Tu quoque?

Regarding the existence of Laws in Social Science

Overview

Summary of the two positions

Roberts Kincaid

What is at stake? Questions & Discussion

Summary: Roberts

Realism regarding laws Laws are mathematically, but not nomologically contingent 3 types of laws

Strict regularities (local / global) Statistical / Probabilistic regularities Hedged regularities

Social sciences cannot have any laws but hedged laws

Only strict and probabilistic regularities are laws

Why not Hedged Laws

Hedged regularity: when A happens, B happens, unless there is interference Meaning of 'interference':

B does not happen Under specific circumstances, B does not happen

Cause within A Cause outside A

We cannot give a definition of interference, but can determine when some C is interference

All don't work

Comments on Roberts

Presupposes that a nomological system is to be treated differently

[Laws should be] robust, in the sense that they do not depend on contingent details of particular systems or objects, and they would not be upset by changes in the actual circumstances that are physically possible.

Paradigm case of science is physics

Summary: Kincaid

A law is a force or causal factor Tu quoque (you also)

Both in social and in physical science we use qualitative relationships and non-experimental results (theoretical physics) Laws can be dependent on factors from within the system, also in physical science (biology) Laws can be 'byproducts' meaning that they are relying on underlying causal factors (chemistry)

Summary: Kincaid (2)

Unlimited variety doesn't lead per definition to idealisations / abstractions

Either we are in a position to predict of a certain cause whether it would be 'interference' Or we can determine by research whether it is a relevant factor Example: law of supply and demand: add factor of substitutes and complements to prevent over-idealisation / limit data to specific products

Social science isn't about individual behavior

And even if, persons can be constrained by factors of the system (combined behaviour of individuals)

Comments on Kincaid

Nomological laws shouldn't have a specific status Questionable whether argument against idealisation works

See e.g. the discussion regarding rationality in the economic debate Is psychology suddenly no social science anymore?

Focusses on social science on mass behaviour

Can Kincaid distinguish genuine causes from epipphenomena? (coffee causes lung cancer)

Setting the stakes

Metaphysical status of laws

Roberts mechanical causation and higher status for laws vs Kincaid's 'paradigm' account of laws, with laws being the same as any other claims

Difference between 'hedged laws' and 'local strict laws'

Is it necessary for a law that we can predict beforehand whether an event E is an interference?

Yes (Roberts) vs No (Kincaid)

Effects determinable beforehand

Irrelevant - We can account for cases in physical sciences in which factors are determined after research (e.g. Gas Law ) Relevant - How to account for cases in physical sciences in which factors are determined after further research?

- We can determine whether - Possiblity of idealisation / a factor will be relevant in all over-generalisation imaginary cases

Questions

Are laws necessary for explanation? Is the inability to determine interference beforehand just a problem of the social sciences?

Relevance of the status of laws metaphysically