Red Spread Aff - Gen Adv

Steer Debate Team 2010-2011
Observation One: Inherency
1.A – The US is Continuing a Failing Counterinsurgency Mission

in Afghanistan – Extended Withdrawal Date to 2014
Wood – January 11th, 2011 (David Wood, chief military correspondent for Politics Daily
and writes for CNN, CSPAN, the PBS News Hour, and on BBC and National Public Radio, January 11th 2011,
http://www.politicsdaily.com/2011/01/11/counterinsurgency-strategy-not-working-in-afghanistan-critics-s/)
The counterinsurgency strategy the United States has relied on to win

the Afghan war is producing disappointing progress at best and, at worst, is
wasting billions of dollars and prolonging the nine-year war, according to a
wide range of informed critics. Experts on Afghanistan and on counterinsurgency, among
them active-duty and retired military officers, analysts and academics, are pushing to have
the U.S. mission in Afghanistan significantly narrowed in scope. Their message, in brief:
Drop the hearts 'n' minds stuff. Go kill the enemy. It's increasingly clear to the critics, at least, that the enemy is not the
Taliban, the local Afghan insurgents. It is, rather, the remnants of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan who continue to
plot against the United States. Sending American soldiers and Marines headlong against Afghanistan's "inadequate
governance, corruption, and abuse of power,'' as the most recent guidance of Gen. David Petraeus demands, is too broad,
"Most people in and around policy-making
too costly and potentially self-defeating, many critics say.
agree that the U.S. and NATO missions in Afghanistan should transition away
circles
from counterinsurgency and toward a strategy combining counter-terror activities with a train-and-equip
mission,'' Andrew M. Exum, a former Army officer and adviser to Petraeus, wrote this week in his counterinsurgency blog.
"General David
C. Christine Fair, a regional expert and Georgetown University professor, writes that
Petraeus' COIN doctrine simply may not apply to Afghanistan. Whether their
suggestions will have any impact is unclear. "People are so set on the current strategy that they become bothered and angry by a serious
questioning,'' said a vociferous critic, Army Col. Gian P. Gentile, director of military history at West Point and a two-tour combat veteran of
Iraq. "There are alternatives'' to the current strategy, Gentile said in an interview. "But they are hard to articulate with an Army and senior
leaders who've been doing this for nine years and are morally committed to it because we've shed blood and they believe they can make it
work.'' With the Obama administration's war strategy being questioned, Vice President Joe Biden (who has advocated abandoning
counterinsurgency and focusing only on killing al-Qaeda terrorists) flew into Kabul Monday to confer with Petraeus, commander of U.S. and
allied forces, U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry and Afghan President Hamid Karzai. "This is a pivot point in our policy,'' an unnamed senior
official confided to reporters aboard Biden's plane en route to Afghanistan Monday. On Tuesday, Biden issued a statement seeming to back
away from a full-fledged counterinsurgency strategy. "It is not our intention to govern or nation-build,'' he said. "This is the responsibility of
Petraeus, co-author of the 2006 military manual on

the Afghan government and they are fully capable of it.''
counterinsurgency, often puts a forward spin on the war, saying that the U.S.-
led coalition finally has "all the inputs right,'' meaning he has enough
troops (97,000 U.S. and 40,000 European and others), enough civilian advisers and trainers, and
the right strategy, to win. But he and the Obama administration, in what seemed a tacit
acknowledgment of slow progress, last November agreed to extend the U.S. and NATO
commitment for another four years, through the end of 2014.
Previously, Obama had said flatly that in July of this year, "our troops will begin to come home.''
1.B – US Involvement in the Middle East Causes Russian

Expansionism
Stratfor 3/8/10 (STRATFOR Global Intelligence think tank,
http://russiaotherpointsofview.typepad.com/files/russia_influence_intro_stratfor.pdf )
The United States’ involvement in the Middle East — wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan and a standoff with Iran over its nuclear program — has given Russia an
opportunity to expand its influence in the former Soviet Union.
Moscow has already had some success in consolidating control over what it considers
the four most crucial countries, but it would like to push back against the West in
several other countries if it has time to do so before Washington’s attention returns to
Eurasia.
Taking a moment to clarify our Inherent Barrier, currently in

the Status Quo the United States COIN Mission in Afghanistan
GRAHAM 1
is thriving, but what our Stratfor evidence points out is that US

Involvement in the Middle East is allowing Russia to expand its
influence and is reminiscent of the Soviet Union. We’ll explain
the harms of Russian Expansionism.
Observation Two: Harms
2.A – Russia’s KGB Regime is the Motherland for Modern

Terrorism and Targeting the US for Destruction
Nyquist 2009
(J.R, renowned expert in geopolitics and international relations, “Never Ask the Wolves to Help You Against
the Dogs,” 8-21, http://www.financialsense.com/stormwatch/geo/analysis.html)
In Russia all facts are attended by a

But the reader must stop and set all this aside.
bodyguard of fiction. Wild opinions bearing the character of insanity, mixed with conspiracy
theory, mixed with rumor, mixed with fantastic speculations and a dash of truth -- leaves everyone
hypnotized by an illusory parade of vivid images. In Filin's account of the Arctic Sea, everything is
probable except for the concluding details; and nothing is independently verified. The story is about a
superpower struggle involving the Middle East, but ends up centering on the conflict between Moscow and
Kiev. The president of Ukraine, who was poisoned by the KGB five years ago, is fighting against pro-
Russian forces in the Ukrainian government. He struggles against pro-Russian voices in the Ukrainian
media. He struggles against a parliament dominated by Russian agents. Is it not outrageous that
American special forces siezed the Arctic Sea? Is it not outrageous that Ukraine's president should take the
side of the United States?One may assume there were negotiations between
Moscow and Washington, and a resolution of the matter. (Perhaps the missiles
would have to return to Russia.) But the truth of the matter? If you want to find the truth
about Russia, if you want to penetrate the reality of Russia's KGB
regime, then you should not seek the truth among the paid minions
and military hangers-on of the Soviet past. The truth, in our time, is more likely to
come from people who have no ties to Russian military intelligence, no professorships, no large book
deals, and no part in Moscow's ongoing disinformation campaign. On the American side, the situation is no
different. The deepest truths do not appear in the major media, at the offices of the CIA or NSA, or within
Congress, or the State Department. The fictionalization of minor events, and the building of myths from
Self deception is our
these and other building blocks, has become a way of life with us.
preference. What we know about Russia is its role as the
motherland of modern terrorism. What we know about Russia is
that its economy is dominated by the minions of the KGB and other
Soviet structures. What we know about Russia -- and should never forget -- is
that America has been targeted for destruction by Russian strategists.
This is not speculation, but fact. It has been testified to by defectors like Sergei Tretyakov,
and by the Russian General Staff
dissidents like Marina and Victor Kalashnikov,
which confesses its hostility to the United States by war
preparations that cannot otherwise be explained. To drive home the point, I
would like to conclude with recent comments from a disillusioned Russian democracy activist, who
described to a friend the political situation in Russia (in the following terms): "Putin and the opposition are
part of the same team. To be exact, they are two teams, but they are sharing power. The borders between
the first and second are very fuzzy.
GRAHAM 2
Harms
2.B – Russian Expansionism Destabilizes the World and

Threatens Global Security
Cohen 2009
(Ariel, Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Security in the
Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Heritage Foundation, “How the Obama
Administration Should Engage Russia,” 3-19,
http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2009/CohenTestimony090319a.pdf)
Despite the economic crisis that provided a reality check for Moscow, Russia is
doing its best to continue to pursue a broad, global, revisionist foreign
policy agenda that seeks to undermine what it views as a U.S.-led
international security architecture. Russia’s rulers want to achieve a world order in which
Russia, China, Iran, Syria, and Venezuela will form a counter- weight to the United States. Moscow is doing
so despite the dwindling currency reserves and a severe downturn in its economic performance due to
plummeting energy and commodity prices. In December 2008, the Russian navy conducted maneuvers in
the Caribbean with Venezuela, while the Russian air force’s supersonic Tupolev TU-160 ―Blackjack‖
bombers and the old but reliable TU-95 ―Bear‖ turboprop bombers flew patrols to Venezuela, as well as
the
close to U.S. air space in the Pacific and the Arctic. A top Russian Air Force general recently announced that
Kremlin is considering a Venezuelan offer to base strategic bombers on
a military airfield on La Orchila island off the coast of Venezuela. The Russian
government is also considering basing bombers out of Cuban territory,
where there are four or five airfields with 4,000-meter-long runways. The Air Force official remarked that
―if the two chiefs of state display such a political will, we are ready to fly there.‖ Russia is also developing
the Syrian ports of Tartus and Latakia in order to manage an expanded Russian naval presence in the
Mediterranean, and may possibly revive an anchorage in Libya and Yemen
. These are only some examples of how Moscow is implementing its global agenda. While some of these
moves may be mostly symbolic, combined with a $300 billion military
modernization program they signal a much more aggressive and
ambitious Russian global posture. Russia is also overtly engaging the Hezbollah and
Hamas terrorist groups. If Moscow’s vision were to be realized, given the large cast of
state and non-state ―bad actors currently on the international stage, Russia’s notion of
―multipolarity would engender an even more unstable and
dangerous world. Additionally, the very process of trying to force
such a transition risks destabilizing the existing international
system and its institutions while offering no viable alternatives
GRAHAM 3
Harms
2.C - If the Russians Spread, They Will Attain Control Over

Global Oil Supplies, Export Terrorism, Strangle the World
Economy and Destroy the US.
Stoos ‘8
(William Kevin, freelance writer, book reviewer, and attorney, whose feature and cover articles have
appeared in Carmelite Digest, Family Digest, Nature Conservancy Magazine, Liberty Magazine,
Encyclopedia Britannica Online, “Dangerous Illusions—Shadow World by Robert Chandler,” Canada Free
Press, 10-29, http://www.canadafreepress.com/index.php/article/5896)
Russia
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, one superpower was left standing. But now we face an alliance formed by sometime enemies/allies by convenience,
and China.
Along with their surrogates, Iran and Venezuela, they seek to weaken
the United States and change the world balance of power in ways we do not want. While
George Bush gushed about his relationship with Putin, “looked into his heart” and saw a democratic idealist, in truth Putin stacked all levels of Russian government with
communist cronies from his old KGB days, had his enemies (reporters, critics, and wealthy industrialists alike) killed, tried or banished, took control of powerful industries,
passed laws making it a crime to “publicly slander public officials,” and parlayed his resources and political power in ways that would make the Czars blush with envy. But
to the world, Putin is a democrat, and we delude ourselves into thinking that Russia will somehow turn into a benign western-style liberal democracy. We see the shadows
of democracy and good will when the reality is something far different. Chandler drills deep and painstakingly analyzes how Putin and Russia
seek hegemony over the region and the world, using its pipeline to Europe and
billions of petrodollars and foreign investments to finance Russia’s historical dreams of conquest. Chandler’s treatment of
the unseen but growing Chinese threat is equally sobering. We grant China favored nation status, feebly protest its repression of religion and free speech and look the
other way while China buys the United States piece by piece. While we treat the world’s largest country and fastest-growing economy as a partner in progress, and watch
the shadows of hope dance on the wall, the reality is far different. Chandler goes to great lengths to expose the true threat—the reality outside the cave: China is growing
the greatest economy on earth, building its military into the strongest in the world, spreading money and influence in Africa and South America, and arming our enemies.
Even more alarming, as Chandler notes, is the fact that a recent poll of Chinese citizens revealed that a majority consider the United States not as a friend, but as China’s
number one enemy. While we naively treat China as a friend and partner, captivated by the dimly lit images of friendship and cooperation, the brutal reality is that China
is our greatest competitor. Our sanguine thoughts of friendship and cooperation are sadly delusional—and not reciprocated. Shadow World offers a keen insight into the
Chinese efforts in the world today to undermine our country and supplant us as the world’s superpower. The Chinese and Russians have found willing allies in their
campaign to change the polarity of the world’s balance of power. Iran (our second greatest Islamic enemy) , itching to step into the vacuum created when a Democrat
president keeps his or her promise to pull out of Iraq—is encouraged and financed by both Russian and China who have invested millions into the country, to design
reactors, supply weapons and build infrastructure. That the United States cannot count on Russia or China to dissuade Iran from building nuclear weapons should come as
no surprise; as Chandler points out, they are strategic partners, joined at the hip. They seek to build a powerful surrogate in the region which will fill the vacuum created
by our departure, ensuring influence, access to oil, and the ability to

strangle the world economy. The implications of a nuclear capable
Iran, flush with billions in oil revenues, bent on the destruction of Israel (our eternal ally), armed by China
and Russia, and able to choke the world the gas pump, are simply too
frightening to imagine. In our own back yard, Chandler chronicles the rising threat of Hugo
Chavez, a surrogate of the Chinese government, who seeks to export terror, revolution
and socialism throughout the region in ways that Fidel only dreamed. The man who would be the next Castro is not merely
the next Castro—but Castro on steroids—more dangerous, more ruthless, and infinitely richer—controlling huge oil reserves
that enable him to finance his hemispheric subversion. Also joined at the hip with China, whose influence is increasing
throughout the region, Chavez boasts of his desire to destroy America. Chandler’s book explores the depths of Chavez’ influence in the region, his desire for hegemony in
the South American continent and his ties to Russia and China which few have studied as extensively as Chandler. No American should doubt that
Russia and China seek world domination and are actively
seeking to extend their influence into our own hemisphere.
Chandler’s treatment of the unholy quadrangle is an eye opener and a unique study of the truth outside
the cave. It would be a mistake to dismiss Russia as a second-rate power defanged by the break up of the
Soviet Union, to regard China as a friend and partner, or to assume that Iran and Venezuela are simply
third world countries run by crazy dictators. The harsh reality is that we face a powerful cabal of nations
intent on doing us in, and Chandler exposes the true nature of the threat.
GRAHAM 4
Observation Three: Plan
Plan: The United States Federal Government will end all Counter-
Insurgency operations and remove all personnel affiliated with
Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan.
Plank One: The Department of Defense will be the Agent of

Change.
Plank Two: The USFG will End and Remove COIN from
Afghanistan.
Step One: The USFG will end the COIN Operation.
Step Two: The USFG will remove COIN personnel from

Afghanistan.
Plank Three: Funding will be drawn from the Department of

Defense Budget.
Plank Four: Enforcement will be through normal means,

including budgetary cuts and removal of power.
Plank Five: The Affirmative claims the concept of ‘fiat’.

Affirmative Speeches will serve as legislative intent.
GRAHAM 5
Observation Four: Solvency
4.A – American Power is the Only Way to Counter Russian

Might and Expansionism
Nyquist 2009 – (J.R., brilliant analyst of Russian foreign policy, 7/17, “Marina Kalashnikova’s
Warning to the West,” accessed at
http://www.financialsensearchive.com/stormwatch/geo/pastanalysis/2009/0724.html on 9/21/10, dml)
The KGB and the

In other words, the West has already been outmaneuvered.
Russian General Staff have taken our measure, and they are laughing
at us. Our leaders do not realize the sophistication of their enemy.
They cannot see or understand what is happening. They blink, they turn
away, continuing to use concepts gifted to them long ago by Soviet agents of
influence. As a nation we are confused and disoriented, believing that the world is
beholden to the West’s money power – and therefore, peace can be purchased. “The
Kremlin has activated a network of extremists in the Third World,” wrote
Kalashnikova. “[At the same time] Russia has managed to shake off nearly all
international conventions restricting the expansion of its military power.” In this
situation, the only counter to Russian power is American power.
4.B – Russia Knows their Time is Limited; We Must Remove

Troops Now to Stop Expansionism Before it is Too Late
Kabalan 6/25/10 (Marwan Al, Professor of Political Science and Media at
Damascus University, “Russia is reasserting its influence”,
http://gulfnews.com/opinions/columnists/russia-is-reasserting-its-influence-1.645812)
The US has always been aware of these geopolitical facts and has
worked to prevent Russia from retaining influence in Central Asia. The US
saw the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to ensure that Russia would never re-emerge as the great Eurasian hegemon. Geopolitical
contest. To do this, the United States sought to expand its influence in the countries surrounding Russia, in a process that would ultimately
see Russian influence limited by its borders. US efforts began with the expansion of Nato into the Baltic States in 2004, putting the West on
Russia's doorstep. In the second phase of this grand plan, Washington encouraged pro-western political movements in the former Soviet
republics. These were the so-called ‘colour revolutions', which began in Georgia in 2003 and moved on to Ukraine in 2004 and Kyrgyzstan in
2005. The Orange Revolution in Ukraine marked a turning point in US-Russian relations, however. At that point, Moscow recognised that the
Taking
United States was seeking to cripple Russia permanently. After Ukraine turned orange, Russia began to organise a response.
advantage of US troubles in Afghanistan and Iraq and the crisis with Iran, Russia began
a process of rolling back Washington's influence in the former Soviet
republics. Its focus on the Islamic world has left Washington with a
limited ability to undermine Moscow, or to counter any Russian
response to growing western influence. Knowing that Washington
won't remain fixated on the Islamic world for much longer,
Russia has accelerated its efforts to reverse western influence
in the former Soviet Union, country by country.
GRAHAM 6
Solvency
4.C – Moscow’s Plan to Expand its Influence Stops when The US

Reduces its Military Presence in Afghanistan
Stratfor 3/8/10 (STRATFOR Global Intelligence think tank,
http://russiaotherpointsofview.typepad.com/files/russia_influence_intro_stratfor.pdf )
While Russia reconsolidated, the United States became preoccupied

with the Islamic world. As the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have
developed, they have absorbed Washington’s focus, presenting Russia
with an opportunity to push back against the West’s increased influence in Eurasia. It remains unclear
whether Russia would have been able to counter the Western infiltration of the former Soviet states if the United States had not been looking
Russia has taken advantage of Washington’s preoccupation to

elsewhere. But
attempt to re-establish its sphere of influence in the former Soviet

Union. The U.S. absorption on Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan has not occurred
without Russian involvement. Russia has used its connections in the Middle East and Afghanistan as leverage in
its negotiations with the United States for years, demanding that Washington outright abandon moves to solidify Western influence in the
Moscow’s plan to expand its influence into the

former Soviet states. Furthermore,
former Soviet sphere depends on Washington’s preoccupation.

Thus, Russia has openly supported Iran with political, nuclear and military deals, and has made negotiations for military supply routes into
Afghanistan more difficult for the United States and NATO.
while Washington has been

The geopolitical tug-of-war between Washington and Moscow has not been easy. But
preoccupied with its wars, Russia has been able to reconsolidate its
influence in countries that never strayed far from Moscow’s hand, such as
Belarus and Kazakhstan. Russia proved that the West could not stop it from militarily rolling back into its former territory during the 2008
Russo- Georgian war. Russia’s most crucial victory to date has been in Ukraine, where the top four candidates in the country’s January
presidential election were all pro-Russian, thus ensuring the end of the pro- Western Orange movement.The question now is: What does
Russia feel it must accomplish before the United States is freed up from its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan or its standoff with Iran?
GRAHAM 7
Observation Five: Advantages
5.A – We Prevent World War 3
1. Unchecked Russian Expansionism Leads to Invasion of

the Caucasus Region
Kvelashvili, 2010. “Russia’s Ursine Embrace of Georgia’s Abkhazia Province: Ongoing
Annexation with Larger Geostrategic Consequences.”
http://jamestownfoundation.blogspot.com/2010/02/russias-ursine-embrace-of-georgias.html
Baghapsh’s words at the press conference, though, attested to yet another aspect of Russia’s
expansionism. He said, “We began working on the agreements signed today a long time ago,
before [the] recognition of our independence.” This statement unambiguously showed that
even though Russia formally respected Georgia’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity before the August 2008 invasion, annexation efforts had been
in full swing for “a long time” before the “recognition.” Many in Georgia fear, however,
that the international community is doing too little to stop
Russia’s annexation of Abkhazia and allege that Moscow’s Abkhazia policy is just one small
part of a larger scheme aimed at the restoration of Moscow’s
domination over the whole of Georgia and the Caucasus. If
Moscow’s attempts are not vigorously countered today, they contend,
Russia will only intensify its efforts to bring about a regime change in Tbilisi,
which would have serious geostrategic consequences not only for
Georgia but the United States and the West as well.
2. Caucasus Invasion Draws in U.S and Causes World War

III
Blank 2000 Stephen J. Blank, strategic Studies Institute's expert on the Soviet bloc and the post-Soviet world since
1989; former Associate Professor of Soviet Studies at the Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, Maxwell Air
Force Base; B.A. in History from the University of Pennsylvania, and a M.A. and Ph.D. in History from the University of Chicago,
June 2000. “U.S. MILITARY ENGAGEMENT WITH TRANSCAUCASIA AND CENTRAL ASIA”
http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/docs/Blank2000.pdf
Russia’s drive for hegemony over the Transcaucasus and Central Asia therefore led those states
and interested foreign powers to an equal and opposing reaction that has blunted the Russian
drive. (The Transcaucasus), to a greater or lesser degree,
Baku, Erevan, Tashkent, Astana, and Tbilisi
are seeking a Western counterbalance to Moscow, which the West,

especially Ankara and Washington, are all too happy to provide.68 Central
Asia has also turned to China, the United States, and Iran in energy and
economics, is exploring forms of regional cooperation, and has begun to build its own national
militaries to escape from Russia’s shadow. Apart from expanded trade and commercial
relations and support for infrastructural projects beyond the energy and pipeline business, Turkey trains Azerbaijani troops and
provides economic-political assistance to Georgia and Azerbaijan. Other Western powers, especially France and Great Britain, also
In 1993 Moscow even threatened World War III to

display a rising regional profile.
deter Turkish intervention on behalf of Azerbaijan. Yet the new Russo-Armenian Treaty and Azeri-
Turkish treaty suggest that Russia and Turkey could be dragged into a confrontation to rescue their allies from defeat. 72 Thus
many of the conditions for conventional war or protracted ethnic conflict in
which third parties intervene are present in the Transcaucasus. For example,
many Third World conflicts generated by local structural factors have a great potential for
Big powers often feel obliged to rescue their
unintended escalation.
lesser proteges and proxies. One or another big power may fail to grasp
the other side’s stakes since interests here are not as clear as in
GRAHAM 8
Europe.
5.B –We Stop Genocide
1. The War Against the Taliban has Lead to

Dehumanization and Demonization – This is Justifying
Their Genocide
Khan 2008 (Liaquat Ali Khan, professor of law at Washburn University in
Topeka, Kansas, “Is NATO Committing Genocide in Afghanistan?” ,
http://www.counterpunch.org/khan01302008.html)
In almost all NATO nations,the Taliban have been completely

dehumanized — a historically-tested signal that perpetrators of
the crime of genocide carry unmitigated intentions to eradicate
the dehumanized group. Politicians, the armed forces, the media, and even
the general public associate in the West the Taliban with irrational fanatics,
intolerant fundamentalists, brutal assassins, beheaders of
women, bearded extremists, and terrorists. This luminescent negativity
paves the way for aggression, military operations, and genocide. Promoting the
predatory doctrine of collective self-defense, killing the Taliban is
celebrated as a legal virtue. To leave the Taliban in control of Afghanistan, says
NATO, is to leave a haven for terrorism. A similar dehumanization took place in
the 16th and 17th centuries when NATO precursors occupied the Americas to
purloin land and resources. The killings of native inhabitants were extensive and heartless.
Thomas Jefferson, the noble author of the Declaration of Independence, labeled Indians as
"merciless savages." President Andrew Jackson pontificated: "What good man would prefer a
country covered with forests and ranged by a few thousand savages to our extensive Republic,
studded with cities, towns, and prosperous farms." Promoting the predatory doctrine of discovery,
the United States Supreme Court later ratified the pilgrims' crimes, holding that "discovery gave
an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title (to land). ([T]he
Indians were fierce
savages...To leave them in possession of their country was to
leave the country a wilderness." The predators have not changed
their stripes a bit. They come, they demonize, they
obliterate. They do all this in the name of superior
civilization.
2. Genocide Should be Weighed before All of their

Disadvantages
Rice 05 (Susan Rice, Brookings Institute, WHY DARFUR CAN’T BE
LEFT TO AFRICA, August 7, 2005,
http://www.brookings.org/views/articles/rice/20050807.htm)
Never is the international responsibility to protect more compelling than

in cases of genocide. Genocide is not a regional issue. A government that
commits or condones it is not on a par with one that, say, jails dissidents, squanders
economic resources or suppresses free speech, as dreadful as such policies may be.
Genocide makes a claim on the entire world and it should be a call to
action whatever diplomatic feathers it ruffles.
GRAHAM 9
Red Spread Affirmative
Table of Contents
Red Spread Affirmative.................................................................................10
Answer to T: Extra-Topicality B/C of Our Harms..............................................12
Answer to T: “in Afghanistan”.......................................................................13
1AR Answer to T...........................................................................................14
Answer to T: Shift.........................................................................................15
Answer to T: Extra-Topical B/C of Where Troops Go........................................16
Answers to Specific DA Links.........................................................................17
Politics......................................................................................................17
COIN Unpopular Among Policy Makers – Ineffective and Incredibly Expensive..........17
COIN Extremely Unpopular – No Public Support Because of Casualties and Failures.17
Complete Withdrawal Links........................................................................18
Negative Arguments Assume Complete US Departure – Doesn’t Link.......................18
COIN Necessary.........................................................................................18
COIN Objectives Cause it to Inevitably Fail – History Proves......................................18
COIN Fails to Accomplish Objectives and Causes Civilian Causalities........................19
COIN and Counter-Terrorism are Two Completely Different Strategies.....................19
War on Drugs............................................................................................19
War on Drugs Fails.....................................................................................................19
Karzai Wants US Military Presence.............................................................20
Karzai Thinks US Should Reduce its Presence............................................................20
Hegemony.................................................................................................20
COIN Collapses Hegemony: Failed War......................................................................20
The Ultimate Goal of Russia’s Expansion is to Collapse America’s Global Hegemony
...................................................................................................................................21
COIN Bad......................................................................................................21
Despite Petreaus Taking Over, Counterinsurgency Still Fails.......................21
COIN Causes Afghans to Join the Insurgency That COIN is Trying to Stop.....22
Removing COIN Won’t Cause Terrorism or a Taliban Takeover – We’ll Isolate 4
Points.......................................................................................................23
Answers to Terrorism....................................................................................26
Removing COIN Still Leaves 20,000 Troops for Counter-Terrorism...............26
COIN Isn’t Necessary for Counter-Terrorism Operations..............................27
COIN and CT are Two Completely Different Strategies.................................27
Answers to Russia is a Democracy.................................................................27
Despite Hopes of a Transition to a Democratic Nation, Russia has
Transitioned to an Authoritarian-Type Government.....................................27
Answers to Russia’s Military Isn’t Modernized................................................28
Russia Is Modernizing their Military...........................................................28
Answers To Russia Is Working with US/NATO.................................................28
GRAHAM 10
START Passed, but Relations Between Moscow and Washington are Still Bad
................................................................................................................28
Russia is Cooperating on The War on Terror to Disguise Concerns about
Russian Expansionism...............................................................................29
Russia Won’t Send Military Force to Middle East – Any Cooperation is
Diplomatic................................................................................................30
Relations are a Sham – The KGB is the USSR Still and they Still Hate the US 30
Answers to Russia Has No Money..................................................................31
Expansionist Policies Will Continue Even In the Midst of a Failing World
Economy...................................................................................................31
Answers to NATO Containment......................................................................31
NATO Wouldn’t Stop an Expanding Russia..................................................31
NATO Won’t Deter Russia...................................................................................32
Inherency Extensions....................................................................................32
US Will Not Withdraw this Summer............................................................32
Petraeus is Resisting Summer Withdrawal – Won’t be out this Summer.......33
With the US Distracted in the Middle East Russia has the Ability to Re-
establish its Spheres of Influence..............................................................34
Russia is Militarily Aggressive and Wants to Expand...................................34
Russia is Now an Authoritarian Regime with Putin Leading its Imperial
Expansion.................................................................................................35
Russia is Preparing to Expand its Regional Influence..................................36
Russia is Cooperating with the West now – But it Wants to Expand its Sphere
of Influence...............................................................................................37
Harms Extensions.........................................................................................38
Russia Breeds Terrorists............................................................................38
Russia has Ties to 9/11 and is Trying to Squelch any Information Pointing that
Direction.....................................................................................................................38
Russia is a Breeding Ground for Terrorism.................................................................39
As Russia Attempts to Expand, they use Muslim Sentiments toward the US as
Weapons – Encourages Terrorism..............................................................................39
Russian Expansionism Threatens Global Security........................................40
Russia Is Helping its Ally – Venezuela – Create Nuclear Weapons and Create an Elite
Military........................................................................................................................40
Russia Uses Tactics that Destabilize Regions and Governments to Expand It’s
Influence – Empirically Proven with the Invasion of Georgia......................................41
The Recent Bombing in Russia Wasn’t a Terrorist Attack – It Was Retaliation from
Russian Expansionism into the Caucus Region..........................................................42
The Moscow Airport Bombing was Retaliation from the North Caucus......................43
Russia Seeks to Destroy the US..................................................................44
Russia Is Using Manipulation to Destroy the US.........................................................44
Solvency Extensions.....................................................................................45
U.S Military Presence in the Middle East is Used to Justify Russian
Aggression................................................................................................45
U.S Overstretch is Enabling Russian Expansionism......................................46
Withdrawal is Key to Stop Russia...............................................................46
We Can’t Deter Russia while Still in Afghanistan.........................................46
US Troop Reduction in the Middle East Frees Up Troops to Focus on Russia. 47
Capitalism....................................................................................................47
COIN is, “by definition”, Nation Building....................................................47
Iraq Proves that the “nation-building-democracy-promoting” Front of the U.S.
Occupation is a Secret Agenda to Globalize Capitalism................................47
Genocide......................................................................................................48
Impact Calculus............................................................................................50
Answers to ‘Increase Surge’ Counterplan.......................................................54
Answers To ‘Afghan National Security Force’ Counterplan..............................55
Answer to ‘Consult’ Counterplans..................................................................56
Answers to ‘XO’ Counterplan.........................................................................57
GRAHAM 11
Wikileaks.....................................................................................................59
Putin still Holds the Reins of Russia – Wikileaks Reveals Russian Corruption
and Authoritarianism.................................................................................59
Wikileaks Reveals that Russia is Selling Weapons and Threatening Global
Security....................................................................................................60
Quick Facts on COIN in Afghanistan...............................................................61
Case Definitions...........................................................................................62
Case Definitions
Answer to T: Extra-Topicality B/C of Our Harms
A) We Meet – We don’t go outside the resolution.

We’re reducing military presence within Afghanistan,
which is a topic country. Our Harms are caused by our
presence in Afghanistan, therefore we’re topical.
COIN is In Afghanistan
Bukhari, researcher at Raja Ratnam School of International Studies,
Nanyang Technical University, 7/4/10 (Syed Adnan Ali Shah, July 4, 2010, “US Flawed
Coin Strategy,” The Statesman, DA: 7/19/10, JPL)
COIN strategy involved deployment of 30,000 fresh troops to the Afghan
theatre, which would increase the total number of U.S. troops to 100,000. There are
numbers of challenges which the US and NATO currently faces in Afghanistan
B) Standards
1. Reasonability – We’ve proven that COIN is in
Afghanistan and that the Harms stem from
our Presence in Afghanistan.
2. Ground – The Negative doesn’t lose any
ground. There’s plenty of cases that remove
COIN and lots of Negative Evidence against
it.
3. (Clash and Lit Check Abuse) – They’ve read
evidence against our case which means they
would have to research this case. There’s no
reason to research a non-topical case, yet
they clearly came prepared today.
D) Voters
1. Fairness – It wouldn’t be fair to vote us down
because we find unique harms to our
presence in Afghanistan.
2. Education – We provide the most education
in the round because we’re learning about a
GRAHAM 12
unique set of harms and learning new

material.
Answer to T: “in Afghanistan”
A) We Meet – We’re Reducing Military Presence in

Afghanistan.
COIN is In Afghanistan
Bukhari, researcher at Raja Ratnam School of International Studies,
Nanyang Technical University, 7/4/10 (Syed Adnan Ali Shah, July 4, 2010, “US Flawed
Coin Strategy,” The Statesman, DA: 7/19/10, JPL)
COIN strategy involved deployment of 30,000 fresh troops to the Afghan
theatre, which would increase the total number of U.S. troops to 100,000. There are
numbers of challenges which the US and NATO currently faces in Afghanistan
B) Counter-Definition(s)
1. In Means Being In the Borders of the Topic Countries
Merriam-Webster 2010 ("in." Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary.
2010, Merriam-Webster Online. 31 July 2010, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/in)
In: used as a function word to indicate inclusion, location, or position
within limits <in the lake> <wounded in the leg>
2. Afghanistan
Princeton 2010 (wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn)
a mountainous landlocked country in central Asia; bordered by
Iran to the west and Russia to the north and Pakistan to the east
and south; "Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in 1979"
C) Standards
1. Reasonability – We’ve proven that COIN is in
Afghanistan and that the Harms stem from
our Presence in Afghanistan.
2. Ground – The Negative doesn’t lose any
ground. There’s plenty of cases that remove
COIN and lots of Negative Evidence against
it.
GRAHAM 13
3. (Clash and Lit Check Abuse) – They’ve read

evidence against our case which means they
would have to research this case. There’s no
reason to research a non-topical case, yet
they clearly came prepared today.
D) Voters
1. Fairness – It wouldn’t be fair to vote us down
because we find unique harms to our
presence in Afghanistan.
2. Education – We provide the most education
in the round because we’re learning about a
unique set of harms and learning new
material.
1AR Answer to T
A) Extend our “We Meet” – We still meet their
definition. We’re clearly reducing presence in
Afghanistan by removing COIN.
B) Extend our Evidence that COIN is in Afghanistan -

From the Counter-Definition and our Inherency
Evidence. COIN is a part of the Afghan Theater.
C) Extend our Standards and Voters – We don’t take

away any negative ground and they’ve read evidence
against our case. Extend Ground and Clash Check
Abuses. We’re also providing the most fairness
because we create a fair amount of ground and the
most education because we’re learning about Unique
Harms.
GRAHAM 14
Answer to T: Shift
A) Re-Location is Normal Means – Troops Would go
Back to the United States after their Service in
Afghanistan is Done.
B) We will advocate and defend any arguments over

what happens when they go back to the US.
C) However, US Troops don’t lose their job when they

go back. They use yearly contracts, and don’t lose
their job till their contract is up.
Globalsecurity.org 2011
(http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/usar-irr.htm)
There are two ways to serve in the US Army: either serve full-time in
Active Duty as an Enlisted Soldier or Officer, or serve part-time as an Enlisted Soldier or
Officer in the Army Reserve. All Soldiers have a statutory eight-year military
service obligation (MSO), which is established at the time of entry into

military service (Active or Reserve). Traditional enlistment terms are three,
four, five and six years. Terms of service for active duty are from 2-6
years.
D) There’s no fairness lost in the round. We still

defend every argument they throw at us.
GRAHAM 15
Answer to T: Extra-Topical B/C of Where Troops

Go
A) We’re not Extra-Topical – These harms are based

off our presence in Afghanistan. We’re not deploying
troops to Russia. We’re just removing from
Afghanistan.
B) There’s no Fairness or Ground Lost – We still will

defend a substantial withdraw from Afghanistan.
They still have links to all of their Disadvantages and
all arguments that say that Withdrawal is bad.
C) There’s no Education Lost – We still learn about

unique harms and impacts of our deployment in
Afghanistan, and the Negative Team can still educate
us as to why we should stay, then we can learn and
debate about which one is better.
GRAHAM 16
Answers to Specific DA Links

Politics
COIN Unpopular Among Policy Makers – Ineffective and
Incredibly Expensive
Exum, Fellow at the Center for New American Security, 9 (Andrew, March 26,
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/200-exum.pdf, “On CT Vs. COIN,” Small Wars Journal, DA: 7/14/10, JPL,
served in U.S. Military 2000-2004)
One thing most policy-makers seem to understand, though, is that a population-centric
COIN campaign in Afghanistan would be long, messy, and expensive. Our
NATO allies would no doubt tire of the inevitable rise in casualties before we do,
and with the global economy in dire straits, it is worth noting that – largely
due to issues of re-supply – an infantry brigade costs twice as much to operate in
Afghanistan as it does to operate in Iraq. For this and many other reasons, there exists
far less enthusiasm in the community of COIN theorists and practitioners
about a possible COIN campaign in Afghanistan than there was for a COIN campaign in Iraq.
COIN Extremely Unpopular – No Public Support Because of

Casualties and Failures
Bukhari, researcher at Raja Ratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang
Technical University, 7/4, (Syed Adnan Ali Shah, July 4, 2010, “US Flawed Coin Strategy,” The Statesman, DA:
7/19/10, JPL)
Secondly, the US COIN strategy enunciated under President Obama seems to be failing
so far. The main issue behind the failure is a lack of public support, without which
any COIN strategy, no matter how cleverly and carefully it is planned,
would fail. This was evident in the military operation "Mushtarak" undertaken
by US, NATO and Afghan forces in Helmand province in March 2010, which failed to
clear the territory of Taliban presence and initiate economic development. To the
contrary, the operation brought more miseries to the population in terms of
loss of civilian lives and property.
GRAHAM 17
Complete Withdrawal Links

Negative Arguments Assume Complete US Departure – Doesn’t
Link
(Dr. Bernard I. Finel, an Atlantic Council contributing editor, is a senior fellow at the American Security
Project. “An Alternative Strategy for Afghanistan” – New Atlanticist” Policy and Analysis Blog – August 20,
2009 – http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/alternative-strategy-afghanistan.)
One of my great frustrations in becoming more involved in the debate over
Afghanistan policy and the utility of population-centric counter-insurgency (COIN) theory is
how ruthlessly the pro-escalation side of the debate has sought to caricature
the position of the skeptics. The choice has been portrayed as being
between a full commitment to COIN or an immediate withdrawal and subsequent
abandonment of Afghanistan. These are not the only choices.
COIN Necessary
COIN Objectives Cause it to Inevitably Fail – History Proves
West, correspondent at the Wall Street Journal, 7/8, (Diana, July 8,
2010, http://www.dailydemocrat.com/guestopinions/ci_15465351, “ ‘COIN Costing Us Too Many Troops in
Afghanistan,” Daily Democrat, DA: 7/15/10, JPL)
Most Americans don't know what the ascendance of counterinsurgency doctrine

in the US military means. Judging by the failure of the senators to raise the topic with the
most famous contemporary COIN author seated before them, neither do our elected representatives.
Some senators were obviously distressed by restrictive battle rules, but they didn't seem to regard
them as a crucial means to COIN's fantasy-end: winning so-called hearts and minds. The whole
nation-building endeavor, too, is just another COIN fantasy effort designed to
make them like us. "Soldiers and Marines are expected to be nation-builders as well as warriors,"
Petraeus himself co-wrote in the foreword of the 2007 COIN manual (with Gen. F. James Amos, recently
tapped to serve as the new Marine Commandant). "They must be prepared to help re-establish
institutions and local security forces and assist in rebuilding infrastructure and basic services. They
must be able to facilitate establishing local governance and the rule of law. The list of such tasks is
long ..." You can say that again. Better, though, for our elected representatives to have read just that
statement back to Gen. Petraeus and to have asked for a reaction, a reckoning, his defense of a
theory that, I would argue (and frequently do), has for years misused and abused the
U.S. military through its willful ignorance of the Islam-West culture clash
that forever dooms all of our do-gooding. The Great Society, it's worth recalling,
didn't work here on our own people. It's no more plausible, even at ROE-controlled
gunpoint, on an alien society. History confirms this. The United States engaged in
intensive Afghan nation-building between 1946 and 1979 -- specifically, in Helmand
Province, now, ironically, a Taliban stronghold. In other words, the program was
not, as Gen. Petraeus told the Senate this week, "hugely successful." For details, read Indiana
University History professor Nick Cullather's 2002 paper, "From New Deal to New Frontier in
Afghanistan," which is available online. It catalogues decades of failure apparent as far back as 1949.
"If illusions doomed the project they also created and sustained it," Cullather wrote, summing up
American denial on Afghanistan.
GRAHAM 18
COIN Fails to Accomplish Objectives and Causes Civilian

Causalities
Bukhari, researcher at Raja Ratnam School of International
Studies, Nanyang Technical University, 7/4, (Syed Adnan Ali Shah, July 4,
2010, “US Flawed Coin Strategy,” The Statesman, DA: 7/19/10, JPL)
Secondly, the US COIN strategy enunciated under President Obama seems to be failing
so far. The main issue behind the failure is a lack of public support, without which
any COIN strategy, no matter how cleverly and carefully it is planned,
would fail. This was evident in the military operation "Mushtarak" undertaken
by US, NATO and Afghan forces in Helmand province in March 2010, which failed to
clear the territory of Taliban presence and initiate economic development. To the
contrary, the operation brought more miseries to the population in terms of
loss of civilian lives and property.
COIN and Counter-Terrorism are Two Completely Different

Strategies
Hughes and Tripodi, Ph. Ds from Department of War Studies,
at King’s College, 9 (Geraint and Christian, March,
http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/487106_918013288_910291733.pdf, “Anatomy of a surrogate: historical
precedents and implications for contemporary counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism”, Small Wars &
Insurgencies, DA: 7/16/10, JPL)
COIN is defined as the coordinated political and military response of a

government and its external supporters to an organised campaign of
subversion and paramilitary action waged against the former by an
indigenous armed opposition. CT involves both the defensive measures a
state undertakes to protect its citizens from terrorist attacks and
offensive measures taken to target and neutralise a terrorist group – these
can range from penetration of the latter by intelligence and police services to more controversial
measures such as assassination or ‘targeted killings’
War on Drugs
War on Drugs Fails
Morgan 9 (Scott Morgan, Chronicle Blog, 04/30/2009,
http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle_blog/2009/apr/30/obama_goes_to_war_against_afghan)
In a renewed effort to stamp out the Taliban by cutting off their cash flow, Obama is sending
20,000 troops into opium producing regions of Afghanistan. It's going to
be a disaster. Jacob Sullum dug through this New York Times story and found several reasons why
this plan will fail spectacularly: 1. Although the Taliban "often fade away when
confronted by a conventional army," they "will probably stand and fight" to protect
their revenue stream. 2. "The terrain is a guerrilla's dream. In addition to acres of shoulder-high
poppy plants, rows and rows of hard-packed mud walls, used to stand up grape vines, offer ideal places
for ambushes and defense." 3. "The opium is tilled in heavily populated areas...The
prospect of heavy fighting in populated areas could further alienate the Afghan population." 4. "Among
the ways the Taliban are believed to make money from the opium trade is by charging farmers for
protection; if the Americans and British attack, the Taliban will be expected to make good on their side
of that bargain." 5. Opium poppies are "by far the most lucrative crop an Afghan can farm." 6. "The
opium trade now makes up nearly 60 percent of Afghanistan's gross
domestic product, American officials say." 7. "The country's opium traffickers typically offer
incentives that no Afghan government official can: they can guarantee a farmer a minimum price for
the crop as well as taking it to market, despite the horrendous condition of most of Afghanistan's
roads." 8. "Even if the Americans are able to cut production, shortages could drive up prices and not
make a significant dent in the Taliban's profits." There's also the fact that there's
enough opium buried somewhere in Afghanistan to supply the entire world for
years. Sorry guys, eradication won't work. Stop trying it.
GRAHAM 19
Karzai Wants US Military Presence

Karzai Thinks US Should Reduce its Presence.
Partlow November 14th, 2010 (Joshua Partlow, Washington Post Foreign
Service, 11/14/10, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/11/13/AR2010111304001_pf.html)
Karzai said on Saturday that the United States

KABUL- President Hamid
must reduce the visibility and intensity of its military operations in
Afghanistan and end the increased U.S. Special Operations forces night raids that
aggravate Afghans and could exacerbate the Taliban insurgency. In an interview
with The Washington Post, Karzai said that he wanted American troops off
the roads and out of Afghan homes and that the long-term presence of
so many foreign soldiers would only worsen the war. His comments placed
him at odds with U.S. commander Gen. David H. Petraeus, who has made capture-
and-kill missions a central component of his counterinsurgency strategy, and who
claims the 30,000 new troops have made substantial progress in beating back the
insurgency. "The time has come to reduce military operations," Karzai
said. "The time has come to reduce the presence of, you know, boots
in Afghanistan . . . to reduce the intrusiveness into the daily Afghan
life."
Hegemony
COIN Collapses Hegemony: Failed War
STEVEN SIMON; JONATHAN STEVENSON 2009 (ADJUNCT SENIOR FELLOW AT THE COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, IS A PROFESSOR OF STRATEGIC STUDIES AT THE US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
AFGHANISTAN: HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?', SURVIVAL, 51: 5, 47 — 67)
that only if the United States establishes a well-calibrated limited policy now
The upshot is
will it have the political flexibility to sustain it over the longer-term and thereby to
effectively contain the jihadist threat in Central Asia. If, on the other hand, the Obama
administration promises more than it can deliver in Afghanistan, a reprise of Vietnam
may occur: once failure becomes clear, domestic support will evaporate, the
administration will be compelled to withdraw precipitously, and the United States will
lose considerable traction in the region.
GRAHAM 20
The Ultimate Goal of Russia’s Expansion is to Collapse

America’s Global Hegemony
Bugajski 10(Janusz, holder of the Lavrentis Lavrentiadis Chair and
director of the New European Democracies program at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, “Russia’s Pragmatic
Reimperialization” CRIA Vol. 4(1))AQB
The word “pragmatic” has been loosely applied in describing Russia’s foreign policy by implying
partnership, moderation, and cooperation, as well as by counterposing it to an ideologized and
expansive imperial policy characteristic of the Cold War. Paradoxically, pragmatic imperialism
is a useful way to describe Putinist Russia’s foreign policy, which has
been continued under the Medvedev presidency, particularly in the
strategies employed to realize specific national ambitions.7 The primary goal
of Putinism is to restore Russia as a neo-imperial state – if not as a global superpower
then as a regional superpower. Moscow’s overarching goal toward the West is to
reverse the global predominance of the United States by transforming
the current unipolarity into multipolarity in which Russia exerts increasing
international leverage. To achieve these long-range objectives, the Kremlin is
intent on expanding the “Eurasian space” in which Russia is the dominant political
player, and thus the Western, or Euro-Atlantic, zone of security would become increasingly fractured
and neutralized. In this strategic struggle, “Eurasianism” for Moscow involves two interconnected
approaches: transforming Europe into an appendage of the Russian sphere
of influence and debilitating Euro-Atlanticism by undercutting Europe’s
connections with the United States. The two strategic objectives were succinctly
highlighted by Russia’s newly installed president Dmitry Medvedev during his visit to Berlin in June
2008 when he proposed the creation of a pan-European security pact that would sideline or absorb
NATO and steadily enfeeble U.S. influence. In Medvedev’s words: “Atlanticism as a sole historical
principle has already had its day. NATO has failed to give new purpose to its existence.”8 Medvedev
followed up his initial proposal for a new European security framework during the World Policy
Conference in Evian, France, on October 8, 2008.9 In elaborating on the initial plan, he posited the
notion of “equal security” in which Russia would maintain a veto on any
further NATO enlargement and where no state or international
organization would possess “exclusive rights” in providing peace and
stability in Europe. In effect, Moscow would be in a position to block any moves by the Central-
East European (CEE) countries to enhance their own security and obstruct any changes in NATO’s
military infrastructure in Europe.
COIN Bad
Despite Petreaus Taking Over, Counterinsurgency Still
Fails
Strick November 22, 2010 (Alex Strick van Linschoten, Five Things David
Petraeus Wants You To Believe, Current Intelligence,
http://www.currentintelligence.net/afghanwire/2010/11/22/five-things-david-petraeus-
wants-you-to-believe.html)
Those final five syllables should be enough to make even the most die-hard optimist take pause. Petraeus
wants to present an empirically valid case for continuing along the current course -- the so-called "default
Petraeus
position" turbo-charged with all the money and weapons the heart could ever want.
wants to use all these "masses of data" to make you believe five things,
all of which are also more problematic than he’d have you believe.
Truth Number One: "It’s Working!" In this scenario, the momentum has shifted, the Taliban are on the
back foot, international military forces have recaptured the initiative, and other clichéd idioms ad
nauseam. Take your pick. Petraeus wants to show that his reinvigorated
GRAHAM 21
"counterinsurgency" strategy is delivering gains against the Taliban and that there
are positive trends in how the local population in southern Afghanistan views and interacts with the local
government. Remember back to 2009 when there was a big debate about the metrics with which the war
effort could be assessed. These are internally set by the military (albeit with some civilian political input).
It's these that Petraeus will use to show that the surge is working, and that it should be given more time to
work properly. Unfortunately, signs on the ground don’t seem to confirm
this. Marjah -- the great test-case for the US military engagement -- is
by all accounts plagued with insecurity issues. US troops are pushing
into Kandahar’s western districts in an attempt to dislodge the Taliban there. In
parallel, they have set up a series of bases circling Kandahar City, and assassinations and IEDs continue
unabated. It’s true, many fighters have left Panjwayi and Zheray and are taking some down time in Quetta,
IEDs and assassinations will continue in the
but they’ll be back in spring, and
meantime. More importantly, the surge has failed to shift public
opinion in favour of either the American presence or the Afghan
government. There is now a deep seated suspicion of the foreign
involvement, rooted in a failure to understand western interests or
goals in southern Afghanistan. Unless this is addressed head-on, everything else
being done is meaningless.
COIN Causes Afghans to Join the Insurgency That COIN is

Trying to Stop
Partlow November 14th, 2010 (Joshua Partlow, Washington Post Foreign
Service, 11/14/10, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/11/13/AR2010111304001_pf.html)
But Karzai was emphatic that U.S. troops must cease such
operations, which he said violate the sanctity of Afghan homes
and incite more people to join the insurgency. A senior Afghan
official said that Karzai has repeatedly criticized the raids in meetings
with Petraeus and that he is seeking veto power over the operations.
The Afghan government does not have the type of legal arrangement that the Iraqi
government has with U.S. forces to approve particular military operations. "The
raids are a problem always. They were a problem then, they are a
problem now. They have to go away," Karzai said. "The Afghan people
don't like these raids, if there is any raid it has to be done by the
Afghan government within the Afghan laws. This is a continuing
GRAHAM 22
disagreement between us." Karzai,who said during his inaugural speech last
year that he would like to have full Afghan security control by 2014, said that the U.S.
military "should and could" draw down its forces next year. He acknowledged that an abrupt
withdrawal would be dangerous, but said that American soldiers should confine
themselves more to their bases and limit themselves to necessary operations along
the Pakistani border. He said he wanted the U.S. government to apply more pressure
on Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan while focusing on development projects and
civilian assistance in Afghanistan. Although he did not say how many U.S. troops he would prefer
in Afghanistan, Karzai said that at current levels "you cannot sustain that." There are about 100,000 U.S.
troops in Afghanistan. "It's not desirable for the Afghan people either to have 100,000 or more foreign
troops going around the country endlessly," he said.
Removing COIN Won’t Cause Terrorism or a Taliban

Takeover – We’ll Isolate 4 Points
Afghanistan Study Group, September 2010, A New Way Forward:
Rethinking US Strategy in Afghanistan,
http://www.afghanistanstudygroup.org/?page_id=27
Obama has repeatedly said that we are fighting in Afghanistan in order to prevent the country “from
becoming an even larger safe haven from which Al Qaeda would plot to kill more Americans ”5.
Since taking office, Obama has committed nearly 50,000
additional troops to an ambitious counterinsurgency campaign
designed to oust the Taliban from the areas it controls, win the confidence of the local population,
train effective Afghan security forces, and help create a competent, legitimate, and effective central
Unfortunately, this counterinsurgency-based nation-
government.
building strategy rests on a flawed understanding of the strategic
stakes, and it undercuts our broader strategic goals. First, the
decision to escalate the U S effort in Afghanistan rests on the
GRAHAM 23
mistaken belief that victory there will have a major impact on Al

Qaeda’s ability to attack the United States Al Qaeda’s presence in
Afghanistan today is very small, and even a decisive victory there
would do little to undermine its capabilities elsewhere. Victory would
not even prevent small Al Qaeda cells from relocating in Afghanistan, just as they have in a wide array of
countries (including European countries).Second,
a U S drawdown would not make
Al Qaeda substantially more lethal In order for events in Afghanistan
to enhance Al Qaeda’s ability to threaten the U S homeland, three
separate steps must occur: 1) the Taliban must seize control of a
substantial portion of the country, 2) Al Qaeda must relocate there in
strength, and 3) it must build facilities in this new “safe haven” that
will allow it to plan and train more effectively than it can today. Each
of these three steps is unlikely, however, and the chances of all
three together are very remote For starters, a Taliban victory is
unlikely even if the United States reduces its military commitment The
Taliban is a rural insurgency rooted primarily in Afghanistan’s Pashtun population, and its seizure of power
in the 1990s was due to unusual circumstances that no longer exist and are unlikely to be repeated Non-
Pashtun Afghans now have ample experience with Taliban rule, and they are bound to resist any
Taliban efforts to regain control in Kabul Moreover, the U S military presence has helped the Taliban
rally its forces, meaning that the group may well fragment and suffer a loss of momentum in the
face of a U S drawdown. Surveys suggest that popular support for the
Taliban among Afghans is in the single digits Even with significantly
reduced troop levels, we can build a credible defense against a
Taliban takeover through support for local security forces,
strategic use of airpower, and deployment in key cities without
committing ourselves to a costly and counterproductive COIN
(counterinsurgency) campaign in the south And if power-sharing and
political inclusion is negotiated, the relevance of the Taliban as an
alternative to Kabul is likely to decline. And even if the Taliban were to regain power in some of
Afghanistan, it would likely not invite Al Qaeda to re-establish a significant presence there The Taliban may be reluctant to risk renewed
U S attacks by welcoming Al Qaeda onto Afghan soil..Bin Laden and his associates may well prefer to remain in Pakistan, which is both safer
and a better base from which to operate than isolated and land-locked Afghanistan Most importantly, no matter what happens in Afghanistan
in the future, Al Qaeda will not be able to build large training camps of the sort it employed prior to the 9/11 attacks. Simply put, the U S
would remain vigilant and could use air power to eliminate any Al Qaeda facility that the group might attempt to establish Bin Laden and his
associates will likely have to remain in hiding for the rest of their lives, which means Al Qaeda will have to rely on clandestine cells instead of
large encampments Covert cells can be located virtually anywhere, which is why the outcome in Afghanistan is not critical
to.addressing.the.threat.from.Al.Qaeda. In short, a complete (and unlikely) victory in Afghanistan and the dismantling of the Taliban would not
make Al Qaeda disappear; indeed, it would probably have no appreciable effect on Al Qaeda At the same time, dramatically
scaling back U S military engagement will not significantly increase the threat from Al Qaeda.
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[AFGHANISTAN STUDY GROUP CARD CONTINUED – NO TEXT

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Third, the current US military effort is helping fuel the very insurgency
we are attempting to defeat An expanded U S presence has
reinforced perceptions of the United States as a foreign occupier
Religious extremists have used the U S presence as an effective
recruiting tool for their cause Efforts to limit civilian casualties
and other forms of collateral damage have been only partially
successful, leading additional Afghans to take up arms against us.
Fourth, the expanded US presence and a more energetic
GRAHAM 24
counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan and Pakistan have reinforced

a tacit alliance among different extremist groups whose agendas are
not identical The Taliban is itself a loose coalition of Pashtuns, many of whom
are motivated by local concerns rather than by any deep commitment
to global jihad Al Qaeda,
COIN will Collapse Pakistan

Akhtar, 10- professor of international relations, and a senior analyst & writer. He was the dean of
faculty of management, Baluchistan university, and former chairman of International Relations
Department, Karachi university (1/26/10, Shameem, “Pakistan’s Instability : The US War Factor,”
http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1262372328640&pagename=Zone-English-
Muslim_Affairs/MAELayout#1)
If it is a war against extremists and militancy inside Pakistan, it is a
civil war because its origins stem from the US, NATO occupation of
neighboring Afghanistan. The conflict should be seen as an extension
of the ongoing resistance of the Afghan people to alien domination. It is
inaccurate to say that the US invaded Afghanistan because of the 9/11
attacks by Al-Qaeda. Former BBC correspondent George Arney reported on September 18, 2001, that Niaz
Naik, the former Pakistani foreign secretary, had told him that he was informed by US officials at a UN-sponsored
international contact group on Afghanistan in Berlin during July that year that unless Osama bin Laden were handed over
swiftly, America would take military action to kill or capture both Bin Laden and Mullah Omar. The wider
GRAHAM 25
objective, however, was to topple the Taliban regime and install a

transitional government under King Mohammad Zahir Shah. The invasion was to take place in mid-
October 2001. Mr. Naik went on to say that he doubted that the US would have abandoned its plan to invade Afghanistan
even if Osama were handed over by the Taliban. Arney's story is corroborated by the Guardian correspondent David Leigh
in his report published on September 26, 2001, in which he revealed that the Taliban had received specific warning by the
US through secret diplomacy in Berlin in July that the Bush Administration would topple the entire regime militarily unless
This was part of the larger design of US military,
Osama is extradited to the US.
industrial complex to bring about regime change in Afghanistan, Iraq, and

Iran. As the US needed bases in Pakistan to accomplish its pre-planned invasion of Afghanistan, the Bush
Administration sought to use Islamabad as a cat's paw to pull the chestnuts out of the fire. Fortunately for
President Bush, a usurper ruled there, devoid of all legitimacy, legal and moral, and he readily and
willingly succumbed to US pressure and made a U-turn by severing all links with the Taliban. He even
joined the war against Afghanistan instead of using his leverage with the Taliban to exhaust all means of
The entire region, including Pakistan, was
peaceful settlement of the dispute.
declared a war zone by the US military command, and the flights of all
passenger planes were prohibited over a certain altitude, while no
merchant ships could enter the harbors of Pakistan, thus bringing
maritime trade (which comprises approximately 95 percent of Pakistan's import-export trade) to
a standstill. It is no wonder that Pakistan suffered a loss of 34 billion
dollars because of its involvement in the Afghan war. America's War As
one can see, it was America's war that was imposed upon Pakistan. Whether
Pakistan could have avoided the war is a matter of controversy among politicians and political observers.
the war has fuelled insurgency in Pakistan's hitherto
But
peaceful tribal territory adjacent to Afghanistan. This insurgency shows
no sign of abatement, as terrorist attacks on military and civilian centers in the capital and major cities of
the North-West Frontier Province and Punjab continue with a vengeance, posing threat to the security of
the state. In the meantime, routine predator strikes by the US in Waziristan
have taken a heavy toll of civilian lives amid accusations of Islamabad's complicity in
the piratical attacks on tribespeople, which prompts them to resort to retaliatory
strikes on the perpetrators. Not satisfied with Pakistan's military operations in the tribal
region, the US Administration has compelled Islamabad's fragile government to pull out its troops from the
tense Indo-Pak border and deploy them in the restive tribal belt along the Pak-Afghan border. Now
Pakistan faces existential threat from the Taliban and not India, a perception
which the country's military leadership is not prepared to share, given the unresolved disputes with New
Delhi, which triggered four wars during the last 62 years.
Answers to Terrorism
Removing COIN Still Leaves 20,000 Troops for Counter-
Terrorism
RORY STEWART 2009 (LONDON REVIEW OF BOOKS VOL. 31 NO. 13 · 9 JULY 2009
THE IRRESISTIBLE ILLUSION HTTP://WWW.LRB.CO.UK/V31/N13/RORY-STEWART/THE-
IRRESISTIBLE-ILLUSION)
After seven years of refinement, the policy seems so buoyed by illusions, caulked in ambiguous language
and encrusted with moral claims, analogies and political theories that it can seem futile to present an
It is particularly difficult to argue not for a total withdrawal but
alternative.
for a more cautious approach. The best Afghan policy would be to
GRAHAM 26
reduce the number of foreign troops from the current level of 90,000 to far fewer –
perhaps 20,000. In that case, two distinct objectives would remain for the
international community: development and counter-terrorism. Neither
would amount to the building of an Afghan state. If the West believed it essential to exclude
al-Qaida from Afghanistan, then they could do it with special forces. (They have done it
successfully since 2001 and could continue indefinitely, though the result has only been to move bin Laden
across the border.) At the same time the West should provide generous development assistance – not only
to keep consent for the counter-terrorism operations, but as an end in itself. A reduction in troop numbers
and a turn away from state-building should not mean total withdrawal: good projects could continue to be
undertaken in electricity, water, irrigation, health, education, agriculture, rural development and in other
areas favoured by development agencies. We should not control and cannot predict the future of
Afghanistan. It may in the future become more violent, or find a decentralised equilibrium or a new
national unity, but if its communities continue to want to work with us, we can, over 30 years, encourage
the more positive trends in Afghan society and help to contain the more negative.
COIN Isn’t Necessary for Counter-Terrorism Operations

STEVEN SIMON; JONATHAN STEVENSON 2009 (ADJUNCT SENIOR FELLOW AT THE COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, IS A PROFESSOR OF STRATEGIC STUDIES AT THE US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
AFGHANISTAN: HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?', SURVIVAL, 51: 5, 47 — 67)
Counter-insurgency in Afghanistan also would probably fail. Counterinsurgency
generally works only when the domestic government resisting the insurgents enjoys the
respect and support of most of the domestic population. Rising perceptions of Hamid Karzai's government as ineffectual
and corrupt, and especially suspicions that it rigged the 20 August national election, indicate that it does not have that kind of credibility among Afghans. On the operational level,
provisional and qualified counter-insurgency success in Iraq is not a persuasive precedent for a comparable result in Afghanistan. One indirect indication is the difficulty the
Obama administration is having in figuring out how to measure such success! While Iraq's prime insurgency challenges were essentially compartmentalised in the confined space
and among the relatively small populations of Anbar, Diyala and Ninewah provinces and in Baghdad, Afghanistan's hazards permeate its Texas sized national territory. Thus,
applying the surge formula to Afghanistan, however it is adjusted, is likely to empower

warlords, increase factionalism and ultimately make Afghanistan harder to sustain as a
functioning unitary state. This would make Afghanistan more susceptible to being used as a strategic pawn by a number
of regional actors, including Iran as well as India and Pakistan. Comprehensively successful counter-
insurgency in Afghanistan, however, is not necessarily required to fulfil the US
counter-terrorism mission. It remains unclear whether a US-led counter-insurgency effort would aim to induce the
Taliban factions to reject al-Qaeda, or some other constellation of tribes to join forces against the Taliban.
COIN and CT are Two Completely Different Strategies

Hughes and Tripodi, Ph. Ds from Department of War Studies, at King’s College, 9
(Geraint and Christian, March, http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/487106_918013288_910291733.pdf, “Anatomy
of a surrogate: historical precedents and implications for contemporary counter-insurgency and counter-
terrorism”, Small Wars & Insurgencies, DA: 7/16/10, JPL)
COIN is defined as the coordinated political and military response of a
government and its external supporters to an organised campaign of
subversion and paramilitary action waged against the former by an
indigenous armed opposition. CT involves both the defensive measures a
state undertakes to protect its citizens from terrorist attacks and
offensive measures taken to target and neutralise a terrorist group – these
can range from penetration of the latter by intelligence and police services to more controversial
measures such as assassination or ‘targeted killings’
Answers to Russia is a Democracy

Despite Hopes of a Transition to a Democratic Nation,
Russia has Transitioned to an Authoritarian-Type
Government
Bugajski 10(Janusz, holder of the Lavrentis Lavrentiadis Chair and director of the
New European Democracies program at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, “Russia’s Pragmatic Reimperialization” CRIA Vol. 4(1))AQB
Despite initial expectations that a prosperous Russia will evolve into a

democracy with a more benign foreign policy, the exact opposite
occurred. With Putin as president from 1999 and the subsequent
GRAHAM 27
decade-long oil bonanza, Russia became more authoritarian in its

domestic politics and increasingly imperialistic toward its neighbors.
This trend has been largely supported by the Russian public, as the
state media inculcated the myth that during the 1990s, Russia was in a
chaotic state of affairs precipitated by international meddling, and that
a strong centralized state was the most effective alternative. Western
analysts often assume that Russia is acting in accordance with its
national interests rather than its state ambitions. It is useful to
distinguish between the two rather than simply accepting official
Russian assertions at face value. For instance, is it in Russia’s
legitimate interest to prevent the accession of neighboring states into
NATO or to oppose the positioning of NATO infrastructure among new Alliance
members? Accepting such positions would indicate that NATO is a threat
to Russia’s security and territorial integrity rather than being primarily
a pretext used by Moscow to deny the sovereignty of neighboring
countries.3
Answers to Russia’s Military Isn’t Modernized

Russia Is Modernizing their Military.
Amies April 4th, 2010 (Nick, writer for Deutsche Welle, [http://www.dw-
world.de/dw/article/0,,5416016,00.html] AD: 7/4/10)JM
A British Ministry of Defence official, in an interview with The Daily Telegraph newspaper, said that
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was suspected of being responsible for ordering the show of
strength, a point of view Margaret Klein, a Russia expert at the German Institute for International and
"Prior to 2007, there were no regular patrol
Security Affairs, agrees with.
flights by Russia's strategic bombers," Klein told Deutsche Welle. "They
were mostly grounded and only took part in military exercises. On Putin's
order, regular patrol flights of Russia's Tu-160 und Tu-95 were
resumed in August 2007. Since then, Russian strategic bombers have
increased their patrols over the Atlantic, Pacific and Arctic Oceans and are sometimes
intercepted by British, American or Canadian aircraft. Russian authorities, however, have denied
accusations that Russian airplanes have violated the airspace of European, NATO or North American
Margaret Light, a Russia expert at the Department of International
countries."
Relations & Centre for the Study of Global Governance at the London School of
Economics, agrees that Russia is showing the West that it should still
be taken seriously as a military power. "Part of the increased activity can
simply be explained by the fact that Russian pilots, who had no real flying practice
throughout the 90s, are now actively flying," she told Deutsche Welle. "As for
the infiltration, it is one of the myriad ways the Russians try to prove
that Russia is a great power that should be treated with the respect
due to its great power."
Answers To Russia Is Working with US/NATO

START Passed, but Relations Between Moscow and
Washington are Still Bad
Cohen – January 13th 2011 (Ariel Cohen, January 13th 2011, Russia’s
repression, The Washington Times,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jan/13/russias-repression/)
GRAHAM 28
The new Congress was sworn in just last week, but events far away - in Russia - already are
causing members to vent their ire. For one, Russian police detained Boris Nemtsov, one of the leaders
of the Russian opposition, during a rally in defense of the freedom of assembly, on
Triumfalnaya Square in Moscow on the last day of 2010. Demonstrators called on Russian authorities to
respect the constitution and demanded the resignation of Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. More than 150 people
were arrested in Moscow and at a similar rally in St. Petersburg. So much for freedom of assembly. Demonstrators also
expressed support for Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the former Yukos Oil Co. chief executive officer, today Russia's
most famous political prisoner. On Dec. 29, Khodorkovsky was sentenced to an additional 14 years in prison, after a kangaroo court in
2005 already had meted out an eight-year sentence for tax evasion. His
trial was deliberately postponed until
after the U.S. Senate ratification of the New START, a strategic nuclear weapons treaty. This was
done to avoid complications during a heated advise-and-consent process. Khodorkovsky's
conviction in a staged trial worthy of Andrey Vyshinsky, a notorious prosecutor of the 1930s Soviet purges, sent a chilling message
throughout Russia and around the world. Congress is also angry that Moscow's ongoing crackdown on
dissent continues apace. Three leaders of the Russian opposition, including Mr. Nemtsov, received short prison sentences
for "disobeying the police" on Jan. 2. On Thursday, Yelena Stashina, a Moscow judge, denied Mr. Nemtsov's appeal and sent him
back to jail. This is the same judge who sent the terminally sick lawyer Sergey Magnitsky back to detention, where he died four days
later in the fall of 2009. Congress is now preparing sanctions targeting her personally and other officials for complicity in Magnitsky's
death. Sen. Ben Cardin, Maryland Democrat, chairman of the Helsinki Commission for human rights, harshly denounced the
miscarriage of justice in Russia.
This latest round of political persecution amid the vaunted "reset" between the United
States and Russia has greatly resonated in the U.S. Sen. John McCain, Arizona Republican, and Sen. Joe
Lieberman, Connecticut independent, issued a strong statement expressing deep disappointment over the unjust treatment and arrest of
Mr. Nemtsov and other opposition leaders. So did Sen. Mark Begich, Alaska Democrat, who published a declaration condemning the
The ongoing arrests of protesters are as
arrest, and his colleague Sen. Roger Wicker, Mississippi Republican.
illegitimate as is Khodorkovsky's draconian sentence. These are signs of a freeze in
Russia domestically, which will translate quickly into a freeze in U.S.-Russian relations.
Russia is Cooperating on The War on Terror to Disguise

Concerns about Russian Expansionism
Bhatty 8(Roy Sultan Khan M.Phil/Ph.D candidate at Area Study Centre for Europe “RUSSIA: THE
TRADITIONAL HEGEMON IN CENTRAL ASIA”)AQB
Moreover,
Putin’s policies from 1999 to 2001 became an instrument in
strengthening Russia’s position and to avoid any clash. It adopted a
defensive posture to reduce cost. It strengthened relations with China and tried to increase
links with Pakistan and the Muslim world. Russia initiated a policy of
appeasement towards the US and the West so that it might pay attention to
internal threats to its security. In continuation of this policy, Russia
GRAHAM 29
cooperated with the US on its war on terrorism.32 The US war on

terrorism has provided Russia an opportunity to appease the West
and to send them a message that they are facing the same threat having the same
interests in respect of the emergence of “Islamic extremism”. Militant groups active in
Chechnya and Xinjiang were getting support from Taliban government of Afghanistan. The
US attack on Afghanistan broke the supply line to Chechens and Xinjiang’s Uighurs. The
Taliban’s defeat psychologically degraded extremist groups active in the entire region and
Russia’s
shattered their morale, which was also advantageous for Russia and China.
cooperation with the US in the war on terrorism should not be
considered as just Russia’s effort to appease the US. In fact,
cooperation is also a form of competition. States cooperate with
each other to enhance their capabilities to compete with other
states. Russia also entered into a cooperation mechanism with the US in
this regard. While supporting the US, Russia has avoided becoming a
bandwagon or a junior partner of the US and has also criticized US
polices.
Russia Won’t Send Military Force to Middle East – Any

Cooperation is Diplomatic
The Statesman 2010 (The Statesman (India), September 10, 2010, p. online
Mary Dejevsky)
Mary Dejevsky MOSCOW, 9 SEPT: Russia is positioning itself for active reinvolvement in
Afghanistan, the country's foreign minister indicated yesterday. Sergei Lavrov said his government
wanted to offer Washington and Nato all the help it can to stabilise the war-wrecked country, short of sending troops.In the most
explicit statement yet of Moscow's desire to boost its influence in the former Cold War battleground, two decades after the humiliating
withdrawal of its troops from Kabul, Mr Lavrov said: "We do not want to take any leading role but we want to help those who are
already there, because we know how hard it is from our own sad experience.
We want to help stabilise the
situation. We would do anything short of military involvement".Among the proposals Moscow has in
mind, he said, is for Russian engineers to renovate some 140 infrastructure projects, including power stations, built during the Soviet
occupation, assistance in repairing the key Salang tunnel, and provision of helicopters.Moscow's interest in putting itself on the map
for the potential endgame in Afghanistan as Washington and its allies seek to manoeuvre an exit represents a significant shift. It also
reflects a comprehensive reappraisal of post-Soviet Russia's position in the world and its national interests.
There have been
growing signs of the desire for greater involvement in Afghanistan, in particular at the
end of last month when Russia hosted a four-way meeting of regional leaders which
included President Hamid Karzai.Speaking yesterday, Mr Lavrov said that Russia's desire to co-operate
stemmed in part from its own "bitter experience" in the country, which cost more than 13,000 Soviet lives and was finally ended by
Mikhail Gorbachev, who described the Soviet Union's 10-year occupation as "a bleeding wound".But Russia has two other reasons
for becoming more actively engaged with Afghanistan now.
Relations are a Sham – The KGB is the USSR Still and they
Still Hate the US
Nyquist 2009 – (J.R., brilliant analyst of Russian foreign policy, 7/17, “Marina Kalashnikova’s
Warning to the West,” accessed at
http://www.financialsensearchive.com/stormwatch/geo/pastanalysis/2009/0724.html on 9/21/10, dml)
In the West we were told that the Soviet system was finished. We were told that the Communist Party lost
power, the KGB was reformed and democracy won the day. Kalashnikov said: “There was not any
moment, I can state with certainty, that the old system of KGB and nomenklatura admitted their failure or
lost control. They just changed their form and appearance. It was a sort of generational change. Instead of
generals in charge, we have lieutenant colonels. They behaved differently, but they are doing the same
thing. There has never been any moment when they admitted historical defeat. There never was any serious
step toward de-communization – never, never. The Yakovlev Commission was conceived to imitate de-
communization procedures in Central Europe.” So it was a sham? “Yes, it was a fake, an imitation,”
GRAHAM 30
Kalashnikov insisted. “From the very beginning the idea was, we’ll get back, we’ll modernize. And that’s
how it happened. Of course, many Western observers were happy about the new faces and new styles and
openness. But step by step, you yourself may remember that many American institutions here in Russia
have been pushed out or brought under Russian control. So, formally, we have several Western bodies here
allegedly doing democracy and consulting work, but in fact they have become an instrument of Kremlin
policy to imitate and exploit for their own purposes.”
Answers to Russia Has No Money

Expansionist Policies Will Continue Even In the Midst of a
Failing World Economy
Bugajski 10(Janusz, holder of the Lavrentis Lavrentiadis Chair and director of the
New European Democracies program at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, “Russia’s Pragmatic Reimperialization” CRIA Vol. 4(1))AQB
Russia’s brewing domestic problems, precipitated by the global

financial crisis and deepened by the drop in crude oil and natural gas
prices, have not aborted its expansionist ambitions. On the contrary,
Moscow uses the opportunities presented by the economic turmoil
among its weaker neighbors to further impose its interests. It may
seek to deflect attention from mounting social and regional disquiet inside the
Russian Federation to cultivate the sense of besiegement by pressuring various
neighbors in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia to abide by its
foreign and security decisions. It is therefore important for the NATO allies
to work more closely with a range of countries along Russia’s
borders – from Ukraine to Kazakhstan – to ensure their independence and
stability during a time of uncertainty and economic crisis. While
President Barack Obama has symbolically pushed the “reset” button in relations
with Moscow, some of Russia’s neighbors fear that instead of a “soft reset,” in
which avenues of cooperation are pursued where there are genuine common
interests, Washington may push a “hard reset” in which Russia’s
imperial impulses are overlooked or accommodated. Indeed, the Putin-
Medvedev tandem views reset buttons as the U.S.’s obligations to make
compromises and as opportunities to expand and consolidate Russia’s influences.
Moscow will therefore drive hard bargains to gain far-reaching
advantages from Washington.
Answers to NATO Containment

NATO Wouldn’t Stop an Expanding Russia
Larison 7/5 (Daniel, July 5th, 2010, http://www.amconmag.com/larison/2010/07/05/russian-
aggression/)KFC
Was Russian recognition of the independence of the separatist republics illegal? Of course. So was the
recognition of Kosovo independence by the U.S. and much of Europe. It is pretty widely accepted now
that it was recognition of Kosovo independence that led to Russia’s recognition of the separatist
Western governments wanted to make Kosovo a “special”
republics.
case, and Russia was going to make sure that it became a precedent that had
unhappy consequences for a U.S. ally. Georgian escalation made it very
easy for Moscow to do just that. The main difference between the conflicts prior to
recognition is that the U.S. and NATO launched the attack on Serbia that later led
GRAHAM 31
Russia was repelling an attack from Georgia

to this partition, while
against the statelets that had effectively broken away decades ago. It
was the U.S. and NATO that launched an unprovoked war against a traditional Russian ally eleven
years ago after assuring Russia that it had no reason to worry about eastward NATO expansion. It was
also the U.S. and many of our NATO allies that arbitrarily partitioned that country’s territory two years
it isn’t exactly paranoia to
ago with those recognitions of Kosovo independence. Perhaps
see an expanding NATO as some sort of threat to Russia and its allies.
Then again, maybe Moscow is mistaken to see NATO expansion as a major
threat. As NATO has expanded, it has steadily gone from being what some of us used to call the
greatest alliance in history to something more like a club for the politically correct. Belonging to it has
had far less to do with collective defense against a foreign threat, which has steadily receded for the
last twenty years, and more to do with burnishing the credentials of one’s country as a truly Western
one. Certainly, many new and aspiring NATO members have contributed to the war in Afghanistan, and
many have also inexplicably contributed to the war in Iraq, but for the most part these have been
symbolic commitments that underscore just how militarily useless most of the new allies are. To the
extent that NATO continues to have any real military function at all, it has been to serve as America’s
posse in military campaigns that have nothing to do with the alliance’s reason for existing. What
continues to amaze is not the limited support NATO allies are giving to the war in Afghanistan, but that
they continue to provide any support when they no longer really have any obligation to do so.
Meanwhile,it is exactly those countries where Western security
guarantees are truly risky and dangerous that stood no chance of
gaining entry, because Ukraine or Georgia in NATO might have eventually required
NATO to fulfill its pledge to defend against an attack on any member, and no current
member of NATO had any intention of doing that.
NATO Won’t Deter Russia

Valasek 9 (Tomas, director of foreign policy & defence @ CER, November,
[http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/wp_929_nato_nov09.pdf] AD: 7/7/10)JM
Second, countries in Europe’s north and east also warn against assuming that the
Kremlin will always act rationally. While the threat of collective
retaliation should deter Russia from confronting a NATO country, the
Central Europeans point out that Moscow’s attitude to its neighbours is driven
as much by emotions as by reason. They worry this could lead Moscow to
escalate future disputes into a war, no matter how disastrous for Russia. They point to the
2009 Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute as an example. This crisis started as a
commercial dispute over unresolved debt, gas prices and transit fees. When Ukraine refused to pay,
Russia cut gas supplies for two weeks, leaving a number of Central European countries without gas in
the middle of winter (Ukraine transports 80 per cent of Russian gas exports to Europe). Kyiv was hardly
blameless in the crisis – it had failed to pay bills on time and was reluctant to remove murky gas
trading companies – but Russia, in turning off gas supplies entirely, turned a bilateral dispute over
One senior Central European official
payments into a gas war affecting all of Central Europe.
blamed “Putin’s rage at
closely involved in brokering the agreement which ended the crisis
Ukraine” for the escalation. Gazprom, Russia’s state-controlled gas
mammoth, lost $1-2 billion in revenue during the crisis. Since the shutoff, the EU has
intensified efforts to build new pipelines to connect Europe to non-Russian sources of gas, such as the
Nabucco pipeline through Turkey and the Balkans. From a commercial point of view and from the
the crisis did predictable damage to Russia –
standpoint of relations with the EU,
yet it did take place, despite solid rational arguments against it.
Inherency Extensions
US Will Not Withdraw this Summer
BBC January 17th 2011 (BBC Monitoring South Asia – Political, January 17,
2011 Monday, Afghan paper says US military plan to stay for good, "Will the US
not give up the Afghan base?" by independent Afghan daily Cheragh)
GRAHAM 32
the United States is trying to turn

Contrary to its previous declarations,
Afghanistan into its permanent military base and does not intend to
withdraw its troops from the country. US officials have made many promises on
military withdrawal from Afghanistan, but so far none of the promises has been fulfilled. US President
Barack Obama vowed in a statement that his country would begin military withdrawal
from Afghanistan in July 2011. His statements regarding US military withdrawal from
this country were supported by most countries, however all these promises were
dropped at NATO leaders' conference in Lisbon, Portugal and a new policy is
now being pursued. In fact, before the Lisbon summit, it had been confirmed that withdrawal from
instead of fixing an exact date, it was
Afghanistan would begin in 2011, however
agreed that the foreign forces would begin withdrawal in 2014.
Petraeus is Resisting Summer Withdrawal – Won’t be out

this Summer
Filkins, 10 (Dexter, foreign correspondent for the New York Times, fellow at the
Carr Center for Human Rights, “Petraeus Opposes a Rapid Pullout in Afghanistan”,
August 15, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/16/world/asia/16petraeus.html?
_r=1&pagewanted=print)
KABUL, Afghanistan — Gen. David H. Petraeus, the commander of American and NATO forces,
began a campaign on Sunday to convince an increasingly skeptical public that the American-led coalition
can still succeed here despite months of setbacks, saying he had not come to
GRAHAM 33
Afghanistan to preside over a “graceful exit.” In an hourlong interview with The New
York Times, the general argued against any precipitous withdrawal of
forces in July 2011, the date set by President Obama to begin at least a gradual reduction of the
100,000 troops on the ground. General Petraeus said that it was only in the last few weeks that the war
plan had been fine-tuned and given the resources that it required. “For the first time,” he said, “we will
have what we have been working to put in place for the last year and a half.” In another of a series of
Petraeus even appeared to leave open
interviews, on NBC’s “Meet the Press,” General
the possibility that he would recommend against any withdrawal of
American forces next summer. “Certainly, yes,” he said when the show’s host, David
Gregory, asked him if, depending on how the war was proceeding, he might tell the president that a
drawdown should be delayed. “The
president and I sat down in the Oval Office,
and he expressed very clearly that what he wants from me is my best
professional military advice.” The statement offered a preview of what promised to be an intense
political battle over the future of the American-led war in Afghanistan, which has deteriorated on the ground and turned
unpopular at home. Already, some Democrats in Congress are pushing for steep withdrawals early on, while supporters of
the war say that a rapid draw-down could endanger the Afghan mission altogether. General Petraeus, in his interview with
The Times, said American and NATO troops were making progress on a number of fronts, including routing Taliban
insurgents from their sanctuaries, reforming the Afghan government and preparing Afghan soldiers to fight on their own.
General Petraeus, who took over last month after Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal was fired for making disparaging remarks
about civilian leaders, said he believed that he would be given the time and matériel necessary to prevail here. He
expressed that confidence despite the fact that nearly every phase of the war is going badly — and even though some
inside the Obama administration have turned against it. “The president didn’t send me over
here to seek a graceful exit,” General Petraeus said at his office at NATO headquarters in downtown
Kabul. “My marching orders are to do all that is humanly possible to help
us achieve our objectives.” General Petraeus’s public remarks, his first since taking over,
highlight the extraordinary challenges, both military and political, that loom in the coming months.
American soldiers and Marines are dying at a faster rate than at any time since 2001. The Afghan in whom
the United States has placed its hopes, President Hamid Karzai, has demonstrated little resolve in rooting
out the corruption that pervades his government. And perhaps most important, the general will be trying
to demonstrate progress in the 11 months until Mr. Obama’s deadline to begin withdrawing troops. The
date was chosen in part to win over critics of the war and to push the Afghan government to reform more
military
quickly. But as critical battles to reclaim parts of the Taliban heartland have faltered,
commanders have begun preparing to ask the White House to keep
any withdrawals next year to a minimum. In the interview with The Times, General
Petraeus also suggested that he would resist any large-scale or rapid
withdrawal of American forces. If the Taliban believes that will happen,
he said, they are mistaken.
With the US Distracted in the Middle East Russia has the

Ability to Re-establish its Spheres of Influence.
Zeihan 6/15/10(Peter, Stratfor Global Intelligence “The Kyrgyzstan Crisis and the Russian
Dilemma”)AQB
Russia is on a bit of a roll. The U.S.

STRATFOR often discusses how
distraction in the Middle East has offered Russia a golden
opportunity to re-establish its spheres of influence in the region,
steadily expanding the Russian zone of control into a shape that is eerily
GRAHAM 34
reminiscent of the old Soviet Union. Since 2005, when this process began, Russia
has clearly reasserted itself as the dominant power in Armenia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Ukraine, and has
intimidated places like Georgia and Turkmenistan into a sort of silent
acquiescence. But we have not spent a great amount of time explaining why
this is the case. It is undeniable that Russia is a Great Power, but few
things in geopolitics are immutable, and Russia is no exception.
Russia is Militarily Aggressive and Wants to Expand.

Petrou 8 (Michael, foreign correspondent at Maclean's magazine with PhD modern
history from the U of Oxford, Aug 25, Maclean’s, 121(33), EBSCO)JM
Russia wasn't bluffing, and is unlikely to do so in future

It is now clear that
standoffs. Less than two decades after losing its Soviet empire, Russia is ready to
re-establish control over independent states in its backyard, regardless of
who their allies are. "With regard to the former Soviet republics it means that the
competition for influence between the West and Russia has
revived," Jeffrey Mankoff, associate director of international security studies at Yale
University, said in an interview with Maclean's. "It never really went away, but what this
means is that Russia is making a more assertive claim to have a say in
their affairs and to want to bring them over to its side." Georgia is the
latest country to face a renewed fight for its autonomy. But other conflicts -- not
necessarily military -- will likely follow in places such as Ukraine, eastern Europe, and the
Baltic states. Moscow has emerged from this altercation victorious on all fronts.
It has shown that it has the will to crush -- all too easily -- a small neighbour,
and it has sent a collective shudder through the other countries along its borders, all in the
face of hollow denunciations from the outside world -- and not much more. The West --
specifically the United States, the European Union, and NATO, the latter two having opened
needs to decide exactly
their doors to countries that are also in Moscow's sights --
what it is willing to do in the face of the growing Russian threat.
Russia is Now an Authoritarian Regime with Putin Leading

its Imperial Expansion.
Llosa 8 (Alvaro, director of the Center on Global Prosperity, Aug 13, Deseret News, p.
A.13, ProQuest)JM
Of course, one could reverse his argument: Soviet imperialism was a continuation,
not an antecedent, of Russian nationalism. Vladimir Putin and his stooge,
President Dmitry Medvedev, have revived a tradition of Russian
expansionism that dates back to Ivan the Terrible. The invasion of Georgia
echoes Russia's annexation of that country in 1801 and again in 1921,
when the Soviets crushed a short-lived Georgian independence. This has little
GRAHAM 35
to do with protecting South Ossetians, who a few years ago were vying for independence
from both Georgia and Russia. And it has little to do with Georgian President Mikheil Saakash- vili's obvious
miscalculation in responding to South Ossetia's latest provocation by trying to assert military control of that region.
Russia had been planning this for some time, as demonstrated by
the awesome efficacy of the assault, targeting areas well beyond South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
another rebellious region, and mobilizing its Black Sea fleet. It would also be a gross mistake to think that the casus belli can be traced to
Western actions such as the recognition of Kosovo's independence to the detriment of Russia's Serbian allies or NATO's push for an anti-
missile system in Central Europe. Those moves, however imprudent given the psychology of Moscow's leaders, did not precede the
: Moscow's foreign expansion is the

emergence of post-Soviet nationalism in Russia. Quite the opposite
logical continuation of authoritarian rule at home, which Putin has

been consolidating for some time with the help of abundant oil and natural
gas money. First, Putin made sure his country's feeble democratic
institutions were replaced with autocratic rule. Most checks and
balances were neutered: the judiciary, political parties, local governments,
the media, private corporations, separatist regions. The security forces, the
Orthodox Church and the energy industry became the pillars of the new
regime. The first two, already steeped in Russian nationalism, required little purging. The energy sector needed
some work, which is why the giant Yukos firm was broken up and its oil subsidiary gobbled by the government, as was
Once the Kremlin's control was
Gazprom, the world's largest producer of natural gas.
established, there was little anyone could do about Russian

expansionism. Europe imports vast amounts of natural gas and oil from Russia. The threat to reduce or cut
off supplies, for instance by ceasing shipments through Ukraine, a major transit route, served to blackmail the
European Union.
Russia is Preparing to Expand its Regional Influence.

Torbakov 9 (Igor, Senior Researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs in
Helsinki, [http://www.upi-fiia.fi/assets/publications/UPI_Briefing_Paper_38_torbakov-
kononenko.pdf] AD: 7/4/10)JM
However, Russia’s conduct appears to be powerfully influenced by the Kremlin’s

own subjective perception of how the recession is going to reshape the world’s
geopolitical landscape. There seem to be two key elements in the Russian post-
crisis strategic outlook. First, there is a strong belief among Moscow
policymakers that although the crisis certainly hit Russia hard, the other
global centres of power were seriously damaged as well. Thus, while
GRAHAM 36
globally Russia’s situation might not be any worse than that of its major
geopolitical competitors, in post-Soviet Eurasia it seems to have
weathered the financial storm much better than its neighbours, whose
economies were literally ravaged by the crisis. Secondly, the Kremlin
strategists appear to believe that the crisis is going to strengthen
the trend towards greater multipolarity and regionalism. As Russia’s
policy elite perceive their country to be one of the world’s several major centres of
power, they seek to secure Russia’s position as a leader of a regional
grouping which, ideally, would embrace all the CIS countries. Some
of Russia’s latest moves seem to be influenced by this strategic
outlook. First came Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s announcement that
Russia is no longer interested in becoming a member of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) on its own but would rather join as part of the customs
union it has forged with Belarus and Kazakhstan. Second was the recent
decision to give a significant boost to the Russia-led Collective Security
Treaty Organization (CSTO), including the creation of the bloc’s rapid reaction
force. These moves suggest that Russia has indeed opted to play the
role of a distinct regional power which is eager to offer its
neighbours alternative non-Western economic and military
institutions.
Russia is Cooperating with the West now – But it Wants to

Expand its Sphere of Influence.
Trenin 9 (Dmitri, director of the Moscow Center of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, October, [http://www.twq.com/09october/docs/09oct_Trenin.pdf]
AD: 7/4/10)JM
Since its leadership abandoned the notion of integration first into the West (Boris Yeltsin following the
breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991), and then with it (Vladimir Putin in the aftermath of the
Russia has been defining itself as a self-standing
September 11, 2001 attacks),
great power with global reach. Its current ambition is to become a
full-fledged world power, one of a handful of more or less equal key players in
the twenty-first century global system. Seen from that perspective, the former
GRAHAM 37
imperial borderlands of Russia are deemed to be both elements of

its power center and a cushion to protect Russia itself from
undesirable encroachments by other great powers. This says a lot about Russia’s
view of the world (Realpolitik/Realoekonomie: power competition and collaboration, under conditions of globalization),
its self-image (a great power in a global oligarchy, holding primacy in its own neighborhood), and intentions (to
advance to a high seat at the global governance table, where the Group of 8, Group of 20, United Nations Security
Council, informal groupings such as BRIC [with Brazil, India, and China], and the proposed trilateral security structure
The aim is to
for the Euro-Atlantic area are seated alongside the European Union and the United States).
bring about a less U.S./Western-centric system. Russia’s evolution in the next two
decades and developments in the new states will decide whether this worldview bears relevance to contemporary international realities
it will be important
and trends, and whether the Kremlin’s ambitions can be fulfilled. For the purposes of this article,
to see how Russia’s great power policies at the beginning of the

twenty-first century differ from the traditional policies of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. More specifically, is the current usage of the spheres of ‘‘privileged interests’’
instead of ‘‘spheres of influence’’ significant or is it a mere window dressing? Seen from a reverse
perspective, how are the former Soviet republics/Warsaw Pact allies taking Russia’s new (old?)
interests? Finally, what does it all portend for Russia’s relations with other power centers, such as
China, the EU, and the United States, and with regional actors such as Iran and Turkey?
Harms Extensions
Russia Breeds Terrorists
Russia has Ties to 9/11 and is Trying to Squelch any
Information Pointing that Direction.
Nyquist 2009 – (J.R., brilliant analyst of Russian foreign policy, 7/17, “Marina
Kalashnikova’s Warning to the West,” accessed at
http://www.financialsensearchive.com/stormwatch/geo/pastanalysis/2009/0717.html on 9/21/10,
dml)
“The NATO idea of deterrence means absolutely nothing to the

Russian generals,” wrote Kalashnikova. “Unlike their Western
counterparts, they are not afraid of big military and civilian
GRAHAM 38
losses. This was true in the time of Stalin. Losses do not affect the
popularity of Kremlin rulers….” The philosopher Nietzsche once wrote that
sacrificing people for a state or an idea makes that state or idea all the more precious to those
who have made the sacrifice. Such is human psychology, yesterday, today and tomorrow. “The
strategic balance,” warned Kalashnikova, “has by and large never
worked.” Standing outside the logic of nuclear deterrence,
Kremlin leaders have modernized their nuclear bunkers. They are
prepared to survive. “The current Russian military is not weaker
than the USSR,” she says, “and in some areas it surpasses the
Soviet military.” – This from a writer who has personally
interviewed Russian generals, spy chiefs and statesmen. She
goes on to say that after 9/11 Russia’s terrorist allies can be
realistically assumed to play a key role in the strategic equation.
And then she fatefully quotes a NATO functionary who spoke
about the role of al Qaeda and Bin Laden as follows: “This [9/11
attack] is beyond their intellectual capabilities.” Insights of this kind
have been known to trigger “polonium reactions,” as in the case of former FSB
Lt. Col. Alexander Litvinenko – who publicly declared that Vladimir Putin
was the master terrorist behind al Qaeda. And here is where the
plot thickens. When Marina Kalashnikova presented her analysis to
Russian and Ukrainian readers on August 26, 2008, she annoyed
the regime and made herself a target of the Russian secret
police. Her Moscow residence was broken into. Private papers
were stolen. Threats were made. And last, but not least, she was
forcibly incarcerated in a psychiatric clinic for 35 days. “I am
completely healthy,” Kalashnikova told me during a telephone interview
on Sunday. “It was absolutely political … and not medical at all.”
Russia is a Breeding Ground for Terrorism

Jamestown Foundation November 9th, 2010 (The Jamestown
Foundation, WAR ON TERRORISM IN THE CAUCASUS: RUSSIA
BREEDS JIHADISTS, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?
no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=3096)
Ever since the September 11 attacks, the Kremlin leadership has

been going out of its way to cast Russia as a frontline state that,
in its North Caucasus region, valiantly defends Europe and the world from
the lethal threat of global terror. Yet most international experts
as well as Russia's independent analysts note that the root
causes of terrorism are almost always local. It is only when the aggrieved
GRAHAM 39
and alienated segments of Muslim populations cannot make themselves heard through formal
institutions that radical Islamism emerges to provide them with a new, mostly militant, religious
Russia's decade-long crisis in Chechnya and the flawed policies in other
and political agenda.
a sad illustration of this vicious cycle that
North Caucasus republics are
goes through the phases of alienation and radicalization, finally
culminating in extremist and terrorist violence.
As Russia Attempts to Expand, they use Muslim

Sentiments toward the US as Weapons – Encourages
Terrorism.
Bhatty 8(Roy Sultan Khan M.Phil/Ph.D candidate at Area Study Centre for Europe “RUSSIA:
THE TRADITIONAL HEGEMON IN CENTRAL ASIA”)AQB
Though the emergence of extremism is also a threat for

Russia, Russia has the opportunity to direct the Muslim’s
sentiments against the US and to get their sympathies. In 2003,
ultranationalist leader of Russia Vladimir Zhirinovsky openly supported US war against Iraq,
Russia would benefit from it, as US would be
arguing that
weakened and while feeling hated for the US, the world
community would look toward Russia for help.33 Since 2001, and
especially after 2003, the US is quite involved in Afghanistan and Iraq that has given much
Russia wants to
time to Russia to revive its power that it lost in the Cold War.34
keep the US and NATO preoccupied. In fact Russia is following the old
saying of the famous and earliest known writer on military strategy, Sun Tzu, who said ‘the
by encouraging
best way to win is to let your enemy defeat himself’. In the CARs,
extremist groups clandestinely, Russia can force their
authoritarian rulers to look towards Russia for help. Russia has
shown no keen interest in providing assistance to crush extremist groups active in Central
Asia. This gives a strong appearance that Russia is involved in encouraging these groups for
its own vested interests in the region. For instance, Russia did not support Uzbekistan and
Kyrgyzstan properly at the time of the infiltration made by the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU) in 1999 and 2000. An article reproduced in the June 2001 issue of a Russian
journal Russia and the Muslim World (Moscow), revealed that the IMU had its bases in
Tajikistan which was ally of Russia. The IMU was patronized by high Tajik officials including
special services, whereas wounded Islamic fighters were treated in hospital in Dushanbe.35 In
an interview with “Abdullah” the son of a man identified as Shaikh Ibrahim (the IMU leader
Tahir Yuldoshev’s second in command) said, Tahir rejected a proposal from an unknown
Russian who offered him a deal to finance him and supply of arms and ammunition to fight
By exploiting the threat of extremism in
against the US in Afghanistan.36
Central Asia, Russia has compelled the CARs to look for
Russia’s help. Russia’s alleged hand in support of militants
fighting against US provides Russia an opportunity to make
the US engaged in a volatile Afghanistan and to take a
revenge of the USSR’s defeat in Afghanistan which was made
possible with US weapons and dollars. So Russia is using its
cards to maintain its influence in the region.
Russian Expansionism Threatens Global Security

Russia Is Helping its Ally – Venezuela – Create Nuclear
Weapons and Create an Elite Military
Sherman October 5th, 2010 (J. Micheal Sherman, Iran has a Russian
Gun Pointed at the US from Venezuela, October 5th 2010,
http://www2.starexponent.com/news/2010/oct/05/iran-has-russian-gun-
pointed-us-venezuela-ar-542639/?
referer=None&shorturl=http://starexponent.com/ar/542639/)
GRAHAM 40
It may have been momentarily satisfying that the delegations from the U.S. and 32 other nations walked out on that
bellicose and bizarre speech, but that small satisfaction quickly fades when one learns that
Iran and Russia
are mining uranium, building nuclear facilities, opening weapon factories, and
placing elite Iranian military troops -- in Venezuela.[1] In October 2009, FBI agents seized
computers and other evidence from the home of Dr. P. Leonardo Mascheroni, a Los Alamos, New Mexico physicist. When
interviewed after the seizure, Mascheroni claimed that a man from the Venezuelan embassy in Washington gave him a
$20,000 down payment and a promise of $800,000 more to create a blueprint for the development of a nuclear weapons
program in Venezuela.[2] Venezuela
has one of the largest uranium reserves in the world
and is partnering with Iran and Russia to develop and harvest them.[3] Russia and
Venezuela have signed a nuclear cooperation agreement[4] and Russia is now
building a nuclear reactor in Venezuela similar to the one they just completed in
Iran.[5] Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez is allowing Iran to establish a
business base there with $30 billion to $40 billion[6] of Iranian money being
poured into more than 150 Iranian/Venezuelan joint-venture agreements.[7]
Media reports have stated that an Iranian firm, Shahid Bagheri, which was already under UN
sanctions, had “used the Venezuelan airline Conviasa to ship computers and missile
engines” to Syria in exchange for Iranian military forces to provide training to
Venezuelan troops.[8]
Russia Uses Tactics that Destabilize Regions and

Governments to Expand It’s Influence – Empirically
Proven with the Invasion of Georgia.
Bugajski 10(Janusz, holder of the Lavrentis Lavrentiadis Chair and director
of the New European Democracies program at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, “Russia’s Pragmatic Reimperialization” CRIA Vol.
4(1))AQB)
Russia under Putin’s guidance has evolved into an imperial

project for two core reasons. First, it has clearly articulated ambitions to
restore its global status, primarily in competition with the
United States, and to undermine international institutions that
GRAHAM 41
hinder these aspirations. Second, Moscow's drive to dominate its

former satellites, curtail the expansion of Western structures, and neutralize Europe
as a security player is accomplished through a mixture of threat,
subterfuge, disinformation, pressure, and economic incentives.
Russia's national interests are viewed as predominating over those of its smaller neighbors
and European partners. However, Russia's neo-imperialism no longer relies
primarily on traditional instruments such as military might, the
implanting of political proxies in subject states, or the control of territory. Instead, Moscow
employs an assortment of diplomatic, political, informational,
economic, and security tools to encourage the evolution of
pliant governments that either remain neutral or actively
promote Moscow’s strategic agenda. Nonetheless, military force may also
be employed to destabilize a neighboring government and fracture its territory as the invasion
of Georgia in August 2008 poignantly illustrated. In contrast with the Cold War, Russia
has deployed novel tools for subversion, disinformation, and
domination. In particular, Moscow’s growing monopolization of energy supplies from
within Russia and the Caspian Basin to Europe buttresses its power projection. Europe’s
growing energy dependence and Russia's accumulative purchases of energy infrastructure
and other assets in targeted states reinforce the latter’s political influence.
The Recent Bombing in Russia Wasn’t a Terrorist Attack – It

Was Retaliation from Russian Expansionism into the Caucus
Region
Reuters January 24th 2011 (Reuters, Alexei Anishchuk, January 24th, 2011,
12:34pm EST, Suicide bomber kills 35 at Russia's biggest airport,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE70N2TQ20110124?pageNumber=1)
A suicide bomber killed at least 35 people at Russia's

MOSCOW (Reuters) -
biggest airport on Monday in an attack that bore the hallmarks of
militants fighting for an Islamist state in the north Caucasus region.
President Dmitry Medvedev vowed to track down and punish those behind the bombing, which also injured about 130 people, including
foreigners, during the busy late afternoon at Moscow's Domodedovo airport. Dense smoke filled the hall and a fire burned along one wall. "The
explosion was right near me, I was not hit but I felt the shock wave -- people were falling," said Yekaterina Alexandrova, a translator who was
waiting in the crowded arrivals area to meet a client flying in from abroad. Thick drops of blood were scattered across the snow-covered
tarmac outside the arrivals hall, where traces of shrapnel were found. "I heard a loud boom... we thought someone had just dropped
something. But then I saw casualties being carried away," a check-in attendant who gave her name as Elena told Reuters at Domodedovo,
GRAHAM 42
The Kremlin said Medvedev, who has called

which is some 22 km (14 miles) southeast of Moscow.
the insurgency in the north Caucasus the biggest threat to Russia's

security, delayed his departure for the Davos international business forum in Switzerland. The
rebels have vowed to take their bombing campaign from the violence-
wracked north Caucasus to the Russian heartland, hitting transport and economic targets.
They have also leveled threats at the 2014 Winter Olympics, scheduled for Sochi, a region they claim as part of their "emirate." "Security will
be strengthened at large transport hubs," Medvedev wrote on Twitter. "We mourn the victims of the terrorist attack at Domodedovo airport.
The organizers will be tracked down and punished." No group has yet taken responsibility for the attack, but dozens of Internet surfers, writing
in Russian, praised the suicide bomber on unofficial Islamist site kavkazcenter.com. Russia's ruble-denominated stock market MICEX fell by
nearly two percent following the blast, which ripped through the arrivals hall, but traders said they expected little long-term impact. "It (the
blast) is moving the market in the short term, but there is no fundamental reason for the market to fall. If you remember, the market didn't
react strongly to (previous blasts)," said trader Alexei Bachurin from Renaissance Capital. Twitter users posted mobile video phone footage of
dozens of people lying on the floor as thick smoke filled the hall and a fire burned along one wall. Airport staff were shown using flash lights to
pick their way through the chaotic scene taped off immediately after the blast. Later videos showed emergency workers wheeling injured
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who shares power in

people out of the terminal on stretchers.
a 'tandem' arrangement with the less influential Medvedev, has staked

his political reputation on quelling rebellion in the north Caucasus. He
launched a war in late 1999 in Chechnya to topple a secessionist government. That
campaign achieved its immediate aim and helped him to the presidency months later; but since then
insurgency has spread to neighboring Ingushetia and Dagestan. "It
does not ... bode well for Russian ties to the North Caucasus and is yet
another sign that what Putin started in 1999 by invading the rebellious
republic of Chechnya has come home to roost again in the Russian
capital," said Glen Howard, president of the U.S. Jamestown Foundation research institution. "The bomb
blast at Domodedevo will further strengthen the view among the Russian elite that Putin is losing control
Moscow recently saw
over security in the capital, which plays into the hands of his enemies.”
riots involving thousands of Russian nationalists who attacked
passersby of non-Slavic appearance, many of whom were from the
north Caucasus. Analysts say rebels are planning to increase violence
in the run up to 2012 presidential elections, that may well see Putin
returning to the presidency. Security has been tightened at Moscow's other two airports,
which will also receive diverted passengers who were flying toward Domodedovo, media reported. Moscow
suffered its worst attack in six years in March 2010 when two female suicide bombers from Dagestan set
off explosives in the metro, killing 40 people.
The worst incident involving north
Caucasus rebels took place in 2004 when militants seized control of a
school in Beslan. When Russian troops stormed the building in an attempt to
end a siege, 331 hostages, half of them children, were killed.
The Moscow Airport Bombing was Retaliation from the North

Caucus
The Australian January 31st, 2011(Moscow bomber from North Caucasus
The Australian January 31, 2011 12:00AM)
THE suicide bomber who killed 35 people in an attack on a Moscow

airport last week was a 20-year-old man from the North Caucasus, investigators
said yesterday. The mangled body of the man had been identified, a national investigative
but he gave no name. The case had
committee spokesman told news agency Interfax,
been solved and further suspects were being sought, the spokesman said. About
180 people were injured in last Tuesday's (AEDT) attack at Domodedovo airport, Moscow's busiest, dozens
GRAHAM 43
Immediately after the attack investigators had

of whom were still in hospitals.
blamed militant Islamist groups from the North Caucasus, which includes the
republics of Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, North Ossetia and Kabardino-Balkaria, in particular singling
Numerous radical Islamist groups have been
out the Nogay Jamaat terrorist group.
fighting for an independent "emirate" in the North Caucasus for years
as the Kremlin has struggled to impose peace on the region, plagued
by poverty and unemployment
Russia Seeks to Destroy the US

Russia Is Using Manipulation to Destroy the US
Nyquist 2009
(J.R, renowned expert in geopolitics and international relations, “Never Ask the Wolves to Help
You Against the Dogs,” 8-21, http://www.financialsense.com/stormwatch/geo/analysis.html)
“You know, one thing people should
“They would be huge,” said Kalashnikov.
understand. There is a definite line of continuity in Moscow’s

military policies from Stalin’s time. Moscow has consistently
followed the same line of policy. What is misleading for many
people is that the material military presence is not there
anymore. We don’t need so many tanks. The question is what
sort of design, what sort of strategy you have in place. All of that
GRAHAM 44
Moscow has in terms of potentials. We see that the Russian

presence is being reinstalled in some places – Latin America, Africa and the Middle East.”
The important thing is manipulation and influence instead of
direct control. In terms of modern strategy Russia’s reduced size
brings advantages. Now Russia is not responsible for feeding Azerbaijan or providing cheap
energy to the Baltic States or Ukraine. The KGB’s weapons of influence and
manipulation, including organized crime and drug trafficking, can be used to

influence and manipulate without maintaining expensive armies.
And so, the Russians have learned how to streamline their
dominance. Make the Americans think that Washington has the

upper hand. But look around today and see what is happening to
the American economy, to the U.S. dollar, and to the U.S. nuclear
deterrent. There is a visible weakening in all three areas.
Solvency Extensions
U.S Military Presence in the Middle East is Used to Justify
Russian Aggression.
Young 9 (Cathy, Russian American journalist and writer, April,
[http://reason.com/archives/2009/03/13/unclenching-the-fist/1] AD: 7/6/10) JM
It could even be argued that the Bush administration’s aggressive unilateralism on the
war in Iraq, its often cavalier attitude toward human rights in the War on Terror, and its
executive power grab on the home front emboldened Putin to behave
similarly. While most of the alleged Bush-Putin parallels are specious, the actions of the
GRAHAM 45
Bush White House easily lent themselves to a self-serving interpretation by

the Putin clique, validating its cynical conviction that democracy is just a cover for “might
makes right.” The war in Iraq also made it far too easy to equate all efforts at “democracy promotion,”
even peaceful activities such as assisting civil rights groups, with naked imperialism.
This helped
the Putin propaganda machine stoke Russian unease about the U.S. role in
the “color revolutions” in Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004, which replaced those
nations’ governments with ones less devoted to Moscow. Many Russians certainly experienced
the collapse of the USSR and the weakening of Russia’s influence abroad as a blow to their national
pride. But the notion that the United States rubbed Russia’s face in its humiliation is a myth. (If the
West rejoiced in Communism’s Cold War defeat, so did most of the Russian media and political elites at
the time.) Yes, NATO expansion into Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics ranks high on the
list of Russian grievances. But when NATO first began seriously considering admitting former Eastern
Bloc states in the early 1990s, most supporters of expansion assumed that it could eventually include
Russia—and Russia seemed receptive. These prospects were undercut by pressures from neo-
Communists and nationalists in the Russian parliament, who wanted a less pro-Western stance, and by
mixed signals and suspicions on both the Russian and the U.S. sides.
It could be that the
conflict is more contrived than real on Russia’s end. The belief that
Kremlin rhetoric about the American threat is a faux paranoia,
calculated to enable bullying at home and abroad, is shared by numerous
commentators inside Russia, from the Carnegie Endowment’s Lilia Shevtsova to former top-level Soviet
arms negotiator Gen. Vladimir Dvorkin. Writing in the independent online journal EJ.ru in April 2008,
Dvorkin pointed out the obvious: Given Russia’s nuclear potential, a military attack by NATO troops on
Russia is unthinkable, no matter how many of its neighbors join the alliance. The real danger to Russia,
in Dvorkin’s view, is “civilizational isolation” if the country continues to resist democratization and
modernization and finds itself surrounded by neighbors integrated into the West.
U.S Overstretch is Enabling Russian Expansionism.

Friedman 8 (George, Ph.D. in government at Cornell U, September 2,
[http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/medvedev_doctrine_and_american_strategy] AD:
7/6/10)JM
In short, the United States remained heavily committed to a region

stretching from Iraq to Pakistan, with main force committed to Iraq and
Afghanistan, and the possibility of commitments to Pakistan (and above all to
Iran) on the table. U.S. ground forces were stretched to the limit, and
U.S. airpower, naval and land-based forces had to stand by for the
possibility of an air campaign in Iran — regardless of whether the U.S.
planned an attack, since the credibility of a bluff depended on the availability of
force. The situation in this region actually was improving, but the United States had to
remain committed there. It was therefore no accident that the Russians
invaded Georgia on Aug. 8 following a Georgian attack on South Ossetia.
Forgetting the details of who did what to whom, the United States had
created a massive window of opportunity for the Russians: For the
foreseeable future, the United States had no significant forces to spare
to deploy elsewhere in the world, nor the ability to sustain them in
extended combat. Moreover, the United States was relying on
Russian cooperation both against Iran and potentially in Afghanistan, where
Moscow’s influence with some factions remains substantial. The United States
needed the Russians and couldn’t block the Russians. Therefore, the Russians
inevitably chose this moment to strike.
Withdrawal is Key to Stop Russia

Friedman 8 (George, Ph.D. in government at Cornell U, September 2,
[http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/medvedev_doctrine_and_american_strategy] AD:
7/6/10)JM
GRAHAM 46
Rapidly disengage from Iraq, leaving a residual force there and in

Afghanistan. The upside is that this creates a reserve force to reinforce
the Baltics and Ukraine that might restrain Russia in the former Soviet Union. The
downside is that it would create chaos in the Islamic world, threatening regimes
that have sided with the United States and potentially reviving effective
intercontinental terrorism. The trade-off is between a hegemonic threat
from Eurasia and instability and a terror threat from the Islamic world.
We Can’t Deter Russia while Still in Afghanistan.

Evans, Charter, and Philp 8 (Evans, award-winning syndicated journalist, David,
journalist and Catherine, foreign correspondent for The Times, September 9,
[http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4709981.ece] AD:
7/7/10)JM
Those near neighbours already in Nato are the ones leading the charge to put the
Russian threat back on the map. “Now, because of Georgia, there are Nato
members such as Poland, the Czech Republic and the Baltic states who are saying the
alliance should stop thinking about expeditionary warfare and
concentrate once again on old-style military structures to deter Russia,”
a senior alliance source told The Times. “Their plea is 'Nato come home', but we can't
ditch Afghanistan to shore up Poland or the Baltic states to deter an assertive Russia.”
The division between those who still want to focus the main effort on Afghanistan
and others who believe that resources should be switched back to
confronting Russia's rediscovered imperialist ambitions has created
turmoil within the alliance. Key to this conflict are the tough decisions to be made over who gets to
join the alliance, and when.
US Troop Reduction in the Middle East Frees Up Troops to

Focus on Russia
Steff 2010— Intern, Centre for Strategic Studies. Dissertation on ballistic missiles and deterrence. MA, IR
(Reuben, The Russian Resurgence, America and the Great Crisis of 2010, 7 January 2010,
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL1001/S00022.htm)
Ultimately, this is the calculus: Russia wants to keep conflicts brewing

in the Middle East so the US cannot reorient towards it. America wants
everyone to either do as they are told, or calm the heck down so it can 'win' its
wars and reorient towards Russia. Israel finds a nuclear Iran untenable, and thus will try force
the US into action. Iran, backed by Russia, is playing for time, trying to develop
their nuclear know-how and infrastructure so that it presents the world
with an accomplished fact.
GRAHAM 47
Capitalism
COIN is, “by definition”, Nation Building
Bradley January 18th, 2011 (Jason Bradley, January 18th, 2011, 2011:
Thinking beyond nation building and counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, The Western
Experience, http://westernexperience.wordpress.com/2011/01/18/2011-thinking-
beyond-nation-building-and-counterinsurgency-in-afghanistan/)
Last week, Defense Secretary Gates announced that 1,400 Marines would be
added to the surge so that the military gains could be solidified before the planned withdrawals
begin in July. And, visiting Hamid Karzai last week, Biden flip-flopped on the 2014 date,
telling Hamid Karzai that we would stay past 2014 if the Afghanis wanted us to.
Biden said, “It is not our intention to govern or nation-build.” Which
must be a considerable shock to Petraeus. His counterinsurgency
strategy doesn’t impose U.S. government on Afghanis but it is, by definition, nation-
building. Its principal elements are expulsion of the “insurgents” (al-
Qaeda and the Taliban) and replacing them with a structure that
provides security and basic governmental services.
Iraq Proves that the “nation-building-democracy-

promoting” Front of the U.S. Occupation is a Secret
Agenda to Globalize Capitalism
Robinson 2004 (William, Sociology, Global and International Studies, Latin
American and Iberian Studies, University of California-Santa Barbara, “What to
Expect from US “Democracy Promotion” in Iraq,”
http://www.soc.ucsb.edu/faculty/robinson/Assets/pdf/new
%20pdfs/democracy_promotion.pdf)
The US has three goals for the political system it will attempt to put
into place in Iraq. The first is to cultivate transnationally-oriented elites who share
Washington’s interest in integrating Iraq into the global capitalist system and
who can administer the local state being constructed under the
tutelage of the occupation force. The second is to isolate those
counter-elites who are not amenable to the US project, such as nationally- (as
opposed to transnationally-) oriented elites and others in a position of leadership, authority and influence,
who do not share US goals. The third is to establish the hegemony of this elite
over the Iraqi masses, to prevent the mass of Iraqis from becoming politicized and mobilized on
their own independent of or in opposition to the US project, by incorporating them
“consensually” into the political order the US wishes to establish. The
type of political system Washington will attempt to establish in Iraq has
little to do with democracy and should not be referred to as such, as the
terminology itself is ideological and intended to give an aura of legitimacy to US intervention. It does not
involve power (cratos) of the people (demos), much less an end to class and foreign domination or to
This political system is more accurately termed
substantive inequality.
polyarchy (a term I have borrowed from Robert Dahl and modified)—a system in which a
small group actually rules on behalf of (transnational) capital and mass
participation in decision-making is limited to choosing among
competing elites in tightly controlled electoral processes. US policymakers
began to promote polyarchy in the 1980s and 1990s around the world through novel mechanisms of
political intervention, abandoning the dictatorships and authoritarian regimes that they had relied on for
much of the post WWII period to assure social control and political influence in the former colonial world.
This shift in policy took place in the context of globalization and in response to the crisis of elite rule that
Behind the new policy was an
had developed in much of the Third World in the 1970s.
effort to hijack and redirect mass democratization struggles, to
GRAHAM 48
undercut popular demands for more fundamental change in the social

order, to help emerging transnationally-oriented elites secure state
power through highly-contested transitions, and to use that power to
integrate (or reintegrate) their countries into the new global capitalism.
Genocide
Genocide goes beyond physical death to destroy the very
fabric of social existence that makes life worth living and
death bearable—social death outweighs even physical death
Goldman, Emma Goldman Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin, 2003 [Claudia,
"Genocide and Social Death," Hypatia 18.1 (2003) 63-79, project muse]
Genocide is not simply unjust (although it certainly is unjust); it is also evil. It
characteristically includes the one-sided killing of defenseless civilians
—babies, children, the elderly, the sick, the disabled, and the injured of
both genders along with their usually female caretakers—simply on the basis of their national, religious, ethnic, or other political
identity. It targets people on the basis of who they are rather than on the basis of what they have done, what they might do, even what they
. Genocide
are capable of doing. (One commentator says genocide kills people on the basis of what they are, not even who they are)
is a paradigm of what Israeli philosopher Avishai Margalit (1996) calls "indecent" in that it not
only destroys victims but first humiliates them by deliberately inflicting
an "utter loss of freedom and control over one's vital interests.” Vital interests
can be transgenerational and thus survive one's death. Before death, genocide victims are ordinarily deprived of control over vital
They may be literally stripped naked,

transgenerational interests and more immediate vital interests.
robbed of their last possessions, lied to about the most vital matters, witness to the
murder of family, friends, and neighbors, made to participate in their
own murder, and if female, they are likely to be also violated sexually.
7 Victims of genocide are commonly killed with no regard for lingering
suffering or exposure. They, and their corpses, are routinely treated
with utter disrespect. These historical facts, not simply mass murder, account for much of the moral opprobrium
attaching to the concept of genocide. Yet such atrocities, it may be argued, are already war crimes, if conducted during wartime, and they can
otherwise or also be prosecuted as crimes against humanity. Why, then, add the specific crime of genocide? What, if anything, is not already
captured by laws that prohibit such things as the rape, enslavement, torture, forced deportation, and the degradation of individuals? Is any
ethically distinct harm done to members of the targeted group that would not have been done had they been targeted simply as individuals
rather than because of their group membership? This is the question that I find central in arguing that genocide is not simply reducible to
mass death, to any of the other war crimes, or to the crimes against humanity just enumerated. I believe the answer is affirmative: the harm is
. Specific to
ethically distinct, although on the question of whether it is worse, I wish only to question the assumption that it is not
genocide is the harm inflicted on its victims' social vitality. It is not just that
one's group membership is the occasion for harms that are definable independently of one's identity as a member of the group. When
a group with its own cultural identity is destroyed, its survivors lose
their cultural heritage and may even lose their intergenerational
connections. To use Orlando Patterson's terminology, in that event, they may become
"socially dead" and their descendants "natally alienated," no longer
able to pass along and build upon the traditions, cultural developments
(including languages), and projects of earlier generations (1982, 5-9). The harm of social death is not
necessarily less extreme than that of physical death. Social death can even
aggravate physical death by making it indecent, removing all

respectful and caring ritual, social connections, and social contexts
that are capable of making dying bearable and even of making one's
death meaningful. In my view, the special evil of genocide lies in its infliction
of not just physical death (when it does that) but social death, producing a
consequent meaninglessness of one's life and even of its termination.
Waging War on the Taliban is Genocide
GRAHAM 49
Khan 2008 (Liaquat Ali Khan, professor of law at Washburn University in Topeka,
Kansas, “Is NATO Committing Genocide in Afghanistan?” ,
http://www.counterpunch.org/khan01302008.html)
NATO combat troops and NATO

It may, therefore, be safely concluded that
commanders are engaged in murdering the Taliban, a protected group under
the Genocide Convention, with the specific intent to physically and mentally
destroy the group in whole or in part. This is the crime of genocide.
Quality of life matters—not how long a life is, that means

solvency of dehumanization comes before life.
Michael Anissimov, co-founder of the Immortality Institute, Media Director for the Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence,
Fundraising Director, North America for the Lifeboat Foundation, has lectured at Yale University, 2004 “Immoralist Utilitarianism,”
http://www.acceleratingfuture.com/michael/works/immethics.htm cp
Ever have a moment in your life that made you feel like jumping for
joy, or crying in happiness? Many claim that these are the moments
that make life worth living, or at least a lot of what life is about. It's that moment where you finish writing a book,
get a big promotion, or share an intimate moment with someone special. How many "typical" days would
you give for a single moment like that? Some might say 1, others 10,
others even 100 or more. Think about it - in a usual day, we're conscious for around 14 hours. Let's be conservative
and suggest that the average John Doe would trade 5 typical days in exchange for a peak experience that lasts 5 minutes. The time ratio is
This
about 1000:1, but many would still prefer the peak experience over the same old stuff. Unique experiences are really valuable to us.
would imply that most people value life not only for the length of time
they experience, but for the special moments that, as I mentioned
earlier, "make life worth living". As the stereotypical quote goes, "Life is not measured
by the number of breaths we take, but by the moments that take our
breath away." Ethicists sometimes quantify such satisfaction as "utility" for the sake of thought experiments; we might say that
each 5 minute peak experience is worth a thousand utility points, or "utiles". Correspondingly, each 5 days of typical activity would also count
.
as roughly a thousand utiles, because one would trade one for the other Although it may make some of us uncomfortable to quantify utility,
our brain is unconsciously performing computations accessing the potential utility of choices all the time, and the model is incredibly useful in
the psychology of human decision making and the field of ethics. Please bear with me as I make some assumptions about utility values and
probabilities. Note that I acknowledge that two different people will not tag everything with the same utility, nor will they necessarily compute
utility mathematically.
GRAHAM 50
Impact Calculus
First, the Russian War Advantage
Magnitude Outweighs – Russian War Is The ONLY
Extinction Level Conflict
Bostrom, ’02 – Ph.D. and Professor of Philosophy at Oxford University (Nick, March, Journal of
Evolution and Technology, Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related
Hazards)
A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear

arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility
with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might
have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry
among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear
Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or
permanently destroy human civilization.1[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear
arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk
Note however that a smaller
that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals.
nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an
existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s
potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most
likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes
are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.
We Outweigh on Probability – Russia Moving Towards

Confrontation
Umland, ’09 – DAAD Lecturer, Shevchenko University (Andreas, “The Unpopular
Prospect of World War III…The 20th Century is Not Over Yet,” HISTORY NEWS
NETWORK, January 17, 2009, http://hnn.us/roundup/entries/60004.html)
the darkness of a future scenario that one comes to regard

That is because
as possible should be no hindrance for its full assessment and public outline.
Arguably, one of the reasons that societies afford themselves the employment of social scientists at
universities and research institutes is the provision of information and interpretation that goes beyond
what journalists, publicists or politicians – often, more dependent on current mainstream opinion and
A plain extrapolation
reigning political correctness than academics – may be able to say or write.
of recent political developments in Russia into the future should lead
one to regard outright war with NATO as a still improbable, yet again possible
scenario. It is not unlikely that Russian public discourse will, during the
coming years, continue to move in the same direction in, and with the
same speed with, which it has been evolving since 2000. What is, in
this case, in store for the world is not only a new “cold,” but also the
GRAHAM 51
possibility of a “hot” and, perhaps even, nuclear war. This assessment sounds not only
apocalyptic, but also “unmodern,” if not anachronistic. Aren’t the real challenges of the 21st century global
warming, financial regulation, the North-South divide, international migration etc.? Isn’t that enough to
worry about, and should we distract ourselves from solving these real problems? Hasn’t the age of the
Do we really want to go back to
East-West confrontation been over for several years now?
the nightmarish visions of the horrible 20th century? A sober look on
Russia advises that we better do: Carefulness may decrease the
probability that a worst-case scenario ever materializes.
The Timeframe is 30 minutes

Helfand and Pastore, ‘09 – past presidents of Physicians for Social Responsibility
(Ira and John, “U.S.-Russia nuclear war still a threat”,
http://www.projo.com/opinion/contributors/content/CT_pastoreline_03-31-
09_EODSCAO_v15.bbdf23.html)
President Obama and Russian President Dimitri Medvedev are scheduled to

Wednesday in London during the G-20 summit. They must not let the current economic crisis keep them
focusing on one of the greatest threats confronting humanity: the
from
danger of nuclear war. Since the end of the Cold War, many have
acted as though the danger of nuclear war has ended. It has not. There
remain in the world more than 20,000 nuclear weapons. Alarmingly,
more than 2,000 of these weapons in the U.S. and Russian arsenals
remain on ready-alert status, commonly known as hair-trigger alert.
They can be fired within five minutes and reach targets in the other
country 30 minutes later. Just one of these weapons can destroy a city. A war involving a
substantial number would cause devastation on a scale unprecedented in human history. A study
if only 500 of the
conducted by Physicians for Social Responsibility in 2002 showed that
Russian weapons on high alert exploded over our cities, 100 million
Americans would die in the first 30 minutes. An attack of this magnitude also would
destroy the entire economic, communications and transportation infrastructure on which we all depend.
Those who survived the initial attack would inhabit a nightmare landscape with huge swaths of the country
blanketed with radioactive fallout and epidemic diseases rampant. They would have no food, no fuel, no
electricity, no medicine, and certainly no organized health care. In the following months it is likely the vast
majority of the U.S. population would die. Recent studies by the eminent climatologists Toon and Robock
have shown that such a war would have a huge and immediate impact on climate world wide. If all of
the warheads in the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals were drawn
into the conflict, the firestorms they caused would loft 180 million tons of soot and debris into the
upper atmosphere — blotting out the sun. Temperatures across the globe would fall an average of 18
degrees Fahrenheit to levels not seen on earth since the depth of the last ice age, 18,000 years ago.
Agriculture would stop, eco-systems would collapse, and many species,
including perhaps our own, would become extinct. It is common to
discuss nuclear war as a low-probabillity event. But is this true? We
know of five occcasions during the last 30 years when either the U.S.
or Russia believed it was under attack and prepared a counter-attack.
The most recent of these near misses occurred after the end of the Cold War on Jan. 25, 1995, when the
Russians mistook a U.S. weather rocket launched from Norway for a possible attack. Jan. 25, 1995, was an
ordinary day with no major crisis involving the U.S. and Russia. But, unknown to almost every inhabitant
on the planet, a misunderstanding led to the potential for a nuclear war. The ready alert status of nuclear
weapons that existed in 1995 remains in place today.
GRAHAM 52
Second, the Genocide Advantage

Magnitude – Genocide Comes Before Any Other
Impact
Extend our 2nd card from the 2nd Advantage in the 1AC
And, There’s a Moral Voter for the Case, our Affirmation of the
Value of Life Outweigh Any of Their Prediction-based
Disadvantages
Harff-Gur, Northwestern, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AS A REMEDY FOR GENOCIDE, 1981, p. 40
One of the most enduring and abhorrent problems of the world is genocide, which is neither
. Prohibition of
particular to a specific race, class, or nation, nor is it rooted in any one, ethnocentric view of the world
genocide and affirmation of its opposite, the value of life, are an

eternal ethical verity, one whose practical implications necessarily
outweigh possible theoretical objections and as such should lift it above
prevailing ideologies or politics. Genocide concerns and potentially effects all
people. People make up a legal system, according to Kelsen. Politics is the expression of conflict among competing groups. Those in
power give the political system its character, i.e. the state. The state, according to Kelsen, is nothing but the combined will of all its people.
This abstract concept of the state may at first glance appear meaningless, because in reality not all people have an equal voice in the
formation of the characteristics of the state. But I am not concerned with the characteristics of the state but rather the essence of the state –
Without a people there would be no state or legal system. With

the people.
genocide eventually there will be no people. Genocide is ultimately a

threat to the existence of all. True, sometimes only certain groups are
targeted, as in Nazi Germany. Sometimes a large part of the total population is eradicated, as in contemporary Cambodia.
Sometimes people are eliminated regardless of national origin – the Christians in Roman times . Sometimes whole
nations vanish – the Amerindian societies after the Spanish conquest. And sometimes religious groups are persecuted – the
Mohammedans by the Crusaders. The culprit changes: sometimes it is a specific state, or those in power in a state; occasionally it is the
. Since virtually
winners vs. the vanquished in international conflicts; and in its crudest form the stronger against the weaker
every social group is a potential victim, genocide is a universal

concern.
Probability and Magnitude – We Outweigh Because

Genocide is Happening in the Status Quo
And, Genocide Turns the Disadvantage – Genocide will eat

away at the structure of global society, destroying the
international institutions critical for preventing global war.
GRAHAM 53
Campbell 01 (Kenneth, associate professor of political science and international relations and director of the international
relations program at the University of Delaware, Genocide and the Global Village, p. 26)
Genocide is the supreme crime! It is arguably the worst crime that can
be committed in the present global system of nation-states and
peoples. Genocide is equal to or worse than the crime of aggression.
Genocide attacks civilization itself. Contemporary civilization is based upon certain fundamental shared
moral values; one of which is the principle that groups of people have the right to exist as a distinct nationality, race, ethnicity, and religion.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) spoke to this point in an Advisory Opinion on the Genocide Convention in 1951: The Convention was
manifestly adopted for a purely humanitarian and civilizing purpose…its object on the one had is to safeguard the very existence of certain
human groups and on the other to confirm and endorse the most elementary principles of morality. In such a convention the contracting
states do not have any interests of their own; they merely have, one and all, a common interest, mainly, the accomplishment of those high
purposes. If left unchecked , genocide eats away like a cancer at the structure of
global society, eventually undermining and destroying just those international institutions
designed to foster global cooperation, mitigate global conflict, and
avoid global catastrophe such as the world experienced in the 1930s and
1940s. Most scholars, political analysts, and policymakers, unfortunately, treat genocide as a mere humanitarian concern, having little to
do with the traditional interests of nation-states. They too often fail to see genocide as a threat to
strategic global interests, such as political stability, economic prosperity,

peace, and security. Genocide, in fact, occupies a unique area of overlap between humanitarian concerns and more
traditional state interests to the degree that international peace and security are indivisible in a world of rapidly increasing globalization. For
globalization not only speeds up the positive effects of open markets, open technologies, and open societies, it increases the spread of
pathological behavior such as genocide.
(Read if they have Nuclear Impacts)
Refusal to confront genocide will cause nuclear destruction

Diamond, ’92 (The Third Chimpanzee; 277)
While our first association to the world “genocide” is likely to be the killings in Nazi concentration camps,
those were not even the largest-scale genocide of this century. The Tasmanians and hundreds of other
peoples were modern targets of successful smaller extermination campaigns. Numerous peoples scattered
genocide is such a painful
throughout the world are potential targets in the near future. Yet
subject that either we’d rather not think about it at all, or else we’d like
to believe that nice people don’t commit genocide only Nazis do. But
our refusal to think about it has consequences we’ve done little to halt
the numerous episodes of genocide since World War II, and we’re not alert to
where it may happen next. Together with our destruction of our own
environmental resources, our genocidal tendencies coupled to nuclear
weapons now constitute the two most likely means by which the
human species may reverse all its progress virtually overnight.
Judge this Round Based off of Probability

Rescher, Prof. of Philosophy, 83
Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Professor of Philosophy, “Risk: A Philosophical Introduction to
the Theory of Risk Evaluation and Management” 1983
A probability is a number between zero and one. Now numbers between zero and one can get to be
very small indeed: As N gets bigger, 1/N will grow very, very small. What, then, is one to do about
extremely small probabilities in the rational management of risks? On this issue there
is a systemic disagreement between probabilists working in mathematics or natural science and
decision theorists who work on issues relating to human affairs. The former take the line that small
numbers are small numbers and must be taken into account as such. The latter tend to take the view
small probabilities represent extremely remote prospects and
that
can be written off. (De minimis non curat lex, as the old precept has it: there is no
GRAHAM 54
need to bother with trifles.) When something is about as probable as it is that a thousand
fair dice when tossed a thousand times will all come up sixes, then, so it is held, we can pretty well
The "worst possible case fixation" is one of
forget about it as worthy of concern.
the most damaging modes of unrealism in deliberations about risk in real-life
situations. Preoccupation about what might happen "if worst comes to worst" is counterproductive
whenever we proceed without recognizing that, often as not, these
worst possible
outcomes are wildly improbable (and sometimes do not deserve to be
viewed as real possibilities at all). The crux in risk deliberations is not the issue of loss
"if worst comes to worst" but the potential acceptability of this prospect within the wider framework of
the risk situation, where we may well be prepared "to take our chances," considering the possible
advantages that beckon along this route. The worst threat is certainly something to be borne in mind
and taken into account, but it is emphatically not a satisfactory index of the overall seriousness or
gravity of a situation of hazard.
Answers to ‘Increase Surge’ Counterplan

1. This Counterplan makes no sense for our case.
2. Cant Solve: It solves for absolutely ZERO of our
harms.
3. Case Outweighs: World War III, Destabilization of

Global Security, Terrorism, and Destruction of
the US outweighs any of their net-benefits.
4. Theory: Counterplans must solve for all or AT
LEAST most of the Affirmative Case. Accept our
Theory.
a. Fairness – Its not fair to make the affirmative
come in and show why their case is good as
well as attack a Negative Counterplan that
doesn’t correlate with the Affirmative.
b. Education – We provide more education in
the round if we focus in depth on one issue
rather than stating which issue should be
more important. We only scratch the surface
of two issues, but we could be learning
critical information about a serious issue in
U.S. policy.
GRAHAM 55
Answers To ‘Afghan National Security Force’

Counterplan
1. Timeframe – The Counterplan can’t solve fast
enough. Our 2nd Solvency Card, 4.B, shows us
that we must enact the plan now! The KGB knows
they have one year. That’s why the Status Quo
can’t solve. Waiting for ANSF too reach a certain
number will be too late.
Petreaus said it Would Take Over a Year – Too Slow for Russia
Alter 10 (Jonathan, award-winning columnist, television analyst and author, May 15, “Secrets From Inside the Obama War
Room”, http://www.newsweek.com/2010/05/15/secrets-from-inside-the-obama-war-room.html#, AV)
Inside the Oval Office, Obama asked Petraeus, “David, tell me now. I want you to be honest
with me. You can do this in 18 months?” “Sir, I’m confident we can train and hand
over to the ANA [Afghan National Army] in that time frame,” Petraeus replied.

the U.S. outweighs any of their net-benefits.
GRAHAM 56
Answer to ‘Consult’ Counterplans
1. Timeframe – The Counterplan can’t solve fast

enough. Our 2nd Solvency Card, 4.B, shows us that
we must enact the plan now! The KGB knows they
have one year. That’s why the Status Quo can’t
solve. Consulting and Negotiations slows down the
process. By the time its all said and done, Russia
will have expanded massively. They can’t solve our
case.
Consultation causes Endless Debates that Slow

Policymaking to a Point of Ineffectiveness
Ignatius 9 – David Ignatius, columnist for the Washington Post, October 15, 2009,
“Careful to a Fault on Afghanistan,” The Washington Post, online:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/10/14/AR2009101402872_pf.html
Afghanistan could be the most important decision of Barack Obama's
presidency. Maybe that's why he is, in effect, making it twice. What's
odd about the administration's review of Afghanistan policy is that it
is revisiting issues that were analyzed in great detail -- and seemingly
resolved -- in the president's March 27 announcement of a new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The recent recommendations from Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal were intended to implement that "Af-
Pak" strategy -- not send the debate back to first principles. The March document stated that the basic
goal was "to prevent Afghanistan from becoming the al-Qaeda safe haven that it was before 9/11." But
to accomplish this limited mission, the president endorsed a much broader effort to "reverse the
Taliban's gains, and promote a more capable and accountable Afghan government." That gap between
GRAHAM 57
end and means has bedeviled the policy ever since. So now the president is doing it again,
slowly and carefully -- as in last Friday's three-hour White House meeting, where, I'm told, he went
quizzed his national security aides one by one.
around the table and
Obama's deliberative pace is either heartening or maddening, depending on your
perspective. Personally, I think he's wise to take his time on an issue in which it's so hard to know the
the White House approach will soften the edges
right answer. But I worry that
so much that the policy itself will be fuzzy and doomed to failure. As
Obama's advisers describe the decision-making process, it sounds a bit
like a seminar. National security adviser Jim Jones gathers all the key people
so that everyone gets a voice. A top official explains: "We don't get
marching orders from the president. He wants a debate. . . . We take the
competing views and collapse them toward the middle." This approach produced a consensus on Iran
and missile defense, and as National Security Councils go, Obama's seems to work pretty smoothly.
Jones is now master of his own house after a rocky start in which he clashed with an inner "Politburo" of
aides who had been with Obama during the campaign. Those younger aides are now out or in different
jobs, putting Jones more firmly in charge. Obama will be happy to have a retired Marine four-star
general at the NSC when it comes time to sell his Afghanistan policy to the military.

Global Security, Terrorism, and Destruction of the
U.S. outweighs any of their net-benefits.
Answers to ‘XO’ Counterplan

1. Counterplan is Normal Means.
a. Definitively Normal Means – Congress Cannot Interfere with
Presidential War Planning
Prakash Herzog Research Professor of Law, University of San Diego
2008 Saikrishna William and Mary Law Review lexis accessed 6/24/10
Apart from claiming the power to initiate warfare,

modern Commanders in Chief have also asserted that
the Constitution bars Congress from enacting
statutes that interfere with presidential direction of
wars. These claims were voiced as early as the mid-1950s
by President Truman. n123 Many scholars have endorsed
the [*1041] notion that the Commander in Chief has
exclusive authority over certain operational matters.
n124
b. The President Directs Forces Once They’ve Been Authorized by

Congress – the Counterplan is Normal Means
Kriner Ass’t Prof of Poly Sci Boston University 2009 Douglas Boston
University Law Review lexis accessed 6/24/10
Some of the starkest cases of such wholesale delegations of authority have come in war
powers. Revisionist critiques notwithstanding, the bulk of constitutional scholarship on
GRAHAM 58
the distribution of war powers across the [*770] branches makes clear that Congress
was intended to be the primary branch at the helm of the nation's martial affairs. n21
Article I expressly granted to Congress alone the power to raise and equip Armies and
Navies, launch limited wars through letters of Marque and Reprisals, and to declare war.
Article II provides for the President to serve as
n22
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy and of the state
militias when called into national service; n23 however, Alexander Hamilton made clear
in The Federalist No. 69 that this
title amounted to "nothing more" than
the direction of forces in the field once authorized
by Congress. n24
c. The Plan states that the Department of

Defense will be the Agent of Change. The
DoD is part of the Executive Branch and
would carry it out.
2. Perm: Do Both

the U.S. outweighs any of their net-benefits.
Wikileaks
Putin still Holds the Reins of Russia – Wikileaks Reveals
Russian Corruption and Authoritarianism
Chivers, December 1st 2010 (C. J. Chivers, December 1st 2010, Dim View of
Russia and Putin, New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/02/world/europe/02wikileaks-russia.html)
Officially, the United States has sought since last year what President Obama and his
a “reset” in relations. But scores of
Russian counterpart, Dmitri A. Medvedev, have called
secret American cables from recent years, obtained by WikiLeaks and made available to
several news organizations, show that beneath the public efforts at warmer ties,
the United States harbors a dim view of the post-Soviet Kremlin and its
leadership, and little hope that Russia will become more democratic or
reliable.
The cables portray Mr. Putin as enjoying supremacy over all other Russian
public figures, yet undermined by the very nature of the post-Soviet country he helped build. Even a man
with his formidable will and intellect is shown beholden to intractable larger forces, including an inefficient
economy and an unmanageable bureaucracy that often ignores his
edicts. In language candid and bald, the cables reveal an assessment of Mr. Putin’s
Russia as highly centralized, occasionally brutal and all but
irretrievably cynical and corrupt. The Kremlin, by this description, lies at the center of a
constellation of official and quasi-official rackets.
GRAHAM 59
the
Throughout the internal correspondence between the American Embassy and Washington,
American diplomats in Moscow painted a Russia in which public
stewardship was barely tended to and history was distorted. The
Kremlin displays scant ability or inclination to reform what one cable
characterized as a “modern brand of authoritarianism” accepted with
resignation by the ruled.
Moreover, the cables reveal the limits of American influence within
Russia and an evident dearth of diplomatic sources. The internal correspondence
repeatedly reflected the analyses of an embassy whose staff was narrowly contained and had almost no
access to Mr. Putin’s inner circle. In reporting to Washington, diplomats often summarized impressions
from meetings not with Russian officials, but with Western colleagues or business executives. The
impressions of a largely well-known cadre of Russian journalists, opposition politicians and research
institute regulars rounded out many cables, with insights resembling what was published in liberal Russian
The cables sketched life almost 20 years after the
newspapers and on Web sites.
Soviet Union’s disintegration, a period, as the cables noted, when Mr.
Medvedev, the prime minister’s understudy, is the lesser part of a
strange “tandemocracy” and “plays Robin to Putin’s Batman.” All the while,
another cable noted, “Stalin’s ghost haunts the Metro.”
Wikileaks Reveals that Russia is Selling Weapons and

Threatening Global Security
Chivers, December 1st 2010 (C. J. Chivere, December 1st 2010, Dim View of
Russia and Putin, New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/02/world/europe/02wikileaks-russia.html)
In June 2009 a delegation of Washington analysts who were

accompanied by diplomats met with Aleksandr Y. Skobeltsyn of Russia’s
Department for Military-Technical Cooperation to discuss American
concerns about sales of anti-tank guided missiles and shoulder-
launched antiaircraft missiles. The latter are a special worry in the
West, where security officials fear terrorists could fire them at
passenger jets. Mr. Skobeltsyn said that Russia “shared U.S. concerns about re-transfer
vulnerabilities, noting that Latin America and Middle East were especially sensitive areas.” “But, he
argued, if Russia did not provide these weapons to certain countries, then ‘someone else’ would.” Outright
distrustful relations between the Kremlin and the Soviet Union’s former vassals were also evident in the
records. At an appearance in Washington in 2009, Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski
of Poland said that American forces would be welcome in Poland “to
protect against Russian aggression.” The comment, unwelcomed by Russia and the
GRAHAM 60
United States alike, ignited a minor flare-up. In a cable after Mr. Sikorski’s appearance, the American
Embassy said that Poland had established a Bureau of European Security, which “Polish diplomats jokingly
refer to as the ‘Office of Threats from the East.’ ” The back-channel quip eventually provided insight into
the diplomatic climate in Moscow. A Polish official, formerly posted to Moscow,
noted that Russia’s Foreign Ministry “threw this moniker back at him
during a meeting.” He told his American colleagues that the “only way”
that Russia’s Foreign Ministry could have known of the nickname “was
to have been listening in on his phone conversations with Warsaw” — a
clear suggestion that his office in Russia had been bugged.
Quick Facts on COIN in Afghanistan
Approximate Total Number of U.S. Troops in

Afghanistan: 117,000
Approximate Number of U.S. Troops Associated with

COIN: 97,000
Annual Cost of Afghanistan War: $100,000,000
(Statistics from http://www.afghanistanstudygroup.org/)
GRAHAM 61
Case Definitions
Resolved - (v) resolve (reach a decision) "he resolved never to drink
again"
(http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=resolve)
United States Federal Government - the executive and legislative

and judicial branches of the federal government of the United States
(http://www.thefreedictionary.com/United+States+government)
Should - The use of the word "should" in the Standards represents a

mandatory obligation.
(internal-audit.web.cern.ch/internal-audit/method/glossary.html)
Substantially – Substantial: considerable in quantity : significantly

great <earned a substantial wage>
(http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/substantial)
GRAHAM 62
Reduce - Reduce: to grow progressively less (as in size, amount,

number, or intensity)
Its - its [ its ] adjective Definition: indicating possession: used to

indicate that something belongs or relates to something ≤The park
changed its policy.≥
(Encarta World English Dictionary,
http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/dictionary/DictionaryResults.aspx?
refid=1861622735)
Military Presence - Means Troops

Harmon 2003 – US Army Major (William, “The Korean Question: Is There a Future
for Forward-Based American Forces in a Unified Korea?,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA415880&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)
In American security writings and military doctrine the term “forward
presence” describes military forces that are stationed,
permanently or on a rotational deployment, in a territory or
nation other than the United States. In American National Security, by Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor Jr.,
and Michael J. Mazarr, the term is used as follows: Forward presence, or the forward deployment of forces, can now be more
usefully thought of as one component of a larger strategy – one that acknowledges the global role of the United States and
the need to remain engaged, visible, and with forces deployed outside the United States that are prepared to respond to
the authors have identified key

contingencies in all corners of the globe.9 In this definition
components of forward presence, namely the flexibility gained by reducing

deployment times and the assurance provided to allies (and potential enemies alike) by the engagement
and visibility of the forces.
In – In Means Being In the Borders of the Topic Countries

Merriam-Webster 2010 ("in." Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. 2010,
Merriam-Webster Online. 31 July 2010, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/in)
In: used as a function word to indicate inclusion, location, or position within
limits <in the lake> <wounded in the leg>
Afhganistan - Princeton 2010 (wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn)

a mountainous landlocked country in central Asia; bordered by Iran to
the west and Russia to the north and Pakistan to the east and south;
"Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in 1979"
GRAHAM 63

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Steer Debate Team 2010-2011

Observation One: Inherency

1.A – The US is Continuing a Failing Counterinsurgency Mission

The counterinsurgency strategy the United States has relied on to win

Petraeus, co-author of the 2006 military manual on

1.B – US Involvement in the Middle East Causes Russian

Taking a moment to clarify our Inherent Barrier, currently in

is thriving, but what our Stratfor evidence points out is that US

2.A – Russia’s KGB Regime is the Motherland for Modern

In Russia all facts are attended by a

2.B – Russian Expansionism Destabilizes the World and

2.C - If the Russians Spread, They Will Attain Control Over

by our departure, ensuring influence, access to oil, and the ability to

Observation Three: Plan

Plank One: The Department of Defense will be the Agent of

Step One: The USFG will end the COIN Operation.

Step Two: The USFG will remove COIN personnel from

Plank Three: Funding will be drawn from the Department of

Plank Four: Enforcement will be through normal means,

Plank Five: The Affirmative claims the concept of ‘fiat’.

Observation Four: Solvency

4.A – American Power is the Only Way to Counter Russian

The KGB and the

4.B – Russia Knows their Time is Limited; We Must Remove

4.C – Moscow’s Plan to Expand its Influence Stops when The US

While Russia reconsolidated, the United States became preoccupied

Russia has taken advantage of Washington’s preoccupation to

attempt to re-establish its sphere of influence in the former Soviet

Moscow’s plan to expand its influence into the

former Soviet sphere depends on Washington’s preoccupation.

while Washington has been

Observation Five: Advantages

5.A – We Prevent World War 3

1. Unchecked Russian Expansionism Leads to Invasion of

2. Caucasus Invasion Draws in U.S and Causes World War

are seeking a Western counterbalance to Moscow, which the West,

In 1993 Moscow even threatened World War III to

5.B –We Stop Genocide

1. The War Against the Taliban has Lead to

In almost all NATO nations,the Taliban have been completely

2. Genocide Should be Weighed before All of their

Never is the international responsibility to protect more compelling than

Red Spread Affirmative

Answer to T: Extra-Topicality B/C of Our Harms

A) We Meet – We don’t go outside the resolution.

unique set of harms and learning new

Answer to T: “in Afghanistan”

A) We Meet – We’re Reducing Military Presence in

3. (Clash and Lit Check Abuse) – They’ve read

B) Extend our Evidence that COIN is in Afghanistan -

C) Extend our Standards and Voters – We don’t take

B) We will advocate and defend any arguments over

C) However, US Troops don’t lose their job when they

service obligation (MSO), which is established at the time of entry into

D) There’s no fairness lost in the round. We still

Answer to T: Extra-Topical B/C of Where Troops

A) We’re not Extra-Topical – These harms are based

B) There’s no Fairness or Ground Lost – We still will

C) There’s no Education Lost – We still learn about

Answers to Specific DA Links

COIN Extremely Unpopular – No Public Support Because of

Complete Withdrawal Links

Most Americans don't know what the ascendance of counterinsurgency doctrine