ADMINISTRATIVE LAW Administrative Law = that branch of public law dealing with the doctrines and p rinciples governing

the powers and procedures of administrative agencies includi ng especially judicial review of administrative action. Prescribes the Administrative permanent framework of the system of government; supplies the gen Constitutional Law Carries into effect the plan of governmental organization, executes what has bee eral plan of governmental organization Prescribes the constitutional law n prescribed bylimitations on the exercise of governmental power so as to protec Provides for the relief to against abuse should exercise t the rights of individualsthe individualsin theirthere be violations of their r Gives stress on their duties to the Stresses on the right of citizens ights by official government action government Composed of persons Court Administrative body or individuals who are considered as experts in their partic A tribunal ular fieldsmanned by persons who are learned in the field of law, imparted and r Given Has a variety passing in Haveonlywider discretionpressure of politics emovedafrom theof functions the exercise of its power since it is not bound by t judicial function Has to observe the principles and rules embodied in he rigid technicalities as prescribed upon the courtthe Rules of Court * Purpose of administrative law is the protection of private rights. * Subject matter of administrative law is the nature and mode of powers exercise d by administrative bodies and officers. * It has for its basic functions the effective and efficient operation of the go vernment machinery. * Origin of administrative law: o Statutes o Increase of government functions and concerns o Necessity of government control and regulation * Sources of Administrative Law: o The Constitution o Statutes creating administrative bodies o Court decisions o Body of rules, regulations and orders issued by administrative agencies Reason why it is called fourth branch of the government: Because of the multiplication of the activities of man, the State through l egislature and courts found it necessary to create agencies in order to de-clog court dockets. The State found it unable to keep up with the various activities of individuals. Thus, the so-called venture into the 4th branch of the governmen t which is actually a delegation of legislative power to the administrative bodi es. BQ: What are the types of administrative bodies or agencies? 1) Administrative agencies created to carry on governmental functions(BIR, BoC, CSC, LRA) 2) Administrative agencies created to perform business services for the public ( Philippine Postal Authority; PNR, NFA, NHA) 3) Administrative agencies created to regulate businesses affected with public i nterest (NTC, LTFRB, Insurance Commission, ERB, HLURB, Bureau of Mines and Geo-S ciences) 4) Administrative agencies created to regulate private businesses and individual s under police power (SEC, Dangerous Drug Board, CID, PRC) 5) Administrative agencies that adjudicate and decide industrial controversies ( NLRC, POEA) 6) Administrative agencies that grant privileges (GSIS, SSS, PAO, Phil Veterans Adm.) 7) Administrative agencies making the government a private party (COA, Social Se curity System Adjudication Office) corporate of the National GovernmentRepublic Of The Philippines Governmentgovernmental entity through which the functions of government are exer

cised throughout the Philippine Islands, including, the various arms through whi ch political authority is made effective in said Islands, whether pertaining to the central Government or to the provincial or municipal branches or other form Entire machinery of (Section 2, Administrative Code) of local government.the central government, composed of executive, legislative, and judicial departments, as distinguished from the different forms of local gov ernments BACANI vs. NACOCO (100P468) F: Court stenographers were asked to return the money paid to them by Nat l Coconu t Corp (NACOCO). COA disallowed the payment saying that since NACOCO is exempted being part of GRP. H: NACOCO has a corporate personality separate and distinct from the GRP. It is not within the scope of GRP. Thus, it is not exempt under Rule 131. The term Government of the Republic of the Philippines" used in Section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code refers only to that government entity through wh ich the functions of government are exercised as an attribute of sovereignty, an d in this are included those arms through which such political authority is made effective whether they be provincial, municipal or other form of local governme nt. These are what we call municipal corporations. They do not include government entities which are given a corporate personal ity and distinct from the government and which are governed by the Corporation l aw. Their powers, duties and liabilities have to be determined by in the light o f that law and of their corporate charters. They, like NACOCO, do not therefore come within the exemption clause prescribed in Section 16 of our Rules of Court CENTRAL BANK vs. CA (63 S 431) F: Court sided with contractor Ablaza and ordered CB to pay. Under the old Admin istrative Code, National Government cannot dispense fund without the requisite c ertification of availability of funds. In this case, there was none aside from t he fact that no formal contract was entered into. H: CB is not part of the National Government To be sure, the CB is a government instrumentality. But it was created as an autonomous body under RA 265, "to administer the monetary und banking system of the republic. It does not depend on the National Government for the financing of its opera tions, it is the national Government that occasionally resorts to it for the nee ded budgetary accommodations. Under Section 14 of the Bank's Charter, the Moneta ry Board may authorize such expenditures by the CB as are in the interest of the effective administration and operation of the bank. Its prerogative to incur su ch liabilities and expenditures is not subject to any prerequisite found in any statute or regulation not expressly applicable to it. Relevant to the issue in t his case, it is not subject, like the Social Security Commission, to section 190 1 and related provisions of the Revised Administrative Code, which require natio nal government construction to be done by or under the supervision of the Bureau of Public Works. For these reasons, the provisions of the RAC invoked by the ba nk do not apply to it. To our knowledge, in no other instance has the Bank consi dered itself subject thereto. * 10/9/1989 Minute Resolution = UP does not fall within GRP Incorporated and Non-Incorporated Government Authorities IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY vs. CA (249 SCRA 539) F: ISA was created for a term of 5 years. It instituted expropriation proceeding s, but while the case was pending, its term expired, so GRP substituted it. H: ISA is a non-incorporated authority, thus GRP could substitute The Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) is a non-incorporated agency or instrumen tality of the Republic of the Philippines, or more precisely of the Government o f the Republic of the Philippines. When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the powers duties and functions as well as the assets and liabi

lities of that agency revert back to, and are reassumed by, the Republic of the Philippines, in the absence of special provisions of law specifying some other d isposition thereof. * For incorporated agencies, GRP will not be able to substitute because they hav e an independent personality. ???????????????????????????????????? ???????????? * Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, o courts cannot and will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, o especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrati ve discretion o requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administ rative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact and o where a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered. * The doctrine applies where a claim is originally cognizable in courts, and com es into play whenever enforcement of a claim requires the resolution of issues w hich, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pendi ng referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view. * The purpose of the doctrine is not only o to give the administrative agency the opportunity to decide the controve rsy by itself correctly, but also o to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to courts. BOC vs. DELA ROSA (May 31, 1991) F: BoC ruled that William s grandfather is a Filipino. This is reversed by the new BoC, thus William appealed before Judge Dela Rosa. BoC contended that the court has no jurisdiction H: The court is not empowered to look into this question: whether or not a perso n is an alleged alien. This is within the competence of the BOI. The Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive authority to hear and try cases involving alleged aliens, and in the process, determine also their citizenship. The Primary Jurisdiction of the Bureau of immigration over deportation proce edings admits of an exception, i.e. judicial intervention may be resorted to in cases where the claim of citizenship is so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is Correct. The Bureau of Immigration is not of equal rank as the RTC, hence its decisions may be appealable to, and may be r eviewed through a special civil action for certiorari by the RTC. Qualitrans Limousine Service Inc. v. Royal Class Limousine Service (179 S 569) F: Land Transportation Commission (LTC) granted a certificate of public convenie nce (CPC) to Royal Class. The same CPC was also granted to Qualitrans. Thus, Qua litrans filed a petition for declaratory relief before the LTC which action is o rdinarily cognizable by the regular courts. H: LTC has jurisdiction Applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the LTC has the power to look into the controversy notwithstanding the fact that it is a petition for declara tory relief. What is important is not the nomenclature or the name attached by t he parties to their pleadings, but what the petition alleges. Actually, the petition although named as petition for declaratory relief, is a petition to declare the rights given by the LTC to the Royal Class. The LTC has the power to modify, revise or set aside the CPC by applying the doctrine of pr imary jurisdiction. Moreover, the LTC as well as most of the administrative bodies are now empow ered to award damages pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

How do you determine whether or not an agency or body is judicial or administrat ive? If the principal function of the body is regulatory in nature although in t he process of this principal regulatory function it is allowed by law to adjudic ate controversy and this latter function is merely an incident to its primary fu nction, it is an administrative body. Otherwise, if the principal purpose in creating such body is to adjudicate and decide given rights, then it is a matter within the ambit of the court.

??????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????? Statutes conferring powers on administrative agencies must be liberally cons trued to enable them to discharge their assigned duties in accordance with the l egislative purpose. SOLID HOMES vs. PAYAWAL (177 SCRA 73 [1989]) F: Payawal bought a house from Solid Homes. Although she already paid the price, Solid Homes failed to deliver the Certificate of Title. Thus, Payawal filed a c ase before the court. Solid Homes argued that NHA has jurisdiction instead. H: RTC has no jurisdiction over the case The Supreme Court sustained the competence of the National Housing Authority (NHA) in the exercise of its exclusive jurisdiction vested in its by PD 957 and PD 1344 to determine the rights of the parties under a contract to sell a subdi vision lot. Under PD 1344, the NHA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature: 1) Unsound real estate business practices; 2) Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or cond ominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or sales man; and 3) Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, devel oper, dealer, broker or salesman. CT TORRES, INC. vs. HIBIONADA (191 SCRA 268) F: After Diongon fully paid the land he bought from Pleasantiville Dev t Corp., it still refused to deliver the Certificate of Title H: RTC has no jurisdiction over the case Under PD 1344, the complaint for specific performance with damages filed wi th the Regional Trial Court comes under the jurisdiction of the Housing and Land use Regulatory Board (HLURB), e.g. where the buyer of a subdivision lot seeks s pecific performance of the seller's obligation to deliver to him the correspondi

ng certificate of title The HLURB is competent to award damages although this is essentially a judicia l power exercisable ordinarily only by the courts, in the exercise of its powers , the HLURB must interpret and apply contracts, and award damages whenever appro priate Note: On 2/7/1981, by virtue of EO 648, the regulatory functions of NHA were t ransferred to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC). But pursuant t o EO 90 dated 12/17/1986, the functions of the HSRC were transferred to the HLUR B. Marina Properties Corp. vs. CA, (294 SCRA 273) F: Marina constructed a condo and hired Carlos as a principal contractor. As an incentive, it allowed Carlos to buy one unit. Now, Marina refused to accept Carl os Construction s payment for its balance for the condo unit it bought. Carlos fil ed damages before the RTC and an action for specific performance before the HLUR B. H: Carlos is not guilty of forum shopping since the cause of action is different There is no forum shopping where a party sues another before the HLURB to enfo rce their Contract to Purchase and to Sell and files another suit in court to co llect sum of money corresponding to unpaid billings from their Construction Cont ract. Arranza vs. BF Homes. Inc. (333 SCRA 300) The HLURB and not the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has jurisdict ion over a complaint filed by subdivision homeowners against a subdivision devel oper (under receivership) for specific performance regarding basic homeowners' n eeds such as water, security and open spaces. The fact that respondent is under receivership does not divest the HLURB of that jurisdiction. No violation of the SEC order suspending payments to creditor s would result as far as petitioners' complaint before the HLURB is concerned. S uch claims are basically not pecuniary in nature although it could incidentally involve monetary considerations. All that petitioners' claims entail is the exer cise of proper subdivision management by the SEC-appointed Board of Receivers so that homeowners shall enjoy the ideal community living. Neither may petitioners be considered as having "claims" against respondent within the context of PD 902-A to warrant the suspension of the HLURB proceeding s. Petitioners do not aim to enforce a pecuniary demand. Their claim for reimbur sement should be viewed in the light of respondent's failure to observe its stat utory and contractual obligations or provide petitioners a "decent human settlem ent" and ample opportunities for improving their quality of life." Thus, the proceedings at the HLURB should not be suspended and should contin ue until such time that the HLURB shall have resolved the controversy. Any and a ll monetary claims duly established before the HLURB shall be referred to the Bo ard of Receivers. Fabia vs. CA. 363 SCRA 433 Although the doctrine of primary jurisdiction exhorts the referral of the i nstant case to the SEC for its resolution, however, RA 8799 (30 May 2000), The S ecurities Regulation Code, has amended PD 902-A, and transferred the jurisdictio n of the SEC over intra-corporate cases (all those enumerated under Sec. 5 of PD 902-A) to the courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Courts. PAL vs. Kurangking, 389 SCRA 588 Note that on 15 December 2000, the Court, in A.M. No 00-8-10-SC, adopted the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation and directed the transfe r from the SEC to RTCs, all petitions for rehabilitation filed by corporations, partnerships and associations under PD 902-A in accordance with the amendatory p rovisions of RA 8799.

Padua vs. Ranada (390 SCRA 664) The laws and the TRB Rules of Procedure have provided the remedies of an int erested Expressway user, that is, to file a petition for review of the adjusted toll rates with the Toll Regulatory Board(TRB). The TRB is the agency assigned t o supervise the collection of toll fees and the operation of toll facilities. Pe titioner Zialcita's argument that the provisional toll rate adjustments are exor bitant, oppressive, onerous and unconscionable is a question of fact requiring k nowledge of the formula used and the factors considered in determining the assai led rates. This task is within the province of the TRB. Further, PD 1112 explici tly provides that "the decisions of the Toll Regulatory Board on petitions for t he increase of toll rate shall be appeasable to the Office of the President with in 10 days from the promulgation thereof.

Republic v. Migrino (189 S 300) F: PCGG chair Jovito Salonga created an Anti-Graft Board to investigate the unex plained wealth of AFP personnel. He ordered an investigation on Lt. Col. Tecson who argued that PCGG has no jurisdiction over him since there was no allegation of his association with Marcos. H: PCGG has no jurisdiction since its authority is only limited to investigating the Marcoses wealth The issuance of the order creating the Anti-Graft Board as applied to the me mbers of the AFP no longer has relation to the law because the law intends only the PCGG to look into the alleged ill-gotten wealth involving the Marcoses and t heir cronies. And if the respondent before the PCGG is facing a charge which has nothing t o do with alleged association with the Marcoses, then it does not fall within th e ambit of the law creating the PCGG. ??????????????????????????????? Generally, administrative bodies can only exercise those powers which are ei ther conferred by the Constitution or statute or those which are necessarily imp lied from their exercise. Administrative bodies commonly exercise two (2) basic powers: 1. quasi legislative or rule-making = enables them to promulgate implementing ru les and regulations 2. quasi judicial or adjudicatory= enables them to interpret and apply such regu lations To directed Absolutely to Maybeapplies to Notice dispensed with Ratebe &FIXINGpresent evidence Extentableapplicability Quasi-Judicialonly Legislativenecessary unless the law provides otherwise ON RATEofhearingallat 1 entity and prove the possible adverse effects on its fin ancial viability ???????????????????? * This is the power of administrative agencies o to resolve questions of fact and questions of law involved in a case bro ught to their determination and adjudication, o provided, that its determination on question of law is subject to judici al review. * The exercise of this power is incidental to their main function. Their main fu nction is to enforce the law entrusted to them for implementation * Procedural due process should be complied with * For an administrative body to be considered and to act as quasi-judicial, o there must be an express empowerment by law. o Absent express empowerment, jurisdiction should be construed to mean mer e regulatory and supervisory, not judicial powers. * Adjudicative power must always be read and exercised as being in aid of the pr incipal function of an administrative body.

In other words, the grant of quasi-judicial power should not be the only power conferred but should instead be only incidental to the administrative age ncy's main task of implementing the law in the specific fields of its expertise. o Otherwise, the agency becomes a specialized court of justice under the j udicial branch. PCGG vs. Judge Pena 2/7/1989 F: PCGG issued freeze order to two export garment firms who filed an injunction before RTC to restrain PCGG. H: RTC cannot restrain PCGG Under its charter, PCGG exercises quasi-judicial power thus it is deemed a co-equal body of RTC. Quasi-Judicial is the term applied the action, discretion etc. of public adm inistrative officers who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the exi stence of facts and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official act ion, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. A quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation of evidence, (b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved Sanado vs. CA, 356 SCRA 546 The action of an administrative agency in granting or denying, or in suspend ing or revoking, a license, permit, franchise, or certificate or public convenie nce and necessity is administrative or quasi-judicial. Under the POEA Rules and Regulations, the POEA, on its own initiative, may c onduct the necessary proceeding for the suspension or cancellation of the licens e of any private placement agency on any of the grounds mentioned therein. University of the Phil. Board of Regents vs. CA (313 SCRA 404) F: UP awarded a doctorate degree in Anthropology to an Indian national. It was l ater found that she has plagiarized her thesis thus the Board of Regents withdre w the degree. She contended that the Board was already estopped. H: the degree can be withdrawn; power to infer includes the power to withdraw; t here was due process because she was given the right to be heard a formal hearin g is not required If the conferment of a degree is founded on error or fraud, the Board of Reg ents is also empowered, subject to the observance of due process, to withdraw wh at it has granted without violating a student's rights. The pursuit of academic excellence is the university's concern -- it should be empowered, as an act of self-defense, to take measures to protect itself from serious threats to its integrity. If an institution of higher learning can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor or disti nction of being its graduates. Carino vs. CHR, 204 SCRA 483 F: Teachers who participated in the mass action were either dismissed or suspend ed. While the appeal was pending before the SC, the teachers also filed a case b efore the CHR who issued subpoena to DECS Sec Cario. H: CHR has no power to adjudicate; decision of DECS Sec is appealed to Pres While the Constitution grants the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) the power to investigate ... all forms of human rights violations involving civil and poli tical rights" its power to investigate does not include the power to adjudicate. Fact-finding is not adjudication and cannot be likened to a judicial or quas i-judicial function. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining there f rom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered such

, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controve rsy must be accomplished by the authority of applying the law to those factual c onclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authorit atively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals, or modes of review as may be provided by law, which the Constitution has withheld from the CHR. BQ: Can the CHR exercise QJ function? No! Since this power was not conferred to the CHR. Authority to conduct investigation does not mean that you also have quasi-judicial powers. Federacion Espaol Profesores vs. QUISUMBING (1/26/1988) F: Educ Sec Quisumbing issued an order abolishing Spanish subject as part of the curriculum and imposing the Arabic subject in an optional basis. The Federacion questioned the order as arbitrary and violative of due process. H: The issuance of the order is a valid exercise of quasi-legislative power, so there can be no violation of due process here. Notice and hearing is not necessa ry The rule against forum shopping applies to quasi-judicial proceedings. * Forum shopping is the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, of seeking another (other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari), or of instituting two or more actions or proceeding s grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other would make a favorable disposition. * In this jurisdiction, a party is not permitted to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different form. * Where forum-shopping is deemed to exist, the summary dismissal of both actions is warranted. * The test to determine whether a party has violated the rule against forum shop ping is where the elements of Iitis pendentia are present or where a final judgm ent in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. * The requisites of res judicata are: a) identity of parties, b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being foun ded on the same facts, and c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amou nt to res judicata in the action under consideration Cabarrus vs. Bemas, 279 SCRA 388 The prohibition against forum shopping does not apply to an agency which doe s not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power Thus, the filing in court of a c ivil case for damages arising from a crime does nor preclude the plaintiff from instituting a criminal complaint with the prosecutor's office or other investiga ting agency, such as the National Bureau of Investigation, they being not quasijudicial office or agencies exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers. The la w allows the filing of a civil action independently with the criminal case witho ut violating the circular on forum shopping.

????????????????? Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies the authority to pr omulgate rules and regulations in order to implement a given legislation and eff ectuate its policies. In order to be valid: 1) the rules and regulation must be germane to the objects and purpose of the st atute;

2) it must conform to the standards of the statute; and 3) it must relate solely to carrying out into effect the general provisions of t he law. If the implementing rules and regulations are issued in excess of the rule ma king authority of the agency, it is without binding effect upon the courts. At b est, the same may be treated as administrative interpretations of the law and as such, they may be set aside by the Supreme Court in the final determination of what the law means Power to makeagencies Quasi-legislative andto issue adm fix legislative policy Legislative Power Powerthe power torulesaand regulations in order to implement t of adm laws Power be the legislative policy Cannot anddelegated legislation to the the legislature he lawof subordinateby legislaturefixed byadm agencies Requisites for a valid delegation (Pelaez v. Auditor General) a) the law must be complete in itself; must set forth a policy to be executed (C ompleteness Test) b) must fix a standard, the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or dete rminable, to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions . (Sufficient Standard Test) Phil. Bank of Communications vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (302 SCRA 241) F: PBCom filed a refund for its tax credit 3 years after it was incurred. It inv oked Rev. Memo. Circ. 7-85 which states that its prescriptive period is 10 years H: circular is invalid; no vested right on erroneous interpretation of the law Revenue Memorandum Circular 7-85, changing the prescriptive period of two ye ars to ten years on claims of excess quarterly income tax payments, created a cl ear inconsistency with the provision of Section 230 of 1997 National Internal Re venue Code. The rule issued by the BIR Commissioner violates the law. It arrogates unto itself the power to legislate. One requirement for a valid issuance of rules and regulations by administrative agencies is that, the rule must be germane to the object and purposes of the law and must at all times be in conformity and withi n the scope and powers as provided by the statute to the administrative agency. So in this case, there can be no estoppel on the part of the State where the administrative agency acting on behalf of the State has made an error. Ople vs. Torres (293 SCRA 141) Administrative Order No 308 which provided for the adoption of a national co mputerized identification reference system is unconstitutional. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relate s to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It cannot b e argued that AO 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. The esta blishment of a national computerized identification reference system requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies, the primacy of nationa l security, the extent of privacy against dossier-gathering by the government, a nd choices of policies. It deals with a subject that should be covered by a law. (what was required was a law itself) * law authorizing Pres to suspend the operation of a law upon the happening of a n act and such ascertainment is also given to the pres = no undue delegation of legislative power * to avoid undue delegation, it is essential that the law must be complete OR, i n the absence of completeness of the law, there must be sufficient guidelines or policies Kinds of Administrative Rules and Regulations: 1. Supplementary or detailed legislation They are rules and regulations "t o fix the details" in the execution and enforcement of a policy set out in the l aw a. ex: Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code. 2. Interpretative legislation They are rules and regulations construing or

interpreting the provisions of a statute to be enforced and they are binding on all concerned until they are changed a. Ex: BIR Circulars, CB Circulars b. They have the effect of law and are entitled to great respect; they have in their favor the presumption of legality. c. The erroneous application of the law by public officers does not bar a s ubsequent correct application of the law. 3. Contingent legislation They are rules and regulations made by an adminis trative authority on the existence of certain facts or things upon which the enf orcement of the law depends. What they Regulations interpretation Rulesis employed in promulgating law of the law Interpretativefrom implement Legislativeadopt totheir(#1&2)thethis regulation is not the discretion to determ arising Regulations ine what the law shall be, as this is exclusively vested in the legislature, but They discretion on how the law shallconstruction of a statute and they are valid i the constitute the administrator s be enforced f they construe the statute correctly. If not, they are subject to judicial revi ew Requisites for its validity: 1. issued under the authority of law 2. within the scope and purview of the law SANZ vs. ABAD SANTOS F: The board of examiners for nursing issued an order requiring a periodic inspe ction of nursing schools H: order is valid; it is an exercise of quasi-legislative power thus prior heari ng not needed RA 877, as amended by RA 4704 (The Phil Nursing Act), empowers the Board of Examiners to promulgate rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry o ut the provision of this Act. It is also empowered to inspect nursing colleges a nd schools and vests it with authority to issue, suspend, revoke or reissue certi ficates of registration for practice of nursing. Thus, statutory authority plainl y exists for petitioner board to conduct periodic inspections of nursing schools in order to discharge its supervisory and regulatory functions vested in it und er the Phil Nursing Act. LUPANGCO vs. CA (160 S 848) F: PRC issued an order requiring that the candidates for CPA board exams are not allowed to participate in any review classes or receive materials within 3-day period prior to the examination day. The order was questioned by the students. H: this should have been valid but invalidated because it was capricious Basically, the PRC performed quasi-legislative power. But the issuance of a quasi-legislative rule must be reasonable. It must not be arbitrary. But in this case, the issuance of order by the PRC violated the rights not only of the stud ents but also the right to academic freedom of the school how to prepare their s tudents to pass the CPA exam is within the ambit of this right to academic freed om. In the same manner, it is the right of liberty of the students to take whate ver measures they deemed proper in order that they successfully hurdle the CPA b oard exams. In other words, the rule issued by the administrative agency must not be ar bitrary. It must be reasonable and consistent with the objective of the law. It is precisely to carry out the object and purpose of the statute creating the adm inistrative agency. PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION vs. DECS (8/31/1987) F: petitioner questioned DECS order authorizing TFI of 15% to 20%. DECS reconsid ered and decreased it to 10%-15%. Petitioner was not contended and filed a petit ion for prohibition before the courts saying DECS has no power to increase schoo l fees and the order constitutes a denial of substantive and procedural due proc ess

H: the order was valid exercise of quasi-legislative power because it applies to all thus prior hearing not needed Section 57 (3) of BP Blg 232, otherwise known as The Education Act of 1982, vests the DECS with the power to regulate the educational system in the country. In the absence of a statute stating otherwise, this power includes the power to prescribe school fees and us such, the power should be considered lodged with t he DECS, if it is to properly and effectively discharge its functions and duties under the law. The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or an adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to affected parties is not a requirement of due process. In the exercise of its qua si-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates. When the rules laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to a ll enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a leg islative character. If it applies exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then it is quasi-judicial function in character. Dadole vs. CGA (393 SCRA 272) F: Mandaue judges received monthly allowances of 1,250. This was increased to 1, 500 on the pending budget. COA though disapproved it citing DBM circular limitin g the allowances to 1,000 H: circular is void Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55 dated 03/15/94) issued by the DBM which provides that the additional monthly allowances to be given by a LGU to nationa l government officials assigned in their locality (like Judges) should not excee d P1,000 in provinces/cities and P700 in municipalities is invalid because it go es beyond the law it seeks to implement. Section 458 of PA 7160, the law that supposedly serves as the legal basis of LBC 55, allows the grant of additional allowances to judges when the finances of the city government allow." The said provision does not authorize setting a def inite maximum limit to the additional allowances granted to judges. The DBM over -stepped its power of supervision over LGUs by imposing a prohibition that did n ot correspond with the law it sought to implement. Further, LBC 55 is void on ac count of its lack of publication CONTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS (264 SCRA 20) F: Petitioners are SSS ee s. Upon their retirement, they availed of RA 660 and SSS Resolution No. 56. COA disallowed all the claims, saying it violated RA 4968 (T eves Retirement Law) which specifically bars the creation of insurance or retire ment plan other than the GSIS government law for GSIS government employees. H: Resolution 56 contravenes the Teves Retirement Law. This is an act arrogating unto itself power solely belonging to Congress. The rule-making power of a public administrative body is a delegated legisla tive power, which it may not use either to abridge the authority given it by the Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond the scope intended. The SSS, in promulgating Res. 56 which provides a supplementary pension/retirem ent plan in contravention of the Teves Retirement Law (Sec 28 of CA 186 as amend ed by RA 4968), cannot, in the guise of rule-making, legislate or amend laws or worse, render them nugatory. NASIPIT LUMBER vs. NWPC (289 SCRA 670) The Labor Code, as amended by RA 6727 (Wages Rationalization Act), grants th e National Wages and Productivity Commission (NWPC) the power to prescribe rules and guidelines for the determination of appropriate wages in the country. Hence , guidelines issued by the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board (RTW PB) without the approval of or worse, contrary to those promulgated by the NWPC are ineffectual, void and cannot be the source of rights and privileges.

Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura & De Los Angeles vs. HDMF (333 SCRA 777) F: petitioner is a law firm exempted from Pag-ibig Fund coverage because of its superior retirement plan. A board resolution was passed though saying that in or der to be exempted, er needs to have both retirement and housing benefit H: board resolution is invalid Where the Board of Trustees of the Home Development Mutual Fund HDMF) requir ed in Section 1, Rule VII of the 1995 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Im plementing PD 1752, as amended by RA 7742, that employers should have both provi dent/retirement and housing benefits for all its employees in order to qualify f or exemption from the Pag-ibig Fund Coverage, it effectively amended Section 19 of PD 1752 which merely requires as a pre-condition for exemption from coverage the existence of either a superior provident/retirement plan or a superior hous ing plan, and not the concurrence of both plans. And when the HDMF Board subsequ ently abolished that exemption through its 1996 Amendments, it repealed Section 19 of PD 1752. Such amendment and subsequent repeal of Section 19 are both inval id, as they are not within the delegated power of the Board.

??????????????? ???????? Do all agencies with quasi-judicial functions have the power to issue subpoena? * Yes. As long as in exercise of quasi- judicial even if charter is silent. Po wer is vested in the AA in the Admin Code (see Sec 13 Bk VII) * Test for valid enforcement of subpoena: 1. w/in authority of the agency ( expressly authorized by law ) 2. demand is not too indefinite subpoena duces tecum 3. info is reasonably relevant (Evangelista v. Jarencio) * rationale: power to adjudicate will be rendered inutile if can t subpoena > Administrative agencies have no inherent power to require the attendance of wi tnesses. However, the power to issue subpoenas ad testificandum or duces tecum m ay be given to them by law; and the disobedience to the subpoena or refusal to b e sworn in to answer questions, or to comply with agency orders or decisions may be punished as contempt. > Under the Administrative Code of 1987 (Sec. 13, Chapters, Book Vll, EO 292), a dministrative and quasi-judicial bodies shall have the power in any contested ca se to require the attendance of witnesses or the production of books, papers, do cuments and other pertinent data, upon request of any party before or during the hearing upon showing of general relevance. > Further when authority to take testimony or receive evidence is conferred upon any administrative officer or any non-judicial person, committee, or other body , such authority shall include the power to administer oaths, summon witnesses, and require the production of documents by a subpoena duces tecum (Sec- 37). > Administrative subpoena differs from a judicial subpoena. The purpose of an ad ministrative subpoena is not to prove a pending charge but to discover evidence on the basis of which a charge may be filed if the evidence discovered so justif ies. A subpoena may be enforced if the inquiry is within the authority of the ag ency, the demand is not too indefinite and the information is reasonably relevan

t (Evangelista vs. Jarencio. 68 SCRA 99). ???????? Do all agencies with quasi-judicial functions have the power to cite for contemp t? * No. Power must be expressly granted in the agency s charter (ex. PD 902-A creat ing the SEC) * If no law, must invoke the aid of RTC * Rationale: power to punish for contempt inherently judicial * The power to cite for contempt can only be used in connection with judicial an d quasi-judicial functions and with ministerial functions. (Guevara v. COMELEC) > The power to punish contempt should be clearly defined and granted by law and its penalty determined. In the absence of provision of law, administrative bodie s do not possess inherent power of contempt. > EO 292 states that unless otherwise provided by law, the agency may, in case o f disobedience, invoke the aid of the Regional Trial Court within whose jurisdic tion the contested case being heard falls. The Court may punish contumacy or ref usal as contempt (Sec 13, Chapter 3. Bk. VII). > Where the administrative agency is given the power to punish for contempt, its exercise of the power is limited to making effective the power to elicit testim ony (in the exercise of QJ)and it cannot be exercised in furtherance of administ rative functions (Guevara vs. Comelec, 104 Phil 268). This limitation derives fr om the nature to punish for contempt as inherently judicial and from the existen ce of the power to punish for contempt as being essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and consequently, in the administration of justic e. Note: Subpoena and Contempt powers are inherent in courts. But for Adm bodies, a law expressly conferring such powers is needed. ???????????? 1. Discretionary power This is the power of administrative agencies to act offic ially on certain cases referred to them according to the dictates of their own j udgment and conscience and not controlled by the judgment or conscience of other s. 2. Ministerial power It is a power exercised in response to a duty as imposed by law and its performance does not depend upon the discretion of the administrati ve agency involved or of the executive officers performing said power. ?????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????? Administrative bodies, corollary to their obligation to enforce the law must perforce have the competence to interpret, at first instance, the meaning of th e laws that they are to execute. Such interpretations are however not binding upon the courts but carry persu asive weight. When an administrative agency renders an opinion or issues a state ment of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law and the administrative i nterpretation is at best advisory for it is the courts that finally determine wh at the law means (Melendres. Jr. vs. Comelec, 319 SCRA 262). ??????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????: (ASAR-P) 1. AUTHORIZED = Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature 2. SCOPE OF AUTHORITY = It must be within the scope of the authority given by th e legislature 3. ACCORDING TO THE PRESCRIBED PROCEDURE = It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure

4. REASONABLE = It must be reasonable, and 5. must be published = publication must be in full, or it is no publication at a ll Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules or regulations can take effect. This is explicit from EO No. 200, which repealed Article 2 of the Civil Code, a nd which states that: Laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completi on of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of gene ral circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided." Need not be published: 1. interpretative rules and regulations 2. merely internal in nature = regulating only the personnel of the administrati ve agency and not the public 3. letter of instruction issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties Caltex, Inc. vs. CA (292 SCRA 273) Issuances by an administrative agency have the force and effect of law, and when the issuances are of "general applicability", publication is necessary as a requirement of due process. Phil International Trading Corp. vs. COA (309 SCRA 177) DBM-CCC No. 10 which was issued by the DBM pursuant to Sec. 23 of RA 6758 an d which completely disallows payment of allowances and other compensation to gov ernment officials and employees is of no force and effect due to the absence of publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Th e fact that it was reissued and then submitted for publication in the O.G. does not cure the defect and retroact to the time that above-mentioned items were dis allowed in audit because publication is required as a condition precedent to the effectivity of a law to inform the public of the contents of the law or rules a nd regulations before their rights and interests are affected by the same. De Jesus vs. COA (294 SCRA 152). The circular issued by the DBM to implement the Salary Standardization Law, which discontinued the payment of allowances and fringe benefits previously gran ted on top of basic salary, was ineffective for lack of publication in the Offic ial Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation as required by law. Philsa International Placement and Services Corp. vs. Secretary of Labor (356 SC RA 174) An Administrative Circular that was never filed without the National Adminis trative Register cannot be used as basis for the imposition or administrative sa nctions. Under Sees. 3 & 4, Book VII, E.O 292, rules and regulations imposing a penal ty as authorized by the law itself must be filed and registered with the UP Law Center. Republic vs. Express Telecommunication Co.. Inc. (373 SCRA 317) F: Nat l Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued a provisional authority to Bay antel to operate a digital Cellular Mobile telephone. Extelcom objects saying su ch was issued under the 1978 rules of procedure when Bayantel s application was fi led on 1/22/1993 H: The 1993 Revised Rules of the NTC should be published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation before it can take effect. In the abse nce of such publication, therefore, it is the 1978 Rules that governs. The absence of publication, coupled with the certification by the NTC Commis

sioner stating that the NTC was still governed by the 1978 Rules, clearly indica te that the 1993 Revised Rules have not taken effect at the time of the grant of the provisional authority to Bayantel. The fact that the 1993 Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law Center on Fe bruary 3, 1993 is of no moment. Nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987 impli es that the filing of the rules with the UP Law Center is the operative act that gives the rules force and effect. The National Administrative Register is merel y a bulletin of codified rules and it is furnished only to the Office of the Pre sident, Congress, all appellate courts, the National Library, other public offic es or agencies as the Congress may select, and to other persons at a price suffi cient to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs.

Additional requisites for Adm rules with penal sanctions: 1. the law must itself declare as punishable the violation of the administrative rule or regulation 2. the law should define or fix the penalty for the violation of the administrat ive rule or regulation ??????????????????????????????????? ??????????? 1. impartial tribunal 2. due notice and hearing or opportunity to be heard 3. procedure consistent with essentials of a fair trial 4. proceedings should be conducted to give opportunity for a court to determine whether the applicable rule of law and procedure were observed REQ #1 Sec 9 of RA 4760 (Magna Carta of Public School Teachers): The committee to h ear public school teachers administrative cases is composed of: 1. the School Superintended of the division as chair 2. A representative of the local or any existing provincial or national teachers organization and 3. a supervisor of the division Fabella vs. CA (282 SCRA 256) The right of public school teachers who allegedly staged a strike to due pro cess was violated as to render the disciplinary sanction against them invalid, w hen the committee that conducted the investigation did not include as member a r epresentative of their organization specifically required by the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers (RA4670) to be so represented. In this case, the inclusion of a representative of a teachers organization in the committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. Emin vs. De Leon (378 SCRA 143) Although under the Civil Service Law, the civil service embraces every branc h, agency and instrumentality of government, including GOCC s whether performing g overnmental or proprietary function, the CSC does not have original jurisdiction over an administrative case against a public school teacher. Jurisdiction over administrative cases of public school teachers is lodged with the Investigating Committee created under Section 2 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers (RA 4670), now implemented under the DECS Rules of Procedure. Nonetheless, the Court affirmed the dismissal from the service of the petiti oner who was found guilty of dishonesty (for faking civil service eligibilities of certain teachers for a fee) as he was sufficiently afforded due process by th

e CSC. Not only did he answer the charges before the CSC Regional Office but he participated in the hearings. Under the principle of estoppel by laches, petitio ner is now barred from impugning the CSC's jurisdiction over his case. Alcafa et al. vs Villar (GR No. 156063. November 18, 2003) Respondent School Principal Villar is barred under the principle of estoppel by laches from assailing the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman since his right to p rocedural due process was properly observed. Not only did he file a counter-affi davit and a motion for reconsideration from the decision dismissing for dishones ty, he also participated in the hearings conducted by OMB-VIS and was given the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him. Cruz vs. CSC (370 SCRA 650) F: Paitim took the CSC exam in behalf of Cruz. They were found guilty by the CSC . They argued that their right to due process was violated since CSC acted as in vestigator, complainant, prosecutor and judge H: Petitioners were not denied due process of law by the fact that the CSC acted as investigator, complainant, prosecutor and judge, all at the same time agains t the petitioners. The CSC is mandated to hear and decide administrative cases instituted by it or instituted before it directly or on appeal, including actions of its officer s and the agencies attached to it. In this case, the fact that the complaint was filed by the CSC itself does not mean that it could not be an impartial judge. As an administrative body, its decision was based on substantial findings. Factu al findings of administrative bodies, being considered experts in their field, a re binding on the Supreme Court. REQ #2: Where the order refers to a simple revival of the archived application of Ba yantel in NTC Case No. 92-426, it cannot be said that oppositor Extelcom's right to procedural due process was prejudiced if it was not given an opportunity to question the motion for revival. There is no denial of due process where it will still have the opportunity to be heard during the full-blown adversarial hearin gs that will follow (Republic vs. Express Telecommunication, 373 SCRA 319). A party may be declared in default in administrative proceeding. So if ther e is a directive but the party respondent did not file the answer within the pre scribed period, the administrative officer may consider such party in default. A nd thus, the complainant may then proceed with the presentation of his evidence ex parte, unless there is waiver likewise of such presentation and that pleading be made clearly on the basis on such submission of a position paper. Note: A violation of any of the cardinal requirements of due process in administra tive proceedings renders any judgment or order issued therein null and void and can be attacked in any appropriate proceeding. requires refers tothat process substantiveduethe law itself, by merely the procedures by proceduralthe method of mannernot which the law is enforcedwhich the law would b due process e enforced, is fair, reasonable and just CSC vs. Lucas (301 SCRA 560) F: he was charged with simple misconduct and was suspended by DA Sec. Upon appea l, CSC charged him with grave misconduct and ordered his dismissal H: no due process since he was not informed of the charge of grave misconduct Administrative proceedings are not exempt from fundamental procedural princi ples, such as the right to due process in investigations and hearings. A basic r equirement of due process is that a person must be duly informed of the charges against him and that he cannot be convicted of a crime with which he was not cha rged. Thus, respondent was denied due process when the CSC, on appeal to it from the decision of the DA Secretary imposing the penalty of suspension for 1 month and 1 day on a charge of simple misconduct, found him guilty of grave misconduc t and meted him the penalty of dismissal.

Audion Electric Co. vs. NLRC (308 SCRA 340) The essence of due process is an opportunity to be heard or as applied to ad ministrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Concerned Officials of MWSS vs. Vasquez (240 SCRA 502) F: MWSS was ordered by Ombudsman to set aside the recommendation of its PBAC and award the contract to a complying and responsive bidder H: there was still due process One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps ev en many times more creditably and practicable than oral argument, through pleadi ngs. In administrative proceedings, moreover, technical rules of procedure and e vidence are not strictly applied; administrative due process cannot be fully equ ated to due process in its strict judicial sense. Univ. of the Phil. Board of Regents vs. CA (313 SCRA 4044) Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceed ings similar to those in the courts of justice. Disciplinary cases involving stu dents need not necessarily include the right to cross-examination. > The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process; it's mer ely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accord ance with provisions of the law. > As a statutory right, it may therefore be withdrawn by law and there can here be no denial of due process. > Due process in administrative adjudication does not mean that there must be a formal trial type investigation as that conducted in the courts of justice. In f act, the administrative agencies are not strictly bound to observe the rigid tec hnicalities as applied in courts following the Rules of Court. Lumiqued vs. Exevea (282 SCRA 125) F: DAR Reg l Director Lumiqued was found guilty of Malversation through Falsificat ion of Official Documents. On his 2nd MFR, he argued he was denied due process s ince he was not represented by counsel during the hearing. He died while the cas e was pending and his heirs has substituted him H: the was no denial of due process The due process clause does not encompass the right to be assisted by counse l during an administrative investigation. A party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent s capacity to repr esent himself, and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person investigat ed with counsel. In an administrative proceeding, a respondent has the option of engaging the services of counsel or not. This is clear from Section 39(2), Rule XIV (on Discipline) of the Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292. Administrative investigations are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that me rit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of the government service. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused dur ing custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may thus be rejecte d in a criminal at case and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In this case, DAR Regional Director Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in the proceedings. The investigation conducted by the committee was for the pu rpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law f or the complaints filed against him.

LINCOLN GERALD vs. NLRC (July 23, 1990) F: Lincoln Gerald complained that he was deprived of due process because the not ice adverse to him was furnished to his former counsel who failed to inform him and failed to file the necessary pleadings. H: there was no denial of due process; notices are sent to counsel of record, no t to the client Records show that petitioner s former counsel did not withdraw its appearance. Hence, service of a copy of the decision of the law was valid. In other words, there must be notice and application filed before the admini strative agency of such withdrawal as counsel. In the absence of such applicatio n and the approval by the administrative agency, the counsel continues to be the counsel of record. Thus, any notice given to the counsel is binding and is a no tice on the client. NAPOCOR vs. NLRC (90933-61; MAY 29, 1997) F: SolGen was Napocor s lawyer. NLRC s decision was sent to the special attorney tem porarily designated by the OSG. Thus, when Napocor filed an appeal, NLRC contend s that it was filed beyond the reglementary period. H: The period will only commence to run from OSG s receipt of the decision. The fact that the OSG is petitioner's counsel is unchallenged, the former ha ving entered its appearance on September 15, 1986. 24 The lawyer deputized and d esignated as "special attorney-OSG" is a mere representative of the OSG and the latter retains supervision and control over the deputized lawyer. The OSG contin ues to be the principal counsel for the National Power Corporation, and as such, the Solicitor General is the party entitled to be furnished copies of orders, n otices and decisions. The deputized special attorney has no legal authority to d ecide whether or not an appeal should be made. As a consequence, copies of orders and decisions served on the deputized cou nsel, acting as agent or representative of the Solicitor General, are not bindin g until they are actually received by the latter. We have likewise consistently held that the proper basis for computing the reglementary period to file an appe al and for determining whether a decision had attained finality is service on th e OSG. In the present controversy, only the special attorney was served with a c opy of the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Since service of said decision was nev er made on the OSG, the period to appeal the decision to the NLRC did not commen ce to run. Hence, the appeal memorandum filed by the OSG on July 17, 1989 was no t filed belatedly. ZAMBALES CHROMITE Mining vs. CA (94 S 261) F: Gozon rendered a decision adverse to Zambales Chromite while he was still dir ector of Bureau of Mines. Pending appeal, Gozon was promoted to DENR Sec, thus h e is not reviewing his decision. H: There was a violation of due process because the Chromite Mining cannot expec t fair play in the appealed case. The palpably flagrant anomaly of a Secretary of DENR reviewing his own decis ion, as Director of Mines, is a mockery of administrative justice. The decision of the reviewing officer would be biased, inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case. A sense of proportion and consideration for the fitness of things should hav e deterred Secretary Gozon from reviewing his own decision as Director of Mines. He should have asked his Undersecretary to undertake the review. SINGSON vs. NLRC F: Labor Arbiter Aquino rendered a decision adverse to Singson. Aquino was later promoted to NLRC Commissioner. The decision was appealed to his division. He pa rticipated in the decision, but he did not participate in the deliberation of th e MFR H: There was violation of due process Petitioner was denied due process when Commissioner Aquino participated, as,

presiding commissioner of the 2n'l division of the NLRC, in reviewing private r espondent PAL s appeal. He was reviewing his own decision as a former Labor Arbite r. Litigants are entitled to a review of 3 commissioners who are impartial righ t from the start of the process of review. Commissioner Aquino can hardly be con sidered impartial since he was the arbiter who decided the case under review. He should have inhibited himself from any participation in the case. PNCC vs. REPUBLIC (89557; 8/20/1990) F: Republic filed a quo warranto with preliminary injunction and restraining ord er saying that some portion of the Expressway be withdrawn from PNCC s franchise b ecause PNCC had long fully recovered its investments. RTC dismissed the case but ordered that the toll fees collected be placed in an escrow account. PNCC and R epublic later compromised and decided that the amount in escrow be used to put u p emergency boxes, etc. Gaite (of Federation of Paraaque Homeowners) opposed the compromise. H: elman said that in this case, there was no due process since the cancellation of the certificate of public convenience was done motu propio; this issue was n ot discussed in the case since the parties compromised A public hearing is mandatory only in cases of petitions for increases in to ll rates the purpose of which is to give users of the expressway who will be adv ersely affected an opportunity to contest the validity of such an increase. Inde ed, no affected toll payer shall be prejudiced where the collectible rates were reduced as in this case. CODINIELO vs. EXEC. SEC. (August 4, 1997) F: A party complained of denial of due process on non-observance of this require ment because there was no participation in the formal hearing or investigation b ut nonetheless this party was given the opportunity to file and in fact did file a motion for reconsideration. H: So there was here a cure of whatever infirmity because there was opportunity given to the adverse party to be heard. So whatever defect in due process was cu red by the subsequent act of the party in filing a motion for reconsideration wh erein he argued his position where he presented his evidence. PEPSI COLA vs. NLRC H: There is no denial of due process where the affected party is heard through h is memorandum of appeal. In the formal hearing, there was nonparticipation but h e did participate because he filed his memorandum of appeal. Thus, whatever infi rmity made in the course of proceedings by lower body was cured. But where in the motion for reconsideration, only the entry of appearance b y counsel and there was only a broad motion to reconsider, the infirmity is not cured because even when he filed his motion for reconsideration but nonetheless there was no opportunity for him to present his evidence. In fact, what was made what was mentioned in the motion for reconsideration was only an entry of appea rance by counsel. Thus, this does not comply with the requirement of due process . (Villarosa vs. Comelec, November 29, 1999) Where an order cancels a certificate of public convenience of a franchise h older (a permittee) was entered ex-parte on the basis merely on a petition filed by the oppositor, there is here denial of due process because there was no oppo rtunity given to the franchise holder to oppose this petition of opposition. ??????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????? 1. The right to a hearing; 2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented; 3. The decision must have something to support itself; 4. The evidence on which the decision is based must be substantial;

5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record disclosed to the parties affected; 6. The board or its judges must act on its or their own independent consideratio n of the law and the facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views o f the subordinate in arriving at decision; and 7. The decision must be rendered in such a manner that the parties can know the various issues involved the reason for the decision rendered. (Ang Tibay case) REQ #1 > The right to a hearing simply means the right to present evidence on his behal f and also the right to know the allegations of the other party and the opportun ity to controvert these findings; Padua vs. Ranada (390 SCRA 666) An administrative agency may be empowered to approve provisionally. when dem anded by urgent public need. rates of public utilities without a hearing, the re ason being that provisional 'rates are by their nature temporary and subject to adjustment in conformity with the definitive rates approved after final hearing. REQ #4 Substantial evident = such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might acce pt as adequate to support a conclusion; more than a mere scintilla Preponderance of Evidence Proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt REQ #6 Padua vs. Ranada (390 SCRA 679) There is nothing irregular that the TRB Resolution No. 2001-89 authorizing p rovisional toll rate adjustments at the Metro Manila Skyway effective January 1. 2002 was signed by the TRB Executive Directors and four TRB Directors, none of whom personally attended the hearing. An administrative agency may employ other persons, such as a hearing officer, examiner or investigator, to receive evidenc e, conduct hearing and make reports, on the basis of which the agency shall rend er its decision

> There is no violation of due process where the investigation is conducted not by the officer duly authorized to render a decision but one who is a subordinate of that duly authorized officer, because the matter of conducting investigation s may be delegated by the superior to a subordinate. > But there is a violation of due process where on the basis of a complaint, an ocular inspection is conducted in the premises of the company which is subject o f the complaint and on the basis of the ocular inspection and interrogation of t he witnesses -- the laborers, the administrative agency makes a decision. o A decision based simply on ocular inspection and interrogation of laborers is not the decision contemplated by law as to fall under the concept of observance of due process, because ocular inspection is not the main trial. There is the re quirement for the conduct of a formal investigation. > There is also a violation of due process where the public officer respondent i s adjudged guilty of an offense of which he was not charged. REQ #7 MALINAO vs. REYES (255 SCRA 616) F: Malinao filed an administrative case against the Mayor. SP held the mayor gui lty but the SP decision was only signed by the Presiding Chair H: decision is invalid Thus, to render a decision in administrative cases involving elective local officials, the decision of the* Sanggunian must be "in writing stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the reasons for such decision.

The so-called "Decision prepared by a Sanggunian member cannot be regarded a s the Sanggunian for lack of the signatures of the requisite majority. The votin g following the deliberation of the members of the Sanggunian did not necessaril y constitute their Decision unless this was embodied in an opinion prepared by o ne of them. Requirement of prior notice and hearing can be dispensed with: 1) summary proceedings of distraint and levy upon the property of a delinquent t axpayer; 2) in the case of a preventive suspension of a public officer because of the nat ure of preventive suspension which is not a legal sanction but merely a prelimin ary measure; 3) cancellation of passport where no abuse of discretion is committed by the Sec of Foreign Affairs (since this is a mere privilege) 4) grant of provisional authority for increased rates, or to engage in a particu lar line of business 5) summary abatement of nuisance per se which affects the immediate safety of pe rsons or property ???????????????????????????????? The right against self-incrimination is available in all kinds of proceeding s, whether civil, criminal or administrative (Galman vs Pamaran, 138 SCRA 294) But such right is available only to natural persons and not to a judicial pe rson (Valmonte vs. Belmonte, 170 SCRA 256). Thus, an administrative agency may require an organization (corporation, par tnership or association) to furnish it with records of books although these may incriminate such an organization. The reason for the exclusion of judicial perso ns from the no self-incrimination rule is the need for administrative bodies tas ked by legislature to see to the compliance with law and public policy. Generall y, when the law requires that certain records be kept, these records are withdra wn from the protective mantle of the no self-incrimination clause (Shapiro doctr ine). ?????????????????????????? ??????????????????????? The administrative agency has authority Doctrine of exhaustion of adm remedies to pass on every question raised by a pe primary jurisdiction rson resorting to judicial relief and enable the court to withhold its aid entir Both the the and adm agency have jurisdiction to pass ely untilcourtadministrative remedies had been exhaustedon a question when a par ticular case is presented to court as an original matter, rather than a matter o The claim f review or matter is cognizable in the first instance by an administrative age The claim ncy alone orof the rulecognizable by both the court and administrative agency purpose matter is is to control the timing of judicial relief from adjudic Doctrine of of an jurisdiction is not concerned with judicial review but deter ative actionprimaryagency mines in some instances whether initial action should be taken by a court or adm Both principles do inistrative agency.not apply where the issue involved is a pure question of law. Whenever there is an available administrative remedy provided by law, no jud icial recourse can be made until all such remedies have been availed of and exha usted. The reasons for this doctrine are: 1. If relief is first sought from a superior administrative agency, resort to th e courts may be unnecessary 2. The administrative agency should be given a chance to correct its error. 3. Principle of comity and convenience requires the courts to stay their hand un til the administrative processes are completed. 4. Since judicial review of administrative decisions is usually made through spe cial civil actions, such proceedings will not normally prosper if there is anoth er plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law

> Before a party can be allowed to seek judicial intervention, he is to exhaust all means of administrative redress available under the law. o The court for reasons of law, comity and convenience will not entertain a case unless all available remedies have been exhausted in order to give the administ rative agency concerned the chance to act and correct the errors, if any, that i t might have committed in the administrative forum and prevent unnecessary and p remature resort to courts o One of the reasons for the doctrine is the separation of powers which enjoins upon the judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming pri marily within the competence of other department (Lopez vs. City of Manila, 303 SCRA 448). > Accordingly, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed, conformably wit h Section 14, Rule VII of the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC - before the specia l civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may be availed of (Sunshine Transportation vs. NLRC, 254 SCRA 51). > The party with an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the prescribe d administrative procedure to obtain relief but also pursue to its appropriate c onclusion before seeking judicial intervention in order to give that administrat ive agency an opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly and prevent u nnecessary and premature resort to court (Carale vs. Abarintos, 269 SCRA 133; Ja riol vs. COMELEC. 270 SCRA 255) DELTAVENTURES vs. CABATO (327 SCRA 522) F: Labor Arbiter filed an alias writ of execution against Ongpin. Now, there is a case filed before the RTC for damages, prohibition and injunction against the same party who is the complainant in the labor case. H: The action before the court was really in the nature of a labor case incident which should warrant the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Ostensibly, the third party claim before the trial court was for the recover y of possession and injunction, but in essence it was an action challenging the validity or propriety of the levy vis-a-vis the alias writ of execution, includi ng the acts performed by the Labor Arbiter and the Deputy Sheriff implementing t he writ in the labor case. The subject matter of the claim is but an incident of the labor case, a matt er beyond the jurisdiction of the regional court. In denying Deltaventure's petition, the court a quo is merely upholding the time-honored principle that a RTC, being a co-equal body of the NLRC, has no jur isdiction to issue any restraining order or injunction to enjoin the execution o f any decision of the latter. Jalandoni vs. Drilon (327 SCRA 108) The review as an act of supervision and control by the justice secretary ove r fiscals and prosecutors finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of administr ative remedies which holds that mistakes, abuses or negligence committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity or by an administrative agency shoul d be corrected by higher administrative authorities, and not directly by courts. Aurido vs. Rabi (392 SCRA 604) When Regional State Prosecutor (RSP) Aurillo motu proprio took over the prel iminary investigation of IS No 95-043 after the same had already been dismissed by the city prosecutor and ordered the assistant regional state prosecutor to co nduct a preliminary investigation of the case, he exercised not only administrat ive supervision but control over the city prosecutor. By doing so, Aurillo nulli fied the resolution of the inquest prosecutor as approved by the city prosecutor and deprived Rabi as the aggrieved party in IS 95-043 of his right to file a mo tion for reconsideration and if said motion were denied to appeal to the Secreta ry of Justice. The office of the RSP does not conduct any preliminary investigat ion or prosecute any criminal case in court at all The bulk of his work consists of administrative supervision over city and provincial fiscals and their assist

ants. This doctrine applies only where there is a provision of law describing the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Supposing the law does not describe the filing of a motion for reconsideration, this method may be dispensed with by the aggrieved party because there is no provision in the law providing for the exha ustion of administrative remedies. A direct action in court without prior exhaustion of administrative remedies , when required, is premature, warranting its dismissal on a motion to dismiss g rounded on lack of cause of action. The failure to observe the doctrine does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court. The only effect of non-compliance with th is rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed waived and the court can take cognizance of the case and try it. Exhaustion must be raised at the earliest time possible, even before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, by a motion to dismis s, otherwise such ground would be deemed waived (Calub vs. CA, 331 SCRA 55). Absent a showing that petitioner had availed itself of and exhausted the app ropriate administrative remedies, a premature resort to the courts would result in the dismissal of the petition (Social Security System Employees Association v s. Bathan-Velasco, 313 SCRA 250) The complaint of private respondent NIA Senior Engr. Ortizo for prohibition and injunction questioning Regional Office Memo No. 52 reassigning him to a stat ion different from that specified in his appointment papers should have been dis missed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. He should have first comp lained to the NIA Administrator, and if necessary, then appeal to the CSC. Cases involving personnel actions, reassignment included, affecting civil service emp loyees, are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CSC (Corsiga vs. Defenses 3 91 SCRA 274). It is well-settled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a prer equisite to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari. Extelcom violat ed the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies when it went directly to th e Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari and prohibition from the NTC Ord er without first filing a motion for reconsideration within 15 days pursuant to NTC Rules (Republic vs. Express Telecommunication Co., 373 SCRA 321). Under Art. 128 of the Labor Code as amended, an order issued by the duly aut horized representative of the Secretary of Labor (involving a monetary award in the exercise of his visitorial and enforcement powers) may be appealed to the la tter. Thus petitioner Laguna CATV should have first appealed the order of DOLE R egional Director Maraan denying its motion to quash the writ of execution to the Secretary of Labor instead of filing with the Court of Appeals a motion for ext ension of time to file a petition for review. The CA was correct in holding that petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies (Laguna CATV Network v s. Maraan, 392 SCRA 226) ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 1.) The principle requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applica ble where the question is purely a legal one a. The question whether respondent's transfer to the position of Regional Direct or of the Public Attorney's Office, which was made without her consent, amounts to a removal without cause is a legal issue (Demaisip vs. Bacal GR 139382, 6 Dec ember 2000); b. The issues of whether or not the decision of the Sangguniang Panlungsod in di sciplinary cases is appealable to the Office of the President, as well as the pr opriety of taking an oath of office anew by respondent Barangay Captain Laxina, are questions of law (Mendoza vs. Laxina, Sr, 406 SCRA 156)]; 2.) where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without juri

sdiction or in excess of jurisdiction (Brett vs. IAC 191 SCRA 687); a. In conducting administrative investigation, service of summons is necessary. If the decision was rendered without the service of summons, then no need to com ply with exhaustion of adm remedies 3.) where the respondent Is a department secretary, who acts as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter (AImine vs. CA . 177 SCRA 97; Quisumbing vs. Gumban, 193 SCRA 523); 4.) when there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking it (Sunga vs. NLRC, 173 SCRA 338); a. in the administrative proceeding, AA made representation that only the court can resolve and such court action was taken 5.) when there is unreasonable delay of official action that will irreparably pr ejudice the complainant; a. An example is a quo warranto case which must be filed within one year 6.) where the amount is too small so as to make the rule impractical; 7.) where the doctrine of qualified political agency applies (Binamira vs. Garuc ho, 190 SCRA 154); 8.) where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial interventio n (Abate vs. Aldana, 29 February 1960); a. The matter involves a boundary dispute between timber concessionaires. While the case is pending, the other party continued to use petitioner s road and no act ion was taken by DENR. Judicial intervention is needed to prevent irreparable da mage or injury to the parties. 9.) where there is no plain, adequate and speedy remedy except court action (Tia ngco vs. Lauchang, 9 SCRA 126; Pagara vs. CA, 254 SCRA 619; NFA vs. CA, 253 SCRA 470); 10.) in land cases, where the land in question is private (Baladjay vs. Castillo , 1 SCRA 1064); 11.) where insistence on its observance would result in nullification of the cla im being asserted (Gravador vs. Mamigo, 20 SCRA 742); 12.) where there is nothing left to be done except to seek court action (Sta. Ma ria vs. Lopez, 31 SCRA 639); 13.) when the controverted acts violate due process; 14.) there is failure of a high government official from whom relief is sought t o act on the matter; and 15.) when the issue of non-exhaustion has been rendered moot and academic (Caral e vs. Abarintos, 269 SCRA 133; Land Bank of the Phil vs. CA, 318 SCRA 144) In Castro vs. Gloria (363 SCRA 423), the Court ruled that the issue of wheth er or not petitioner's dismissal from the service is the proper penalty for the first offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct is a pure question of law Hence , the doctrine may be dispensed with and judicial action may be immediately reso rted to by petitioner. (#1) NAPOCOR vs. MISAMIS PROVINCE (72477; 10/16/1990) F: An action was filed by the province against NAPOCOR for the collection of del inquent real property taxes pursuant to PD 464 or Real Property Tax Code. NAPOCO R filed a motion to dismiss alleging that PD 242 should apply prescribes adminis trative settlement instead H: Here, the issue is clearly a legal one i.e. which law applies. Thus, the doct rine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply in the case. (#3) DIMAISIP vs. CA F: Director awarded fishpond to Dimaisip. Dept Sec reversed Director. Instead of filing an appeal before the Office of the Pres., Dimaisip filed an action befor e the court. H: This is an exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies bec ause the decision was one made by the Department Secretary who is an alter ego o f the President.

(#3) CALO vs. FUENTES. (The SC made a reversal of its earlier decision in DIMAIS IP) F: Director of Lands and Dept Sec awarded homestead application to Fuentes. Calo initially filed an appeal before the Office of the President. But even before t he Office the President could act on the matter, he withdrew such appeal. H: The withdrawal of such an appeal before the Office of the President was fatal because it was the last act required of him in compliance with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. But in many other cases decided by the court, it went back to its earlier ruling . Thus, you have the case of (#3)QUISUMBING vs. GUMBAN (193 SCRA 523) F: DECS Secretary Quisumbing transferred Mrs. Yap to South Cotabato. The order w as contested not before the Office of the Secretary but before the sala of Judge Gumban. Department Secretary filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that there should be exhaustion. H: The Court ruled that there was no need for exhaustion of administrative remed ies because the act complained of was one made by the Department Secretary as th e alter ego of the President How to reconcile these contradictory rulings: A: The first basis is to look into the provisions of the law i.e., where th e law itself prescribes remedy, then there must be compliance with this doctrine there is no of exhaustion of administrative remedies. But if the law is silent such provision requiring exhaustion there is no need to exhaust administrative r emedies. Example: Under PD 1281, the matter of the conflicting mining claims is now within the competence of the Bureau of Mines. The matter of resolving conflictin g mining claims is now purely administrative. Thus under PD1281, the authority w hich has the say on the matter is the Director of the Bureau of Mines. But his d ecision is appealable to the Department Secretary of Natural Resources and from the decision of the DENR Secretary, if the party is still aggrieved, the same ma y be elevated to the Office of the President. So, there is here in this case the need to comply with the doctrine of exha ustion administrative remedies. The doctrine of qualified political agency does not apply here because there is a provision in the law requiring that an appeal be taken from the decision of the Department Secretary to the President within a period of 5 days. The law itself even provides that the decision of the Preside nt on the matter of conflicting claims is final and executory. Of course, it does not mean that the party has no remedy. Even if the provi sion of the law makes the decision of the Office of the President final and exec utory but the same has been made in abuse of authority, then it can be the subje ct of judicial review. LLORENA vs. LACSON F: A laborer was dismissed by the mayor because of the loss of a personal proper ty a piano. The law requires that the action must be taken before the Office of the President. Laborer did not comply with this requirement, saying that since h e is uneducated (barely reached the 4th grade), he is exempted H: Lack of education is not a defense. There must still be compliance with the d octrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. (BQ) SABELLO vs. DECS (12/26/1989) F: School Principal Sabello was found guilty in a criminal case. He was reinstat ed because there was an absolute pardon given to him. But he was reinstated as a mere classroom teacher. He did not file his appeal in the DECS but went directl

y to the court saying poverty denied him the services of the lawyer. H: case was allowed to continue The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies and the application of the exceptions is not a fast and rigid rule. In the case of Sabello, the Court granted the petition of the petitioner her e. Sabello claimed that poverty denied him the services of a lawyer. On that bas is, the Court set aside this requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedie s and looked into the merits of the case and so, he was reinstated to the positi on of school principal. In this situation, where the interest of justice requires, the Court ruled t hat there was no need to exhaust administrative remedies because poverty deprive d the petitioner access to lawyers. ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? In the absence of a constitutional provision or a statute to the contrary, t he official acts of a department secretary are deemed acts of the President hims elf unless disapproved or reprobated by the latter (Binamira vs. Garrucho, 188 S CRA 154; Villena vs. Secretary of Interior. 67 Phil. 451). > The power of the DILG to investigate administrative complaints is based on the alter-ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency (Joson vs. To rres, 290 SCRA 281). Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts o f the Executive Department and the heads of the various executive departments ar e assistants and agents of the Chief Executive. > Except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or l aw to act in person, or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act perso nally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Exec utive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of th e Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular cour se of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive pre sumptively the acts of the Chief Executive' (Fortich vs. Corona. 298 SCRA 705) Province of Camarines Norte vs. Province of Quezon, (367 SCRA 91) The claim of respondents (Quezon Prov. Gov Rodriguez and Calauag Mayor Lim) that the DENR technical team conducted the survey (to make a delineation of the boundary separating the Provinces of Camarines Norte and Quezon) without prior a uthority from the Office of the President is baseless. The authority of the team emanated from the Special Order No. 1179 duly issued by the DENR Secretary, the alter ego of the President. Being an alter ego, the acts of the DENR Secretary are presumed to be the acts of the President unless expressly repudiated by the latter. The DENR team was precisely created to comply with the SC Decision to co nduct the survey.

???????????????????????????????? Where provided by law, appeal from an administrative determination may be m ade to a higher or superior administrative officer or body. (Basis: Power of Con trol) power Power of Control the President Supervision over the executive branch of government, including all ex The power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases against electi ecutive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk ve local officials is derived from his power of general supervision over local g It is the overnmentspower of the President to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitu the power of ensuring former with faithfully executed, or that the subordinate te the judgment of thethat laws arethat of the latter includes the power ofthe law officers act within supervision > Supervision is not incompatible with discipline which must be construed to aut horize the President to order an investigation of the act or conduct local offic ials (Joson vs. Torres, 290 SCRA 281) > The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. As the Di sciplining Authority, the President has the power derived from the Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local elective officials. > AO 23, however, delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a Special In vestigating Committee as may be constituted by the Disciplining Authority. This is not undue delegation as what is delegated by the President is the power to in vestigate, not the power to discipline. > Hence, jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary cases against elective lo cal officials is lodged in two authorities: o the Disciplining Authority (the President) and o the Investigating Authority (the DILG Secretary, who may act by himself or con stitute an Investigating Committee). o In lieu of the DILG Secretary, the Disciplining Authority may designate a Spec ial Investigating Committee. The Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, may reverse a Decision of the Director that had been affirmed by the Department Secretary. > The argument that the Executive Secretary is equal in rank with other departme nt heads is incorrect for he acts by "authority of the President." > His decision should thus be given full faith and credit by the courts. His ass umed authority should be accepted for only the President can rightfully say that he is not authorized to do so.

??????????????????????????????????? ????????????? the superior administrative official is authorized, in the exercise of his discr Review by Administrative Agencies the Courts Since to authority of the court is simply to find out whether there is substant etion,the receive additional evidence ial evidence in support of the conclusion reached by the administrative officer, its power of review is limited only to all the evidence already submitted by th It CANNOT e parties.be compelled by the parties for them to submit new evidence precisely because its role is not to determine conflicting claims which is a power given t

it is within the prerogative of the superior adm officer to order the conduct of o the administrative body a new hearing or trial de novo, in the exercise of his discretion, and even the The role ofof new evidence admission the court is simply to find out whether the evidence supports the de cision whether or not there is substantial evidence to support the finding made by the administrative officer. Findings of facts of administrative bodies are as a rule not subject to judicial review and must be accorded not only utmost respect but even finality as long a s such decisions are confined to matters within their respective jurisdiction an d are supported by substantial evidence (San Sebastian College vs. CA. 197 SCRA 139; Labor Congress of the Philippines vs. NLRC, 292 SCRA 469). Philsa International Placement & Services Corp. vs. Labor Secretary (356 SCRA 17 4) Findings of the POEA regarding alleged contract substitution constitute quest ion of fact which may not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence. Cosep vs. NLRC (290 SCRA 705) But if there is a misappreciation of facts by the quasi-judicial agency like the NLRC, thereby impairing petitioners right to security of tenure, or where the factual findings lack support, the Court is compelled to deviate from this well established rule. Even decisions of administrative agencies which are declared "final" by law are not exempt from the judicial review when so warranted. Malonzo vs. COMELEC (269 SCRA 381) In cases filed before administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount o f relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Neugene Marketing vs. CA (303 SCRA 295) The rule that the appellate court will not generally disturb the factual find ings by the trial court does not apply where the Securities and Exchange Commiss ion overlooked certain facts of substance and value which if considered would af fect the result of the case. Oarde vs. CA (280 SCRA 235) Certifications issued by administrative agencies or officers that a certain p erson is a tenant are merely provisional and not conclusive on courts. Bautista vs. Araneta (326 SCRA 234) F: Bautista claimed he is a tenant, but the owner of the land Araneta, denies it . DARAB ruled that he is a tenant. This was reversed by the CA. H: CA can reverse DARAB s finding that he is a tenant The Supreme Court rejected petitioner's claim that he is a tenant by virtue o f the factual finding of the DARAB considering that DARAB mainly relied on the c ertifications issued in favor of petitioner in holding that he is a tenant of th e disputed landholding. Certifications issued by administrative agencies or officers that a certain p erson is a tenant are merely provisional and not conclusive on courts. This Cour t is not necessarily bound by these findings especially if they are mere conclus ions that are not supported by substantial evidence. [Note: Tenancy is not purely a factual relationship dependent on what the all eged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship that can only be created with the consent of the true and lawful landholder.] Questions which may be subject of judicial review: 1. Questions of Law a. involves the constitutionality of law, treaty, ordinance or administrative or

der b. jurisdiction of the adm agency c. there is an error of law committed by the adm officer 2. Question of Fact GR: Factual findings of administrative bodies are accorded respect, if not final ity. Exceptions: a. The decision is not supported by substantial evidence; b. The findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion. c. The procedure is irregular. d. Palpable or serious errors have been committed. e. When grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness or capriciousness is manifest. f. The law explicitly authorizes review of factual matters (Sibayan vs. Pena, 18 7 SCRA 22; Purefoods Corporation vs NLRC, 171 SCRA 415). g. There is conflict in the factual findings not only at the Ombudsman level, bu t even at the appellate court (Teresita Fabian vs. Agustin, GR No. 143092, 14 Fe bruary 2003) 3. Mixed Questions of Law and Fact (Brandeis Doctrine of Assimilation of Facts) This doctrine lays down the rule that when a finding of fact is so intimatel y involved and dependent upon the question of law, the court will, in order to r esolve the question of law, examine the factual setting including the evidence a dduced thereto. (findings of facts are necessary in order to determine the findi ngs of law) Fabian v. Agustin The Ombudsman Investigation Officer found DPWH District Engineer Agustin gui lty of grave misconduct as well as irregular or immoral conduct and recommended his dismissal from the service, which finding was approved by Ombudsman Desierto with modification that the offense is only misconduct and that the penalty Is s uspension from office for one year without pay. Eventually, Deputy Ombudsman Guerrero dismissed the complaint for insufficie ncy of evidence. However, the Court of Appeals in its original Decision reinstat ed Ombudsman Desierto's order imposing the one-year suspension. Later, the CA re ndered an amended Decision, this time affirming the Guerrero dismissal of the ca se. Such conflict in the factual findings compels the Supreme Court to deviate f rom the general rule and review the evidence. In this case, the Court reversed t he CA amended Decision and ordered respondent s dismissal from the service with fo rfeiture of retirement benefits and with prejudice to his re-employment in the g overnment. All errors or decisions of administrative bodies involving questions of law are subject to judicial review consistent with Sec. 5 (2-e), Art. VIII, 1987 Con stitution which provides: "All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved." The questions of that may be Onlyonly Certiorari may 45)raised is 65) Special Civil Action for Certiorari (Secwhether 43) Appeal byquestion law(Rulebe raised (Rule1, Ruleor not the respondent (tribunal or officer exercising judicial function) has acted without or in excess of juris The parties are:grave abuse of as petitioner respondent is the respondent diction or withisthe appellant discretion theand the appellee astribunal or offi petitioner the aggrieved party and cer exercising judicial function who is alleged to have acted without or in exce The party benefited by the act Filed before CA; w/in 15 days complained of is also ss of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion included as respondent If the facts Facts Questions of Law established or admitted, their legal effect is a question of la are A question of fact arises when w for the court to determine there is a conflict in testimony. The question mu st be resolved by the court. No question of fact exists if only one conclusion i There is a questions of law in a given s possible from the facts established case when the doubt or difference arises There is a question of fact when the doubt facts as to what the law is on a certain state ofor difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. Tuazon vs. CA (118 SCRA464)

In Brandeis Doctrine of Assimilation of Facts, the more important issue, whi ch is law, assimilates the facts. Thus, questions of facts and of law are subjec t to judicial review. For instance the issue or tenancy involves legal questions as tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged t enants do upon the land but it is also a legal relationship. Sanado vs. CA (356 SCRA 546) If a party disagrees with the decisions of the Office of the President, he s hould elevate the matter by petition for review before the Court of Appeals for the latter's exercise of the power of judicial review. (Rule 43)

Matuguina Integrated Wood Products (MIWP) vs. CA (263 SCRA 508) The issue of whether or not petitioner MIWP is an alter ego of Milagros Matu guina, the losing party-respondent in the MNR case, Is one of fact, and which sh ould have been threshed out in said administrative proceedings, and not in the p rohibition proceedings in the trial court, where it is precisely the failure of the respondent Minister of Natural Resources to proceed as mandated by law in th e execution of its order which is under scrutiny. Republic vs. Imperial (303 SCRA 127) The classification of public lands is a function of the executive branch, sp ecifically the Director of Lands (now the Director of the Lands Management Burea u), and the decision of the director of lands when approved by the DENR Secretar y as to questions of fact is conclusive and not subject to review by the court i n the absence of any showing that such decision or finding is tainted with fraud or mistake (In Re: Petition Seeking for Clarification as to the Validity and Fo rceful Effect of Two Final and Executory but Conflicting Decisions of the SC, 32 1 SCRA 62). > Bureau of Patents: where there is a question as to whether or not such a trade name causes confusion, or similar to a prior registered trade name or trademark , such issue is one belonging to the courts. > Bureau of Immigration: within its jurisdiction: o excluding an alien on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen o whether or not a person is authorized to reside or is an immigrant or an alien > If the issue of citizenship is put into issue, then it is within the power of the court to order the administrative agency to defer action on the matter in or der for the court to look into the issue of citizenship. The issue of citizenshi p is one within the exclusive authority of the court and not of the administrati ve agency. > COA: (PD 1445) the findings made by the auditor on the matter of claims or set tlement of accounts may be the subject of an appeal to the COA within a period o f six (6) months from the findings made by the auditor. And from the decision of the COA, the same may be the subject of judicial review within a period of 30 d ays as mandated by PD 1445. ????????????????????????????? GR: Administrative bodies are not allowed to grant criminal and civil immunities to persons. Exception: where the law itself authorizes the grant of such immunity to the ind ividual. 1) Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) pursuant to Sec 5, E.O. 14 as amended by E.O. 14-A. The PCGG has the power to grant criminal, civil and adm inistrative immunity to persons who testify on the matter of alleged acquisition

of ill-gotten wealth by associates of the Marcoses; and the 2) Office of the Ombudsman, pursuant to Section 17 of RA 6770, may grant immunit y from criminal prosecution to any person whose testimony or possession and prod uction of documents and evidence may be necessary in any proceeding or hearing b eing conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman.

?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? A basic principle of the law on public officers is that a public official or employee is under a three-fold responsibility for violation of duty or for a wr ongful act or omission - a public officer may be held civilly criminally and adm inistratively liable for a wrongful doing (Tecson vs. Sandiganbayan. 318 SCRA 80 ). A criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if th e same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings. A finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Neither would the results in one concl ude the other. (Gatahalian Promotions Talents Pool vs. Naldoza. 315 SCRA 406) Thus, an absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution or vice versa. The court, in dismissing the criminal complaint was simply saying that the prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of petitioner b eyond reasonable doubt. The absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not me an an absence of any evidence whatsoever for there is another class of evidence which, though insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, is adequa te in administrative cases; the substantial evidence rule in administrative proc eedings merely requires such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might acce pt as adequate to support a conclusion (Ocampo vs. Ombudsman, 322 SCRA 22). Administrative offenses do not prescribe (Floria vs. Sunga, 368 SCRA 551). (Prescriptive period for criminal case is 15 years, while administrative case is imprescriptible; Sec 20 of the Ombudsman Act provides that no investigated is n eeded this is merely directive) The withdrawal of a complaint or the desistance of a complainant does not ne cessarily warrant the dismissal of an administrative complaint (Guro vs. Duronio , 397 SCRA 1) In instances, however, where an administrative case cannot proceed without t he active cooperation of the complainant, the Supreme Court may find itself with hardly any alternatives but to dismiss the complaint (Dagsa-an vs. Conag, 290 S CRA 12). An administrative complaint against public officers cannot just be withdrawn at any time by the simple expediency of the complainant suddenly claiming a cha nge of mind (Nones vs. Orrnita, 390 SCRA 520). An affidavit of desistance will not automatically result to the dismissal of an administrative case or to the exoneration of respondent. This is because the complainant is merely a witness in an administrative case. He cannot, by his ow n desistance, divest the court of its jurisdiction, for the court has an interes t apart from complainant's own in determining the truth and, when necessary, imp osing sanctions against erring court employees (Jacob vs. Tambo, 369 SCRA 148). While a reelected official may no longer be held administratively liable for signing a questionable contract before his reelection, this will not prejudice the filing of any case other than administrative case against him (Garcia vs. Mo

jica. 314 SCRA 207). LOYAO, JR., vs. CAUBE (A.M. No. P-02-1599. April 30, 2003) F: Clerk of Court Caube issued summons to plaintiffs although there was no case pending against them. Caube called them so that they could forge an amicable set tlement with their creditors. Caube was dismissed. Pending appeal, he died. H: The death or retirement of any judicial officer from the service does not pre clude the finding of any administrative liability to which he shall still be ans werable. This jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the administrat ive complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his case. The Court retains its juri sdiction either to pronounce the respondent public official innocent of the char ges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injusti ce and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications . . . If innocent, resp ondent public official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under th e situation. To be sure, respondent Caube s death has permanently foreclosed the prosecutio n of any other actions, be it criminal or civil, against him for his malfeasance in office. We are, however, not precluded from imposing the appropriate adminis trative sanctions against him ??????????????????????????????????????? Under this doctrine, public officials cannot be subject to disciplinary act ion for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term. The doctrine is not only founded on the theory that an official s re-election expresses the sovereign will of the electorate to forgive, or condone any act o r omission constituting a ground for administrative discipline which was committ ed during his previous term, but also dictated by public policy, otherwise, his second term may just be devoted to defending himself in the said cases to the de triment of public service. The doctrine cannot however apply to criminal acts wh ich the reelected official may have committed during his previous term (BQ) AGUINALDO vs. SANTOS (212 SCRA 768) F: DILG Secretary Santos filed an administrative case against Governor Aguinaldo for disloyalty to the Republic. The penalty of such is of dismissal. Pending t he administrative case, he ran for the same elective position and got elected as the governor. H: Applying the doctrine of forgiveness and condonation, Gov. Aguinaldo could no t be held administratively liable for a prior act committed. Why? The previous term is distinct from the succeeding term. So where no sanction was meted for an act during a previous term, definitely no sanction should be allowed for such act committed during a previous term in a subsequent term of office. Paredes vs. CSC (192 SCRA 84) Civil Service Law "does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating of ficers or employees from administrative charges" Section 39(a), in relation to Section 37(a), of PD 807 which provides that ' Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the d ecision x x x" was interpreted by the Court: "The phrase 'party adversely affect ed by the decision' refers to the government employee against whom the administr ative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the fo rm of suspension (of more than 30 days), demotion in rank or salary, transfer, r emoval or dismissal from office. Parenthetically, the Philippine Civil Service L aw does not allow the complainant to appeal a decision exonerating or absolving

a civil service employee. > Sec 39 & 37 of CSL: penalty of suspension for less than 30 days; or a fine of less than 1 month salary; or reprimand is final and executory ???????????????????????????????????? Decisions and orders of administrative agencies have, upon their finality, th e force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the res jud icata doctrine. The rule of res judicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by competent authority acting within their exclusive jurisdictio n. Once an issue has been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent c ourt, it can no longer be controverted anew and should be finally laid to rest Exceptions lo the doctrine of res judicata: 1. Where there are supervening events which make it imperative, in the higher in terest of justice, to modify a final judgment to harmonize it with the prevailin g circumstances (Teodoro vs. Carague. 206 SCRA 429); 2. Where the applicability of the doctrine would involve the sacrifice of justic e to technicality (De Leon vs. CA), as when it would amount to a denial of justi ce or a bar to a vindication of a legitimate grievance (Suarez vs. CA, 193 SCRA 183); 3. Where the parties involved have waived it or do not timely raise it as a defe nse (Teodoro vs. Carague). 4. The doctrine of res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship (Labo vs. Comelec). BID vs. dela Rosa (197 SCRA 855) Every time the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a jud icial or administrative case, whatever the court or administrative authority dec ides as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res judicata, hence, it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial and quasi-judicial pro ceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers. The doctrine embraces tw o concepts: 1. bar by prior judgment under par. (b) of Rule 39, Section 47; and 2. conclusiveness of judgment under par. (c) thereof

Ocho vs. Calos (345 SCRA 488) F: Calos land was subjected to CARP. His property was distributed through Operati on Land Transfer (OLT). Calos questioned the qualifications of beneficiaries. PA RAD ruled that land be returned to Calos since the beneficiaries are already lan downers. DARAB reversed PARAD. CA held that Polinar (one of the beneficiaries) i s disqualified since he already owns land H: res judicata applies thus DARAB s decision that Polinar does not own land is fi nal and conclusive on the Courts Conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation of particular facts or iss ues in another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause s of action. Thus, the decision of the DAR hearing Officer in Adm. Case 006-90, which had long attained finality, that petitioner Ocho is not the owner of other agricult ural lands, foreclosed any inquiry on the same issue involving the same parties and property. Although the action instituted by the Calos in Adm. Case 006-90 (Anomalies i n OLT Transfer Action) is different from the action in Adm. Case X-014 (Annulmen

t of Deeds of Assignment, Emancipation Patents and TCTs, Retention and Recovery of Possession and Ownership), the concept of conclusiveness of judgment still ap plies because the identity of causes of action is not required but merely identi ty of issues. > In other words, it does not matter that the issues are different. The issue he re (DAR) is one of cancellation of title and recovery of possession and ownershi p, whereas, the issue in the CA pertains to whether or not this person is the ow ner of another agricultural land. But nonetheless, since the facts are the same, the issues are related, even if the causes of action are different, the doctrin e of res adjudicata still applies. Montemayor vs. Bundalian (405 SCRA 265) The decision of the Ombudsman does not operate as res judicata in the case b efore the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) subject o f this review. The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-ju dicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers. Petitioner DPWH Regional Director Montemayor was investigated by the Ombudsm an for his possible criminal liability for the acquisition of the Burbank proper ty in violation of RA 3019. For the same alleged misconduct, petitioner, as a pr esidential appointee was investigated by the PCAGC by virtue of the administrati ve power and control of the President over him. As the PCAGC investigation of pe titioner was administrative in nature, the doctrine of res judicata finds no app lication in this case. ????????????????????????????????? Section 6, Art- XVI of the 1987 Constitution provides: The State shall esta blish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civili an in character to be administered and controlled by a national police commissio n (NAPOLCOM). The authority of local executives shall be provided by law. > The authority of local executives over the elements of the PNP shall be provid ed by law. Thus, you have RA 6975 as amended by RA 8851 MANALO vs. SISTOZA [G.R. No. 107369. August 11, 1999] F: Pres Aquino appointed respondents to PNP Superintendents and Directors withou t the approval of CA. RA 6975 mandates that CA confirmation is needed. Manalo ar gued that PNP is akin to AFP where appointment to colonel and naval captain requ ires confirmation H: CA confirmation is not needed The Philippine National Police is separate and distinct from the Armed Forc es of the Philippines. The Constitution, no less, sets forth the distinction. Under Section 4 of Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution, The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be composed of a citizen armed for ce which shall undergo military training and service, as may be provided by law. It shall keep a regular force necessary for the security of the State. On the other hand, Section 6 of the same Article of the Constitution ordain s that: The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be nati onal in scope and civilian in character to be administered and controlled by a n ational police commission. The authority of local executives over the police un its in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law. To so distinguish the police force from the armed forces, Congress enacted Republic Act 6975 which states in part: Section 2. Declaration of policy - It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to promote peace and order, ensure public safety and further streng then local government capability aimed towards the effective delivery of the bas ic services to the citizenry through the establishment of a highly efficient and competent police force that is national in scope and civilian in character. xx

x The police force shall be organized, trained and equipped primarily for the performance of police functions. Its national scope and civilian character sha ll be paramount. No element of the police force shall be military nor shall any position thereof be occupied by active members of the Armed Forces of the Phili ppines. Thereunder, the police force is different from and independent of the armed forces and the ranks in the military are not similar to those in the Philippine National Police. Thus, directors and chief superintendents of the PNP, such as the herein respondent police officers, do not fall under the first category of presidential appointees requiring the confirmation by the Commission on Appointm ents. Important Provisions of RA 6975(DILG Act of 1990): [1] Section 8 No retired or resigned military officer or police official shall be appoint ed within one (1) year from the time of his resignation or retirement. In other words, the prohibition is only for a period of 1 year from his separation from t he military or police service. Thereafter, the President is empowered to appoint such retired or resigned military officer or police official. [2] Section 12 = defines the relationship between the DILG and the Department of National Defense. The primary role of the Department of National Defense through the Armed Fo rces of the Philippines (AFP) is to secure and preserve the external security of the State. In other words, the AFP has the primary, the principal role of prese rving external security. > Under the DILG are several offices, bureaus, i.e., PNP, the National Police Co mmission (which exercises administrative control and supervision over the PNP), Bureau of Jail and Management. What is the role of DILG through the PNP? o It has the primary role of preserving the internal security of the State. o But where there are serious threats, through the national security of the Stat e and in the interest of public order, the President may upon the recommendation of the Peace and Order Council, may call upon the Armed Forces to reassume the primary responsibility of preserving not only the external but also the internal security of the State. [3] Section 39 = compulsory retirement of officers and non-officers upon reachin g the age of 56 years In case an officer with the rank of Chief Superintendent, Director or the D eputy Director General, the National Police Commission may allow his retention i n the service for an unextendible period of one (1) year. Positions Covered: Director General, the Deputy Director General, the Chief of the PNP, the Director, and down the line is the Chief Superintendent. [4] Section 45 = citizens complaints.

Authorizes the filing by the private individual of a complaint against a mem ber of the PNP: 1. offense calls for a penalty punishable by a fine of 15-day salary or suspensi on, the citizen s complaint shall be filed before the Chief of Police. 2. where the penalty is not more than 30 days suspension, the complaint may be filed before the mayor, 3. where the penalty is more than that period of suspension -- more than a one m

onth of suspension as penalty or even dismissal from the service, a citizen may file such administrative complaint before the People s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB ). t 1. 2. 3. There is created a PLEB in every municipality, city or legislative distric composed of: a member of the Sanggunian Barangay Captain; and Impeccable citizens of the place (known for probity and independence)

The membership in the PLEB is a civic duty. This is one instance where an of ficer aware of a private individual may be called upon to render public service, to membership in the People s Law Enforcement Board. [5] Section 45 = disciplinary action imposed by the PNP Regional Director or the PLEB involving demotion or dismissal from the service, may be appealable to the Regional Appellate Board. (RAB) Decision of the PLEB is final unless the penalty is demotion or dismissal f rom service. It will be appealed within 10 days from receipt of decision to: a. Regional Appellate Board (RAB) = cases taken cognizance of by the Regional Di rector or the PLEB; b. National Appellate Board (NAB) = cases taken cognizance of by the Chief of th e PNP > RAB is given a period of 60 days to decide on such an appeal. > If no such decision is made on such appeal by the RAB, then it means that the decision appealed from has become final and executory but subject to the right b y the aggrieved individual to appeal to the DILG Secretary. > So notwithstanding the lapse of the 60 day period and no action was taken on s uch appealed case by the RAB, the matter can still be the subject of an appeal t o the DILG Secretary. It is erroneous to state that the appeal may be taken to the NAPOLCOM becau se the NAPOLCOM takes cognizance of appealed cases only through its recognized d isciplinary machineries -- RAB and NAB. CABADA vs. ALUNAN (260 SCRA 839) F: The aggrieved individual filed the appeal addressed to the DILG Secretary in his capacity as ex-officio Chairman of the NAPOLCOM. H: his appeal is not deemed an appeal to the Napolcom Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990 (RA 6975) dearly shows that the NAPOLCOM exercises appellate Jurisdiction only on the following cases and THROUGH (a) the National Appellate Board (NAB) in personnel disciplinary actions involvi ng demotion or dismissal from the service imposed by the PNP Chief, and (b) the RAB in administrative cases against policemen and over decisions on clai ms for police benefits. The NAPOLCOM has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions rendered by the NA B and the RAB. Consequently, the NAPOLCOM did not have authority over the appeal and the petition for review, and just because both mentioned the DILG Secretary as Chairman of the NAPOLCOM did not bring them within the jurisdiction of the N APOLCOM. [6] Section 46 = members of the PNP are no longer subject to the provisions of c ourt martial proceedings nor under the provisions of the CA 408 known as the Art icles of War. > The PNP shall be national in scope and civilian in character. Meaning, all mem bers of the PNP are now subject to the authority of civilian courts. So, if case

s are to be filed against the members of the PNP, the cases, if evidence warrant s, should be filed before the regular courts and not before courts martial pursu ant to the provision of PD 1850 and the matters be tried under the civilian laws . > Courts martial are not judicial bodies but are implementing arms of the execut ive branch. It is an administrative body under the executive branch and not a ju dicial body. > The Sandiganbayan is a regular court. The ranks in the PNP service that belong s to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan are o from the rank of Provincial Director up -- salary grade 27 and up (high-rankin g officer) o Below salary grade 27, superintendent is a low ranking officer of the PNP. [7] Section 47, = preventive suspension GR: Preventive suspension of a public officer must be for a fixed period 90 days , 60 days, etc. Exception: 1. the preventive suspension from office of a PNP member criminally charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last unt il the termination of the case, and the suspension cannot be lifted before that time 2. where there may be indefinite preventive suspension -- such as under RA 3019 in relation to RA 1379 (Ill-gotten Wealth.) The reason why PNP members are treated differently is that they carry weapo ns and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them. (Himagan vs. People, 237 SCRA 538-541)

[8] Section 51 defines the powers of local government executives over PNP units. The Regional Police Director has the prerogative to name the five (5) eligib les for the position of chief of police from a pool of eligible officers screene d by the Senior Officer Promotion and Selection Board, PNP, Camp Crame, Quezon C ity, without interference from local executives. As deputy of the National Police Commission, the authority of the mayor is v ery limited -- in reality, he has no power of appointment and has only the limit ed power of selecting one from among the list of five eligibles to be named the chief of police. The mayor cannot require the Regional Police Director to include the name of any officer, no matter how qualified, in the list of five to be submitted to th e mayor (Andaya vs. Regional Trial Court. Cebu City, Br. 20. 319 SCRA 696). In the provincial level, the Provincial Governor is limited to the list the names of 5 eligible police officers as screened by the Senior Police Officer s Pro motion and Selection Board of the PNP Camp Crame, Quezon City. GR: The power of local executives is one of operational supervision and control. Meaning, the Local Chief Executive shall exercise operational supervision and c ontrol over PNP units within his territorial jurisdiction. Exception : Within a period of 30 days immediately before a national, local or barangay elections and 30 days thereafter, the local chief executives do not have operat ional control and supervision. It is the COMELEC which has the operational contr ol over PNP units within 30 days before and 30 days after the elections pursuant to Section 51 of the PNP Law. Operational supervision and control exercised by the local chief executive over

PNP units > the power to direct, oversee and even inspect police units, police forces, and the power to employ and deploy PNP units through the Station Commander to ensur e public safety and the maintenance of peace and order within the territorial j urisdiction of the local chief executive > the power to employ and deploy units and elements of the PNP through the polic e station commander to ensure the maintenance of peace and order within the terr itorial jurisdiction. [9] Section 52 withdrawal of operational power The President may upon consultation with the Provincial Governor and the Co ngressman suspend the power of operational supervision and control of any Local Chief Executive over police units on any of the following grounds: a) abuse of authority by the local chief executive; b) frequent unauthorized absences; (Note that this is also one of the grounds fo r the institution of disciplinary action against a local executive official unde r Section 60 of RA 7160;) c) providing material support to criminal elements if the local chief executive is in cahoots, or maintains an army of goons who are members of the PNP; d) engaging in acts inimical to national security. ALUNAN vs. ASUNCION (323 SCRA 623) F: DILG Sec Alunan issued Resolution 93-032 stopping the members of the Criminal power to arre Investigation Service (CIS) from exercising certain police powers st, investigate commission of offenses as well as the power to effect seizures. The resolution classifies them as merely civilian components of the PNP. The res olution was questioned as violative of the DILG law (RA 6975). H: the questioned resolution implements RA 6975. Resolution No. 93-032 issued by the NAPOLCOM which strips members of the Cri minal Investigation Service (CIS) with police powers (such as effecting arrest, search and seizures and the investigation of the commission of crimes), and inst ead classifies them as civilian personnel of the PNP does not violate RA 6975 bu t actually implements it. RA 6975 had the effect of revising the whole police force system and substit uting a new unified one in its place. The new police force absorbed the members of the former NAPOLCOM, Philippine Constabulary (PC) and Integrated National Pol ice, all three of which were accordingly abolished. With the abolition of the PC, including necessarily the CIS, RA 5750, which provides for the qualifications, selection and appointment of civilian investiga tion agents of the CIS as well as their powers as peace officers, has been rende red inutile. RA 5750 has been superseded by RA 6975. Accordingly, police powers have been reserved for such uniformed PNP personn el. Hence, those former CIS agents who opted not to join the uniformed personnel of the PNP are effectively denied police powers. ??????????????????????????????? The Solicitor General is the lawyer of the government, any of its agencies and officials in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring t he services of a lawyer. This is so provided under Sec. 11 of PD No.478. The exc eption is when such officials or agents 1. are being charged criminally or 2. are being civilly sued for damages arising from a felony > the reason here is that, the government as the principal, cannot commit a wron g. The illegal acts or omissions committed by the agent cannot be imputed on the principal Orbos vs. Civil Service Commission, 12 Sept. 1990

F: DOTC Secretary Orbos made a reorganization in the DOTC. Madarang questioned t he appointment of Ayug and Maglayon. He subsequently filed an appeal before the CSC which ruled that Madarang should be appointed instead. Orbos refused to heed CSC since the matter of appointment is one solely belonging to the sound discre tion of the appointing authority. OSG represented DOTC. CSC questioned this. HELD: OSG can validly represent DOTC. When confronted with a situation where one government office takes an advers e position against another government agency, the Solicitor General should not r efrain from performing his duty as the lawyer of the government. It is incumbent upon him to present to the court what he considers would legally uphold the bes t interest of the government although it may run counter to a client's position. In such an instance, the government office adversely affected by the position t aken by the Solicitor General, if it still believes in the merit of its case, ma y appear in its own behalf through its legal personnel or representative. In situations where the other agency has already filed a pleading which is inconsistent with the stand taken by the Solicitor General, the Solicitor Genera l may seek permission from the courts not to represent such agency and for that agency to represent itself through its own in-house counsel. Virata vs. Sandiganbayan, (272 SCRA 663) Sec. 35 Chapter 123, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292), wh ich reproduces the powers of the OSG enumerated in PD 478, provides that the OSG shall "deputize legal officers of government bureaus, agencies and offices to a ssist the Solicitor General and represent the Government in cases involving thei r respective offices, and call on any office or instrumentality of the Governmen t for such service assistance. NPC vs. NLRC (272 SCRA 706) When authorized by the President or head of office, the OSG also represents GOCCs. The OSG is the principal counsel of the National Power Corporation (NPC). As such, copies of orders and decisions served on the deputized special attorne y, acting as agent or representative of the Solicitor General, are not binding u ntil they are actually received by the Solicitor General. The proper basis for c omputing the reglementary period to file an appeal and for determining whether a decision has attained finality is service on the OSG and not on the special att orney. Urbano vs. Chavez & Co vs. Chavez (183 SCRA 347) F: DILG Secretary Luis Santos was charged before the Ombudsman. He was represent ed by OSG H: OSG cannot represent Santos The Office of the Solicitor General is not authorized to represent a public official at any stage of a criminal case or in a civil suit for damages arising from a felony. This applies to all public officials and employees in the executi ve, legislative and judicial branches of the government. A public official who is sued in a criminal case is actually sued in his per sonal capacity inasmuch as his principal, the State, can never be the author of a wrongful act. In the same light, any pecuniary liability a public official may be held to account on the occasion of a civil suit for damages arising from a f elony allegedly committed by him is for his own account. The State is not liable for the same. GO vs. CHAVEZ (183 SCRA 347) F: Solicitor General Frank Chavez was interviewed by Business World and he utter ed defamatory remarks. Go filed a civil action for damages arising from these ut terances of malicious remarks. Chavez was represented by the Office of the Solic itor General. H: Chavez should not be represented by the Office of the Solicitor General becau se the case for damages cannot be attributable to the State. If ever there is a

judgment for the payment of damages, the government cannot be made answerable th erefore. Of course, it does not mean that the Solicitor General should not represent a government official sued in his official capacity where such representation w ould be adverse to a position taken by another government office. Republic vs. Desierto (389 SCRA 452) The Court allowed the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by the Rep ublic of the Philippines through the PCGG (not the OSG) assailing the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the graft complaint against private respondents Cojuangco et al. (involving the acquisition by the United Coconut Oil Mils of 16 oil mills u sing coco levy funds). Although the OSG should have filed the petition in behalf of the Republic, h owever, if the ends of substantial justice would be better served, and the issue s in the action could be determined in a more just speedy and inexpensive manner , then the petition should be entertained. Assuming the PCGG has no authority to file the petition, its unauthorized fi ling was ratified, and the defect was cured, when the OSG signed as co-counsel f or the Republic in its Consolidated Reply. PEOPLE vs. DELGADO (September 18, 1990) F: This was an action filed by the Commission on Elections in the name of the Pe ople of the Philippines a petition questioning the authority of the RTC to revie w the actions taken by the COMELEC in the conduct of investigation and prosecuti on of election offenses brought before the RTC. HELD: The petition has to be dismissed on the ground that the petition was not f iled by the proper counsel for the government which in this case is the Office o f the Solicitor General. Only the Office of the Solicitor General can represent the People of the Phi lippines. In the least, the consent of the Office of the Solicitor General shoul d have been secured by the COMELEC before the filing of the petition.

??????????????????????????RA 6770 The Ombudsman has the power, function and duty to act promptly on any compla int filed in any manner or form against any public officer or employee and to in vestigate any act or omission of any public official when such act or omission a ppears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The incumbent Tanodbayan (called Special Prosecutor under the 1987 Constitut ion) effective 02 February 1987 is without authority to conduct preliminary inve stigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan exc ept upon orders of the Ombudsman (Zaidivar vs. Sandiganbayan, 160 SCRA 843, 27 A pril 1998). Before the creation of the Office of the Ombudsman, what we had was the Tan odbayan. Subsequently, the Tanodbayan remained as the Office of the Special Pros ecutor (OSP). Under the Constitution, the OSP became a component unit of the Off ice of the Ombudsman. The OSP can only proceed upon the permission of the Ombuds man in the matter of conducting preliminary investigation and the filing of case s before the Sandiganbayan. The authority of the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs is not confined t o the military. The Ombudsman, under Sections 11 and 31 of R.A. 6770, may refer cases involving non-military personnel, like the officers of the Philippine Nati onal Police (PNP) who are civilian personnel of the government, for investigatio

n by the Deputy for Military Affairs. (Lacson et al vs. Casaclang et al, 248 SCR A 568). Jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman: DELOSO vs. DOMINGO (191 SCRA 545) F: Gov. Deloso claimed that he was ambushed while on their way to a pre-wedding celebration. All the casualties were the ambushers, not one of the convoy of Gov . Deloso was injured or killed. But in the investigation conducted by the PNP, i t is found out that Deloso and his men were actually the ambushers. Before cases were filed, Deloso claimed that the Ombudsman has no authority to conduct the p reliminary investigation because the crime is not office-related. HELD: The authority of the Ombudsman covers all kinds of offenses, all misfeasan ces, malfeasances and non-feasances committed by public officers and employees. As protector of the people, the Office of the Ombudsman has the power, func tion and duty to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials and to investigate any act or omission of any public official w hen such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient The jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasa nce and nonfeasance committed by any officer or employee during his tenure of of fice. George Uy vs. Ombudsman (20 March 2001) F: SC made an earlier ruling that the power of the Ombudsman to prosecute cases extends only to those cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The Ombudsman filed an MFR H: SC went back to the earlier ruling in Deloso case on the matter of broad juri sdiction of the Ombudsman The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute all criminal cases involving public officers and employees, no t only those within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, but those within the jurisdiction of the regular courts as well. His authority to investigate and pro secute offenses committed by public officers and employees is founded in Section 15 and Section 11 of RA 6770. Section 15 vests the Ombudsman with the plenary and unqualified power to inv estigate and prosecute any act or omission when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular c ourts. Section 11 grants the Office of the Special Prosecutor, an organic component of the office of the Ombudsman under the latter's supervision and control, the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within t he jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Indeed, the powers granted by the legislature to the Ombudsman are very broa d. He is mandated by law to act on all complaints against officers and employees of the government and to enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liabi lity where the evidence warrants. Recognizing the importance of this power, the Court cannot derogate the same by limiting it only to cases cognizable by the Sa ndiganbayan. Finally, the authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute cases involving public officers and employees before the regular courts does not conflict with the powe r of the regular prosecutors under the DOJ to control and direct the prosecution of all criminal actions under Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedu re.The power of the Ombudsman is a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. Thus, Administrative Order No. 8 of the Office of the Ombud sman provides that in cases cognizable by regular courts, the control and superv ision of the Office of the Ombudsman is only in Ombudsman cases and that the law recognizes a concurrence of jurisdiction between the Office of the Ombudsman an d other investigative agencies of government in the prosecution of cases cogniza ble by regular courts. (Ombudsman s jurisdiction is primary and can take over anyt

ime) SANCHEZ vs. DEMETRIOU (227 SCRA 637) F: DOJ conducted the preliminary investigation of Sanchez with regard to Rape an d homicide cases filed against him. Sanchez argued that only the Ombudsman which has the power to conduct preliminary investigation against a public officer. H: The authority of the Ombudsman is one of shared and concurrent jurisdiction w ith other investigating body of the government such as the DOJ. Kinds of Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman: 1. Primary = The Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. If other agencies have in the meantime investigated the case, at any time of the proceeding, the Ombudsman can take over the investigation 2. Shared/ Concurrent = cases falling under the jurisdiction of other courts , RTC MTC

Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan: 1. Office related offenses 2. Regardless of penalty 3. High Ranking Officer (Salary grade 27 and up) the ff officers, although with salary under grade 27, are still within the jurisdiction of Sandigan: a. Prosecutors b. Regional Director and above c. Municipal Mayor d. Senior Supreintendent e. Heads of offices of the LGU s NATIVIDAD vs. FELIX (229 SCRA 682) F: The provincial prosecutor of Tarlac conducted a preliminary investigation of a murder of an NPA suspect Ceverino Aquino. The crime was allegedly committed by Tarlac Mayor Natividad Ramos. Ramos claimed that it is only the Ombudsman whic h has the power to investigate because he is a high-ranking official. HELD: The authority of the Ombudsman is a shared and concurrent authority with t he other investigative bodies of the government. Although it was argued by Mayor Natividad that the murder was committed in r elation to his office which is to maintain peace and order in the society since the victim is an NPA, however, nowhere in Section 444 of the LGC is the commissi on of murder among the duties and responsibilities of a municipal mayor. ORCULLO vs. GERVACIO, JR. (314 SCRA 452) F: Virgilia Yap Morales was hired as a coordinator in a study for the codificati on of the Women Code of Davao. The project was terminated because of lack of fun ds. She is now claiming that there was non-payment of wages due her in the amoun t of P70,800.00. The Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao was not satisfied with the comment submitted by Councilor Orcullo thus it directed the payment of the wages. H: The Ombudsman has no power to direct the payment of a supposed money claim du e an employee.

A money claim against a councilor is within the jurisdiction of a court of p roper jurisdiction, not the Ombudsman, and if the money claim is against the Cit y Government, the claim is within the jurisdiction of the City Council (Sangguni ang Panlungsod), or other proper government agency, but not the Office of the Om budsman. MACEDA vs. VASQUEZ (221 SCRA 464) F: Ombudsman filed a criminal case against Judge Maceda for falsification of his certificate of service that he had completed the number of resolutions within t he period mandated. H: The Ombudsman has no jurisdiction. Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presid ing Justice of the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. H ence, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court personne l's compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. Thus, where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employees ar ises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said c omplaint and refer the same to the Supreme Court for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative dutie s Where administrative questions relevant to the inquiry have yet to be resol ved by the Supreme Court before a prima fade finding of criminal responsibility may be made, such as where the complaint alleges falsification by the judge of a certificate of service and the Court still has to ascertain if the judge has be en granted an extension of time, the Office of the Ombudsman should defer action on the case pending such resolution. This is dictated by practical consideratio ns only. DOLALAS vs. OMBUDSMAN (265 SCRA 819) F: A criminal complaint for violation of the Anti-Graft Law was filed before the Ombudsman against MTC Judge Dolalas of Zamboanga City for unreasonable delay in deciding a case for alarms and scandals filed before her sala. H: this is clearly administrative in nature over which the SC has administrative control and supervision The Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to initiate an investigation into the alle ged undue delay by the judge in the disposition of the criminal case which involve s the determination of whether, in resolving the alarms and scandals case, petit ioner-judge acted in accordance with the Code of Judicial Conduct. Such is dearly administrative in nature over which the Supreme Court has adm inistrative control and supervision FUENTES vs. OMBUDSMAN (October 23, 2001) F: Owners of expropriated land to construct the fly-over in Buhangin were not ye t paid. Judge Fuentes ordered the attachment of several properties considered as junks found in the compound of DPWH in Panacan. The order was questioned before the Ombudsman. The fact-finding committee recommended the filing of a criminal case against Judge Fuentes. H: Omb. has no jurisdiction; only the SC Petitioner judge's questioned order directing the attachment of government p roperty and issuing a writ of execution were done in relation to his office, wel l within his official functions. However, whether or not such order of execution was valid must be inquired into in the course of judicial action only by the Su preme Court that is tasked to supervise the courts. Thus the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrat ive complaint before his office against petitioner judge, but indorse the case t o the Supreme Court. Petitioner Fuentes' questioned order directing the attachment of government property and issuing a writ of execution were done in relation to his office, we

ll within his official functions. The order may be erroneous or void for lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, whether or not such order of execution was val id must be inquired into in the course of the judicial action only by the Suprem e Court that is tasked to supervise the courts. Before a civil or a criminal case is filed against a judge for violation of Articles 204 and 205 of the Revised Penal Code on rendering an unjust judgment or interlocutory order, there MUST be a final and authoritative judicial declara tion that the decision or order of the judge is indeed unjust. In the absence of such declaration, the filing of civil or criminal case against the judge on suc h matter is premature and cannot prosper. The pronouncement that the judgment is unjust may result either from: (1) an action for certiorari or prohibition against such action of the judge, or , (2) pursuant to the filing of an administrative case before the higher court imp ugning the validity of such judgment or order rendered by the respondent judge Investigatory and Prosecutory powers: Ocampo vs. Ombudsman (225 3CRA725) F: OSP moved to dismiss to the graft case against Gov. Ocampo. Ombudsman reverse d OSP. Ocampo then filed a case to move to dismiss Ombudsman s finding based on OS P s recommendation. H: Courts cannot review the exercise of discretion of Ombudsman The Court, recognizing the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by t he Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman and for reasons of practicably, w ill not interfere nor pass upon findings of the Ombudsman to avoid its being ham pered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedi ngs conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed bef ore it, and the Court will not review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an informatio n in court or dismiss a complaint. If the Ombudsman has the power to dismiss a complaint outright without going through a preliminary investigation, it necessarily follows that it is also wit hin his discretion to determine whether the evidence before him is sufficient to establish probable cause. Thus, petitioners may not compel the Ombudsman to order the production of ce rtain documents if in his judgment, such documents are not necessary in order to establish the guilt, or innocence, of the accused (Mamburao vs. Ombudsman. 344 SCRA 818). Despite the Ombudsman's non-compliance with the affidavit requirement, petit ioner filed his counter-affidavit and answered the charges against him. Hence, h aving submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and having allowed the proceedings to go on until the preliminary investigation was terminated and the information filed with the Sandiganbayan, petitioner Is deemed to have waive d whatever right he may otherwise have to assail the manner in which the prelimi nary investigation was conducted (Bautista vs. Sandiganbayan, 12 May 2000). Duterte vs. Sandiganbayan (130191; 4/27/1998) F: To substantiate an unverified complaint filed against Duterte for the purchas e of computers, OMB-Mindanao requested COA s Special Audit Team to submit affidavi ts. Duterte et. al., were not given copies of these affidavits. They were only a sked to file a comment on the civil case and COA Report. The civil case was dism issed for being moot since the said contract was rescinded. H: no due process A COA special audit report is not equivalent to the affidavits required unde r Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules or Procedure) of the Ombudsman for the cond

uct of preliminary investigation. When Duterte et. al., were asked to file a com ment on a COA Audit Report, they were already being subjected to preliminary inv estigation without being so informed. Also, they were not furnished a single aff idavit of any person charging them of any offense. Garcia vs. Primo (148944; 2/5/2003) F: Cebu Mayor was charged with graft with regard to a contract he entered with F E Zuelling an asphalt distributor H: due process was complied with The Duterte ruling does not apply where the Ombudsman's order requiring peti tioner to submit his counter-affidavit was accompanied by the COA Special Audit Report and the joint affidavit and supplemental joint affidavit of the auditors. The fact that the Prosecutor who conducted the fact-finding investigation al ready resigned and that his name was withdrawn as complainant from the case is o f no fatal consequence. First, Tagaan's report and affidavit still form part of the records of the c ase. He could still be called by subpoena if necessary. Second, Tagaan was a nominal party, whose duty as special prosecutor was to investigate the commission of crimes and file the corresponding information. Since the illegal acts imputed are public offenses. The real complainant is the State, which is represented by the remaining complainants - the COA and the Ombudsman. Baluyut The nce the ration, vs. Holganza (9 February 2000) Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy si Philippine National Red Cross is a government owned and controlled corpo with an original charter under RA 95 as amended.

?????????????????????????????????????? Garcia vs. Mojica, 314 SCRA 207 F: Mayor Garcia signed the anomalous purchase of asphalt 4)days before the local elections. Garcia was re-elected. Ombudsman then preventively suspended him. Ga rcia claims that he could no longer be placed under preventive suspension becaus e of his re-election citing the case of AGUINALDO. H: The Ombudsman can still issue preventive suspension order even if the act in question happened during a previous term. The power of the Ombudsman to issue preventive suspension order is provided for under Section 24 of R.A. 6670. The power to investigate is separate and dist inct from the power to impose administrative sanctions. The power to investigate is also separate and distinct from the power to preventively suspend a local el ective official. But because of Garcia s re-election, he cannot be sanctioned administratively because the subject of the administrative complaint was committed during a previ ous term despite the fact that the act complained of happened 4 days before the elections. What is determinative is the time of commission, i.e., during a previous ter m. It does not matter that it took place a few days before the elections. There was here a presumed knowledge on the part of the people re-electing him to the s ame office. Thus, there was condonation as in the AGUINALDO case. The power of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend any officer or employee " under his authority" means that he can preventively suspend all officials under investigation by his office, regardless of the branch of government in which the y are employed, excepting those removable by impeachment, members of Congress an d the Judiciary. > To initiate impeachment, the Ombudsman can investigate YABUT vs. OMBUDSMAN (233 SCRA 311)

F: While Vice Mayor Yabut was direct a traffic, a fistfight ensued between him a nd an American. While investigation for simple misconduct and oppression was ongoing, he was preventively suspended for 90-days. His penalty was 90-day suspens ion. Yabut now asks that the period of preventive suspension must be credited to whatever penalty of suspension that may be imposed by the Ombudsman. H: the period of preventive suspension cannot be credited A preventive suspension decreed by the Ombudsman by virtue of his authority under Section 21 of RA 6770. In relation to Section 9 of Administrative Order No . 07, is not meant to be a penalty but a means taken to insure the proper and im partial conduct of an investigation. The period of preventive suspension cannot be credited to whatever penalty t hat may be meted out. (BQ) BUENASEDA vs. FLAVIER (226 SCRA 646) F: DOH Sec Flavier filed graft cases against several employees including the Chi ef (Dr. Buenaseda) of the Hospital of the National Center for Mental Health. Aft er filing their answers, the Ombudsman issued preventive suspension order. The r espondents contended that there was yet no formal hearing conducted on the matte r and so, the issuance of the preventive suspension order violated due process. H: they can be preventively suspended Being a mere order for preventive suspension the questioned order of the Omb udsman was validly issued even without a full-blown hearing and the formal prese ntation of evidence by the parties. The moment a criminal or administrative complaint is filed with the Ombudsma n, the respondent is deemed to be "in his authority" and he can proceed to deter mine whether said respondent should be placed under preventive suspension. CASTILLO-Co vs. BARBERS (290 SCRA 719) F: Gov. Castillo was charged with graft practices because she purchased recondit ioned heavy equipment when the requirement is for brand new ones. Castillo conte nds that she can only be preventively suspended for 60 days since that was what is provided under LGC. H: she can be suspended for 6 months The provisions under the LGC are different from that under the Ombudsman Act . So, administrative proceedings taken by the Ombudsman pursuant to its provisio ns under the Ombudsman Law ought to be followed. In other words, the Ombudsman can mete out the maximum preventive suspension of six (6) months. A preventive suspension can be decreed on an official under investigation aft er charges are brought and even before the charges are heard since the same is n ot in the nature of a penalty. The length of the period of suspension within the six-month limit prescribed by Sec. 24 of RA 6770, like the evaluation of the st rength of the evidence, lies in the discretion of the Ombudsman. YASAY vs. DESIERTO (300 SCRA 494) The matter of imposing the period of preventive suspension up to six months l ies within the discretion of the Ombudsman. The Supreme Court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the Ombudsma n on this matter, absent clear showing of grave abuse of discretion Generally, the SC will not interfere into the exercise of discretion by the O mbudsman. Although in the case of GARCIA vs. MOJICA, the SC ruled that the impo sition of six (6) months preventive suspension on Mayor Garcia was unreasonable and so the SC reduced the period. As a general rule however, the matter is with in the sound discretion of the Office of the Ombudsman. Appeal: ALBA vs. NITORREDA (254 SCRA 753) F: DECS Asst. Regional Director Alba was charged of being partial to the owner o f a school in Tagum. He was found guilty but cannot appeal because of Sec 27 of

RA 6770 H: no violation of right to appeal Section 27 of RA 6770 and Section 7, Rule 111 of Administrative Order No. 7 (known as the Rules of Procedure of the office of the Ombudsman), denying the r ight of appeal and providing for the finality of the decision where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than 1 month or a fine equivalent to 1 month salary, is constitutional and not tantamount to a de privation of property without due process of law. The right to appeal is not a natural right nor part of due process. All other decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman which impose penalties t hat are not enumerated in Section 27 are not final, unappealable and immediately executory. In these other cases, the respondent therein has the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals within ten days from receipt of the written notice of t he order, directive or decision. An appeal timely filed will stay the immediate implementation of the decision. In all these other cases therefore, the judgment imposed therein will become final after the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected or, an appeal therefrom having been taken, the judgment in the appellate tribunal becomes final. Lapid vs. CA. 334 SCRA 741 F: Lapid was suspended for 1 year. Pending appeal, the NB, DILG and Ombudsman wa nts the penalty immediately executed. H: penalty cannot be immediately executed since no law allows it; this case was decided before AO-14-A A decision of the Ombudsman finding him liable for misconduct and imposing t he penalty of one year suspension without pay, is not among those listed in the Ombudsman Act of 1989 as final and unappealable. There is no general legal principle that mandates that all decisions of quas i-judicial and administrative agencies are immediately executory. Decisions rend ered by the SEC and the Civil Aeronautics Board, for example, are not immediatel y executory and are stayed when an appeal is filed before the Court of Appeals. On the other hand, the decisions of the Civil Service Commission, under the Administrative Code, and the Office of the President under the Local Government Code are immediately executory even pending appeal because the pertinent laws un der which the decision were rendered mandate them to be so. The provisions of the last two cited laws expressly provide for the executio n pending appeal of their final orders or decisions. Section 68 of the Local Gov ernment Code only applies to administrative decisions rendered by the Office of the President or the appropriate Sanggunian against elective local government of ficials. Similarly, the provisions in the Administrative Code of 1987 mandating the execution pending review applies specifically to administrative decisions of the Civil Service Commission involving members of the Civil Service. There is n o basis in law for the proposition that the provisions of the Administrative Cod e and the Local Government Code on execution pending review should be applied su ppletorily to the provisions of the Ombudsman Act as there is nothing in the Omb udsman Act which provides for such suppletorily application. Lopez vs. CA and Romeo Liggayu (389 SCRA 570) F: Liggayu, Manager of the Legal Department of the PCSO, was found guilty by the Ombudsman of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service for issuin g a subpoena in excess of his authority as Resident Ombudsman of PCSO and was me ted the penalty of six months and one day suspension without pay. H: suspension cannot be executed pending appeal The legislature has seen fit to grant a stay of execution pending appeal fro m disciplinary cases where the penalty imposed by the Office of the Ombudsman is not public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month, or a f ine not equivalent to one month salary. The Court of Appeals, committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining the execution of private respondent Lig gayu's suspension pending appeal. Considering that Liggayu appealed from the dec

ision of the Office of the Ombudsman, the stay of execution of the penalty of su spension should therefore issue as a matter of right. The fact that the Ombudsma n Act gives parties the right to appeal from its decisions should generally carr y with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal. GR: The filing of an appeal will stay the immediate execution of the penalty Exception: when the law itself allows the execution (this may have been repealed by AO-14-A dated 8/17/2000 issued by the Ombudsman which states that an appeal shall not stop the decision of the Ombudsman from being executory; he is entitle d to back wages though) Fabian vs. Desierto (295 SCRA 470) Appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disc iplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In so holding, the Court declared unconstitutional Se ction 27 of RA 6770 which provided that decisions of the office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by way of petition for review on certiorar i under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Such provision was violative of Section 3 0, Article VI of the Constitution, as it expanded the jurisdiction of the Suprem e Court without its advice and consent. Villavert vs. Desierto (23 February 2000) Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure precludes appeals from quasi-ju dicial agencies, like the Office of the Ombudsman, to the Supreme Court. Consequ ently, such appeals in administrative cases should be taken to the Court of Appe als. Namuhe vs. Ombudsman (298 SCRA 299) A transfer by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, o f pending cases involving review of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals which shall now be v ested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction there over, relates to procedure onl y and does not impair any substantive right. It is not the right to appeal of an aggrieved party which is affected by law; that right has been preserved. Only t he procedure by which the appeal is to be made has been changed. Morong Water District vs. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman (17 March 2000) Any appeal or application for remedy against a decision or finding of the Of fice of the Ombudsman may only be entertained by the Supreme Court on a pure que stion of law. Findings of fact of the Ombudsman, when supported by substantial e vidence, are conclusive. Remedy where the penalty imposed is more than 30-day suspension or up to one yea r (the period of suspension as a penalty should not exceed one year or dismissal from the service): 1. Adm case decided by Ombudsman = Petition for review on certiorari applying Ru le 43 -- brought before the CA within 10 days. 2. Criminal cases decided by the Ombudsman = file MFR within 5 days, then appeal should be taken to SC. 3. Under Rule 65 but only as an exception, i.e., where there is grave abuse of d iscretion, error of law and such other instances. MARQUEZ vs. DESIERTO (G.R. 135882, June 23, 2001) F: Ombudsman ordered bank manager of Unionbank to produce the bank records of La gdameo who is subject to a fact-finding investigation. No formal investigation y et, only a verification whether there is enough evidence to support the complain t. H: the fact-finding investigation is a fishing expedition which does not warrant an exception from the Bank Secrecy Act (RA 1405) The order of the Ombudsman to produce several bank documents for purposes of

inspection in camera relative to various accounts maintained at Union Bank, Juli a Vargas Branch, where petitioner is the branch manager, is an invasion of priva cy which is violative of the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act (RA 1405). Before an in camera inspection may be allowed: 1. there must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction 2. the account must be clearly identified, 3. the inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the c ourt of competent jurisdiction 4. The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present duri ng the inspection, and 5. such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case. In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of co mpetent authority. What is existing is an investigation by the Office of the Omb udsman through its Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB). In short, what t he Ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence to formally cha rge Amado Lagdameo, et. al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pendi ng case in court which would warrant the opening of the bank account for inspect ion. Exceptions to Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act: (1) in the course of an examination by the bank pursuant to an authority given b y the Central Bank; (2) an authority given to the auditor for the conduct of an audit; (3) upon written permission of the depositor; (4) in cases of impeachment proceedings; (5) where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the controver sy; and (6) upon order of competent courts in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty on the part of the public officers (7) Sec 8 of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) = during his incumbe ncy, public official has acquired property manifestly out of proportion to his s alary and other lawful income ???????????????????????????(PD 1445: Gov t Auditing Code) Article IX-D, Section 2 COA has the authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue end receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by the Government and the power to promulgate rules for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unn ecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures or uses of gover nment funds and property. The Constitution and existing laws mandate the COA to audit all government a gencies, including GOCCs with original charters like the water districts created under PD 198 (De Jesus vs. COA, 403 SCRA 666). DBP vs. COA (3 73 SCRA 356) The COA's jurisdiction covers all government agencies, offices, bureaus and units, including GOCCs, and even non-government entities enjoying subsidy from t he government. However, nothing in Sec. 26 of PD 1445 states that the COA's powe r to examine and audit government banks is exclusive, thereby preventing private audit of government agencies concurrently with the COA audit. Even with a priva te audit, the COA will still conduct its usual examination and audit, and its fi ndings and conclusions will still bind government agencies and their officials. The COA does not have the sole and exclusive power to examine and audit gove rnment banks. The Central Bank has concurrent jurisdiction to examine and audit, or cause the examination and audit, of government banks. Still, the COA's audit prevails over that of the Central Bank since the COA is the constitutionally ma

ndated auditor of government bank. And in matters under second paragraph of Sect ion 2, Article IX-D of the Constitution, the Central Bank is devoid of authority to allow or disallow expenditures of government banks since this function belon gs exclusively to the COA. Commissioner or Internal Revenue vs. COA (218 SCRA 204) H: Dept of Finance, which has supervision and control over the BIR, may grant th e informer s award. COA may disallow such grant and this disallowance can be set a side by the court. The final determination by the Department of Finance, thru the recommendatio n of BIR of the entitlement to the informer's reward under NIRC, is under Sec 90 of PD 1445, conclusive only upon the executive agencies concerned and cannot bi nd COA in the exercise of its constitutional function. But the disallowance in a udit by COA may be set aside and nullified by the Supreme Court if done with gra ve abuse of discretion. In its exercise of its power to audit, the COA cannot disallow the payment of back wages to employees, which had been decreed pursuant to a final decision of the Civil Service Commission (Cagatin, et al vs. COA, 21 March 2000). NHA vs. COA (226 SCRA 65) F: The Republic, through NHA, entered into a loan agreement with KFW. To fulfill one of the conditions for loan extension, NHA extended the services of a foreig n consultant. COA disallowed the extension H: COA s disallowance was valid The claim that renewal of NHA's foreign loan with German entity KFW for the U rban Housing Project would have been jeopardized if NHA did not agree to the ext ension of a foreign consultant's services is no justification for not complying with the Constitutional mandate prohibiting unnecessary expenses of public funds which is beyond compromise. Rodrigo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan (303 SCRA 309) F: The transaction post-audited by COA has been found in order by COA. Despite s uch findings, the Ombudsman still inquired into the criminal liability of Public Officers who were responsible for such contract H: the Ombudsman has discretion whether to adopt the COA report or not The exoneration of respondents in the audit investigation does not mean the a utomatic dismissal of the complaint against them - the preliminary investigation , after all, is independent from the investigation conducted by the COA, their p urposes distinct from each other. Cruz vs. COA (368 SCRA 85) The classification of COA as to who were entitled to the social amelioration benefits (SAB) and excluding there from those employees of the Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA) hired after October 31, 1989, has no legal basis. The date of hiring of an employee can not be considered as a substantial distinction and is not among those factors that shall be taken into account in fixing compensati on or granting benefits. RA 6758 (Salary Standardization Law) and Corporate Comp ensation Circular 10 (the Implementing Rules) do not make any distinction betwee n those hired before and after October 31, 1989. ???????????????????????????????? ??????????????PCGG The laws creating PCGG: E.O. 1 (February 28, 1986) > mandates the PCGG to recover ill-gotten wealth accumulated by the Marcoses, th eir immediate families, relatives, subordinates, associates and cronies, whether such properties found in the Philippines or abroad.

> includes the power to take over or sequester all business enterprises or entit ies controlled or owned by them > PCGG has the power to take over or place under its control any property or off ice within its authority > no civil action shall prosper against the PCGG or any member thereof for the d ischarge of their functions and duties E.O. 2 > empowers the PCGG to freeze all assets and properties in the Philippines and > likewise prohibit any person from transferring or concealing such property all eged to be ill-gotten E.O. 14 and E.O. 14-A > mandate the PCGG to file and prosecute all cases before the Sandiganbayan whic h has the exclusive jurisdiction to try and hear cases of the PCGG. > Section 5 of E.O. 14 as amended, empowers the PCGG to grant immunity from crim inal prosecution of any person who testifies Baseco vs. PCGG (150 SCRA 181) The PCGG cannot perform acts of ownership or dominion over sequestered prope rties. The essence of the sequestration order is not an act of ownership. It is sim ply an act to conserve properties to prevent further dissipation of assets alleg ed to be ill-gotten. Since the PCGG is not the owner of the sequestered assets, it is not allowed to vote sequestered shares of stocks or even elect members of the board of dire ctors concerned (Cojuangco vs. Azcuna, [April 16, 1991]). The reason here is tha t, PCGG is a mere conservator and not an owner of the sequestered property. The exception to this rule is in case of a take over of a business belonging to the government or whose capitalization comes from government funds, but now in the hands of the private business. In such situation, the PCGG may vote on th e sequestered shares not as an act of ownership but to conserve properties alrea dy in the hands of private businesses but which used to be owned by the governme nt, or the capitalization comes from the government. And under the rules promulgated by the PCGG, there was a question on whethe r or not the power to issue a writ of sequestration may be delegated to an agent or representative of the PCGG. In the case of Two clear "public character" exceptions under which the government is grante d the authority to vote the shares: (1) Where government shares are taken over by private persons or entities who/wh ich registered them in their own lames, and (2) Where the capitalization or shares that were acquired with public funds some how landed in private hands (Republic vs. COCOFED, 372 SCRA 463; Republic vs. Sa ndiganbayan, 402 SCRA 85) Republic vs. COCOFED (372 SCRA 463) The sequestered UCPB shares having been conclusively shown to have been purc hased with coconut levies, the Court holds that these funds and shares are, at t he very least, affected with public interest; thus, private respondents even if they are the registered shareholders cannot be accorded the right to vote them. The coconut levy funds are not only affected with public interest they are i n fact prima facie public funds They also partake of the nature of taxes which a re enforced proportional contributions from persons and properties, exacted by t he State by virtue of its sovereignty for the support of government and for all public needs. The PCGG has no authority to sell sequestered property as it is not the owne r of the property it sequesters. It is only an overseer, c protector and a prese rver (Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 26 December 1990).

Under Sector 5 of Executive Order No 14, the PCGG is authorized to grant imm unity from criminal prosecution to any person who testifies. As ruled by the Sup reme Court in Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72), the PCGG, pursuant to E 0. No. 14, in relation with Section 3 of the same Executive Order, may grant cri minal and civil immunities. The Sandiganbayan though has the jurisdiction to loo k into the validity of the immunity granted by the PCGG. REPUBLIC vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (173 SCRA 72) F: There was a grant of civil immunity to Jose Campos. Such immunity was extende d to his son, Jose Campos, Jr. Whether or not the PCGG is empowered to grant civ il immunity. Note that Section 5 of E.O. 14 talks only of immunity given by PCGG in criminal cases. H: Section 5 must be related to Section 3 of E.O. 14 as amended which provides f or the procedure and the applicable laws in the prosecution of civil cases, and applying the provision of the New Civil Code, Article 2028 the mandate is to con ciliate civil cases. Therefore the grant of civil immunity in civil case to the son (Jose Campos, Jr.) was within the powers of the PCGG. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (258 SCRA 686) F: A representative of the PCGG, Atty. Ramirez issued a sequestration order over the assets and properties of Dio Island Resort in Leyte allegedly owned by the Romualdezes. H: to be valid, a sequestration order must be issued with the authority of 2 Com missioners Under the rules promulgated, the PCGG may issue writ of sequestration upon t he authority of at least two Commissioners "when the commission has reasonable g rounds to believe that the issuance thereof is warranted." But the PCGG may not delegate its authority to sequester to its representatives and subordinates and any such delegation is invalid and ineffective The power to sequester, therefore, carries with it the corollary duty to mak e a preliminary determination of whether there is a reasonable basis for sequest ering a properly alleged to be ill-gotten. The absence of such prior determinati on by PCGG is fatal defect which renders the sequestration void ab initio, and t hus not subject to ratification by the PCGG. H: order was invalid event though it was ratified by the Commission The writ of sequestration is null and void since the issuance made by the re presentative of the PCGG did not conform to the rules implementing the law. No r atification by the PCGG can cure the defect. Such non-compliance is a fatal defe ct. Republic vs. Migrino (30 August 1990) F: PCGG initiated an investigation on the alleged ill-gotten wealth of Col. Tecs on, yet there were no allegations that Tecson is related to the Marcoses H: PCGG has no jurisdiction; Ombudsman has The PCGG is the agency empowered to bring proceedings for forfeiture of prop erty alleged acquired unlawfully before February 25, 1986, while the power to in vestigate cases of ill-gotten or unexplained wealth acquired after that date is vested in the Ombudsman (Republic vs. Sandiganbayan. 237 SCRA 242), and if warra nted, the Solicitor General may file the forfeiture petition with the Sandiganba yan. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (407 SCRA 13) Where there is no jurisdiction to waive, as the PCGG cannot exercise investi gative or prosecutorial powers never granted to it, then respondent Major Genera l Ramas could not be deemed to have waived any defect in the filing by the PCGG of the forfeiture petition by filing an answer with counterclaim. Parties may ra ise lack of jurisdiction at any stage of the proceeding. Ramas position atone as

Commanding General of the Philippine Army does not suffice to make him a subordin ate of former President Marcos for purposes of EO 1 and its amendments. It is pre cisely a prima facie showing that the ill-gotten wealth was accumulated by a "su bordinate of Marcos that vests jurisdiction on PCGG. Failing in this, the PCGG sh ould have recommended the instant case to the Ombudsman. PCGG vs. PEA (April 12, 1988) F: There was a freeze order issued by the PCGG over the assets and records of tw o government firms. This freeze order was contested before the RTC. Based on a c omplaint, the RTC issued a restraining order. H: The RTC has no jurisdiction over PCGG. The SC applied the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies. The PCGG is a co-equal body with the RTC and co-equal bodies have no power to control the other. It is only the Sandiganbayan which has the exclusive jurisdiction over the P CGG. ???????????? The actions of the Monetary Board in proceedings on insolvency are explicitl y declared under Section 29 of the Central Bank Act (RA 265, as amended by EO 28 9) to be "final and executory." They may not be set aside, except upon "convinci ng proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith." (Central Bank vs. Judge dela Cruz 12 November 1990). The Central Bank can close down a bank for insolvency without prior notice a nd hearing. The "close now and hear later policy that empowers the Central Bank t o take over a bank before it could even disprove the CB's findings of insolvency is intended to prevent the unwarranted dissipation of the bank assets and prote ct its depositors, creditors, stockholders and the public. Central Bank vs. Triumph Savings Bank (220 SCRA 536) Section 29 of the Central Bank Act does not require prior notice and hearing before a bank may be directed to stop operations and placed under receivership because they would not only cause delay but also give bank insiders the chance to further dissipate the bank's assets, create more liabilities and destroy evi dence of fraud. Requisites before the Central Bank can close down a bank for insolvency without prior notice and hearing: 1) There must be an examination pursuant to the authority of the Central Bank. I n other words, the examining department of the Central Bank is given the power b y the Central Bank to look into the accounts and records of the bank in question ; 2) On the basis of such examination, a report has to be submitted to the Monetar y Board; and 3) The Monetary Board on the basis of such report finding that further operation would only cause danger to the bank and to the public, then it can order the im mediate closure of the bank. Of course under the law, the aggrieved bank is given the opportunity to sue the Central Bank within a period of ten (10) days from the date of closure. ?????????????????????????????????????(RA 6657) Republic Act No. 6657 explicitly recognizes the effectivity and applicabilit y of PD 229, investing the Department of Agrarian Reform with original jurisdict ion, generally, over all cases involving agrarian laws, although under Section 5 7 of said act, it restores to the Regional Trial Court original and exclusive ju risdiction over: 1) all petitions for the determination of just compensation; and 2) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under the Act (Tangub vs. Court of A

ppeals, 03 December 1990). Under Sec. 50 of RA 6657, it is the DAR which is vested with 1. primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters; and 2. the exclusive original jurisdiction overall matters involving the implementat ion of agrarian reform (includes determination of just compensation), except tho se falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agricu lture and the DENR. DAR s exclusive original jurisdiction is exercised through hierarchically-arr anged agencies of the DAR, namely: 1) DARAB (Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board); 2) RARAD (Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator); and 3) PARAD (Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator) > All cases under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DAR must commence i n the PARAD of the province where the property is situated. > The DARAB only has appellate jurisdiction to review the orders and findings of the PARAD. ROXAS & CO. vs. CA (321 SCRA 106) F: DAR determined that the property in Nasugbu, Batangas should be brought under CARP. Presidential Proclamation 15-20 declared the same area as tourist zone. HELD: DAR authorities must not simply disregard the Proclamation because it has the effect of a law unless the same is repealed The character of a parcel of land is not determined merely by a process of e limination the actual use which the land is capable should be the primordial fac tor. Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, which declared Nasugbu, Batangas as a t ourist zone, has the force and effect of law unless repealed -- it cannot be dis regarded by DAR or any other department of Government. Since it governs the extraordinary method of expropriating private property, The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) should be strictly construed. confers 57 the DAR the primary jurisdiction to determine to judicial inquiry Refers 50judicial proceedings in determining be compensation Sectionto administrative proceedings which mayjustsubjectagrarian reform matters to and the exclusive authority over all matters pertaining to the implementation o f agrarian reforms which necessarily includes the determination of just compensa confers the exclusive landowner tion to be paid to theoriginal jurisdiction to the RTC to hear and decide petiti preliminary ons for the determination of just compensation matter of the value of the land made by the DAR in the RTC is not exercising appellatejust compensation placed under the CARP and the jurisdiction; Under Section 11, Rule 13 of the DARAB Rules, the decision of the adjudicat or in the summary administrative proceeding on land-valuation and preliminary de termination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the DARA B but shall be filed directly with the RTC which shall be constituted as a Speci al Agrarian Reform Court. So this still is an exercise of original exclusive jur isdiction of the RTC. This is consistent with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and the doctri ne of exhaustion of administrative remedies. It only means that primary jurisdic tion is lodged in the DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a prelimin ary manner the just compensation. The STAGES required under Section 50 under this agrarian (administrative) procee ding: 1. The Landbank determines a preliminary determination as to the value of land p laced under the CARP and the compensation to be paid to the landowner; 2. The DAR initiates the acquisition of agricultural land by notifying the owner of the property of the desire of the government to place the property under the coverage of the CARP together with the notice and the valuation as initially de termined by the Landbank; 3. Within 30 days from notice given by the DAR, the landowner must decide whethe

r to accept or reject the offer made by the DAR; 4. If there is rejection by the landowner, there will be a summary administrativ e proceeding held by the PARAD or RARAD, as the case may be, depending on the va lue of the land, for purposes of determining just compensation; 5. Parties interested in the transaction are required to submit their respective evidence; 6. The DAR adjudicator must decide the matter within 30 days from submission of the case; 7. If the landowner still finds the price unsatisfactory, the landowner can brin g the case immediately and directly to the RTC WITHIN 15 DAYS from receipt of no tice of such decision. There is no need to bring it to the DARAB. PHIL. VETERANS BANK vs. CA (322 SCRA 140) F: PVB s properties were placed under CARP. PVB filed its appeal before the RTC be yond the 15-day period as required under Section 11, Rule 13 of the DARAB Rules. The RTC dismissed the petition. H: The 15-day period to file the petition for just compensation is mandatory. The jurisdiction of the courts is not any less "original and exclusive" bec ause the question is first passed upon") by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative determination. Hence, as the petit ion of the landowner PVB was filed beyond the 15-day period provided in Rule XII I, Sec. 11 of the DARAB Rules, the trial court correctly dismissed the case (for judicial determination of the just compensation) and the Court of Appeals corre ctly affirmed the order of dismissal. LAGUNA ESTATE DEV T CORP. vs. CA, (335 SCRA 38) F: CARP beneficiaries filed a case before the DAR to compel LEDC to grant them a n easement of right of way H: DARAB has NO power to grant to the beneficiaries a right of way (easement) si nce there is not tenancy relationship between the parties For the DARAB to have jurisdiction over the case, there must be TENANCY rela tionship between the parties. In the instant case, there exist no tenancy relati onship between the petitioner estates and the beneficiaries. The following indispensable elements must be established: 1. the parties are the land-owner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2. the subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land 3. there must be consent between the parties to the tenancy relationship; 4. the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5. there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lesse e; and 6. the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural le ssee Obviously , in this case, the issue of a right of way or easement over priva te property without tenancy relations is outside the jurisdiction of the DARAB. This is not an agrarian issue. Jurisdiction is vested in a court of general juri sdiction. BAUTISTA vs. ARANETA (326 SCRA 235) F: PARAD and DARAB held that Bautista is a tenant -- based on the certification issued by the agrarian reform technician and the MARO (Mun. Agrarian Reform Offi cer). The certification was based on interviews with persons in occupation of th e property. H: possession and cultivation is not sufficient to make a conclusion that tenanc y exists There must be a consent by the landowner for the relationship to exist. The certifications do not show such consent. The certifications show only that Bauti sta is the possessor and the cultivator of the land. These certifications are no t sufficient to show that Bautista is a tenant of Araneta.

???????????????????????????????? ??????????? The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virt ue of PD 1067, as amended by PD 1839, to regulate and centralize all games of ch ance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. It is allowed to esta blish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territo rial jurisdiction of the Philippines. PAGCOR is a reliable source of much needed revenue for the cash strapped Gov ernment. It provided funds for social impact projects and subjected gambling to close scrutiny, regulation, supervision and control of the Government. Public We lfare lies at the bottom of the enactment of the PD 1869 BASCO vs PAGCOR (197 S 53) PAGCOR has two-fold character: (1) governmental and (2) proprietary function s. In its governmental character, the PAGCOR is mandated to regulate and centr alize all forms of games of chance in one centralized agency known as the PAGCOR . The basis here is public welfare the need to regulate gambling and all the con sequent evils attendant to operations of gambling joints and casinos. In its exercise of its proprietary function, PAGCOR is therefore authorized to operate as a business. PAGCOR has a dual role to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The lat ter role is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or instru mentality of government. Being an instrumentality of the government, PAGCOR shou ld be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise its operation might be burdened, embedded or subjected to control by a mere local government MAGTAJAS vs. PRYCE PROPERTIES (253 SCRA 255) The LGU has no power to impose a tax on the PAGCOR. Clearly, under the charter of PAGCOR, it is exempt from local taxes. And un der the Constitution, the power of the LGUs to tax is subject to such guidelines and limitations that Congress may impose. The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is considered inimical to the interests of the people, in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling, it is left to Con gress to deal with the activity as it sees fit.

CSC and PAGCOR vs. Salas (274 SCRA 414) Section 16 of PD 1869 insofar as it exempts PAGCOR positions from the provis ions of Civil Service Law and Rules has been amended, modified or deemed repeate d by the 1987 Constitution and Executive Order 292. Re: Jai-Alai Del Mar vs. PAGCOR (346 SCRA 485) F: PAGCOR entered into a contract with Grand Jai-alai Corp wherein PAGCOR will m ange and operate the operation no financial cash out by PAGCOR. Rep. Del Mar que stioned the agreement on the ground that PAGCOR has no such power H: The charter of PAGCOR does not give it any franchise to operate and manage ja i alai. Firstly, a franchise is a special privilege of public concern which cannot b e exercised at will. Thus, the manner of granting the franchise, to whom it may be granted, the m ode of conducting the business, etc., are defined in clear language. Such expres s grant and its conditionalities protective of the public interest are evidently

wanting in PD 1869, the present Charter of PAGCOR. Second, a historical study of the creation, growth and development of PAGCOR will show that it was never given a legislative franchise to operate a jai alai . It cannot be the intent of President Marcos in the exercise of his martial l aw powers to grant PAGCOR in 1977 a franchise to operate jai alai because a year and a half before it was chartered under PD 1067, he issued PD 810 on 16 Octobe r 1975 granting Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation controlled by the Romualdezes a 25-year franchise to operate Jai-alai in Manila. The amendatory laws to PD 1067, namely: PD 1399, PD 1632 and PD 1869, did no t change the nature and scope of PAGCOR's franchise to maintain gambling casinos (not a franchise to operate jai alai). When President Aquino issued EO 169 on 0 8 May 1987 repealing PD 310, PAGCOR's franchise to operate gambling casinos was not revoked. Neither was it given a franchise to operate jai alai. Third, PAGCOR is engaged in business affected with public interest. Perforce, a legislative franchise to operate jai alai is imbued with public interest and involves an exercise of police power. The rule is that laws which g rant the right to exercise a part of the police power of the state are to be con strued strictly and any doubt must be resolved against the grant. ??????????????????????????????LTO??? ???????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????LTFRB > The LTO and the LTRRB are under the supervision of the Department of Transport ation and Communication (DOTC). > The DOTC, through the LTO and LTFRB, is mandated to implement laws pertaining to land transportation under RA 4136, otherwise known as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. > The LTO has the duty to register vehicles and licensing of drivers. > The LTFRB under E.O. 202, is tasked for the regulation of public utility or for -hire vehicles and the grant of franchises or certificates of public convenience. o Take note that Section 458 of the Local Government Code confers to the LGUs th e regulation of operation of tricycles-for-hire and grant of franchises for the operation thereof, subject to the guidelines issued by the DOTC. o The duty of LTO is not affected by Section 458 of the LGC. Still, the LTO is m andated to require the registration of these tricycles-for-hire. R.A. 4136 manda tes the registration of all kinds of motor vehicles used or operated on or upon a ny public highway in the Philippines. Hutchison Ports Philippines Limited vs. SBMA (339 SCRA 434) F: SBMA conducted a bidding for the operation of container terminal in Subic Bay . Of the 3 bidders, only 2 qualified -- ICTSI and HPPL. Before the opening of th e sealed bidding, HPPL wanted to disqualify ICTSI since it is the operator of th e Manila International Container Port (MICP). Under E.O. 212, there is prohibiti on as to the operation of the same operator of another similar facility. ICTSI appealed such protest to the Office of the Pres. Pending appeal, SBMA awarded the bid to HPPL. Exec Sec Torres recommended the re-bidding of the proje ct. The HPPL argued that there was already a perfected contract because the SBMA Board of Directors already awarded the contract to it. HELD: Petitioner HPPL has not shown that it has a clear right to be declared as the winning bidder with finality. The award given by the SBMA was not yet final and thus still can be assailed. Petitioner HPPL has not sufficiently shown that it has a clear and unmistaka ble right to be declared the winning bidder with finality, such that SBMA can be compelled to negotiate a Concession Contract. As chartered institution, the SBM A is always under the direct control of the Office of the President, particularl y when contracts and/or projects undertaken by the SBMA entail substantial amoun

ts of money. Specifically, LOI 620 dated October 27, 1997 mandates that the approval of t he President is required in all contracts of the national government offices, ag encies and instrumentalities, including GOCC s involving P2 Million and above, awa rded thru public bidding or negotiation. Though the SBMA Board of Directors, by resolution, may have declared HPPL as the winning bidder, said award cannot be said to be final and unassailable. The SBMA Board of Directors and other officers are subject to the control and super vision of the office of the President. The President may, within his authority, overturn or reverse any award made by the SBMA Board of Directors for justifiabl e reasons. The discretion to accept or reject any bid, or even recall the award thereof, is of such wide latitude that the courts will not generally interfere w ith the exercise thereof by the executive department, unless such exercise is us ed to shield unfairness or injustice. When the President issued the Memorandum s etting aside the award previously declared by SBMA in favor of HPPL and directin g that a re-bidding be conducted, the same was within the authority of the Presi dent and was a valid exercise of his prerogative ?? ?? ?? ??

1 Administrative Law Review emily zen chua