Psychological Inquiry 2000, Vol. 11, No.

3, 142148

Copyright 2000 by Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

The Self-Regulation of Moods: Second Thoughts on the Importance of Happiness in Everyday Life
Ralph Erber
Department of Psychology DePaul University

Maureen Wang Erber

Department of Psychology Northeastern Illinois University How do people go about regulating their moods? This question may sound grandiose to some and silly to others. Grandiose because its answer would appear to involve speculations about a variety of affective, cognitive, motivational, and behavioral processes. Silly because everyone knows the obvious answer: People like to feel good and avoid feeling bad. In this target article, we try to show that this is, at best, an oversimplification borne out of a faulty assumption about human nature that has historically permeated social psychological theorizing. We then present research in support of a contextual model of mood regulation which emphasizes concerns with the appropriateness of ones mood as a powerful motivator. Having ones theorizing be guided by faulty assumptions is not a terribly difficult thing to do. After all, research in all sciences is to some extent guided by some fundamental and frequently untested assumptions about the nature of its subject matter. Such assumptions are essential because they shape the generation of hypotheses in important ways and to some extent determine our research agendas. Despite their obvious utility, the untested nature of our basic assumptions can sometimes lead us astray. Kuhn (1970) provided a particularly poignant illustration of a research agenda gone awry because of a faulty assumption. Back in the 18th century, Newton thought of light as consisting of material corpuscles. This idea became the accepted assumption about the nature of light in the science of physical optics. Consequently, scores of scholars directed their research efforts toward finding evidence of pressure exerted by light particles on solid bodies. Of course, once light was conceived of as a transverse wave motion, as became common in the 19th century, the search for physical deformations as a result of exposure to light began to appear somewhat comical. Psychology is no different from physical optics in that it makes some basic assumptions about its subject matter (human nature) that have influenced and continue to influence our theorizing and research agendas. 142 The assumption we have in mind is the widely accepted idea that humans, by and large, seek pleasure and avoid pain. It has its origins in the writings of Jeremy Bentham (1789), who, by conceiving of pleasure and pain as our sovereign masters essentially proposed a hedonistic theory of human motivation. Benthams principle of utility has in one form or another permeated much of the theorizing in psychology. Freud, at least in his early work, subscribed to positive hedonism of the future (Troland, 1928) by conceiving of all human instincts at being directed toward seeking pleasure. Similarly, drive reduction theories (e.g., Dollard & Miller, 1950) proposed that ridding oneself of aversive arousal was crucial for understanding human behavior and thus embrace negative hedonism of the future. Thorndikes (1898) law of effect that became the bedrock of reinforcement theory contains the dictum that pleasure stamps in; pain stamps out, and thus includes elements of negative and positive hedonism of the past. In all fairness to psychology it needs to be said that the assumption of humans as hedonistically driven creatures has not been without its critics. Titchener (1908) proposed that pleasure seeking and pain avoidance may be but two of many forces that drive human behavior. McDougall (1923) went so far as to suggest that pleasure and pain may serve no motivational purpose at all, but instead serve as mere signposts indicating that instincts have successfully or unsuccessfully run their course. Finally, Allport (1954) held that whereas hedonism may explain the behavior typical of childhood and adolescence (and perhaps among those who fail to grow up), it fails to explain the many instances of adult behavior that originate from a sense of duty, loyalty, and commitment in a satisfactory way. Given the time that has elapsed since these arguments were advanced, one might expect hedonistically tinged theorizing to be a thing of the distant past, especially in a discipline as enlightened as social psychology. However, an inspection of theories looking at such diverse issues as attitude change, attribution, altruism, impression formation, and the mental control

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of affect reveals that this is far from being the case. Even dissonance theory, which rejected the behaviorist implication that people would change their attitudes in light of external incentives, retained a strong element of negative hedonism by virtue of proposing a drive reduction mechanism to account for self-generated attitude change (Aronson, 1968). Although attribution theory is concerned mainly with how people process information relevant to establishing cause-effect relationships regarding behavior in the context of dispositions and situational constraints, it too is not entirely free of hedonistic assumptions. For example, until Miller and Ross (1975) provided evidence to the contrary, theoretical explanations of the self-serving bias proposed that it was brought on by a desire to protect or enhance self-esteem. Likewise, in reviewing the literature on helping behavior, Batson (1987) concluded that the cynical view of all prosocial behavior as being motivated by some form of self-benefit was the dominant view in social psychology. Even relatively recent theories of person perception and impression formation acquired part of their new, new look through a makeover applying a concoction of positive and negative hedonism. A case in point is Fiske and Neubergs (1990) continuum model which proposes that perceivers adjust their processing goals to either attain or avoid a state they desire or fear. Given the widespread application of hedonistic assumptions to explanations of human motivation, it isnt surprising that they are even more prevalent in social psychological conceptions of how people regulate, manage, or control their emotional livesincluding their moods. The generally accepted idea espoused by Isen (1984; Clark & Isen, 1982) and later echoed and amplified by Taylor (1991) is that positive affective states will be sought and maintained because of their rewarding consequences while negative affective states will be avoided or repaired because of their unpleasantness. The mood repair hypothesis became ubiquitous as an explanation for the failure of many studies to find effects for sad moods that would be mirror images of the effects of good moods. In fact, it is a more or less explicit component of many current models of mood and processing (e.g., Forgas, 1995; Wegener & Petty, 1994). However, a close inspection of the studies that rely on mood repair as a process reveals that few, if any, provide any indication of how mood repair is accomplished (Erber, 1996; Erber & Erber, in press). Nonetheless, it is difficult to dismiss outright such goody-goody theories (Bower, Gilligan, & Monteiro, 1981) on the regulation of moods. All else being equal, most people would probably prefer to be happy and content rather than sad and gloomy. Thus, when we first began to study mood regulation it seemed that the important task was not so much to de-

termine when people would attempt to regulate their negative moods but instead how they go about doing it.

The Search for Mood Repair Presumably, the experience of mood entails a proclivity to entertain mood-congruent thoughts (Clark & Isen, 1982). Reasoning that moods might be attenuated if we could take sad participants minds off their sad thoughts we (Erber & Tesser, 1992) first put subjects into a sad mood through exposure to a depressing video (scenes from the movie Sophies Choice, 1982). Subsequently we asked them to solve a series of math problems. Some participants solved difficult problems (long division and multiplication); other participants solved fairly simple problems (short division and multiplication) for 10 min. Participants in a control group solved no problems and instead waited an equal amount of time for the experimenter to return with the relevant questionnaire. At the end of that period, all participants reported their moods on a questionnaire along with their general thoughts. Just as we had expected, participants who had done the difficult math problems felt less sad than participants who had completed the simple problems and participants who had just sat around for 10 min. Also, consistent with our hypothesis, those who had solved difficult problems reported fewer thoughts related to either the depressing movie or their sad mood. What is interesting about these findings with regard to hedonism and mood repair is the observation that those participants who sat around for 10 min showed no evidence of attempting to repair the sad mood induced by the depressing video. This finding is troublesome for the mood repair hypothesis, which, contrary to our results, predicts that in the absence of a suitable task provided by the experimenter, participants should generate strategies to attenuate their sadness on their own. Additional findings from this study are equally troublesome (at least from a hedonistic approach). It just so happened that the design of the study included a group of participants who completed the math problems after being exposed to a cheerful video (comedy routines by Robin Williams and Billy Crystal). Doing the difficult problems attenuated the happy mood induced by the video the same way it attenuated the sad mood of those who had watched the depressing video. Doing the simple problems or just sitting around for 10 min preserved the happy mood, however. Again, these findings are difficult to handle by the mood repair hypothesis because of its assumption of positive hedonism. If people preferred happiness to the extent predicted by theories based on the hedonism assumption, happy participants faced with the difficult math 143

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problems should have initiated strategies to counteract the mood attenuating consequences of the task. It is important to note that the findings from these studies are not simply an aberration or an exception to a more general goody-goody rule as we have replicated them with different interventions and different affective states. In a series of studies, we (Erber & Therriault, 1994) had female participants engage in 10 min of step exercise, watch an exercise video for 10 min following a sad or happy mood induction. The results mimicked the findings of the previous study in that the happy and sad moods of participants were attenuated as a result of engaging in the exercise. Simply watching the exercise video did not result in mood attenuation compared to the control condition. In another set of studies we (Erber, Erber, Therriault, Onesto, & Amador, in press)made some participants anxious by leading them to believe that they would be giving a speech on sexually transmitted diseases. In one study, participants believed that they would make their presentation to a live audience, while in a second study, participants believed that their speech would be videotaped and then evaluated. Prior to giving the speech, participants were asked to solve a set of either easy or difficult anagrams. After several minutes of working on the anagrams, participants blood pressure, pulse rate, and verbal responses were measured. Results of both studies were as predicted and consistent with previous findings. Participants reportedly felt less anxious after solving the difficult anagrams and were much more anxious if they had worked on the easy anagrams. In other words, distraction alone (i.e., completion of the easy anagrams) was not enough to attenuate participants anxiety, rather, absorption in the solution of the difficult anagrams produced reductions in perceived anxiety. Interestingly, the attenuation of anxiety was not reflected in several physiological measures (heart rate, systolic and diastolic blood pressure), indicating that it was instead due to a reduction in anxiety-related thoughts. Our research on the mechanisms underlying the attenuation of moods suggests that successful mood repair depends on ability and motivation. It appears that it is most readily accomplished via cognitively taxing tasks, ostensibly because engaging in them detracts from mood-congruent thinking of any kind. It is worth noting that mood attenuation does not necessarily require tasks or activities whose valence is incongruent with the currently experienced mood. In other words, sad people wishing to rid themselves of their mood may benefit from doing crossword puzzles or yard work just as much, if not more, as they would from watching hours of sidesplitting comedy. The research discussed thus far also suggests that mood itself is not the primary motivator for mood maintenance and mood repair as espoused by Isen (1984) and Taylor 144

(1991). If this were the case our happy participants confronted with the difficult tasks should have initiated some type of strategy to counteract its mood-absorbing consequences. Similarly, our sad and anxious participants who had been deprived of a suitable task should have enacted some type of strategy to make themselves feel better, especially in light of the fact that they had nothing else to do.

The Social Constraints Model of Mood Regulation One way to deal with such observations is to call into question the general idea that people are indeed hedonistically motivated in the ways they manage their emotional life. Instead of constantly seeking to be happy and avoiding sadness and other unpleasant affective states, people may be more strategic (and considerably more sophisticated) in managing their moods than suggested by hedonistic approaches. Common observation suggests that people frequently forego the experience of happiness, and sometimes engage in activities that would make them feel sad. Attenuating ones affect before delivering bad news (Tesser & Rosen, 1975), reading stories with tragic endings, listening to plaintive music, and spending a small fortune to repeatedly watch movies like Titanic (1997) are all behaviors that seem to violate hedonistic principles. Observations like these give rise to the speculation that whether happy and sad moods as well will be entertained or banished depends in large part on the context in which they are experienced. Being alone in ones room, for example, poses few if any constraints on our emotional experience. Consequently, we may decide to indulge in feelings of sadness, at least to a point. However, when the luxury of solitude is taken away from us, we may be compelled to regulate our moods according to the demands of the situation. And while some situations require the display and perhaps the experience of happiness (at ones birthday party) or sadness (at someones funeral), many situations require that we suspend or attenuate our moods to some extent. In fact, it has been argued (Goffman, 1963) that the ability to control socially inappropriate affect is what sets most of us apart from those incarcerated in mental hospitals. From this perspective, we might consider the actual, imagined, or implied presence of others to act as the major social constraint on the kinds of moods we can reasonably experience. One reason why the presence of others acts as a constraint on our moods is because we often know little or nothing about other peoples affective states, especially when they are strangers. Because of this, sad as well as happy moods may be a burden for a number of reasons. First, our preoccupation with mood-congruent thoughts may do little to

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promote and might actually interfere with the smoothness with which we interact with others. Moods may become burdensome if we fear that others look unfavorably on our happiness or sadness and their concomitant emotional displays. Or we may fear that a continued preoccupation with our moods may deprive us of a sense of composure. Consequently, we may be most likely to attempt attenuation of our happy and sad moods prior to interacting with a stranger.

Research Supporting the Social Constraints Model: The Coolness Effect To test the general idea of mood attenuation prior to social interaction with a stranger, we (Erber, Wegner, & Therriault, 1996) conducted a set of studies in which we made participants either happy or sad through exposure to cheerful or depressing music. Subsequently, half the participants were led to believe that, following the main experiment, they would work on an unrelated task either by themselves or with a stranger in a room across the hall. All participants were then asked to indicate their preference for reading a set of newspaper stories, identified by their headlines as humorous and uplifting, sad and depressing, or affectively neutral. Consistent with our expectations, participants who expected to complete the second part of the experiment by themselves preferred stories with headlines suggesting mood-congruent content: Sad participants indicated a preference for depressing stories whereas happy participants preferred cheerful stories. Also as expected, participants who expected to complete the second part of the experiment with a stranger preferred mood-incongruent stories. Specifically, sad participants preferred cheerful stories and (contrary to predictions made from hedonistic approaches) happy participants preferred depressing stories. According to our social constraints model, participants made these choices presumably as a means to attenuate their previously induced mood prior to meeting the stranger. These result suggest that mood, by itself, does not serve as a primary motivational force in terms of the maintenance and attenuation of moods. Rather than using everything in their power to (a) maintain their happy mood and (b) repair their sad mood at all costs, our participants adopted strategies designed to maintain happy and sad moods in the absence of social constraints (i.e., when there was no anticipated interaction with a stranger). However, in the presence of a social constraint, happy and sad participants relied on strategies that enabled them to extricate themselves from the mood we had previously induced. Interestingly, participants attempts at regulating their moods were aimed at neutralizing sad and happy moods. This was even the case when we told partici-

pants in a second study that the person they were about to meet was either happy or seemed somewhat depressed. The one notable exception was a tendency on the part of happy participants to bolster their mood prior to interacting with a depressed stranger, presumably in preparation for an interaction that would likely leave them somewhat depressed. But even this finding could be considered an attempt at neutralization: counteracting the affective consequences of spending a period of time with someone who is depressed. However, we found no evidence that people anticipate and try to adopt the moods of their future interaction partners. Needless to say, it is difficult to account for these findings in hedonistic terms. But we must attempt to account for these results and fill the vacuum left by hedonistic assumptions. Thus, we ask how can we account for the seeming desire for attenuated moods prior to entering into a social interaction with a stranger? There are several possibilities. First, it may be that a neutral mood is a relatively good bet, particularly when we know little about how the person whom we are to meet is feeling. Unburdened, free from preoccupation with our feelings and its resulting distractions, a neutral mood allows us to be sensitive to multiple mood affordances suggested by the complexities of the social settings. This idea fits well with the observation that people frequently moderate their attitudes prior to discussing them with another person (Cialdini, Levy, Herman, & Evenbeck, 1973). Extrapolating from these findings one would expect anticipatory mood control to follow similar principles. To the extent that people are inclined to regulate their mood in light of social constraints, the direction of such attempts should be toward relative neutrality, regardless of whether the initial mood is positive or negative. Moreover, as we alluded to earlier, people may attempt to neutralize their moods under these circumstances to avoid being unfavorably evaluated for displaying potentially inappropriate moods. Just as singing show tunes off key is perfectly alright in ones shower but not in a crowded subway car, the experience and display of moods may be similarly inappropriate in a public context.

Research Supporting the Appropriateness Hypothesis I: Strangers Versus Romantic Couples We recently completed a couple of studies that support the idea that the coolness effect may be mediated by concerns regarding the appropriateness of moods in public contexts. In one study we (Commons & Erber, 1997) recruited romantic couples for a relationship study. Two couples signed up for each time slot. Participants were then run through an experimental proce145

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dure identical to the one employed by Erber et al. (1996), with one exception. Rather than expecting to complete a second experiment either by themselves or with a stranger, participants were led to believe that they would be doing this either with their romantic partner or with the opposite-sex partner of the other couple (in essence, a stranger). We predicted that participants who expected to do the second task with the stranger would once again show evidence of attempts toward regulating their happy and sad moods. However, among romantic couples these concerns are, to some extent, superseded by norms prescribing self-disclosure that would render withholding ones feelings inappropriate. We expected those participants who anticipated doing the second task with their partner to show evidence of attempting to maintain their happy and sad moods. This is exactly what we found. Whereas participants expecting to interact with a stranger preferred newspaper stories with a mood-incongruent content, those expecting to interact with their partner preferred newspaper stories with a mood-congruent content. Again, these findings are difficult to explain from a hedonistic perspective. However, they make sense when one considers that concerns about the appropriateness of ones mood are of paramount importance in public contexts yet largely irrelevant in the context of close relationships.

control. On the other hand, priming a critical other should highlight the evaluative nature of that person and consequently lead to an attempt toward controlling ones sad and happy moods as well. This is precisely what we found. Participants for whom an accepting other had been primed preferred mood-congruent stories whereas participants in whom a critical other had been primed preferred mood-incongruent stories, presumably in an attempt to control their moods. This finding provides further evidence for our theoretical claim that concerns about the appropriateness of ones mood contribute in important ways to our desire to control our happy and sad moods. Moreover, it suggests that the actual or anticipated presence of others is not required to instill a motive toward mood control. The finding that our participants attempted to regulate their mood in response to imagined others helps explain why we frequently manage to control our moods although we may be by ourselves. It appears that under such circumstances conjuring up images of critical others (What would my mother say if she saw me like this?) may be what ultimately compels us to rid ourselves of the (inappropriate and unwanted) moods we are in.

Social Constraints-Induced Mood Regulation: A Case of Hedonism After All? We would like to think that the social constraints model along with its supporting research indicates that hedonistic theories of mood regulation provide insufficient accounts for how people manage their moods. Quite contrary to hedonistic predictions, we found, among other things, that sad people appear to make no attempt at attenuating their mood in the absence of social constraints. Furthermore, happy people are willing to forego their good mood when appropriate social constraints are present. At the very least, this seems to suggest that pleasure seeking and pain avoidance may not be the primary forces at work in the self-regulation of moods. However, one could argue that our observations are not so much an indication of strategic mood regulation but instead reflect a kind of hedonism of the future. Happy people anticipating to interact with a stranger may engage in some sort of hedonic calculus in which they weigh the benefits of maintaining their good mood against the possible costs, such as the possibility of embarrassment or the fear of an unfavorable evaluation. Thus, any attempt at bringing a present good mood under control may ultimately be in the service of avoiding feeling bad in the future. It is difficult to dismiss this argument outright. Nonetheless, we believe that there are several things that are wrong with it. First, it is based on a logic that suggests that all forms

Research Supporting the Appropriateness Hypothesis II: Accepting Versus Critical Others To the extent that anticipating interaction with a close other reverses our usual tendency to control our moods when the other is a stranger, one would expect that unique characteristics of the other would similarly predict different mood-regulation strategies. Others whom we perceive as accepting of us should trigger little in the way of controlling our mood because appropriateness concerns are of little importance. However, when the other is perceived as critical of us, mood control should become of paramount importance as unaccepting others are most likely to respond to our potentially inappropriate moods with disapproval. To test this idea we adapted Baldwins (Baldwin, Carrell, & Lopez, 1990) research strategy on the effects of imaginary audiences on self-evaluation. After inducing a sad or happy mood by having participants recall an appropriate autobiographical memory, we asked them to think of someone who was accepting or critical of them and write a short paragraph about that person. Subsequently, all participants indicated their preference for reading newspaper stories with a cheerful or depressing content. We expected that priming an accepting other through writing a paragraph about that person would not trigger much in the way of mood 146

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of human behavior, including those that appear to be self-defeating or self-destructive, are ultimately motivated by some form of hedonism. But as we all know, a theory that explains both the occurrence of A and non-A in the end explains nothing at all. Second, hedonism of the future seems ill suited as an explanation for why sad people would maintain their sadness in the absence of social constraints. Assuming that they do that because they expect some benefit like improved insight or increased self-awareness (e.g. Wood, Saltzberg, & Goldsamt, 1990) would create logical issues similar to the ones inherent in trying to explain why happy people would relinquish their good mood. It seems that social constraints induced appropriate concerns and their resulting tendencies to control ones mood are best understood without reference to any kind of hedonic calculus. We often take the appropriate course of action for its own sake and not so much because we fear the negative consequences of taking the alternative route. For example, in deciding on the amount of a tip to leave in a restaurant we generally take into account customary conventions along with the quality of the service rendered. Our final determination regarding the appropriate percentage is generally not influenced by fears about possible retribution from the wait staff. In light of our empirical evidence, there is reason to believe that the self-regulation of moods follows similar principles.

indulge in their moods whereas reflective self-focus may lead to self-regulation efforts (Campbell et al., 1996). Whereas some of these are not social in nature, they add to the list of variables that determine how people regulate their moods outside of purely hedonistic concerns.

Concluding Remarks As we stated in the opening to this target article, hedonistic assumptions of various kinds have permeated much of the theorizing in 20th century psychology. Given the progress we have made toward understanding human behavior, one might argue that they have served us well. On the other hand, our research shows that hedonistic concerns play a minor role at best where they should count the most. Abandoning simple hedonistic assumptions has begun to allow us to look at the complexities involved in how people manage their moods. As we stand on the threshold of a new millennium, we cannot help but think that our field as a whole might want to take a closer look at the extent to which implicit or explicit hedonistic assumptions have led us astray in our theorizing. Theoretical soul searching of this kind may have several desirable outcomes. First of all, it may ultimately provide a less circuitous route to the truth. Second, it may help us match the complexity of our theories with the complexity of our subject matter. If we assume that human behavior is ultimately motivated by hedonistic concerns, we deprive ourselves of the opportunity to look at the entire range of variables and processes that bring it about and modify it. As a result we may end up giving too much credence to person variables at the expense of situational variables and the interaction between the two. Abandoning rampant hedonism would allow us to bring our theories closer in line with Lewins (1951) admonition that to predict behavior we have to take into account the configuration of forces operating on the person in any given situation. Of course, one might ask what we are to substitute for hedonism. One answer might be found if we heretically assumed that humans in some respects are more like physical objects than is commonly thought. According to Newtons first law, in the physical world every body will continue in its state of rest or uniform motion in a straight line except insofar as it is compelled to change that state by impressed force. This analysis fits much better with the basic tenet of Lewinian field theory than any analysis that relies too heavily on internal forces, such as pleasure seeking and pain avoidance. It also fits with what our research reveals about the goings-on in the affective world. Moods remain at rest or in motion unless there is a reason to act upon them. In other words, individuals are 147

The Nature of Social Constraints Revisited To date the bulk of our research has focused on the anticipated and imagined presence of others for how people manage their moods. And whereas the presence of others on any level is a basic fact of social life, the range of social constraints on our affective experience extends to less social situations as well. In several studies we have found that anticipating a task perceived to be cognitively demanding (Erber & Erber, 1994) or requiring accuracy (Therriault, Erber, & Oktela, 1996) prompt attempts toward mood control in much the same ways as anticipating interacting with a stranger. A number of individual differences may similarly determine the extent to which mood control motives come into play. People with chronic proclivities to regulate negative moods are likely to respond to sadness with attempts toward mood control even in the absence of situational or task variables (Catanzaro & Mearns, 1990; Smith & Petty, 1995). Deliberative mindsets should promote a general tendency toward mood congruency and mood maintenance whereas implemental mindsets may trigger a desire to rid oneself of ones mood (Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, & Steller, 1990). Finally, ruminative self-focus may compel people to

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likely to remain in whatever mood they are in unless appropriateness concerns brought on by perceived social constraints suggest a change.

Note Ralph Erber, Department of Psychology, DePaul University, 2219 North Kenmore, Chicago, IL 60614. E-mail: rerber@coudor.depaul.edu

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