East Asia (2009) 26:120 DOI 10.

1007/s12140-008-9063-y

Taiwan: An Internal Affair! How Chinas Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Interact on the Taiwan Issue?
Jean-Pierre Cabestan

Received: 25 April 2008 / Accepted: 7 October 2008 / Published online: 30 November 2008 # Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2008

Abstract Taiwan may be an internal affair but the domestic public opinion is not invited to participate very much in a debate and a decision-making process that have remained confined to the Chinese Communist Party and the military top leadership and, on purpose, involves a very small number of officials and experts. Conservative and nationalist forces do constrain Beijings Taiwan policy. And some leaders are tempted to use the Taiwan issue for unrelated domestic or foreign policy purpose. Nevertheless, what is striking is the potential for flexibility in Chinas Taiwan policy. While Chinese local governments and companies increasing interests in businessas-usual in the Strait and the unbearable cost of any armed conflict tend to narrow the governments options, concentration of power and the efficiency of the propaganda machine allow it to rather smoothly manage, in particular vis--vis the elites conservative opinion group as well as its own public opinion, this flexibility. Keywords China . Decision-making . Foreign policy . Peoples Liberation Army . Taiwan United States

Introduction Since 1949, the authorities of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) have continuously claimed that Taiwan is not only an inalienable part but also an internal affair of China. At the same time, there has always been a strong international dimension in the Taiwan issue. Taiwans democratization in the late 1980s and quest for a better international status since the early 1990s, if not formal independence, have forced the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership to adjust its own unification policy. And for this reason, since Taiwans missile crisis (19951996), Beijing has better accepted this international dimension, and in particular the role
J.-P. Cabestan (*) Department of Government and International Studies, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong e-mail: cabestan@hkbu.edu.hk

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played by the United States in the preservation of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. Today, Beijing wants Washington to help it in preventing Taiwan from moving towards formal independenceeven if this danger has receded since Ma Ying-jeous election in March 2008and perhaps also in finding a solution to cross-Strait differences. In other words, Chinas Taiwan policy is not only determined by domestic considerations but also by two other outside factors: the United States policy and the current developments in Taiwan1. Yet, there is probably no Chinese foreign policy issue which is more closely linked to domestic politics. This linkage is more complex than it may appear at first glance. On the one hand, Taiwan separate existence under the name of Republic of China (ROC) has been a constant reminder of unfinished business: the unification of China under the PRC rule. How to reach this objective has always been the subject of vivid discussions and a source of disagreements among the CCP elite as well as among scholars. Although these debates have partly remained secret and can anytime be hijacked by domestic considerations, they underscore a larger variety of opinions than is often thought outside of China. On the other hand, the survival of the ROC on part of Chinas territory, its democratization in the 1980s and its renewed quest for a better international status directly question the legitimacy of the PRCs polity and put growing pressure on the CCP leaders to contemplate a genuine political reform. Taiwan has become a lively illustration of the successful graft of democratic values on a Chinese society, weakening the arguments of the current CCP leadership on the political value gap between the West and Confucian societies, if not Asia as a whole. It is clear that, rather than pursuing ambitious political reform objectives, Hu Jintao and his colleagues have continued to emphasize the drawbacks of Taiwans democracy and resort to nationalism, including, when need be anti-Taiwan sentiments, to enhance the CCPs legitimacy and keep the country united. However, for nearly two decades, the Taiwans democratization experience has fed Chinas own debates about political reform, both within and outside the Party [28]. Yet, illustrating Peter Gourevitchs second image reversed, the international and in particular the power politics dimensions of the Taiwan issue constrain to a large extent the domestic debates in China both on the policy towards Taiwan and the Taiwans political experience [15]. For these reasons, the linkage between Chinas Taiwan policy and Chinas political reform needs to be carefully analyzed. Obviously, there is a possible connection between Beijings rigid unification policy and its staunch opposition to study from Taiwans political experience. But as we will see below, this connection is probably a very complex and indirect one. While the unsolved Taiwan issue is far from being the main obstacle to any genuine political reform, any recognition of the survival of the ROC on part of Chinas territory may challenge the PRCs legitimacy. And a true democratization of mainland China can but bear important consequences for Taiwan and the relations across the Taiwan Strait. Can a democratic China accept Taiwans independence? Or, on the contrary, will it precipitate reunification? Though impossible to answer it today, these questions need to be asked.

This point is well presented in Susan Shirk [23], ch. 7, pp. 181ff.

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Regarding the current situation, a number of often too-quickly accepted assumptions should also be scrutinized. The CCP leadership often invokes domestic political pressures to justify its current unification strategy: any acceptance of Taiwans formal independence would be suicidal for any CCP leadership [23], p. 186). However, the difficulty here resides in assessing these domestic pressures: Do they mainly come from the hardliners in the Party and the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA)? Are they really embedded in the society and among its intellectual or business elite? Arent there members of these elites or even of the CCP leadership who would be ready to negotiate a more flexible solution to the differences between Beijing and Taipei? What is the role of the CCP official propaganda in preventing larger segments of the elites and the society from adopting a more open-minded approach of the Taiwan issue? Is popular nationalism, as opposed to state nationalism, a true obstacle to flexibility? And finally, has the centralization of decision-making on Taiwan not allowed the CCP leadership to manage such pressures and introduce flexibility when it serves its interest?

On China, One Dream: Unification! The policy of the Beijing authorities is well-know and just needs to be summed up here: there is only one China, the Peoples Republic of China; Taiwan is a sacred part of the PRC, as indicated in the 1982 state constitutions preamble; the central government sole objective can but be the unification, preferably by peaceful means, of the motherland, on the basis of the one country, two system formula (yiguo liangzhi), a political recipe designed by Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s initially for Taiwan but first applied to Hong Kong (1997) and then Macau (1999). Article 31 of the constitution instituting special administrative regions (tebie xingzhengqu) was also designed for welcoming back Taiwan. More recently, in March 2005, an Anti-Secession Law (fan fanlie fa) was promulgated both to keep in check Taiwans pro-independence forces and to better guarantee peaceful reunification of the mortherland (zuguo heping tongyi). Conversely, the Party leaders have repeatedly stated that no Chinese government would accept Taiwans independence, since the island has been part of China since ancient times. Moreover, because the Republic of China ceased to exist and was replaced by the PRC in 1949, the Taiwanese entity cannot be considered as a state: while for a long time, Beijing has stopped qualifying Taiwan as a rebel island, it usually calls it a political entity (zhengquan), de facto acknowledging that it has been separated from the mainland, but not from China, since then. Negotiations and talks across the Taiwan Strait therefore can only be based on the precondition that both sides accept that there is one China although Beijing accepts not to define this notion and the Kuomintang (KMT) indicates that each side keeps its own interpretation (yige Zhongguo gezi biaoshu). That is what both the KMT (and the whole pan-blue camp in Taiwan) and the CCP have since 2000 called the 92 consensus (jiuer gongshi), a verbal agreement reached in late 1992 but which ex-president Chen Shui-bian, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the whole pan-green camp never recognized, or to be more accurate, never considered as a consensus. This general policy is largely supported by the mainland Chinese society. All opinion polls organized in the PRC and most conversations with mainland Chinese

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citizens confirm this point. As we will see below, there may be differences of view about the specifics of this policy, the strategy to privilege or the likelihood of reunification in the foreseeable future, but this very aim is the only one conceivable by the overwhelming majority of the Chinese population. The efficiency of the CCP propaganda and education machine, and its strong orientation role on the internet as well as the impossibility to expose on the mainland the historical arguments made by the pro-independence Taiwanese all contribute to explaining this strong consensus [2]. However, on the whole, this consensus has an obvious nationalist dimension that constrains any Chinese political regime, be it authoritarian or democratic. For most Chinese, since its return to China in 1945 after Japans defeat, Taiwan has been part of the Chinese nation and no other country has tried to claim it. In other words, unification with Taiwan may be a dream, but this is the only dream that the Beijing authorities and most mainland Chinese can contemplate. This basic reality narrows the room of manoeuvre of any Chinese government and facilitates all sort of domestic utilization of the Taiwan issue, often, as the Chinese Communists would say, for ulterior motives. But at the same time, the long-term separation of Taiwan, the cost of any military adventure, the centralization of decision-making on Taiwan and the gradual economic integration across the Strait have also created constituencies pushing for more political flexibility vis--vis Taiwan. This means that mainland Chinese may just agree about opposing by all means Taiwans formal independence and very well disagree about the solution of the Taiwan issue.

Domestic Obstacles to Flexibility A number of genuine domestic obstacles have prevented the Chinese government from adopting a more open-minded approach to the Taiwan issue and, on the contrary, often forced it to opt for a very safe and hard-line policy on the matter. However, we need to establish a distinction between, on the one hand, these genuine obstacles and, on the other hand, the utilization of the Taiwan issue made by domestic constituencies pursuing specific political aims as well as the utilization by Beijing of supposedly-strong domestic pressures as a leverage to exert additional pressure on Taipei or on Washington. Among the true domestic obstacles to flexibility, two major ones should be mentioned: 1) the legitimacy of the PRC and nationalism; and 2) the hardliners within the CCP and the PLA leadership. Regime Legitimacy and Nationalism Since the end of the Cold War and the demise of communist ideology, the PRC regimes legitimacy and survival have been closely linked to its ability to remain the best promoter of nationalism. That is how the CCP leadership sees itself and wants the Chinese society sees it [13, 16, 24, 31]. Among the CCPs nationalist objectives, unification with Taiwan has not only remained high on the list but become more prominent as, in the aftermath of democratization, the separatist (fenliezhuyi) and pro-independence forces developed in Taiwan.

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For this reason, on the one hand, Taiwans independence remains inconceivable. It is true that the long-term separation of this island and its de facto independence have not affected Chinas successful path towards economic takeoff and international rise. It is also true that it is more likely today to meet mainland Chinese who understand Taiwaneses lack of interest for unification and would not oppose Taiwans independence. However, this opinion group remains small, and probably minuscule. Aware of this reality, the CCP leadership continues to portrait itself as the best defender of Chinas sovereignty and true heir of the national borders left by the Manchu Empire in 1911 (with the exception of Outer Mongolia which independence was reluctantly accepted by Chiang Kai-shek in 1945, then Mao Zedong in 1947 1950). Its offensive against the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan splittists after protest and violence broke out in Chinas Tibetan areas in March 2008 is the most recent illustration of this highly principled policy. And again, this policy is largely approved by the Chinese society. On the other hand, although it was excluded from the United Nations for more than twenty years, engaged in an ideological battle against the KMT, the Beijing regime never accepted the coexistence of two Chinese states on the international stage. And Chiang Kai-sheks stubborn attachment to the one China principle actually facilitated the PRCs entry into the UN and the ROCs expulsion in 1971 [3], p. 119). In spite of the adoption in 1979 of a peaceful reunification strategy, the CCP leadership has continued to ignore the ROCs survival on part of the national territory, feeding rather than discouraging the pro-independence movement on Taiwan as well as the Taiwaneses quest to return to the UN. Justified in several policy documents which try hard to draw a line between Chinas and other divided nations situations (Germany or Korea), this stance stems directly from a need for the PRC to preserve its political legitimacy both as the only official representative of China, the best promoter of reunification and also the best polity for China2. In the last decade or so, some critics in China (and of course many more in Taiwan) have argued that reconciliation and unification can only be based on a recognition of the reality on the ground and, so to speak, the other [17]. Nevertheless, for domestic political reasons, e.g. legitimizing the leading role of the CCP and the perpetuation of the one party system, it remains quasi-impossible for the current regime to openly embark into a two-China policy. Such a change would provoke a strong political earthquake in China and would risk dividing and even splitting the CCP leadership into two opposite camps: one continuing to refer to 1949 as the founding date of New China, the other one trying to close the civil war and moving to another approach to Chinas division and the Chinese nation. Finally, there is a power politics dimension in the Taiwan issue that feeds nationalism and constrains to a large extent domestic debates both on the policy towards Taiwan and Taiwans political experience. The close strategic relationship between Taipei and Washington as well as Chinas international objectives make any recognition of the ROC statehood, not to mention Taiwans independence, more uncertain. On the contrary, Chinas great power ambitions and strategic competition with the USA contribute to reducing the range of options that the CCP leadership

Cf. Chinas white papers on Taiwan published in August 1993 and in February 2000.

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can contemplate to address this issue as well as to postponing any prospect for democratization on the mainland. Hardliners in the Party and the Military Very often, the Chinese military has been identified as the main source of conservatism on and resistance to a more flexible policy towards Taiwan; it is also presented as the most powerful driver pushing for a military action against the island. All this is true, but the reality is more complex: Chinas conservatism on Taiwan is far from being limited to the military, fed as we have just seen by a strong and politically much-needed nationalism; although the military are often perceived as being more inclined to show strength, assertiveness or rigidity towards Taiwan, not every PLA general has a preference for war; and are more aware than the civilians of their own weaknesses and limitations to conquer Taiwan or even to take control of the Strait in a scenario that would involve the USA, the Chinese military may be more prudent than anticipated if the CCP leadership asked them to act [5]. It is clear that over the years a number of PLA officials have made public their strong views about Taiwan and given the impression that they would rather opt for a military solution of the issue. This was particularly the case after Lee Teng-huis unofficial visit to the USA in May 1995, Lees qualification of cross-Strait relations as state-to-state relations (liangguolun) in July 1999 or August 2002 Chen Shui-bian statement that indicated that there was one country on each side of the Strait (yibian yiguo). On these occasions, Hong Kong media (as monthly magazine Zhengming) reported about pressuresoften through open letters or petitionsexerted by active or retired PLA leaders on the CCP leadership to show more assertiveness vis--vis or even teach a lesson (meaning a limited use of force) to Taiwan. For instance, at the Beidaihe meeting that took place just after the Taiwanese presidents July 1999 statement, some generals (probably both active and retired) argued for a military action against Taiwan (as taking control of one of Taiwans off-shore islands) [4], p. 5; [23], p. 193). After Chen Shui-bians first referendum and reelection in March 2004, this pressure did not stop and actually intensified. In July 2005, putting the stakes pretty high, General Zhu Chenghu, then president of the National Defense University, threatened to use nuclear weapons against America if the USA decided to intervene in an armed conflict over Taiwan3. Although the Chinese government took rapidly its distance from Zhus views, this statement was clearly understood as a trying balloon by both Taiwan and the US. It is hard to deny that there are probably more hard-line views about Taiwan within than outside the PLA for two main reasons: its responsibility is to prepare for war, not to negotiate peaceful reunification, the job of the civilian government, as

He was quoted as saying: If the Americans draw their missiles and position-guided ammunition into the target zone on Chinas territory, I think we will have to respond with nuclear weapons If the Americans are determined to interfere...we will be determined to respond, and we Chinese will prepare ourselves for the destruction of all cities east of Xian...Of course the Americans will have to be prepared that hundreds of, or two hundreds of, [or] even more cities will be destroyed by the Chinese, Wall Street Journal, 15 July 2005.

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candidly stated a PLA officer in 19994; and as every military, the PLA is less open to liberal opinions, innovative solutions or difficult compromises than the rest of the CCP leadership or the society. At the same time, when bluntly asked by Jiang Zemin in the summer 1999 if the United States intervenes to defend Taiwan, are you sure to prevail?, the PLA leaders admitted that they were not ready. True, thereafter, addressing their request, Jiang decided to increase the PLA budget more rapidly and give them the means to solve the Taiwan problem by force if peaceful methods fail5. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether all the military leaders would be ready to embark without hesitation in such an adventure, even when the PLA has mastered the asymmetrical weapons it claims to possess and is able to use them to deter the US from interfering in a military operation against Taiwan. Actually, it can be argued that in such circumstances, some PLA generals could show more caution and moderation than civilian ideologues and hardliners that may on the contrary, for politicoideological reasonsas guaranteeing the CCPs grip to power, push for a daring armed conflict in the Strait. While it remains hard to speculate on the future, Chinas past practice and experience may serve as an indicator. As documented in many studies, the Chinese military never voiced their views alone: such views are usually heard in a context of crisis, triggered by a Taiwanese or an American initiative, which contributes to the building of a hardliners coalition made of both civilian and military leaders that can exert strong pressure on the CCPs top leadership: the Politburos Standing Committee (PBSC), the Central Military Commission (CMC) and the Secretary General (GS) [26], pp. 289336). Such a coalition took shape in June 1995, after Lee Teng-huis rebuttal of Jiang Zemings overture (his January 1995 Eight Points) and Lees visit to the USA. Then, Jiang had to give in to such a coalition (made of, among others, Li Peng, Li Ruihuan, Qiao Shi, Admiral Liu Huaqing and General Zhang Zhen) and, in order to consolidate his position, proposed two series of missile tests in the vicinity of Taiwan, instead of one [32], p. 8). Later, in March 1996, he decided to test missiles much closer to the island, provoking a well-known US reaction: the dispatch of two aircraft-carrier groups to the Taiwan area. It is worth noting that while the Central Committees Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group (Zhonggong zhongyang Taiwan shiwu lingdao xiaozu, TALSG), of which Jiang had taken control as early as June 1993, became in the year 19941995 the main decision-making body on Taiwan (it drafted Jiangs Eight Points), this leading group did not make any key decision during the crisis: this power was exerted collectively by the PBSC with the participation of the CMC [26], pp. 319327)6. A similar scenario occurred in the summer 1999. Then, Jiang had not only to promise the PLA additional resources and let its Air Force violate on several occasion Taiwans airspace as a show of force. He was put on the defensive by a number of hardliners who estimated that, contrary to what Deng had thought before,

4 5 6

Cited by Shirk [23], p. 193. Ibid. For a history of the TALSG, see [6], pp. 109-117; [8], pp. 4-9.

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peace and development were no more the main trends in the world [12]. But again, decisions were not made in the TALSG but in the BPSG and later at the Beidahe meeting including Politburo, CMC and retired military leaders. However, these two examples differ on one point: in 1999, Jiang was a stronger leader than in 1995 and in a better position to resist the most extreme proposals. Weak Leader and Strong Leader The division of responsibilities between the TALSG and the PBSG is quite a logical one: although including a military leader (the deputy chief of the general staff in charge of intelligence, then Xiong Guangkai), the TALSG could not make any decision of military nature on Taiwan. However, the TALSGs scope of competence and, more generally, Chinas ability to draft and carry out coherent policies and initiatives towards Taiwan depend upon the status of the CCP Secretary General. In 1995, Jiangs position as number one of the Party and the military had not yet been fully consolidated. Deng Xiaoping had just retired from politics (he died in February 1997) and Jiang was on his own, trying, as head of the CCP and as his predecessors (Mao and Deng) to take control of Chinas Taiwan policy. Having to lead but also to negotiate, as a primus inter pares (first among equal), with two powerful groups of leaders the members of the PBSC and the CMC he was under unprecedented pressure to deliver. This pressure was intensified by the fact that in the PRC leaders from both leading bodies often get together with additional officials who may have a say in the matter in informal enlarged meetings that tend to intensify the influence of the dominant opinion group of the time. For instance Zhang Zhen, a CMC leader but not a PBSC member, and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, a simple Politburo member, took part in the key meetings that endorsed the decision to test missiles. Conversely, in 1999, Jiang was more in a position to resist conservative pressures, not only thanks to the USs help7, but also because he had been able to strengthen e. g. through a series of promotionsits control over the PLA and consolidate his power at the 15th Party Congress in 1997. Today, Hu Jintaos status appears much stronger than 1995s Jiang. Since September 2004, he has chaired the CMC and, since the 17th Party Congress (October 2007), has on the whole strengthened his grip on the leadership. A year earlier, in May 2003, Hu had already taken over the TALSG chairmanship. Of course, then, several of Jiangs allies still sat in the TALGS, including Jia Qinglin, number four of the BPSG and Chairman of the Chinese Political Peoples Consultative Conference (CPPCC, an assembly symbolizing the CCPs united front policy) who then became TALSG vicechairman, Wang Gang, head of the CCP General Office, Guo Boxiong, the CMC first vice-chairman and PLA boss, Xiong Guangkai, deputy chief of staff in charge of intelligence, Tang Jiaxuan, State Councillor in charge of foreign affairs, and Ms Liu Yandong, director of the CCP United Front Department8.
7 8

This point is emphasized by Shirk [23], p. 192.

Lianhebao (United Daily News), 29 May 2003. After the missile crisis, in 1996, a Taiwan military working leading group (Zhonggong zhongyang duiTai junshi gongzuo lingdao xiaozu) chaired by Zhang Wannian, then CMC vice-chairman and number two) was identified. But it probably merged with the TALSG after 2000. Cf. Lianhebao, 30 April 1996.

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But after the 17th Party Congress and Ma Ying-jeous election, Hu reshuffled and slightly reformed the institutional composition of the TALGS, underlining a change of policy, emphasis moving from the military to trade, and (hopefully) from threat to economic integration. On the one hand, Guo Boxiong apparently left the TALGS. Since 2008, the PLA has been only represented by Ma Xiaotian, the new deputy chief of the general staff in charge of intelligence. On the other hand, in April 2008, Commerce Minister Chen Deming (Bo Xilais successor) was promoted to the TALGS. And the majority of the other ex officio representatives of the various bureaucratic constituencies concerned with Taiwan are now closer to Hu than to Jiang: they include Ling Jihua, the new head of the CCP General Office, State Councillor Dai Bingguo, Du Qinglin, the new CCP United Front Department Director, Geng Huichang, the new minister of State Security and Wang Yi, the new Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) director (and former deputy foreign minister). Only Jia Qinglin and Chen Yunlin, the new ARATS (Association for the Relations across the Taiwan Strait) chairman and Wang Daohans long-awaited successor (Wang died in December 2005) have long been associated with Jiang. However, they both have no other choice today but to work for Hu [8], p. 7). That said, the pattern described above would again apply in case of crisis and past practice has always given an advantage, in such circumstances, to the most prudent and nationalistic opinion group, forcing the leadership to shelf or refrain from making any bold initiative. For instance, under Chen Shui-bians presidency, hardliners utilized and even exaggerated the strength of the pro-independence forces on Taiwan, the rise of the Taiwanese identity and the magnitude of the Taiwanese societys desinisation (feizhongguohua) to prevent the resuming of any talks without preconditions-a return to the 1992 consensuswith Taipei9. And they are subject to take excuse of the ROCs unabated quest for a better international status to sabotage future negotiations if Ma Ying-jeou does not compromise enough. This is not to say that a crisis is likely to break out in the coming years. As we will see below, KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeous victory in Taiwans March 2008 presidential election and Taiwans return to the so-called 1992 consensus are conducive to ease Hus job, allowing him and the TALSG to conduct most of Taiwans policy. Nevertheless, if an important agreement is to be approved (as an end of hostility accord or military confidence-building measures), the BPSC and the CMC will have to endorse it, giving an opportunity to more conservatives forces within the leadership to express their view and influence the final decision [14]. In other words, the CCP top leadership remains subject to genuine pressures from the hardliners in the Party and the PLA as well as the nationalist elements of the society. And these pressures intensify in case of an unwelcome initiative of the part of Taiwan or the USA, facilitate the constitution of a conservative, and sometimes bellicose coalition and are harder to resist when the CCP Secretary General (and country leader) has not yet consolidated his powerbase.

Interview with Wang Zaixi, deputy director of the Taiwan Affairs Office, June 2006.

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Political Utilization of the Taiwan Issue for Domestic Purpose The Taiwan issue has sometimes been utilized by forces or institutions pursing a domestic political agenda that is not necessarily or directly related to Taiwan. This was particularly true at the time of Mao Zedong, when the slogan we must liberate Taiwan! (women yiding yao jiefang Taiwan) was used more as a glue to mobilize the society around domestic political goals than as a marching order to launch an attack against the rebel island. Since 1979, and in particular the early 1990s, this type of instrumentalization of the Taiwan issue has become quasi-marginal. Of course, as we have seen the CCP has promoted state nationalism as a key feature of its ideology. And nationalist media, such as Huanqiu shibao (Global Times) and commentators, as Yan Xuetong, are encouraged to air their views on Taiwan, and launch vitriolic attacks against Taiwan or the USA every time tension increases in the Strait. Besides, Chinese media know pretty well that Taiwan is a topic that sells well. Nevertheless, as far as Taiwan is concerned, even when Taipei launched an initiative that it condemned, the CCP leadership never encouraged the society to get mobilized and organize demonstrations against Taiwan independence or separation. In this respect, there has been a staunch contrast with the CCP laissez faire attitude about and utilization of protests against the US (for example in the aftermath of the NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade), Japan (the 2005 demonstrations against history textbooks) or France (the April 2008 boycott movement of Carrefour chain stores after the disrupted passage of the Olympic Torch in Paris). In other words, the CCP leadership seems to remain much more hostile to political participation on the Taiwan issue, as if it wanted to keep as much room for manoeuvre in terms of political decision-making and options, including and probably especiallyin periods of crisis. This last point is probably not unrelated to the temptation of some segments of the politico-military elite to use Taiwan for domestic political purpose. Two cases of instrumentalization have taken place in the past: 1) by some members of the CCP leadership in order to weaken or even destabilize the top leader; and 2) by PLA generals in order to get more resources. The June 1995 offensive launched by leaders as different as Qiao Shi, Li Peng, Li Ruihuan and Liu Huaqing is probably the best example of a concerted pressure on the Secretary General by opinion groups following conflicting domestic political agendas. It made sense that hardliners, such as Li Peng, and military leaders, such as Liu Huaqing, criticized Jiangs Taiwan policy as too soft. But the attacks of more reformist leaders such as Qiao Shi and Li Ruihuan were probably motivated by their own rivalry with Jiang whom they tried to weaken and perhaps destabilize [25], p. 262). And probably Li Peng and Liu Huaqing also took advantage of the situation to try to clip Jiangs wings. This is to say that Taiwan is such a sensitive issue that political challengers are often inclined to use it as a leverage for pushing interests that are not necessarily related to this matter. After the 19951996 and the 1999 crises in the Taiwan Strait, the PLA was granted a substantial increase of its budget. As we have seen, it was a way for Jiang Zemin to gain the PLA generals support to his Taiwan policy. However, it cannot be excluded that tensions and crises with Taiwan are also used by the military as a

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11

leverage to receive additional resources that are not going to be allocated to the Taiwan theatre. As we know, for a few years, a debate has developed in the PLA about the place Taiwan should occupy in the PLA modernization plan and strategic objectives10. Should all the modernization effort be concentrated on the establishment of a capacity to conquer or submit Taiwan? Or should the PLA limit itself to deploying weapons aimed at deterring Taiwan from declaring independenceas the 1,300 plus conventional short-range missiles targeted at the island, in spite of their questionable value [22]? Although the debate is far from being over, it underscores a recognition of the greater diversity of security objectives followed by the PLA: borders; air defence, nuclear second strike capability, internal order, in particular in Xinjiang and in Tibet, sea lines of communications, participation in UN sponsored Peace-Keeping Operations, protection of the growing number of PRC nationals living abroad and especially in unsafe areas like Africa. Taiwan remains of course a prominent political and diplomatic objective but Chinas own strategic ambitions in East Asia, vis--vis the USA and in the rest of the world are conducive to actually move away its attention from Taiwan as a military objective, provided that Beijing and Washington keep a close level of understanding and cooperation on that matter. For these reasons, the PLAs vocal concerns and strong views about Taiwan should be scrutinized with attention and not always taken at face value. Utilization of Domestic Pressures for Diplomatic Purpose Similarly, the Chinese government has often been tempted to instrumentalize the domestic pressures and public opinion as a leverage to extract more diplomatic concessions on the part of the Taiwanese or the American authorities. For example, between 2004 and 2007, the risks of constitutional change or formal declaration of independence were obviously exaggerated in order to secure additional American and KMT pressures on Chen Shui-bian. This exaggeration is also perceptible in a number of American analyses of the Taiwan issue. For instance in the chapter on Taiwan of Susan Shirks otherwise excellent book China, A Fragile Superpower, it seems that the influence of the hardliners, the prowar, leaders is overestimated; past crises (19951996, 1999, 2002) are presented in too of an alarmist way, as if they could have degenerated into an armed conflict; and the positive role played by the US in these crises is also artificially swollen. We know from other sources that in 1996 since the very beginning Beijing had informed Washington about the scope of the exercises or the limits of the incursions. Of course, miscalculation is a problem. However past crises, such as the EP3 incident in April 2001 have demonstrated that, after having covered if not endorsed aggressive behaviours, the Chinese authorities can also rapidly de-escalate when they want. Moreover, while, drawing the lessons from the 19951996 crisis, Beijing and Washington had developed a better channel of communication and level of understanding in the following crises that actually shortened them. More generally, Chinese officials and experts are keen to convince their American and Taiwanese

10

[9, 20, pp. 44-47. [30], p. 11; [10, 27].

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interlocutors of the strength of the hardliners and the warmonger factions. Given on purpose a free ride in time of crisis, the nationalist media and commentators are also used in that aim. Yet, as we have seen, neither in 1996 nor in 1999, the PLA was ready to launch any kind of attack against Taiwan. In 1999, the pro-war leaders were actually easily convinced by Jiang Zemin to calm down. They were allowed to fly fighter planes across the middle line in the Taiwan Strait. In return, Jiang just pretended to be tough in promising more high tech weapons to the military and in continuing to accumulate missiles targeted against Taiwan [23], p. 193). And since 2000, in spite of Chen Shui-bians election, the CCP leadership has embarked onto a new policy, initiated by Jiang himself and deepened by Hu Jintao after 2004, that instead of trying to accelerate unification and imposing a deadline on that process has concentrated on preventing Taiwans formal independence and winning the heart of the Taiwanese. In other words, the changes that have occurred in Chinas Taiwan policy since the early 2000 underscore that there is more room for manoeuvre than anticipated. They also force us to reassess the genuine strength of the pro-war or pro-military solution faction in the Chinese leadership and the ability of the PLA to influence the Taiwan policy.

Domestic Factors of Flexibility This larger-than-often-recognized room of manoeuvre stems from a number of domestic factors of flexibility. Often overlooked, these factors include the centralization in the RPCs decision-making process on Taiwan, the efficiency and versatility of its propaganda machinery, the growing influence of the business community and finally the cost of any conflict with Taiwan. The Centralization of Decision-Making Generally, the Chinese government has been rather successful in insulating its Taiwan policy, as the rest of its foreign policy, from domestic constrains. In this sense, Chinese leaders are pro-active realists: they try as much as possible and usually manage to isolate its Taiwan policy from domestic political pressures outside of the top CCP leaderships inner circle. The centralization of decision-making on Taiwan has not only limited any domestic constituencies from interfering in this process but also reduced the influence of leaders who are not involved in the policy towards Taiwan on a day-to-day basis. Recognizing himself the failure of the past objectives (e.g. speeding up unification), in 2000 Jiang was able, in spite of Chen Shui-bians election, to introduce a more flexible policy towards Taiwan. Of course, some important external factors also forced China to reassess its strategy, including George W. Bushs election in November 2000. However, once his power was consolidated, Jiang was able to launch and impose upon the rest of the CCP leadership a series of initiatives that heralded a relaxation of policy. In the summer 2000, Qian Qichen made public a new definition of one China: both the mainland and Taiwan are part of China. And in 2002, Beijing accepted to

East Asia (2009) 26:120

13

de-link the negotiations on commercial matters from any hypothetical acceptance by Chen of the one China principle or even the 1992 consensus, allowing semidirect charter flights across the Strait to start on the occasion of the Chinese New Year in 2003, and to resume in 2005. In October 2002, when visiting the USA, for the first time Jiang proposed Bush to freeze the deployment of missiles targeted at Taiwan in exchange for a halt to American arms sales to Taiwan. And after March 2000 (and Zhu Rongjis famous warning to the Taiwanese voters), aware that past threats and admonitions had actually backfire, the CCP leadership has refrained from interfering in Taiwanese elections. All these initiatives would have been hard to make without this degree of concentration of power and a very limited scope of discussion among the leadership and experts. Satisfied of the additional resources allocated to them and working on the modernization of their weapons, the PLA leaders did not apparently try to stop or even to criticize this new policy; nor did the hardliners. After taking control of the TALSG in May 2003, Hu managed to deepen this evolution, despite Chens unwelcome initiatives (referendum) and re-lection in March 2004. True, Hu has not abandoned the final goal put forward by his predecessors, including Deng Xiaoping. He has continued to intensify Chinas military pressure on Taiwan, in order to change in its favour the bilateral military balance. He never tried to open unconditional talks with Chen. However, he decided to de-emphasize Deng Xiaopings one country, two system formula11. He succeeded to strengthen Chinas united front strategy and cultivated closer contacts with Taiwans opposition parties. Taking advantage of the political polarization in Taiwan, he wooed the blue camp (KMT and Peoples First Party) and convinced it in 2005 to establish direct relations with the CCP in spite of the adoption of an anti-secession law. Actually, the 2005 anti-secession law is another illustration of this relative moderation of Beijings Taiwan policy. Initially, the Chinese government was reported to work on a unification law, perhaps establishing a deadline by which Taiwan was supposed to reunify with the mainland. For instance, in November 2002, Chinese scholar Yu Yuanzhou, associate professor in the Law School of the Jianghan University in Hubei Province, drafted a national unification promotion law12. And after Chen Shui-bians re-election, some Chinese officials, in particular in the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office, became very interested in this draft and proposed to adopt it in order to warn Chen and prevent any additional move towards independence. However, by the end of 2004, it became clear that the CCP had preferred to draft an antisecession law, putting stringent restrictions to any unilateral change of the status quo by the Taiwanese authorities but not trying to precipitate unification. This law was obviously a compromise and included a threat to resort to nonpeaceful means (fei heping fanshi) to solve the Taiwan issue. But the wording of the second casus belli introduced in the February 2000 White Papers (the first one is a declaration of independence) was somewhat toned down: war would not be started any more in case of Taiwans sine die refusal to open unification negotiations; instead, non peaceful means would be employed if all the possibilities for a
11 For instance, this formula was not referred to in the 17 May 2004 statement on Taiwan issued by Beijing three days before Chen Shui-bians second inauguration. 12

Hong Kong Feng Huang Wang, 17 May 2004; Ming Pao, 19 May 2004.

14

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peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted13. And the one country, two system formula was not enshrined in the law. In other words, the anti-secession law underlines that priority should now be given to fighting against a formal independence of Taiwan, not to questioning the status quo. At the 17th Party congress, Hu Jintao went further and emphasized the promotion of a peaceful development of cross-strait relations (liangan heping fazhan) as well as the community of life (shengming gongtongti) across the Strait or the shared destiny of both mainland Chinese and Taiwanese, a transparent echo to Taipeis 1994 White Papers that underlined that the Taiwanese had created their own community of life or nation. Peaceful development in the Strait is a reference to Hus peaceful rise (heping jueqi), a concept that he had to abandon in the spring 2004 because of opposition from both moderates (concerned about the rise) and the hardliners (irritated about the idea that peace was a must). But the idea is the same: time is for stabilization and normalization with Taiwan, not unification. Ma Ying-jeous election in March 2008 will probably contribute to keeping the PRCs decision-making pattern on Taiwan highly centralized, but this centralization is not new. And even in times of crises, the Chinese leadership never gave the impression of being uncoordinated on Taiwan. The PLA never took any decision that was not first not only approved by the CCP leadership but also well publicized to the other side (including the daring incursions in the Taiwanese airspace in 1999). Recent dysfunctions between the PLA and the Foreign Ministry around the Anti-satellite test in January 2007 or the US Aircraft carrier Kitty Hawks port call in Hong Kong in November 2007 may be a source of concern in Taipei or in Washington. However, there are no precedents of such dysfunctions in the Taiwan Strait. The Versatility of the Propaganda Machine and Popular Nationalism As indicated in the first section, the PRCs propaganda machine has always been efficient at framing the terms of the debates among the Chinese elites and public opinion. For instance, when Beijing wants to exert pressure on Taipei and Washington, it intensifies its attacks against separatist forces in Taiwan, portraying every Taiwanese politician that wishes to improve the island-states international status as a splittist. This type of offensive was common after Lee Teng-huis visit to the USA or publication of his two state theory. A similar kind of tactic has been used since unrest and violence in Tibet broke out in March 2008 against the Dalai Lama who, although he abandoned for a long time any quest for independence, is still presented as a splittist aiming at dismantling China. The PRC authorities official discourse has a strong impact on the domestic public opinion: in the 1990s, most Chinese thought that Lee Teng-hui wanted to definitely separate Taiwan from China. Actually, in his July 1999 famous interview with the Deutsche Welle that triggered the second crisis in the Strait, Lee had also shown some moderation: for instance, he was the first to make public, 18 months before Chen Shui-bian, the concept of political integration (zhengzhi tonghe)

13

Article 8 of the Anti-secession law (14 March 2005) states:

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15

between the two sides of the Strait. The same can be said of the Chineses popular perception of the Dalai Lama today. However, the CCP propaganda machine has demonstrated an ability to reverse its own discourse rather quickly when new priorities are designed. Beijings reconciliation with the KMT after 2000 is a well-known example. And its nonconfrontational attitude vis--vis, if not tolerance of, Ma Ying-jeous quest for a better ROC international status is a more recent illustration of this flexibility [21]. In such cases, differences are put aside and objectives that would have been taboo before can be contemplated. For instance, Michael Swaine indicates that in the mid1990s, three basic approaches to the Taiwan issue emerged in the Chinese leadership: 1) accelerate the unification process; 2) gradually move towards unification through two stages: peaceful agreement first, and unification negotiations, later; 3) give priority to preventing Taiwan independence [26], pp. 316317). The first view was strong in the PLA, the state security apparatus and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the second view prevailed in the TALSG and in the Taiwan Affairs Office and was initially supported by Jiang Zemin; the third view was held by a minority of officials and experts. Yet, since early 2000, and even more so after Hu Jintao took over the TALSG in 2003, China and its propaganda machine have embarked into promoting the third view. For example, in 2004 a Communist Party Propaganda Department magazine declared: Our opinion is that the basic pattern of cross-strait relations that have developed over a long time has been gravely challenged, but not basically changed... We have basically contained the overt threat of Taiwanese independence since Chen took office, avoiding a worst-case scenario and maintaining the status of Taiwan as a part of China.... The balance of power in the Strait continues to shift in our favour.14 More self-confident, China banks on both Taiwans economic integration and growing military vulnerability to gradually impose its conditions and favour long term-unification. But at the same time, it has developed a discourse aimed at preparing the public opinion to accept the status quo and the negotiations of what can be called normalization agreements with Taiwan (direct air links, tourism, and later end of hostility agreement, military confidence-building measures). This new discourse seems to have had a decisive impact on the Chinese society. As an opinion poll released in January 2004 by Horizon Research in Beijing indicated, some 58% of the 4,000 people surveyed believed military action was unnecessary and both sides should work towards economic integration. Only 15% supported immediate military action [19]. Finally, popular nationalism, as opposed to state nationalism, should be put into perspective. Chinas modernization drive and rise to a great power status is based on this countrys internationalization. In everyday life, this mean that the Chinese society is probably one of the least nationalistic, importing and consuming foreign goods and ideas and expecting that other countries will continue to do the same with

14

Current Event Report, January 2004 quoted by Kuhn [19].

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Chinese exports and culture. True, in time of crisis, nationalist fever can rapidly rise; it can be also utilized or even stirred up by the Chinese leadership. However, precedents have shown that usually the temperature comes down also quite quickly for the reasons indicated above [7]. They are red lines in the Chinese mind as far as Taiwan is concerned: a formal declaration of independence is the main, and probably the only one. But these red lines are unlikely to be crossed in the foreseeable future not only because of Beijings and Washingtons pressures but also because the Taiwanese society remains divided and prefer to postpone any decision about its long term future. The Chinese Business Community and Taiwan Growing economic integration between China and Taiwan has contributed to creating new constituencies on both sides of the Strait that have a vested interest not only to keep the relations between Beijing and Taipei stable but also to see them improving and intensifying, in other words, becoming normalized. Studies on the Taiwan business people (Taishang) established in China have demonstrated a growing influence on the islands government as well as political elites. To some extent, Mas victory can be understood as a success of this business communitys lobbying (and Chinas united front work), but these studies have also shown that the Taishang have been unable to really influence Beijings policy towards Taiwan. Their relations with the local governments on the mainland, through the Taiwan business associations, cannot be neglected. Though the local Taiwan affairs offices officially control these associations and have been instrumental in order to influence the voting behaviour of their members in Taiwan elections, they also try to address their demands, which are, for most of them not of political but commercial nature [29]. However, because of the hyper-centralization of policy-making on Taiwan, there is no evidence that these associations or Chinese local authorities have been able to influence national policies on this issue. Having said that, the situation may be gradually changing. For one thing, the number of Taishang on the mainland has been increasing steadily and may be over 1 million today. Most large Taiwanese high tech or computer companies are established in China and have developed close relations with a number of big city or provincial governments, mostly in the Southern half of the country (Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong in particular). Being politically more blue than green (it is thought that two third of them voted for the KMT in the 2004 presidential election), these companies have privileged access both to these local authorities and now the new Taiwanese government. It remains of course to be seen whether key Taiwanese executive can play a role in improving cross-Strait relations in the coming year, but they are in a position to lobby powerful provincial or city CCP officials. Again, these officials do not directly participate in the decision-making process on Taiwan. Nevertheless, the close links that several local governments have developed with Taiwan and more generally the growing economic interdependence across the Strait have given shape to unorganized constituencies that would, in case of crisis, put additional pressure on Beijing to refrain from opting for adventurous policies. For example, because of Chinese economy and in

East Asia (2009) 26:120

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particular electronic industrys dependence upon Taiwanese products, a boycott of these products would be very hard, if not impossible, to carry out. As early as 2000, in the aftermath of Chen Shui-bians Wang Daohan indicated that Northern China wanted war with Taiwan but Southern China was opposed to it15. In 2008, nobody talks of such options; but the antiwar lobby in China is certainly much stronger than in 2000. The Cost of War Indeed, the cost of war with Taiwan would be very heavy, if not unbearable to China. The Chinese government has repeatedly argued that China would not back off from an armed conflict if its sovereignty was threatened. And as we have seen, in the previous crises in the Strait, some PLA generals or CCP ideologues were ready to conduct a military operation against the island, e.g. teach a lesson to Taiwan. At the same time, most Chinese specialists admit that a war in the Strait would have great difficulties in remaining a local and limited armed confrontation. Even if some PLA strategists regularly try to test the USs resolution to intervene, China has not acquired the certainty that Washington would stay aside. The rapid modernization of the PLA, and its acquisition of both means to project forces and asymmetrical weapons are gradually changing the balance of power in the Strait in favour of China, at a time when the US is busy on other fronts (i.e. Iraq and Afghanistan) and would be unable to conduct two wars at the same time [1]. However, Washingtons close albeit unofficial politico-military links with Taiwan (loosely defined in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act), its strong strategic relationship with Japan and the need to maintain its international credibility would probably force it to take action, turning a local armed conflict around Taiwan into a regional, if not a global war, probably also involving Japan, causing huge damages to all the parties involved. Moreover, any war in the Taiwan Strait in which the US would intervene would increase the risk of a nuclear face off between Beijing and Washington. This risk is paradoxically not discussed as much as it should be neither in China nor in the USA. In any case, such a risk is also an additional factor against war in the Strait, since the danger of nuclearization of any war directly involving nuclear powers have in the past prevented these powers from crossing the threshold of military confrontation. It is conducive, on the contrary, to convince the Chinese authorities to explore more innovative peaceful solutions to their differences with Taiwan. Of course, the militarys mission is to improve its readiness to the worst case scenario and we have seen how successful the PLA generals have been to guarantee a higher budget every year. However, they obviously privilege deterrence on war, since using military force in the Taiwan Strait would contribute to rapidly destroying the PLAs newly acquired capability and therefore Chinas great power status. Finally, can a social or economic crisis push the CCP to embark into a military adventure against Taiwan? This is unlikely if we look at past experience: on the contrary, when facing internal difficulties, the Chinese government has so far never been inclined to go to war.

15

Xinbao, 7 April 2000, p. 12.

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Conclusion We end up this short exploration of the connections between domestic politics and foreign policy on Taiwan as a paradox: Taiwan is an internal affair but the domestic public opinion is not invited to participate very much in the debate. It is solicited to air its view and side with the government, in particular in time of crisis in the Strait. However, the mobilization does not usually go further than letting the usual conservative media and experts get excited on the matter, although their views are often used by the Chinese diplomats as a leverage to add pressure on Taipei or Washington (or other capitals), hoping that this latter capital(s) will intensify its (their) own pressure on the former. Policy debates and disputes have remained confined in the CCP top leadership and involve a handful of officials. This is not to say that domestic forces and considerations have not constrained Beijings Taiwan policy. We have seen how many conservative and nationalist elites, in the CCP as well as in the PLA, have remained influential. For example, it still cannot resuscitate the officially-defunct ROC without taking political and ideological risks. Some Chinese officials, in the ARATS or the TAO, are still resisting against abandoning the one country, two system formula16. And Hu Jintao seems resolute to defend his country against any contamination from Taiwans democratic experience. Nevertheless, what is striking is the potential for flexibility in the CCPs Taiwan policy. There is clearly a two level game in China, in which actual bargaining with Taiwan can somewhat be disconnected from domestic persuasion [11]. Simultaneously, the rapid internationalization of China may not automatically enhance the chances of peace but it obviously increases the cost of war and even of prolonged tension in the Taiwan Strait [18]. Having said that, the political obstacles to a solution acceptable by both sides to the differences between Beijing and Taiwan should not be underestimated because, even if extreme scenarios, as forced unification or unilateral independence, are now more likely to be excluded, the acceptance of a middle-ground resolution depends not only upon China but also Taiwan, and its own political forces and public opinion...another and even more troublesome domestic politics-foreign policy connection!
Acknowledgements This is the revised version of a paper prepared for the Conference ForeignDomestic Linkages in Chinas International Behaviour, University of Victoria, British Columbia, Canada, 2425 April 2008.

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Interview with ARATS official, Xiamen, June 2008.

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Jean-Pierre Cabestan is head and professor at, Department of Government and International Studies, Hong Kong Baptist University. He is also associate researcher at the Asia Centre, Paris. His most recent publications include (with Benot Vermander) La Chine et ses frontires. La confrontation Chine-Taiwan, Paris, Presses des Sciences Po, 2005 (translated into Chinese and published in a special issue of the Journal Renlai, Taipei, in January 2007) and (with Sbastien Colin, Isabelle Facon and Michal Meidan), La Chine et la Russie: entre convergences and mfiance, Paris, Unicomm, 2008. He has also published numerous articles and contributions in English on Chinas political system and reform, Chinese law, Chinese foreign policy, the relations across the Taiwan Strait and Taiwanese politics.