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128 ANALYSIS
REFERENCES
E. W. Adams (1975). TheLogicof Conditionals: An Applicationof Probabilityto Deductive
Logic,Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
E. W. Adams (1976). 'Prior Probabilities and Counterfactual Conditionals', in W.
Harper and C. W. Hooker (eds.), Foundationsof ProbabilityTheory,StatisticalInfer-
enceand StatisticalTheoriesof Science,Vol. I, Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
D. Lewis (1974). Counterfactuals, Cambridge:Harvard University Press.
B. Skyrms (1980). CausalNecessity,New Haven: Yale University Press.
R. Stalnaker (1968). 'A Theory of Conditionals', in N. Rescher (ed.), Studiesin
LogicalTheory,Oxford: Blackwell.
By DAVID LEWIS
EVANS's article 'Can There be
Vague Objects?'([1]) is
GARETH
over-brief, cryptic, and often misunderstood.' As misunder-
stood, Evans is a pitiful figure: a 'technical philosopher' out of
control of his technicalities, taken in by a fallacious proof of an
absurd conclusion. Rightly understood, Evans endorses neither the
bad proof nor the bad conclusion. Instead he is making a good
argument in favour of a very different conclusion. To honour his
memory, and to make his point more clearly available, it is worth
setting the record straight.
Evans discusses a purported proof that there can be no such
thing as a vague identity statement. There are two problems
about this proof. One problem is that its conclusion is plainly
false. There are vague identity statements. Example:
'Princeton = Princeton Borough'. (It is unsettled whether the name
'Princeton' denotes just the Borough, the Borough plus the sur-
rounding Township, or one of countless somewhat larger regions.)
The other problem is that if we understand vagueness as semantic
indeterminacy, a deficiency in our language, we can diagnose a fal-
lacy. The proof twice invokes an alleged equivalence between
statements of the forms (1) and (2):
[1] Gareth Evans, 'Can There Be Vague Objects?'Analysis38 (1978) 208; reprinted
in Gareth Evans, CollectedPapers,Oxford University Press, 1985.
[2] Richmond Thomason, 'Identity and Vagueness', PhilosophicalStudies42 (1982)
329-32.
21 thank Antonia Phillips for her kind permission to quote this passage.
VAGUENESSAND IDENTITY
By B.J. GARRETT