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fa RADICAL DEMOCRACY, PERSONAL FREEDOM, AND
,
we ) THE TRANSFORMATIVE POTENTIAL OF POLITICS'
I By STEVEN WALL
I
I. Izr...'TKODUCTION
H. PRELIMINARY CLARIFICATIONS
'1 wuuld like to thank Robert Amdur, Ellen Frankel PIUI. and Mark W,men fur their
comments on earlier drafts of this essay .
I Wrill;!'rs associated with the liberal pluralist model of politics include empirical political
scientists like Robert A. Dahl, A F-rrfoct to lXmocratic Tht!ory (Chicago: University of Chjcago
Press, 1959); and David Truman, The Gotltrnmmtal Procl5�: Politicu[ Int�t5 1Irn1 Public Opin
ion, 2d 00. (Berkt'ley: Tn!;titutt:' IIi Govt:'nunentai Studies, 1993); as well. s economk theorists
of democracy likeAnthony Downs, An Economic Thtory of Drmornq (NeVI' York: Harper and
Row, 1957); William Riltt:'r, Uboalism agllitl5t Populism: A COl1frontlltion bdwrrn tM. 'TNeory af
SocjQl ChDin lind Drmocrncy (San rranci�o: William F� Co., 1982); and James Bucha
nan, HPolitics without Romance: A Sketch of P05ltiVE- I>\.bli(' Chn� ThPnry and 11'$ Norma_
tive Im plications,N in The 11ttory of Public au)icc, vol. 2, N. James Bucnan.an and R. D.
Tollison (Ann Arb.,r: Univt:'rsity of Michigan Press, IIJ84).
C> 2000 Soei.al J>hilotiophy .. rulicy fuundlliOl'l. Ponied in the L!SA. 225
I
2 See Benjamin &rber, Slrrmx lHmocrrKy: Participtllory PoIilics for a Ntw Ag� (Berkeley:
University of COllifomia Press, 1983); Carole Pateman. l'tIrticipation find CkmomIlic TIwry
(Cambridge: C.mbrillgc University PrKS. 1970); Frank Michc lman, �1k SuprelTlt! Court,
1985 Term - Furward: ']riillCeS of Self-Govt!f'lUn('nl,H H4nard lr"" Rnrit-w 100 (19S6): 4-"; CISI!'
Sunstein, "Beyond the Rep u b lican Rt'viv.l," Yfllt /...ow J01lnw/1J7 {1988}: 1539-90; Jurgen
Habcrma�, Bctuwn Fflets find Nonn<:: eo"'ribw'ions to Q Disrnwrw Thtory of UnuQud Ot-mocrncy,
traml. Will iam Rehg (Cambrid�, MA: MIT Press, IIJ1J6); and Seyla Bmhatrib. Crit/tiut, Nurm,
tlnd Utopin (New York: Columbia Univenity Pmis, 1986). Otht!r r.dkal democrats include
John Dryzek, Discwrsiw DrmnmIcy: Politics, Policy, tmd Politiall Scima> (C.mbridgc: Carn
bridge University f>reg, 1990); lri� Marion Young. fuslier find Iht Politics of Diffntctl t (Priroce
ton: Prinreton University PMos, 1990); Chantal Moufk, Tht hlum of thi Po!iticlJl (London:
Verso, 1993); CArol Guuld, Rtthinking DtInOCl'l:lCY: Frttdom and Socllli Cuopml/iotl in P.Jlitics.
Eamomlcs, tmd Socitty (Cambridge: Cambridge Univl/!'noity Pn!'$5, 1988); Hannah Pitkin. "Jus.
tiC'(': On Reliuing Priv ate and Public. Politiall Thtory 9, no. 3 (1981): 327-52; M;!Irk W'al"K'l\,
...
,
0 one that contrasts with the liberal view:' As mentioned above, this view
,- of personal freedom can be stated. albeit broadly and vaguely, as the
s claim that there is a tight connectio n between personal freedom and
\- political self-government.
" Stated this broadly, however, the radical democratic view is hopelessly
Ie fuuy. To make any headway at all, we must identify more precisely the
a idea(s) expressed in the claim that there is a tight connection between
01 personal freedom and poli.tical self-government. With this in mind, sev
eral different possibilities need to be distinguished. For example, itean be,
v- and has been. argued that political self-government is a constituent ele
it- ment of personal freedom. Rousseau famously held that people can be
OS free only insofar as they live in a political community in which they
ek pncticipOlte in the processes of self-rule and the political community is
governed by a general wilP Such a view makes political self-government
a necessary condition of personal freedom. Less stringently, some have
argued that a necessary condition of being free is that one play some
active role in the sell-government of one's political community. On this
less stringent view, there is no further requirement that one's political
community be governed by a general will or that one authorize its use of
political power.
In contrast to these two views, it is sometimes claimed that political
self-government is instrumental to personal freedom. This might be true
for one of two reasons. first, it is sometimes argued that active partici
pation in political self-government helps people develop capacities and
skills which themselves are integral to personal freedom.· On this view,
,m- while participation in political self-rule is not strictly speaking a neces
,nly sary condition for the development of these capacities, it is an important
om, means to their development. Without participating in political self
government, many will fail to develop the capacities and skills intet,"J'a1 to
'Ie)r.
""""
�"-
I personal freedom. Second, it is sometimes atgUed that participation in
political self-government is instrumentally valuable to personal freedo m
I
c... in the sense that the fonner is an importMt safeguard to the latter. Given
irgen the world in which we live, this VleW holds, if we are to preserve our
cm'y.
''''',''
i liberty we must be self�veming and we must actively pOlrticipOltc in
I
dude
Cam-
rin<O- • It ill important lo!>tress that, gi...en this limitalion of tropr, this eMIly d0e5 not purport
ndoo: 10 reach a gefl('ral ...erdict Ofl radiclll demuC'Ky or on any particular radical democratic
'/ilic:s, theory. llle point is not to affirm or �f!Ct radkal deoliiOCillA."}, but meumine ando.ploreonc
. -Jus- im� nant line of argument that rlldol ckmocratli have advanct!d.
',nen. Few radical democrats aro:>pt Rousseau's MiNI of community outright, but identifica·
op- tions with it crop up hom time to time in radD.ldemocratk writi�.See"p. Barber", SlrvnX
)d We Drmocn:lCY, and Patcman, Ptlrticipotiort end Drmocralic n.tury. In diKU5Sin8 this view, I will
Th""y spE'alt of citizens rollecti...dy id6lrifying with the authorization of �ilic:al power in their
pulitkal rommunity. I will do this to ....oid having tCi confront the intcrp�i� question of
197(): how to undenland Ro US!;t!au's notion of the gmeral will.
Press, i> This view has sotMlimes been attributed to Hab.!rmas. Sc.... Warren. -The Self in Di5-
C1Jrsive Democracy,� 172-79.
!
-----�- --
- -- --- � .. --- . ..."
-
ruling our political communities, for only by so doing can we protect our
fTeedom from potential threats both at home and abroad?
Thus, depending on how the phrase "a tight connection'" is construed.
there are at least four different interpretations of the claim that there is a
tight connection between personal freedom and political self-government.
These fOUl interpretation.. are summarized. below.
I
and abroad.
This essay will focus on the first three of these claims. While it raises
important issues, (0) does not clearly represent a departure from liberal
pluralist theory. With no difficuJty, liberal pluxalists can concede that if
circumstances are such that widespread political participation is the only
or the most effective way to preserve liberty, then people ought to value
self-government if they value freed om. Accordingly, the dispute beh\'een
the liberal pluralist and the proponent of (0) is not perspicuously de
scribed as a theoretical disagreement about the nature of freedom and
self-government. Rather, it is better understood as a sociological dispute
over when and how often widespread political participation is necessary
to preserve personal freedom.s
, For discussion and deftm!ie of thi� view, ICe Quentin Skinner, "1be Idea of Negative
LiMrty; Philosophic.1 and HistorKal PeOlpI!CtivM,- in Philosophy in History, ed. Rkhud
Rorty, jerome Schnecwind, and Quentin Skinner (umbridge; Cambridge University Press,
1984).
• Thi» hi pretty much conceded by the most pro�t contemporary proponent of claim
(D). Qupntin Skinner m.kH it plain thai the writers he draws on in his work .11 ac«pt a
libe-ral und en;tanding of personal frftdom. Their disa�ment with liberal wrilft"S concerns
how thiS Shared understanding of pe'rsonaJ fret!dom can bPst be promoted and safeguarded.
See also Charles Taylor'. discussiun of this i56ue in his PhiloscJrH,icaIA'8IfmtnIS (Cambridge,
MA; J I.rv"rd UniVCDlty Prl'!ill, 1'1'!l5), 302 n. 1'.
•
RADICAL DEMOCRACY 229
In contrast, claims (A). (B), and (e), in different ways, all pose an
important theoretical challenge to liberal pluralism. It is this theoretical
challenge that I want to investigate in this essay. If any of these claims ace
d,
true, liberal pluralists have failed to grasp, or have underestimated the
a
significance of, political self-government for personal freedom.
It.
I will discuss these claims in serial fashion, starting with the stronger
(A) and (8) and then later turning to (C). First, however, 1 need to fill in
some of the theoretical background to the radical de mocratic view. To
ward this end. in this section, 1 will identify and discuss two important
m themes of radi.cal democratic political thought. These two themes I will
: is call respectively self-transformation through political discussion and civic au·
ith tonomy. By studying these two themes in some detail, we con come to see
ity. why many radical democrats have been tempted to embrace one (or
several) of the claims distinguished above.
By
The basic idea behind the first theme is not difficult to explain. Accord
.op
ing to radical democrats, politics is not simply a space where we come
together to advance our pre-political interests and ends. It is also a space
,ily where we subject our understanding of our needs and interests to rational
m, scrutiny. This is a natural consequence of the logic of political discussion.
me In politics we arc called on to express our views and articulate our inter
ests, but in the process of expression and articulation these views and
interests can change and be refIned. We can discover that our views arc
,ses mistaken or that we do not have a fully accurate grasp of what is in our
�ra1 best interests. In this way, our understanding of who we are (and other
It if people's understanding of who we are) can be transformed; and more
only often than not, the radical democrat will contend, this tr ansformation will
Ilue be for the better.9
een The second theme is not so easily explained in simple, straightforward
de terms. Civic autonomy refers to a socially constituted form of freedom
and that results when citizens colJectively identify with the authorization of
oute political power in their SOCiety. This can occur in one of two main ways.
HOry The first way is the achievement of a rational consensus on political
questions. This consensus is made possible when men and women come
together to deliberate about and define the common good of their SOCiety.
Importantly, when such a consensus is reached, persons are bound only
.ative
;hard by laws they themselves have endorsed. For this reason, consensus in
".", politics is valuable and inspiring. But the consensus must be a rational
one to be worthy of respect. Accordingly, radical democrats who invoke
claim
"'1'''
��
Q For di5C'USSion. sec Michclmiln, �The Supreme Court"; Ca:o� Sunste-in. �Prere� lind
rded. Politics," Philosophy and Public Alfilirs 20, no. 3 (1991); and Benhabib, CriliqlM, Norm, lind
ridge, Utopia,313-14.
230 STEVEN WALL
consensus put great store in the claim that all persons should be allowed
to participate on fair terms with others in the formation of the consensus.
Only in this way. it is held, can we ensure that no rclcvnnt considerations
will be overlooked and that no one's interests will be left out in the
fonnation of the consensuS.1O A rational consensus, then. is simply a
consensus that has been reached when all have been allowed to partici
pate under fair conditions.ll
As many radical democrats themselves are quick to stress, however,
achieving a rational consensus on political questions is a ctiIficult thing to
do in modern pluralistic societies. If this were the only way to realize civic J.
autonomy, it might be fair to conclude that it is a utopian idea. But there
is a second way to realize civic autonomy. Unable to reach agreement on
the substance of how conflicts ought to be resolved and what coUective
goals ought to be pursued. citizens might nevertheless come to agree on
the appropriate procedures for settling their differences. They might come
to share a commitment that certain decision-making procedures-when
all participate in them on fair terms11-confer legitimacy on the outcomes
that flow from them. In this case, despite their disagreements on the
substance of politics, citizens would be led to agree that the Jaws that bind
them are legitimate and fair. This would amount to a collective identifi
cation with the authorization of political power in their society. Let us call
this second-order civic Qutonomy. to distinguish it from the first-order civic I
autonomy that is realized when a rational political consensus obtains. i
I
Having now sketched these two themes-themes which are given a
different interpretation and a different emphasis by different radical
democratic thinkers-we can now inquire into how they might bear on
the radical democratic view of f reedom and self-government. Two an
swers imme(Hately suggest themselves. The first one holds that the self
transformation that occurs through political discussion is an integral
component of personal freedom. The second answer holds that the achieve
ment of civic autonomy is integral to personal freedom because a consti
tutive element of personal freedom is living in a community in which one
can identify with the laws that bind one (as one can in a political com
munity that realizes civic autonomy). These two answers connect the two
radical democratic themes to the value of personal freedom. They explain
why the radical democrat privileges the domain of politics and exalts the
value of political participation. If the first answer is right, then only by
10 See,
fOft'llample,}ilrgen Habermas, Moral COII5Ciowsn� md CmmPfllnil;atrorAction (Cam
bridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990); Bcnhabib, Critiqlle. Norm,lwd Wapiti; and Sunstein. HBt'yond
the Republican �·ival."
II
The� are different IICCOunts of what tun.'1titutes fair conditions. Di�nmt racHal dem
ocrabi hav," specified them in diHerent ways, but hc� WI: JWed nOI collCe'm oursetves with
these diffe�nct!!;.
12 Thi
s qualificatMln is impmtMt. Civic autonomy requi� active I!TlgJIgeomcnt with and
coomwmenl of the relevant dt'Cision"makjng pfOC"t'dUl'H. It is not achit.'yl!d whm dtiuns
acquiesce in political outc� that follow from proct'dures they naye no! participated in.
RADICAL DEMOCRACY 231
dem- Both (A) and (8) assert a necessary connection between personal free
; with dom and participation in democratic politics. But (A) is the stronger of the
two claims. We should start, then. by asking whether there are good
h a.nd
.tizen' reasons for thinking it is true. As 1 noted above, the idea that in order to
:00 in. be free one must live in a politicol community that realizes civic au ton-
--_.- -- - - - --..._- .
-
omy gains support from the thought that living in a political community
in which one can identify with the la'o\'S that bind one is a constitutive
element of personal freedom. lhi5 thought, of course, was Rou5Seau's;
and it expresses a powerful ideal.13
But while there is little doubt that this ideal is inspiring, doubts have
often been voiced about whether it is achievable in practice, particularly
in complex, differentiated pluTalistie societies. If it is not achievable in
practice, then it cannot serve as a valid guide for political action. The ideal
would be utopian in the pejorative sense. Given this, radical democrats
who accept claim (A) because they accept the ideal that lies behind it need.
to offer some explanation for how this ideal could be achieved (or at least
how it could come doser to being achieved) under modem conditions.l'"
In this section, 1 will examine and criticize two such explanations that
sometimes have been offered by r<1d.ical democrats. This will put us in a
better position in the next section to examine a third explanation, one that
draws more explicitly on the transformative potential of polities.
The two explanations to be considered here can be labeled the uniwr
sali2ation strategy and the mediation strategy. In its most general fonn, the
universalization strategy maintains that political discussion has a "disci
plining effect." It compels political actors to present their views in public
regarding language. By so doing, it facilitates the achievement of a rational
consensus. The basic idea behind this strategy has been well summarized (
by Benjamin Barber: I
1.1 As RoWifil!�u famously put it. the idal is to find � form of political H!IOCiation in which
..
each as�at� "while uni ting with all, nev�rthe-Icss obeys only himself . " (Jean·Jacques
Rousseau, On tltt 5ocitI1 COt/tlllet Ilndianapulis: Hackett Publi!hing Cu., 1988), 148).
If By "modern condition�" I mean to ref€'r to certain unruntroversial facts about modem
political communiti�, N'lmrl)" that they arc rclath·cly 11Irg(', have rrnx.km �onomies, and
contlun a diversity of social gn)Ups.
l' S.·U'ber. Slro"g DmKICracy. 171.
I
•
-,
-
russion. Still, even conceding this point, it is fair to inqu.ire into how
.ty
ve political di scussion is supposed to work its magk once the right condi
's; tions are established. And by focusing on this more speculative question,
we can come to a judgment about the plausibility of the univen;alization
"e strategy.
rly The universalization strategy gets its bite from the idea thilt in p0-
in litical argument one must p resent reasons for one's views that relate
,al them to the public good of one's community. Simply asserting that
.Is some policy would serve one's own interests normally will not pass
� muster. This rules out all policies or proposals that cannot be defended
os, in public-regarding language. And, if selfishness obstructs the achieve
.1' ment of a rational consensus (n not implausible idea!), then this con
,.
d<m '" Conside-r tlm example. The owner of a domestic fl\ctory might be in favor of prot«:
. and tlOl\lst legiSlatiOn because such legislQhon would like!}' in�a5e his profits. Ho�er, in
arguing for the Iegh.lation in public deblllte, he could "repackagt:" his v�ws by appe"ling to
public v.duo:!> such � the n� tu pru\l;!(:\ local jobs from foreign competition.
.
:-'------�--
. _ .. ...
�--. -_._---
I
.
from their particular beliefs and values and seek outcomes that all
could accept. But even supposing that we could arrive at outcomes
that all could accept if we all stepped back, many will not have the
I
motivation to do so. They will not want to step back from their com·
mitments, perhaps viewing this as a form of betrayal.19 If this is right,
then we cannot expect political discussion to move all participants to
accept the requirement of universalizability.
11 5eto, .mong others, Joshua Cohen. "OC'liberolion ilnd Ot:mocntic �tim.cy," in Tht
Good Polity, ed. Alan Hamlin .00 Philip Pettit (Oxford; 81.ckwell. 1989); and 5cyla Ben
habib, -Ubenli DIalogue versus a Critical Theory of DlJelUSlve l.A:girunacy," in 5enhlbib.
SilauJ,in8 1M �If (New York: Routledge, 1992).
I' See John Mackie's discussion of what he terms the "third stage of univeruli7.arion in
moral thought"; John L Mackie, Ethics: rnmltinK RiSkl /lnd Wrong (Harmondsworth; Pen·
guin. 1971l. 93.
I. Thi5 point is a natural extensKK"I of what MkhHl Walttr has termed the problem of
partkulari5m;
Even if [persons) an! committed to impartiality, the question most likely to arise in the
minds of membtors of a political community is not, What wllUld fltionallndividuals
choose under univenoaUzing conditions of !Il1ch And such I sort? Sut rather, What
would indMduaJsliu us choose, who arc situated as we lll'C, who!l�re a culture and
tire determined to go on sharing it?
See Michael WaLz.er, Splrtm of ]USIKt.' (New York: &sk Books , 1(84). 5. See "Iso Georgia
Wamake, �Communicalive RationalilY and Cultural Valuo..'"lI.� in TMC,mlhridg.! CllmlMmilli W
H/lbtrmas, eel. White, where Watnake critically di5C\lSSt'S Haberll"'LU'" views on this issue.
I
RADICAL DEMOCRACY 235
)mes
, the
i rational consensus in politics is possible because political discussion pro
vides a powerful means for mediating and overcoming disagreement. As
com i one writer has put it, the democratic "commitment to universalism amounts
to a belief in the possibility of mediating different approaches to polities,
�ight,
Lts to
I or different conceptions of the public good, thTOugh discussion and
I dialogue."21
The important idea in this passage is that persons who hold different
political views may nevertheless have shared interests of which they have
not yet become fully aware. Participation in political discussion provides
an avenue for the discovery of these common concerns.
Consider the following scenario: Two parties, A and 8, have different
views about politicaJ morality. Suppose now that they share, but do not
fuUy realize that they share, a common interest that is compelling for both
of them. Further suppose that participation in political discussion would
make it more likely that they would come to understand that they share
this interest. In this way, participation in political discussion would sup
ply A and 8 with a motive to make mutual concessions so as to promote
their common interest, and this might help them reach agreement on a
wide range of political questions.
The second argument in support of the mediation strategy is sketched
by Cass Sunstein, among others. "A principal function of a democratic
system," he writes, "is to ensure that through representative or partici
patory processes, new or submerged voices, or novel depictions of where
interests lie and what they in fact are, are heard and understood.."25 He
then argues that these new voices and submerged interests will have a
\. -
t
I
nol write as if civic virtue and civility were complementary, merely different
oth aspects of the same virtue.29 This allows them to claim that as more
uld
.are
I people become active in politics and begin to take political discussion
seriously, there will be a corresponding increase in the sincere willingness
up- of people to search for shared goals and to adjust their perspectives to
lote accommodate the interests and concerns of others. 1t is precisely this
,n ' promise of enhanced civility that gives both of the mediation arguments
their force.
he<! But given the common experience of political life in modem soci
-atic eties, this is oddly romantic. Surely it is more plaUSible to think that an
tid-
-.ere
210SWbtein, �Beyond the Republic.n Revival" 1555.
He 'Z1 As a reading of Hobbes makes plain, I n 1M early modem pe-riod, one of the central
,e a arguments against widespread dvic participation was that il lendcd to dividt: and polarizc
• society. See Thomas Hobbes, LniDthllll, !:d. Richard Flathmiln and Dlvid johnston (N_'
York.: W. W. Norton and Company, 1997), 118-19. M� �tty, one could point to tM
I db-
dh'isivene5s And tumult that went hand·in·hand with increased poitical
l plftlcipation in the
ncWs
1960s in the United States.
lA The distinction has � dr.wn by others. s...e, in p... t
kulJlr, Michael Walzer, "Civility
and Gvic Virtul! in Contemporary AmeriCil,� In lWtiCJJI Prir.dplts (Ne..... York: bie Books,
1980).
"" For 1'1 particularly dear example of this, see Barber, Strong Dmwcracy, 223.
....... . - ----� ."--
robust. but also less tolerant and civil. This might be an improvement
on the status quo; but at the moment that is not what is at issue. The
strategy of mediation asserts that a more pilfticipatory, more inclusive
form of political life would be more likely to achieve consensus be
cause people would discover shared goals and become more inclined
to adjust their views to accommodate the concerns of others. Taking
people as we find them, and as they have been in the recent past, this
claim is hard to accept.
All of this suggests that the mediation strategy, like the universalization
strategy. fails to provide a convincing explanation for how political dis
cussion could make possible. or more likely, the achievement of a rational
consensus on political questions. However, this does not yet show that
these strategies are unsuccessful in explaining the possibility of civic
autonomy. for it might be true that the mechanisms identified by these
two strategies. while not leading to a rational consensus on political
questions, would nonetheless lead people to accept as fair and legitimate
the same decision·making procedures for resolving their disagreements.
TIle two strategies, that is, might be able to account for the realization of
second.arder civic autonomy, even if they fail to account for the realiza·
tion of first�rder civic autonomy. But while possible, this is unlikely.
Substantive disagreement in politics is all too often interwoven with pl"O
c:edural disagreement about how the issues ought to be resolved. Con·
sider, for example, contemporary debates in the United States over abortion.
The substantive disagreement about the moral permissibility of abortion
is tightly intertwined with disagreement about which institutions-the
federal courts, the federal legislature, or the state legislatures-are the
appropriate decision·making bodies for resolving the dispute. The fact,
then, that substantive and procedural issues are not sharply separable,
but often tightly intertwined, strongly suggests that if the universaliza·
tion and mediation strategies cannot explain the possibility of fiT'St�rder
civic autonomy, they will not be able to explain the possibility of second·
order civic autonomy either.
However, nornithstanding this skeptical conclusion, the foregOing analy·
sis of both strategies has taken dtizens as we find them, and perhaps this
is a mistake. I have tried. to show that the universalizntion and mediation
strategies cannot explain how civic autonomy is possible under modem
conditions.
But radical democrats can respond to my arguments by insisting that
universalization and mediation will become effective mechanisms only
after the self·understandings of citizens have been suitably trans
formed. This brings us to a third explanation of how dvic autonomy is
possible, one that draws on the follOWing thought. In politil.'S we do
not simply argue for policies that advlIonce our interests, nor do we
l
RADICAL DEMOCRACY 239
! fact,
are mistaken or that some of their beliefs about what is worthwhile are
rable. not sufficiently sensitive to how things really are. And, for this reason,
.a.liza they may change their minds about their interests. When this occurs, I
",roer shall call it a progressj� transjomliltion, since those who change their
'Cond- minds in this way believe that their new interests represent an advance
on their old ones?'
analy Both types of transformative experiences can occur through partici
)s this pation in political discussion. By participating in political discussion, a
jation person may come to a better understanding of the origins of his pref�
adem erences and the conditioning influences on his beliefs. 10 this way, he
)U It is possible that a person might come to think that some of his intelt$\s were im
Ig that plant� in him when this was, in fact. falM!. In such a case, an aulonoff\OU!t trilnsfol"TNolion
5 only might result (ironically) in the pe-rson's becoming less au\(momous. Oi5CUssing this com
plication, however, would needlessly complkate my argument. J mention il ht!re just to put
trans
it to one side.
)my is .'1 It is pussible thai pt'Ople could be mistaken in thinking this. We might want to distin
we do guish a genuine progressivt! transformation from iii merely perceivl'd progressive transfor
mation. But again I shall ignore this rompikatiun.
:Io we
-._.
240 Sf
EVEN WALL
For present purposes, we can assume that radical democrats have well
workedooQut and convincing accounts of self-transformation through po
Iitical discussion. We can assume that these accounts can explain how
autonomous and progressive transformations are possible and how they
can be identified in practice. Our question is whether there is any reason
to think that such transformations could make the realization of civic
autonomy possible or more likely.
RADiCAL DEMOCRACY 241
tical Before proceeding, I need to introduce one lOlst piece of terminology. Let
·alu us say that a person who has undl!rgone either an autonomous or a
how progressive transformation had a distorted nud-inttrprttQtion prior to the
transformation. That is, prior to the transfommtion he had ol distorted
idea understanding of his own needs and interests. With this terminology, we
�k is: can ask what happens when people overcome their distorted need
ltion interpretations by participating in political discussion. And to this ques
ved? tion three general answers can be given: people who overcome their
lable distorted need-interpretations mOlY be no more and no less likely to con
tions verge on political questions or to converge on how they ought to be
fans resolved; or they may be less likely to so converge; or they may be more
lents likcly to so converge.
!d to The last of the three answers ;s the one the radicaJ demOCTat needs if
he is to provide an account of self-transformation through political
discussion that can vindicate claim (A). Perhilps realizing this, some
radical democrats have thought that such an answer is plausible. One
eces
writer, for example, has argued that public political discourses should
Idlor
be viewed as "moral-transforma tive processes,'" "processes through which
new needs and interests, such as can lead to a consensus among the
15for
participOlnts, emerge."32 But here it is necessary to ask why it is that
(\y.
people whose n�-interpretations have been tested and refined by p0-
litical discussion would be any more likely to reach consensus. \-,Vhy
11ana
not think the conver.;e is just llS likely to be true? After all, it is cer
lWing
tainly possible that when people come to a better under.;tanding of
If no
their individual needs and interests, they will be driven further apart.
·ondi
They may come to recognize that what is imporwnt to them confljcts
loubt
more violently (than they had previously thought) with what is impor
tant to others. We cannot just assume, then, that accurate or refined
Y' Do nt.'ed-interpretations will bring people closer together. And without this
Ion of
assumption, it is hard to see how participation in political discussion is
t will
supposed to bring about the types of transformations in participants
·1 self necessary to achieve a rational political consensus, or at least make
!). For achieving it substantially easier.
·lc au-
Against this, some radical democrats may believe thnt there exists an
underlying social bond between citb
:ens that is disrupted and frag
mented only because they suffer, for various reasons, from distorted need
interpretations. If this were right, it would be p14msible to think that
political di scussion under appropriate conditions could bring about trans
? well formations in citizens that make it more likely for them to converge in
gh pe judgment. However, as many have pointed out, such a belief is difficult
n how to sustain for complex modem societies marked by religious, ethnic, and
/'J they cuJtural pluralism. For these societies, there is no thick, shared ethical
.reason self-understanding that political discussion could bring to the surface and
If civic
:<:. Benhabib, Crllh)u�, Norm, and Utopia, 314.
._--- .' ..'_.'.-
<lrticuinte, That is why in these societies, even under the best of condi·
tions. politics will remain in large measure a matter of making comp�
mises and striking barg<lins.33
This gives us good reason to conclude that even if democratic politics
has a strong tmnsformative dimension (and this is something I have
conceded for the purposes of this section), no convincing case exists for
thinking that it could make the realization of civic autonomy any more
likely. And this means that claim (A) ....ill
. need to be given up.:W
Thus far, a good deal of my discussion has centered on the first radical
democratic theme, the theme of civic autonomy As I have pointed out. .
this theme owes much to Rousseau. Yet many radical democrats do not
accept the Rousseauian ideal of democratic community. Some have even
explicitly advocated a clean break with this ideal,3.5 and they perhaps will
be able to accept much of the discussion up to this point. Accordingly, we I
need now to drop talk of civic autonomy and focus exclusively on the \
second radical democratic theme, the theme of sell-transformation through
!
political discussion.
Working with this theme, it is possible to construct important and
interesting arguments about personal freedom that do not presuppose the
achievement of a rational consensus on political questions. This brings us
to claim (8). Recilll that this claim holds that participation in political
self-government is a necesScuy component of personal freedom, but it
does not add the further requirement that people collectively identify
with the authorization of political power in their society. Furthermore, as
I pointed out above, claim (8), if true, would give the radical democrat
what she needs. It would establish a tight link between political self
government and personal freedom.
In the previous section, 1 assumed the1t radical democrats have well
worked out and convincing accounts of self-transformation through po
litical discussion. But is this true? Do any such accounts exist? In this
I
RADICAL DEMOCRACY 243
II
....ell· discussion.:t9 Such participation can make us more aware of the origins
and causal histories of OUf preferences. For when we participate in p0-
p<>- litical discussion, we come into contact with the views and experiences of
this
others, and we are called on to reflect on <lnd justify our preferences. This
� and
,. � Ienn -adapti...e pr.ferencc" (Urnes from}on Ehret; he diKU� this phenomenon
1 (A). in Sour Grapt$ (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni...�rsity Press, 1983).
1:r'C is 31 As thP titlfo of Elstl!f'" book suggesbo, the pE'tsOrI whu sufft'rs from ad.ptivt' preferences
•nd I is lib the foJ.; in Aesop'S fable who rome$ not tll dt"Sire the grapes M cannot havt'.
...alid ,. Elster is c�ful to diliringuish this type of preference adllptation fn,m §elf-conscinu5
! and strategies of prcferenct' changc; 1t4.'e Sour CfllptS. 117.
.1 "" � By "rational political dillCUssion" I rN!an political discu!l6ion under fairly &ood coodi·
h....1: tiun,..., howt"Ycr U- might be 5�Ued out. lhe lloUggesrion th3t p-rtici�tion in rational
political discussion is the remedy for adapti...e preferences i5 made by El$ter, SoUf Crolpt$, 33,
'
It'.u s 140. Howt'Ver. Elster malcH it plain tNt he does nut be1i('\'t' that cIYt'rroming adapri...t'
,m0<- prderenccs (or achit'...ing ot�r b!meficial trill\S formative effects) rould be tht- primary point
O,"" of puliticai participaHun; M't' ibid., 91-100. See also ea- Sunstt'in. "Lo..,;al lnterfcrel'lre '""itn
Privat" Pccicn.-n«'6.� Ullhl('rsity "I Chkllgo Lnw &vinv S3 (1 966).
244 STEVEN WALL
process of reflection and justificiltion can bring the "behind the back"
causal mechanisms that underlie adaptive preferences out into the open.
freeing their victims from their grip.
Thus. the phenomenon of adilptive preference formation reveals how
participation in T<ltional political discussion could be a necessary com·
poneot of personal freedom. If citizens suffer from adaptive prefer
ences, and if rational political discussion is necessary to overcome them,
then they will need to participate in rational political discussion if they
are to be fully free. Of course, one might have doubts about just how
effecti�'e rational political discussion would be at accomplishing this
task. but I want to draw attention to a different problem with this line
of argument. Many radical democrats fail to distinguish politicCl} from
social Interilctlon. This allows them to portray political discussion as the
counterpoint to the solitary reflection of the individual. But it is an error
to identify the political too tightly with the social, for the former is a
subset of the latter. Political activity is simply one kind of social activity.
Once this is borne in mind, it is not plaUSible to claim that participation
in rational political discussion is necessary to overcome adaptive prefer
ences. People can learn about the origins and cilusal histories of their
preferences by interacting with others in social, but not necessarily po
litical. contexts.
At this point it might be objected that political discussion, at least under
good conditions. is different from other kinds of social discussions, and
that these differences are relevant to the matter at hand. In political set
tings, it might be argued. we must confront the views and perspectives of
a wide range of individuals, whereas in other social settings our inter
action is often more confined, Limited to those who share many of our
beliefs and biases. Furthennore, the exposure to a wide range of views
and perspectives in political settings might have epistemic value...a We
might come to learn more about ourselves by confronting the diverse
views and perspectives of others; and this self-knowledge might better
enable us to overcome adaptive preferences.
There is indeed truth to this objection, and we shall come back to it
later. For now, however, it ought to be clear that the objection cannot
defeat the point made above. Even if participation in ratio�l political
discussion better enables people to identify adapti\'e preferences than
participation in other forms of social discussion does, it would not follow
that participiltion in rational political dL.:;cussion is necessary for over
coming adaptive preferences. One cannot move from the claim that x is
the most effective means for overcoming y to the claim that x is necessary
to overcome y. And this stronger type of claim is what must be estab
lished i f this account is to be relied on to vindicate claim (8).
.a For more on this point. see lrill Marinn Ynung, "Cnmmunic�tion and th. Otn.r: Beyond
i fkn,OCftllY Itlld Vilfrrmu. ed. Benhabib, 126--28.
Deliberative Ot!mocr.lCY," n
RADICAL DE.\1OCRACY 245
I tum now to the second account mentioned above, the one that
relies on the idea that political discussion can provide protection against
manipulation.'U To understand this account, we need fi�t to attend to
10W an insight that is both important and true. The insight is that the iden
om tity of human beings is constituted in large part by their interaction
!fer- with others. TIle beliefs. needs, and prcien.>nces of people are not fixed,
oem, but fluid; and they are shaped and structured by the social practices
mey that they find themselves a part of and participate in. These facts war
now rant the conclusion that the "self" comes to be only within "'webs of
this interlocution.,,42
line Granting this basic insight, an insight which has by now become a
rom mere truism, it becomes possible to ask how we know that the social
; the ization processes that have shaped our needs and preferences are not
�ror themselves distorted. If the social framework that shapes us is beset
is a with pathologies, how much respect do our self-understandings wac
vity. rant? How ore we to distinguish distorted from authentic self-under
ltion standings? The answer given by the second account is that we can only
efer know th«t our "interpretationsH of our needs and interests are not dis
their torted if we have submitted them to a political discussion in which
. they have been tested. The reason we need to participate in such dis
po-
cussions is thell there is simply no better way to ensure that we are not
nder being manipulated by others. Participation can be thought of as a fOnTI
and of insurance against bad faith. As Habermas puts it: "[Nlothing better
I set prevents others from perspectivally distorting one's own interests than
esof actual participation.""3 If this is right, then participation in political
nter discussion, at least under the right conditions, is an integral component
f our of genuine self-understanding.
'jews But why, we need to ask «gain, must we participate in political as
o We opposed to social interaction in order to test our need-interpretations?
Ie,.. The argument we have been considering establishes that if people are to
�tter be free from manipulation, then it is advisable for them to discuss their
needs and interests with others. Yet, by itself, this tells us nothing about
to it the importance of political discussion per sc, as opposed to other types of
mnot discussions. Thus. by itself, it provides no support for claim (B).
itical Proponents of the argument do not wish to leave the matter here,
than however. They contend that the discussion with others that is needed
,Uow must take place under the right conditions. namely. under conditions in
over which all have the opportunity to participate on eqWlI teans. And a
t :t' is discussion like this occurs only in public political discourses, where all
ssary
!Stab-
�I Proponents of this account include Habermas, MonJI eo"SCioUStrlSS Dnd C"",mlltlimtiw
Act"", and BmNibib, C,Wqut, Nann, Dud UlopUi.
tl T'hf. phrase Ii Inkcn from Chnrlt'l: Taylm .'OlIImn of t� Stlf(Cambrid�, M": Harvard
•
·.._ .
.....
.-.-
are brought together to discuss their common fate."" This further step in
the argument connects it with claim (B). It shows that participation in
rational political di scussion is a necessaty component of personal freedom.'"
But is this further step plausible? In thinking about this, we need to
attend to the following point: a rational decision to investigate the au
thenticity of a need-interpretation requires taking into account the costs of
doing so. Suppose, for example, that the reliability of a need-interpretation
is a function of the relevant information one is aware of, the degree to
which that information is representative (not a biased sampling), and the
time spent reflecting on it. Participation in ideal political discussion may
enable one to score very high along these dimensions; but there are also
costs involved in participating in these discussions: time is lost, energy is
wasted, and the character of one's commitments may be changed in
undesirable ways.� For these reasons, it may be rational for some not to
want to participate in these discussions. By not participating, even if they
become more vulnerable to manipulation, they might be better able to
lead the lives they want to lead. This does not mean that it would be
rational for such people to forgo all attempts at self-examination. Self
examination-and the scrutiny of one's understanding of one's own
needs-can occur in a wide range of social contexts, and it can take many
different forms. The point here is only this: It would be a mistake to think
that all people, regardless of the character of their projects and concerns,
have tl compelli.ng reason to participate in rational political discussion so
as to insure against pOSSible manipulation.
This undercuts the further step in the argument under consideration.
Foe if participation in ideal political discussion is necessa ry to get pro-
-M For discussion of this point :.t."I! Warren. -What Should We E)(pect hum More DrmlX'
racyr 244·50.
RAOKAL DEMOCRACY 249
Each of these steps has to be argued for; but if all rou Id be defended, then
it would follow that there is a tight instrumental connection between
political seU-govemment and personal freedom.
The first step is not that controversial. Most will agree that being au
tonomous is part of what it is to be free . The disagreements begin with the
second step, for autonomy is a notoriously slippery concept. How it is
characterized is often as important as the claims made on its behalf, The
second step holds that autonomy demands th.lt one adopt a reflexive i
attitude toward one's interests, commitments, and projects. Since this is a t
I
very important claim, 1 want to quote from a proponent of the argument
under review:
then suasive. The reason for this is that there are features of democratic polit
ical p<1rticipation that make it likely to be a good means for promoting the
reflexive attitude identified above. Two features in particular should be
� au mentioned here. TIle first one is that in democratic political interaction we
aJ'@ brought into contact with a wider range of perspectives than we
... the
it is normally are in other forms of social interaction. In democratic politics
· The we must confront difference to a greater degree, for in many forms of
�xive social interaction people meet and discuss with others who share many of
5 is a
their own values, beliefs, and preconceptions. The second feature has
1 im
perspectives and negotiate our way through conflicts suggests the,t it
ames
thers would be a good means for developing the capacities n«essary for au
tonomy. The reflexive attitude is likely to develop and take root only if we
'plies
are forced to confront different identities and come to grips with the
lions,
· con-
claims they make on us. 1his is not to deny that the reflexive attitude
could be developed in nonpolitical social interaction. It is just to say that
there are reasons to think that participation in democratic politics would
be a particularly good means to its development.
eople
If this is right, we have some reason to accept the third step in the
erests
argumen t. Of course, we should welcome empirical research on this mat
.ding.
ter, but for the purposes of this esSClY I want to concede the point. Let us
,t; but
return, then, to the issue of the correct char�cterization of autonomy-the
'ntion
issue raised in the second step. The view that autonomy includes, among
other things, the adoption of a reflexive attitude toward onc's interests,
:itude
commitments, and projects sits well with a particular conception of hu
cratic
man needs and interests. On this point conSider the follo.....ing remarks by
dem
a writer who embraces this understanding of autonomy:
more
about
Epistcmically, we cannot say that all needs that permit linguistic
es for
expression are true, but only that those which do not permit linguis
tic articulation cannot be true. It is ultimately the process of dis
vity of
course, what 1 have named the moral-transformative experience, that
establishes the truth and lllisehooci of our needs. But even then, we
-'-�
If we believe, as this pussage urges us to, that the truthfulness of OllT own
needs and interests can only be established in discursive debate with
others, then we wil1 1ikely be attracted to an understanding of autonomy
that demands of us "constant critical reevaluation and reconsideration of
OUT most cherished needs." Let us call this understanding the discursive
conception of autonomy.
In thinking about this conception of autonomy, it is important to realize
that other conceptions are available. Even if one rejects the discursive
conception, one can still affirm the value of autonomy. To make this point
clear, we can introduce a second conception of autonomy, one that 1 shall
call the liberal pluralist conception. On this conception, the autonomous
person is understood as one who has access to an adequate range of
options, is relatively free from coercion and manipulation, and has (and
exercises) the mental capacities necessary for seU-directed action.54 While
such a person may subject his needs and interests to constant critical
evaluation, this is not an essential condition of autonomous agency. In·
deed, on the liberal pluralist conceptjon, the autonomous person may
lead a relatively unreflective life, seldom critically discussing hi.s most
cherished need s and interests with others.
Therefore, on the liberal pluralist conception, we should expect the
instrumental value of participation in democratic politics for cultivating
capacities necessary to autonomous agency to be much less important
than it is on the discursive conception. This, in tum, suggests that an
Olssessment of the argument under consideration turns hea vily on which
conception of autonomy better expresses what is valuable about the con·
cept. Resolving this maHer obviously raises a number of difficult issues,
and this is not the place to address them comprehensively. Instead, I want
to conclude by focusing on one important advantage of the liberal plu
ralist conception, an advantage that may help explain why liberal plural·
ists are inclined to resist the idea that there is a tight instrumental connection
between participation in democratic politics and personal freedom.
Liberal pluralists are committed to the idea that there exists a wide
range of different conceptions of the good OT different ways of life worthy
of respect. This commitment to pluralism accounts for why they are re
luctant to say that there is a tight instrumental connection between par-
Ill'r tidpation in democratic politics and personal freedom, for the liberal
and pluralist will think that there are ways of life worthy of respect that do not
value (or are incompatible with) a disposition to participate actively in
democratic politics. Of course, the radical democrat, as we have described
)wn her, is not hostile to pluralism. She concedes that there are many valuable
"'ith ways of life. But to the extent that she is committed. to the discursive
)my co�ception of autonomy, she must look with suspicion on ways of life that
·n of discourage (or do not actively promote) the type of critical self-questioning
.. hi< she prizes. It is here that her pluralism must give way.
To sharpen trus point, we can distinguish two levels of pluralism. One
tlize level concerns the content of ways of life. It holds that there are a wide
'Sive variety of projects, pursuits, virtues, and excellences, some of which are
'Oint incompatible with one another, that could be components of a fully good
;hall life. The second level concerns the myriad ways in which people come to
lOUS acquire and sustain both their beliefs about what are worthwhile projects,
, of pursuits, virtues, and excellences and their preferences about which of
:and these they wish to realize. It holds that it is not unreasonable for people
lhile to acquire and sustain these beliefs and preferences under a wide range
tical of circumstances and conditions. The point t am making here is that the
.
' In liberal pluralist conception of autonomy is more pluralistic at this second
may level, but not necessarily at the first, than the discursive conception of
"os, autonomy. And this, J am suggesting, is an important advantage of the
liberal pluralist conception.
; the To put this point differently, we can cite Hannah Arendt's claim that
lting one of the most important freedoms is the "freedom from politics/sS and
(tant we can ildd to this the thought that it ought to be possible for a person to
It an lead a fully free life away from politics. The problem with the discursive
'ruch conception of autonomy is that it threatens to deny this.
con- Of course, for some, participation in democratic politics will enhance
sues, their freedom. It will help them develop capacities integral to autono
want mous agency. It is a mistake, however, to exaggerate this valid point, since
plu for others, given their circumstances and their way of life, active engoge
ural ment in politics or active participation in political discussion may not be
etion instTumcntaUy valulIblc to their freedom at all. It may even impede their
ability to lead their lives on their own terms.
wide Bearing these points in mind, we can now draw some conclusions.
)rthy 1bere are good reasons for favoring the liberal pluralist conception of
" re autonomy over the discursive conception. On the basis of this, we can
par- reject the argument under consideration in this section. For without the
discursive conception of autonomy the argument does not stand up. Fi
nally, without this argument, we have no good reason to believe there is
�. "" a strong instrumental connection between participation in democratic
tory of politics and personal freedom. We should, accordingly, reject claim (C).
unl of
P
....,
S! rlannah Arendt, On RetI(Ifwrion (Harmoodsworltt: Penguin, 1963), 280.
254 STEVEN WALL
x. CONCLUSION
5eo J have Mt, for ellample, sought to dt!'f\y thlt active fMrticipaon
il in politic s and political
discussion might bring about other (non-frocdom-relalt'd) trnw.donNItions n i people that
are valuable. Such participation may, u many radical democrats beli�e, promote virtue,
loleranCl!, and lhe development of intelligenC!'.
�1 It re1T\.'\ins true thai for some people, given their pro;ectsand goals, active participation
in polilical life will be bound up with their �rsonal freedom. For them. but only for them.
will it be corm::t to say thilt the politic....l domain is a domain of personal freedom.