REVIEW OF SOCIAL ECONOMY, VOL. LXIV, NO.

3, SEPTEMBER 2006

David Hume’s Model of Man: Classical Political

Economy as ‘‘Inspired’’ Political Economy
Alain Marciano
University of Reims-Champagne Ardenne, Reims Cedex, France
and EconomiX (CNRS), France

Abstract The purpose of this paper is to analyse David Hume’s model of man.
We show that three major elements characterize his representation of man: first
the weaknesses and limitations of human rationality; second, the psychological
foundations of human behaviour, with a particular focus on the role of
association in human cognition; and third, the collective dimension of
individual learning through a process of communication based on sympathy.
Therefore, we show that the theory of human nature and human cognition
Hume proposes is different from the narrow view of man as homo œconomicus
that is used by mainstream economists.
Keywords: Hume, associationist psychology, cognition, sympathy, homo
œconomicus

INTRODUCTION
The model of man upon which economics rests is frequently criticized or, at
least, questioned. Recently, the debates were revived by the experiments made
by psychologists and economists1 that in effect suggest that human beings do
not behave rationally and act only out of egoist motives. The various
behavioural anomalies and irrational behaviours thereby revealed seem to
imply the necessity ‘‘to go beyond homo œconomicus’’ (Anderson 2000) and to
move from ‘‘homo œconomicus to homo sapiens’’ (Thaler 2000). Furthermore,
such an evolution requires that economics should be ‘‘inspired’’ by other

1 Among others, one can cite Kahneman et al. (1982), Arkes and Hammond (1986), Dawes (1988),
Schoemaker (1982), Hogarth and Reder (1987), Thaler (1992).

Review of Social Economy

ISSN 0034-6764 print/ISSN 1470-1162 online Ó 2006 The Association for Social Economics
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
DOI: 10.1080/00346760600892782
 REVIEW OF SOCIAL ECONOMY

discipline, in particular by psychology (see Frey and Stutzer 2001; Frey and
Benz 2004).
From an historical perspective, similar debates have always existed. Indeed,
many past economists have already stressed that human beings do not follow
the assumptions of economic theory and insisted on the limitations and
weaknesses of the standard model of economic man. Thorstein Veblen, Carl
Menger and even Friedrich Hayek, or G.L.S. Shackle and Herbert Simon are,
among others, quoted as important predecessors from the perspective of a
more refined conception of human beings. However, reference is rarely made
to the founders of political economy and the theory of human nature or the
model of man David Hume and Adam Smith developed. To some extent, this
should come as no surprise: the founders of the discipline should not have been
expected to have proposed a model of man different from that used by modern
economists. More surprisingly, even Austrian economists, consistent critics of
the neo-classical model of man (see for instance Boettke et al. 2003), who claim
that the theoretical tradition they defend goes back to Smith and Hume, rarely
discuss the theory of human nature of the economists and philosophers of the
Scottish Enlightenment (see, however, Horwitz 2000, 2001).
It nonetheless remains the case that the model of man proposed by the
founders of political economy—in this paper, we specifically focus on David
Hume—is closer to conceptions of man as homo sapiens than to the narrower
view of man as homo œconomicus used by neo-classical economists. This is the
underlying argument developed in this paper. Accordingly, we discuss the
theory of human cognition proposed by Hume and emphasize the three major
aspects of his model of man. We show that Hume first stresses the weaknesses
and limitations of human rationality (section 2); second, he insists on the
psychological foundations of human behaviour, with a particular focus on
the role of association in human cognition (section 3); and third, he stresses
the collective dimension of individual learning through a process of communi-
cation based on sympathy (section 4). In other words, Hume’s model of man
differs from the model of man used by modern economists—and even by
modern or new political economists. Thus 200 years of research have carried
the discipline away from its foundations, and the need to move from homo
œconomicus to homo sapiens may well be a movement back to the origins of
political economy, rather than a move away from economics.

Hume on Human Rationality and Subjectivism

Economists frequently quote the Scottish founders of political eco-
nomy as representatives of 18th century rationalism. Certainly, there are

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exceptions.2 However, it is conventional wisdom to consider classical

political economists as the promoters of rationalism. This view is
problematic when applied to Smith, but it is even more questionable when
applied to Hume. The latter is indeed known for his ‘‘scepticism with regard
to reason’’ (1992 [1739]: 1.IV.1), summarizing his enquiry concerning human
understanding by a radical alternative: ‘‘We have . . . no choice left but
betwixt a false reason and none at all’’ (1992 [1739]: 268).
In fact, Hume clearly chooses the first rather than the second of the two
possibilities. His scepticism must not be interpreted as an argument against
reason and the capacity of human beings to reason. To the contrary, reason
is considered as playing a major role in the way individuals acquire
knowledge and make their decisions or choices. Hume is particularly clear
about this when he states, for instance, that ‘‘humans naturally reason’’ and
insists that no one—‘‘neither I, not any other person’’—‘‘was ever sincerely
and constantly [such a total sceptic]’’ (1992 [1739]: 183) as to suggest that
humans do not reason. However, while claiming how important reason is,
Hume apparently contradictorily also argues that reasoning does not depend
on the faculty of reason: ‘‘when we infer an effect from a cause, we are not
determin’d by reason’’ (1992 [1739]). The contradiction only exists, however,
from the perspective of the standard—let us say ‘rational’—conception of
reason. In fact, Hume’s scepticism towards reason does not mean that he
rejects any form of reason. He only opposes ‘‘the traditional conception of
reason as an independent faculty functioning with its own distinctive sort of
operations’’ (Owen 2000: 324). In other words, Hume ‘‘is trying to convince
us to let go of a particular conception of reasoning’’ (Lynch 1996: 102), to
separate ‘‘himself from a certain tradition’’ and to substitute a conception of
reason of his own. We argue that this conception not only differs from
traditional conceptions but also from that used by mainstream economists.
The major and fundamental difference appears in Hume’s claims that
human reason is a limited or, in more modern terms one could say, a
bounded capacity: ‘‘though our thought seems to possess this unbounded
liberty, we shall find, upon a nearer examination, that it is really confined
within very narrow limits’’ (Hume 1999 [1748]: 19). Moreover, the limitations
that Hume believes characterize human reason are similar to what,

2 For instance a recent paper by Manfred Holler analyses ‘‘Adam Smith’s Models of Man’’ (forthcoming)
and show that the model proposed in the Theory of Moral Sentiments is different from the one proposed in
the Wealth of Nations. See also the analysis made by Steve Medema (forthcoming) of the different and
antagonistic views of Adam Smith that were promoted at Chicago in the second half of the 20th century: on
the one hand, ‘‘old Chicago’’ economists tended to follow the Theory of Moral Sentiments, while ‘‘new
Chicago’’ economists rather stuck to the model of the Wealth of Nations.

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according, for example, to Herbert Simon (1955), limit the ability of human
beings to process information. For Hume, as for Simon, the constraints are
both internal and external. First, Hume insists that the exercise of human
reason involves a very imperfect and fallible capacity: ‘‘Our reason must be
considered as a kind of cause, of which truth is the natural effect; but such-a-
one as by the irruption of other causes, and by the inconstancy of our mental
powers, may frequently be prevented’’ (1992 [1739]: 1.iv.1). Although ‘‘truth
is the natural effect’’ of reason, the ‘‘actions’’ it performs are not reliable and
cannot be held with certainty. As shown by Lynch (1996), this problem
concerns any kind of reasoning: the demonstrative inferences performed in
scientific reasoning and also the inductive inferences executed in everyday
life. Second, Hume believes that the use of reason rests upon, and is therefore
strictly delineated by, what individuals experience: ‘‘all this creative power of
the mind amounts to no more than the faculty of compounding, transposing,
augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and
experience’’ (1999 [1748]: 19). In other words, while a ‘rational’ reason
quantitatively computes information and allows a human being to question
and correct whatever perceptions are received from the external world, in
Hume’s view, reason rests on the qualitative perception of data. It is thus
bounded by experience. This is particularly constraining: individuals are
prevented from going beyond their personal and subjective experience of the
world in the use of their reason.
To put it in different terms, Hume believes that reasoning is ultimately
grounded in the ‘‘sensitive’’ aspect of human nature. This conception of
human reason corresponds to the tenets of the Scottish Enlightenment
philosophy, which Hume shared with other important Scottish scholars such
as Smith in the first place, but also Adam Ferguson or Dugald Stewart. Even
continental philosophers, such as Étienne de Bonnot, known as Abbé de
Condillac, envisaged a model of man based on a similar understanding.
From the perspective of these philosophers, and different from the rationalist
philosophy of the Sie`cle des Lumie`res, our senses replace reason in the
perception of the world and in the origins of human knowledge. These
philosophers then propose what can be termed a sensualist theory of human
nature. Sensualism is a doctrine in which the human mind is seen as a tabula
rasa upon which impressions received through the senses from the external
world progressively gather and the shape an individual. This is not to say, as
Rogers (1993: 83) stresses, that the existence of a human nature or of
typically human dispositions is denied. Sensualism does not deny either the
existence of specific, personal—in particular biological—features for each
individual. In fact, the tabula rasa assumption has to be viewed from the

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perspective of the rejection of the rationalism and dualism of Descartes’

philosophy. From this perspective, sensualism means that individuals are not
capable of distinguishing between the essence of an object and its material
occurrence. An object only exists under the material form in which it appears
to individuals. The corollary of this conception of cognition is that both
human faculties, including reason and knowledge, have their origins in the
external world—i.e. in the objects to be known—rather than in the knowing
mind. A good illustration of this perspective on the origins of human
knowledge is provided in the way Condillac describes how and why a human
being differs from a marble statue. Condillac argues that though a statue has
the same internal organization as an individual, it cannot be considered as
human because it lacks the five senses that characterize human beings, and
consequently cannot perceive its environment. The lesson Hume and
Condillac teach us is that, when deprived of sensory perceptions as to what
surrounds and insulates him or her from the environment, an individual is
not different from a marble statue.
Thus, the tabula rasa assumption means that in the absence of any
perception of the external world, human beings are incapable of any form of
knowledge. First, and most importantly because it contrasts with what
mainstream economists assume, Hume believes that individuals are not
completely transparent to themselves. He argues against self-awareness, and
self-conscious awareness or knowledge about oneself. It may be argued that
the obstacle to transparency, and to self-consciousness or self-awareness, is
the very absence of a self to be conscious or aware of. Indeed, Hume’s theory
is all about the de´saisissement—to use Paul Ricœur’s word—of the conscious
ego. Hume then proposes the following argument. The ‘‘idea of the self’’ can
exist if and only if the it ‘‘could be deriv’d’’ from a stable and constant
impression—that is from an impression existing within the individual even in
the absence of perception. But, such an impression does not exist: as Hume
points out, ‘‘there is no [such] impression constant and invariable’’ (1992
[1739]: 251). Accordingly, ‘‘there is no such idea’’ as the ‘‘idea of the self’’: ‘‘It
cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions, of from any other, that
the idea of the self is deriv’d; and consequently there is no such idea’’ (1992
[1739]: 252). Indeed, it is impossible to imagine that an individual could be
something other than a set, ‘‘a heap or collection of different perceptions’’
(1992 [1739]: 207).3 From this perspective, to be aware or conscious of

3 The entire sentence is as follows ‘‘we may observe, that what we call a mind, is nothing but a heap or
collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and suppos’d, tho’ falsely, to be
endow’d with a perfect simplicity and identity’’.

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oneself means to be ‘‘sensible’’ to a flow or stream of sensible perceptions

carried through the senses: ‘‘when I enter most intimately into what I call
myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or another, of heat,
cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasures. I can never catch
myself without a perception’’ (1992 [1739]: 252). This is confirmed by the
converse and complementary statement: ‘‘When my perceptions are remov’d
for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible to myself, and may
truly be said not exist’’ (1992 [1739]: 252). As a consequence, the individual is
both dependent on and reflects his or her relationship with the environment;
the individual does not exist independently from his or her environment.
More broadly, this same perspective applies to any form of knowledge.
This is a second aspect of the tabula rasa assumption: experience gives birth
to knowledge. For instance, as Hume notes, ‘‘to give a child an idea of scarlet
or orange, of sweet or bitter, I present the objects, or in other words, convey
to him these impressions’’ (1992 [1739]: 5). This implies that ‘‘to convey to
someone, whose relevant sense organs are functioning, the visual sense
impression of ‘orange’, we place in their visual field an orange-colored
object’’ (Owen 2000: 324). By contrast, in the absence of sensible perceptions,
knowledge is impossible:

A blind man can form no notion of colours; a deaf man of sounds. Restore either of
them that sense in which he is deficient; by opening this new inlet for his sensations,
you also open an inlet for the ideas; and he finds no difficulty in conceiving these
objects. (Hume 1999 [1748]: 16)

Interestingly, it appears from the preceding quotation that Hume equates

the perception of external objects with the capacity to conceive of them.
Perception would then be assimilated with an act of individual creation. This
raises a question regarding the nature of the link that exists between
impressions, ideas and the reality they stem from. A particularly important
question then has to be asked: can impressions and ideas, i.e. perceptions, be
considered as copies of objects that ‘objectively’ exist independently from
individual perception? Do perceptions correspond to an objective reality?
A rationalist doctrine would provide a positive answer to these questions:
rational individuals perceive objects that are objective; reality exists
independently from the way individuals perceive it.
The perspective Hume adopts is different. He notes that objects—
external bodies—are not present to the mind as such but only under the
form of the perception that represents them: ‘‘‘tis universally allow’d by

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philosophers, and is beside pretty obvious of itself, that nothing is really

present with the mind but its perceptions’’ (1992 [1739]: 67); or, ‘‘external
objects . . . become present to the mind [when] they acquire such a relation
to a connected heap of perceptions’’ (1992 [1739]: 207). Therefore, Hume
argues that external objects exist under the form of a subjective copy within
the human mind. One could interpret this view broadly as meaning that
objects, i.e. external bodies, do not exist at all in the purely objective sense
of the term; objects exist only as perceptions, i.e. under the form of
impressions and ideas. In this respect, subjective perceptions may be viewed
as totally unrelated to any ‘objective’ reality. Alternatively, another
interpretation is possible. It consists in arguing that objects may have an
‘objective’ existence. However, the latter is not independent from and
possible outside of subjective individual perceptions. This second inter-
pretation is consistent with what Hume argues about value or any form of
evaluation. For instance, beauty is not considered to be a quality that can
be objectively attributed to an object; it does not correspond to the
geometrical relations that exist between the different parts of an object.
Beauty rather results from the interaction that exists between the owner
and the object he owns. This thus means that Hume believes that what
counts is the evaluation that exists within each individual’s mind, and each
evaluation corresponds to the expression of the necessarily subjective
relationship that exists between an individual and the object evaluated. In
other words, Hume’s approach can indeed be interpreted as meaning that,
as O’Driscoll and Rizzo have argued, the ‘‘‘level of reality’ that is
important is the ‘realm of subjective meaning’. The objects of economic
activity are thus not even definable except in terms of what actors perceive
them to be’’ (O’Driscoll and Rizzo 1985: 18).
Therefore, Hume’s argument is twofold. On the one had, it means that
the individuals’ capacity to observe, or in Hume’s words to perceive the
world, implies their being part of it: individuals are not capable of
detaching themselves from the world in which they live. In effect,
individuals are incapable of being rational in the economic sense of the
word because their computational ability is limited, and also because
they lack of the resources required for behaving rationally. On the other
hand, the perceptions that result from being part of the world are
subjective evaluations of this environment. The external world is not
objective but is subjectively perceived—or created—by individuals. Rather
than depicting human beings as ‘‘resourceful evaluating maximizing men’’,
as standard economic theory does, Hume views them as genuinely,

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fundamentally and radically ignorant, open to and dependant upon their

environment.

Associationism and Individual Psychology

A second important aspect of human cognition relates to the way individuals
deal with the huge amount of messages, information or data that are
transmitted from the external world to the senses. The risk is that the human
mind could be overloaded with data: ‘‘the constraints on human working
memory require a selective processing of the vast amount of sensory
information offered to the nervous system at every moment of time’’ (Witt
1998: 164). The weakness of human reason, and its inability of separating
out sensible data, cannot but increase the difficulties. Many economists,
following recent work in psychology, have stressed the role of association –
associative thinking—as a screening device: ‘‘Sets of incoming information
are screened by means . . . of an associative basis’’ (ibid.; cf. also Rizzelo and
Turvani 2000, 2002). In particular, frequent references are made to Albert
Bandura, one of the most prominent contributors to associationist
psychology.
Interestingly, the origins of associative thinking or associationist
psychology date back the second half of 18th century, namely to a book
entitled Observations on Man, his Frame, his Duty and his Expectations
published in 1749 by David Hartley, a Scottish scholar with whom David
Hume was acquainted. More broadly, it appears that associationism in
psychology, and sensualism in philosophy, are two sides of the same theory
of human nature. It is no surprise, then, as noted by Young, that ‘‘the
association of ideas was also a basic assumption of the epistemology and
psychology of David Hume and had continental parallels in the work and
influence of Condillac’’ (1985: 65). Associationist psychology and the
philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment are closely intertwined.
This can be explained by the fact that having rejected reason as a capacity
able to organize the data received from the external world, Hume argues that
human cognition—i.e. the origin of human knowledge—rests on the
existence of a ‘‘gentle force’’ (1992 [1739]: 10), a ‘‘kind of ATTRACTION, which
in the mental world will be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the
natural, and to show itself in as many as various forms’’ (1992 [1739]: 13).
Hume argues that ‘‘RESEMBLANCE, CONTIGUITY in time and place, and CAUSE
and EFFECT’’ (1992 [1739]: 11) are ‘‘the principles of union or cohesion among
our simple ideas’’ (1992 [1739]: 12). In other words, Hume describes the

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process of human cognition as being based on two combined faculties:

memory and imagination. Memory performs a backward looking function: it
stores and ‘‘repeats impressions in the first manner’’ (1992 [1739]: 8)—that is
impressions such as they were perceived in the first place. Imagination,
playing a forward-looking role; it separates ideas and unites ‘‘them again in
what form it pleases’’ (1992 [1739]: 10), thereby creating new and perfect
ideas or new knowledge.
Further, the role of memory needs to be evaluated with respect to the
process of perception, because memorization depends on how perception
works. From this perspective, Hume assumes that impressions and ideas are
perceived and enter the human mind in a specific order. Impressions come
first, and give birth to ideas—‘‘our impressions are the causes of our ideas,
not our ideas of our impressions’’ (1992 [1739]: 5). It is equally important to
stress that ideas only exists when connected to corresponding impressions:
‘‘all our simple ideas proceed either mediately or immediately from their
correspondent impressions’’ (1992 [1739]: 7). Impressions and ideas are
related in what can be called a cognitive sequence that Hume describes as
follows:

An impression first strikes upon the senses, and makes us perceive heat or cold,
thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain of some kind or other. Of this impression there is a
copy taken by the mind, which remains after the impression ceases; and this we call
an idea. This idea of pleasure or pain, when it returns upon the soul, produces the
new impressions of desire and aversion, hope and fear. . . These impressions again
are copied by the memory and imagination, and become ideas; which perhaps in
their turn give rise to other impressions and ideas. (1992 [1739]: 7 – 8)

Thus, individuals are accustomed to perceiving impressions and ideas in a

given order, and take for granted the connexions following from them. Then
these connections are memorized. In other words, memorization does not
consist in an accumulation of separate and independent data. Impressions
and ideas are memorized in a specific order or sequence; the very order and
sequence in which they were perceived. Impressions and ideas are not
memorized as such but connected to each other and in a specific order. Hume
writes:

The nature of experience is this. We remember to have had frequent instances of the
existence of one species of objects; and also remember, that the individuals of
another species of objects have always attended them, and have existed in a regular
order of contiguity and succession with regard to them. Thus we remember, to have

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seen that species of object we call flame, and to have felt that species of sensation we
call heat. (1992 [1739]: 87, emphasis in original)

On this view, the role of the memory is to keep a record of past perceptions
in a certain order and to preserve this order: ‘‘‘Tis evident, that the memory
preserves the original form, in which its objects were presented . . . The chief
exercise of the memory is not to preserve the simple ideas, but their order and
position’’ (1992 [1739]: 9; emphasis added).
Then, due to accumulated experiences, and because certain cognitive
sequences are stored in the memory, a readiness or disposition to perceive
certain cognitive sequences emerges. This sort of ‘alertness’ will drive, and make
possible further (new) perceptions, ‘‘When ev’ry individual of any species of
objects is found by experience to be constantly united with an individual of
another species, the appearance of any new individual of either species naturally
conveys the thought to its usual attendant’’ (1992 [1739]: 93; emphasis added).
New perceptions are therefore possible in connection with previous perceptions
and in terms of already memorized connections. If and when new perceptions
can be connected to old ones, they are stored and reinforce the cognitive
structure that has permitted their perception.
This view is confirmed by the fact that the individuals’ capacity to perceive
objects increases with the number of perceptions:

External objects [. . .] become present to the mind [when] they acquire such a relation
to a connected heap of perceptions, as to influence them very considerably in
augmenting their number by present reflections and passions, and in storing the
memory with ideas. (1992 [1739]: 207)

In contrast, external objects that ‘‘do not acquire such a relation to a

connected heap of perceptions’’ are not perceptible and are not perceived. In
other words, a perception is rejected if it does not fit into the structures or
sequences already stored in the memory. The event or object corresponding
to this impression is simply ignored. This means that impressions are
received, transformed into ideas and knowledge, if and only if they are
consistent with previously perceived and already stored information. In the
huge amount of data, information and messages that are transmitted through
the senses to the mind, only those corresponding to memorized cognitive
sequences are selected and reach the mind. As a consequence, Hume really
envisages perception as an act of interpretation that consists in a selective
and (more or less) unconscious screening and filtering of perceptions, and a
framing of them within memorized interpretative patterns.

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Interestingly, Hume’s approach is close to the modern theories of

perception put forward by economists and psychologists. For instance,
Hume is not far from Boulding’s conception of knowledge:

[W]e cannot regard knowledge as simply the accumulation of information in a

stockpile, even though all messages that are received by the brain may leave some
sort of deposit there. Messages are continually shot into this structure; some of them
pass right through its interstices . . . without effecting any perceptible change in it.
Sometimes messages ‘‘stick’’ to the structure and become part of it . . . Occasionally,
however, a message which is inconsistent with the basic pattern of the mental
structure, but which is of a nature that it cannot be disbelieved hits the structure,
which is then forced to undergo a complete reorganization. (Boulding 1955,
103 – 104)

One may also note that Hume’s approach corresponds to recent works
that stress biased and selective perception. For instance, as Kuran puts it,
individuals ‘‘perceive selectively, noticing facts consistent with our beliefs
more readily. This bias imparts resistance to our beliefs by shielding them
from counterevidence’’ (1995: 173). This conception of human cognition
relates to a phenomenon known such as the curse of knowledge—once an
individual knows something, he cannot imagine thinking otherwise—or
cognitive dissonance (Akerlof and Dickens 1982).
Thus, backward looking plays a crucial role in human cognition, since
memory delineates and at the same time makes cognition possible. This does
not mean that individuals are not capable of envisaging genuinely new
connections between past perceptions. Memory is complemented or
supplemented by imagination. Just as Shackle insists on the importance of
imagination, Hume emphasizes imagination as a crucial human capacity. He
particularly stresses the role of imagination with regards to the problem of
the continued existence of external objects when these objects are no longer
present to the senses. The problem is as follows: when senses cease to
operate, impressions are no longer transmitted to the mind, and objects are
then no longer present to the mind. However, objects nonetheless continue to
exist in the individual mind, because individuals infer that objects still exist.
But, as argued above, no inference is an act of reason. Hume indeed claims
that, in these matters, our reason is of no use: ‘‘upon the whole our reason
neither does, not it is possible it ever shou’d, upon any supposition, give us
the assurance of the distinct contin’d existence [individuals] feel or see’’ (1992
[1739]: 193). Rather, that objects have a distinct and continued existence
comes from a ‘‘sentiment’’ that ‘‘is entirely unreasonable [and] must proceed
from some other faculty than understanding’’ (1992 [1739]: 192; emphasis

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added). Hume then refers to imagination to explain that objects still exist
even in the absence of any sensory perception: ‘‘This opinion must be entirely
owing to the IMAGINATION’’ (ibid.). In other words, imagination replaces
reason as a capacity for establishing new connections between impressions
and ideas. Imagination—rather than reason—explains that individuals may
not be limited regarding external reality. Individuals may imagine anything,
for instance, as is the case with poets or philosophers.
Let us note that, however unbounded the imagination may appear, it
cannot be considered a totally free process, a ‘‘free unlimited fantasy of day-
dreams’’, as Shackle (1959: 288) puts it. To insist on the role of imagination
‘‘is not an invitation to free flight of thought’’ (Augier and Kreiner 2000:
670). Hume, indeed, claims that the individuals’ capacity to imaginatively
create new connections relates to, depends on, and is constrained by what has
been already experienced. As a capacity that combines impressions and ideas
which have previously been memorized, imagination is necessarily bounded
by existing knowledge. Once again, we are drawn to the role of memory
and to past experiences. Obviously, through the link between imagination
and memorized past experiences, Hume acknowledges that our memorized
cognitive structure delineates what can happen. This perspective echoes
what Shackle wrote about human decision making: ‘‘There is a texture in
the world which prescribes, not what will happen but what can happen’’
(1966: 760).
To sum up Hume’s view of cognition, one may say that individual learning
consists in a selective and an imaginative process of interpretation and re-
interpretation of the flow of impressions and ideas received from the external
world. More precisely, the human mind combines two faculties—memory
and imagination—to deal with past experience and current information. Two
forces are decisive. First, there is a backward-looking force: a process
bounded, guided, and made possible by the mental models built up from
previous experience and stored in the memory. Second, there is a forward-
looking force: the capacity to go beyond sensible experience and to imagine
new connections.

Sympathy and Collective Learning

A third and final aspect has still to be stressed. It relates to the collective
dimension of learning, and more precisely to the way collective and
individual processes combine. In effect, from the perspective of a refined,
less rationalist, and more realistic model of man, it needs to be emphasized

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that the development of individual faculties and the acquisition of

knowledge do not consist in purely independent and isolated processes.
Learning does not rest only on the accumulation of data or information
subjectively perceived by an individual. To put it differently, the
environment in which individuals’ behaviour take place is not only a
reservoir in which they pick up information (and resources). Rather, the
individual’s cognitive development is influenced or, as Witt argues,
‘‘moulded in interactive processes with man’s social environment’’ (Witt
1998: 164) and by the other individuals who are part of this environment.
What individuals know, then, does not only depend on what they learn
from their personal experiences, but also from what they learn from their
interactions with others. To be more precise, individuals learn by observing
and imitating what others do (see, in particular, Bandura 1977, 1986). This
corresponds to the social dimension of learning that social cognitive
theorists term ‘‘vicarious’’ or ‘‘observational learning’’.
Hume was convinced that knowledge acquisition could not be understood
solely in the terms of subjective perception of the external world. One may
even argue that the social or collective learning is necessary in the sensualist –
associationist framework used by Hume. In effect, and on the one hand,
within such framework, individual knowledge depends on a subjective and
necessarily limited perception of the world. However, on the other hand, an
individual’s knowledge obviously goes beyond the limits of personal
experience. This means that a part of an individual’s knowledge corresponds
to the experiences of others, and results from interactions with them. Hume
thus cannot but acknowledge the existence of an interactive learning process
through which opinions are formed and changed because of communication
with others.
Sympathy is the mechanism that explains how the domain of individual
knowledge increases, is quantitatively extended beyond the limits of personal
experience, and is qualitatively improved through interactions with others.
Moreover, rather than a specific sentiment, sympathy is a psychological
capacity or a ‘‘very powerful principle’’ (Hume 1992 [1739]: 577) that allows
and supports a certain form of communication between individuals.
Sympathy plays a quantitative function, by providing information about
experiences that have not yet been experienced but that have been
experienced by others. In different words, what individuals know about an
object does not depend only on their own perception of the object but is
complemented by the perceptions of others.
Sympathy also qualitatively influences individual knowledge. In effect,
sympathetic communication does not provide brute data. It provides

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information about the way others (however subjectively) perceive the

environment. As Hume notes:

no quality of human nature is more remarkable in itself and its consequences, than
the propensity we have to sympathise with others, and to receive by communication
their inclinations and sentiments, however different from, and even contrary to our
own. (ibid.: 316)

More precisely, as is apparent from the references to ‘‘inclinations’’ and

‘‘sentiments’’ in the preceding quotation, in spite of its cognitive dimension,
sympathetic communication should certainly not be viewed as a cognitive
process (cf., for instance, Pitson 1996: 262). Sympathetic communication
rests on the participation in the same experiences as others. To feel sympathy
towards someone else means that ‘‘all affections readily pass from one person
to another, and beget correspondent movements in every human creature’’
(Hume 1992 [1739]: 575 – 576). This is possible because, as Hume notes,
human minds are ‘‘similar in their feelings and operations, nor can any one
be actuated by any affection, of which all others are not in some degree
susceptible. As in strings equally wound up, the motion of one communicates
itself to the rest’’ (ibid.). As a consequence, sympathy does not rest on explicit
communication. Through sympathy, communication is necessarily implicit
and informal.
To illustrate how sympathy functions, one may refer to the way ‘‘our
sense’’ or ‘‘judgement’’ of beauty’’ develops. As Hume writes, in effect, ‘‘Our
sense of beauty depends very much on this principle’’ (1992 [1739]: 576). This
is due to the fact that, ‘‘In every judgement of beauty, the feelings of the
person affected enter into consideration, and communicate to the spectator
similar touches of pain or pleasures [. . .] What association of ideas would
ever operate, were that principle here totally unactive’’ (1998 [1751]: 113).
But, as noted above, a perception is not an objective description of the
external world but only consists in a subjective evaluation. Thus, sympathy
transmits the subjective evaluation an individual forms—namely the pleasure
felt—when he or she believes that an object is beautiful. Sympathy does not
inform us of an objective quality or feature of an object; it tells us how an
individual feels towards an object:

where any object has a tendency to produce pleasure in its possessor, it is always
regarded as beautiful . . . Whenever an object has a tendency to produce pleasure in
the possessor [. . .] it is sure to please to the spectator, by a delicate sympathy with
the possessor. (1992 [1739]: 576 – 577)

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However, sympathy not only transmits quantity of data and qualitative

information on others’ tastes by informing us of the feelings of others.
Sympathy also plays an important role in the definition of which actions are
virtuous or, one may say, valuable. In effect, Hume extends his argument
regarding ‘what pleasures to others also induce pleasure in the observer’ to
the domain of morals. Virtue is thus defined with respect to approbation:
‘‘virtuous’’ is used to designate ‘‘whatever mental action or quality gives to a
spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation’’ (1998 [1751]: 160). More
precisely, from Hume’s perspective, an action or a quality is made valuable
through our powers of approval. As a consequence, the evaluation of an
action, a behaviour, or a quality depends on the possible approbation of
others, and does not rest only on a private decision. In particular, this means
that there are not only private benefits that make an action, a quality
valuable, or virtuous. Obviously, Hume did not believe that individuals
would consider actions valuable and rewarding which only serve their
self-interest.
Hume combines this argument with his understanding of the role that
motives such as generosity, benevolence, or concern for others play in
human behaviour. Among many virtuous actions or qualities, some are
susceptible of being approved because they serve the public good, the good of
mankind, or the welfare of others: ‘‘a sympathy with public interest is the
source of moral approbation’’ (1992 [1739]: 499 – 500). These actions or
qualities which are valuable for the whole of society are named ‘‘social’’
virtues. This means that when human beings are benevolent, they tend to
consider as valuable—and to approve—those actions and qualities which
promote the public good.
Certainly, Hume does not ignore the fact that human beings are also able
to act out of egoistic motives. Individuals may behave as ‘‘knaves’’ or ‘‘bad
men’’, egoistically favouring their private interest. Hume acknowledges the
possible mixture in the motives out of which individuals act. As he notes, ‘‘it
is sufficient for our present purpose, if it be allowed . . . that there is some
benevolence, however small infused in our bosom; some spark of friendship
for human kind; some particle of the dove, kneaded into our frame, along
with the element of the wolf and serpent’’ (1998 [1751]: 147). In particular,
there are certain circumstances in which an individual may deliberately
and egoistically seek the approbation of others. However, Hume insists
that this type of behaviour does not correspond to the basic condition of
human nature. Spontaneously, individuals tend to favour those actions
and qualities that are approved by others and that contribute to the welfare
of others.

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Part of Hume’s argument rests on the role sympathy plays in the develop-
ment of social virtues. Interestingly, from Hume’s perspective, sympathy
creates these social virtues: ‘‘sympathy is the source of esteem, which we pay
to all the artificial virtues’’ (1992 [1739]: 577). By this Hume means that the
‘‘pleasing sentiment of approbation’’, which gives birth to virtuous and
valuable actions, springs from and is conveyed by sympathy. Put differently,
we esteem all the artificial or social virtues, that is we approve the behaviours
or qualities of virtuous individuals because and when we sympathize with
these individuals.
Thus, one cannot dissociate individual and social of cognition. Sympathy
not only explains communication, it also explains the origins and existence of
social beliefs about one another’s behaviour. Sympathy explains why,
‘‘although subjective in nature, the individual’s cognitive development [. . .] is
moulded in social process’’ (Witt 1998: 164). As Hume notes, sympathy
contributes to the homogenization of knowledge: ‘‘to this principle, we ought
to ascribe the great uniformity we may observe in the humours and turn of
thinking of those of the same nations’’ (1992 [1739]: 316). Sympathy can
indeed be considered the source and origin of the ‘‘emotional commitment’’
(Frank 2001), which is a necessary condition for co-operation. In different
words, sympathy gives birth to the common background that is necessary for
repeated interaction, and allows for the emergence of rules.

CONCLUSION

After decades of ‘‘economic imperialism’’, during which the ‘‘queen of social

sciences’’ sought to impose its methods and assumptions on other social
sciences, economists now believe it necessary to look for inspiration in other
social sciences—more specifically psychology and cognitive science. Refer-
ence to these social sciences is assumed to be important for developing a
more refined, richer and more realistic conception of man than the one used
in economic theory. As we have shown here, David Hume developed a
representation of man and a theory of cognition not so far from this more
modern perspective on man. This reference to Hume—one of the founders of
political economy—suggests that economic theory has moved away from its
origins. Even recent attempts made to develop a new or modern form of
political economy, in the form of public choice theory and an economic
analysis of law, reveal that there are quite important differences between this
new form and the old one it is intended to revive. To some extent, a genuine
new or modern political economy requires we pay more attention to classical
political economy and the models of man it developed.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
A first version of the paper was presented at the World Congress in Social
Economics (Albertville, June 2004) and at the 2005 History of Economics
Society annual conference (Tacoma, June 2005). I thank John Davis,
Manfred Holler, Eric Schleisser and an anonymous referee for comments and
remarks on earlier versions of the paper.

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