Governance, the State and the Politics of Development

Adrian Leftwich
ABSTRACT
Current western aid and development policy aims to promote good governance in the third world. Few would deny that competent, open and fair administrationis both a worthy aim and a self-evident requirement of development. However, the current orthodoxy clearly illustrates the technicist fallacy, which is implicit in the following quotation from Pope, that the effective administration or management of development is essentially a technical or practical matter. This article argues that development is fundamentally a political matter and that it is illusory to conceive of good governance as independent of the forms of politics and type of state which alone can generate, sustain and protect it.

For Forms of Government, let fools contest; Whateer is best administered, is best. (Pope, 1734: Bk 3, lines 303-4).

INTRODUCTION
Three majorfeatures define contemporary western aid and overseas development policy. The first is the use of aid to promote open, market friendly and competitive economies (World Bank, 1991: 1). This objective was embodied in the new conditionality of structural adjustment lending developed in the 1980s (Mosley et al., 1991: ch. 1). Two further (and sometimes related) features have been added to the policy in the 1990s. These are support for democratization and the improvement of human rights records, on the one hand, and insistence on what has come to be called good governance on the other. Put simply, the overall thrust of this new development orthodoxy is that societies characterized by these features - essentially, capitalist democracies -promote both peace and prosperity because they generate economic growth and do not go to war with each other (Doyle, 1983: Hurd, 1990). With regard to structural adjustment, however, there is plenty of evidence to show that where it has taken place, it has not always been an immediate or sufficient guarantee that economies will prosper and development occur: the record has been very patchy (Mosley et al., 1991: ch. 10; Nelson, 1990~: 3214; World Bank, 1990:2), especially in Africa (Financial Times, 1993:3).
I am grateful to David Held, John Peterson, Geoffrey Hawthorn, Peter Larmour and anonymous reviewers for constructive comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I alone, however, am responsible for the arguments developed here.
Developmen! and Change Vol. 25 (1994), 363-386.0 Institute of Social Studies 1994. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Rd, Oxford OX4 lJF, UK.

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Moreover, adjustment has often had destabilizing effects by imposing heavy burdens on the poor who have responded in predictable ways, as the surge in food riots in the 1980s has shown (Walton and Seddon, 1994: ch. 1). As for the promotion of democracy, there are powerful theoretical grounds for doubting that democratization - especially when premature can universally provide the appropriate political forms for either good governance or sustained economic development. As Przeworski has argued, social and economic conservatism may be the necessary price for democracy (1988: 80). Yet effective development has often required that some quite radical steps are taken early on in a developmentalcycle. These might include land reform or wage restraint, which are precisely the kind of measures which may alienate major socio-economic groups whose consent is necessary for stable democracy. There is also abundant empirical evidence to show that many of the successful examples of late development since the midnineteenth century, as in Germany, Japan, Korea or Thailand, have occurred under conditions which have not remotely approximated competitive democracy (Amsden, 1991; Fukui, 1992; Gerschenkron, 1962; Girling, 198l), though some have moved or are now moving in a democratic direction, as in Indonesia or Korea (Liddle, 1992; Chung-in Moon, 1988). As I have argued elsewhere (Leftwich, 1993: 610-1 5), democratization in the socio-political and economic conditions which prevail in much of the third world and elsewhere is likely to engender political turbulence and also blow stable market friendly development strategies wildly off course. As the 1990s unfold, therefore, it seems likely that we shall see a period of democratic reversal, not consolidation, in much of the developing world and parts of eastern Europe. But what of good governance? What are its implications for development? While it can hardly be doubted that this is an essential feature of any successful development process, I argue that the current preoccupation with good governance is naive and simplistic. It is part of the technicist illusion, illustrated by Popes quotation at the start of this article, which holds that there is always an administrative or managerial fix in the normally difficult affairs of human societies and organizations, and that this also applies to the field of development. This is especially noticeable in the World Banks approach which presents governance almost as if it were an autonomous administrative capacity, detached from the turbulent world of politics and the structure and purpose of the state. Where good governance is presented as part of a wider conception of democratic governance (as in the case of major western governments), there appears to be little awareness of how few democracy-sustainingconditions may be found in many third world societies (Gills and Rocamora, 1992: 5041 1).
1. This is part of a wider argument about the centrality of politics in development (Leftwich, 1994).

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Against this approach I shall argue that an effective public capacity for promoting development is not a function of good governance, as currently understood, but of the kind of politics and state that can alone generate, sustain and protect it. As the empirical evidence shows, it has been the existence of effective developmental states (whether democratic or not) which has accounted for the most successful records of economic development in the third world over the last thirty years. Unattractive as many of these states may be from a liberal or socialist point of view, they have been highly effective in raising the material welfare of the majority of their citizens within a generation. Understanding the institutional structures and politics of these states is a contribution which the discipline of Politics can uniquely make. I shall thus also be arguing the more general case for bringing Politics back centrally into Development Studies, from where it has been excluded for too long. Before doing so, however, let me define briefly the conception of politics used here (Leftwich, 1983: ch. 1). I start from the assumption that human societies are characterized by a diversity of interests, preferences, values and ideas. Each of these constitutes or directly involves resources, or ways of doing things with resources, which individuals or groups seek to promote or protect. In general, people prefer to get their way: but they also have to live together and cooperate if they are to prosper, and so constant war and outright victory in dispute is not a viable long-term solution to the problem of diversity of interests, although it often happens. With one possible exceptioq2 the human species is the only one to have evolved a set of conscious processes for trying to sort out or resolve these differences. These processes are what I call politics, which I define as all the activities of conflict, cooperation and negotiation involved in the use, production and distribution of resources, whether material or ideal, and whether at local, national or international levels. It will be clear from this definition why all development is so inescapably political, for at any point in any developmental sequence what is crucially at issue is how resources are to be used and distributed in new ways and the inevitable disputes arising from calculations about who will win and who will lose as a result.
ORIGINS OF THE CONCERN WITH GOVERNANCE3

In contemporary usage, the concept of good governance has two main meanings. The first and more limited meaning is associated with the World Bank (see below) which interprets it in primarily administrative and managerial terms. The second meaning, associated with western governments, is
2. The best account of this may be found in de Waals classic study of Chimpanzee Politics (1982). 3. In this and the next section, I have drawn on my Governance, Democracy and Development in the Third World (Leftwich, 1993).

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more political. While it involves a concern for sound administration, it also includes an insistence on competitive democratic politics as well. The two meanings are often confused with each other, and sometimes overlap, but they need to be kept distinct. For the purposes of this paper, I concentrate on the first and narrower administrative meaning since the second and wider version is much more concerned with the relationship of democracy and development, which I have dealt with elsewhere (Leftwich, 1993). It also needs to be said that insistence on good governance and democracy as a condition of aid is not altogether new in the history of western aid policy. Such conditionality, for instance, lay at the heart of President Kennedys doomed Alliance for Progress initiative in Latin America in the 1960s (Robinson, 1993: 58-9). However, concern to promote good governance (in Latin America and elsewhere) was in practice regularly eclipsed by foreign policy considerations or overseas economic interests. Indeed, by their own current criteria, western governments and the major internationa: institutions, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, regularly supported bad governance and cruelly authoritarian regimes. For instance, forbidden by its Articles of Agreement from using explicitly politicalcriteria in its lending operations (IBRD, 1989: 8), the World Bank has loaned to both democratic and non-democratic member governments, whether military or civil. Western governments regularly provided systematic economic, political and military aid for authoritarian regimes such as Argentina, Chile under Pinochet, Iran and South Korea, as well as some of the least liberal, most corrupt or straightforwardly incompetent governments, such as Iraq, Zaire, Haiti and much of sub-Saharan Africa (Barya, 1993: 18). Why did all this change? Why did western governments begin to take a serious interest in good governance and democracy from the late 1980s? I think there have been four main influences: the experience of structural adjustment lending, the dominance of official neo-liberalism (or neoconservatism) in the west, the collapse of official communist regimes and the rise of pro-democracy movements in the developing world and elsewhere.

The experience of structural adjustment in the 1980s

Structural adjustment is the generic term used to describe a package of economic and institutional measures which the IMF, the World Bank and individual western aid donors -sometimes singly, but more often in concert - sought to persuade many developing countries to adopt during the 1980s in return for a new wave of policy-oriented loans (Cammack et al., 1993: 1113; Mosley et al., 1991: ch. 1). The aim of adjustment lending was to shatter the dominant post-war state-led development paradigm and overcome the problems of developmental stagnation by promoting open and free competitive market economies, supervised by minimal states. The general pattern of adjustment packages usually involved two main stages, stabilization and

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adjustment. Stabilization normally meant immediate devaluation and often quite drastic public expenditure cuts. Adjustment followed and sought to transform economic structures and institutions through varying doses of deregulation, privatization, dismantling or diminishing allegedly over-sized and rambling public bureaucracies, reducing subsidies and encouraging realistic prices to emerge as a stimulus to greater productivity, especially for export (Mosley and Toye, 1988: 403-41; Nelson, 1990a: 2-5). When people change the way they use resources, however, they change their relations with each other (Stretton, 1976: 3). Structural adjustment in the economies of developing countries certainly involved profound change in the use, production and distribution of resources. This has inevitably given rise to both winners and losers (Haggard and Kaufmann, 1989b), as in Ghana, Zambia and Nigeria (Callaghy, 1990), and in some new democracies (Haggard and Kaufmann, 1989a). Those who stood to lose often included bureaucrats, public sector workers, party officials, farmers and manufacturers. They all had something to fear from reduction in the size of the public service, diminution of the power of the party-state, more competition, withdrawal of subsidies and freer trade. But the poor also lost, for they often experienced sharp increases in basic food prices as well as medical and education services (Bienen and Waterbury, 1989; Demery and Addison, 1987; Glewwe and de Tray, 1988; R.H. Green, 1986,1988; Longhurst et al., 1988). These are some of the reasons why adjustment has been so political (Nelson, 1989), for no significant change occurs in society without destabilizing some status quo, without decoupling some coalition and building another, without challenging some interests and promoting others. Thus what became clear in the course of the 1980s was that the ability to plan and implement adjustment was largely a consequence of both political commitment, capacity and skill, as well as bureaucratic competence, independence and probity (Healey and Robinson, 1992: 91, 155).4 However those who stood to lose from adjustment were often located in, or closely associated with, the state apparatus; hence they could use their influence to curtail or dilute the programmes, and often did. Paradoxically, therefore, effective adjustment in practice has required a strong, determined and relatively autonomous state, whether democratic or not (Nelson, 1989: 9-10; Whitaker, 1991: 345). This had been the case in Ghana (Callaghy, 1990), Chile (Stallings, 1990), Costa Rica (Nelson, 1990b),Turkey (Mosley et al., 1991: ch. 10) and Indonesia (Soesastro, 1989); but not in Zambia

4. John Waterbury (1989: 39, 5 9 , amongst others, has made the crucial point that effective adjustment involves the careful management of a regimes basic support coalition,even in authoritarian systems.This only serves to highlight the centrality of politics in all forms of change and development, especially where radical shifts in resource use and distribution are entailed.

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(Gulhati, 1989), India (Kohli, 1989), the Philippines (Haggard, 1990a), Jamaica (Nelson, 1990b) or Zaire (Callaghy, 1989). The significance of a strong state seems to have been lost on the prevailing orthodoxy which aims, in part, to reduce the scope and scale of state power through both economic and political reform. The experience with adjustment confronted the international institutions and bilateral donors with the reality of incompetent and often corrupt government in many developing countries (Lancaster, 1993: 9; World Bank, 1991: 128-47). This was especially true of sub-Saharan Africa and it was this that had, in part, led the Bank to identify poor governance as a major source of the African crisis in its major report on the continent, From Crisis to Sustainable Growth (World Bank, 1989). There was some limited acknowledgement of the political causes and context of this crisis of governance in the report but in practice it said little about the state or the politics of development. Instead it focused single-mindedlyon managerial and administrative issues, as became clear in its formal statement on Governance and Development (World Bank, 1992b). In this and other Bank publications (such as the influential World Development Report, 1991), the Bank committed itself to the seemingly more apolitical and largely technical strategy of improving governance. Even this was something of a sleight of hand, for the apparently politically-neutral recommendations presupposed profound political change and represented not simply an economic vision but also a political one. For what was advocated was a slim but efficient administrative state, detached from its prior pervasive involvement in economic matters. While such a state might undertake basic investment in, and management of, essential physical and social infrastructure, its central role was to encourage the free and fair play of market forces in an impartial, open and accountable manner (World Bank, 1991: 4-1 1).

The political influence of the neo-classical counter-revohtion

The Bank and the IMF have a remarkable operational autonomy and are often independent sources of important development ideas and policy. Politically, however, they are ultimately the creatures of their members. The structure of voting power in these institutions is such that the influence of the USA, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom and France is overwhelming (World Bank, 1992c: 237). For this reason the new orthodoxy in Bank and IMF policy came to reflect the emerging neo-liberal ascendancy in economic theory and public policy from the late 1970s in these countries (Killick, 1989: 9-20; Toye, 1987: ch. 2). However, neo-liberalism is not only an economic doctrine but a political one as well, involving strong normative and functionalist theories of politics and the state. In normative terms neo-liberal theory celebrates individual economic and political freedom as representing the good life itself. Beyond the preservation

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of peace and order, it is hostile to state limitation on the rights of individuals, irrespective of race, sex or creed. Neo-liberals, especially rightwing libertarians such as Nozick (1974), also argue that state intervention in the economy or official discrimination imposes constraints on the inalienable rights and liberties of individuals, interferes with freedom of choice, distorts the free play of markets and thus harms economic development (D. C. Green, 1986: 82-90; Olsen, 1982: ch. 6). In functional terms, neo-liberal political theory asserts that democratic politics and a slim, efficient and accountable public bureaucracy are not simply desirable but also necessary for a thriving free market economy, and vice versa, for the two are inextricably implicated with each other (Friedman and Friedman, 1980: 21). Neo-liberals thus regard an obese state apparatus with a large stake in economic life as being both inefficient from an administrative point of view and also incompatible with an independent and vibrant civil society which is held to be the basis of effective democracy. Hence neo-liberal developmentalists often argue that poor development records and adjustment failures have been a direct consequence of authoritarian rule and deficient governance, all arising from excessive concentration of both economic and political power in the hands of the state (Lal, 1983: 103-9), which is incompatible with accountable and responsive good governance in a free economy. This concentration of power also explains regime reluctance or inability to institute political liberalization and bureaucratic contraction. For all these reasons, resurgent neo-liberal theory from the end of the 1970s spurred western governments and international institutions to go on from promoting economic liberalization to making good governance (and democracy) a condition of development assistance.

The collapse of communism

The collapse of Eastern European communist regimes was an important strategic factor which helped to shape the emergence of western interest in promoting good governance. The new international circumstances which prevailed after 1990 meant that the west could now attach explicit political and institutional conditions to its aid without fear of losing its third world allies or clients to communism. The fate of twentieth-century communism also served to confirm neo-liberal theory that bureaucratically sclerotic, nondemocratic collectivist systems were both unable to produce sustained economic growth and unable to change. Corruption, economic mismanagement, inefficiency and stagnation all flowed directly from their grotesque bureaucracies and lack of popular democratic participation. Political liberalization, administrative decentralization, reducing bureaucratic controls and the promotion of good governance on the essentially western model were seen as necessary conditions for economic liberalization and growth (World Bank, 1991: 20).

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This explicit linkage of economic and political liberalism in the theory and practice of good governaiice is nowhere better illustrated than in the Articles of Agreement of the new European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), established in 1991 to help restructure the Eastern European and former Soviet economies. Unlike the World Bank, it has typically neoliberal economic and political objectives which are to promote multi-party democracy, pluralism and market economics (EBRD, 1991: Article 1).

The impact of the prodemocracy movements

Finally, the pro-democracy movements in Latin America, the Philippines and latterly Eastern Europe in the 1980s stimulated similar movements elsewhere (Huntington, 1991: ch. 1). In Africa, between 1989 and 1992, internal and external pressures prompted steps in the direction of democratization in a host of countries, from Nigeria to Zaire and Guinea to Angola, though seldom without profound resistance from incumbent regimes (Riley, 1991: 17-21). Democratization in Asia - though stalled in China and Myanmar, for example - has advanced in the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, Bangladesh and even Nepal. The west drew legitimacy for its prodemocracy policies from these movements and can thus be said to be supporting popular and intellectual demands for good governance in those societies (Ake, 1991). While the west may thus be said to be demonstrating its genuine preference for liberal democracy (other things being equal), some theorists are inclined to see the contemporary orthodoxy as the most recent manifestation of the onward march of global capitalism, which had been delayed by the bipolar world (Barya, 1993: 1617; Gills and Rocamora, 1992: 506). What steps marked the emergence of this new concern for good governance, and what does it mean in practice?

GOOD GOVERNANCE EMERGENCE AND MEANINGS

Emergence
The first official appearance of the contemporary notion of good governance came in the 1989 World Bank report on Africa, which argued that Underlying the litany of Africas development problems is a crisis of governance, by which was meant the exercise of political power to manage a nations affairs (World Bank, 1989: 60). This report was followed, between 1989 and 1991, by a steady flow of pronouncements on governance, democracy and development from a variety of sources. These included the OECD (1989); the Nordic Ministers of Development (1990); the US, British and French governments

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(Africa Conjidentiul, 1990; Chalker, 1991; Cohen, 1991; House of Commons, 1990; Hurd, 1990); the Commission of the European Communities (CEC, 1991); the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 1991; World Bank, 1991, 1992b). The promotion of good governance and democracy was in turn supported by many intergovernmental and regional organizations such as the Organization for African Unity (OAU), The European Council and the Commonwealth Heads of Government (IDS Bulletin, 1993:7). The views of these organizations on the relationship between governance, the state and development were not identical. While some stressed democracy or the protection of human rights, others emphasized sound administration or, in the Bank's terms, management, as key causal factors in development. All, however, failed to explore the kind of politics or state which might be necessary for housing good governance. Nonetheless, despite these differences and omissions, the underlying shape of the concept of good governance soon became clear.

Meaning of good governance

Good governance can be said to have three main levels of meaning which may be defined as systemic, political and administrative. First, from a broad systemic point of view, the concept of governance is wider than that of government which conventionally refers to the formal institutional structure and location of authoritative decision-making in the modern state. Governance, on the other hand, refers to a looser and wider distribution of both internal and external political andeconomic power (Lofchie, 1989: 121-2). In this broad sense, governance denotes the structures of political and, crucially, economic relationships and rules by which the productive and distributive life of a society is governed. In short, it refers to a system of political and socioeconomic relations or, more loosely, a regime. In current usage there can be no doubt that good governance in this systemic sense means a democratic capitalist regime presided over by a minimal state which is part of the wider governance of the new world order (Chalker, 1991: 2-3; House of Commons, 1990: Cols. 1235-1299). The second, more limited and obviously political sense of good governance clearly presupposes such a regime. But it also explicitly means a state enjoying legitimacy and authority, derived from a democratic mandate and built on the traditional liberal notion of a clear separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers. Whether presidential or parliamentary, this presupposes a pluralist polity with a freely and regularly elected representative legislature, with the capacity at least to influence and check executive power. This is the position of most western governments. Finally, from a narrow administrative point of view, good governance means an efficient, independent, accountable and open public service. This is.

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the World Banks position which is fully outlined in its latest definitive statement on Governance and Development which treats good governance as synonymous with sound development management(World Bank, 1992b: 1). This policy document focuses on four main areas of public administration in general and public sector management in particular, which it considers fall within its mandate. (i) Accountability, which in essence means holding officials responsible for their actions. (ii) A legal framework for development, which means a structure of rules and laws which provide clarity, predictability and stability for the private sector, which are impartially and fairly applied to all, and which provide the basis for conflict resolution through an independent judicial system. (iii) Information, by which is meant that information about economic conditions, budgets, markets and government intentions is reliable and accessible to all, something which is crucial for private sector calculations. (iv) Finally, insistence on transparency is basically a call for open government, to enhance accountability, limit corruption and stimulate consultative processes between government and private interests over policy development.
It should be clear, then, that in its most extensive form the idea of good governance is not simply a new technical answer to the difficult problems of development. Good governance is best understood as an intimate part of the emerging politics of the new world order. Clearly, the barely submerged structural model and ideal of politics, economics and society on which the notion of good governance rests is nothing less than that of western liberal (or social) democracy -the focal concern and teleological terminus of much modernization theory. Whatever the merits and limitations of that world view, who could possibly be against good governance, at least in its limited administrative sense, as presented by the World Bank? For is it not the case that any society - whether liberal or socialist - must be better o f with a public service that f is both efficient and honest, open and accountable, and with a judicial system that is independent and fair? In this sense, at least, the World Banks conception of good governance is unexceptional: it re-identifies precisely the principles of administration that have long been argued as being of benefit to developing countries. They are impeccably Weberian in spirit, if not letter (Weber, 1964: 329-41). Even in the most unpromising third world circumstances, good governance in this limited adminstrative sense must be better for development than its opposite, bad governance. However, the Banks prescription for good governance is naive, whereas Webers was not (Beetham, 1974: ch.4), because it fails to recognize that good governance is a function of state character and capacity which is in turn a function of politics. In short, the failure to engage with the history, practice and theory of the state as an agent in the developmental process is

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the major shortcoming of the contemporary preoccupation with governance in development. For it has become clear that, at least in its critical early stages, sustained economic growth in late developers (whether market friendly or not) is the product of patterns of politics which tend to concentrate in the state both the political will and the bureaucratic competence to establish a developmental momentum in a competitively hostile international environment. It is these characteristics which distinguish developmental states from the general pattern of incompetent and often cruel statism in the third world, as I will elaborate later. The fact that few states in developing countries have had those capacities is entirely beside the point. The point is that without such developmental states, the economic prospects of most poor societies will remain bleak. This is precisely why the conception of good governance, presented as the necessary administrative capacity for development, is no substitute for a conception of the developmental state in which the role of politics and the state is paramount. It is to this that I now turn.

THEIDEA OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE

Meaning and background
The idea that the government should have a role in promoting development is not new. However, in almost every context in which this issue has been addressed, from Germany in the 1840s to Botswana in the 197Os, it has always been profoundly political in origin and explicitly statist in focus. In modern times, the idea may be traced back to Friedrich Lists classic critique (1885) of Quesnay and Smith, where he argued that the less advanced nations first required artificial means to catch up with the advanced nations. It was the task of national political economy, and hence the state, to accomplish the economical development of the nation and to prepare it for admission into the universal society of the future (List, 1885: 175). Explicitly (and presciently, remembering Japan and Korea in the twentieth century), List claimed that a perfectly developed manufacturing industry, an important mercantile marine, and foreign trade on a really large scale, can only be attained by means of the interposition of the power of the State (1885: 178). Marx too (in the second of his two main theories of the state) hinted at something recognizable as a rudimentary developmental state (Marx, 1852: 238) when he referred to the completely autonomous position of the state in France under Louis Bonaparte. This state arose as a result of a balance of class forces in society, and so was not the captive of any, but nonetheless acted to further the interests of capitalism in general. In Elsters opinion this version of the autonomous capitalist state was the cornerstone

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of Marxs theory after 1850 (Elster, 1985: 426), and was later developed by European Marxists, such as Poulantzas (1973). Moreover, Elster argues, this theory corresponds well with the actual historical development of the capitalist state in European development as an active, autonomous agent from the sixteenth century onwards, pursuing its own interests by harnessing those of others to its purposes (Elster, 1985: 426). In the twentieth century, the idea of the state as an agent of development came to be part of the official policy of western colonial powers in the interwar years. However little they may have done in practice, colonial governments came to believe that they had a special role in promoting the socioeconomic progress of the colonies and their people. Interestingly, in the light of current official theory on the relationship of democracy and development, the explicitly non-democratic corollary of this view was that political advancement for the colonial peoples would (one day, perhaps) follow. All this was based on a theory of politics and the state which held that democratic self-governance was a consequence of economic development and that premature democratization was dangerous. These ideas were explicit, for instance, in British colonial policy, especially after the rise of colonial development and welfare provisions in the 1930s (Lee, 1967), and were also embodied in the idea of the beamptenstaut (official state) in Dutch Indonesia (McVey, 1982). At the same time, in the heart of Europe, driven by the fiercely competitive politics of nationalism and implemented by a centralizing, integrative and managerial state, was the developmental dictatorship of Italian fascism (Gregor, 1979: 303). Regimes of this kind were not based on the Weberian vision of a minimal state and a detached bureaucracy setting a framework and impartially applying rules for private economic actors. On the contrary, the whole purpose and structure of this kind of developmental drive involved a dynamic, interventionist and hegemonic state (Gregor, 1979: 314) which would smash the old order and bring about the progressive victory of modern capitalist industrialization. In short, it was a developmental state structure based on the political energies of nationalism with industrial modernization in its sights. The notion that the state has much more than a minimal supervisory role has been central to development theory and practice, especially in the postwar era, and has also been an article of faith of economic planners and development economists (Roberston, 1984: 7-68). But it was only when political scientists began to look at some of the political characteristics of the economically more successful developing countries that preliminary ideas about the provenance, structure and purposes of developmental states began to form. An early example of this was the concept of the bureaucratic polity, initially developed by Fred Riggs to explain the structure of the Thai state, arising from its nationalist political origins and purposes after the revolution against the absolute monarchy in 1932 (Riggs, 1966). In the 1970s this

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notion of the bureaucratic polity was adapted to explain the particular forms and features of the Indonesian state under Soehartos New Order after 1966, which has been very successful developmentally but bears no relationship to any contemporary model of good governance. The bureaucratic polity in non-democratic Indonesia has been described as a political system in which power and participation in national decisions are limited almost entirely to the employees of the state, particularly the officer corps and the highest levels of the bureaucracy, including especially the highly trained specialists known as the technocrats (Jackson, 1978: 3). The military apart, this has also been true for some of the successful developmentaldemocracies, such as Botswana and Singapore, sometimes described as administrative states (Crouch, 1984: 11; Picard, 1987: 220). The political importance of bureaucratic polities was stressed, too, by S. P. Huntington in the 1960s. He emphasized the critical developmental significance of concentrating political power in a modernizing and innovative state. Such power was essential for the developmental success of such states, especially in order to undertake the political destruction of those existing social forces, interests, customs and institutions. . . which have held back development and which continue to oppose modernization (Huntington, 1968: 141-2). Based on his work in South Asia (and India in particular), Gunnar Myrdal (1970: 229) drew the elementary distinction between soft and strong states in the third world. He was seeking to explain what he saw as the feeble developmental record of a weak Indian state, paralysed by the grip of special interests and enervated by the societys lack of social discipline. What was needed if Indian poverty was to be overcome was not a minimal state but a strong state, which could break free of the clamour and especially the influence of the special interests. Despite these important contributions, it is only in the last fifteen years or so that political scientists have begun to look more closely and comparatively at the political causes and conditions which have enabled some states to be capable of effective developmental action but not others (Nordlinger, 1987; ODonnell, 1979; Stepan, 1978). An interesting example was Ellen Trimbergers political explanation of how autonomous and developmentally progressive bureaucratic states have emerged in the third world. Focusing comparatively on Japan, Turkey, Egypt and Peru, she argued that the bureaucratic state apparatus achieved its relative autonomy when, first, those holding high military or civil office were not drawn from dominant landed, commercial or industrial classes; and, second, where they did not immediately form close relations with these classes after achieving power (Trimberger, 1978: 4). Despite its limitations, her account offered insights into some of the political and structural characteristics of strong states. In none of these early arguments was the term developmental state explicitly used, nor was there much effort to specify either the preconditions or characteristics of this type of state. As in much development economics on left and right (Gillis et al., 1992: 25; Green, 1974: 15@, the state was assigned a

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major role, but the political conditions for its effective discharge of that role were never identified. Indeed, and significantly, it had been the failure by political scientists to analyse the political anatomy of contemporary and historical developmental states that, in part, allowed anti-statist theorists to berate all state developmentalism, rather than discriminate between the successful and the unsuccessful. It was only with the publication of Chalmers Johnsons seminal work on Japan (1982) that the phrase developmental state made its formal debut and that a serious attempt was made to conceptualize it. Crucially, Johnson distinguished the developmental orientation of such a state from the Soviet-type command economy state, on the one hand, and the regulatory orientation of the typical liberal-democratic state, on the other hand, which is the state ideal that lies at the heart of the contemporary theory of good governance. He argued that while it was dedicated to the market economy, the Japanese developmental state had nonetheless been preeminent in setting . . . substantive social and economic goals (Johnson, 1982: 19) for market agents. The conventional regulatory state, by contrast (as in good governance theory), merely established the legal and institutional framework in which the private sector was left entirely free to set goals for itself. A further feature of the developmental state was the power and autonomy of its elite bureaucracy which, in the Japanese case, was centred in certain key ministries, notably the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). The state in Japan sought and maintained intimate relations with major actors in the private sector and sought their cooperation. But it was dominant in setting and gaining agreement about farreaching national policy goals, which were largely determined by the bureaucratic elite, the epicentre of decision-making for much of this century (Fukui, 1992: 200-7). Johnson finally stressed that the Japanese developmental state must always be understood politically. He argued that the provenance of the Japanese developmental state lay essentially in the urgent political and nationalist objectives of the late developer, concerned to protect and promote itself in a hostile world. It arises from a desire to assume full human status by taking part in an industrial civilization, participation in which alone enables a nation or an individual to compel others to treat it as an equal (Johnson, 1982: 25). In this respect Johnson echoes the argument made by List about Germany in the 1840s; by Mussolini about Italy in the inter-war years (Gregor, 1979); by Stalin in 1931 (Deutscher, 1966: 328); by the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party after 1949 (White, 1985: 208); and by President Park Chung-hee in Korea in 1963 (Lim, 1986: 73). There have been a variety of contributions to the theory and practice of developmental states since then: by Gordon White in relation to socialist states (1984, 1985); by White, Robert Wade, F. C. Deyo and others in relation to East Asia (Deyo, 1987; White and Wade, 1985) and most recently by Robert Wade in relation to Taiwan, under the revealing title Managing the Market (Wade, 1990).

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Table 1. Selected average annual rates of growth of GNP per capita: 1965 to 1990 (%)
~~

Democratic Regimes:

Non-democratic Regimes:
- 2.2
0.1

Jamaica Trinidad and Tobago Venezuela Senegal India Sri Lanka Malaysia Costa R i a Botswana Mauritius Singapore
~~

- 1.3
0.0 - 1.0 - 0.6
1.9 2.9 4.0 1.4 8.4 3.2 6.5

Zaire Nigeria Zambia Libya South Korea Taiwan Indonesia Brazil China Algeria Thailand
~~ ~ ~~~

- 1.9 - 3.0
7.1 7.0 4.5 3.3 5.8 2.4 4.4

Sources: Council for Economic Planning and Development (1992); World Bank (1992a).

However, the important point to make about this body of work on the state and the politics of development is that, unlike current theories of governance, it has never sought to depoliticize the necessarily political processes of development by emphasizing apparently technical bureaucratic factors (Whateer is best administered is best). Nor has it sought to deflect attention from the character, structure and purposes of the state which alone can both provide the developmental will and also enable good governance to happen. Contrary to Popes view on the matter, contestation about forms of government is not a fools contest: it is a contest between different interests about power and the institutions which distribute it (Przeworski, 1988: 64; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992: 77). As the studies I have referred to above all show, the form and distribution of power, and the manner of its use in and through the state, are critical for development. Comparative empirical evidence both illustrates and sustains this point, as the next section shows.

DEVELOPMENTAL STATES
Table 1 shows that both democratic and non-democratic states have achieved high average rates of growth since 1965. From these data one may isolate a small group of eight states which have had average rates of growth in excess of 4 per cent per annum: Malaysia, Botswana, Singapore, Taiwan, Korea, Indonesia, China and Thailand. In most respects they could not be more different. Apart from most being found in East or South-east Asia, they differ profoundly with respect to size, population, natural endowments, history, regime type, social and cultural structure, religion and even economic policy. Yet, by any standard, they have

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all achieved remarkable developmental records. What then do they have in common that might explain their achievements?I suggest that it is the nature of their politics (and especially the character of the states which these politics have generated) that is central, not their modes of governance. A number of common features which these states share suggest a preliminary model of the effective developmental state, which is very different to the model of good governance. (i) Whether democratic or not, developmental states have all been de facto or de jure one-party states for much of the past thirty years, although in general the democratic group (Botswana, Singapore and Malaysia) have had better human rights ratings than the non-democratic group (Thailand, Indonesia, Taiwan, Korea and China) (Humana, 1987: xiv-xv). Whereas the non-democratic group has been ruled by military-backed authoritarian regimes (Thailand has had short democratic interludes), the democratic states have been ruled either by a single party (the BDP in Botswana and the PAP in Singapore) or, as in Malaysia, by a coalition in which a single party (UMNO) has dominated. The effect has been to concentrate very considerable and unchallenged political power at the top in these states, thus usually enhancing political stability and continuity in policy. (ii) These states have been dominated by purposeful and determined developmental Clites, which have also been relatively uncorrupt, at least by comparison with Haiti, Zaire and the Philippines under Marcos. As in Japan (Muramatsu and Krauss, 1984), these states have also been characterized by a well-documented and intimate linkage between political leaders and top bureaucrats (Crouch, 1979: 576; Egedy, 1988: 6 1 1; Liddle, 1992: 448; Puthucheary, 1978: 40). The solidity of these Clites has been enhanced by a dense traffic between the top levels of the civil and military bureaucracy and high political office, something which is very rare in western liberal democracies and entirely alien to the contemporary philosophy and specifications of good governance theory. For instance, in 1984 almost half of the eleven cabinet members in Botswana were former civil servants (Charlton, 1991: 273), as has also been the case in Soehartos Indonesia (Crouch, 1979: 576). While these Clites have regularly experienced internal differences, they all appear to have been united by a determined national developmental objective, always fuelled by varying combinations of political, ideological and nationalist considerations, as well as internal and external security threats. The obvious examples are South Koreas and Taiwans fierce competition with North Korea and China respectively, Thailands fear of regional communist threats, Botswanas anxiety for maximum economic development, given the power and threat of South Africa, and Singapores concern about its position, sandwiched between Islamic Indonesia and Malaysia. (iii) A further shared characteristic of the greatest importance has been the relative autonomy of the developmentalClites and the state institutions which they command. By this is meant that the state (or its leadership) has been able to achieve relative independence from the demands of special interests

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and could, and did, over-ride them in the putative national interest (Crouch, 1984: 13,32,75; Haggard, 1990b: 264; Holm, 1988: 187;Johnson, 1987: 156-8; Liddle, 1991; Nordlinger, 1987: 369-71; Wade, 1990: 375-6). As with other aspects of these states, this again is best explained politically with respect to the routes by which the regimes came to power or retained it: either by revolution, conquest or coup by modernizing elites (e.g. Thailand from 1923, China from 1949, Korea from 1960, Taiwan from 1949, Indonesia from 1966), or by an electoral process that has nonetheless consistently yielded one dominant party of government (as in Botswana, Malaysia and Singapore). The combinedpoliticulstrength and continuity of these developmental states, whether democratic or not, has clearly differentiated them from others, such as Jamaica, Sri Lanka, Nigeria or India. (iv) Elite determination and the relative autonomy of the state has helped to shape very powerful, highly competent and insulated economic bureaucracies with authority in directing and managing economic and social development. The template for this might be thought of as MITI in Japan (as Johnson pointed out) but examples may be found as far afield as the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning in Botswana (Holm, 1988: 187-97), the Economic Planning Board in Korea (Luedde-Neurath, 1985: 196) and the considerable policy autonomy of the Economic Development Board in Singapore (Haggard, 1990b: 113-14). What differentiates these economic high commands (or pilot agencies in Johnsons language) in developmental states from the generality of planning institutions in so many developing countries is their real power, authority, technical competence and insulation in shaping development policy. Their existence, form and function, once again, needs to be understood as a consequence of the politically-driven urgency for development and the politics of a strong state, and not as an attribute of the principles of good governance. Indeed, the idea of an authoritative economic bureaucracy shaping the goals and strategy of development policy fundamentally contradicts the contemporary theory of, and prescription for, good governance. (v) In all developmental states, civil society has experienced weakness, flattening or control at the hands of the state. The institutions of civil society (non-governmental organizations) have, at least until relatively recently, been smashed, penetrated, dominated or come to be financed by the state. It almost seems as if this has been a condition for the emergence and consolidation of the developmental state. This is most evident in the harsher authoritarian developmental states, such as China or Indonesia (Gold, 1990: 18-25; Sundhaussen, 1989: 462-3), but it has also been the case in democratic developmental states, such as Botswana (Molutsi and Holm, 1990: 327). This has enhanced state power in ways that have been developmentally useful, as the next point indicates. (vi) The power, authority and relative autonomy of these states were established at an early point in their modern developmental history, well before national or foreign capital became important or potentialiy influen-

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tial. This, coupled with the weakness of civil society, or its domination by the state, has been significant in enhancing their capacities vis Ci vis private economic interests, internal or external. It has given them much power in determining the role which both foreign and national capital has played in the developmental process. This has been especially obvious in the battery of instruments which, say, the Korean state assembled to bend national and foreign capital to its developmentalpurposes (Johnson, 1987: 160-4; Mardon, 1990: 136). But it is more or less true for all the others, as in Malaysia (Bowie, 1991: ch.4). As Robert Wade has pointed out for Taiwan, this has led to these societies being described as corporatist in which the leadership role of the state in economic matters has been far more important than its followership role (Wade, 1990: 295). Unlike Latin America, where powerful landed interests, an emerging bourgeoisie and foreign capital have been deeply embedded in political and economic life, developmental states in these societies have for long been the most powerful players in town. (vii) Finally, there can be little doubt that, whether democratic or not, these have not been particularly pleasant states by either liberal or socialist standards. They have frowned on dissent, handed out rough and sometimes brutal treatment to student, labour, political and religious organizations which have opposed them, and have used a variety of internal security measures to suppress, banish or eliminate opposition. Although it is notoriously hard to measure legitimacy, especially under these conditions, it is therefore surprising that even some of the toughest of these regimes, as in Indonesia, appear to have been genuinelypopular (Liddle, 1992: 450). This is not to say that there have been no protests. On the contrary, these have sometimes been bloody as in the Korean and Taiwanese labour struggles in the 1980s(Bello and Rosenfeld, 1992:ch.l,13) or the regular student protests in Bangkok or more recently in Tiananmen Square. But it is at least worth hypothesising that the endurance of this strange mixture of repression and legitimacy in the politics of these societies is best explained by the generally positive overall effects of the rapid growth which it has helped to deliver, at least as measured by the Human Development Index (HDI). On key indicators of improvement such as per capita income, life expectancy and educational attainment, these developmental states have delivered the goods. Of 160 countries ranked on a world basis, Korea, Singapore and Malaysia are in the top 30 per cent, with the others in the top 60 per cent (UNDP, 1992: 20), way ahead of India, Pakistan, Vietnam, Egypt, Kenya and Bolivia, for instance. The distinguishing characteristic of developmental states, then, has been that their institutional structures (especially their economic bureaucracies) and political objectives have been developmentally-driven, while their developmental purposes have been politically-driven. In short, fundamentally political factors have shaped the thrust and pace of their developmental strategies through the structures of the state. These factors have normally included nationalism, ideology, a wish to catch up with the west, as well as

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38 1

defensive and security/military concerns, all commonly fuelled by regional competition and, sometimes, hostility.

CONCLUSIONS
It is important to welcome the belated interest that international development institutions like the World Bank have begun to take in questions of governance, but I have tried to show that their current approaches are naive and limited in their failure to recognize the centrality of politics and the state in development, Good governance is not simply a function of institutionbuilding or heavy doses of training (World Bank, 1991: 234-s), desirable as they may be. Moreover, good governance, in its limited current conception, is not likely to generate much development on its own. Neither sophisticated institutional innovations nor the best-trained or best-motivated public service will be able to withstand the withering effects of corruption or resist the developmentally-enervating pulls of special or favoured interests if the politics and authority of the state do not sustain and protect them. To expect that stern conditionality will yield good governance and hence development in, say, Haiti, Zaire or Myanmar, without recognizing the enormity of the political change that is required for it to happen, is to commit the ultimate technicist error. If overcoming the continuing offence of poverty, ignorance and disease is the real objective, then calling weakly for good governance in states which cannot sustain it is not likely to help much in many parts of the developing world. For the remarkable achievements of the societies discussed have not been a function of the kind of depoliticized governance now being urged on other developing societies. On the contrary, their growth has been masterminded by developmentalstates (both democratic and non-democratic); that is, states whose politics have concentrated sufficient power, probity, autonomy and competence at the centre to shape, pursue and encourage the achievement of explicit and nationally-determineddevelopmental objectives, whether by establishing and promoting the conditions of economic growth, by organizing it directly, or by a varying combination of both. It has only been on the basis of their success that some are now beginning to extend or implement democratic processes. At almost every point, then, the models of good governance and the developmental state are in conflict. Current official theories of good governance eulogize the minimal state, a Weberian-type bureaucracy, rigorous respect for human rights, a rich and diverse civil society, political pluralism and a sharp separation of economic and political life. Uncomfortable as it may be to acknowledge it, the model of the developmentalstate, on the other hand, whether democratic or not, entails a strong and determined state which protects a powerful and competent bureaucracy that largely shapes and directs development policy, a dubious (and sometimes appalling) civil and

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- at

human rights record, the suppression or control of civil society and a fusion least at the top - of the political direction of economic power. Above all, both the idea and practice of developmental states illustrate not simply the importance, but the primacy of politics and the state in development, whereas the somehow lifeless notion of good governance has been evacuated from them. For all these reasons, in both the analysis and promotion of development, it is time to bring politics back in.

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Adrian Leftwich is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of York (Heslington, York YO1 5DD), where he specializes in the politics of development. He is currently working on a comparative study of developmental states. Amongst his publications are Redefining Politics: f People, Resources and Power (Methuen, 1983) and States o Development (Polity, forthcoming 1994).