War, and Sino-
American Rapprochement’, 56; Li, ‘Vietnam and Chinese Policy Toward the United States’,
184; also see Shu, ‘Beijing’s Aid to Hanoi’, Ch. 7; Li, ‘The Sino-Soviet Dispute’, Ch. 8; and
Shen, ‘Sino – U.S. Reconciliation and China’s Vietnam Policy,’ Ch. 10, in Priscilla Roberts’
(2006) edited volume, Behind the Bamboo Curtain.
[2] Li, ‘Vietnam and Chinese Policy Toward the United States’, 206.
[3] Ibid., 205; also see Shen, ‘Sino – U.S. Reconciliation and China’s Vietnam Policy’, 363.
[4] Shu, ‘Beijing’s Aid to Hanoi’, 219; Li, ‘The Sino-Soviet Dispute over Assistance’, 280– 81; Chen,
‘China, Vietnam and Sino-American Rapprochement’, 136; Luthi, The Sino-Soviet Split,
324– 39.
[5] Teiwes and Sun, The End of the Maoist Era, 49 –50. For further details on the economic cost of
the Cultural Revolution, see Schoenhals, China’s Cultural Revolution, 1966 – 69, 268– 72, and
MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution, 268– 72.
[6] Teiwes and Sun, The End of the Maoist Era, 196– 9.
[7] Ibid., 50.
[8] Chen Jian puts it best: ‘Beijing pursuit of fundamental changes in Chinese foreign policy
toward the United States therefore was fraught with political hazards, not the least of which
was possible detriment to the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Revolution. It seems
that unless Beijing’s leaders were willing to make basic compromises in their commitments
to the anti-imperialist Communist ideology, it would be impossible for them to pursue a
rapprochement with the United States’. See Chen, Mao’s China, 142.
Cold War History 29
[9] Shen Zhihua correctly points out that ‘realism forced China to become reconciled with the
United States, whereas ideology required China to support Vietnam’s anti-American
struggle’. See Shen ‘Sino-U.S. Reconciliation and China’s Vietnam Policy’, 350. Qiang Zhai
points to Beijing’s concern that ‘China’s détente with the United States might push Hanoi
further into the arms of the Soviet Union, a development that would run counter to the very
objective that underlay Beijing’s opening to American’. See Qiang, China and the Vietnam
Wars, 195.
[10] Ma, The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry, 343.
[11] Chen, ‘China, the Vietnam War and Sino-American rapprochement’, 56; Shen, ‘Sino-U.S.
Reconciliation and China’s Vietnam Policy’, 351– 6. According to Shen Zhihua, ‘on 3 March
1971, at a Politburo meeting, China confirmed its policy of enhanced support for Vietnam
. . . In 1971 alone China agreed to send Vietnam seven assistance packages, outright aid with
no strings attached totalling 3.614 billion renminbi, or 48.67 percent of China’s total foreign
aid for that year’.
[12] Shen, ‘Sino-U.S. Reconciliation and China’s Vietnam Policy’, 363.

[13] Shu, ‘Beijing’s Aid to Hanoi and the U.S.– China Confrontations’, 217.
[14] Bô Ngoai thu’o’ng, ‘Báo cáo hàng tuâ`n vê` ho’p tác khoa hoc kỹ thuât và thiê´t bi tòan bô vó’i
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
Trung Quôć tù ngày 25 tháng 2 dêń ngày 1 tháng 3 năm 1972.’ Trung Tâm Lu’u Tr~u’ Quôć
Gia 3, Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng, Hô´ So’ 8964, 70 – 75.
[15] See Li, ‘Vietnam and Chinese Policy Toward the United States’, 176– 208, and Chen, ‘China,
the Vietnam War and Sino-American Rapprochement’, 56– 7.
[16] Bô Ngoai giao, Vu Á Châu 1, Hà Nôi ngày 13 tháng 5 năm 1972. ‘Nôi dung dô`ng chı́ Nguyêñ
_ _ _ _ _
Duy Trinh nói vó’i Ðai sú’ Trung Quôć Vu’o’ng Âu Bı̀nh tôí ngày 12 tháng 5 năm 1972.’ Trung
´ _ `
Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôc Gia 3, Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng, Hô So’ 8964, 36 – 42.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng. ‘Thu’ c a Phó Th Tu’ó’ng Lê Thanh Nghi g ’i Phó Th Tu’ó’ng Lý
_
Tiên Niêm tháng 9 năm 1972.’ Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć Gia 3, Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng,
_
Hô` So’ 8964, 55 – 67.
[19] Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng. ‘Thu’ c a Th Tu’ó’ng Pham Văn Ðô`ng g ’i Th Tu’ó’ng Chu Ân Lai
_
ngày 15 tháng 8 năm 1972.’ Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć Gia 3, Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng, Hô`
So’ 8964, 43 – 8.
[20] See Quang, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950 – 1975, 136; and Li, ‘Vietnam and Chinese Policy
Toward the United States’, 184. Zhai and Li quoted a Chinese source, Li Ke and Hao
Shengzhang, Wenhua dageming zhong de remin jiefangjun, 416.
[21] Phan Trong Tuê, ‘Báo cáo vê` chuyêń di công tác Băć Kinh tù’ ngày 1 dêń ngày 12 tháng 3 năm
_ _
1974.’ Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć Gia 3, Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng, Hô` So’ 9558, 145.
[22] Bô Ngoai thu’o’ng, ‘Báo cáo hàng tuâ`, n vê` ho’p tác khoa hoc kỹ thuât và thiê´t bi tòan bô vó’i
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
Trung Quôć tù’ ngày 25 tháng 2 dêń ngày 1 tháng 3 năm 1972’, 75.
[23] Ibid., 76.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng. ‘Báo cáo c a Hòang Văn Diêm g ’i Anh Tô, Anh Nghi, Anh Côn, Anh
_ _
Mu’ò’i, Nguyêñ Lâm ngày 10 tháng 2 năm 1973.’ Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć Gia 3, Phòng
´
Ph Th Tu’ó’ng, Hô So’ 9559, 23 – 4.
[26] Van Trong, ‘Báo cáo công tác thăm Trung Quôć tù’ 19 tháng 8 dêń 2 tháng 10 năm 1972’ Trung
Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć Gia 3, Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng, Hô` So’ 8985, 40 – 43.
[27] Ibid., pp. 26– 7.
[28] Li, ‘The Sino-Soviet Dispute over Assistance for Vietnam’s War’, 305.
[29] Bô Ngoai giao gũ’i cho Bô Chı́nh Tri ngày 26 tháng 3 năm 1973. ‘Ðê` nghi cho ba cán bô Bô
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
Ngoai giao Nhât B n thăm Viêt Nam’. Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć Gia 3, Phòng Ph Th
_ _ _
Tu’ó’ng, Hô` So’ 9004, 100– 102. This proposal was approved by Nguyen Duy Trinh Trinh
30 K. Path
[Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs Minister, and Member of the Politburo, on 2 April
1973. The three Japanese officials were 1) W. Miyake, Head of the Southeast Asia and Asia
Pacific Department, MOFA (last visited Vietnam in February 1972), 2) K. Inowe, Vietnam
Specialist of the Southeast Asia Department I, MOFA (last visited Vietnam in February),
3) I. Uchida, Official from the Economic Cooperation Department, MOFA.
[30] Ibid., 108– 9.
[31] Lý Ban gũ’i cho Ph Th Tu’ó’ng ngày 6 tháng 4 năm 1973. ‘Vô` gũ’i cán bô di hoc rút kı́nh
_ _
nghiêm ngoai thu’o’ng c a Trung Quôć vó’i các nu’ó’c tu’ b n.’Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć
_ _ ´
Gia 3, Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng, Hô So’ 9004, 110– 12.
[32] Phan Trong Tuê g ’i Thu’ò’ng vu Hôì dông Chı́nh ph ngày 15 tháng 03 năm 1974. ‘Báo cáo vâ`
_ _ _ _
chuyêń di công tác Băć kinh tù’ ngày 1 dêń ngày 12/03/1974’. Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć Gia
3, Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng, Hô` So’ 9561, 141 –5. Phan Trong Tue was DRV Deputy Prime
Minister and Minister of Transportation, Major General of the Vietnam People’s Army,
Chairman of the VPW Transportation and Communication Board, and Member of the
Central Committee. He was authorised by the VWP Central Committee Politburo to discuss
with the Chinese leadership measures to speed up deliveries of goods to North Vietnam.
[33] Li, ‘The Sino-Soviet Dispute over Assistance for Vietnam’s War’, 305.
[34] Ibid., 306– 7.
[35] Ibid., 305– 6.
[36] Ibid., 308– 9.
[37] Ibid., 310– 11.
[38] For fuel transfer, China laid two four-inch pipelines (with the combined capacity of funneling
1200 metric tons per day to North Vietnam) along the China – Vietnam railroad line from
Pingxiang Railroad [China] to the petroleum distribution centre at Kep north-east of Hanoi.
See Pike, ‘North Vietnam in Year 1972’, 55.
[39] Phan Trong Tuê g ’i Thu’ò’ng vu Hôì dông Chı́nh ph ngày 15 tháng 03 năm 1974. ‘Lu’o’c ghi
_ _ _ _ _
biên b n hôi dàm giũ’ dô`ng chı́ Phan Trong Tuê nói vó’i dô`ng chı́ Lý Cu’ò’ng, tai Bô Ngoai
_ ´ _ _ ´ _ _ _
thu’o’ng lúc 4 giò’ chiêu ngày 7/3/1974’. Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôc Gia 3, Phòng Ph Th
Tu’ó’ng, Hô` So’ 9561, 122– 4. On the Chinese side were Li Qiang and Wang Bin, and on the
Vietnamese side were Phan Trong Tue, DRV Ambassador Ngô Thuyê`n, and other officials
_ _
including Man Th n, Lê Tuâń, Lê Quang Tu’o’ng, Hiê`n and Nguyêñ Ðı̀nh B ng.
[40] Phan Trong Tuê, ‘Lu’o’c ghi biên b n hôi dàm giũ’ dô`ng chı́ Phan Trong Tuê nói vó’i dô`ng chı́
_ _ _ _ _ _
Lý Cu’ò’ng, tai Bô Ngoai thu’ó’ng lúc 4 giò’ chiêù ngày 7/3/1974’, 120– 22.
_ _ _
[41] Ngiêm Bá Dú’c, Thú’ tru’ ’ng Bô Ngoai thu’ó’ng, gũ’i cho Ph Th Tu’ó’ng ngày 29 tháng 6
_ _
năm 1973. ‘Báo cáo (sô´ 243/BNgT/KV) tı̀nh hı̀nh hàng Nhâp qua c nh du’ò’ng bi n và dê`
_
nghi cho c ’ ngu’ò’i sang Trung Quôć dôí chiêú kê´ toán cu th bàn kê´ hoach du’a sô´ lu’ong
_ _ _ _
còn lai vê` nu’ó’c’. Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć Gia 3, Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng, Hô` So’, 9004, ’
_
119– 20.
[42] Phan Trong Tuê, ‘Báo cáo vê` chuyêń di công tác Băć kinh tù’ ngày 1 dêń ngày 12/03/1974’,
_ _
145– 8.
[43] Ibid., 120.
[44] Ibid., 121.
[45] Ngiêm Bá Dú’c, Thú’ tru’ ’ng Bô Ngoai thu’ó’ng, 29 tháng 6 năm 1973. ‘Báo cáo tı̀nh hı̀nh hàng
_ _
Nhâp qua c nh du’ò’ng bi n và dê` nghi cho c ’ ngu’ò’i sang Trung Quôć,’ 119– 20.
_ _
[46] Ibid., 120.
[47] Ibid., 122.
[48] Agricultural land in the North is much less fertile than that in the South, and therefore, for
rice cultivation in the North, peasants need to use a lot more fertiliser to produce the same
amount of rice.
Cold War History 31
[49] An excerpt from a conversation between Phan Trong Tue and Li Qiang on 7 March 1974. See
Phan Trong Tuê, ‘Lu’o’c ghi biên b n hôi dàm giũ’ dô`ng chı́ Phan Trong Tuê nói vó’i dô`ng
_ _ _ _ _ _
chı́ Lý Cu’ò’ng, tai Bô Ngoai thu’o’ng lúc 4 giò’ chiêù ngày 7/3/1974’, 122– 40.
_ _ _
[50] Phan Trong Tuê g ’i Văn phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng, ngày 15 tháng 3 năm 1974. ‘Báo cáo vê`
_ _
chuyêń di công tác Băć Kinh tù’ ngày 1 dêń ngày 12 tháng 3 năm 1974’. Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’
Quôc Gia 3, Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng, Hô` So’ 9558, 141– 50. Pham Van Dong’s letter was
´
delivered to Zhou Enlai on 4 March 1974.
[51] Ibid., 142.
[52] Ibid., 149– 50.
[53] Qiang, China and the Vietnam Wars, 207.
[54] Phan Mỹ, Bô Tru’ ’ng Ch nhiêm Văn Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng, gũ’i cho y ban kê´ hoach Nhà
_ _ _
nu’ó’c, ngày 30 tháng 7 năm 1973. ‘Gũ’i dai diên ta di Trung Quôć’. Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’
_ _
Quôć Gia 3, Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng, Hô` So’, 9004, 115– 17.
[55] Morris, ‘The Soviet – Chinese – Vietnamese Triangle in the 1970s’, 413– 14.
[56] Thu’ Lê Thanh Nghi ’i d/c Ngô Thuyê`n, Ðai sú’ Viêt Nam tai Trung Quôć và d/c Nguyêñ
_ _ _ _
Chanh, Thú’ tru’ ’ng Bô Ngoai Thu’ó’ng, ngày 24/09/1975. Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć Gia
_ _ `
3, Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng, Hô So’, 9562, 46 – 8.
[57] Phan Trong Tuê g ’i Thu’ò’ng vu Hôì dông Chı́nh ph ngày 15 tháng 03 năm 1974. ‘Ðê` cu’ò’ng
_ _ _ _
d dô`ng chı́ Phan Trong Tuê nói vó’i d/c Phu’ó’ng Nghi ngày 6 tháng 3 năm 1974.’ Trung
_ _ _
Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôc Gia 3, Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng, Hô` So’ 9561, 94 – 95.
´
[58] Ibid., 98– 9.
[59] Ibid., 102.
[60] Phan Trong Tuê, ‘Báo cáo vê` chuyăń di công tác Băć Kinh tù’ ngày 1 dêń ngày 12 tháng 3 năm
_ _
1974’, 148.
[61] Phan Trong Tuê, ‘Ðê` cu’ò’ng d dô`ng chı́ Phan Trong Tuê nói vó’i d/c Phu’o’ng Nghi ngày 6
_ _ _ _ _
tháng 3 năm 1974’, 77 – 8.
[62] Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng. ‘Bài phát bi u c a Phó Th tu’ó’ng Lý Tiên Niêm trong dip dòan dai
_ _ _
bi u ho’p tác Khoa hoc Kỹ’ Thuât c a Viêt Nam sang Trung Quôć ngày 23/03/1974.’ Trung
_ ´ _ _ _ `
Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôc Gia 3, Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng, Hô So’, 9565, 1– 3. It was submitted to
and received by the Prime Minister (Pham Van Dong) on 26 April 1974.
[63] Phan Trong Tuê, ‘Báo cáo vê` chuyăń di công tác Băć Kinh tú’ ngày 1 – 12 tháng 3 năm 1974’,
_ _
149.
[64] Phan Trong Tuê. ‘Biên b n tiê´p xúc giũ’a Th tu’ó’ng Chu An Lai và d/c Phan Trong Tuê – y
_ _ _ _ _
viên Trung U’o’ng Ð ng Lao dông Viêt Nam, Bô Tru’ ’ng Bô GTVT tù’ lúc 21h40 ngày 4
´ _ _ _ _ ´
tháng 3 năm 1974 dên 1h20 ngày 5 tháng 3 năm 1974.’ Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôc Gia 3,
Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng, Hô` So’ 9558, 27 – 30.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Ibid.
[67] Ibid., 26.
[68] Ibid., 27.
[69] Ibid., 29– 30.
[70] Nguyêñ Văn Biên – Tru’ ’ng dòan chuyên viên, y ban kê´ hoach Nhà nu’ó’c, ngày 20 tháng 9
_
năm 1974. ‘Báo cáo tı̀nh hı̀nh và kê´t qu làm viêc vó’i Bô liên lac kinh tê´ dôí ngoai Trung Quôć
_ _ _ _
tù’ ngày 26 tháng 8 năm 1974 dên ngày 5 tháng 9 năm 1974.’ Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć Gia 3,
`
Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng, Hô` So’ 9559, 31– 4. Nguyen Van Bien was instructed by Le Thanh
Nghi, Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the State Planning Committee to lead the
Vietnamese economic delegation and hold talks with Han Sunzhen and Yang Yong Jie, Vice-
Ministers of Foreign Economic Relations in Beijing between 31 August and 5 September
1975.
[71] Ibid., 34.
32 K. Path
[72] Ibid., 35– 40.
[73] Hòang Văn Diêm, Phó Ch nhiêm Ph Th Tu’ó’ng, g ’i cho Lê Văn Lu’o’ng ngày 18 tháng 2
_ _
năm 1971. ‘Báo cáo tóm tă´t tı̀nh hı̀nh viên tro’ kinh tă´ và kỹ thuât c a Trung Quôć cho Viêt
_ _ _ _
Nam t̀’ năm 1955 dêń nay (2/1971).’ Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć Gia 3, Phòng
Ph Th Tu’ó’ng, Hô` So’ 8964, 68 – 76.
[74] Nguyêñ Văn Biên, Tru’ ’ng dòan kh o sát, g ’i Văn phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng và y ban
KHNN, Hà Nôi, ngày 5 tháng 3 năm 1974. ‘Báo cáo công tác kh o sát và dàm phán vê` công
_
trı̀nh loc dâù tai Trung Quôć tù’ ngày 16 tháng 12 năm 1973 dêń 18 tháng 2 năm 1974’.
_ _
Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć Gia 3, Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng, Hô` So’, 9509, 55– 60.
[75] Ibid., 61– 2.
[76] Ibid., 70– 72.
[77] Lý Ban g ’i d/c Pham văn Ðô`ng, d/c Nguyêñ Duy Trinh, d/c Lê Thanh Nghi, d/c Phan Trong
_ _ _
Tuê, d/c Ðô˜ Mu’ò’i, d/c Ðang Viêt Châu, d/c Phan Mỹ, ngày 19 tháng 3 năm 1975. ‘Báo cáo
_ _` _
nôi dung bu i gap giũ’a dông chı́ Vu’o’ng Bı̀nh Thân- Cuc tru’ ’ng dôí ngoai Bô Nhiên liêu
_ _ _ _ _ _
hóa châ´t Trung Quôć và dô`ng chı́ Hòang Trong Ðai, Giám dôć T ng Công ty nhêp khâ˙u
´ _ _ ´ _
thiêt bi tòan bô thuôc Bô Ngoai thu’o’ng’. Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôc Gia 3, Phòng
_ _ _ _ _
Ph Th Tu’ó’ng, Hô` So’, 9509, 86 – 7.
[78] Lý Ban g ’i d/c Pham văn Ðô`ng, d/c Nguyêñ Duy Trinh, d/c Lê Thanh Nghi, d/c Ðô˜ Mu’ò’i,
_ _
d/c Phan Trong Tuê, ngày 29 tháng 3 năm 1975. ‘Báo cáo tóm tă´t vê` kê´t qu dàm phán vê`
_ _
công trı̀nh loc dâù vó’i dòan chuyên gia Trung Quôć.’ Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć Gia 3,
_
Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng, Hô` So’, 9834, 11.
[79] Ibid., 14.
[80] Ibid., 14– 15.
[81] Ibid.
[82] Nguyêñ Xuân Trúc – VP9, ngày 28 tháng 11 năm 1975. ‘Báo cáo kê´t qu dàm phán kinh tê´ vó’i 8
nu’ó’c xã hôi ch nghı̃a cho 5 năm 1976 – 1980.’ Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć Gia 3, Phòng
_
Ph Th Tu’ó’ng, Hô` So’ 9921, 1. This report was be submitted to the VWP CC Politburo for
deliberation.
[83] Hòang Văn Diêm, Phó Ch nhiêm Ph Th Tu’ó’ng g ’i Lê Văn Lu’o’ng ngày 28 tháng 2 năm
_ _
1975. ‘Du’ kiêń Kê´ hoach xuâ´t kh u dài han vó’i Trung Quôć tù’ 1976 dêń 1980’. Trung Tâm
_ _ _
´
Lu’u Trũ’ Quôc Gia 3, Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng, Hô` So’, 8964, 77– 82.
[84] Lê Thanh Nghi g ’i Th Tu’ó’ng Pham Văn Ðô`ng ngày 31 tháng 8 năm 1975. ‘Báo cáo kê´t
_ _
qu dàm phán kinh tê´ năm 1976 vó’i Trung Quôć’. Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć Gia 3, Phòng
Ph Th Tu’ó’ng, Hô` So’, 10088, 164– 5.
[85] Bô Ngoai thu’o’ng gũ’i cho Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng ngày 29/09/1975. ‘Biên b n làm viêc giũ’a
_ _ _
d/c Lý Ban và d/c Trâ`n Khiê´t ngày 16/09/1975.’ Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć Gia 3, Phòng Ph
Th Tu’ó’ng, Hô` So’, 10088, 15 – 18.
[86] Mao Zedong and Le Duan, 24 September 1975, in Westad et al., 77 Conversations, 192.
[87] Deng Xiaoping and Le Duan, 29 September 1975, in Westad et al., 77 Conversations, 192.
[88] Teiwes and Sun, The End of the Maoist Era, 240– 41.
[89] Ibid., 252.
[90] Lý Ban gũ’i cho Ph Th Tu’ó’ng ngày 10 tháng 11 năm 1975. ‘Báo cáo kê´t qu dàm phán kinh
tê´ vó’i Trung Quôć năm 1975 tù’ ngày 13/08 - 08/11/1975.’ Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć Gia 3,
Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng, Hô` So’ 10088, 21– 2.
[91] Ibid., 23.
[92] Qiang, ‘China and the Cambodian Conflict, 1970 – 75’, 392– 3.
[93] See Nguyêñ Xuân Trúc, ‘Báo cáo kê´t qu dàm phán kinh tê´ vó’i 8 nu’ó’c xã hôi ch nghı̃a cho 5
_
năm 1976 – 1980’. ngày 28 tháng 11 năm 1975, 24.
Cold War History 33
[94] Ibid., 25.

[95] Ibid., 16– 17.
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34 K. Path
Vietnamese Archival Sources
Bô Ngoai giao gũ’i cho Bô Chı́nh Tri ngày 26 tháng 3 năm 1973 [Ministry of Foreign Affairs 26
_ _ _ _
March 1973 to the Politburo], ‘Ðê` nghi cho ba cán bô Bô Ngoai giao Nhât B n thăm Viêt
_ _ _ _ _ _
Nam’ [Proposal for three Japanese Foreign Affairs officials to visit Vietnam]. Trung Tâm Lu’u
Trũ’ Quôć Gia 3 [National Archive No. 3], Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng [Collection of the Prime
Minister’s Office], Hô` So’ [Folder], 9004, 100– 109.
Bô Ngoai giao, Vu Á Châu 1, Hà Nôi ngày 13 tháng 5 năm 1972. ‘Nôi dung dô`ng chı́ Nguyêñ Duy
_ _ _ _ _
Trinh nói vó’i Ðai sú’ Trung Quôć Vu’o’ng Âu Bı̀nh tôí ngày 12 tháng 5 năm 1972.’ Trung Tâm
_
Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć Gia 3, Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng, Hô` So’ 8964, 36– 42.
Bô Ngoai thu’ó’ng gũ’i cho Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng ngày 29/09/1975 [The Ministry of Foreign Trade
_ _
sent to the Prime Minister’s Office on 29 August 1975]. ‘Biên b n làm viêc giũ’a d/c Lý Ban và
_
d/c Trâ`n Khiê´t ngày 16/09/1975’ [Minutes of the discussion between comrade Ly Ban and
comrade Zhen Jie (Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade) on 16 September 1975]. Trung
Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć Gia 3 [National Archive No. 3], Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng [Collection of
the Prime Minister’s Office], Hô` So’ [Folder], 10088, 12– 20.
Bô Ngoai thu’o’ng, gũ’i cho Ph Th Tu’ó’ng [The Ministry of Foreign Trade to the Prime Minister’s
_ _
Office (undated)]. ‘Báo cáo hàng tuâ`n vê` ho’p tác khoa hoc kỹ thuât và thiê´t bi tòan bô vó’i
_ _ _ _ _
Trung Quôć tù’ ngày 25 tháng 2 dêń ngày 1 tháng 3 năm 1972’ [Weekly report on general
equipment and economic, science and technical cooperation with China between 25 February
and 1 March 1972]. Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć Gia 3 [National Archive No. 3], Phòng Ph
Th Tu’ó’ng [Collection of the Prime Minister’s Office], Hô` So’ [Folder] 8964, 70– 86.
Hòang Văn Diêm, Phó Ch nhiêm Ph Th Tu’ó’ng gu?’i Lê Văn Lu’ó’ng ngày 28 tháng 2 năm 1975
_ _
[Hoang Van Diem, Deputy Chief of the Prime Minister’s Office sent to Le Van Luong, member
of the VWP Central Committee]. ‘Du’ kiêń Kê´ hoach xuâ´t kh u dài han vó’i Trung Quôć tù’
_ _ _
1976 dêń 1980’ [A long-term export plan with China from 1976 to 1980]. Trung Tâm Lu’u
´
Trũ’ Quôc Gia 3 [National Archive No. 3], Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng [Collection of the Prime
Minister’s Office], Hô` So’ [Folder], 8964, 77– 82.
Hòang Văn Diêm, Phó Ch nhiêm Ph Th Tu’óng, g ’i cho Lê Văn Lu’o’ng ngày 18 tháng 2 năm
_ _
1971 [Hoang Van Diem, Deputy Chief of the Prime Minister’s Office sent to Le Van Luong,
member of the VWP Central Committee on 18 February 1971]. ‘Báo cáo tóm tă´t tı̀nh hı̀nh
viên tro’ kinh tê´ và kỹ thuât c a Trung Quôć cho Viêt Nam tù’ năm 1955 dêń nay (2/1971)’
_ _ _ _
[Summary report on China’s economic and technical assistance to Vietnam from 1955 to
February 1971]. Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć Gia 3 [National Archive No. 3], Phòng Ph Th
Tu’ó’ng [Collection of the Prime Minister’s Office], Hô` So’ [Folder], 8964, 68– 76.
Lê Thanh Nghi g ’i Th Tu’ó’ng Pham Văn Ðôńg ngày 31 tháng 8 năm 1975 [Le Thanh Nghi sent to
_ _
Prime Minister Pham Van Dong on 31 August 1975]. ‘Báo cáo kê´t qu dàm phán kinh tê´ năm
´
1976 vó’i Trung Quôc’ [A report on the result of economic negotiations with China for 1976].
Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć Gia 3 [National Archive No. 3], Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng
[Collection of the Prime Minister’s Office], Hô` So’ [Folder], 10088, 163 – 73.
Lý Ban gũ’i cho Ph Th Tu’ó’ng ngày 10 tháng 11 năm 1975 [Ly Ban sent to the Prime Minister’s
Office on 10 November 1975]. ‘Báo cáo kê´t qu dàm phán kinh tê´ vó’i Trung Quôć năm 1975
tù’ ngày 13/08 – 08/11/1975’ [Report on the result of economic negotiations with China from
13 August to 08 November 1975]. Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć Gia 3 [National Archive No. 3],
Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng [Collection of the Prime Minister’s Office], Hô` So’ [Folder], 10088,
21 – 25.
Lý Ban gũ’i cho Ph Th Tu’ó’ng ngày 6 tháng 4 năm 1973 [Ly Ban to the Office of Prime Minister
(urgent) on 6 April 1973. ‘Vê` gũ’i cán bô di hoc rút kı́nh nghiêm ngoai thu’o’ng c a Trung
_ _ _ _
Quôć vó’i các nu’ó’c tu’ b n’ [About sending our cadres to study China’s experiences in
trading with capitalist countries].Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć Gia 3 [National Archive No. 3],
Cold War History 35
Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng [Collection of the Prime Minister’s Office], Hô` So’ [Folder], 9004,
110– 12.
Lý Ban g ’i d/c Pham văn Ðôńg, d/c Nguyêñ Duy Trinh, d/c Lê Thanh Nghi, d/c Phan Trong Tuê,
_ _ _ _
d/c Ðô˜ Mu’ò’i, d/c Ðang Viêt Châu, d/c Phan Mỹ, ngày 19 tháng 3 năm 1975 [Ly Ban sent to
_ _
comrade Pham Van Dong, comrade Nguyen Duy Trinh, comrade Le Thanh Nghi, comrade
Phan Tron Tue, comrade Dang Viet Chau, and comrade Phan My on 19 March 1975]. ‘Báo cáo
nôi dung bu i gap giũ’a dô`ng chı́ Vu’o’ng Bı̀nh Thân- Cuc tru’ ’ng dôí ngoai Bô Nhiên liêu
_ _ _ _ _ _
hóa châ´t Trung Quôć và dô`ng chı́ Hòang Trong Ðai, Giám dôć T ng Công ty nhâp kh u thiê´t
_ _ _
bi tòan bô thuôc Bô Ngoai thu’o’ng’ [Report on the content of the conversation between
_ _ _ _ _
comrade Wang Ping Qing, Head of the Foreign Relations Repartment, PRC’s Ministry of
Chemicals and Fuel, and comrade Hoang Trong Dai, Director of the General Equipment
Import Company, DRV’s Ministry of Foreign Trade]. Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć Gia 3
[National Archive No. 3], Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng [Collection of the Prime Minister’s Office],
Hô` So’ [Folder], 9509, 86– 90.
Lý Ban g ’i d/c Pham văn Ðôńg, d/c Nguyêñ Duy Trinh, d/c Lê Thanh Nghi, d/c Ðô˜ Mu’ò’i, d/c
_ _
Phan Trong Tuê, ngày 29 tháng 3 năm 1975 [Ly Ban to the Prime Minister’s Office, copied to
_ _
Nguyen Duy Trinh (Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister), Le Thanh Nghi (Deputy
PM), Do Muoi, (Deputy PM) and Phan Trong Tue (Deputy PM) on 29 March 1975]. ‘Báo cáo
tóm tă´t vê` kê´t qu dàm phán vê` công trı̀nh loc dâù vó’i dòan chuyên gia Trung Quôć’ [Brief
_
report on the result of the meeting with China’s Group of Experts about the oil refinery project
´
in Vietnam]. Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôc Gia 3 [National Archive No. 3], Phòng Ph Th
Tu’ó’ng [Collection of the Prime Minister’s Office], Hô` So’ [Folder], 9834, 11– 15.
Ngiêm Bá Dú’c, Thú’ tru’ ng Bô Ngoai thu’o’ng, gũ’i cho Ph Th Tu’ó’ng ngày 29 tháng 6 năm
_ _
1973 [Nghiem Ba Duc, Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade sent to the Prime Minister’s Office on
29 June 1973]. ‘Báo cáo (sô 243/BNgT/KV) tı̀nh hı̀nh hàng Nhâp qua c nh du’ò’ng bi n và dê`
´
_
nghi cho c ’ ngu’ò’i sang Trung Quôć dôí chiêú kê´ toán cu th , bàn kê´ hoach du’a sô´ lu’o’ng
_ _ _ _
còn lai vê` nu’ó’c’ [Report (No 243/BNgt/KV) on the situation of imported goods via China’s
_
sea ports and proposal to send people to China to verify statistical records and discuss a plan
to bring the remaining goods to our country]. Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć Gia 3 [National
Archive No. 3], Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng [Collection of the Prime Minister’s Office], Hô` So’
[Folder], 9004, 119– 22.
Nguyêñ Văn Biên, Tru’ ’ng dòan kh o sát, g ’i Văn phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng và y ban KHNN, Hà
Nôi, ngày 5 tháng 3 năm 1974 [Nguyen Van Bien, Head of the Vietnamese delegation sent to
_
the Prime Minister’s Office and the State Planning Committee, Hanoi, 5 March 1974]. ‘Báo
cáo công tác kh o sát và dàm phán vê` công trı̀nh loc dâú tai Trung Quôć tù’ ngày 16 tháng 12
_ _
năm 1973 dêń 18 tháng 2 năm 1974’ [Report on our feasibility study and negotiations in
China concerning oil refinery between 16 December 1973 and 18 February 1974]. Trung Tâm
Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć Gia 3 [National Archive No. 3], Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng [Collection of the
Prime Minister’s Office], Hô` So’ [Folder], 9509, 55 –75.
Nguyên Văn Biên–Tru’ ông dòan chuyên viên, y ban kê´ hoach Nhà nu’ó’c, ngày 20 tháng 9 năm
˜
_
1974 [Nguyen Van Bien, Chief of Experts Group, the State Planning Committee on 20
September 1974]. Báo cáo tı̀nh hı̀nh và kê´t qu làm viêc vó’i Bô liên lac kinh tê´ dôí ngoai
_ _ _ _
Trung Quôć tù’ ngày 26 tháng 8 năm 1974 dêń ngày 5 tháng 9 năm 1974’ [A situation report
on the result of working with PRC Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations with Foreign
Countries from 26 August to 5 September 1974]. Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć Gia 3 [National
Archive No. 3], Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng [Collection of the Prime Minister’s Office], Hô` So’
[Folder] 9559, 31 – 40.
Nguyêñ Xuân Trúc– VP9, ngày 28 tháng 11 năm 1975 [Nguyen Xuan Truc, Office No. 9. ‘Báo cáo kê´t
qu dàm phán kinh tê´ vó’i 8 nu’ó’c xã hôi ch nghı̃a cho 5 năm 1976 – 1980’ [A report on the
_
result of economic negotiations with eight socialist countries for the five year plan, 1976 – 80].
36 K. Path
Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć Gia 3 [National Archive No. 3], Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng
[Collection of the Prime Minister’s Office], Hô` So’ [Folder], 9921, 1– 51.
Phan Mỹ, Bô Tru’ ông Ch nhiêm Văn Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng, gũ’i cho y ban kê´ hoach Nhà
_ _ _
nu’ó’c, ngày 30 tháng 7 năm 1973 [Phan My, Minister and Chief of the Prime Minister’s
Office, to the State Planning Committee]. ‘Gũ’i dai diên ta di Trung Quôć’ [Sending our
_ _
delegation to China]. Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć Gia 3 [National Archive No. 3], Phòng Ph
Th Tu’ó’ng [Collection of the Prime Minister’s Office], Hô` So’ [Folder], 9004, 115– 17.
Phan Trong Tuê g?’i Thu’ó’ng vu Hôì dông Chı́nh ph ngày 15 tháng 03 năm 1974 [Phan Trong Tue
_ _ _ _
sent to the State Council of Ministers on 15 March 1974]. ‘Báo cáo vê` chuyêń di công tác Băć
kinh tù’ ngày 1 dêń ngày 12/03/1974’ [A report on my working trip to Beijing from 1 to 12
March 1974]. Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć Gia 3 [National Archive No. 3], Phòng Ph Th
Tu’ó’ng [Collection of the Prime Minister’s Office], Hô` So’ [Folder] 9561, 141– 50.
Phan Trong Tuê gó’i Thu’ò’ng vu Hôì dông Chı́nh ph ngày 15 tháng 03 năm 1974 [Phan Trong Tue
_ _ _ _
sent to the State Council of Ministers on 15 March 1974]. Lu’o’c ghi biên b n hôi dàm giũ’
_ _
dông chı́ Phan Trong Tuê nói và dô`ng chı́ Lý Cu’ò’ng, tai Bô Ngo
` ’ ai thu’o’ng lúc 4 giò’ chiêù
_ _ _ _ _
ngày 7/3/1974’ [A summary minute of the conversation between comrade Phan Trong Tue
and comrade Li Qiang on 7 March 1974]. Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć Gia 3 [National Archive
No. 3], Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng [Collection of the Prime Minister’s Office], Hô` So’ [Folder]
9561, 122– 40.
Phan Trong Tuê g ’i Thu’ò’ng vu Hôì dông Chı́nh ph ngày 15 tháng 03 năm 1974 [Phan Trong Tue
_ _ _ _
sent to the State Council of Ministers on 15 March 1974]. ‘Ðê` cu’ò’ng d dô`ng chı́ Phan Trong
_
Tuê nói vó’i d/c Phu’o’ng Nghi ngày 6 tháng 3 năm 1974’ [A draft of fundamentals for Phan
_ _
Trong Tue’s discussion with Comrade Fang Yi at PRC Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations
in Beijing on 6 March 1974]. Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć Gia 3 [National Archive No. 3],
Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng [Collection of the Prime Minister’s Office], Hô` So’ [Folder] 9561,
77 – 109.
Phan Trong Tuê g ’i Văn phòng Ph Th [Tu’ó’ng Phan Trong Tue sent to the Prime Minister’s
_ _
Office on 15 March 1974].’Biên b n tiê´p xúc giũ’a Th tu’ó’ng Chu An Lai và d/c Phan Trong
_ _
Tuê - y viên Trung U’o’ng Ð ng Lao dông Viêt Nam, Bô Tru’ ’ng Bô GTVT tù’ lúc 21h40
_ ´ _ _ _ _
ngày 4 tháng 3 năm 1974 dân 1h20 ngày 5 tháng 3 năm 1974’ [Minutes of the Meeting
between Premier Zhou Enlai and comrade Phan Trong Tue, Member of the VWP Central
Committee and Minister of Traffic and Transportation from 21:40 pm on the 4th to 1:20 am
on the 5th of March 1974]. Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć Gia 3 [National Archive No. 3], Phòng
Ph Th Tu’ó’ng [Collection of the Prime Minister’s Office], Hô` So’ [Folder] 9558, 27 – 37.
Phan Trong Tuê g ’i Văn phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng, ngày 15 tháng 3 năm 1974 [Phan Trong Tue sent
_ _
to the Prime Minister’s Office on 15 March 1974]. ‘Báo cáo vê` chuyêń di công tác Băć Kinh tù’
ngày 1 dêń ngày 12 tháng 3 năm 1974’ [Report on my working trip to Beijing from 1 to 12
March 1974]. Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć Gia 3 [National Archive No. 3], Phòng Ph Th
Tu’ó’ng [Collection of the Prime Minister’s Office], Hô` So’ [Folder] 9558, 141– 50.
Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng [The Prime Minister’s Office]. ‘Báo cáo c a Hòang Văn Diêm g ’i Anh Tô,
_
Anh Nghi, Anh Côn, Anh Mu’ò’i, Nguyêñ Lâm ngày 10 tháng 2 năm 1973’ [Hoang Van Diem’s
_
report to Pham Van Dong, Le Thanh Nghi, Nguyen Con, Do Muoi and Nguyen Lam on 10
February 1973]. Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć Gia 3 [National Archive No. 3], Phòng Ph Th
Tu’ó’ng [Collection of The Prime Minister’s Office], Hô` So’ [Folder] 9559, 23– 30.
Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng. ‘Thu’ c a Phó Th Tu’ó’ng Lê Thanh Nghi g ’i Phó Th Tu’ó’ng Lý Tiên
_
Niêm tháng 9 năm 1972.’ Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć Gia 3, Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng, Hô` So’
_
8964, 55– 67.
Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng. ‘Thu’ c a Th Tu’ó’ng Pham Văn Ðô`ng g ’i Th Tu’ó’ng Chu Ân Lai ngày
_
15 tháng 8 năm 1972.’ Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć Gia 3, Phòng Ph Th Tu’ó’ng, Hô` So’ 8964,
43 – 8.
Cold War History 37
Thu’ Lê Thanh Nghi g ’i d/c Ngô Thuyê`n, Ðai sú’ Viêt Nam tai Trung Quôć và d/c Nguyêñ Chanh,
_ _ _ _
Thú’ tru’ ’ng Bô Ngoai Thu’o’ng, ngày 24/09/1975 [Le Thanh Nghi’s letter to comrade
_ _
Ambassador Ngo Thuyen and comrade Nguyen Chanh, Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade on
24 September 1975]. Trung Tâm Lu’u Trũ’ Quôć Gia 3 [National Archive No. 3], Phòng Ph
Th Tu’ó’ng [Collection of the Prime Minister’s Office], Hô` So’ [Folder], 9562, 46– 8.
Văn Trong – Tru’ ’ng dòan g ’i cho Ph Th Tu’ó’ng ngày 20 tháng 10 năm 1972 [Van Trong, Chief
_
of the Institute of Archaeology and Social Science, sent to the Prime Minister’s Office on 20
October 1972]. ‘Báo cáo công tác và thu hoach c a dòan dai bi u Viên kh o c hoc thăm
_ _ _ _
Trung Quôć tù’ 19 tháng 8 dêń 2 tháng 10 năm 1972’ [Report on the result of our
archaeologist delegation’s visit to China from 19 August to 2 October 1972]. Trung Tâm Lu’u
Trũ’ Quôć Gia 3 [National Archive No. 3], Phòng Ph Th Tu’ò’ng [Collection of the Prime
Minister’s Office], Hô´ So’ [Folder], 8985, 01– 44.

Kosal Path - The Economic Factor in The Sino-Vietnamese Split, 1972-75: An Analysis of Vietnamese Archival Sources

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Kosal Path - The Economic Factor in The Sino-Vietnamese Split, 1972-75: An Analysis of Vietnamese Archival Sources

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Cold War History

iFirst Article, 1–37, 2011

The economic factor in the Sino-

Relying on so far untapped Vietnamese archival sources, this article examines

ISSN 1468-2745 print/ISSN 1743-7962 online

improving relations between Hanoi and Beijing in the ensuing years.

Goods Reached China’s Ports

274,450 94,068 277,758 646,276 317,426 328,850

Canned food 231 439 122 792 686 106

Li Qiang: When goods arrive at the [Sino-Vietnamese] border, Vietnamese

Dispute over China-aided projects, 1973 –75

postponed all the construction of the remaining 80 projects (as of mid-1975) to

pledge any significant aid during Le Duan’s coming visit.

of economic assistance to us is not simply because of China’s economic difficulty but

Table 2. China’s and USSR’s assistance, 1971 – 75 and 1976 –80.

Country/Period 1971 – 75 1976 –80 (pledged)

[12] Shen, ‘Sino-U.S. Reconciliation and China’s Vietnam Policy’, 363.

[94] Ibid., 25.

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