Mendoza Civ Digests

CIVIL LAW MENDOZA DIGESTS
ATENEO CENTRAL BAR OPERATIONS 2002
Heirs of Placido Miranda v. Court of Appeals (255 SCRA 368) Facts: Placido Miranda and his wife were owners of a parcel of land. Upon their death, the land was administered by their son Maximo who, in 1957, sold it to Agerico. In 1984, a free patent title was issued to chariot, Agericos daughter. Since then, Agerico has been in possession and cultivation of the land in behalf of Charito who became a resident of USA. In 1991, the heirs of Placido entered the land and prevented Agerico from cultivating it. They claimed rightful ownership and possession contending that Maximo was merely the administrator of the land. Thus, Agerico and Charito brought an action for forcible entry against the heirs. Meanwhile, the heirs also filed a complaint for declaration of nullity, annulment of title and deed of sale, and cancellation of title and reconveyance with damages and partition against Agerico and Charito. As they involve the same parties and subject matter and related issues, these cases have been consolidated. Issue: Whether or not Agerico, and subsequently Charito, has acquired the land by virtue of the deed of sale executed by Maximo? Held: Yes. 1.) Agerico acquired the land by virtue of the deed of sale executed by Maximo. Charito, to whom the land was transferred has the certificate of title, tax receipts, and evidence of possession of the land for more than 30 years. Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation, when coupled with proof of actual possession of the property can be the basis of claim of ownership through prescription. 2.) Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by either ordinary or extraordinary prescription. On the one hand, ordinary prescription entails adverse possession by virtue of a title and in good faith for 10 years. On the other hand, extraordinary prescription is uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years without need of title or good faith. In this case, therefore, on the basis alone of possession for more than 30 years, Agerico and Charitos ownership, acquired through extraordinary prescription, is beyond question. 3.) The heirs contend that under Art. 1391, CC, they had a period of 4 years within which to bring an action for annulment and that this period commenced to run only from November 1991, when they allegedly discovered the fraud committed against them. However, 1391, CC presupposes that no acquisitive prescription has set in, for after the favorable effects of acquisitive prescription have set in, rights of ownership over a property are rendered indisputable. Balogbog v. Court of Appeals (269 SCRA 259) Facts: Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal who died intestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively. They had an older brother, Gavino, but he died in 1935, predeceasing their parents. Private respondents Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog brought an action for partition and accounting aginst petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such, they were entitled to the one-third share of Gavino in the estate of their grandpaprents. Petitoners denied this and alleged that their brother Gavino died single and without issue. Private respondents presented three witnesses: 1.) Trazo, then the mayor of their municipality, testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be married and Ramonito to be their first child. Furthermore, he said that he attended the wedding of Gavino and Catalina. 2.) Pogoy, a family friend of private respondents, testified that they are the children of Gavino and Catalina. He also said that he attended their wedding and that Gavino and Catalina lived together. 3.) Catalina, the alleged wife of Gavina, tesitified concerning her marriage with Gavino. She testified that after the wedding, she was handed a receipt, presumably the marriage certificate,
by Fr. Jomao-as, but it was burned during the war. She said that they lived together and begot three children, namely, Ramonito, Petronillo, and Generoso. Petronillo died after an illness at the age of six. On cross-examination, she stated that after the death of Gavino, she lived in common law relation with a man for a year and then they separated. Private respondents furthermore produced various certificates from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, the Office of the Treasurer, and the Parish Priest of Asturias Municipality that the records of the marriage of Gavino and Catalina and the birth of Ramonito must be presumed to have been either lost or destroyed during the war. On the other hand, petitioners presented three witnesses: 1.) Leoncia testified that Gavino died single at the family residence and denied that her brother had any legitimate children and stated that she did not know private respondents before the case was filed. 2.) Maranga, the Assistant Municipal Treasurer, testified that there was no record of the marriage in the Book of Marriages between 1925 to 1935. 3.) Narvasa tesitified that Gavino died single in 1935 and that Catalina lived with a certain Keriado after the war, although he did not know whether they were legally married. He added, however, that Catalina had children by a man she had married before the war. On cross-examination, he stated that Leoncia, who requested him to testify, was also his bondsman in a criminal case. Issue: Whether or not Gavino and Catalina were married and therefore private respondents, as their alleged heirs, are entitled to one-third share of Gavino in the estate of their grandparents? Held: Yes. 1.) Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place other evidence may be presented to prove marriage. Here, private respondents proved, through testimonial evidence, that Gavino and Catalina were married and they had three children, one of whom died in infancy; that their marriage subsisted until Gavino died; and that their children, private respondents herein, were recognized by Gavinos family and by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino. 2.) An exchange of vows can be presumed to have been made from the testimonies of the witnesses who state that a wedding took place, since the very purpose for having a wedding is to exchange vows of marital commitment. It would be unusual to have a wedding without an exchange of vows and quite unnatural for people not to notice its absence. 3.) In accordance with Arts. 266 and 267, CC, in the absence of titles indicated in Art. 265, CC, which provides that such status shall be proven by record of birth in the Civil Register, by an authentic document, or by final judgment, the filiation of children may be proven by continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child and by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. Almendras v. Court of Appeals (269 SCRA 526) Facts: Petitioner Alemndras is the registered owner of the parcel of land, which is bounded on the north and on the east by lots owned by private respondents Tan Pang Eng and Yap, on the south by the lot owned by Bongo, and on the west by the properties of the Opones. About 9.74m of the western boundary of petitioners land abuts an existing private road, which passes through the lots of the Opones and leads to another private road located on the property of Tudtud, which in turn connects to the provincial road. Soemtime in 1987, private respondents began building a concrete wall on their property on the northern and eastern sides of petitioners lot. Petitioner offered to buy a portion of private respondents lot so that he would have access to the provincial road, but her request was denied on the ground that there was an existing private road on the western side of petitioners property providing an adequate outlet to the provincial road. Shortly thereafter, Bongo also fenced his property, thus closing off the southern boundary of petitioners lot. Thus, petitioner brought this action for the establishment of a right
of way through private respondents lot. The Opones subsequently closed off the western side of petitioners property by erecting a fence on their lot, with the result that petitioners property became inaccessible. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a right of way through private respondents property? Held: No. The owner of a landlocked property has the right to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates. The easement must be established at the point, which is least prejudicial to the servient estate and whenever possible, the shortest to the highway. If these two conditions exist on different properties, the land where establishment of the easement will cause the least prejudice should be chosen. Thus, where the easement may be established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. However, if these two circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest. Ong v. Court of Appeals (272 SCRA 725) Facts: Petitioner Miguela Ong is the surviving spouse of Manuel Ong. The latter died while the case was pending appeal. Private respondents Alfredo Ong, Jr. and Robert Ong are children of Saturnina Caballes allegedly by Manuel Ong. Manuel Ong introduced himself to Saturnina as Alfred Go and they had an illicit relationship from 1954 until sometime in 1957, during which they had repeated sexual intercourses. During this period, Manuel gave support to Saturnina and private respondents, but subsequently stopped. Dolores Dy, Manuels common law wife, treated private respondents like close relatives of Manuel by giving them tokens of affection, such as family pictures or Dolores and Manuel and by visiting them in their house. On two occasions, Manuel gave money to Alfredo, first, as the latters high school graduation gift and, second, for the latters educational support. They brought this case to compel Manuel to recognize them as his illegitimate children and to give them support. Saturnina testified for the private respondents. However, petitioner questions the morality and credibility of Saturnina. Petitioner claims that Manuel was sterile therefore it is improbable that he was the father of private respondents. Issue: Whether or not private respondents are the illegitimate children of Manuel Ong? Held: Yes. 1.) An adult male is presumed to have the normal powers of virility and the burden of evidence to prove the contrary rests upon him who claims otherwise. Petitioner has not overcome this presumption. The evidence for petitioner does not show that Manuel was sterile and could not have begotten private respondents or that even if he was so during the war, that he could not have been cured 10 years later of that condition when Alfred, Jr. was conceived. 2.) This case does not fall under pars. 2 and 3 of ART. 283, CC. The times during which Manuel met Alfredo and gave the latter money cannot be considered proof of continuous possession of the status of a child. The fathers conduct toward his son must be spontaneous and uninterrupted for this ground to exist. Here, there are no acts shown of Manuel treating Alfredo, Jr. as his son except on the occasions during which they met. In the case of Robert, there is no proof at all that Manuel treated him as his son. 3.) Nor can it be said that there was proof of cohabitation in this case. While Saturnina testified that she and Manuel lived together for 4 months as husband and wife in order to justify a finding of cohabitation, the relationship was not open and public so as to constitute cohabitation. While the parties are not required to hold themselves out as husband and wife, neither must they act clandestinely or secretly, otherwise they will be considered to have merely engaged in illicit sexual intercourse.
4.) Nonetheless, the evidence in this case sufficiently makes this case fall under the last paragraph of Art. 283, i.e., any other evidence showing that Manuel was the father of private respondents. This operates as a blanket provision. The testimony of Saturnina that she had an illicit sexual relation with Manuel over a long period is proof that private respondents were conceived and born during such relationship and constitutes evidence of Manuels paternity. Ancog v. Court of Appeals (274 SCRA 676) Facts: The land, with improvements thereon, was formerly the conjugal property of spouses Gregorio Yap and Rosario Diez. In 1946, Gregorio died, leaving his wife, private respondent Rosario, and children, petitioners Jovita Yap Ancog and Gregorio Yap, Jr., and private respondent Caridad Yap as his heirs. Thereafter, Rosario obtained loans from the Bank of Calape, secured by a mortgage on the disputed land, which was annotated on its OCT. When Rosario applied again for a loan, offering the land as security, the banks lawyer, Atty. Serna, suggested that she submit an extrajudicial settlement covering the disputed land as a means of facilitating the approval of her application. The suggestion was accepted. The extrajudicial settlement, which was prepared by Atty. Serna, was signed by the heirs, with the exception of Gregorio, Jr., then only a minor. After the document was notarized, the OCT was cancelled and a TCT was issued. Upon the execution of a real estate mortgage on the land, the loan was approved by the bank. Rosario exercised rights of ownership over the land. She brought an ejectment suit against Jovitas husband and son to evict them from the ground floor of the house built on the land for failure to pay rent. Shortly thereafter, Jovita learned that Rosario had offered the land for sale. She informed her younger brother, Gregorio, Jr. and they filed an action for partition. As Caridad was unwilling to join in the action for partition against their mother, she was impleaded as a defendant. Petitioners alleged that the extrajudicial instrument was simulated and therefore void. They claimed that in signing the instrument, they did not really intend to convey their interests in the property to their mother, but only to enable her to obtain the loan on the security of the land to cover expenses for Caridads school fees and for household repairs. Issue: 1.) Whether or not the extrajudicial settlement is valid and can be enforced against petitioners? 2.) Whether or not Gregorio, Jr. is barred by laches from recovering his share in the property? Held: 1.) Yes. The heirs meant the extrajudicial settlement to be fully effective. The record reveals that there was an intention on the part of Jovita and Caridad to cede their interest in the land to their mother rosario. It is immaterial that they had been initially motivated by a desire to acquire a loan. Under Art. 1082, CC, every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs is deemed to be partition even though it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, or any other transaction. 2.) No. As he did not take part in the partition, he is not bound by the settlement. At the time the extrajudicial settlement was executed, he was a minor. As such, he was not included or even informed of the partition. Instead, the registration of the land in his mothers name created an implied trust in his favor by analogy to Art. 1451, CC, which provides that when land passes by succession to any person and he causes the legal title to be put in the name of another, a trust is established by implication of law for the benefit of the true owner. As a general rule, a resulting trust arises where such may be reasonably presumed to be the intention of the parties, as determined from the facts and circumstances existing at the time the transaction out of which it is sought to be established. For prescription to run in favor of the trustee, the trust must be repudiated
by unequivocal acts made known to the cestui que trust and proved by clear and conclusive evidence. A cestui que trust may make a claim under a resulting trust within 10 years from the time when the trust is repudiated. The rule that the prescriptive period must be counted from the date of issuance of the Torrens certificate of title applies only to the remedy of reconveyance under the Property Registration Decree. Since this action by Gregorio, Jr. to claim his share was brought shortly after he was informed by Jovita of their mothers effort to sell the property, his claim cannot be considered barred either by prescription or by laches. RAMOS VS. CA (275 SCRA 167) [July 1997] Facts: Remedios Navoa Ramos is an owner of a factory space in QC. She entered into a contract of lase with the Malapit spouses (private respondents). It was stipulated in the contract that In case of inflation or devaluation of the Philippine Peso, the monthly rental will automatically increase or decrease, monthly rental shall be paid every first week of the month and the contract is terminated if the delay in payment of monthly rentals reaches 3 months. Ramos then filed a complaint for ejectment for failure of private respondents to comply eith their undertakings. Ramos argued that private respondents failed to pay increased rent brought about by the inflation or devaluation of the Philippine Peso. RTC ruled for private respondents stating that it was petitioner who violated some of the terms of the contract (i.e. changing yakal posts to concrete posts in the 5th year) Issue: whether there is ground to eject private respondents. Held: The SC ruled there is, however it is not based on Art. 1250 of the CC (inflation and devaluation). The provision of the said article requires for its application a declaration of inflation by the Central Bank. Without such declaration creditors cannot demand an increase of what is due them. The SC ruled that there is reason to eject for failure to pay rent for three consecutive months, resulting in the termination of the lease. * (1) Failure to comply with a provision deemed by the parties themselves as so important is a ground for the termination of the contract. (2) Art. 1250 requires for its application a declaration of inflation by the Central Bank, without such declaration creditors cannot demand an increase of what is due them. Ramos v. Court of Appeals (279 SCRA 118) Facts: Eduardo Yuseco obtained a loan from GSIS and mortgaged his property in favor of GSIS to guarantee the payment of the loan. The mortgage contract provided that Yuseco was prohibited from selling or in any manner disposing of the mortgaged property without prior written consent of GSIS. Thereafter, Yuseco executed a Contract to Sell the property in favor of Felipe Belmonte who agreed to assume Yusecos obligation to GSIS. However, Belmonte was unable to comply with his obligation. Thus, with the knowledge and consent of Yuseco, Belmonte spouses asked Andrea Ramos to share in the payment of the amortizations to GSIS. Consequently, Yuseco executed a Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of Mortgage in favor of Belmonte spouses and Ramos, who submitted the contract to GSIS for approval. The GSIS Board of Trustees approved his request for authority to execute the Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of Mortgage even though Yusecos certificate of title had not been returned. The approval was made subject to the condition that the Belmonte spouses and Ramos would pay to GSIS the monthly amortization on the loan of Yuseco. Ramos and the Belmonte spouses had been paying the GSIS the monthly amortizations, but for some reason they stopped doing so. GSIS informed Yuseco and the spouses of the arrearages and warned them that if the amount was not settled on time, the mortgage would be foreclosed. As no settlement of the amount was made, GSIS extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. As the highest bidder, it
purchased the property at the auction sale and informed the Belmonte spouses of the foreclosure and demanded payments of rents from them for their use of the property. Instead, the spouses and Ramos wrote to GSIS that. As vendees of the property, they were exercising the right to redeem the property. Meanwhile, Yuseco sold the foreclosed property to Dionisio Palla, showing the latter a photocopy of his title to the property. Palla sought to redeem the property so he advanced the redemption price to Yuseco who redeemed the property from GSIS. The TCT in the name of Yuseco was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of Palla. Thus, Ramos and the Belmonte spouses filed an action for Annulment of the Foreclosure Proceedings, Redemption and Sale, and Reconveyance. They charged that Yuseco and GSIS acted in bad faith in selling the foreclosed property to Palla even if the same had already been sold to them. Issue: Whether or not Ramos and the Belmonte spouses have the better and superior right over Palla as regards the mortgaged property? Held: No. 1.) Because of Ramos and the spouses failure to comply with the conditions imposed by the GSIS, the Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of Mortgage was not perfected so that Yuseco remained the owner of the property and as such had a right to sell it to Palla. 2.) Because of Ramos and the spouses failure to update their account, GSIS conditional approval of the sale of the property and assumption of mortgage never became effective. The Deed itself was not perfected since the assumption of the mortgage by the petitioners was a condition precedent for the sale of the property to them. Art. 1181, CC provides that, In conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights, as well as extinguishment or loss of those already acquired, shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitutes a condition. Accordingly, in sales with assumption of mortgage, the assumption of mortgage is a condition to the sellers consent so that without approval by the mortgagee, no sale is perfected. 3.) Where the Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of Mortgage is ineffective, the seller remains the owner and mortgagor of the property, and as such, he retains the right to redeem the foreclosed property. Sadhwani v. Court of Appeals (281 SCRA 75) Facts: Sawit was the registered owner of a lot with 2 buildings built on it. Under a contract effective for 5 years, Sawit leased his property to Orient Electronics. The lease was subsequently extended for 3 more years. Among other things, the lessor gave the lessee the right of first refusal in the event the lessor decided to sell his property. In addition, Orient Electronics was granted the right to sublease the property. Accordingly, it entered into a contract with the Sadhwanis for the sublease of the buildings, for periods coinciding with the date of expiration of the Sawit-Orient lease contract. 6 months before the expiration of both lease and sublease contracts, Sawit sold his property to Silver Swan Mfg. The Sadhwanis protested the sale, claiming they had the right of first refusal because their sublease contracts with Orient Electronics expressly incorporated the Sawit-Orient lease contract as integral part of such contracts. Thus, they brought an action for annulment of contract of sale, cancellation of title, and specific performance against Orient Electronics, Sawit, and Silver Swan Mfg. Issue: Whether or not under their contracts with Orient Electronics, the Sadhwanis have a right of first refusal in the event the leased property was sold? Held: No. 1.) A contract binds only the parties to it. The right of first refusal was embodied in the contract of lease between Sawit and Orient Electronics. The Sadhwanis were not parties to that contract. While their contracts with Orient electronics made the lease
contract an integral part of the contracts of sublease, there is no proof that Sawit consented to an assignment of the lease to the Sadhwanis. What Sawit had agreed to was simply to give Orient electronics the right to sublease the property. For that matter, Sawit did not have to give his consent to the sublease because under Art. 1650, CC, when in the contract of lease, there is no express prohibition, the lessee may sublet the thing leased. 2.) However, with respect to assignments of lease, the rule is different. Art. 1649, CC provides that the lessee cannot assign the lease without the consent of the lessor, unless there is a stipulationto the contrary. The Sadhwanis have not cited any provision of the contract of lease between Sawit and Orient Electronics giving Orient Electronics the right to assign the contract. The fact is that Sawit was not a party to the sublease contracts. Indeed, the consent of the lessor is necessary because the assignment of lease would involve the transfer not only of right but also of obligations. Such assignment would constitute novation by the substitution of one of the parties, i.e., the lessee. Salao v. Court of Appeals (284 SCRA 493) Facts: This case is a complaint for damages filed by Apolonio for head injuries allegedly inflicted upon him by Salao. Apolonio testified that on August 24, 1986, he saw a friends jeep parked outside the compound of Salao. Upon entering the compound, he saw his friend having drinks with Salao. He therefore decided to join them but Salao saw him and drove him away for being a drug addict. As he was leaving, Salao hit him on the head with a gun and threatened him with further harm. Only the timely intervention of Apolonios brother, Gary, and Salaos mother, Lourdes, saved him from further injuries in the hands of Salao. Apolonio submitted in evidence a certification and receipts in support of his claim for damages. His claim was corroborated by Gary Apolonio, his brother, and Dr. Sarrosa, the doctor who operated on him for a fractured skull at the hospital. On the other hand, Salao claimed that it was Apolonio who tried to assault him and he only acted in self-defense by hitting Apolonio with his gun. Salao, contending that since the court found him not guilty in the criminal case for serious physical injuries and grave threats based on the same incident, questions the propriety of the award of damages and attorneys fees to Apolonio. Issue: Whether or not the award for damages and attorneys fees to Apolonio was proper in this case? Held: Yes. 1.) Salao has not shown that the award of damages is not supported by evidence. In fact, the award for actual damages was based on hospital bills and receipts for medicine which Apolonio properly identified in court and formally offered in evidence. 2.) This being a case of physical injuries resulting from a crime or quasi-delict, moral damages may be awarded in the discretion of the court, as provided in Art. 2219(1) or (2), CC. The award is consistent with the rule that moral damages are not intended to enrich the injured party, but to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone by reason of the defendants culpable action. 3.) Salao invokes Rule 111 2(b) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides: Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. However, the civil liability referred to in the Rule is the civil liability arising from crime (ex delicto). It is not the civil liability for quasi-delict, which is allowed to be brought separately and independently of the criminal action by Art. 33, CC. The civil liability based on such cause of action is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has
not been committed by the accused. Salaos acquittal in the criminal case for serious physical injuries and grave threats is not conclusive of his liability for damages to Apolonio. The case is separate, distinct, and independent of the criminal action and requires only a preponderance of evidence. Heirs of Pascasio Uriarte v. Court of Appeals (284 SCRA 511) Facts: Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is the son of Agatonica Arreza, whose parents were Pedro Arreza an Ursula tubil. Upon the death of Pedro, Ursula married Juan Arnaldo by whom she had another daughter, the decedent Justa. Benedicto is thus the nephew of Justa by her half sister Agatonica. Petitioners, the heirs of Pascasio Uriarte, are the widow and daughters of Pascasio Uriarte. Pascasio was one of the sons of Primitiva Arnaldo and Conrado Uriarte. Primitiva was the daughter of Domingo Arnaldo and Catalina Azarcon. Domingo and Justas father, Arnaldo, were brothers. Petitioners are thus grandchildren, the relatives within the fifth degree of consanguinity, of Justa by her cousin Primitiva Arnalso Uriarte. The other petitioners are grandchildren and relatives within the fifth degree of consanguinity of Justa by her cousin Gregorio Arnaldo, the brother of Primitiva. Bendicto brought this action for partition of a 2.7 hectare land left by Justa. The land had been acquired by Justa as follows: 0.5 hectare by inheritance from her parents and 2.2 hectares by purchase. Benedicto claimed to be the sole surviving heir of Justa, on the ground that the latter died without issue. He contended that Pascasio had no right to the entire land of Justa but could only claim one-half of the 0.5 hectare land, which Justa had inherited from her parents. On the other hand, the heirs of Pascasio, who substituted Pascasio upon his death during the pendency of the case, denied that they were mere tenants of Justa and claimed that the entire land was originally owned by Ambrocio Arnaldo, their great granduncle. Two-thirds of the land was allegedly bequeathed to Domingo and the remaining one-third to Juan. The heirs claimed that the land had always been in their possession and that, in her lifetime, Justa never asserted exclusive right over the property but only received her share of the harvest from it. They alleged that Benedicto did not have any right to the property because he was not an heir of Ambrocio Arnaldo, the original owner of the property. Issue: Who among the petitioners and the private respondent is entitled to Justas estate as her nearest relatives within the meaning of Art. 962, CC? Held: Given the fact that 0.5 hectare of the land belonged to the conjugal partnership of Justas parents, Justa was entitled to 0.125 hectare of the 0.5 hectare land as her father Juans share in the conjugal property, while petitioners are entitled to the other 0.125 hectare. In addition, Justa inherited her mother Ursulas share consisting of 0.25 hectare. Plus the 2.2 hectares, which belonged to her in her own right, Justa owned a total of 2.575 hectares of the 2.7-hectare land. This 2.575-hectare land was inherited by Benedicto as Justas nearest surviving relative. Petitioners misappreciate the relationship between Justa and Benedicto. Bendicto is the son of Justas half-sister Agatonica. Therefore, he is Justas nephew. A nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse survives the decedent. That Benedicto is only a half-blood relative is immaterial. This alone does not disqualify him from being his aunts heir. The determination of whether the relationship is of the full of half blood is important only to determine the extent of the share of the survivors. MANANSALA VS. CA (286 SCRA 722) Facts: Fidela manasala is the registered owner of a parcel of land. She has been in actual possession of the land since 1955 by virtue of a conditional sale by the National Housing Authority (formerly PHHC). In 1984, she paid the full price and deed of sale was executed in her favor.
Then, Corazon Aranez brought an action for specific performance against manansala to enforce a deed of sale covering the same lot allegedly enterd into between her and petitioner. Petitioner denied selling the land and contended that the deed was a forgery. The TC ruled in favor of petitioner since there was no perfected contract of sale because petitioner never intended to sell the land. On appeal, the CA reversed, it held that there was meeting of the minds between the parties as evidenced by the signature of the petitioner in the deed of sale which the NBI found to be genuine. The CA further held that petitioner could validly sell the land even before the actual award to her pursuant to Art. 1461 of the CC which provides that things having a potential existence may be the object of a contract of sale.. Issue: whether CA erred in validating the contract. Held: The SC ruled in the negative. The NBI found the signature of petitioner on the questioned document to be genuine. The signature is genuine and is a factual finding of both the TC and the CA which, in the absence of very clear evidence to the contrary, this court will not revise. There was a meeting of the minds between the parties as evidenced by the signature of the petitioner in the deed of sale which the NBI found to be genuine. Petitioner could validly sell the land even before the actual award to her pursuant to Art. 1461 of the CC which provides that things having a potential existence may be the object of a contract of sale. DE LEON VS. CA (287 SCRA 94) Facts: PRs filed in RTC a complaint for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale of two parcels of land against petitioners. Petitioners (spouses De Leon) moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by reason of PRs nonpayment of the correct amount of docket fees. They argued that PRs should have paid docket fees based on the alleged value of the two parcels of land. PRs on the other hand argued that an action for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale of real property is incapable of pecuniary estimation and, so, the docket fees should be the fixed amount of P400.00 in Rule 141, section 7(b)(1). In support of their argument, they cited cases of Lapitan v. Scandia, Inc. and Bautista v. Lim where the Court held that If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought.this Court has considered such actions as cases where the the subject of litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by the courts of first instance. The SC ruled in favor of the PRs. Although eventually the result may be the recovery of land in the case at bar, it is in the nature of the action as one for rescission of contract which is controlling.
An action for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale of real property is incapable of pecuniary estimation and, so, the docket fees should be the fixed amount of P400.00 as provided in Rule 141, section 7(b)(1). As held in Lapitan v. Scandia, Inc. and Bautista v. Lim, If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought.this Court has considered such actions as cases where the the subject of litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by the courts of first instance. Thus, although eventually the result may be the recovery of land in the case at bar, it is in the nature of the action as one for rescission of contract which is controlling. LABASTIDA VS. CA (287 SCRA662)[March 1998] Facts: The Delestes (private respondents) were the owners of a parcel pf land in Iligan city. A portion of the lot was leased to petitioners (Labastida). After some time, private respondents filed a case against petitioners for recovery of possession and damages. Plaintiffs alleged that they served notice to the occupants to vacate the property because the owners would erect a commercial building. The petitioners refused to vacate. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendants and over the nature or subject matter of the action. In support of their argument, petitioners contended that there is no showing that defendants ever received such notice to vacate and therefore there is no evidence to show that the one year period has elapsed from the time petitioners received the written notice to vacate, coupled by the fact that this is a clear case of Unlawful Detainer and the court that should have jurisdiction over the case is the MTC. MTD was denied by the lower court and CA. Issue: whether the trial court had jurisdiction to try the case filed against petitioners. Held: The SC held that although the action is one for recovery of possession, damages, with preliminary mandatory injunction, it is evident from the allegations of the complaint filed by private respondents that the case was actually for unlawful detainer. Private respondents alleged that petitioners were paying on a month-to-month basis and despite repeated demands to vacate the land made by PRs, petitioners refused to leave the premises. This amounts to an allegation that petitioners were unlawfully withholding possession. Since the action is that of an unlawful detainer, another issue is whether it was filed within one year after the unlawful withholding of possession. The SC held that petitioners did so. In case of several demands, SC ruled that the period is reckoned from the date of the last demand. The SC ruled further that pursuant to rule 70, section 2 of RoC, no action could be brought against petitioners for alleged violation of the terms and conditions of their lease agreement unless a notice to vacate is given to the lessee. On the other hand, if the action for unlawful detainer is based on expiration of leased, no notice is required. Such a notice is needed only when the action is due to the lessees failure to pay rent or to comply with the conditions of lease. CABARDO VS. CA (290 SCRA 131) [May 1998] Facts: Jose Peralta was a driver of CIGI. He was on the southbound lane of SLEX when he met an accident. He claimed that a car suddenly took the inner lane occupied by his truck and as a result he was forced to swerve to the left causing the truck to veer and roll over the center island of the expressway. With Peralta was his helper and pump operator Cabardo. Private respondent Rodil was driving on the other side of the expressway and due to heavy rains, he
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was not able to see the truck that rolled over. He then crashed into the underside of the truck tanker. Petitioner Cabardo suffered a fractured left leg. A criminal case was filed against Rodil (physical injuries). Rodils on the other hand filed a complaint for damages against CIGI and Peralta. Cabardo filed a complaint for damages against Rodil. Cabardo claimed that they were able to get out of the vehicle unhurt but because of Rodils recklessness and negligence, the car that Rodil was driving bumped the truck and hit his left leg. Rodil in his answer claimed that the injury was sustained when the truck-tanker fell on its side and that petitioners action was barred by another case pending in another court. The trial court ruled against Rodil and held him guilty of negligence in driving his car which was the proximate cause of injuries suffered by Cabardo. CA reversed TCs decision because of inconsistencies in the testimonies of Peralta and Cabardo. Issue: whether the Petitioners injuries were caused by PRs car. Held: Yes. The lower courts of Malolos and Sta. Cruz, after reviewing the facts of the case, both ruled on PRs negligence. While the CA reversed the TCs decision because of inconsistencies in the testimonies of Cabardo and Peralta, these are minor and inconsequential. What is important is that the statements dovetail in essential details with the testimonies given in court. (In this case, the inconsistency is based on whether Cabardo was bumped by Rodils car while he was checking the pressure gauge or while in the act of putting up the EWD). The SC has ruled in a number of cases that as long as inaccuracies concern only minor matters, the Court have not allowed the resulting inconsistencies to affect SCs judgement of the credibility of the witnesses. Indeed, a witness is not expected to remember an occurrence with perfect recollection down to insignificant and minute details. NATIONAL POWER CORP. VS. CA (293 SCRA 130) Facts: Coo (private respondent) purchased six tons of assorted scrap aluminum wires and allied accessories. The assorted goods were shipped and received by Coo. However, the goods were seized by the elements of the 331st PC from Coos residence for violation of the anti-fencing law. The RTC acquitted Coo on the ground that the wares belong to him. Notwithstanding this decision, NPC got the got the wares and refused its return. Coo filed a case for replevin. TC and CA ruled for Coo. NPC argued that CA erred since the acquittal of petitioner was based on reasonable doubt and, therefore, was not conclusive of the ownership of the goods. Petitioner calls attention to the fact that the goods seized were taken form his residence and not from his warehouse. Issue: whether or not conclusive proof of ownership is needed in a case for replevin. Held: The SC held that it is sufficient that plaintiff prove entitlement to legal possession. It is not necessary to prove ownership. The TC correctly found that Coo has proven by a preponderance of evidence that he and not NPC is entitled to the possession of said property. Under the RoC, it is indispensable in replevin proceeding that the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit that he is entitled to the possession of property, that the property is wrongfully detained by defendant, alleging the cause of detention, that the same has not been taken for tax assessment or seized under execution, or attachment, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure, and actual value of the property.. NPC is thus wrongfully withholding possession of the property since they knew about the decision of the RTC. Conclusive proof of ownership is NOT needed in a case for replevin. It is sufficient that plaintiff prove entitlement to legal possession. Under the Rules of Court, it is indispensable in replevin proceeding that the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit that he is entitled to the possession of property, that the property is wrongfully detained by defendant, alleging the cause of detention, that the same has not been taken for tax assessment or seized under execution, or attachment, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure, and actual value of the property.
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ALMENDRAS VS. CA (293 SCRA 540) This is a resolution by the SC. Private respondents seek a reconsideration of the decision in this case remanding it to the TC so that private respondents may file a third-party complaint against parties through whose property they claim a right of way in favor of petitioner should pass since it would be the property least prejudiced by the establishment of such easement. PRs contend that while it is undisputed that a right of way through their property is the shortest distance to the provincial road, there is no proof that making the easement pass that way will cause the least damage and as ruled by the SC in another case, if these (2) circumstances ( estate with the shortest way and will cause least damage) do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used. In this case, SC said that it is not possible to determine whether the estates which would be least prejudiced by the easement would be those of the owners of Opune and Tudtud properties because they have not been heard. This is the reason why the case was remanded for further proceedings. In determining where the easement should pass, owners of surrounding property must be heard with respect to two matters: point which is least prejudicial and point the distance of which is the shortest. If these two does not concur in the same tenement, the way which will cause the least prejudice should be taken. RAET VS. CA (295 SCRA 677) Facts: Spouses Raet negotiated with Amparo Gatus concerning the possibility of buying the rights of the latter to certain units at a subdivision in Bulacan developed by PVDHC primarily for parties qualified to obtain loans form GSIS. They paid Gatus a certain sum of money for this prupose. The spouses applied with PVDHC for the purchase of the units. As they were not GSIS members, they looked for members who could act as accommodation parties by allowing them to use their policies. They did so and paid PVHDC a sum of money on the understanding that these amounts would be credited to the purchase prices of the units which will be determined after the approval of the loan application by the GSIS. For the meantime, they were allowed to occupy the unit. Later on, the loan application was disapproved and PVHDC asked them to vacate the units. When they refused, a ejectment case was filed against them. They filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against Gatus and PVDHC. Issue: whether there was a perfected contract of sale between the parties over the subject units. Held: The SC ruled there was none. The parties in this case had not reached any agreement with regard to the sale of the units in question. First, the records do not show the total costs of the units in question and the payment schemes therefor. The figures referred to by Raet were mere estimates given to them by Gatus. The parties transactions, therefore, lacked the requisites essential for the perfection of contracts. Second, Gatus was not an agent of PVHDC. The estafa case again Amparo was even dismissed since it was proven that Gatus never misrepresented herself. Lastly, Art. 1874 of the CC requires for the validity of a sale involving land that the agent should have an quthorization in writing, which Gatus did not possess.
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*There was no contract of sale perfected between the buyers and PVDHC. There was no meeting of the minds as to the terms thereof, especially with respect to the price. The records do not show the total costs of the units in question and the payment schemes therefor. The figures referred to by Raet were mere estimates given to them by Gatus. Furthermore, Gatus, the negotiator, was not even an agent of PVDHC. Also, Art. 1874 of the NCC requires for the validity of a sale involving land that the agent should have an authorization in writing, which Gatus did not have. At the most, it is became only a proposal to sell. They did not go beyond the negotiation phase of the a contract, which is the period from the time the prospective contracting parties indicate interest on the contract to the time the contract comes into existence the perfection stage. SANITARY STEAM LAUNDRY, INC. VS. CA (300 SCRA 20) This case involves a collision between a truck owned by petitioner and a cimarron which caused the death of three persons and injuries to several others. Petitioners truck crashed the cimarron when the driver stepped on the brakes to avoid hitting the jeepney and this caused his vehicle to swerve to the left and encroach on a portion of the opposite lane. RTC found Petitioners driver to be responsible for the accident and awarded damages in favor of Private respondents. Petitioner contends that the driver of the cimarron was guilty of contributory negligence since it was guilty of violation of traffic rules and regulations (overloading, had only one headlight on) at the time of mishap. He also argued that sudden swerving of a vehicle caused by its driver stepping on the brakes is not negligence per se. He further argued that the driver should be exonerated based on the the doctrine of last clear chance, which states that the person who has the last clear chance of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. He petitioner claimed that the cimarron had the last opportunity of avoiding an accident. The SC found the petitioners arguments to be without merit. It has not been shown that there was a casual connection between the injury received and the violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. Negligence consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury. Violations alleged in this case were mere allegations unsupported by any evidence and are insufficient to discharge its burden of proving clearly that such alleged negligence was the contributing cause of the injury. Police report did not show that only one headlight was functioning and there is nothing to suggest that the driver of the camarron had no elbow room for maneuvering the vehicle due to the alleged overloading of passengers. All these point to the fact that the proximate cause was the negligence of petitioners driver. The argument that sudden swerving is not negligence per se is untenable since in the case relied on by petitioner, it is sudden skidding that was held to be not negligence per se. Although it is not required for employees to undergo psychological and physical examinations or submit clearances from the police and the NBI, driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses. Accordingly, it behooves employers to exert extra care in the selection and supervision of their employees. They must go beyond the minimum requirements fixed by law. Finally the formula for determining life expectancy is determined by applying the formula 2/3 multiplied by (80 minus the age of the deceased). KALUBIRAN VS. CA (300 SCRA 320) [December 1998] Kalubiran is the owner of Kalmar Construction (Kalmar), a single proprietorship engaged in the construction business. Private respondent JRCM is a corporation also engaged in the construction business. PLDT entered into an agreement with PR for restoration work in Cebu
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City in line with PLDTs expansion program. It was stated in the acceptance letter of the Cebu city engineer informed them that the acceptance of the project did not relieve JRCM of its obligation to undertake repair works on any failure that may occur in any section of the project. Thereafter, PLDT wrote the city engineer requesting a permit for a right-of-way in Cebu. The latter informed the former that a permit would only be granted upon restoration of the previously restored section affected by PLDTs expansion program. He called attention to some areas that needed immediate repair. PLDT referred the complaint to JRCM as its project manager. The city engineer stood pat on his demand for immediate restoration of the areas affected and denied PLDTs reconsideration of the denial of the application. Then, on November of 1983, Kalubiran and Kalmar, through their counsel, wrote PLDT a letter claiming credit for the restoration work. JRCM filed a complaint for damages against Petitioner, alleging it never authorized Kalmar to undertake restoration work and as a result of letter sent by Kalmars counsel to PLDT, the latter ceased giving them major contracts. The TC found that Kalmar made the repairs. However, the TC said she did so without authority because the person who told her to proceed with the project was a mere laborer who had no authority to speak for the Private respondent. On appeal, CA ruled that the repairs were actually made by Private respondent. It also ruled that Kalmar acted in bad faith when it wrote PLDT the letter claiming payment for the restoration work. First, petitioner contends that the CA erred in reversing the TCs finding that the repairs were made by Kalmar although it was without the authority of private respondent. SC ruled that the argument is without merit. The question of who did the repairs is relevant to the appeal of petitioner. It is settled that the appellate court can consider issues, although not specifically raised in the pleadings filed before it, as long as they were raised in the trial court or are matters of record having some bearing on the issues submitted which the parties failed to raise or the lower court ignored. It was also contended that petitioner cannot be held liable for the letter which gave rise to this action because it was written by petitioners counsel. It is settled, however, that the mistake of counsel binds the client. It is only in case of gross or palpable negligence of counsel when the court step in and accord relief to a client who suffered thereby. Lastly, the petitioners contention that pleadings filed in a case constitute privileged matter and are not actionable is misplaced since the letter written by petitioners counsel was not one made in the course of judicial proceedings. It was not, therefore, privileged. CANQUE v. CA (305 SCRA 579 [April 1999]) Civil Law/ Damages/ Interest: In spite of the fact that the contracts did not have any stipulation on interest, interest may be awarded in the form of damages under article 2209 of the Civil Code. SUMBAD v. CA (308 SCRA 575 [June 1999]) Civil Law/Property/Donation: The donation of a certain parcel of land by George to Maria, after the death of his wife is valid. The evidence on record does not show that at the time the deed of donation was executed, George and Maria were still maintaining common-law relations. Petitioners testimony is only to the effect that in 1941 Maria became their stepmother. There is no evidence on record that George and Maria continuously maintained common-law relations until the time the donation was made. Baluyot v. CA (July 22, 1999) G.R. No. 122947 Facts: Petitioners are residents of Barangay Cruz-na-Ligas, Diliman, QC and members of the Cruz-na-Ligas Homesite Association, Inc. They filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against UP and QC government alleging that plaintiffs and their ascendants have
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been in open, peaceful, etc of that parcel of riceland known [as] Sitio Libis, Barrio Cruz-naLigas, Quezon City. They claim that UP has approved the donation to the petitioners, by the office of the President, of the aforestated lands, but conveyance was not executed because of disagreements as to the size of the property to be donated, and later, UP backed out of the agreement. An LRC case was filed against UP. Petitioners agreed to the dismissal of the case provided that a donation would be made to the QC government which would appropriate the land to the present occupants. UP unjustifiably revoked the donation. Issue: W/N complaint states a cause of action Held: YES. While prescription does not run against registered lands, nonetheless a registered owners action to recover possession of his land may be barred by laches. Thus, laches is a defense against a registered owner suing to recover possession of the land registered in its name. But UP is not suing in this case. It is petitioners who are, and their suit is mainly to seek enforcement of the deed of donation made by UP in favor of the QC government. Indeed, petitioners do not invoke laches. What they allege in their complaint is that they have been occupying the land in question from time immemorial, adversely, and continuously in the concept of owner, but they are not invoking laches. If at all, they are claiming ownership by prescription which, as already stated, is untenable considering that the land in question is a registered land. Nor can petitioners question the validity of UPs title to the land. As CA held, this constitutes a collateral attack on registered title which is not permitted. Issue: W/N CA erred in dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Held: YES. We find all the elements of a cause of action contained in the amended complaint of petitioners. While, admittedly, petitioners were not parties to the deed of donation, they anchor their right to seek its enforcement upon their allegation that they are intended beneficiaries of the donation to the Quezon City government. Art. 1311, second paragraph, of the Civil Code provides: If a contract should contain some stipulation in favor of a third person, he may demand its fulfillment provided he communicated his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation. A mere incidental benefit or interest of a person is not sufficient. The contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor upon a third person. Case remanded to RTC for trial on the merits. T & C DEVELOPMENT CORP. v CA (317 SCRA 476 [October 1999]) Civil Law/Contracts/Lease/Ejectment: Under Art. 1673 of the Civil Code, the lessor may judicially eject the lessee for any of the causes enumerated therein. The trial court found that PR had failed to pay the monthly rental of P1800 from Nov 1992 to Feb 16,1993, despite demands to pay and to vacate the premises. Even if PR deposited the rents in arrears in the bank, this fact cannot alter the legal situation of PR since the account was opened in PRs name. Clearly, there was cause for the ejectment of PR. Although the increase in monthly rentals from P700 to P1800 was in excess of 20% allowed by BP 877 (Rent Control Law), as amended by RA 6828, what PR could have done was to deposit the original rent of P700 wither with the judicial authorities or in a bank in the name of, and with notice to, petitioner. REPUBLIC v. CA (317 SCRA 605 [October 1999]) Civil Law/Land Titles/Issuance of Owners Duplicate Title:Nothing in the law requires that the Office of the Sol-Gen be notified and heard in proceeding for the issuance of an owners duplicate certificate of title. In contrast, 23 of PD 1529, involving original registration proceedings, specifically mentions the Sol-Gen as among those who must be notified of the petition. Similarly, 36 provides that the petition for registration in cadastral proceedings must be filed by the Sol-Gen, in behalf of the Director of Lands. Considering that the law does not impose such notice requirement in proceedings for the issuance of a new owners duplicate
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certificate of title, the lack of notice to the Sol-Gen, as counsel for the Registrar of Deeds, was at most only a formal and not a jurisdiction defect. OBRA v. CA (317 SCRA 594 [October 1999]) Civil Law/Damages: Petitioner who is the Regional Director of the Bureau of Mines and GeoSciences is liable for damages under Art 32 of the Civil Code, even in the performance of his duty in good faith. While there may been illegal mining activities in the area as alleged in the letter complaint of Ms. Gyrbos, petitioner should have conducted further investigation and not just seize and impound respondents truck absent showing of probable cause. The truck was in fact only entering the mining area and not transporting minerals outside the area. Luis Miguel Ysmael vs. CA (November 16, 1999) G.R. No. 132497 Facts: Petitioners brought suit for sum of money against private respondents and obtained judgment in their favor The decision remained unexecuted for a long time as petitioners were unable to locate property belonging to private respondents. Before the right of action prescribed, petitioner filed a case for the revival judgment. PRs appealed to the CA, dismissed; appeal to SC dismissed. RTC issued a writ of execution; lands were sold at public auction. Petitioners won. On July 16, 1996, PRs informed petitioner that PR was exercising their right of redemption. The 12-month period of redemption expired on July 19, 1996, although the certificate of sale was registered on July 25, 1995, the 12-month period ended on July 19, 1996, considering that the latter year was a leap year. However, thinking that the last day of the period of redemption was on July 25, 1996, PR went to the office of the Atty on said date and tendered to him 2 checks. Petitioner wasnt around, so PRs consigned the amount in court the next day. Petitioners opposed the motinob, arguing that the period of redemption had already expired and that there was no valid tender of payment because the cashiers checks were insufficient to cover the total redemption price. The consignation was granted, hence this appeal. Issue: W/N the redemption period has expired Held: Rule 3930 of the 1964 Rules of Court provided that within 12 months after the sale, the judgment debtor may redeem the property sold at public auction. Under Art. 13 of the Civil Code, a month, unless designated by name, is understood to be equivalent to 30 days, while a year is understood to be of 365 days. Thus the rulings of this Court under the 1964 Rules stated that the 12-month period of redemption under Rule 3930 is equivalent to 360 days counted from the registration of the certificate of sale. Within the said period, the redemptioner must pay the purchaser the full amount of the redemption price, otherwise the redemption is ineffectual. In the instant case, there is no question that the certificate of sale was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds. Consequently, the right of redemption should have been exercised on or before July 19,1996, the 360 th day after July 25, 1995 considering that 1996 was a leap year. BUT, neither petitioners nor the sheriff corrected PRs mistaken impression, leading the latter to believe the 25 July 1996 was indeed the last day of the period of redemption. Salvador and Ligaya Adorable (November 25, 1999) G.R. No. 119466 Facts: PR Bareng was the registered owner of 2 parcels of land. PR and his son (Saturnino) obtained a loan from petitioners amounting to 26,000 in consideration of which they promised to transfer the possession and enjoyment of the fruits of the Lot. Saturnino sold to Francisco who sold it to Ramos. The portion of land being rented to petitioners was included in the portion sold to Ramos. As Barengs failed to pay their loan, petitioners were complained to the police, a
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compromise was made. When the maturity date arrived, Bareng failed to pay. A demand letter was sent to Bareng, but he refused to pay. Petitioners, learning of the sale made by Bareng to Ramos, then filed a complaint for the annulment or rescission of the sale on the ground that the sale was fraudulently prepared and executed. Issue: W/N petitioners have a cause of action Held: NO. As creditors, petitioners do not have such material interest as to allow them to sue for rescission of the contract of sale. At the outset, petitioners right against PRs is only a personal right to receive payment for the loan; it is not a real right over the lot subject of the deed of sale. A personal right is the power of 1 person to demand of another, as a definite passive subject, the fulfillment of a prestation to give, to do, or not to do. On the other hand, a real right is the power belonging to a person over a specific thing, without a passive subject individually determined, against whom such right may be personally exercised. In this case, while petitioners have an interest in securing payment of the loan they extended, their right to seek payment does not in any manner attack to a particular portion of the patrimony of their debtor, Bareng. Alfredo Aguila vs. CA (November 25, 1999) G.R. No. 127347 Facts: Petitioner is the manager of a partnership engaged in lending activities. PR and her late husband were the registered owners of a house and lot. PR and Aguila & Sons, Co represted by petitioner entered into a Memorandum of Agreement. The parties likewise executed a deed of absolute sale, whrein PR sold the subject property to AC Aguila & Sons Co. PR authorized petitioner to cause the cancellation of the TCT and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the event she failed to redeem the subject prop. PR failed to redeem the property w/in the 90-day period. Hence, petitioner caused the cancellation of the TCT. PR was ordered to vacate and surrender possession; she refused. Petitioners filed an ejectment case, they won. After defeat in a series of appeals, PR filed a petition for declaration of nullity of a deed of sale. She alleged that the signature of her husband on the deed of sale was a forgery because he was already dead when the deed was executed. It appears that PR had filed a crim complaint against petitioner for falsification which was dismissed by the Prosecutor. RTC dismissed, CA reversed ruling that it was an equitable mortgage, and being pactum commissorium and prohibited by law. Issue: W/N petitioner is the real party in interest Held: NO. Under Art. 1768 of the Civil Code, a partnership has a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of each of the partners. The partners cannot be held liable for the obligations of the partnership unless it is shown that the legal fiction of a different juridical personality is being used for fraudulent, unfair, or illegal purposes. In this case, PR has not shown that AC Aguila & Sons Co. and the MOA was executed between PR with the consent of her late husband, and AC Aguila & Sons, Co. represented by petitioner. Hence, it is the partnership, not its officers or agents, which should be impleaded in any litigation involving property registered in its name. A violation of this rule will result in the dismissal of the complaint. ADORABLE v. CA (G.R. No. 119466. November 25, 1999) Civil Law/Real Right v. Personal Right/Rights of Creditor: A personal right is the power of one person to demand of another, as a definite passive subject, the fulfillment of a prestation to give, to do, or not to do. On the other hand, a real right is the power belonging to a person over a specific thing, without a passive subject individually determined, against whom such right may be personally exercised. In this case, while petitioners have an interest in securing payment of the loan they extended, their right to seek payment does not in any manner attach to a particular
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portion of the patrimony of their debtor. As creditors, petitioners do not have such material interest as to allow them to sue for rescission of the contract of sale. Their right against respondents is only a personal right to receive payment for the loan; it is not a real right over the lot subject of the deed of sale. HERNANDEZ v. CA (320 SCRA 76 [December 1999]) Civil Law/Family Code/Psychological Incapacity: Wife is five years older than her husband, who was one of her students in her first year of teaching. Wife argues that her husband is psychologically incapacitated --- he devotes most of his time engaging in drinking sprees with friends, cohabited with another woman with whom he had an illegitimate child while having affairs with different women, beat up their eldest child and her for which she was confined in a hospital because of cerebral concussion, infected her with gonorrhea, and abandoned the family. Petition denied. Reaffirmed the Santos v. CA ruling that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. The husbands alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from a psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make the husband completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to his youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome. As held in Republic of the Philippines v. CA, the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological--- not physical, although its manifestations and or/symptoms must be physical. Expert testimony should have been presented by the wife to establish the precise cause of the husbands psychological incapacity, in order to show that it existed at the inception of marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage rests upon the wife (petitioner). Armando Jose vs. CA (January 18, 2000) G.R. Nos. 116441-42 Facts: Petitioner Manila Central Bus Lines Corporation (MCL) is the operator-lessee of a public utility bus (Bus 203). Bus 203 is owned by the Metro Manila Transit Corporation and is insured with the GSIS. Bus 203, then driven by petitioner Jose, collided with a red Ford Escort driven by Macarubo. Macarubo, and its lone passenger, Abraham, were seriously injured. Macarubo failed to recover and died 5 days later. Abraham survived, but he became blind on the left eye which had to be removed. In addition, he sustained a fracture on the forehead and multiple lacerations on the face, which caused him to be hospitalized for a week. Abraham, instituted Civil Case for damages against petitioners MCL and Jose. Parents of Macarubo, filed their own suit for damages against MCL alone. On the other hand, MCL filed a third-party complaint against Juanita Macarubo, registered owner of the Ford Escort on the theory that John Macarubo was negligent and that he was the "authorized driver" of Juanita Macarubo. The latter, in turn, filed a counterclaim for damages against MCL for the damage to her car. Both civil cases were consolidated and later tried jointly. Issue: W/N private respondent Juanita Macarubo is liable to petitioners. Held: NO. Article 2180 of the Civil Code makes the persons specified therein responsible for the quasi-delicts of others. The burden is upon MCL to prove that Juanita Macarubo is one of those
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specified persons who are vicariously liable for the negligence of the deceased John Macarubo. In its third-party complaint, MCL alleged that Juanita Macarubo was the registered owner of the Ford Escort car and that John Macarubo was the "authorized driver" of the car. Nowhere was it alleged that John Macarubo was the son, ward, employee or pupil of private respondent Juanita Macarubo so as to make the latter vicariously liable for the negligence of John Macarubo. The allegation that John Macarubo was "the authorized driver" of the Ford Escort is not equivalent to an allegation that he was an employee of Juanita Macarubo. That John Macarubo was the "authorized driver" of the car simply means that he drove the Ford Escort with the permission of Juanita Macarubo. Nor did MCL present any evidence to prove that Juanita Macarubo was the employer of John Macarubo or that she is in any way liable for John Macarubos negligence under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. For failure to discharge its burden, MCLs third-party complaint should be dismissed. DBP v. CA (331 SCRA 267 [April 2000]) Civil Law/Land Titles/Land Registration: A degree of registration cut off or extinguished a right acquired by a person when such right refers to a lien or encumbrance on the land which was not annotated on the certificate of title issued thereon and NOT to the right of ownership thereof. Registration has never been a mode of acquiring ownership over immovable property. Land registration does not create nor vest a title. It simply confirms a title already created and already vested, rendering it forever indefeasible. HEIRS OF SERASPI v. CA (331 SCRA 293 [April 2000]) Civil Law/Property/Ownership/Prescription: The contention of a party of having acquired ownership of a piece of land by ordinary prescription through adverse possession for 10 years is untenable where he has neither just title nor good faith. There is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession through one of the modes: occupation, intellectual creation, law, donation, succession, tradition in consequence of certain contracts, and prescription, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right. Good faith consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the possessor received the thing was its owner but could not transmit the ownership thereof. HEIRS OF SAN ANDRES v. RODRIGUEZ (332 SCRA 769 [May 2000]) Civil Law/Sales/Elements of Sale: The object of the sale is determinate. Since the lot subsequently sold is said to adjoin the previously paid lot on three sides thereof, the subject lot is capable of being determined without the need of any new contract. The fact that the exact area of the adjoining lots is subject to the result of a survey does not detract from the fact that they are determinate or determinable. The Court clarified that although denominated a Deed of Conditional Sale, a sale is still absolute where the contract is devoid of any proviso that title is reserved or the right to unilaterally rescind is stipulated, e.g., until or unless the price is paid (Ang Yu Asuncion v. CA). The stipulation that the payment of the full consideration based on a survey shall be due and payable in five (5 ) years from the execution of a formal deed of sale is NOT acondition that affects the efficacy of the contract of sale. FRANCISCO v. BOISER (332 SCRA 792 [May 2000]) Civil Law/Co-ownership/Legal Redemption/Notice Requirement: The Court reverts to the Butte v. Uy and Sons, Inc. ruling that for a co-owner to be able to exercise the right of legal redemption, the written notification should come from the vendor and not from any other person for the vendor of an undivided interest is in the best position to know who are his co-owners who under the law must be notified of the sale.
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By not immediately notifying the co-owner, a vendor can thus delay or even effectively prevent the meaningful exercise of the right of redemption. In this case, the sale took place in 1986, but it was kept secret until 1992 when the vendee needed to notify the vendors co-owner about the sale to demand 1/5 rentals from the property sold. The only adverse effect to the vendor and the vendee is that the sale could not be registered and that it is binding only to the parties. It is therefore unjust to further delay the co-owners exercise of the right of legal redemption by requiring that notice be given by the vendor first before the co-owner can exercise such right. The Court ruled that the receipt by the co-owner of summons in the civil case filed against her constitutes actual knowledge on the basis of which she may exercise her right of redemption within 30 days from the finality of decision. CUTANDA v. HEIRS OF ROBERTO CUTANDA (335 SCRA 418 [July 2000]) Civil Law/Prescription/Laches/Distinction: While prescription is concerned with the fact of delay, laches is concerned with the effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches is principally a question of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity being founded on some change in the condition of the property or the relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not. Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law. Prescription is based on fixed time; laches is not. Prescriptive Period/Effectivity When Prior to the 1950 Civil Code: Where a partys possession of a property commenced way back in 1938, a time when the Old Civil Code was still in force, the prescriptive period is governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES PHILIPPINES,INC. v. HUANG (336 SCRA 737 [July 2000]) Civil Law/Sales/Elements of Sale/Perfected Contract: The P1M earnest deposit could not have been given as earnest money as contemplated in Art. 1482 because, at the time when the vendor accepted the terms of vendees offer, their contract had not yet been perfected, evident from the ff. conditions attached by the vendees: (1) that they be given the exclusive option to purchase the property within 30 days from acceptance of the offer; (2) that during the option period, the parties would still negotiate the terms and conditions of the purchase; and (3) the vendor would secure the necessary approvals while the vendees would handle the documentation. The amount presented by the respondents was merely a deposit of what would eventually become the earnest money or downpayment should a contract of sale be made by them. The amount was thus given not as a part of the purchase price and as proof of the perfection of the contract of sale but only as a guarantee that respondents would not back out of the sale. The option giving respondents the exclusive right to buy the properties within the period agreed upon is separate and distinct from the contract of sale which the parties may enter. What the vendees had was just the option to buy which privilege was not, however, exercised by them because there was a failure to agree on the terms of payment. The manner of payment of the purchase price is an essential element before a valid and binding contract of sale can exist. Moreover, even the option secured by respondents was unenforceable, in the absense of a distinct consideration. ANACLETO v. VAN TWEST (339 SCRA 211 [August 2000]) Civil Law/Compromise Agreements/Requisites for Validity: Like any other contract, a compromise agreement must have consent, object, and cause. A compromise agreement entered into by a person not duly authorized to do so by the principal is void and has no legal effect. The same is true as regards the judgment based on the compromise. DOLFO v. REGISTER OF DEEDS (341 SCRA 58 [September 2000])
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Civil Law/Land Titles/Land Registration: The applicant and the oppositors are the only parties in cases of original applications for land registration, unlike in ordinary civil actions where parties may include the plaintiff, defendant, third party complainants, cross-claimants and intervenors. A motion to intervene in a land registration case cannot therefore be allowed. A party wishing to be heard should ask for the lifting of the order of general default, and then if lifted, file an opposition to the application for registration. This is so because proceedings in land registration are in rem and not in personam, the sole object being the registration applied for, not the determination of any right connected with the registration. ALIPIO v. CA (341 SCRA 441 [September 2000]) Civil Law/Obligations/Actions/Effect of Death of Spouse: An obligation is presumed to be joint only. Thus, as held in Calma v. Taedo, after the death of either spouses, no complaint for the collection of indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal partnership can be brought against the surviving spouse. Instead, the claim must be made in the proceedings for the liquidation and settlement of the conjugal property. The reason for this is that upon the death of one spouse, the powers of administration of the surviving spouse ceases and is passed to the administrator appointed by the court having jurisdiction over the settlement of estate proceedings. Reyes vs. Sisters of Mercy Hospital (Oct. 3, 2000) 341 SCRA 760 Facts: Petitioner is the wife of the late Jorge Reyes. Five days before his death, Jorge had been suffering from recurring fever with chills. After taking some medication, he was taken to the Mercy Community Clinic and was attended to by respondent Dr. Rico. As typhoid fever was prevalent in the locality, Dr. Rico suspected that Jorge was suffering from this disease and ordered a Widal Test to be performed on him. Dr. Rico concluded that Jorge was positive for typhoid fever. He was then indorsed to respondent Dr. Blanes. He was given the antibiotic choloromycetin but his temperature rose to 41o and subsequently slipped into cyanosis. He died shortly thereafter. Petitioners filed before the RTC of Cebu a complaint for damages against the respondent hospital and doctors. They contend that Jorge did not die of typhoid fever but that his death was due to wrongful administration of choloromycetin. That the respondent doctors were negligent in rushing the performance of the Widal Test and hastily concluding that Jorge was suffering from typhoid fever and was compatible with the antibiotic administered. Issue: Whether or not the death of Jorge Reyes was due to or caused by the negligence, carelessness, imprudence, lack of skill or foresight on the part of defendants? Held: Medical Malpractice is a form of negligence which consists in the failure of a physician or surgeon to apply to his practice of medicine that degree of care and skill which is ordinarily employed by the profession generally under similar conditions, and in like surrounding circumstances. In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that the physician or surgeon would have done , or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would not have done, and that failure or action caused injury to the patient. There are four elements involved in medical negligence cases: duty, breach, injury and proximate causation. And in the determination of the reasonable level of care and the breach thereof, expert testimony is essential. This, the petitioner failed to do. The doctor they presented as witness was not an expert of typhoid cases and in his autopsy of the deceased; he failed to examine the head which is necessary in this case. Nor does this case fall under the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitor where expert testimony may be dispensed with. Petitioners assert that such doctrine is applicable since Jorge Reyes was merely experiencing fever and chills for 5 days and was fully conscious, coherent, and ambulant when he went to the hospital. Yet he died after only 10 hours from the time of his admission. For the doctrine to apply, there are four requisites: 1) The accident was of a kind
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which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; 2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charge; and 3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured. While it is true that the patient died just a few hours after professional medical assistance was rendered, there is really nothing unusual or extraordinary about his death. Prior to his admission, the patient already had recurring fevers and chills for 5 days unrelieved by analgesic, antipyretic, and antibiotics given by his wife. This shows that he had been suffering from a serious illness and professional medical help came too late for him. Petitioner correctly observed that the medical profession is one which , like the business of common carrier, is affected with public interest. Moreover, they assert that since the law imposes upon common carriers the duty of observing extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers,1 physicians and surgeons should have the same duty toward their patients. The practice of medicine is a profession engaged in only by qualified individuals. After years of education, they may obtain a license to practice through professional board examinations where such licenses may be revoked by the government. Aside from such regulation, the conduct of doctors is also strictly governed by the Hippocratic Oath, an ancient code of discipline and ethical rules which doctors have imposed upon themselves. Given theses safeguards, there is no need to expressly require doctors the observance of extraordinary diligence. The standard contemplated for doctors is simply the reasonable average merit among ordinarily good physicians. Nazareno vs. CA (Oct. 18, 2000) 343 SCRA 637 Facts: During their marriage, Maximino and Aurea Nazareno acquired lots in QC and Cavite. After the death of Maximino, Romeo was appointed administrator of his fathers estate. In the ocurse of the intestate proceedings, Romeo discovered that his parents had executed several deeds of sale conveying a number of real properties in favor of his sister, Natividad. One of the deeds involved 6 lots in QC for the amount of P47,800. Among the lots covered by the deed of sale was a lot occupied by Romeo, his wife and by Maximino Jr. Unknown to Romeo, Natividad sold the lot to Maximino Jr.. When Romeo found out abot the sale to Maximino Jr., he and his wife locked Maximino Jr. out of the house. Maximino Jr. brought an action for recovery of possession and damages with the RTC. Romeo in turn filed, on behalf of the estate of Maximino Sr., the present case for annulment of sale with damages against Natividad and Maximino Jr. Then, Natividad and Maximino Jr. filed a 3rd party complaint against the spouses Romeo and Eliza, alleging that Lot 3 included in the Deed of Absolute Sale to Natividad had been surreptitiously appropriated by Romeo by securing in his name a new title and leasing it to 3rd parties. Romeo contends that their parents never intended to sell the 6 lots to Matividad and that Natividad was only to hold the said lots in trust for her siblings. He presented the Deed of Partition and Distribution signed by their parents and all of the children. Natividad and Maximino Jr. claimed that the Deed of Partition and Distribution was not really carried out and instead, their parents offered to sell them the 6 lots. However, it was only Natividad who bought the 6 lots because she was the only one financially able to do so. The RTC and CA found that the Nazareno spouses transferred their properties ti their children by fictitious sales in order to avoid payment of inheritance taxes. Issue: Whether or not he Deed of Absolute Sale is an indivisible contract and if so whether the estate of Maximino Sr. alone can seek the annulment of the sale?
1
Art. 1733, CC. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to the circumstances of each case.
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Held: An obligation is indivisible when it cannot be validly performed in parts, whatever may be the nature of the thing which is the object thereof. The indivisibility refers to the prestation and not the object thereof. In the present case, the Deed of Absolute Sale conveying the 6 lots to Natividad, the obligation is clearly indivisible because the performance of the contract cannot be done in parts, otherwise the value of what is transferred is diminished. Petitioners are therefore mistaken in basing the indivisibility of a contract on the number of obligors. Natividad never acquired ownership over the property because the Deed of Sale in her favor is void for being without consideration. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that Maximino Sr. intended to give the 6 QC lots to Natividad. As Romeo testified, their parents executed the Deed of Sale in favor of Natividad because the latter was the only female and the only unmarried member of the family. She was thus entrusted with the real properties in behalf of her siblings. There was thus an implied trust constituted in her favor. 2 There being an implied trust, the lots in question are therefore subject to collation.3 Isabela Colleges, Inc. vs. Heirs of Nieves Tolentino-Rivera (Oct. 20, 2000) 344 SCRA 95 Facts: The late Nieves Tolentino-Rivera and Pablo Rivera were married in 1921. On 1934, Nieves, still using her maiden name, filed an application for a sales patent over a 13 hectare land in Isabela. Her application was approved and Nieves was issued a sales patent in the name of Nieves Tolentino, married to Pablo Rivera. Pablo Rivera and Nieves sold to petitioner Isabela Colleges 4 hectares of land covered by such patent through a deed of sale signed by both spouses. Sometime in 1988, the children of the spouses Rivera, entered the property bought by Isabela Colleges, prompting the latter to bring an action for forcible entry against them. The MTC rendered a decision ordering the intruders to vacate the land. Nieves (now widowed), thereafter brought the present suit against Isabela Colleges for Nullity of Titles, Deeds of Sale. She contends that she was the exclusive owner of a parcel of land and that petitioner occupied 4 hectares of her land, allegedly by virtue of a sale between petitioner and her husband and that the deed of sale was void because the land sold was paraphernal property and the sale was made without her knowledge and consent. Issue: Whether or not the land in question paraphernal or not? Is the signature of Nieves forged or no? Held: The CA ruled that the 4 hectare land is paraphernal property based on Nieves deposition that she applied for a sales patent when she was single. However, the sate of the sales patent application is irrelevant for that fact alone would not vest in her ownership over the subject land. Neither is Nieves allegation that she was already in possession of the land even before her marriage to Pablo Rivera material. The land was acquired through the sales patent under CA 141 and not through prescription or any other mode of acquiring ownership. Under CA 141, her application must be approved and the purchase price paid before Nieves could be granted a sales patent and issued a certificate of title. It is undisputed that Nieves was issued a sales patent only after she was married to Pablo Rivera. The land in question was thus acquired during her marriage to Pablo Rivera. Although this court finds that the signature of Nieves on the Deed of Sale to Isabela Colleges was forged, nonetheless, the sale was valid. The fact that Nieves signature in the deed of sale is a forgery does not render the deed of sale void. For the land was conjugal property and, under the Spanish Civil Code, the wifes consent to the sale is not required.
2
Art. 1449 CC: There is also an implied trust when a donation is made to a person but it appears that although the legal estate is transmitted to the donee, he nevertheless is either to have no beneficial interest or only a part thereof.
3
Art. 1061 CC: Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation; or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.
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Therefore, that her signature is a forgery is determinative only of Nieves lack of consent but of the validity of the sale. DBP vs CA (Oct. 30, 2000) 344 SCRA 422 Facts: Petitioner DBP was the owner of a parcel of land in Bulacan. It sold the land to respondent spouses Dela Pena under a deed of conditional sale for P270,000. The Deed of Conditional Sale stipulated: That the down payment shall be P41,400 and the balance of P165,600 shall be paid in 6 years on the semi-annual amortization plan at 18% interest per annum. The first amortization of P23,125.14 shall be due and payable 6 months from the date of execution of the Deed of Conditional Sale and all subsequent amortizations shall be due and payable every 6 months thereafter. Pursuant to their contract with DBP, the spouses made payments through 1983 to 1989 amounting to P289,600. After making such payments, the spouses went to petitioner DBP for the execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale and for issuance of the title to the property. DBP refused stating that a balance of P221, 867.85 was still due, which included principal in the amount of P150,000 and interests. The spouses proposed a settlement but the parties failed to reach an agreement. Thus, the spouses filed a complaint against petitioner DBP for specific performance. Issue: Whether or not respondent spouses could be held liable for the interests and penalty charges considering that they had already paid the full amount of the principal obligation and petitioner DBP did not object to the late payments made for them? Held: The interest and penalty charges to be paid by respondent spouses in case of delay in payments were EXPRESSLY stipulated in the Conditional Contract of Sale. Under the Civil Code, parties to a contract can make stipulations therein provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. There being no question as to the validity of the Conditional Contract of Sale, DBP correctly applied the provisions on interests and penalty charges when private respondents failed to pay on the date agreed upon. No further notice to private respondents had to be given to them. Correspondingly, the annual interest of 18% must be construed together with paragraph 8 of the Contract imposing additional interests and penalty in case of arrears in making payments. Hence upon failure of private respondents to pay their amortizations on the prescribed dates, they incurred interests and penalty charges at the stipulated rates. Private respondents cannot be allowed to renege on their obligation on the ground that what they had paid was in excess of the principal obligation. Nor can private respondents demand fulfillment of petitioners obligation to execute a final deed of sale and deliver title to the land in their favor when they have not yet fully paid their principal obligation with the accrued interest thereto. However, we find the interests to be excessive. It is noteworthy that the spouses have paid interest and penalty charges in an amount more than the principal obligation, and they have already paid such interest halfway. Under the CC, art 1229 states that Even if there has been no performance, the penalty may be reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or unconscionable. Lee vs CA (345 SCRA 707) Facts: Petitioner Anita Lee entered into a contract with Carmen Recario over a piece land which Recario owned. They agreed that Anita would pay and reimburse Recario for the costs of the improvements already made and still to be incurred in completing the construction of an unfinished building on the land, Anita would then lease the lot. It was also stipulated that after 7 years if Recario would want to sell or alienate the property while the contract is still in force
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or while Anita is still occupying the land, the latter would have first priority in purchasing it. At the end of the 7 year-term, the heirs of Recario demanded that petitioners vacate of the building on the ground that they needed the space for a dental clinic. Petitioners refused the demand on the ground that there was an existing lease over the building pursuant to the agreement which would not expire until 15 years. Petitioners filed a case for unlawful detainer. Petitioners contend that they cannot be ejected from the subject premises because after 7 years they had become lessees of the undivided portion that became the property of private respondent. Hence, since there was an existing lease over the building, they cannot be ejected by private respondents. On the other hand, private respondents say that the lease covers only the lot and not the building also, therefore, as they had become co-owners of the building, they had the right over an undetermined half of the property. Issue: Whether or not private respondents can lawfully eject the petitioners? Held: The phrase on the lot and/or both lot and building indicates that the lease covers both the land and the building. The duration of this agreement is 15 years. Hence, even if private respondents become co-owners of the building after 7 years, petitioners lease over the land and the building gave them the right to remain in the premises until the year 2001. The monthly rental of P5000 is for the lot and/or lot and building. Indeed, the parties to the agreement could have simply said lot and building but they did not. Instead they said lot and/or lot and building, indicating thereby that during the first half (7 years) of the agreement the lease would cover only the lot since during that period petitioners were the absolute owners of the entire building. After that period, however, i.e., during the second half, the lease would cover both the lot and the building since the latter would by then be owned in common by private respondents and petitioners. This construction of the agreement is in line with Art. 1374 of the CC that the various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly. Benguet Exploration, Inc. vs CA (February 9, 2001) Facts: Petitioner Benguet Exploration Inc. filed a complaint for damages against Seawood Shipping and against respondent Switzerland General Insurance. Private respondent Seawood Shipping was chartered by petitioner Benguet to transport copper concentrates. It was insured by Switzerland Insurance. When cargo was unloaded in Japan, however, Rogelio Lumibao (one of petitioners employee) received a report from a surveyor in Japan stating that the cargo was 355 metric tons short of the amount stated in the bill of lading. For this reason, petitioner Benguet made a claim of the loss to Seawood Shipping and Switzerland Insurance. Petitioner Benguet then made a formal demand through a letter for the value of the alleged shortage. As both Seawood Shipping and Switzerland Insurance refused the demand, petitioner brought these cases against them. Issue: Whether or not respondents are responsible for the shortage? Held: No. We find that petitioner failed to present evidence to prove that the weight of the copper concentrates actually loaded on the ship was 2,243.496 wet metric tons and that there was a shortage of 355 metric tons when the cargo was discharged in Japan. Petitioners own witness, Lumibao, admitted that he was not present at the actual loading of the cargo at Poro Point, his information being limited to what was contained in the bill of lading. Neither was he present when the cargo was discharged in Japan. Thus, petitioner witness had no personal knowledge of the actual weight pf copper concentrates loaded on the vessel and discharged in Japan. The testimonies are thus hearsay. The Mayan Bank vs CA (GR 144884) [April 27, 2001]
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Facts: Demetrio Llego inherited from his father a portion of a parcel of land, the other portions were left for his siblings and mother. The heirs partitioned the land among themselves informally without executing a written extrajudicial partition. Thus, title remained in the name of Llegos father. Llego sold his portion to his uncle respondent Agustin Lagrama. Llego did not, however, execute a deed of sale as title to the lot was still in his fathers name. Llego promised that as soon as the title was transferred in his name, he would immediately execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of the buyers, to which they agreed. Respondents then took possession of the land. Eventually the heirs extrajudicially partitioned the land and new title was issued to LLego for his share. Llego however mortgaged the land to the Republic Planters Bank. As Llego failed to pay his indebtedness to petitioner bank, the mortgage was foreclosed and the property was sold to the bank as the highest bidder. Private respondents filed a complaint for specific performance to compel LLego to execute the necessary deed of absolute sale in their favor. Petitioner bank, in its answer, pleaded that it was a mortgagee in good faith. The lower court rendered its decision in favor of private respondents. A writ of execution was issued but it was returned unsatisfied because it turned out that petitioner bank had consolidated its title over the land in dispute for failure of Llego to redeem it. Private respondents then filed a motion to require the petitioner bank to execute the necessary deed of reconveyance. Issue: Whether or not petitioner bank may be compelled to execute a deed of reconveyance transferring the parcel of land mortgaged to petitioner in favor of private respondents? Held: Yes. The instant petition is improper considering that it attempts to reverse the trial courts decision which is already final and executory. This being the case, whatever judgment was rendered by the court in that case is necessarily binding on all defendants. As to which defendants would actually execute the reconveyance is not important, for this merely involves the implementation of the courts order. Petitioner bank was a transferee pendent elite whose title was subject to the incidents and results of pending litigation. Petitioner acquired the property only after the filing of private respondents case for specific performance. When the mortgage was constituted, petitioner was not yet, properly speaking, a transferee, being a mere mortgagee of the property. Only when petitioner acquired the property in the foreclosure sale and subsequently consolidated its title did it become the transferee of the property. Thus petitioner is a transferee pendent elite of the property in litigation within the contemplation of Rule 39, 47(b). Petitioner bank may thus be ordered to execute the necessary deed of reconveyance in favor of private respondents. The remedy left to petitioner is to pursue its claim against Llego. Rev. Fr. Dante Martinez vs. CA (May 21, 2001) Facts: Private respondents Godofredo Dela Paz and his sister Manuela Dela Paz entered into an oral contract with Petitioner Fr. Martinez for the sale of a parcel of land. At the time of the sale, the lot was still registered in the name of Claudia Dela Paz, mother of private respondents, although the latter had already sold it to private respondent Manuela Dela Paz by virtue of a deed of Absolute Sale. When the land was offered for sale to petitioner, private respondents Dela Pazes were accompanied by their mother. He was assured by them that the lot belonged to Manuela Dela Paz. Petitioner completed payment of the lot for which private respondents executed two documents, one an acknowledgement of payment and the other a promise of executing a deed of sale. However, private respondents never delivered the deed of sale they promised to petitioner. In the meantime, in a Deed of Absolute Sale with Right to Repurchase, private respondents sold 3 lots with right to repurchase the same within 1 year to respondent spouses Veneracion. One of the lots sold was the lot previously sold to petitioner. Respondents
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Veneracion never took actual possession of any of these lots during the period of redemption, but all titles to the lots were given to them. Petitioner discovered that the lot he was occupying with his family had been sold to the spouses Veneracion after receiving a letter from private respondent Veneracion claiming ownership of the land and demanding that they vacate the property and remove their improvements thereon. Petitioner, in turn, demanded through counsel the execution of the deed of sale from private respondents Dela Paz and informed respondent Veneracion that he was the owner of the property as he had previously purchased the same private respondents Dela Paz. Respondent Veneracion brought an action for ejectment. Issue: Whether or not petitioner may be judicially ejected? Held: No. Even if this case involves double sale where according to Art. 1544 of the CC the requirement of the law where title to the property is recorded in the Register of Deeds, is 2-fold: acquisition in good faith and recording in good faith. To be entitled to priority, the second purchaser must not only prove prior recording of his title but that he acted in good faith, i.e. without knowledge or notice of a prior sale to another. The presence of good faith should be ascertained from the circumstances surrounding the purchase of the land. Private Respondent Veneracion already knew that there was construction being made on the property they purchased. It can be shown that the second sale to respondents Veneracion were intended to be an equitable mortgage and not a contract of sale since Private respondents Veneracion never took actual possession of the 3 lots and that they never made any effort to take possession of the properties. The City Government of Davao vs Monteverde-Consunji (May 21, 2001) Facts: Pursuant to a Land Registration case, an OCT was issued in the name of the Montaverdes covering 3 parcels of land. The Register of Deeds of Davao City issued a TCT over the controverted property in the name of the Municipal Government of Davao. The City of Davao has since then occupied and utilized the subject property in the concept of owner. Said property is now the site of a sports complex and a public elementary school. Private respondent Juliana Monteverde-Consunji wrote a letter to the mayor of Davao City, inquiring about the validity of the citys title to the subject lot because the research caused to be conducted by her family failed to show any document whatsoever to support the transfer of the property by her father, Tomas Monteverde Sr. in favor of the City of Davao. The mayor allegedly ignored the letter, for which reason, Petitioner filed a complaint for a declaration of nullity of title and damages against the City of Davao. The City of Davao alleged that its ownership of the subject property was already existing at the time of the issuance of OCT in the name of the Monteverdes, for which reason it was cancelled and TCT was issued in lieu thereof. Issue: Whether or not the City of Davao properly acquired the title over the land in is name? Held: Yes. Although the rights of the City of Davao over the subject property had already been in existence and recognized at the time of the issuance of the OCT to the Monteverdes, the land registration court could not have issued title in its favor under the law applicable at that time and could only cause the annotation of the same on the face of the OCT. Moreover, the respondents claim is barred by laches. The City of Davao has long been in possession of the property in the concept of an owner, at least from the time the TCT was issued in its name. The respondents complaint was filed only after 45 years. Even if respondent Monteverde-Consunji discovered the alleged fraud in the transfer of ownership of the property to the City of Davao only in 1960, the fact is that respondents slept on their supposed rights over the property for 34 years before the filing of the complaint in 1994. Where it was shown that the action for reconveyance or quieting of title was instituted only after 30 years from the time a party was able to acquire a certificate of
27
title covering a particular property, while the occupant had been in actual possession of the same, it was held that the action is barred by laches. Graciano Palele vs CA (July 31, 2001) Facts: The properties involved in this case form part of a larger tract of land referred to as Lot No. 707. The original holder-cultivator of the lot was respondent Tomas Sobrevinas father, Daniel, who had worked on the lot as a tenant since the 1920s. After Daniel died, Tomas, herein private respondent, succeeded to the possession of the said land. Private Respondent filed an application with the Dept. of Agrarian Reform for the purchase of Lot 707. However, despite his full payment pf the purchase price, no deed of sale was issued to him and the lot remained the property of the government. Lot 707 was then divided into four parcels, two of which was sold to Petitioner Graciano Palele and was thus given Certificate of Land Ownership Awards (CLOA) for the corresponding parcels. Not knowing these incidents, private respondent continued paying the real estate taxes on Lot 707. Upon learning of the issuance of CLOAs in favor of petitioner, he filed a petition for cancellation of the certificates. The case was filed with the Dept. of Agrarian Reform Provincial Adjudication Board of Bataan or PARAD. PARAD rendered judgment for petitioner. Respondent appealed to the Dept. of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board of DARAB, but the latter affirmed in toto the decision of PARAD. Consequently, respondent filed a petition for review before the CA which reversed the decision of the DARAB and rendered judgment for private respondent. Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the decision of DARAB? Held: Yes. At the time respondent applied to purchase Lot 707 the law in effect was RA 1199 or the Agricultural Tenancy Act . Pursuant to the said law, the then Land Tenure Administration, the implementing agency of the government issued an administrative order provided that those persons qualified to purchase are those who have personally cultivated and/or occupy the land subject of the purchase. Although at the time of his application, respondent was personally cultivating the land. However, since he was allowed to pay the purchase price in installment, a year after his application, he had not personally occupied and cultivated Lot 707 because he had instituted tenants on his landholding. Thus, prior to his full payment of the purchase price of Lot 707, he had already failed to comply with the requirement of personal cultivation and/or occupation of the lot being purchased because he was allegedly prevented by law from ejecting the tenants thereon. The DARAB was thus, justified in rejecting to issue a deed of sale in favor of respondent even though he paid in full the purchase price.
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