Korean Shipyard (SHI/DSME/HHI) Argon/TIG Welding Incidents* from

2007, 2008, 2009

and Common Threads / Corrective Actions

Skip Garrett, SHE&S Lead

fgarrett@qatargas.com.qa

*HHI reported zero Ar incidents

1 20 February 2009
 Shipyard Reported Argon Incidents*
1. Death due to suffocation while TIG welding

DSME, QG Hull Jan 15, 2009
2. Medical Treatment (2 IP’s) Ar Incident

SHI non-QG, Jan 9 2009
3. Near Miss personal oxygen detector alarmed

SHI QG Hull, 6 Jan 2009
4. Death due to suffocation during grinding (air/Ar manifold switched)

DSME QG Hull, 16 May 2007
5. Death due to suffocation during T.I.G welding

Incident report stated the IP died of Natural Causes (included here as the IP was welding prior to death

SHI QG Hull, 31 Aug 2007
6. Death due to suffocation by argon gas remaining in pipe

SHI non-QG, 7 Sept 2007
7. Death due to suffocation deck pipe weld

DSME non-QG, May 2002 (included even though its previous to the past 3 years)

*2007, 2008, Jan 2009 - from DSME and SHI, note: HHI reported no Ar incidents
2 20 February 2009
 1st Death due to suffocation while TIG welding
DSME 15 Jan 2009
DATE 2009.1.15(THU) 13:45 Location NO.2 COFFERDAM AREA of H.2285
Company OOENG Name OOO
Description: IP and another worker had completed tack welding of N2 line pipe (150A, 30m) located inside cofferdam #2 from
08:00 AM to 12:00PM. From 13:00 PM to prepare N2 line pipe for welding, the pipe needed to be filled with argon. One feeder hose at
base of pipe in Sump Well was not proving sufficient to fill pipe with Argon (Ar).
IP entered Cofferdam #2 to attach
<the accident site condition> additional Ar feeder hose to inside pipe
H.2285 NO.2 COFFERDAM AREA as more Argon was needed for the weld
at higher elevation. Due to gravity and
leakage from pipe through tapped
N2 Pipe (SUS 150A) connection, the sump became oxygen
deficient due to Argon gas. When IP
entered sump well to connect second Ar
feeder hose he suffocated immediately.

Apparently there were no confined

space entry controls or gas checks and
he had no oxygen detector to warn him.

•There are 11 more N2 pipes similar to

150A to complete on DSME hulls.
•SHI outfits the N2 pipe at block stage
Lesson Learned: When atmosphere
is 100% Argon, death can occur in
one or two breaths.

3 20 February 2009
 2nd Ar Medical Treatment Incident (2 IP’s)
SHI non-QG, 9 Jan 2009

Date January 9th, 2009 10:30

Location Ballast Tank
Personal Damage [ Medical Treatment ]
- Oxygen Deficiency due to Argon
Summary
The two injured persons went inside a tank to
perform welding on 2 pipes. After finishing
welding on small pipe, IP2 disconnected
argon hose from nipple and then took a short
break outside of the tank for 10 minutes. IPs
went inside the tank and IP1 tried to remove
a wooden plate stuck between floor and end
of big pipe in preparation of welding works.
While removing the wooden plate, IP1 lost his
consciousness due to argon gas leakage. At
that time, IP2 discovered IP1 and alerted
situation to other workers immediately. IP2
pulled up the IP1 from the bottom area and
took out IP1 to outside of tank with help of
another worker. IPs were transported to
Hospital immediately for further examination.
4 20 February 2009
 3rd Near Miss
SHI QG Hull, 6 Jan 2009

Stripper Line TIG Welding Argon Gas, Cargo Tank, Level 1&2
– Result: One personal oxygen detector alarmed (19% in one localized area but immediat
ely cleared as inspector moved from area), all work stopped and personnel evacuated
the tank until source understood. This is an example of a good response to an oxygen
personal detector alarm.
– Neither the welding team foreman nor the SHI Safety Supervisor checked that the dam
had been positioned correctly before signing the work permit.
– Hence, the welders received a signed permit and began welding.
– The stripper line had been welded in the wrong sequence meaning that a dam could not
be inserted from the liquid dome area and had to be inserted at the end of the line at the
bottom of the cargo tank.
– When questioned, the new welding foreman did not know what the line they were
welding was used for and was not aware that it went to the bottom of the cargo tank and
was open ended. He was told to weld the joint he couldn’t insert a dam as is normal
practice so he just started welding with the argon gas inserted into the line.
– Usually, the end of the stripper lines in the cargo tanks are dammed with a foam stopper
and then the end of the pipe is wrapped in plastic and sealed with duct tape as a
secondary defense against leaking dams at the top of the liquid dome – but this had not
been done in tanks # 4 & 5 although it had been done in tanks # 1 ~ 3.

5 20 February 2009
 4th Death Due to Suffocation During Grinding
DSME QG Hull, 16 May 2007
Line supplying Argon Line supplying Air

Position reversed

Description : To install insulation, IP was grinding anchoring – bar installation. IP

put Air hose connected with Air hood in line supplying Argon.
Oxygen displacement occurred due to Argon gas and IP suffocated

- Manifold air and argon fittings were reversed.

6 20 February 2009
 5th Death Due to Suffocation*, SHI - QG Hull 31 Aug 2007
*Incident Report Stated the IP died of Natural Causes

7 20 February 2009
 5th Argon incident showing IP
Note: Incident Report Stated the IP died of Natural Causes

8 20 February 2009
 5th Argon Incident Pictures SHI QG Hull
Incident Report Stated the IP died of Natural Causes

9 20 February 2009
 6th Death due to suffocation during T.I.G welding, SHI non-QG Sept 2007
Date : September, 2007

Location : S Company

Description : The deceased was T.I.G. welding a pipe on top of the deck of an LNGC (Refer to Picture.
The worker leaned into the pipe after removing the purging sponge (seal) to check the quality of the weld
(Refer to picture. And breathed in argon gas and was found slumped over the open branch of the pipe
The foremen had last talked to the welder at 11.40 am. The welder was found at 11.55 am (15 minutes)

10 20 February 2009
 7th Death due to suffocation by argon gas remaining in pipe
DSME non-QG, May 2002

Description : After welding by

argon at the outside cargo
suction line(700+400A), IP
entered inside pipe. At that
time IP was suffocated by
argon remaining inside pipe.

Note: Pipe need not be in

Confined Space to be 100%
Argon atmosphere. After
argon work deck pipes must
be sufficiently ventilated
BEFORE workers can enter
or inspect!!!

11 20 February 2009
 Common threads
1. PTW, procedure or standard available and required but not followed

Gas checks not enforced, no continuous air monitoring

Signing permit without walking the job site (observation)

Ventilation – dilution or exhaust of low areas absent (ventilation on top of tank may
not be sufficient)
2. Shipyard subcontractor’s perform most TIG welding

Difficult to determine what training is provided to subcontractor’s
3. Training/Argon hazards not understood such as the following:

One or two breaths and you are down

Heavier then air

Plan/prepare/train for inert gas leaks
4. No personal oxygen detectors in use
5. Pre-job planning may lower the argon suffocation exposure

Design, engineer, and plan to perform TIG welding in block stage or pre-fab shops

Do not place dams in lower areas where personnel have to enter

Welder’s may not understand that the pipes they are welding on may be
open at another remote location where other worker’s may be working

12 20 February 2009
 Corrective Action
1. Review/comment/amend (as required) the Best Method Safe Worker
procedure (first review in process)
2. Review/comment (as required) on the Root Cause Analysis received from
DSME on 13 Feb 2009. Define/amend each causal factor root cause and
verify controls are implemented (in process, first review 18 Feb 09)
3. Ensure Confined Space Entry (CSE) signage and JSA/Risk Assessment
Pre-Work check sheet clearly state suffocation hazard (complete)
4. Continue to lead by example and promote the use of personal oxygen
detectors (daily)
5. Sustained review of inert gas welding through inspections, observations
and audits (daily as appropriate)
6. Continue to reinforce safe inert gas welding practices, behaviors, and
strict adherence to BMSW procedure, stop work as appropriate
7. Verify welders have received appropriate training by questioning during
welding operations (daily as appropriate)

13 20 February 2009