THE CIA AND JACOBO ARBENZ: HISTORY OF A DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN By Roberto Garcia Ferreira* INTRODUCTION

The covert operation by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to forcibly oust Guatemalan president Jacobo Arbenz in June 1954 has been almost completely documented now, thanks to the near-total declassification of the operation's records. It is now clear that this event represented a decisive moment in U.S. relations with Latin America during the Cold War. Not surprisingly, given the significance of the event (a fact perceived at the time), a good number of studies have been dedicated to its analysis. Half a century later, and through the study of new records, the historiographie debate seems to have arrived at the conclusion that in the U.S. decision to overthrow Arbenz, the ideological imperatives and policies demanded by the global bipolar confrontation were more important than any economic motivation related to the influence of the banana monopoly, the United Fruit Company, on governing circles in Washington.' It is interesting that despite the abundant scholarly literature on the vast CIA operation to overthrow Arbenz via a military coup,^ there are only scarce and dispersed references by those scholars to the exile of Arbenz. His exile has been treated as a painftil personal drama. But on the contrary, the CIA documentation alerts us to how much the agency continued to dedicate itself covertly to destroying the public image of the president after he was toppled. Arbenz was considered a political figure of the first order of importance within the Latin American spectrum, a fact corroborated in the historiographie literature. For that reason the CIA seems to have taken an immediately vigilant attitude toward Arbenz. Based on the declassified documents consulted for this article, not only is it possible to determine the existence of a rigorous control and surveillance of each one of the former president's steps; also revealed is the extent to which the agency focused on targeted operations against the interests of Arbenz. Sometimes these were efforts to infiuence, and other times to
*Roberto Garcia Ferreira is Professor in the Deparment of History of the Americas, The College of Humanities and Educational Science, University of the Republic, Montevideo, Uruguay. ^^^^^ Journal of Third World Studies, Vol. XXV, No. 2 2008 by Association of Third World Studies, hic.

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orchestrate, some of the trials and tribulations, rumors, speculations, denunciations, and misinformation published by the media (especially Guatemalan and Uruguayan print media) about Arbenz, his family, his friends, and his political future. It is fitting to point out that this CIA media strategy, the central and specific topic of this article, was particularly intense between 1954 and 1960. With the eruption of the Cuban revolution Arbenz's notoriety entered a phase of some decline. After 1960 CIA records on Arbenz are scarce, and most probably, the efforts of the CIA were not necessary because by that time the expresident was a symbol of defeat.' In any case, the proposal to investigate more deeply the surveillance and the attacks inspired by the CIA mainly during the first years of Arbenz's exile provides us the opportunity to understand a facet heretofore unknown of the CIA's methods. And no less important: the case reveals how opinion may be constructed. The Arbenz affair illuminates a strategy that the CIA valued positively. Indeed, one of its analysts commented, "[T]he language, the arguments and the techniques of the Arbenz episode" were "used in Cuba in the beginning of the decade of the 60s, in Brazil in 1964, in the Dominican Republic in 1965, and in Chile in 1973."" This significant affirmation confirms, as noted in much literature, that the 1954 "stainless"' triumph went far beyond the case of Guatemala.' As of this moment, the new materials permit us to establish three certain principles. First, one must point out that "the historian, in these years of Arbenz's life, cannot do otherwise than to simply narrate the facts" since he "completely disappeared from the history of his country" after his resignation.' Second, it is necessary to realize that we are beholding an event as painful as it has been silenced in Guatemalan history.* Third, everything indicates that in the innumerable judgments about Jacobo Arbenz, one important element still has not been discussed: how mueh infiuence the propagandistic actions of the CIA still have in the extreme polarization that surrounds the president and his work in Guatemala.

JACOBO ARBENZ, THE PEOPLE'S SOLDIER"

Jacobo Arbenz, son of a Swiss pharmacist of the same name and a Guatemalan womanfi-omQuetzaltenango, was bom in September 1913. He, who was to eventually be President of Guatemala, moved to the capital city, where he entered the Escuela Politcnica, the military academy. He graduated with excellent grades, which were key for later becoming a professor at the same institution. Those were the times of Jorge Ubico, a dictator in power from 1931 to 1944, who could not mask his sympathies for fascism. In 1944, Ubico was
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forced to resign under pressure from a heterogeneous set of rebel forces. Arbenz, then a young army officer, was one of the leaders that inspired the rebellion. With that episode he began his vertiginously rising political career. Before being elected to the highest position in govemment at the end of 1950, his three important political roles were: leader of the 1944 October Revolution; member of the Junta that convened the elections for 1945; and Minister of Defense, a guarantor of legality, during the democratic presidency of Juan Jos Arvalo from 1945 to 1951. Under Arbenz, the revolutionary program initiated by Arvalo was to be accelerated. The agrarian reform plan, which Arbetiz himself characterized as the most beautiful fruit of the revolution, was the main axis for a quite successful project to structurally change the country. Without idealizing this project, and taking into account some evident errors in strategy, we should not forget, as a U.S. specialist points out, that this was the first and only occasion in Guatemala when "a significant part of the state authority was used to promote the interests of the nation's masses."' Unfortunately, this project was aborted by the CIA-orchestrated invasion of 1954. After several military coup attempts and an intensive national and intemational campaign by the Eisenhower administration against President Arbenz, a small force of exiles and mercenaries invaded from Honduras and penetrated a few miles into the country. Air raids by planes operated by CIA pilots created terror and confusion, while U.S. diplomatic pressure for Arbenz's ousting was applied locally and intemationally. The end of Guatemala's "democratic spring" was approaching. ARBENZ'S RESIGNATION: "IT WAS A TRAGEDY" Betrayed by his military colleagues, without any intemational support, and after ten days of the highest tensions, Arbenz resigned and transferred power to a military comrade he believed to be loyal. He assumed, naively,'" that his resignation would serve to safeguard the conquests of the revolutionary period. It was the aftemoon of June 27, 1954, and that act marked the rest of his life. A very close friend to the Arbenz-Vilanova family during the period the family lived in Uruguay remembers that for Jacobo, both the invasion and his resignation were "trapped in his head," and that he "kept on recalling those events and reproaching himself for them."" Without ignoring Arbenz's own insecurities, it must be added that the magnitude of CIA documentation exclusively regarding the pressure on Arbetiz allows us to take some distance from simple explanations about his last hotirs in the presidency (it was insistently repeated again and again, in both friendly and unfriendly circles, that his resignation had been an act of cowardice). It rather seems that those who have judged that, at that stage, there were abundant
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reasons to delegate the position were correct.'^ Much later, Arbenz assessed those circumstances in the light of the moments he had then lived and expressed categorically: "it was a tragedy."" The CIA came to know well both the strengths and weaknesses of the president. Beyond a 1950 "compliment," when the agency described him as "brilliant...cultivated,"'" Arbenz's weak points in both his life and personality were used, once he was out of power, in CIA actions against his image and prestige as a politician who had implemented a model agrarian reform. A summary of the Guatemalan historical process noted the ascending career of that young military officer, first as a revolutionary and then as a defender of legality as Arvalo's minister.'* Even then it seemed important for the agency to be knowledgable about Arbenz's health conditions, and it had access to a clinical report of 1947, when Arbenz visited a specialist to treat his problems with alcohol. '^ It seems that the president was subjected to intense physical and psychological attacks that caused notable deterioration in the Guatemalan during the period before the 1954 invasion." POLITICAL ASYLUM AT THE EMBASSY OF MEXICO IN GUATEMALA The Embassy of Mexico was the first lodging place for Arbenz after his resignation. The 73 days he spent there were uncomfortable, given the fact that another 300 persons had also sought asylum. It was in this period that the CIA started a new phase of operations against him, with three main objectives. The first was to demonstrate the supposed communist connections of the deposed regime. The second was to circulate the idea that "those in asylum should be prosecuted in Guatemala and...they should not be allowed to extend their misbehavior to other countries in Latin America." And the third objective was to exploit that situation for propaganda purposes by attempting "to associate Arbenz's supporters with Moscow."'* Furthermore, there is proof that a diverse set of other ideas was used through the media with the purpose of harming Arbenz's public image. CIA agents confiscated his personal papers, and, once they had been tampered with, they constituted the basis for elaborating "press releases" to generate adverse public opinion. Through these measures the CIA made clear that it was pursuing deeper treatment of some issues: for example, due to Arbenz's resignation, "to accuse [him] of cowardice" and "lack of courage to lead a desperate resistance;" to exploit his friendship with the communist Jose Manuel Fortuny" as "very useful" to "reinforce the story of an intimate relationship between the two;" and finally, to recall his "unfortunate personal life."^"

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By reviewing the perspectives and content of the Guatemalan media's coverage of these events, we can trace a striking similarity with the CIA's planned objectives. Secretly, the CIA and the State Department promoted the view that those in asylum should be "prosecuted in Guatemala."^' In an opinion column Fabian Ymeri coincided with that orientation by stating that "if a delinquent seeks refuge in a foreign country, the government of the country where the crime was perpetrated has the right...to request his or her extradition in order to prosecute him or her," thereby "easily" solving "the asylum problem."^^ Regarding Arbenz's refuge, the propaganda stressed that far from his expected protagonism, the former president was "taking cover behind the four walls of the room he had been given, from which he never came out." Additionally, the propaganda diseminated "jokes" that were circulating "from person to person" among those in asylum, whose central "protagonist" was Arbenz. The publicity given to these humorous tales seemed to kill two birds with one stone: on the one hand, it implicitly assessed the president's "cowardice," and on the other it made clear his supposed "links" with communism. The jokes included the following: "an old supporter of Arbenz has nicknamed him Sandino, sarcastically comparing Arbenz with that Nicaraguan hero who honored his word by being killed;" and "Someone else says that the former president will go to the Russian university in Kurken, where he is going to lecture on how to govern...and defend the goverrmient against any invasion."" Once safe conduct guarantees to go abroad were obtained, Arbenz left Guatemala. The ostentious humiliation to which he was subjected (he was forced to undress before the cameras at the airport) was not enough to make him open his lips. Coverage of this event next day were particularly harsh, and again, they followed the CIA's plan. According to the media, the former president had left "gloomy" and "with arrogance" while his wife was "more composed." One journalist said that Arbenz "acted as in a play" and "disappointed the audience" by refusing "to say a single word." He arrived at the airport in a "lackluster" car, and as soon as he got inside the terminal members of the public uttered "gross words" of "indignation." "He was terrribly pale" and "he could hardly hide his...fear.. .He walked like a robot," although in his favor the journalist also said that "in one moment he acted a bit more human, and with his hand he caressed his little daughter" Leonora. When Arbenz was forced to take his clothes off, the article indicated that it "gave the impression that a cold statue was taking off his marble clothes." The search lasted one hour, and then Arbenz walked to the airplane's stairway. At that moment one could see that Arbenz "lost his self-control and officers of the Mexican Embassy had to help him." Finally, the article made the point that Fortuny's presence was noted, in his condition as "number one
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Communist of Guatemala," "inseparable" friend, and "as always," Arbenz's traveling companion.^"* ARBENZ'S DAYS IN MEXICO A few hours later Arbenz and his companions landed in Mexican soil. Press articles of that country, reproduced in the Guatemalan newspaper El Imparcial, were not any more encouraging. Again, Arbenz was presented as "gloomy," with a "corpse-like paleness," and in the place "only one woman.. .attempted a timid clapping, which immediately died within the strange coldness that pervaded the environment."" Arbenz thanked the Mexican authorities, and he was surrounded by some important personalities, such as members of the Cardenas family. However, not even there could he enjoy some tranquility, because, as an Uruguayan paper reported, his presence posed a "delicate diplomatic problem" for Mexico.^' Denunciations and an extradition request arrived from Guatemala. Because of that, the former president convened a press conference. Anticommunist organizations, some of them facades behind which the CIA operated, organized a protest at the hotel door, and Mexican authorities forced Arbenz to cancel the event. The news that spread after this episode contained the same tendentious profile: Jacobo "abruptly let down" a hundred journalists.^' Partly overcoming the circle of silence, Arbenz gave his views to Siempre, a weekly magazine. The reaction was immediate. A vehement article by Antonio Urz suggested that this Mexican journalist was following a preestablished script. During the interview Arbenz had said that the Ambassador of the United States in Guatemala was a "gangster" and that his fall was due to military treason. According to the CIA, such "comments against the army" were useftil to be "emphasized in internal propaganda in Guatemala."^* Coinciding with this, Urz asked Arbenz, "Why do you now accuse [the ambassador] of being a gangster? Why did you not have courage enough to say it at the time? You," Urz continued, "do not have the character, and even less the courage. What soldier in our America, with more than 12,000 men, surrenders the way you did? We, the Indo-Hispanics, are ashamed of you." After that, Urz asked Arbenz to "leave Guatemala in peace, because no one likes you there and if they want you to return., .it is to apply the Talion law to you."^' TOWARDS EUROPE Without either papers or stability, the Arbenz family left for Europe, where they had a chance to reach Switzerland and seek passports based on
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Arbenz's heritage. Informed of his plans, the CIA assessed that such a move could be used in the media from "two angles": first, "that the Mexican government had expelled him," and second, "that his trip to Europe was a last attempt to travel behind the Iron Curtain for advice.'"" Maria Vilanova", Arbenz's wife, remembers that the route "took them through Canada in order to pick up Arabella," their oldest daughter." After that, the journey continued, with a stopover in the Netherlands, before arriving the same day in Paris, where they stayed a few days and then continued to Switzerland by car. During that time, the media circulated several rumors. Confirmation of Arbenz's presence in Switzerland since January 5, as well as his intention to obtain Swiss citizenship, seemed to the CIA as two potentially interesting elements. A report written by Frank Wisner, the imaginative chief of the Office for Policy Coordination," leaves no doubts about when, how and why they should pay attention to Arbenz. Quick action was justified because, in Wisner's perspective, "it would be a mistake...if we waited with arms crossed while Arbenz successfully rehabilitates himself in Switzerland and wears the mantle of martyr and victim of cynical U.S. intrigues." Consequently, Wisner ordered three lines of aetion. The first addressed how to deal with the problem vis-a-vis Latin America, where Wisner noted that "with his request for a Swiss passport" Arbenz demonstrated that "he was not as Guatemalan" as he had always pretended. The second directive, "to be used in Europe," was "speculative and tendentious:" "[I] f Arbenz is not attempting to go behind the Iron Curtain" is because "the plans ordered by Moscow have been revoked." Finally, the third of Wisner's points was the most extensive and encompassed two tracks. One proposed "making available a certain number of documents and information to the Swiss government regarding Arbenz and the reeord of his regime." The second track was to plant "a few stories in the newspapers" including "verbal accusations against Arbenz," a mechanism for which Wisner asked, "Do we have contact with any paper in Switzerland in order to approach it... in a secure manner?"" Some time later, another CIA report noted that with the purpose of "discrediting Arbenz" "many operations were carried out," after instructions were given to CIA stations to speculate that Arbenz was "going the route of a refugee beyond the Iron Curtain" while, simultaneously, in other media, "articles, pamphlets and posters were inspired portraying Arbenz as a traitor who had abandoned his comrades."" Some examples confirm that what was planned was carried out in practice. In Guatemala, a columnsuspiciously, without a bylinestated: "Very Guatemalan, people said of Mr. Jacobo, because he was the son of a pharmacist of Quetzaltenango, and the whiteness of his skin derived from the climate ofthat city and the fact that he bathed frequently." The column called Arbenz's conduct "disgraceful," because he had never before remembered his
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land, Switzerland, and now he was doing it only "to save himself from extradition.'^ The fact that a photograph of the Arbenz-Vilanova couple appeared on the front page of one of the Uruguayan newspapers closest to the CIA station in Montevideo," as well as the fact that the same newspaper published soon after a colutnn about Switzerland and the "Arbenz case," seems to show its adherence to CIA orientations. This editorial piece contained especially harsh words: "If former president Arbetiz can and wants to one day provide the documents...he will automatically become a citizen" in Switzerland. "So far he has not presented them [and] this distraction or lax attitude...has surprised and even upset many Swiss, probably because they perceive that in such attitude there is indifference or disdain towards a nationality they are justly proud of" Several lines later, the resemblance with another CIA suggestion seems to be direct, as the columnist hinted that "Arbetiz had recovered or requested Swiss citizenship in order to protect himself against a possible extradition request by the present Government of Guatemala. In fact...no Swiss citizen can be tumed in to a foreign country...[and] Arbenz, as a Swiss citizen, would enjoy the protection and all the rights granted by Swiss citizenship. Nobody could impede him even to be a communist...because that party...is not banned in Switzerland...[and] he could carry on any intemal or foreign policy he wanted."" With the same diligence, a biweekly Mexican publication, Lucha, showed a cartoon of Arbenz going to Switzerland under the title "the quetzal [a bird that is a national symbol of Guatemala] is incensed."" Additionally, El Imparcial, a Guatemalan newspaper, circulated the rumor that Arbenz ' s alleged "change of nationality" was received with "profotmd displeasure by other Guatemalan exiles in Mexico, who certainly will erase Arbenz's name in their sedition plans...and look for a new caudillo.''^'^ Jacobo gave up his quest to obtain Swiss citizenship, and the CIA's strategy was exhausted because Arbetiz's preference to remain a Guatemalan citizen led to the agency's conclusion that it was no longer "very useful to deal with this issue."^' France authorized Arbenz to reside there for a year, under the condition of abstaining from all political activism. The former president accepted and retumed to Paris with his family. Following the Arbetiz family was an easy task for French agents, because, far from seeking conspiratorial objectives, the family wanted to walk around the city. The agents offered themselves to take them to different places around the French capital.''^

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BEYOND THE IRON CURTAIN Conditions for the Arbenz family continued to be inconvenient and the possibility of moving to Czechoslovakia seemed to promise greater stability. For the CIA, Arbenz had crossed the "curtain" and that move made it possible to act according to the most profitable path: Arbenz was a communist agent, and he was seeking "advice" in that country. In Guatemala, the news immediately spread, and with that the analyses appeared one after the other. The following headline left no doubts about the manipulation of the news of the former president's move: "Communist former President will receive instructions for subversion in Guatemala."^' In New York, the World Telegram and Sun, an evening paper, proclaimed: "Finally Arbenz has found asylum in a place that he must love, a land from the Iron Curtain where they practice the same sort of democratic regime as his.'"" Again, repercussions reached as far as Uruguay, and, once again, they must be attributed to a CIA operation. According to one CIA doctiment, two "inspired" articles published in Montevideo showed "that Arbenz's trip to Prague demolished the arguments of those people who defended him against accusations of communism.'"" Those "inspired" editorials appeared on two consecutive days in the pages of El Da and La Maana. The first, a fervently anticommunist paper, dedicated its space to crowing that now Arbenz "will feel comfortable." The passage of time had transformed the ex-president into a "former dictator," and the paper informed Uruguayan readers about the causes for Arbenz's decision to live "for a long period of time" in "vassal" Prague: "the exemplary" Switzerland "did not please" Arbenz because there its citizens "practice democratic traditions and take life honestly and seriously.'"" The next day, the second newspaper denounced Arbenz's actions as displaying "a revealing attitude about the Guatemalan problem." After reminding readers that the former president had not demonstrated "fervent patriotism" by requesting Swiss citizenship, it assessed his presence in Prague as leaving "his defenders pretty empty-handed, since they had tried so far to explain his fall based on a unilateral interpretation which was far from sticking to truth.'"" The New York paper Z,a Prensa did the same thing, stating, "It did not take too long for Mr. Arbenz to confirm what people had long suspected about him, and which he used to deny." Moreover, this paper added a piece of information that it considered confirmed: "Arbenz is now being paid...as a propagandist for the communist cause" and "it is believed that...he works for the Latin American section of the Cominform.'"'* The CIA also had links in communist territory, which provided firsthand information and told the agency that during an interview Arbenz "revealed that he was preparing a book on the events of 1954.'"" The receptive Guatemalan media echoed that news, reporting that the former president lived
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"comfortably" in a "golden exile in Prague." One journalist said that "while Arbenz's life was inexorably linked to international communism," he was drafting a book on his experiences that "will probably be translated to all languages in the communist world, guaranteeing a circulation of hundreds of thousands of copies."'" Carlos Manuel Pellecer, a Communist Party leader in Guatemala who at that time was Arbenz's friend and fellow exile in Czechoslovakia, wrote notes on Arbenz's time in Prague that greatly differed from the above mentioned news reports. He gave the opinion that when Arbenz arrived he looked like "a castaway in search of refuge" and that far from being "an official guest," "his treatment by the authorities was discourteous and even violent." Pellecer added that after sour negotiations Arbenz managed to get "a residence in the countryside, with no communication to the city and with many inconveniences." Under those circumstances, Arbenz's trip to Mosow was "rather than a solution, a source of relief."'' According to the CIA documents, the days in the Soviet Union and China were discreetly handled. "His departure from Prague was a carefully kept secret" and among other precautions both Jacobo and Maria used "pseudonyms." The secretiveness made almost impossible any filtration to the press. In fact, any circulation of intimate details of the family would have jeopardized the privileged position held by the agent who was the CIA's main source of information, whose cryptonym was "Inluck."" After some time, Jacobo and Maria returned to Prague with their youngest son, and then they went back to Paris. At that time the couple was temporarily separated. Maria travelled to El Salvador to sell some properties, and, close to Guatemala, try to obtain her little son's birth certificate. Moving into action, the CIA managed to influence public knowledge regarding her trip, reporting that "this information can be used as a facade, leaving hints that her real intentions were much more sinister."" The separation from Maria increased Jacobo's depression, and thanks to "Inluck" the agency continued to receive every detail. Based on "the history of Inluck regarding Arbenz's personal life," in the chronological biography produced by the CIA, one reads that "his loneliness in Paris (what he calls "a life without hopes") leads Arbenz to excessively drink." Moreover, "his desperation drove him to remain in seclusion in his room for days...food would be sent to him.. .and he would not talk with anyone, with the windows shut and the lights off day and night. He stayed hours in a state of total depression, violent irritation and screams. Physically he was exhausted and looked old. His temperament became more impulsive and violent. He looked like a man with no strength, without any desire to live or at least a person who wanted to peacefully live and not to struggle."''' In some of his writings, Carlos Manuel Pellecer (in this moment also
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in Paris) offered a version almost identical to the CIA report just cited. "The seora and the child have departed," leaving Arbenz "alone in Paris," wrote Pellecer. Of the "energetic and handsome official that we used to admire in the Escuela Politcnica, there is little trace...The disillusionment was palpable." "The ex-president passed the main part of his days and nights in his room, doors and windows closed, lights extinguished, in bed, smoking, thinking in the absolute darkness of the night. He ate little, went out rarely."" At this point, his lines differed solely in the first letters of the name of the hotel where Arbenz was staying.^' The similarity between the CIA reports and the writings of Pellecer was not a coincidence; everything indicates that "Inluck" was the cryptonym of the very same Pellecer, who, it is important to remember, figured in the extensive list of collaborators of the CIA, as revealed later by one of its agents." AGAIN IN AMERICA In a desperate situation, Arbenz sought ways to return to Latin America. Since it was impossible to go to Mexico, one of his ex-ministers, living in Uruguay, raised the possibility that this country might receive him. The firm and traditional hospitality regarding political reftigees gave small margin to the maneuvers of the CIA, so that a visa for Arbenz seemed assured. In any case, various documents indicate that the efforts aimed at preventing Uruguayan govemment permission for Arbenz to live in Uruguay were as persistent as they were fruitless. The CIA and the State Department worked together. The operation planned diplomatic protests both formal and informal aimed to "emphasize the danger for the hemisphere" constituted by the presence of this "Soviet agent," an accusation proven by Arbenz's previous "residence behind the Iron Curtain."'* The beginning of the visa process from Paris hurried the CIA to put its plan into practice. According to the CIA, the U.S. ambassador in Montevideo was instructed to "make representations to the Minister of Foreign Relations asking that a visa not be guaranteed" for Arbenz. In the same vein, at the request of the CIA's "staff" in Guatemala, "president Castillo Armas was requested to mandate his Ambassador in Montevideo to make a proposal to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Uruguay" to deny the visa for Arbenz "based on his decision to go beyond the Iron Curtain."" Based on confidential reports promptly sent to Montevideo, the Ambassador of Uruguay in the United States and his First Counsellor were approached by State Department officials. Without abandoning diplomatic subtlety, they made "very unfavorable" references "about ex-president Arbenz," suggesting that if he were accepted by Uruguay "unfavorable" circumstances "would be created" as well as "difficulties of various types.'"60 ,
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In any case, and despite demands to the contrary, the Government of Uruguay accepted the "request by Mr. Jacobo Arbenz to come to the country," providing him "asylum as a political refugee."'' The CIA, once confirming the forthcoming presence of the Guatemalan citizen in South America, designed a series of "operations against" him, including the circulation of statements, in various stages and through the usual channels of information, emphasizing Arbenz's friendship with "the Communists;" "exposing his political and subversive activities, and showing therefore that he had violated the norms of asylum;" underlining "Arbenz's unstable temperament... and his dependence on liquor;" and indicating that "his daughters still were behind the iron curtain."" A physician working for the agency was assigned to work on "a study of Arbenz that could be presented as a work of a psychiatrist having had a series of interviews with him." The plan was to have this study seem "as if it had come from a Czech desertor" and the"idea behind it" was to "portray Arbenz as a person unfit for public life."" Dates, expressions and contents of the Uruguayan anticommunist press confirm the extent to which those media abided by the CIA's operative suggestions'"*, which, we must add, was not anything new." Furthermore, the intensity of the operation corroborates one of the central ideas of this work: he was not just any former president. It must be said that regarding this aspect the agency was right: in local leftist circles the former Guatemalan leader was an important referent.'* Only this fact could explain a newspaper campaign of this magnitude, in addition to following him and exerting a covert control of this sort." The first news on Arbenz came to the media in Montevideo in April, when a newspaper reported that the former "Head of the pro-Soviet Guatemalan Government" had obtained "a visa to travel to our country."'* A few days later, the same newspaper devoted an exclusive editorial piece to this point in question: Arbenz was a "flilly-discussed figure" for having been the "first governmental official outside the iron curtain who accepted to be an official guest in a Commimist State." For this reason, it was "inadmissible to imagine that someone might have had the occurrence of inviting him," although if he eventually came we would have the "ungrateful duty to receive him."" The following day, another morning paper also produced an editorial piece saying that the Guatemalan citizen considered "moving" in order to "be surrounded by the well-known commie elements," and in case of confirmation "we will have, then, repetitions of case of Guatemala, already overcome, for the.. .concern of the Interior Minister." The CIA's clandestine moves seem to have encompassed all possible groimds, with no room for improvisation. In this sense, it sent two wires to Montevideo aimed at organizing a "welcoming committee" with "Uruguayan anti-Communist journalists" to wait for Arbenz at the airport with a
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"demonstration" against his presence." Arbenz arrived in Montevideo on May 13,1957. The day before, the second largest paper published what it understood to be his main "biographic features." We can note the tone in the four columns by reading some of its lines: "Arbenz had many of the traits that distinguish individuals of the Aryan race," but there was something about him that "gave the impression of coldness and distance," and for this reason he is "surrottnded by an environment which is far from bringing him sincere friends and followers." Even worse, the main feature in his physiognomy was a "permanent mutism" leading to "view him as a pale wax figure."'^ As foreseen, some twenty joumalists were waiting for Arbetiz at the airport. As soon as he landed on Umguayan soil, they surrounded him and presented him with suspicious questions: "Why did you go to Czechoslovakia?" "Are you a Communist or do you feel like one?" "Was your Govertiment a Communist one?" "What about your wife and children?"'" He was taken from the airport to meet with the Head of the Police, who transmitted to him his obligations as a person in asylum, among them one that was imposed on him for the very first time ever: "to daily present himself to the police authorities."'" The local CIA station insisted again and again through the press that the Guatemalan citizen should be under tight control.'' Howard Hunt'*, the agency's chief in Montevideo confirms this, as does the official police record of the Uruguayan Intelligence Service. Eventually this unusual measure was given some flexibility and Arbenz was told to present himself every eight days. The campaign reached the parliament as well, where several senators and congresspersons denounced the fact that public events had been organized for Arbetiz and that he should have canceled a press conference and a talk at the National University. They mentioned that the front wall of the house where he was living had been painted with a hammer and sickle. Moreover, the city was full with pamphlets, with no signature, accusing him of being a "Russian agent."" The assassination of head of state Carlos Castillo Armas in Guatemala in July provoked a marked increased in the media attacks against the former president then installed in Rio de la Plata.'* Because of this episode, Arbenz spoke to the media. It would be the last time that he would publicly speak for the next three years. His words (in essence, half a page written with a typewriter that he gave to the avid joumalists who came to his domicile) were tendentiously presented in the front page pretending to be an exclusive interview with him, even though Arbetiz was not permitted to hold such interviews." The local Intelligence Service, alert as always, analyzed the news. The govemment, however, ultimately did not take any action regarding this issue.'" As much as they could, Uruguayan fnends accompanied Jacobo and
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Maria Arbenz in solidarity and made more placid their asylum. A year after Jacobo's arrival, former Guatemalan president Arvalo came to Uruguay and established himself there for some time. The Arbetiz couple originally welcomed the news,*' but rapidly the relationship became cold because of significant differences.*^ In Montevideo, Arvalo was not under rigorous surveillance and he could express himself, as he did through press articles.*^ Arvalo left for Venezuela the following year, when he was hired to teach a university course.*" Despite all their constraints, Arbenz's wife wrote that the couple was grateful for the hospitality they received. She said: "the friends we had were very kind.. .if we had been given permanent residence, we would have stayed working in this country."*^ CUBA AND MEXICO: THE FINAL YEARS For Arbenz, the possibility of emigrating to Cuba after the revolution there seemed like a propitious opportunity to live in more freedom. He, therefore, accepted an invitation that a Cuban delegation offered to him during a visit to Uruguay in mid-1960. Arbenz flew to Havana in July 1960 and he fotmd the city in elation. He was infected by this euphoria, and at first he participated in public events and gave some interviews. However, he became upset at the repetition of the slogan: "Cuba is not Guatemala," because it was a painful reminder of the 1954 defeat. Arbenz's proximity to his country radicalized Guatemalan media and authorities, because they were afraid that, with Cuban support, he might lead an expedition aimed at taking power. As had occurred since 1954, media denunciations and attacks in his country became increasingly harsh. Without doctimentary proof of possible CIA involvement in propaganda campaigns*' he historian must be very cautious in his or her interpretations. But one cannot fail to observe that, at this time, there were media attacks with very similar characteristics to those of the years before 1960. NewsfromGuatemala reported that a "chalet" belonging to the former president was "given back to its legitimate owners."*' When Arbenz was accused of being "one of the most active agents Moscow ctirrently counts on in South America."** few days after Arbenz arrived in Cuba, journalist Clemente Marroquin Rojas*' warned in a long article that he was "in Havana and will wage war on us."'" In next day's issue of the same paper, another coltimnist made it known that all seemed to "indicate that Jacobo Arbenz has been pointed by the finger of the Kremlin to get all possible support from the Government of Cuba to head a revolt in Guatemala, directed from Fidel Castro's land, aimed at overthrowing the present constitutional regime in the country in order to take power again.""
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Some offers were made to Arbenz to be in command of a revolutionary movement in Guatemala, where the military had assumed a very repressive role. He was pessimistic, however, about the possibilities of successfully applying the Cuban guerrilla experience to Guatemala. For this reason he postponed the decision to participate. In 1965, Arbenz was invited to the Communist Congress held in Helsinki.'^ Soon after, Arabella, his oldest daughter, committed suicide, shocking and weakening Arbenz even ftirther. Guatemalan newspapers echoed the family drama in these terms: the remains of the "suicidal person" were transported from Bogot to Mexico City, and after the funeral, the former president left "his family in Mexico as indeflnite tourists."" The following years Arbenz alternated between France and Switzerland, where, Maria remembers, everything was "very different from the treatment received before."'"* Living in Mexico continued to be Jacobo's goal and the positive response from that country revealed that time had passed by and consequently the pressures had ceased. Once in Mexico a "serious illness" that "he did not want to take care o f " became more acute, and his health increasingly deteriorated. By the end of 1970, Arbenz was sick. Marroquin Rojas addressed this issue in his newspapers and did not hesitate to make questionable claims. He dismissed any merit for Arbenz regarding the October Revolution that overthrew dictator Ubico's autocratic regime. He said that at that time Arbenz "returned to the country and, as is well known, joined the rebellion that Colonel Francisco Javier Arana had initiated." His program of government was nothing but "simple," while his resignation "disappointed us." He immediately added: "He has had political ftiends in exile and good money." Meanwhile, he let Arbenz know that in Guatemala "few persons remember him," and that if he attempted to return "something very similar to what had happened to Arvalo could occur to him: Arvalo thought that he was going to be greeted as a demi-God, but only a few hundred old friends embraced him."'* Not long after, the end came. It happened in the loneliness of the bathmb after Arbenz suffered a heart attack. An Uruguayan teacher, who had known Arbenz well while he lived in Montevideo, summarized with accuracy Arbenz's final departure: "His name sounds distant, but at one time he played a fundamental role in Latin American revolutionary politics."" FINAL COMMENTS As we have demonstrated, it seems undeniable that the CIA played a key role in undermining Arbenz's prestige, particularly during his first years in exile. We should add that it was not the CIA only, given the fact that the conservative upper class, which would never forgive Arbenz's agrarian reform, enthusiastically joined the anticommunist campaign.
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The fiftieth anniversary of the 1944 October Revolution in 1994 was a good time to begin to discuss those historical events. The following year, in October 1995, Arbenz's remains were repatriated from El Salvador. His widow once again accompanied him, and the San Carlos de Guatemala National University posthumously decorated the former president. However, decades of terror, violence and fear are not easily forgotten. In Guatemala, a country of strong contrasts, Arbenz is still a topic of debate. The ambitious and well-documented Historia General de Guatemala faithfully reects this fact; there, interpretations of the govemment of Arbenz and its historical role continue to be completely contradictory."

NOTES 1. A specialized scholar on the issue affirms: "The original revisionist claim that United Fruit masterminded Arbenz's defeat also appears untenable." See Stephen Streeter, "Interpreting the 1954 U.S. Intervention in Guatemala: Realist, Revisionist, and Postrevisionist, Perspectives," The History Teacher 34 (2000), athttp://www.history cooperative.org/joumals/ht/34.1/streeter.html. Similar conclusions appear in Richard Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala. The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004, [1982]) IX; Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954 >iew Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1991); Stephen Rabe, "The U.S. Intervention in Guatemala: The Documentary Record," Diplomatic History 28 (2004): pp. 785-790. Nick Cullather, PBSUCCESS. La operacin encubierta de la CIA en Guatemala, 1952-1954 (Guatemala: Avancso, 2002) p. 102. Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, p. 391. Nick Cullather, PBSUCCESS, p. 117. Theodore Draper, "Is the CIA Necessary?" The New York Review of Books, XLIV, 13 (1997). Richard Immerman, TheCIA, 187-197; Nick Cullather, PASi/C^S, pp. 116-117; Piero Gleijeses, "Ships in the Night: The CIA, the White House and the Bay of Pigs," Journal of Latin American Studies 27 (1995) pp. 1-42; Piero Gleijeses, "Mirando hacia atrs: Dwight Eisenhower y Jacobo Arbenz," Revista de la Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala 8 (2005) pp. 18-26. Jess Garcia Aoveros, Jacobo Arbenz (Madrid: Historia 16, 1987) pp. 137, 139. So far, this is the only biographical essay dedicated to the life of Jacobo Arbenz, though, unfortunately, it lacks
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2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

7.

Roberto Garcia Ferreira/The CIA and Jacobo Arbenz: Histoiy of a Disinformation Campaign methodological rigor and depth. Maria Vilanova de Arbenz, "La conspiracin del silencio," SigloXXI, Aug. 31, 1990. Greg Grandin, "Pensar globalmente, actuar ocalmente," in Nick Cullather, PBSUGGESS, p. VIII. Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, pp. 379-380. The former president often visited them and "he always came with a bottle of whiskey that he placed on the table." That was the ideal excuse for his reliving for hours the final moments of the Guatemalan Revolution, "as someone who would like to go back" in time. Interview with Martha Valentini, Montevideo, September 2005. Stephen Streeter, "Interpreting." Marta Cehelsky, "Habla Arbenz. Su juicio histrico retrospectivo," ^/ero, 8 (1968) p. 124. PieroGleijeses, ^/iaWez-ei/Z/ope, p. 142. Source: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 'The Revolutions of 1944 (W/Attachments)," Document Number: 928377, 16 May 1952. The 18 pages attached to this report are "totally censored." (From now on CIA sources will be quoted in the following manner: Source, Name, Document number and Date). The agency had access to the clinical report that was prepared on that occasion, when Jacobo was advised that "it is imperative for your sense of well-being as well as for your happiness to place yourself in a balanced life plan." The doctor added as an argument that "you felt much better when you were here." CIA, "Clinical Report on Arbenz' mental attittide," 915065, Jan. 25, 1952. About Arbenz's political orientations see CIA, "Personal Political Orientation of President Arbenz/Posibility of a Left-Wing Coup," 924149, Set 1952. Re possible attacks against Arbenz before the invasion, see: "General-Kugown-Specific. Possible Attacks Against Arbenz," 916073, 30 April 1954; "Hula-600. Possible Attacks Against Arbenz," 915676, 5 May 1954; "KUGOWN- Cartoons," 915235, 16 May 1954; "(Est Pub Date): Black and White List," 915774. CIA, "Proposals of Combined Department of State and CIA for Action to Exploit Asylee Situation in Guatemala", 934416, 3 August 1954; "Exploitation of Asylee Situation in Guatemala (W/Attachments)", 934415, 5 August 1954. A personal friend of Arbenz since 1947, Fortuny was the main leader of the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT, the Communist Guatemala's Workers Party). After visiting many countries, he settled in Mexico, where he recently died at age 89. See La Hora
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8. 9. 10. 11.

12. 13. 14. 15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

JOURNAL OF THIRD WORLD STUDIES, FALL 2008

20.

21. 22.

23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

30. 31.

32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

38. 39.

(Guatemala), March 19, 2005. CIA, "Jacobo Arbenz, ex-President of Guatemala-Operations Against (W/Attachments)," 919960, May 15, 1957. Written in 1957, the doctmient is Arbetiz's "chronological biography" between 1950 and 1957. Each of the "operational standards" to be carried out before each trip, such as information to the press, circle of fHends, ups and downs of his married life, and other personal aspects, were studied. CIA, Document Number: 934416. El Imparcial (Guatemala), Aug. 6,1954. Most Guatemalan press was reviewed in the Archive of Centro de Investigaciones Regionales de Mesoamrica (CIRMA), in the city of Antigua, Guatemala. //w/7araa/, Sept. 8, 1954. El Imparcial, Sept. 10, 1954. El Imparcial, Sept. 10,1954. La Maana (Uruguay), Sept. 11, 1954. El Imparcial, Oct. 21, 1954. CIA, Document Number: 919960. This refers to the vengeful and retaliatory practice of "an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth." "Due to its interest." Uroz's article was totally reproduced in //wj/>araa/, Dec. 11, 1954. CIA, Document Number: 919960. She was a Salvadorean bom to a wealthy couple from El Salvador. She was known for her high spirits and strong will, and she met Jacobo at a party in Guatemala. Soon after they were married and had three children: Arabella, Leonora and Jacobo Antonio. She is now 91 years old and resides in Costa Rica, where she finally settled in 1978. Maria Vilanova de Arbenz, Mi esposo, el Presidente Arbenz (Guatemala: Editorial Universitaria, 2000) p. 93. Francis Stonors Saunders, La CIA y la guerra fra cultural (Madrid: Debate, 2001), pp. 66-67, 140. CIA, "Notes-Guatemala 1954 Coup", 920015, Jan. 6, 1955. CIA, "Mise Re Guatemala 1954 Coup (W/Attachment)", 919991, Apr. 6, 1955. Laora,Feb. 23, 1955. A short time earlier, on Jan. 8, a pictitre of the Arbenz-Vilanova couple at the Paris airport was the issue cover, with a headline stating that Arbetiz was the "procommunist" president "who had been overthrown last year," La Maana, Jan. 8, 1955. La Maana, Feb. 14, 1955. In the drawing, Arbetiz looks older; he is carrying a suitcase that suggests he is taking a million quetzals from "Banco Agrario" and a bag where one can read three inscriptions: "treason to Guatemala,"
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Roberto Garcia Ferreira/The CIA and Jacobo Arbenz; History of a Disinformation Campaign

40. 41. 42.

43.

44.

45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52.

53. 54. 55. 56. 57.

"sacrifice for the people," and "communist slave." The scene is completed by a quetzal that talks to the president while he walks by, telling him: "I hope you neither get there nor return here!" See El Imparcial, Jan 5, 1955. El Imparcial, Jan \2, 1955. CIA, Document Number: 919960. Maria Vilanova de Arbenz, Mi esposo, 94. No opportunity was missed in Guatemala to talk about the former president's "relaxation season" in the French Riviera. El Imparcial, Apr. 14, 1955. "The ones who met the Arbenz family in Prague say "(...) they are wealthy and Mr. Arbenz frequently gets together with the main Russian and Czech communists." El Imparcial, Dec. 20, 1955. In the Dec. 2 issue. El Imparcial reproduced the article from that North American newspaper with the headline: "Arbenz finds a country for himself (...) behind the Iron Curtain." CIA, Document Number: 919960. El Da (Uruguay), Nov. 29, 1955. Z,aMiaa, Nov. 30, 1955. The article was reproduced in El Imparcial, Jan. 26, 1956. CIA, "Kucage-Operational-Guatemalan Exiles-Jacobo Arbenz (W/Attachment)", 919983, Dec. 6, 1955. El Imparcial. Feb. 2,1956. Carlos Manuel Pellecer, Arbenz y yo (Guatemala: Artemis, 1997) pp. 262-263, 287-289. The CIA knew the Arbenz's daughters had stayed at a Soviet school for a period of time, but the group of people who had that information was so small that the agents suggested caution in handling the news: even though it "was possible to publish that they were being educated in a communist country, possibly, the USSR (...) the specific school or its location should not be mentioned." CIA, Document Number 919960. CIA, Document Number 919960. CIA, Document Number 919960. Carlos Manuel Pellecer, Arbenz, pp. 292-293. The CIA files say the name was "Vermont" while Pellecer argues that it was "Frimont." In the appendix to his diary, Agee wrote textually: "Pellecer, Carlos Manuel. CIA infiltration agent in the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) and in the communist movements and their connections in Mexico City. After working for the CIA for several years, he broke away from communism. Code name: "LINLUCK." Philip Agee, La CIA por dentro (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1987) p. 475. To be
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58. 59. 60.

61. 62. 63. 64.

65.

66. 67.

68. 69. 70. 71. 72.

73. 74. 75.

precise, there is one letter's difference in the name (the first L). However, it does not invalidate the statement; most likely, that difference was an error of memory of Agee's. CIA,"Sit-Rep Uruguay's Grant of Asylum to-Expresident Arbenz of Guatemala", 919961, May 10, 1957. CIA, Document Number: 919961. Historical Archive of the Uruguayan Ministry of Foreign Relations, Source: Legations and Embassies, Section: Embassy of the Repblica Oriental del Uruguay in Washington, box 52, folder 31, Apr. 26,1957 and May 6, 1957. General Archive of the Nation,ft-omConsejo Nacional de Gobierno, volume XXXII, Minute 281, Apr. 30, 1957. CIA, Document Number: 919961. CIA, Document Number: 919957; Document Number: 919958. Roberto Garcia Ferreira, "'Operaciones en contra': el asilo politico de Jacobo Arbenz Guzman en Uruguay (1957-60)", Poltica y Sociedad 42 (2004) pp. 45-70. Roberto Garcia Ferreira "Uruguay y Guatemala. La CIA en la prensa de 1954" Revista de la Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala 16 (2006) pp. 22-38. Roberto Garca Ferreira, "El caso de Guatemala: Arvalo, Arbenz y la izquierda uruguaya, 1950-1971" Mesoamrica 49 (2007). Archive of National Office of Information and Intelligence, Montevideo Police, Office of Investigation, Intelligence and Liaison Service, Folder 280, Subject: Jacobo Arbenz Guzman; Folder 280 A, Subject: Jacobo Arbenz Guzman. Comentarios de prensa. See Roberto Garcia Ferreira, "Arbenz, la CIA y el exilio en Uruguay" Dilogo (FLACSO) No. Extraordinario, Oct. 2006. La Maana, Apr. 20, 1957. La Maana, Apr. 25, 1957. El Pas (Uruguay), Apr. 26, 1957. CIA, Document Number: 919961. El Pas, May 12, 1957. Ex-president Arbenz's biographical information published that day was taken from a book published in Mexico by the Guatemalan writer Carlos Samayoa Chinchilla. At the same time, an issue of this publication was donated to the National Library in Montevideo in 1957 as a "compliment of the Office of 'Diffusion, Culture and Tourism of the Presidency of the Republic.'" El Pas, La Maana and Accin (Uruguay), May 14,1957. In the newspaper original, this is quoted in dark type. Accin, May 14,1957. El Da, May 9, 1957; El Pas, May 12, 1957 and El Plata, May 7,
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Roberto Garcia Ferreira/The CIA and Jacobo Arbenz: History of a Disinformation Campaign

76. 77. 78.

79.

80.

81.

82.

1957. Howard Hunt, Memorias de un espa. De la CIA al escndalo Watergate (Barcelona: Noguer, 1975) 137, pp. 140-141. Diary of Parliamentary Reports, June 4 and 12, and Aug. 6, 1957. A column in the socialist weekly journal perfectly summarized the contents of the anticommunist media of the time: "Arbenz was a risk to the country's security. Arbenz is in touch with our country's union agitators. Arbenz is the mastermind behind a communist conspiracy in Latin America. Arbenz ordered the execution of Castillo Armas, the dictator. In conclusion, a proper cap for the unleashed repugnant campaign (...) would be to fix posters revealing that Arbenz was the real culprit of the total failure of Uruguayan soccer. Although, in truth, this would be nothing (...) For the moment we can inform that the LOA has gathered a sufficient number of secret documents to unmistakingly prove that Arbenz is responsible for the recent solar explosions." LOA referred to Liga Oriental Anticomunista (Anticommunist League of the East, one of the CIA's fronts in Montevideo. El Sol (Uruguay), Aug. 9, 1957 La Tribuna Popular (Uruguay), July 28, 1957, "Arbenz speaks for 'La Tribuna Popular.'" Arbenz strongly condemns the crimes perpetrated by traitors in Guatemala. Exclusive report by DOLORES CASTILLO." Lieutenant Captain Fontana transcribed these statements in a report to his superior, informing him that he made them known "in case these statements might constitute a transgression of the norms regulating the right to asylum." Archive of National Office of Information and Intelligence, Montevideo Police, Office of Investigation, Intelligence and Liaison Service, Folder 280, Subject: "Jacobo Arbenz, sus declaraciones", Aug. 7, 1957, 1. It is very possible that the rapid reaction of this official can be explained by his close relation with the CIA in Montevideo. P.Agee, the former CIA officer, indicated that among his close collaborators "linked to the station in Montevideo," lieutenant captain Fontana was key. Philip Agee, La CIA, 465. When the well-fed Arvalo came to Montevideo, "the Arbenz couple bought a very large bed" to place "in the living room." Interview with Martha Valentini, Montevideo, September 2005. The death of Francisco Javier Arana, never well explained by Arvalo, was an unsurmountable barrier and a sure reason for friction. While both lived in Montevideo, Jacobo suggested that Arevalo publicly clarify the way Arana had died. Arevalo refused, arguing that best thing to do was not to talk about that subject. Piero Gleijeses,
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Shattered, p. 70. It may be recalled that one of the strongest issues the CIA used in its campaign against Arbenz was precisely the Arana afffair. The fact that Arbenz was consistently accused by the media, without a single opportunity to respond, adds another element to prove Maria's testimony, cited by Gleijeses. Jos Manuel Fortuny, who at the time used to clandestinely visit Montevideo, states that the differences between the two former presidents were originated by Arbenz's policy regarding the communists. Marco Antonio Flores, Fortuny: un comunista guatemalteco (Guatemala: scar de Len, 1994) pp. 268-269. 83. 84. Marcha (Uruguay), May 2 and May 30,1958; Aug. 8,1958. The Uruguayan Intelligence Service gave a different interpretation: "A few days ago, we obtained confidential information indicating that the person named AREVALO would go to live in Caracas, in accordance with a perfectly devised communist plan, in order to direct the entire Latin American movement, and Arbenz would remain in Montevideo." Archive of National Office of Information and Intelligence, Montevideo Police, Office of Investigation, Intelligence and Liaison Service, Folder 410, "Caracas - Centro de Actividades Comunistas en Amrica Latina," memo dated March 12, 1959. Maria Vilanova de Arbenz, M/esporo, p. 140. There are few declassified documents on Arbenz's life in Cuba. CIA, "Castro Regime Plans Arms Aid To Guatemalan Leftist", 132566; "NSC Briefing, 12 August 1960", 137334; "Cuban Developments", 132785; "Cuban Situation: Economic Agreements With Bloc; Latin American Youth Congress", 132769. Prensa Libre (Guatemala), Feb. 12, 1960. El Imparcial, March 24, 1960. Journalist and intellectual of the right, with a large literature, mainly with the daily paper La Hora. Years later he was elected Vice President of the Republic (1966-1970). Z,a//ora, Aug. 10, 1960. a/fora, Aug. 11, 1960. Maria Vilanova de Arbenz, Mi esposo, p. 118. El Imparcial, Oct. 20, 1965. Maria Vilanova de Arbenz, Mi esposo, p. 120. Maria Vilanova de Arbenz, Mi esposo, p. 122. a/fora,Nov. 2, 1970. A/arcAa,Jan. 29, 1971. See Alfredo Guerra Borges, "Semblanza de la Revolucin Guatemalteca de 1944-1954" and Alcira Goicolea, "Los Diez Aos de Primavera" in Jorge Lujan Muoz [Dir.], Historia General de
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85. 86.

87. 88. 89.

90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98.

Roberto Garcia Ferreira/The CIA and Jacobo Arbenz: History of a Disinformation Campaign

Guatemala (Guatemala, Asociacin de Amigos del Pas y Fundacin para la Cultura y el Desarrollo, 1997) Tomo VI, pp. 11-22; 23-40.

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