.

l
,
t
I
l

ICA. AIR P ,. AND

BY
General 1111 m ltchell
ror er Com nder,Alr Foroee,A.E.r.,
nd reator, I11tary Aeron_utlce,
U. 5. ArmJ
'!'he rumbling. ot Impendl
war In ela between the us.
oarlte and Chlneee, the at entlTe att tude ot the Ja neee, r dy
to selze an, pretext tor the occupatl n ot the ABlattc lnl
a
nd,
the Int ree e ot the Unlted 1n Aele and re ard tor our
posee l ne ot Alaska, al1 nd the Phillpp1ne lelande, all ke
It neceBeary tor ue to "have an eye" to the Paclt1c and Aela. Th1B
applles not & mll1tary way but carom rclal1y ae ell.
The tlret three arttcl th t I wrote tor eronautlcs
dealt wlth the 8eneral oondltlon at aTlatlon 1n the Unl ed titatee,
how 1t baa been and le bel mlemana ed by the pre.ent admlnlBtra.
Uon, and lomethlng about the uee ot alr power In the Atlantlc 01 n
and 1n the T1alnlty ot our panama C nal. In thle artlcle, I ahall
tr."'t ot our all' po 1n the paclt1c and what It meanll to ue ae a
naUon.
Strateg1cally, the
,
merlcan posltlon wlth rellpect to the
\
Ith armlea, the alde th
Paoltlo ocean 18 a .,e17 .troD8 one. 1(ost or Ull ha.,e
14e Of what .trate@l)1 ..an

8oatt ..n f1rate.t" exoelled In etrategy.

tth
Tary hazy
"got the
vy, who-
..,.r 0\ the "mollte. .hipe there flrateat" excelled. Ith air po"er,
ODe who 8-t. ".osteat alrplane. there firateat" 11l the atrong.
e whe\her 1t be In a oommerclal or a mll1tany op I' tion. Ithough
l\lon 1n the Paoltic wa .,ery etro
beto e the adTent at air
....:r. _laoe that tl.. our potentlal strength has been 1 .ea.urably
.1.
lna d It ta advaD a ot.h the alr ottera ua.
e re the only great .blte po.er, the hoae ahorea ot .boae
terrl or, are waahed by tbe pacltlc OC D. Oppoalte u. la the con-
lnent ot ala, COD a e 950,000,000 neop1e, or one baIt tbe
popu1atlon ot the .orld. It la .1th the people ot ala tb trope ne
ye al.aya a bt to trade nd ln ny caaea tbla b a reaulted ln .ar,
not on1 .1 h ela, but alao bet.een the r ean the.ae1vea.
!be 0 14 .aa tou ht 1& ely over .ho ebou tbe tr de
rou .. t the r 8t and f.be paclt1e.
Today .1th our Dleael otored eea yeellele .e need no baaea
or refuell lItatl na ln he rat. a8 8al11 vesaele and coal
burnl
at an
refueU
atea era ulled to. ao or yesllel can t te on lta fuel all
nel.co, go to Shangb 1 or Canton,C 1 , and return .1tbout

trattl0 b1 alr baa changed tbe linee ot co nleation tl'o

one oount.r, to anot.ber. The routea of co eree and .h tare tno.ne
Un.a ot oper&t.1on ln war (the linea alo whleb .ar 18 made) a1.a,e
tollow e.ob otber. etore the com! ot alr po.er. when velleele nd
rehl were t.he on11 .. ne ot t. the eeae. the 11ne aer
t.be oltlo e tl'o San neleco to the H llan lelande. the ce
.OP08a t.o ".pan or Cblna; but wl h alr power, the shOrteat. route la
bl _, ot A1.....
la r 11, the te, pOlnt. to the .bole pacltlc Ocean.
a1 , ouob.. al. t.he dletanoe .oroe. Berl 5tra1\ onl1
wlUl '.0 he Dloaedee. 1n he 1441e, .hlcb are
811 par'. One to RUllSla .nd the otber t.o the
,,"",.. ."u leland. at. t.be end ot tbe 1eutiana, 1. no
turtb r aw y. tram Yolrob , J n, than 18 nlla In tile Ph1l1pplnea.
lrplan a can ny ther and bac wlthout taklng on addltl nal tuel.
The poln I wlah to emphaslze la that we are 80 el uated
th t tro nlted St tea terrltory on the contlnent of North A erlca
not only erehant ehlpe but alrc tt are able to 0 to sl and
return wl h a elngle cha e of tuel.
0", the croselng or the pacltlc 18 notht It le no 1Il0r e
tban a fer y between two polnta aeroee t e ter. Alrplane
e
can fly
fro sew Yor 0 Pelrl by. Y of Alae In eo e boura and to
the center ot Chlna or even Indla In ten or t"enty bours are. It
Ie not alle. tbat count In tranepDrta lon, It la th tlme required
to n880tla the di.tanoe. The vaet lea ue8 ot the Paclflc are .brtnk-
lQ! contlnually under the ma le ot s01ent1flc alrcraft development.
The day 18 no far off wben nelther months, wee e nor day. wl11 be
u.ed 1n COapll 1QlT tbe trlp, but bou alone.
om an aeronautic I standpoint, It i8 very Interesting to
loot at the Paclflc OCean In a strate leal way. e may cODSlder tbe
nor\b paclf 0 as a buge lsoeoele. trlangle, wlth 1ts on Bering
S, U, one enc! of tbe base on the pana. C nal and the other enc! In
,be Phl1lpolnea or the coa.t of Asla c!lrectly opp081te.
!be 8lc!.. ot thl. great trlangle are appr01tl tel, 1500
In leQ!tb, while the base m"sures about 11,000 ml1es, or
, It the cU.t noe around the ear h at that laU ude. 10 ttl
tar .lde ot tbl. we fin' the Unlted States elther In
"MMlo ot. or coapletel, doal tl
ba r\ ot canada front!
the Whole of territor"
on the paolflc ean between
..1ft .,aDa aDc! ,be PorUand canal, the 80u b rn border ot Ala.
-,-

III tlc
ot
III OJ alterca 10n arllUl18 be ween the Unlted St ee and an
power, C&na4& w ul elther openly IUde with ue 0 run the r18
ocoup&\lon.
Freedo. ot neu.er ot a .111tary free 111 de endent on the
le th ot the lie. Ta 1118 all t.he detinl tion of t1balle" tne l1ne wnlch
oon eotll he I11t.ary depotll or aagaslnell ot a country. the unlted
St. tell hall a lie ot 1500 l1ell fro 1811 to pana 01 P rt of
thl. baee y e re ched elther on or over the land and all e1e entll
tor the le ng, ooncentratlon and intenance or 111 ry power 111
o be II wi h i t.1I borderll.
The lIelltern or
dltferent. fro our 1I1de.
a II ra1 ht line dralln tro
1I1at c Blde or th1e tria le le very
The 00&llt11ne 111 reat1y Indented 110 that.
any one place alo Itll coast to another

ullua11y Dallllee a cOnllderable diB ance lie 11 rd. tringe ot illlandB

ooye" the cOIUSt of Allia a l ~ the way fro t e Peni ul ot lta.eh tka
to the uator, .ary 118 1n dll1t nce to the _Unland tro. a .ery tew
IIllee, aa at 8 khalin III1a d, to one hundred in the caee ot .lapan,
and about tl.e bundred In the calle of the Ph1lippines and Borneo.
!beae 1alan48 are r1ch by nature. oa ble ot great deyelpp-
at and bear very Slob the aa... atrate lc 1 elation to the continent
ot Aela that the Brit1eh Ialee do to tbe contlnent ot rope. In other
wo ,lt b 1II1aneters In U .... paet lIere able to do te In lI.a
power, be, rend.red th....l.e. not only 1 IlUne from attack troll the
lnland but tbe, ba the pOller ot lnltiaU a alnet the oontlnent.
e leal aev lop nt ot n In thtll r at not been
ot Great Brl In. a.nce. lie tlnd tbe pollOI of Japan to
oOl.ete 40 nanoe ot all thelle Aelatic lIn II t no only ..
ber OWD 11tary protectlon but a180 tor further! ber
. ~
lnter sta OD he oontlnent.
nother at tegle 1 slmil rl y between J8p nand Gr t
Brltaln 18 h t tho 1 tte tlnds he uropean oontlnenta1 alr power
to be e reateat enace t her existenee. Practlc l1y everywhere
OD the continent ot Asia we t nd
opul tlon ore or 1e88 hostile
to the Japanese. J pan theretore wl11 deTelop her ir power to
the IItmOllt. Ineo r as the
pl1cat on of her air ls con-
cerned. Ja n haa t e I1ne For 0118- ameha e1c1us ve av 11 ble.
or a diet noe t about ml1es.
5UI'Yey
,
the two side8 of th tria let
we tind our II ide
to be a ho oseneous s r te leal enti y co Ie in Itllelf nd
_naoe4
on11
fro. acrolls the paciflc. hila on ne eet or AUatic
alde we rlnd an Insu1ar elllpir occupyi b e a 11ttle ore than
ced atrate ic
a
l11 ba1f the of one a de of the tria Ie nd
bo\b fro. the PAcific nd the con Inent ot 8ia.
A the baae of the tria leo or t e 11ne P n
- nl1&
e tlnd til'tlt an expanee of 5000 milell of ocean to the Xing n Reef.
owne4 b1 the Unlte4 5tates. bu fro tbere on a practlc 111 continuoua
.eri..of la1anda within short distances ot each othe clear to the
coaa or ala. Theae lsl nde are either in the po eeeion of or
pDtlre11 4a.dnated by Great Brltaln.
he only 1 nd encountered be-
'.e D ..... and the Klng,.,.n e la Ollpperton Island, ab ut 1900
\ of pana.. olal d botb by
ce n the epubllc or
..at.o. !be United Statetl abollle! oqulre th18 t once.
ngland.
be. foo\bold Oft these lsla 8. 0 - Inod with her air and aea
.....1.. 14 be able to oontrol about b 1t be base of the trla!l81e.
o be. baae 51 apore_ ew Zeal nd. coyera all tbe
1f1. OetI&:D.
-5-
a b at, aUrTel ot
1" IItrateglcal poel Ion.
t 0 nel l' w 111 necealla
to ell bl1811 a 11111 1"'1 depot.
ao
\1. erroneously c lled baae. It
o a be aald at
tbe outset
tbat.
1
tar t.he e IIlea, depo to organize 111 an
eron utlcal on
wblob at. t.he a
tl_
h a co
nd ot p weI" uperior to
that
of Il al'W,J 01' A
TJ
An AI"
1
occupy po
ad it given a few d y8 to
pre re 1 to defenlle.
1 dne10p It 0 a1 Ollt II great a extent.
all It 'he, bad bee for
prot. cted llpace ot 1 e. It 1tll
o ale t.lone re II uare11 be lnd It. n If hOlltl1e ground forcell
bay. t.o 0 e acrollll t.he wat.er. It hall 11 tle to fear fro either land
OJ' II... 1t. on n ee be from all" power. On the other h nd. It
an Arll1 e chell a nee In a b rbor. the ar '1 y d811troy 1t. there
v1 Cervera at n lago. karoft at port
Arthur. 01' poleon'lI c pture of the Eanll1b fleet 1tb hili cavalry.
when 1 waa frozen t.l ht In the 10e.
y lUb depot. aa.t t1ret seek out a l1arb
wi b a dept.h ot water ot for 1 teet at low tide, otherwise a
bat 1hl wl1 be u ble 0 en er It. If It III not aece 81ble tall
t.l.... wb n 1 III neeaed t.he O8t will be Just the tl tb t it c nnot
be. .red. 1 b the co 1 Xl '1 ot modern v 1 1"-' ents h 8 co e a
oO1'l!'ellIDOlltU atur..ntatlon of IIhore elltabllllhments.
e docklardS
, ... o bu d. the technic 1 re 11" and supply t cl11tle require
I
o , ..a au
10fU

of one, but Infinite attention to det 11 and
1. 1. rapl 11 beeo Iftll' 110 Intrlc te a proc ed
1 1". and 1e.. obl1e. are chal ed to tbelr
..,,... tb we., of the theat.re of operatl na require
of 8Uppl, potaU. ADJ appl1eat.1on of sea power at a
.6-
CU8t
of oyer 2000 lee tro ita so nece lt te
18&rl!l ot
p
I o aod no 191
1
bu b
ona ot dollar8 expendl
M
'Ire. As

1 p tiona lncreaae
ln s1ze nd extent.
Just so cb
40 t
1 beco be tel' t
ete tor 11' att ck.
and ae the ut1l1ty
of
19 eurrace
tbe great eurrace bat lesbip 18
tbe effo1'\ e ended ln 1
ene1'81.
idly dr wi
val ar
t a olose. 0 t of
ente 1 a a te of
n 11' toroe. on the otber band. 0 n el!lt lieh ltself wlth
\b
eaae
unoooupl d fleld. a etretch of oce n beach.
..en the 0 n er ot a volo no '" be occu ied nd 0 e ted trolll wl
lnl _ of pre ratlon. co red to he installation of & nayal
ae ot or tbe nt ot rtl11ery ot poei Ion.
Tbe First Bo _
bard nt Group landed on and opera. ed fro tter l!I leland long our
Atlan le C et w th 1i 1
2000Mlb. bo 8. t 0 Dl'Il.
e ratton. 11 their euppllol!l. lncludl
eollne and fuel. were I nded ln three nd
de the. l' d1
one balt teet ot water. I b ve 1 nded purBult pI nes ln an open road-
8te d on aurt bOA" trc. atealllere. aet tbe. up and
for n .ht ln a oouple of booJ'll.
lro ft", be OArrled .8 dec 1 de on 8ub 1'1088; a
81x or ore. They c n be 1& ded ln their
own wate r,ot ca.e. nd s t up ln a a rt 1 e. hs c .ea c n be
ea .. boat. nd 11 bters tor the dob l' tlon of otber supplle
1ft o,era III! .ereea - well 0 an ed all' force c n be ready to
_1"1
wi bln l!IlS boure ot 1ta
arr1val _
1 e de l' BUon pOint.
ft1 operaU n ln tho all' 1'19 ul e
h t the dTant gea to
"" ftto
1 ..t be toulOht tor. JQst ae
co reepondl
1 land 11"811
-!'He! contact. bee uae
If it. 18 "01'\b
-1M
Wbl1. be ene., wll1 a te t to etop 1t. To lneure he operatlon
of alre ft. pursu1t av! tlon -aet be conee tr ted t the de 1 lTe
polnta at tbe beBlenl ot operat1 ne. To be Cfective, &T1 t10n ha
to ao 1 concentrate" compact bodies, otherwise It can be deteated
In de 11 no .atter wbat the elze ot t e op 081 fore may be. or
thle and 0 her reaeooe. an all' torce cannot OPO! te wlth succe strom
alost an air torce tlr 1 establ18hed
Oil land alrdro.... 'l'h6re Is no bi
wh te er 0 e r tro so.c lled
Tal alrplane oarrlers, because not onl, re h y u
Ie to opel' te
e1' pOllsl 1e, they could
ertlcle 1, on the hl h eea. but eyen It tbt
not place .utficlent alrcraft 1n the alr at 0 tl to Ineure oon-
oentrate4 ope tlon. Consequently. h08tl1e 11' ore wl11 selze
land alrdro_. fro. wblob to launch 1t8 ttac aga1nst 1ts ntended
yloU
t. rent, &1e to the efforts of our
...,........" pre.cU 111 our
wbole defena. In t.h. Pacltl0 18 ba ed on he HaTl 11an Islands. very.
bod)' tnow. It and there 1. no secret a ou It. ore1 nationll tno
It. better than .. do. 'lbe .er10&n people ought to be Intor d hat
a terrlbl, d& eroue poslt1on w. have been put 1n 1 b 81 our
defense ot tbe pac1flc on the v, Inste d ot on alr pOller.
OU waUan Isl nda have been te e "'rho 1'011111'0 dB ot
th. P&oltlO". bee use t.he route t w ter born t tflc 01 tro t
fa canal \0 ela
our ,..lfl0 Coaa\ to A
.a.. direotl1 by the a do the fro
raIla, to th soutb rn ot 81 the
Dm at Indl.. and t.bs Phl11ppines.
Betare the of 811' power, th ae 1 1 nde bad 6r. \
.. 8810 1 vala. .. ba.. tor a camp 16n tro h ort .erle8D
8.
oon ioen a a net ASl , bee use they the 1 at stopp1
etc Co st. lnoe
o 1. tro
1 0
power 0 the pol t
c h t e P
e evelopmen of
Tle8 p oeee 1 to
" e
irpl nell
n Sink battle8hl e 1 h he restest ese, a
.., 1
e!\
1 '1 in e oll! senae lost e 18 n 1
oOMequent1;r this value no longer e",
...
e p 81 1 ot
las
.
18 ott o e TO 1e tor a 0 p 1 n s
As
'1
r od sUb-
ri h n 1 ot e H .8 1 n Is an , c 8 e dle oe
IIhorter.
Tb Talue of
a"au
&S an 1 b Be tor he p nese,ho eTer,
U Ter, r t, eo use d rect ttac a c ul e 0 rr e out fro there
alnat. our pacitic C et c1 lell nd he lnte lor r eountr
e pOllle8alon or tbe
" 11
n IelandS de n B p 1 rl1y on who
controls t e lr bOTe t em. h '/ c
o be a en a ae or held
b;r air d f
6

I 11111 well re y us to hol he 0 coount ot

he e UTel1 8 11 0 nay 1n en n 0 y o Id be
required to equip an ir to ee au! lelel" or the r ton.
H i Hee aho mUes tr st. ou 0 00 ere
a tI ...en inhablted 1151 nde 10 a cun- 1 ne tro northweat
to the tloutbern inhablted lelan , Haw 11, 1 ab u
t.o llouth lit. e dietano fro the no ern Bb t lel n , llh
a
u,
o lee, or
tb" hours flight tor an or I r1 a,lrpl nee fae o!' na 1y ot
of exoe t b1 al. n Is th t a llne ot s 11 1 landS and ree"
n for ate
t 1100
fro the 1I&1n lelan&l direct y
lea, to Mldwa7 leland. Pr etlc
11 ot
d eta ee
el!le 11 1e
I.t,aac. aDd "efa are capable af bel e ln 0 1 eee obBerYa.
I po nU anI! recUo IItations.
1111 1 111 about 2000 l1e8 fro
apan or bout. tbe 8a_
let.noe S nolulU Is fro San ancisco. It i8 1'00 ile8
tro. the Aleuol n IslAnds of las 0 dl ry al0 speed.air-
oraft., the .T&pllnelle could reach Id1l y In twent hJl\rs, merle
1 reach onolulu n twent, hours; or fl1 h be de
tro t.he leutlan8 to Idwa, In hirt 'n 1 r tory blrdll
fll fro t.he Rawaiian IlIlanda and ne t in lAska. hall H w 11 n
finch. which 18 unable to 1 nd on the w ter, kea t e fl1 ht each
lIeallon oyer theee vallt expanees of sea. 50 does the H l1an
The flli maohino can do thll1 eh ore 0 8111 th n c n he birdS.
on account of 1t8 power n v ab1l1ty In stor e.
Our p lien elstem of defend1 the H w 1 Ialan B 18
perfect 1 rldloulous. The la8 tl e I looked It over, I tho ght to
.elf th 1 was 0 more efficient In thiS ge a lost
a ern air t c than ere the H 11 n Is1 e B, u 1 up and
down the beach 1 heir speare n yell1 t tne top of heir
YO c... when In Coot c me thor In 1774. r erense 18 b eo
on a land ar-r. ooast defonse gun8 and b t leshlps, 11 of which are
unooordinated. aodern bOl fifteen ,e rs old who knowS abo t air
power and baa bad 81 ple 111tary tr 01 1n. 1 h 8e
wort ou a be\ter elate
8 the detense ot the H wall n 161 nd$ 18 b sed on the
au tlon bat n attack .ould be de a alne them by the apane
1.' .a ..aa a atate of WSr to be 1m e 1 be ae the Unl ed States
Ia n. n4 the .le810n or the n ted State8 fore e 1n wall to
Old or 'be le1 nd of oahu for fa r oatne bero e the
aI"IPl:l of a 1 troope.
I.e ilia ..\1." what. the actlon or a n would be. Japan
-10-
an ar., an nayy and not on an air orce.
The or oahu. wlth 1 ml1it ry depots, atrdro ee.
water supply. nd the c1t1 or Honolulu with 1 s wh
e. and Ilupply
polnts, forms an easy. co pact and convenlen object f r alr attack.
The whole area of the lsland 1. about 650 squ8re mileB. or which one
balf ls yer.J moun lnous, wh11e the rest 1B a en up 1n grea part
by rleultural deYelop ent the area bav1 n important mill tar:
consists ot about 100 square milee or about the Bame
rea tor a1r defence as t e of e
In seloe 1. t e we ponB to be UB ag 1.n8 t 10eat1 n of
hie n. an air force has tbe cholce of tOT-lc gee.
bo ot sizes. a d pbeaphorou8 n lncend1 ry be 8 of
altt.rent catesorl Tbe meane of pplyl theSe weapon. conslst of
aerial torpedO, wblcb In subet nee 1.. n 1 pIa e controlled nd
_ft.
, groeoope8 and
d10. whleh c n e 0 l1e
n;r"bere
oa bllit1es of the lrplane; tbe l1dlng bo ,
.... a cJnloe enabl1
an airplane to 1ft nch 1
t a d1St.anoe of
over 1
, .d last, the
-11-
reduo 10n and seizure ot the R wall n 181 nds, the tollo 1
rop be b. wh ob requ rea that the 1 0 tt employl
he target.
I bolleye. t e efo e,
of
procedure
It P !!IS over
n oolde upon the
re t. eonelet e t
p eh u
t ri boo bar would be ado ted:
40 purSuIt all' 1 nell nd 200
8 w1 h he r auxillar.
lee co d e own d1rect trolll
n to 1t 81 n The route
10 hIe heee tlew 1tOU d e trolled by flU
ye8sels or
or b1 a aurprll1e Ian 1
aIrshIps. Idw -:I lellan w ule! be s zed el
w th he 0 e1tS fr 111 S b
Y by a1rcr ft
h d an
exa Ie sOm81th t .csemb11 th e u I las ~ r, hen BrItIsh
Bub.riDe ee t eUlhol'e 1 n 1 rt In e J:8l'd elles and blew up
a br dire.
As ldw '1 Isl 18 onl'1 1 11e !r ~ n lulu n
there a e in e"e'1lnrr s 11 181andll 11 he w 0 lles ot
.ach 0 h ~ r . &01 ot wh ch oou b ueed s I'dI' mes n llUp Ued by
Bub_rlnes or airel'll t, the ttacl': 0 d e e ra lvely e ay. The
weapana ueed t't'o. he alrpl nes w ld
s rd aa on water au 11ea.
Phosgene ~ a e on al dro es, e nton e te
nayy y rde.
High ex loelyee on alrdr es, n 1 fuel a n the
city ot HonolUlu. (Tbe uee of hlrh exploelve galnet
Honolulu to be co blned wIth no lee 0 ey eu te It
wlth1n tour boure. when it would e eubJec ed to a6
aUack.)
!here le no adequate defense
E\ e all'
c except
an all' tOl'O.. !hi. eIln be Ilupple nted by uxHl rlee on the grcnnd ,
hella ..
'.a. a
obln. ~ u n and balloon
~ . nU aot onl1 to lye
-12-
rra es. but without air
lse e nile ot a curl'1.
such as t e 08 rich
air 1n the
st
el when he hides hiS hend in the se d.
opean war lost lesS than one-tenth or one
p cont
ti- lrcr ft efen e
of all kln

rthertllore,
n aefenses c n be e sily P rtlcularly if they are
at emptl
to ac Indepen ently
Consider wh t an a
d not att ched to the alr torce.
a t ck such as h s been de cribed
g8lnst Hawa11 wo Id mean, undefended as it lS 1th odern
a1rcraft; and bear 1n lnd hat such a Bc a could be repeated t
leaat hroe t1 es a day unless etopp d by an alr force.
I have clted the landl
can be done, tb t Instant co' mun oation "1 h .r ph 1s assured and
t t an aeroMut\ca advance on HonolUlu can be lllI: de L edlately
afterward. Once a p rmanent r oti
wae obt lned by n eae
on
any of the islande. oahu be educed by eron u leal 81e e and
no a ount or sea power or 1 nd power culd be able to stop It. becausl
slrc ft wo d s n or estroy the surface shipe as f st as t ey
apoe red. _ en could a rcrart c rrlerll or or
reach the
Ylctnlty of the islandS. hey would have to es abllsh themselves
rwaaentl1 on land in order to operate arfec lvely.
If we desire to hold the Haw 11an Isl de. e
at ase
our detenue on n alr force capable of cover ng efr.ect1vel not
I the 1rectl n of J& n. Co ero1ally, we must x end our &1 W&y8
hu eleven hundred mlle.
onl1 ..ery inhab1ted lsland of ho roup, but the tr
11 islands and shoals t t oxten fro
of reefs,

ewep the cif c, both by airpl ne and air hlp

!he Philippine ISlandS are a source or str te loal we kne.
..d or strength. Jap n 18 pr c ic
a
1ly Jo nc up to th
-\3-
by an airway hr h her IslandS wh eh extenft to ne Just 8 uth or
fOrmosa, C lIed ote1 o. Tha lsl n 1e UA six Y mlles away
froa the ls1an ot the Philipplne roup. from there on
Is a contlnuous chaln up to the lsl nd of uz n whlch contains the
late conte
s rike.
18 w thout n
o II nry 01 c
which we woul
h any Aeia le power,
st, which wae a neoessity thirt ye rs ago.
1 IIlta
relally, we c n t ade with 01\y or Manila. Co
armed ba.e In the rar
Sb uld we become Involved In war w
than tho Philippines
1. cloaer",to the Yi al pOln s aal s
The Uni ed States' colonl 1
ex the people or the islandS or their resourcell In a
rticular rea on for United tate.
way that would illtate
that ee nomic 111 the e i8 no
t he well ei of h inhabitants, so
stayi there. P 1itieally, howey , here i8 a decided reason.
Should we eTacuate tll Ph 11 ines, they W'J Id be seized iID ediately
by Jap n. The pe Ie uld be enslaTed in the w y that those ot orea
and or oea h ve been. The Ja nese wOl1d then cooplete a s1ste ot
irways Bnd depots alo the IslandS blan etl sla and
would e a Japn se la e ot the w tar between these lslands, on
hlcb no eo eree C'JU d move wlth u thelr ermiSsio.
OUr evacuation ot the Phllippines would ean the exti Ui8h.
of t.he pit'e 1n the r . st, ec u e the Japanese wo Id
1 b 1n p-opaganda tbe na ivee, 'whlcb
uld cause
and serIOUS Thi , 1n com in tion witb RUSSian
aot.iYlt1.. troa the north, would probably 1e d eYentually to &n
i_I of the poople ot Indi and a serIous blow at the Britisb
.....
eretore the UnIted States should keep t e PhIlippine i
down on the PbIlippines and &tte p to dete d thea would

Ie 0 notbl bo beet eten's 0 the hi1ippl e a the
Japane8e wo d be a di eot a 0 tnst from 1 .a.
'!'he 111 ar ol1oy or he n ted ';to.to in the P 11 P lnaa
ore 8hol1 be to n In on y 10 en i1ito.ry ower to
peace n r n ull1 y on he na Ivee and 0 h va s 11
foroes t U8e ln h [ tee f r he pro actlon
of A rlcan 1 ves proper y. To do more n blS ould 1e
to a useless 8 e of A eric n 1 va n ran0 e w
Outside ot he ited 5t tes p per, 1 a is 0 most
imoortant po n with re rd u rotection n t sla. The
distance to B wa 1 Alas 8 on 1300. l1e, 0' red to
2000 miles from our P 0 flc 00 st. 1 ak 1e wit. in etr1kl.
distanoe of any p1 oe we nt 0 e thor 00 e cla1_
ly or \n a mlit ry y.
L tt1e d d gocretar Sewa how le11 h wa bu11dl
w n he Ino eted th 1 s a e from the 1 ns. e were
tor u te lnd ad t at I e che pl as we d, h s, t 7,400,000.
The story a. to how It as haa ly r c n know
aa It Was never publlahed for re a s at teo I ae a ofore
he ivll , the Ru a1 ns pr poaed th t th y eel ua the ter itory
ot 1 I ey h3d ust tiniehe a w r r -a1n 1n the
Crl , and were hav1 re_t of r' Ie over eoause
thiS prOYI co touched Canada and b re as cJns nt a rlf between
, tUr traders, t It 1"1 Ish Au aon y e. .10 th.ee Co nlee n
be Illan f arican Compan1es. RuSSl th u h th t by Interpo log
d S be ween her 5lber n 008sea 10 a 1 od'e
Olel n. she be cal mf of
.15-
able to cope with her, between themeelyes. She
reed to aell
the xce, :m of Russ1a. e
r aln over
t th e the evil ' r
terr\toI'J to the United 5 tee tor 1,
i 1
an
ro ut,/\._ e hands
tion ot ro e 8
,000.
o re ot the United were tled.
trlen ly to the nern slde w
were on the p01"l of ar wl t G e"
prlyateer8 in QrltI8h ports t r he Contede c1, a w h nce
oyer the seizure of exico. The Uni ed B. es needed friendly
demonBtratl n tro a 8 e t po er nd Ru
S B t she elle
to eend a tleet 0 ew York and ano he to
5 n Franci co
on a vUlt ot trie dllhlp and ood wHl. She re Hed th t ehe woul d
be to do 80, ut h tri
"oul
'Ie :> b 1 tor by
the UnIted 5ta ee. e they th elves we e en rt ot money. U n
our Inqu ry, 81a lit ted they n cd 0 6, , to defray
the expeneee ot t trien v 1 ur , Co r 88 could not
be &eted tor thte a ount,
ae then 1 wou1 be Mol 8 0 n that
the friendly v elt was chased b 1\ erle ney ltll eftec
on the' other natione would h 'Ie been dl lnlll ed accord! 11; eo
notbl wa. 8ald b ut thle 8U3 0 mone un 1 t er h Cly11
r,
When an appropr1atl n or 7,400,000 w s
n e by C
rese _
1,200,000 tor A1 8)[
nd 6,roo,ooo f r the vislt f the fleeU.
e y well
"e1 over t 18 I'l
11 rice. The value of
the otal productll ot 1 IIIr& fro e 1 e 1 8 !lnexed 1n 1867,
\0 -,
alllount to OYer bl1llon dol a

rl!1P 81 le e X' now,
la, tuN, tlllb and other pro c s unt t re th n
t ten tl ell the pure aSe pr1 e lone.
1 18 he eeono le yalu ot 1.
6
treMndou8, but
{
her etra'881c Talue 18 eyen a8 alre cxpl In a
oon'.., between thls t and ela It wo d bo laeka
Ie the U ont" or bridge head, tor ean culture ae exe -
pl1tled 1n Aaer1ca, ae to ABiat1c culture.
In eu t100. we can m9 e he S wi te r t
bel salneald. th t alr power 1e tbe decidl
of the paOltlC; wlthout It, an7 0 hol
proteot our own country an enemy .,11
r ctor 1n our detene.
ou 08see810ne or
e r lUelle.
..
EFFECT OF AIR POWER ON OPEPATIONS
..
.
With this brief view of the political and military condition
of the various cOuntries bordering the Pacific Ocean, let us consider
what the strategical donditions in the Pacific are at the present time,
from the standpoint of the United States.
Air power has completely changed the method of applying military
power. While its effect has been very great on land operations, it has
not yet changed the character of land forces their general methods
of use of an air force at the inception of a war may be
decisive and not require the use of one army against another to obtain
the decision, but if the use of armies becomes necessary, they will still
use infantry, artillery, possibly some cavalry, and many of the auxiliar-
ies that have heretofore been employed.
Air power's effect on a navy, however, will entirely change all
methods and means formerly used by sea forces. To begin with, no surface
vessels can eXist wherever air forces acting from land bases are able
to attack them. This is because
a. A surface vessel cannot conceal itself from the view of aircraft.
b. Aerial weapons: the bomb, mines, chemical weapons,air and water
torpedoes, and gunfire, can destroy and completely put out of
action at a minimum cost and effort any surface vessel that has
been built or that can be built.
c. There i8 no efficient means of defense against aircraft from
the vessels themselves either by missile throwing weapons,balloon
or other barrages, or chemical weapons.

d. A 8urface navy can floating bases
A
..ainet aircraft acting from land bases. because the platform
-15-
ailable for launching the airplanes is so small,contracted,unstable
and exposed to hostile air attack that neither sufficient nor suitable
aircraft can be launched from them, to cope with air forces acting from
shore bases.
;-
The future naval arrangements will, therefore, be confined, for offensive
purposes, vessels capable of diving below the surface of the water to
rk
conceal themselves from view an
As aircraft are able to dominate completely the surface of the
water within their radii of operations, it will be impossible to trans-
port great numbers of men or masses of materiel in surface vessels across
sea areas in war until complete control of the air is obtained.
In the first stages of a contest for the control of the air, the
linea of operation will be along coast lines, where secure air bases
can be seized and held. Small islands offer great advantages because
they can be easily defended from sea craft and, on the other hand, can
be easily supplied either by air or by .
.4- ,In a war between the United States an\l. Japan, an advance cannot
\..v W3-y '1
'Ibe the southern IineAwfth any great of success because,as
will be seen further on is tQ1i , Japanese air pOTIer completely
a.. - Wl\.-V
dominates it. a line of air bases .wi11 have to be estab_
lished along the coast to Alaska and thence to Asia under cover of which
any direct operation s against the main island ofJapan \i111 have to be
made. In the event of moving an army to the Far Bast, it is not incon_
oeivable that the advance e1ements,if not a preat part of the force,
have to be moved up the inside passage to over
Pas. by railway, thence down the Yukon and across Bering Sea
Daive against Japan itself would be decisive because all
-16_
Japanese cities, centers of population and agricultural areas, lie
along the valleys of the streams, are congested, and easily located.
In general, their structure is of paper and wood or other inflam-
mable substances. depart from this character of construction
because of earthquakes., U


j, JrY'
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tfVJP
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