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Contents
1 Executive Summary ..................................................................................................... 5
2 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 8
3 Theories of transparency, accountability and participatory initiatives (TAIs) .......... 10
3.1 Transparency initiatives: Definitions and Assumptions ..................................... 10
3.2 Accountability initiatives: Definitions and Assumptions .................................... 12
3.3 Participatory initiatives: Definitions and Assumptions ...................................... 13
3.4 Relationships among transparency, accountability and participation .............. 14
4 Traditional (non‐/pre‐ICT) transparency and accountability initiatives ................... 20
4.1 Making government information transparent ................................................... 20
4.1.1 Right to information.................................................................................... 20
4.1.2 Transparent budget information ................................................................ 21
4.2 Auditing government information and services ................................................ 23
4.2.1 Complaint mechanisms ............................................................................... 23
4.2.2 Citizen report cards and community scorecards ........................................ 23
4.2.3 Community Monitoring .............................................................................. 27
4.2.4 Public hearings and social audits ................................................................ 28
4.2.5 Public Expenditure Monitoring ................................................................... 28
4.3 Public participation in budget ............................................................................ 29
4.3.1 Participatory budgeting .............................................................................. 29
4.3.2 Gender Budgeting ....................................................................................... 31
4.4 Dialogue and activism ........................................................................................ 32
5 Technologies for transparency, accountability and participation ............................ 33
5.1 Websites and wikis ............................................................................................. 34
5.1.1 Public Information or Transparency Campaigns......................................... 34
2
5.1.2 Tracking voting records/politicians ............................................................. 35
5.1.3 Digital budgeting ......................................................................................... 35
5.2 Social media ....................................................................................................... 39
5.2.1 Publicizing Information and Organizing Crowds ......................................... 39
5.2.2 Deepening Democracy and Long‐Term Impact .......................................... 40
5.3 Interactive mapping ........................................................................................... 42
5.3.1 Mapping Election Results ............................................................................ 42
5.3.2 Citizen Reporting issues .............................................................................. 42
5.3.3 Crime Mapping ............................................................................................ 44
5.3.4 Budgets and Financial Transactions ............................................................ 44
5.3.5 The Case of Sithi: Mapping Human Rights Violations ................................. 45
5.4 SMS and Voice Based Reporting ........................................................................ 46
5.4.1 Citizen Reporting Issues with Service Delivery ........................................... 46
5.4.2 The Case of CGNet Swara: localized citizen journalism .............................. 46
5.5 Hybrid and "older" technologies ........................................................................ 48
6 Findings, discussion and policy recommendations .................................................. 49
6.1 The value of ICTs ................................................................................................ 49
6.2 Research and policy recommendations ............................................................. 52
6.2.1 Impact on the poor and information capabilities ....................................... 52
6.2.2 Online or offline impact/ Measuring social impact .................................... 53
6.2.3 Comparison between ICT and non‐ICT enabled initiatives ........................ 54
6.2.4 A comprehensive database ......................................................................... 54
6.2.5 Changing nature of state ............................................................................ 55
6.2.6 Research methods ...................................................................................... 55
6.2.7 Robustness of data ..................................................................................... 56
6.2.8 Gender and participation ............................................................................ 56
6.2.9 Regulation and Ethics .................................................................................. 57
3
7 BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................................... 59
4
1 Executive Summary
In wake of the events of Arab Spring and increasingly over the last decade, there has
been attention and expectations on the role that Information and Communication
Technology (ICT) based technology platforms such as websites and wikis, social media,
interactive geo‐mapping, and SMS and voice based reporting can play in increasing
accountability, participation and transparency in public administration (R. Avila et al.,
2010; Davis, 2004; Pina, Torres, & Royo, 2009). Public bureaucracies are under pressure
to adapt and more openly improve the ways they interact with citizens through the
adoption of web‐based technologies (Ibid.). Factors such as the gap between public
expectation and perceived governmental performance, the role of mass media, political
scandals, lack of transparency, and corruption contributed to a decline of public trust in
government in the last two decades (Nye, 1997; Sirker & Cosi, 2007).
The field of technology for transparency, accountability and participation is an
increasingly dynamic space for innovation. Whether it is using the power of crowds to
monitor elections, or educating citizens about how the government spends money on
public service, or monitoring local and national government budgets, ICTs are tools that
have been used to shift how accountability and transparency are incorporated into
public service delivery.
ICTs, particularly online and mobile technology tools, are changing the transparency and
accountability field. Many of the initiatives including complaints mechanisms, public
information/transparency campaigns, and public expenditure monitoring, are based on
ICT platforms (R Avila, Feigenblatt, & Heacock, 2009). A number of websites function as
portals where citizens can list their complaints related to their government’s
performance and administration. As a result, citizens may have better access to
information through technologies and can find new ways to participate (R Avila, et al.,
2009). Citizen journalism and the concept of digital democracy are rapidly emerging and
citizens are demanding their rights in public online forums. There are also initiatives that
aim for transparency by publishing more information about the private sector that are
in the public’s interest.
This report focuses on analyzing the conditions under which new technologies can
enhance delivery of public services to the poor through improved accountability and
transparency. It examines the linkages between the use of innovations in technology,
increased accountability and the effects on the delivery of public services to poor
communities. Specifically, the paper investigates the role that the combination of social
media, geo‐mapping and various technology platforms can play in this process.
Section 2 of the report lays down the theories behind transparency, accountability and
participatory initiatives, while critiquing the assumptions inherent within these.
5
Section 3 outlines traditional (non‐/pre‐ICT) transparency and accountability initiatives,
making information transparent, the auditing of government services and information,
(including participatory budgeting), and the resultant potential for dialogue and
activism.
Section 4 moves on to reviewing cases of technologies for transparency. For example,
we examine cases of websites and wikis that are used in public information or
transparency campaigns, for tracking voting records and politicians, and for digital
budgeting. Cases focus on the use of social media, specifically for publicizing information
and organizing crowds, and deepening democracy. We also look at cases of interactive
mapping, specifically for mapping election results, citizen reporting issues, crime
mapping, budgets and financial transactions, and mapping human rights violations.
Finally, we look at platforms for citizen reporting with service delivery and localized
citizen journalism. These cases highlight the challenges and practical implications of
what technologies can do in the transparency and accountability field.
Section 5 enters into the discussion of the value of ICTs, as opposed to "off‐line"
attempts at transparency and accountability. It also outlines a set of research and policy
recommendations. There are several important factors influencing and limiting the
effectiveness of technology‐based transparency and accountability initiatives: the level
of democratization or context within which demands can be made for accountability;
‘political will’ or support for accountability and transparency initiatives; political
economy within which the initiatives operate is influential; enabling legal frameworks,
and incentives and mechanisms for sanctions on public officials to influence behavior.
On the demand side, the capabilities of citizens and civil society organizations to access
and use information as well as the capacity to mobilize are important factors influencing
the impact technologies for transparency can have. We argue that ICTs smoothen the
transition from data> information> action but also conflate each of these stages, so that
it becomes a seamless, iterative cycle. We find that technologies enable accountability,
transparency and participation by:
reducing the distance between government service provider and user with more
access to decision makers’, information and platforms to raise concerns and issues
providing multi‐platform opportunities for dissemination and interaction with
information
providing visual and analytical tools for citizens to access government data and
therefore simplifying traditionally presented government information (e.g. budgets
or to compare year‐on‐year, or with other departments, or states)
providing real‐time opportunities for citizen interaction and feedback
The combination of a free media with ICTs being used for accountability and
transparency is powerful in the dissemination of information and attention to locally
6
relevant issues. The level at which ICTs can be used as an effective tool depends on the
ICT infrastructure itself, levels of connectivity throughout a country, and broadband
penetration. The ubiquity of devices can also determine who is participating and
contributing to the process of accountability and transparency.
In Section 5, the report concludes with a set of policy recommendations. Below are a
few of the key recommendation areas.
Impact on the poor and information capabilities: access to ICTs is important but not
sufficient for meaningful impact in terms of enhancement of ICT capabilities and
sustainable change for the poor. Enhancing peoples’ informational capabilities
through digital literacy is critical in determining the impact of accountability and
transparency initiatives on poor peoples’ well‐being.
Online or offline impact/ Measuring social impact: It is still unclear what the actual
impacts (social, political, economic) of these initiatives are for both governments
and citizens and how best to measure it. Need to better understand the factors that
enable or constrain replication of initiatives and how together they create an
enabling environment for transparency and accountability
Comparison between ICT and non‐ICT enabled initiatives: little empirical
comparative data looking at ICT and non‐ICT enabled transparency and
accountability initiatives exist. When designing and supporting new initiatives that
are ICT based, analysis of the actual value ICTs may have vs. a low tech solution is
important.
A comprehensive database: Currently there is no comprehensive central database
of all transparency and accountability initiatives using ICTs worldwide as well as
NGOs working in this field. Recommend a collaborative undertaking to work
together to build a comprehensive database that can be a resource to development
agencies, decision makers, governments, NGOs, and academics.
Gender: The technologies for transparency initiatives have implications for gender,
particularly on its impacts for women and girls. However, this is a largely untapped
area which seems to hold potential for women to use technologies as a tool to
enable better participation in public processes, demanding services, and interacting
with governments. Research is needed to better understand how these technologies
may have a positive (or negative) impact in the lives of girls and women.
Regulation and Ethics: There are implications for how ICTs are used, what platforms
should be used, and importantly how this is regulated. There is much work to be
done in defining a regulatory and legal framework under which transparency and
accountability initiatives can operate
7
2 Introduction
In wake of the events of Arab Spring and increasingly over the last decade, there has
been attention and expectations on the role that Information and Communication
Technology (ICT) based technology platforms such as websites and wikis, social media,
interactive geo‐mapping, and SMS and voice based reporting can play in increasing
accountability, participation and transparency in public administration (R. Avila, et al.,
2010; Davis, 2004; Pina, et al., 2009). Public bureaucracies are under pressure to adapt
and more openly improve the ways they interact with citizens through the adoption of
web‐based technologies (Ibid.). Factors such as the gap between public expectation and
perceived governmental performance, the role of mass media, political scandals, lack of
transparency, and corruption contributed to a decline of public trust in government in
the last two decades (Nye, 1997; Sirker & Cosi, 2007). Innumerable studies indicate that
public investments in services have resulted in inadequate returns. Additionally, the
failure in many countries to achieve substantial poverty reduction and much inequity
among marginalized people contributes to a lack of trust in government. Improved
governance processes and increased public trust in governments has been associated
with increased responsiveness to citizens through two way interactions between
governments and citizens (R. Avila, et al., 2010; Joshi, 2010; Mc Gee & Gaventa, 2010).
More access and transparency of information has been perceived as a way to enhance
trust in governments by improving accountability of government services and
empowering citizens with e‐governance (Demchak, Friis, & La Porte, 2000). E‐
government can be interpreted in various ways. Definitions of egovernment vary from
“the translation of private sector e‐commerce experiences to the public sector” to
issues of actual governance such as online engagement of stakeholders in “shaping,
debating, and implementing public policies” (Pina, et al., 2009).
The field of technology for transparency, accountability and participation is an
increasingly dynamic space for innovation. Whether it is using the power of crowds to
monitor elections, or educating citizens about how the government spends money on
public service, or monitoring local and national government budgets, information and
communication technologies (ICTs) are tools that have been used to shift how
accountability and transparency are incorporated into public service delivery. Over the
last decade, both accountability and transparency have emerged as critical ways to
address both developmental failures and democratic shortfalls (Mc Gee & Gaventa,
2010). This is based on the argument that “through greater accountability, ‘leaky pipes’
of corruption and inefficiency will be repaired, aid will be channeled more effectively,
and in turn development initiatives will produce greater and more visible results”
(McGee et al, 2010, p. 3). In the context of democracy, there are increasing
expectations that democracy must lead to material outcomes through new forms of
democratic accountability. There has been a shift in perception that traditional forms of
state‐led accountability are increasingly seen to be inadequate. Instead, innumerable
8
multi‐stakeholder and citizen‐led approaches have increased in visibility and
importance. Such initiatives now supplement or supplant traditional state led ones
(Ibid).
Technology plays a unique and interesting role in the space of accountability and
transparency initiatives. A study by Avila (2010) indicates ICTs, particularly online and
mobile technology tools, are changing the transparency and accountability field. Many
of the initiatives including complaints mechanisms, public information/transparency
campaigns, and public expenditure monitoring, are based on ICT platforms (R Avila, et
al., 2009). A number of websites function as portals where citizens can list their
complaints related to their government’s performance and administration. Citizens have
better access to information through technologies and new ways to participate (R Avila,
et al., 2009). Citizen journalism and the concept of digital democracy are rapidly
emerging and citizens are demanding their rights in public online of the private sector.
Many of these efforts are just beginning, but the literature indicates that several cases
show that they are “moving ahead of traditional transparency organizations and their
models.”(R. Avila, et al., 2010). Technology based transparency efforts are noted for
their speed in execution and stimulating change. These initiatives are developed by a
number of different types of stakeholders and include collaborative approaches
including governments and/or service providers. Technology for transparency efforts
are often classified as “pull” or “push” efforts. Specifically, “push” efforts have goals of
giving voice to civil society. “Pull” efforts on the other hand raise awareness on the part
of the public. These “pull” efforts try to provide an accessible information pool from
which the public can pull relevant information to “better inform their demand for
improved governance and service delivery.” For the purposes of this paper, we focus on
technologies for transparency in relation to public officials, government processes, and
budgets rather than other aspects of governance such as the judiciary.
This paper will focus on analyzing the conditions under which new technologies can
enhance delivery of public services to the poor through improved accountability and
transparency. It will examine the linkages between the use of innovations in
technology, increased accountability and the effects on the delivery of public services to
poor communities. Specifically, the paper will investigate the role that the combination
of social media, geo‐mapping and other platforms can play in this process, while bearing
in mind that more traditional technologies, such as community radio and print media
can also be effective channels. Adopting a sociotechnical approach as it does, i.e. that
both the technical and societal aspects of ICTs for transparency and accountability need
to be discussed, the paper targets a diverse range of stakeholders, from government
policymakers, ICT specialists, academics, regulatory agencies to "ordinary" citizens.
The paper is structured in the following way. The next section lays down the theories
behind transparency, accountability and participatory initiatives, while critiquing the
assumptions inherent within these. Section 3 outlines traditional (non‐/pre‐ICT)
9
transparency and accountability initiatives, in terms of firstly making information
transparent, the auditing of government services and information, including
participatory budgeting, and the resultant potential for dialogue and activism. Section 4
moves on to technologies for transparency, reviewing technologies such as websites and
wikis, social media, interactive mapping, mobile phones, and arguing that other
technologies such as community radio should not be forgotten. Section 5 enters into the
discussion on the value of ICTs, as opposed to "off‐line" attempts at transparency and
accountability, and research and policy recommendations.
3 Theories of transparency, accountability and
participatory initiatives (TAIs)
3.1 Transparency initiatives: Definitions and Assumptions
In the last decade, the capacity of government and civil society to undertake
transparency initiatives has substantially grown, increasingly aided by technology.
Literature indicates that demand side approaches can lead to enhanced governance
through participation (or citizen’s voice), accountability and responsiveness (Sirker &
Cosi, 2007). Participation, transparency and accountability are at the basis of debates
and literature on service delivery (Joshi, 2010). The World Development Report (2004)
argued that the “long route” of accountability through public officials and elected
political figures to providers was failing to serve the poor. The WDR argued for an
alternative “short route” which created direct accountability between users and
providers (World Bank 2004). Out of these arguments grew a body of literature that
examined how to strengthen the “short route” by strengthening and providing a
platform for voice, improving transparency and enhancing accountability (Sirker & Cosi,
2007).
Transparency initiatives have been defined as “any attempts (by states or citizens) to
place information or processes that were previously opaque in the public domain,
accessible for use by citizen groups, providers or policy makers” (Joshi, 2010, p.2). For
example, more than 60 countries around the world have launched right to information
acts, from Sweden in 1966, two more recently Mexico in 2002 and India in 2005. Civil
society campaigners have welcomed this transparency, in the hope that it will lead to
accountability in the glare of the public eye (Fox, 2007).
However, it could also be said that in comparison to accountability and participation,
transparency has received more practical and less conceptual attention. In other words,
it is taken for granted that there needs to be transparency, but there is less discussion
on what exactly is meant when we talk of transparency. There is a danger that such a
warm all‐encompassing term, which can mean all things to all people, can be a victim of
its broad appeal, by a lack of definition and critique. Two broad approaches on
transparency can be found: firstly, the multiple ways in which transparency can be
10
unpacked and critiqued, and secondly, the way in which it is both instigated either
through push/pull mechanisms, and how it is addressed in terms of directionality, for
example upwards and downwards transparency. These multiple interpretations of
transparency, push/pull mechanisms and directionality will be discussed below.
Firstly then, in terms of multiple definitions, one can ask, who needs to be transparent?
To whom? Is the entity that needs to be accountable an individual or an organization? Is
the recipient of the accountability an individual or an organization? Why does the entity
(individual or organization) need to be accountable? Is it on the basis of a human right,
is to tackle corruption, crime, or generally evaluate individual/institutional
performance? Fox 2007 argues that each of these would require different mechanisms
to tackle the accountability: corruption and crime would require more legalistic
measures, while performance more systematic interventions. He uses the example of
budget transparency: if corruption is in question, transparency would mean revealing
the details of public sector contracts, whereas if performance assessment is the final
aim, it is more the impact of public spending which needs to be made transparent ‐ how
the agency used the funds, and to what effect.
It is therefore inevitable that transparency is linked to accountability, the assumption
being that transparency generates accountability, with phrases such as "information is
power" and "the truth shall set you free" (Fox, 2007). Once information is made
transparent, the entity that needs to be transparent can be held accountable. Yet, as
noted, empirical evidence does not illustrate a straightforward causal link between
transparency and accountability (Fox, 2007). Instead, further clarification is needed.
Under what conditions can transparency leads to accountability? What types of
transparency generates what types of accountability (Fox, 2007). Fox argues that there
is not just one type of transparency, but there can even be opaque and clear
transparency, where the first involves simply disseminating nominal information, which
may not even be reliable, needing the work of intermediaries such as civil society
organizations to translate it into more accessible language, and to analyze it. The
second, clear transparency, is reliable, concise transparency which reveals who is
accountable for what processes. The extent to which transparency is opaque or clear
can result in whether accountability is soft (there is a need for institutional
"answerability") or hard (sanctions or compensation can be applied).
In terms of push/pull, transparency can either be proactive (driven by the government,
such as right to information acts) or demand driven ‐ in practice initiatives may be an
iterative process of both. In terms of directionality, transparency can be both
downwards (that society requires governments to be transparent about how it
operates) but also upwards (that the state also has the right to monitor whether citizens
are accountable to their behavior, for example social security checks to ensure that
citizens are legally entitled to the services they apply for).
11
This then returns to the notion of the multiple ways in which transparency is
understood: transparency may be seen as surveillance (e.g. the government requesting
social security checks). Using the US government's investment in Jordan's eGovernment
program, for example, Ciborra (2005) argues that the drive for "transparency" is rather
surveillance on a country which is geographically critical. Such interpretation unpacks
not only the notion of transparency, but also accountability, as discussed next (Ciborra,
2005).
3.2 Accountability initiatives: Definitions and Assumptions
Schedler (1999) defines public accountability as “the relationships between the power
holder (account‐provider) and delegator (account‐demander).” There are four key
elements of an accountability relationship which include setting standards, acquiring
information about actions, making decisions about appropriateness and identifying and
sanctioning unsatisfactory performance (Joshi, 2010, 3). As with the transparency
literature, however, the accountability literature does not identify which of these
elements are essential for a particular initiative to be considered robust. It is noted that
often some, but not all of these four components can be found and have an impact on
public services (Ibid). Also as with transparency literature, there is an element of
directionality, as accountability is either considered horizontal (e.g. state or civil society
organizations monitoring state accountability) or vertical (e.g., electoral choice) (Goetz
and Jenkins, 2001).
There are many state‐led and citizen‐led initiatives that demand accountability in
service delivery. Multiple stakeholders demand accountability of politicians who are not
adopting appropriate policies. Additionally accountability is demanded of public officials
who are not delivering services according to rules or entitlements or not monitoring
providers for appropriate service levels. Finally accountability is demanded directly of
providers for not maintaining service levels in terms of access and quality (Davis, 2004;
Joshi, 2010).
However, as with transparency, the concept of accountability can be critiqued and
interpreted in several ways. Firstly, Goetz and Jenkins (2001) argue that horizontal
accountability is largely unsuccessful, and more powers should be given to citizens to
ensure political accountability, as elections have their own shortcomings (an argument
closely linked to the value of technology, which will be returned to in this paper). They
go on to argue that where citizen participation is incorporated into horizontal
accountability, more powerful hybrid forms of accountability emerge. Secondly, it is
argued that although accountability may be understood in instrumental terms, such as
the monitoring and planning of public service delivery, as identified above, there also
needs to be greater consideration of what exactly accountability means. As with
transparency, accountability is a social construct, consisting of the attitudes,
relationships, power structures and norms of the organization being accounted for
(Roberts, 1991; Mulgan, 2000). These local interpretations of accountability are critical if
12
we are to understand how accountability can be institutionalized. If accountability is an
external requisite, not integrated with an entire government process from initiation to
evaluation, it is unlikely to be more than superficial information gathering and
consultation (Paul, 1992; Vigoda and Golembiewski).
3.3 Participatory initiatives: Definitions and Assumptions
Citizen participation is the third inextricable element of the tripartite fundamentals of
efficient and effective government service delivery: accountability, transparency, and
participation. Although participation has been seen as a democratic principle (Held,
2006; Hickey & Mohan, 2005), like accountability, it is a difficult concept to capture and
define, broadly seen as possible through direct, representational or information based
(when aggregate results lead to a decision in terms of planning) participation. In
addition to the differing views as to what participation is, there are also different
understandings of the value of participation. In terms of the definitions, there are four
broad assumptions in capturing the concept of participation: that it is a process based
on dialogue and negotiation, that it involves the necessary stakeholders/actors, that this
participation should be equitable and active, and that participation can be and
frequently is on a sliding scale from weak to strong. Participation is recommended
through the life cycle of a project, from requirements analysis to evaluation (Gavin &
Pinder, 1998; Gosling & Edwards, 2003). Estrella and Gaventa (1998) compare the
difference between conventional and participatory evaluation as below (Estrella &
Gaventa, 1998)
Conventional Participatory
Who External experts Community members, project staff,
facilitator
What Predetermined indicators of success, People identify their own indicators of
Principally cost and production success, which may include production
outputs outputs
How Focus on "scientific objectivity," Self‐evaluation, simple methods
distancing of evaluators from other adapted to local culture; open,
participants; delayed, limited access to immediate sharing of results through
results local involvement in evaluation
process
When Usually upon completion of project, More frequent, small scale evaluations
sometimes also mid‐term
Why Accountability, usually summative, to To empower local people to initiate,
determine if funding continues control, and take corrective action
However, one can already see issues arising regarding the assumptions of participation:
who manages the dialogue and negotiation? Who defines which stakeholders and actors
participate? How can this participation be equitable and active? Numerous critiques
have been raised regarding both the definitions and assumptions of participation. It is
argued that those who participate are usually those who are already politically
13
interested, motivated, articulate and who can afford the time to participate (Cooke &
Kothari, 2001). In their research in participatory environmental policy in Nepal, Agrawal
and Gupta (2005) found that the opportunity cost of participation was too high for
poorer segments of the population, and therefore it was the economically and socially
better off participated in meetings. Women in particular may be sidelined, or
considered as a homogenous group (Gujit & Shah, 1998). This may create a vicious
circle, where weaker voices may not be heard and they may not be motivated enough to
participate again. For these reasons, participation has been increasingly treated with
caution, with many arguing that it is no more than a "warmly persuasive" (Williams,
1976), "politically ambivalent and definitionally vague" term (Andrea Cornwall & Brock,
2005) which needs greater conceptual clarity.
In theory, then, ICTs can lower barriers to participation, through the use of mobile
phones, community radio, as well as through intermediaries when the technologies
require higher levels of skill and literacy (e.g. online fora, contributing to wikis or
participatory budgeting). However, as will be discussed in this paper, this raises a
number of complexities which should not be underestimated: what is the broader
environment in which participation is encouraged? Who are the intermediaries and
what vested interests may they have?
3.4 Relationships among transparency, accountability and
participation
Transparency and accountability initiatives are based on a set of assumptions and
aspirations of improving the quality of governance and supporting democratic
outcomes, improving the effectiveness of development initiatives, and leading to
stronger roles for citizens in government processes (Mc Gee & Gaventa, 2010). These
initiatives are based on goals of expected impact such as increased state or institutional
responsiveness, lowered levels of corruption, the development of new democratic
spaces for citizen engagement, increased participation or role for local voices, and
improved utilization of budget and delivery of services(Mc Gee & Gaventa, 2010). Other
claims are based on the premise that transparency will lead to accountability. With
increased transparency in the decision making process of the state, greater
accountability can result for citizens.
There is an interesting and dynamic relationship among transparency, participation and
accountability. Does transparency lead to accountability? If citizens have more
information and participation, will this lead to public officials performing more
effectively? These linkages as well as the impact and effectiveness in service delivery are
often assumed, rather than overtly stated (Joshi, 2010). As Figure 1 indicates, there is a
claim that these initiatives will create awareness among citizens through transparency
of information. This will lead to a process of empowerment and participation through
formal and informal institutions. Finally, the relationship leads to accountability by
changing the incentives of providers and resulting behavior change.
14
In reality, as the literature indicates, the relationship among these concepts is much
more complex. While the claims of many transparency and accountability initiatives are
ambitious, the underlying assumptions are often untested. At the outset, there is an
assumption that if information is made public through transparency initiatives, this will
expose corruption. Then concerned citizens can participate in the governance process
by exercising their voice and have a platform to express discontent with the status quo.
The relationship between participation and improved accountability, however, is not
inevitably straightforward. As seen, Fox (2007) argues that transparency will not always
or necessarily lead to accountability.
A second set of claims argues that transparency may lead to increased responsiveness
by providers, improvements in access to services and better development outcomes.
This assumes again that exposure of poor performance on the part of providers will lead
to improved responsiveness. It also assumes that the shortcomings in service delivery
can be attributed to poor motivation of public officials rather than because of lack of
resources or capacities. Additionally it assumes that with these mechanisms in place,
public officials will be motivated to better behavior. Yet, as Joshi 2010 states, “there is
no clear reason why all of these assumptions will hold true in specific cases: public
providers may be immune to exposure of poor performance, increased citizen voice may
be met with backlash and reprisals, lack of resources may constrain public officials’
capacity to respond, and accountability mechanisms may not be enough of a deterrent"
(Joshi, 2010, p.6).
Growing evidence indicates that transparency alone is insufficient, and only leads to
greater accountability in interaction with and in relation to other factors. By framing the
question around “under what conditions can transparency lead to accountability”, it
becomes possible to understand those factors. For example, this could include asking
whether particular institutional spaces are used for inclusion (A. Cornwall & Coelho,
2006). With this is the related assumption that effective institutions are necessarily
transparent and accountable. However, there is a tension between effectiveness and
accountability(Mainwaring, 2003). It is critical to unpack the conditions under which the
two interact.
15
A final, related set of claims is that transparency and accountability initiatives lead to
greater participation of the poor and empowerment with greater awareness of
information and rights. This assumes that with information, comes power. Joshi argues
that “we simply do not know much about when citizen groups engage in social
accountability activities. To the extent that accountability initiatives are collective and
aggregate citizen voice, they can be empowering of the poor, whose strength lies in
numbers.” (Joshi, 2010). McGee argues that little may be known about the incentives
and constraints of collective action to use this information (2010).
What factors are then necessary to ensure transparency, accountability and
participation? One framework is the set of "ARVIN" indicators, developed by the World
Bank, where Association (A) relates to the freedom of citizens to associate ; Resources
(R) refers to their ability to mobilize resources to fulfill the objectives of their
organizations ; Voice(V) to their ability to formulate and express opinion; Information (I)
to their access to information, and Negotiation(N) to the existence of spaces and rules
of engagement for negotiation, participation and public debate. Each of these is subject
to the existing legal and regulatory framework, political and governance context,
sociocultural characteristics and economic conditions. The full framework is as below:
Political and Economic Conditions
Legal and Governance Socio‐Cultural
Regulatory Context Characteristics
Framework
Association ‐ Freedom of ‐ Recognition ‐ Social capital ‐ Cost of legal
association and ‐ Gender registrations and
‐ Procedures for accreditation barriers accreditations
registering CSOs policies and ‐ Illiteracy ‐ Cost of convening
‐ Policies and procedures ‐ Attitudes to meetings and forums
procedures for ‐ Conflict of youth, ‐ Cost of communication
licensing CSOs registration and disabled, and travel
licensing elderly
regulations ‐ Social
hierarchies
Resources ‐ Tax laws ‐ Government ‐ Social ‐ Impact of economic
‐ Laws on grants, private philanthropy pressures on CSO funding
foundations funds, other (the culture of sources
‐ Regulation of transferences giving) ‐ Impact on employment
fund raising ‐ Donations ‐ History of ‐ Infrastructure and cost
‐ Procurement from politicians associational of communications
regulation ‐Political life, self‐help
interference on
16
contracting and gap‐filling
Voice ‐ Constitutional ‐ Political ‐ ‐ Fees associated with
provisions and control of Communication expressing views in media
laws on freedom public media practices (use (ads vs. op‐ed)
of expression ‐ Restriction on of media by ‐ Costs to
‐ Media and ICT civic protests different social present/publish/distribute
related laws ‐ Mass media groups) views (petitions,
influence on ‐ Gender newsletters, radio
policy making barriers stations)
‐ Professional ‐ Relations
training of between media
journalists and CSOs
Information ‐ Constitutional ‐ Information ‐ Role of ‐ Costs/fees for access to
provisions on disclosure of information public documents
access to policies and movements ‐ Printing and
information practices. and networks communications facilities
‐ Freedom of ‐ Ability to ‐ Barriers
information laws demystify created by
‐ Regulations for public policy illiteracy
access to public and budgets ‐ Social barriers
information ‐ The use of
(people, places word of mouth
and documents) (oral cultures)
Negotiation ‐ Legally ‐ Political will ‐ Social values ‐ Impact of economic
established and capacity to and hierarchies pressures on autonomy,
dialogue spaces engage citizens that set rules bargaining power and
(referendums, ‐ CSO and advocacy of CSOs
lobby collaboration expectations ‐ Risk of co‐option
regulations, with on who can ‐ Impact of budget
public forums, legislatures speak on what constraints on capacities
etc.) ‐ Political subject in what of legislators to engage in
‐ limitations to context and budget accountability
Decentralization the role of when (social
legislation, legislatures exclusion of
provision for ‐ children and
participation Institutionalized youth,
‐ Legal dialogues disabled,
framework to ‐ Social elderly, and
define accountability other special
17
institutional mechanisms interest
roles, checks groups)
and balances:
Legislature,
executive, and
auditor general
‐ Legal
framework for
rules/regulations
guiding the
budget decision‐
making process
18
ARVIN has already been applied in Senegal and Albania. A more information focused
framework is suggested by Heeks (2000) who argues that government provision of
information for transparency and accountability relies on assumptions that a) data is
made available and transparent; b) this data is accessed by stakeholders who are able to
assess it and transform it into information; c) that this information can be acted upon
and d) used to initiate citizen‐government and citizen‐citizen dialogue and activism; e)
that government takes action based on these processes. This informs our understanding
and typology of "pre‐" or "non‐" ICT initiatives. Firstly, information needs to be made
transparent through right to information initiatives and transparent budget initiatives.
This can then be audited through complaint mechanisms, citizen report cards and
community scorecards. And finally, there is the potential and space for dialogue and
activism (e.g. used for participatory community monitoring, participatory budgeting).
See figure 2 below.
However, the potential for each of these, and their transformation into the next stage is
influenced by a number of contextual factors, as indicated by ARVIN. Therefore,
although the next section deconstructs "traditional" transparency and accountability
initiatives into those that make government information transparent (access), those
that audit government information and services (assess/adapt), and those that
encourage dialogue and activism (act), along the lines of Heeks's framework, this is a
deliberately artificial distinction, to illustrate how, as will be discussed in sections 5 and
6, ICTs conflate each of these steps, making the process of access/assess/act shorter,
more iterative, more seamless and more participative.
19
4 Traditional (non‐/pre‐ICT) transparency and
accountability initiatives
There are a number of different types of initiatives in the transparency and
accountability space that existed without the use of ICTs. Most of these revolved around
the label ‘social accountability’ such as citizen report cards, community score cards,
community monitoring, public hearings and audits. (Ackerman, 2004; Davis, 2004;
Deininger & Mpuga, 2005) These are based on the idea that traditional service delivery
has failed the poor and that demand‐led accountability initiatives can improve the
effectiveness of service delivery. Social accountability encompasses several definitions
including monitoring by citizen groups of public authority (Peruzzotti & Smulovitz,
2006), participation in policy making, policy advocacy as well as deliberation (Joshi,
2010). It could be one part of a package of strategies that citizen groups use to acquire
better services through mobilization, political advocacy, and intermediation. Specifically,
we will now look at a number of social accountability initiatives that were not ICT based.
With each initiative, we will highlight the theories of change for impact, the underlying
assumptions, the factors that influence the process and evidence of impact.
4.1 Making government information transparent
4.1.1 Right to information
Over 85 countries around the world have implemented legislation to ensure freedom of
access to information held by governments. In the United Kingdom, the Freedom of
Information Act was passed in 2000, coming into effect in 2005. At the time, the British
Prime Minister, Tony Blair, stated that "the very fact of its introduction will signal a new
relationship between government and people: a relationship which sees the public as
legitimate stakeholders in the running of the country and sees election to serve the
public as being given on trust." Ecuador signed a "Transparency and Access to
Information Law" in 2004. Malaysia passed a Freedom of Information Act as recently as
2011. Mexico's "Federal Law of Transparency and Access to Public Government
Information" was signed by Vicente Fox in June 2002.
In India, the Right to Information Act was implemented in 2005, where any citizen can
request government‐held information in any state (excluding Jammu and Kashmir). This
marked a watershed in terms of transparency, if not accountability. The law states that
any enquiry or complaint made to a "public authority" must be addressed within 30
days. There are inevitably both benefits and weaknesses to acts such as these. On the
one hand, requesting information in itself may speed up government processes. This
was the case reported of Chandra Devi, a rural citizen of Jharkhand, in India, who
applied for a government grant to build a bricks and mortar house, but whose
application went unaddressed until she asked for further information as to where it had
20
reached and why others were being successful (Polgreen, 2011b). Once the enquiry was
made, her grant was approved. However, there are several critiques levelled at the
underlying assumption of the "right to information". One is that although it may act as a
pressure valve to speed up processes, the overall nature of bureaucratic corruption
particularly that of middlemen is not addressed. Another is that if there is no equivalent
horizontal accountability measures (such as the power of the police, ombudsman, and
legislation); citizens may make themselves even more vulnerable. Queries can end in
fatal consequences, as in the example given where Amit Jethwa, attempting to stop
illegal quarrying in Gir National Park in Gujarat, was attacked by assassins believed to be
linked to the local politicians backing the quarrying, after leaving his lawyer's office.
Jethwa had repeatedly filed RTI requests, and found that 55 illegal quarries existed in
and around the preserve, and the process of establishing these had been documented
on land leases, electricity records etc. held by the government (Polgreen, 2011a).
While the principles of Right to Information precede the widespread use of ICTs,
particularly in developing countries, many countries are developing ICT platforms to
handle access to information requests, including India, Chile and Mexico. Technology
can and has certainly speeded up the process of accessing government information.
Civil society organisations in many countries act as intermediaries, e.g. Germany's
www.abgeordnetenwatch.de (Simply Ask Your Government), the EU's "Ask the EU" and
Spain's upcoming tuderechoasaber.es.However, as discussed in the above paragraph,
unless the overall context of transparency and accountability is addressed, technology is
no more than a tool which can also be manipulated and encapsulate existing corruption.
4.1.2 Transparent budget information
A national budget is an implicit agreement between the government and the people
where the government commits to provide specified public services in return for the
draft it made on private resources. Citizens have the right to know how their funds are
being collected, how it is being spent and what their governments’ priorities are (IBP
2010). They can rightfully ask the government for an efficient and equitable delivery of
well‐intended services. Over the past two decades, governments made efforts to
improve their budgeting system through the adaptation of Performance Budgeting, the
Single Treasury Account and other reformation systems. More importantly, there has
been a growing need and interest in making government budget information publicly
available. Budget transparency is a fundamental cornerstone to accountability and
providing efficient and effective government services. In addition, timely access to
information opens up opportunities for citizens to participate in fiscal policy decision
making that have significant impacts on their lives.
21
Open Budget Index
The Open Budget Index (OBI) established in 2006 by the International Budget
Partnership (IBP), evaluates how accessible and transparent countries’ budget
documents and process are to their citizens and rates each country. IBP was established
in 1997 by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities to help non‐governmental
organizations conduct budget analysis to make their budget systems more transparent
and responsive in emerging democracies and developing countries. The OBI is based on
the Open Budget Survey which focuses on the content and timeliness of a country’s
eight key budget documents: Pre‐Budget Statement, Executive’s Budget Proposal,
Enacted Budget, In‐Year Reports, Mid‐Year Review, Year‐End Report, Audit Report and
Citizens Budget. OBI is designed to provide citizens, legislators and civil society
advocates with relevant information needed to comprehensively and practically
evaluate a government’s commitment to budget transparency and accountability.
The OBI has been released by the IBP every two years since 2006 and encouraged
governments make their budget more transparent. The 2010 Index was constructed by
averaging the countries’ answers to the Open Budget Survey that included 123
questions (91 questions in 2008) relating to information contained in each country’s
national budget documents that should be open to public. The number of survey
participants has been on an upward trajectory. Carlitz (2010) adds that the OBI is
particularly notable in that it explicitly incorporates advocacy into its research design,
creating a network of civil society experts who conduct the research to inform the Index
and then participate in various coordinated advocacy activities based on the OBI
findings.
The 2010 Open Budget Survey report found that 74 of the 94 countries assessed failed
to meet the basic standards of transparency and accountability when it comes to their
national budgets. Of those 74, 40 countries did not release any meaningful budget
information. However, the average performance of these 40 countries has improved
nearly 20 percent in a relatively short period of time over the course of three
consecutive Open Budget Surveys. This is a notable achievement and a positive sign for
future.
The 2010 survey includes four key findings:
1. The overall state of budget transparency is poor. Only a modest minority of
countries can be considered to have open budgets while a large number of
countries provide grossly insufficient budget information.
2. The general trend toward open budgets is nonetheless favorable. Budget
transparency is improving substantially, especially among countries that
provided little information in the past.
22
3. Budget engagement by the audit institutions and the legislature is typically weak
and is strongly correlated to the lack of budget information made available to
these institutions and the public.
4. There are many simple steps to opening up budgets that governments are failing
to undertake. Such steps can be taken by the executive branch, the legislature,
and the supreme audit institutions alike. (IBP 2010, p.3‐7)
In addition, according to the report there are correlation between democracy and
transparency, also correlation between income and transparency so that countries that
have strong budget transparency are generally high income countries, while countries
that lack budget transparency have low income in general. However, it is not impossible
for low income countries to achieve relatively high levels of budget transparency.
4.2 Auditing government information and services
4.2.1 Complaint mechanisms
Arguably, the most obvious form of complaint mechanism in democracies is that of
elections. Elections provide an opportunity for citizens to exert their options of "exit,
voice or loyalty" (Hirschman, 1970), either by voting for their political party, switching
allegiance, or abstaining altogether. Rather than a purely "citizens with rights"
perspective, therefore, elections also present a marketization reminder to politicians
that citizens are consumers with choices. However, Ackerman identifies three major
problems with elections: elections only hold elected officials accountable, whereas
corruption may occur through appointed bureaucrats who are not directly accountable
to the public through the electoral process; secondly, because elections occur every few
years and include many opinions and evaluations, citizens tend to vote for an overall
perspective; and finally, as many politicians are elected by only a small percentage of
the population, they may pander to this segment only, encouraging a mutual patronage
(Ackerman, 2004).
4.2.2 Citizen report cards and community scorecards
Citizen report cards (CRCs) are based on the premise that measuring quality and
responsiveness of service providers in governance will spur these providers to improve
(Deichmann & Lall, 2007). This is usually influenced by the "glare effect" of putting the
services under the "public scanner" and shaming poor performers (Paul, 2006).
Frequent executions of the report card also monitor performance improvement over
the years (J. M. Ackerman, 2005). The underlying premise is therefore a shift from
seeing citizens as beneficiaries to citizens as clients who provide customer feedback (J.
M. Ackerman, 2005; Paul, 2006).
The most well‐known case of citizen report cards is that implemented in Bangalore by
the NGO Public Affairs Centre (Paul, 1998, 2006; Ravindra, 2004). The first citizens
report card was attempted in 1993, which asked a sample population of 807 general
23
households and 327 poorer income households (both in the same localities) their
satisfaction levels with government services. Amongst the public agencies for
telephones, municipal corporation, electricity, water, health, regional transport,
Bangalore Development Authority, public‐sector banks and regional transport office, the
Bangalore Development Authority (responsible for property and house sites) was found
to have 65% dissatisfied customers, the highest out of all the agencies. This was also
found to have the highest percentage of corruption. It has been reported that although
response from the agencies was "lukewarm", with five out of the eight agencies not
showing interest or contradicting findings, it was the media which helped publicize the
findings. The Times of India for example started a weekly feature for about two months,
publicizing one of the study findings at a time (Paul, 1998). If immediate change was not
seen in the agencies, Paul (1998) felt that this led to increased citizen awareness of
widespread corruption problems, and greater public pressure on the agencies. Indeed, a
second report card implemented by the PAC in 1999 showed a "partial improvement in
public satisfaction" (Paul, 2006). Corruption levels appeared to have increased,
however, in certain agencies. This second report card also appeared to have a more
tangible impact, where within a few months of the report card, the chief minister of
Karnataka (the state in which Bangalore is the capital) created the Bangalore Agenda
Task Force (BATF) as a public‐private‐civil society forum (Paul, 2006). The third report
card in 2003 showed a radical increase in satisfaction levels (between 64 and 96%) (J. M.
Ackerman, 2005). Overall, the impact varied from agency to agency. Providing the
report card information was only one part of the story, other factors that influenced
how much impact the citizen report card had included leadership, resources and the
institutional environment of each agency (Ravindra, 2004).
Although citizen report cards were implemented in other countries including the
Philippines and the Ukraine as well as other Indian cities such as New Delhi, Mumbai,
Hyderabad and Chennai (Ravindra, 2004), there needs to be a more concerted effort on
understanding the impact of these initiatives. Equally, a number of critiques have been
made regarding CRCs. Firstly, it has been argued that these are not citizen led, but
rather NGO led. In the case of Bangalore, a market research agency designed and
executed the questionnaire in collaboration with the NGO, so it was not a truly
participatory design. Secondly, it was argued that even in quantitative surveys,
satisfaction is a subjective measure, dependent on expectations, and influenced by what
respondents see in comparison to their neighbors or peers. In analyzing the Bangalore
scorecard data for water services, Deichmann and Lall (2007) found that households
better off than their neighbors tended to be more satisfied and vice versa. Therefore if
service levels were relatively homogenous across a given locality, they were considered
satisfactory, unless somebody can make a comparison with another level of service
delivery. This was shown to be particularly the case in Peru, when conducted in a rural
setting, as users had a limited knowledge of quality standards and challenge in
comparing with other service providers. Therefore, it could be argued that CRCs are
more effective in an urban rather than rural environment. Thirdly, it was argued that
24
CRCs do not achieve anything in themselves, largely because government service
providers tend to be monopolistic. This could engender the attitude among citizens that
nothing would change and they were at the mercy of these providers. Related to this,
other stakeholders were necessary in order to publicize and pressurize, such as the
media as seen in the Bangalore case.
Making services transparent through CRCs can clearly have a wide impact. Paul (2006)
states that one outcome was the incentive of inter‐agency competition, and employee
pride in comparing with other agencies. He gives the example of a Bangalore public bus
driver who told a customer "don't you know that the PAC has rated our transport
service as the best amongst all the services in the city". According to Ravindra, the BDA
(Bangalore Development Authority) and Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board
initiated training programs to improve customer‐oriented skills of their staff as a result
of the second scorecard (Ravindra, 2004). However, as argued, it is difficult to attribute
these changes and initiatives such as the BATF exclusively to the report card (J. M.
Ackerman, 2005; Ravindra, 2004). Finally, it remains to be seen how much ICTs can be
used to disseminate citizen report cards if these are revived.
In contrast to citizen report cards, community scorecards appear to be more qualitative,
participatory, and focused on immediate dialogue and policy making. Ackerman (2005)
finds the following differences between CRCs and community scorecards:
25
The Citizen Report Card The Community Scorecard
• Unit of analysis is the • Unit of analysis is the community
household/individual • Information collected via focus group
• Information collected via a survey interactions
questionnaire • Involves no explicit sampling. Instead the
• Relies on formal stratified random aim is to ensure maximum participation of
sampling to ensure that the data is the local community in the gathering of
representative of the underlying information.
population • Emphasis here is less on the actual
• The major output is the actual scorecard and more on achieving
perceptions immediate response and joint decision‐
assessment of services in the form of the making
report card • Relies more heavily on grass‐roots
• The media plays the major role in mobilization to create awareness and
generating invoke participation
awareness and disseminating information • Conducted at a micro/local level (village
• Conducted at a more macro level (city, cluster, and set of facilities)
state or even national) • More useful in rural settings
• More useful in urban settings • Time horizon for implementation is short
• Time horizon for implementation is long (about 3‐6 weeks)
(about 3‐6 months) • Role of intermediary is mostly as
• Intermediary plays a large role in facilitator of the exercise
conducting the survey and data analysis • Feedback to providers is almost
• Feedback to providers and the immediate and changes are arrived at
government is at a later stage after media through mutual dialogue during the
advocacy interface meeting
One example of community scorecard implementation is in Malawi, where scorecards
are used in the health sector by the NGO CARE, in partnership with village leaders and
members of Local Health Committees (comprising citizens concerned about health care
in the local area). A list of indicators is jointly devised by all these stakeholders to
evaluate local health centres, and participants are asked to rank the performance of the
health centre against these indicators (J. M. Ackerman, 2005). Staff at the health centres
go through a similar process, and while the indicators might be similar, as was the case
in Malawi, the evaluations, presented at an "interface meeting" might be different,
providing the opportunity to work together to design solutions. Evidence from the
Malawi study showed improvement in centre service between the first and second
scorecard processes, and that this improvement was attributed to the implementation
of the scorecard. However, inevitably, questions can also be asked here, in particular
that of the role of the intermediary (in this case CARE) in facilitating discussion and
reaching agreement, and also how these local level initiatives can be scaled up.
26
4.2.3 Community Monitoring
A related, but different initiative to the score cards is community monitoring. This a
process by which the community plays a ‘watchdog role’ in relation to service providers
because of ineffective monitoring and weak accountability relationships(Bjorkman &
Svensson, 2009). Rather than rate outcomes like with the scorecard, the idea of
community monitoring is to monitor ongoing activities of public agencies. The theory of
change is that community monitoring is supposed to ensure ongoing performance and
quality of services such as monitoring of teacher or doctor attendance or ensuring that
appropriate procedures are followed. Specifically, studies indicate that community
monitoring has been useful in exposing instances of corruption or diversion of public
resources.
There are quite a few examples in which it has been reported that community
monitoring has improved the quality of public services. This is based on the argument
of “co‐governance” that civil society participation and strengthening the state apparatus
are not mutually exclusive or contradictory.
Community monitoring has also been found to be useful in monitoring the quality of
schooling (Prew & Quaigrain, 2010). Prew and Quaigrain (2010) highlight community
monitoring in a case study of school performance data driving school and education
district office accountability. The case shows that the generation of school level data
that can inform planning enables schools to monitor their performance in promoting
access for children to school. Another example is Bangladesh, where Transparency
International Bangladesh has set up CCCs (committees of concerned citizens) who
monitor education and health services in specific geographic clusters. This case has been
found to have an impact on service delivery. Duflo et al (2008) found that teacher
attendance rates in India improved with improved incentives for teachers and strong
accountability mechanisms. Schools were given cameras to photograph teachers at the
beginning and end of each day. Teachers were given financial incentives that were
linked to attendance rates. The study concludes that accountability mechanisms alone
may not be sufficient to lead to responsiveness on the part of providers. Incentives and
greater capacities often need to accompany accountability initiatives (Duflo, Hanna, &
Ryan, 2008).
Finally, the case of police and school reform in Chicago is another example of
community monitoring and the evidence of impact (Ackerman, 2004). Through the
inclusion and participation of civil society, the police force and schools improved their
performance. However, this was not a straightforward process and they examine levels
of accountability and look at the root causes of why the levels of citizen participation
were lower than other cases.
27
4.2.4 Public hearings and social audits
Social audits are initiatives in which organizations audit public program through various
mechanisms including public hearings. The case of MKSS in Rajasthan, India and RKS or
Action Committee for rationing movement in Mumbai illustrate that “when reformist
bureaucrats are faced with an active pro‐accountability movement in civil society, it is
possible to make important inroads into the area of social auditing.” (Ackerman, 2004).
Both of these organizations faced accountability problems in service delivery to the
poor. The MKSS was a pioneer in holding public officials accountable for local level
implementation of programs through the use of public hearings. These hearings are
based on collecting information about the budget and expenditures, and verifying these
in a public gathering with all the relevant stakeholders present (Joshi, 2010). There is
strong evidence of impact on public services in these cases—mainly revealing
discrepancies between official accounts and reality of practice. These initiatives
empowered people to demand accountability and claim rights. The evidence is more
mixed, however, on the impacts on quality of service itself.
4.2.5 Public Expenditure Monitoring
Public expenditure monitoring activities have a variety of forms and methodologies.
Among them Carlitz (2010) notes that the most prominent example is the social audit
scheme developed by the Indian social movement Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan
(MKSS) founded in 1990 in Rajasthan, India's largest state. MKSS originally campaigned
for the payment of the minimum wage in public work and later expanded its mission to
'Right to Information' campaign. After successful this campaign, the MKSS launched a
participatory process for monitoring government programs in their communities by
adopting social audit, public hearings and expenditure monitoring. (See the website of
MKSS for more information on the initiative: http://www.mkssindia.org)
There are other successful cases in Philippines and Malawi. The Concerned Citizens of
Abra for Good Government (CCAGG) in the Philippines aims to increase community
participation in the monitoring of development programs and triggers an official
government audit and expenditure monitoring. (See the website of CCAGG for more
information: http://www.ccagg.com) In Malawi, an association of over 60 civil society
groups, the Civil Society Coalition for Quality Basic Education (CSCQBE) has monitored
its progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in education
section in particular. CSCQBE has conducted public expenditure tracking survey (PETS)
every three years since 2002 and raised public awareness around reducing corruption
and better monitored budget. (See the website of CSCQBE for more information:
http://www.cscqbe.org)
More importantly, PETS is the best known methodology developed in Uganda in the
1996 when 'aid leakages' at local schools prevailed. The Uganda PETS is one of the most
frequently mentioned successful cases of anti‐corruption in developing country (Sundet,
2008). The strength of the PETS is its simple methodology and quantitative analysis. It
28
has inspired a large number of similar initiatives in other countries including Tanzania
where PETS was conducted for tracking non‐wage recurrent expenditure, known as
Other Charges (OC), in the education and health sector in 1999.
4.3 Public participation in budget
4.3.1 Participatory budgeting
Although more and more governments are making budgets transparent, there is a
growing acknowledgement of the necessities of public engagement in budgeting.
Budget transparency and accountability strategies include the now well‐known
participatory budget approach (PB), as well as gender budgeting, public expenditure
monitoring, participatory auditing, the use of the Open Budget Index, and other forms
of budget advocacy (McGee & Gaventa, 2010). Among them, we will examine
participatory budgeting and gender budgeting. With each initiative, we will look at the
definition, its impact and factors of success and limitations.
In the last two decades, it has been a growing belief that broader participation in budget
setting is essential for effective, democratic and relevant local governance.
Governments started to support information sharing between citizens and local
governments. This helped strengthen the ties between communities that have an
interest in discussing local budgets, authorities and statutory agencies such as the
health services and police.
Ackerman defines participatory budgeting as determining budget allocations as
efficiently and transparently as possible by ensuring that budget decisions reflect
consensus‐determined priorities and removing information barriers between state and
society (J. M. Ackerman, 2005). Public Affairs Foundation defines PB more broadly as a
mechanism or process whereby citizens participate directly in the different phases of
budget formulation, decision making, and monitoring of budget execution. Participatory
budgeting can be instrumental in increasing the transparency of public expenditure and
in improving budget targeting (Sirker and Cosi, 2007). Participatory budgeting is
different from a regular budget planning process in that it establishes a reciprocal
process in which the diverse actors give feedback to directly impact policy change and
distribution of public resources. It is beyond a simple consultation of fiscal policies or
lobbying, but a direct participation in a decision making process in democratic way.
More importantly participatory budgeting is noteworthy because it addresses two
distinct but interconnected needs: firstly, improving state performance and secondly,
enhancing the quality of democracy (Shah, 2007).
Participatory budgeting began in 1989 in the municipality of Porto Alegre, the capital of
Brazil’s southernmost state, Rio Grande do Sul. The Union of Residents’ Associations of
Porto Alegre (UAMPA) first advocated the introduction of a state‐society collaboration
mechanism in the city in 1986. It began to be adopted in other cities under the Workers’
Party in the early 1990s. Local governments throughout Latin America began using
29
participatory budgeting shortly thereafter, especially after 1996, when the United
Nations Habitat II Conference in Istanbul recognized Porto Alegre’s participatory
budgeting as one of 42 best practices in urban governance (Shah, 2007).
Porto Alegre’s participatory budgeting incident became an exemplary case. Since 1989,
the Porto Alegre city government has held the people accountable for over 10% of its
annual budget, and had normal citizens participate in the intense negotiation process of
setting priorities for government investment in infrastructure and basic social services
(Ackerman, 2004). The significance of this event is that it was an arrangement where
normal citizens were invited to be a part of the government beyond a “co‐production,”
while maintaining a healthy balance between decentralization and supervision.
Depending on how strictly one defines it, PB has expanded from about 12 cities mostly
in Brazil to between 250 and 2,500 locales in Latin America alone (Goldfrank, 2006).
While Latin America has the most extensive usage and rapid development of
participatory budgeting, there are several meaningful case studies in Asia, Africa,
Eastern Europe and also Western Europe including England and Germany (Shah, 2007).
Broadly speaking the impacts of Participatory Budgeting on transparency and
accountability are:
1. enhanced participatory democracy
2. improved quality as well as the quantity of budget information to citizens by
making them more accessible and developing citizen’s capacity to analyze and
influence government budgets,
3. reduced possibilities for corruptive behavior and political use of government
budget through providing alternative channels for civil society
4. better decisions tailored to citizen’s need
5. increased budget and administrative transparency
6. enhanced the citizens’ trust in government’s activity
Although participatory budgeting became a wide‐reaching, global phenomenon with its
potential benefits (Sirker and Cosi, 2007), there are still major constraints and concerns
related to the use of participatory budgeting. Carlitz (2010) cites a number of potential
limitations: 1) risk of co‐optation (Abers, 2000) and 2) distortion of public opinion due to
misrepresentation of society because civil society organizations (CSO) engaged in PB are
not always representative of society at large (Heimans, 2002 ). Furthermore, there exist
institutional barriers such as discretionary provisions of PB adoption and
implementation and lack of time as a more time consuming ‘bottom‐up’ participatory
model.
30
Carlitz (2010) points out pre‐conditions in a success of PB initiatives: 1) political will (i.e.
supportive local officials), 2) social capital, 3) bureaucratic competence, 4) small size, 5)
sufficient resource, 6) legal foundation and 7) political decentralization. Furthermore
the accordance between the ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ side for accountability is a crucial
factor for success of PB.
Beyond transparency and accountability initiatives and participatory budgeting, there
has been substantial growth in monitoring public expenditure by citizens for the
purpose of promoting equity in managing government’s budget.
4.3.2 Gender Budgeting
Actual budgeting is the consequence of political negotiations on how government's
budgets are allocated and spent. Therefore the budget corresponds to the map of
power in society and reflects gender relations as well as power relations between
women and men. In this sense, governments have been adopting approaches for public
expenditure in more gender equitable ways.
The Public Affairs Foundation defines participatory gender budgeting as the use of
gender analysis to evaluate the impact of budgets on females and males to assess
whether budgets respond to the needs of both women and men adequately (Sirker and
Cosi, 2007). Similarly, the UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of
Women uses a term ‘Gender‐responsive budgeting (GRB)’ as a government planning,
programming and budgeting that contributes to the advancement of gender equality
and the fulfillment of women's rights (http://www.gender‐budgets.org). In theory,
gender responsive budgeting can have a considerable impact on developing countries
with a large gender gap, particularly in participatory budgeting. However, the success of
gender budgeting is as yet under researched.
The need of information and communication technology (ICT) in participatory budgeting
is increasing. While traditional participatory budgeting such as Porto Alegre’s doesn’t
necessarily utilize the advantage of ICT, it is clear that ICTs provide an opportunity for
citizen‐government connection and government transparency. ICT, in particular the
internet, can be democratic tool with ease of access, great data capacity and two‐sided
interaction and revolutionizes the accessibility and transparency of information. We will
look in detail about how ICT contribute to better accountability and transparency in the
technologies for transparency section with a case study of the ‘d‐Brain’, digital
budgeting and accounting system in Korea.
31
4.4 Dialogue and activism
Arguably, the element of engagement in transparency and accountability that proves
most challenging to bring to fruition without ICTs is dialogue and activism. There are of
course innumerable cases of NGOs and other civil society organisations which
spearhead citizen activism with regard to government transparency and accountability.
For example, in Peru, "roundtables for attacking poverty" were established bringing
together government officials and civil society representatives in 2001, where concerns
could be raised (J. M. Ackerman, 2005). In Indonesia, Ackerman (2005) reports of a
Justice for the Poor initiative, which works on strengthening transparency in several
legal areas (e.g. nonstate village level dispute resolution). However, these mechanisms
require a number of preconditions: laws to protect those who complain, a strong and
independent media willing to take up causes, a vociferous civil society caucus,
championing individuals, and a government which is willing to respond to complaints.
Currently, there is a strong movement in India to pass stronger anticorruption laws. A
bill to form an independent anticorruption Lokpal (ombudsman) has been presented to
Parliament several times since 1968, but has always been rejected. The NGO India
against Corruption has been campaigning for revised laws, a movement which came to a
head in April 2011, when a prominent 74‐year‐old social activist, Anna Hazare went on
hunger strike, followed by hundreds of people across India, until the government agreed
(four days after the fast began) to form a committee to pass stronger laws. Although
such a law was drafted, Hazare and his supporters rejected this on the grounds of being
too superficial. Momentum gathered across India, as Mumbai's taxi union kept all the
taxis off the street on 16 August in sympathy, Hazare undertook indefinite hunger strike,
joined by many also striking in public areas, and chanting "I am Anna Hazare", similar to
the chant of "I am Khaled Said”, the protest against the 28‐year‐old Egyptian who
criticised the government, and was subsequently murdered, a trigger according to many
for the Egyptian revolution in early 2011. The case continues, and the bill is currently
under negotiation, but Hazare's tactics have been severely criticised by many, as being
"non‐democratic".
The dialogue and activism discussed above is an area in which ICTs theoretically provide
the greatest benefit, both through a multiplier effect of many citizens becoming aware
of and therefore participating in initiatives, and because of the speed of technology, and
the virality with which social movements can spread. However, again, unless the overall
structure is addressed, technologies are merely a tool. We discuss this in the next
section.
32
5 Technologies for transparency, accountability and
participation
All of the examples outlined in the section above do not necessarily rely on ICTs to
promote transparency and accountability. We will now turn to be types of ICTs which
have been used for the basis of promoting accountability and transparency. The aim
throughout is to investigate whether ICTs add value to the process of accountability and
transparency in the provision of government information and services. We analyze the
different cases based on the technology platform as shown in Figure 3 below.
These initiatives rely on a range of technologies, including PCs, smart phones, feature
phones and are increasingly working across a compute continuum. (For example,
citizens may input text based SMS messages about election results. This may link with
web‐based interactive map that provide real‐time data for richer viewing experiences
on PCs). These initiatives often depend upon internet access, with 3G networks and
broadband playing an increasingly important role as internet access becomes more
widespread.
33
5.1 Websites and wikis
5.1.1 Public Information or Transparency Campaigns
One of the greatest benefits of information technology, particularly the Internet, is the
ability to gather crowd power to raise issues of transparency. Many of these efforts
focus on publicizing public information or transparency campaigns. For example, this
may be a case of publicising non‐governmental initiatives, e.g.
http://www.reportpubliccorruption.org in the United States, or
http://www.ipaidabribe.com in India. The latter is supported by the Bangalore‐based
NGO Janaagraha, where ordinary citizens register the market price of bribery
anonymously (Bangalore currently being listed as the city with the highest amount of
corruption, although this could be because the website is based here, and has
generated the greatest publicity here). Inevitably, these campaigns are also only
effective if they are allowed by the governments themselves. An article reports that a PR
individual who copied the Janaagraha model in China (www.ibribery.com) shut down
the website after censors blocked access to it within China (Associated Press, 2011).
Blogging has been seen as a powerful tool for citizen participation in governance, not
only reaching a global audience, but also interactive, with the ability to leave comments.
Blogging (including from mobile phones) and posting on social networking sites has
been exemplified during the Arab Spring in 2010 and 2011. However, there needs to be
more systematic research on the variety, process and impact of blogging ‐ who blogs?
Who reads blogs? What impact do these blogs have? What impact do wikis have? The
website http://fightcorruption.wikidot.com was started by an Indian civil servant's wife
in 2007 when her husband revealed corruption amongst senior Indian Administrative
Service officials. However, the reluctance in China of these initiatives illustrates that
citizen participation in public information/transparency campaigns are not always
welcomed, i.e. the wider governance structure needs to be democratic (J. M. Ackerman,
2005). Whistleblowing websites are highly susceptible: for example, paying bribes in
themselves is a criminal offence, and although these websites are intended to be
anonymous, if the individuals can be traced, they would be convicted of criminal
offences. On the other hand, if there is no accountability itself (Janaagraha states that it
does not verify information posted), then false accusations can be made.
Finally, one positive finding comes from Mexico's online access to information system.
Several right to information initiatives worldwide use ICT platforms, although there is as
yet insufficient research as to whether requests for information online are more
transparent and fair than those made in person. Lagunes (2009) conducted a
randomized experiment in 2007 by sending out information requests via Mexico's online
access to information system, Sistema de Solicitudes de Información, or SISI. He found
that although half the requests were sent under the name of a wealthy, powerful
businessman (sharing his surname with a well‐known high‐ranking Mexican politician),
and half by a regular male civilian with a popular Mexican surname, they received very
similar treatment in terms of response times, answers to questions and so on, indicating
34
that there could be a possibility of less discrimination through the use of ICT and
therefore, perhaps preventing the harassing of activists or civilians requesting data in
person as reported in India above(Lagunes, 2009).
5.1.2 Tracking voting records/politicians
Similarly, the Indian site Mumbai Votes (http://mumbaivotes.com/), and the Brazilian
Adote um vereador (http://vereadores.wikia.com/wiki/P%C3%A1gina_principal) both
attempt to track local politicians, and compare achievements against promises made.
On Mumbai Votes, a red, orange and green flag system is used to indicate poor,
mediocre and satisfactory performance (the criteria used for these are published on the
website). There are currently (August 2011) 1445 politicians being tracked. Users can
click on MPs, MLAs and corporators in any one of Mumbai's 187 constituencies to see
their track record. Vivek Gilani, an environmental engineer by training, who founded the
site in 2004, is quoted as saying the inspiration for the site came from innumerable train
journeys from the suburbs to the center of Mumbai, where he had to pass the stench of
Mahim Creek and the realization that "we are the people we have been waiting for"
(Mumbai votes, 2011). Instead of blind voting based on perception, opinion, gossip, and
personal charisma, he wanted voting to be more informed and based on results
achieved by politicians (Mumbai votes, 2011). The website and initiative has elicited
much media attention, and provides an extremely innovative method of tracking
politicians, which would have been impossible off‐line both in terms of depth, breadth
and the real‐time updating.
Adote um vereador, started in 2009 in São Paulo, adopts a similar principle, but a
different format (in this case, wiki‐based), where local politicians are tracked by citizen
"adopters" who blog about their activities. However, one critique has been that
adopters do not know what to blog about (and in fact may simply act as public relations
representatives) (Angélico, 2010). Secondly, the politicians may not see these as
legitimate concerns. A second call has been that adopters work more efficiently in a
group, e.g. pick a topic on a monthly basis, rather than blogging individually (Angélico,
2010). A detailed analysis of the website by a Portuguese speaker is needed, as it is
currently only available in Portuguese.
5.1.3 Digital budgeting
As mentioned in section 3.1.2, governments are becoming more open about sharing
budget information, and the Internet provides the ideal space to do so. Transparency
and accountability can be easily improved through public participation in the budget
process by posting existing budget information online. Publishing governments’ budget
document online and also making internet accessible to CSOs and local government will
show improved OBI measures.
35
Mongolia has also achieved a significant improvement as its score on the OBI doubled
from 18 in the 2006 Survey to 36 in 2008 and further increased to 60 in the 2010 Survey.
The remarkable improvement is primarily due to the fact that the government started
publishing budget documents that had previously not been open to the public online.
These included the Executive’s Budget Proposal and the reintroduction of public Year‐
End Reports in 2008. Additionally, the Mongolian Supreme Audit Institution (SAI)
recently began making its Audit Reports available to the public on its new website. The
government only needed to make the additional effort to publish the Executive Budget
Proposal online, while the proposal was already existent for internal use prior to 2007.
In addition, evidence for improvements in budget transparency can be attributed to the
technical assistance provided to countries and increased technical capacity of the staff
within the Ministry of Finance in a country. For example, experts from international
development agencies or donor funding to support greater transparency helped
advance public finance management reforms in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and Rwanda
(IBP, 2010).
The case of D‐Brain in Korea: Digital budgeting and accounting system
http://www.digitalbrain.go.kr
The Republic of Korea ranks first in both the e‐Government Development Index and e‐
Participation Index from the UN Global E‐Government Survey 2010. Backed by its
strength in ICT, Korea adopted the Digital Budget & Accounting System (d‐Brain) early
on in 2007 and has positioned itself as the leading model for innovative digital
budgeting ever since.
The d‐Brain is an integrated web‐based system providing the public real time analysis on
government’s fiscal activities including budget formulation, execution, account
settlement and performance management. This system enables a better use of the
national budget by reducing duplicative expenditure, leading the nation towards a more
efficient fiscal policy. Especially, the transparent nature of the system enables policy
makers, as well as the public, to easily access the necessary budget information to
validate the accuracy and reliability of the budgeting records.
The significance of this system is that it allows participatory budgeting where the central
government, local governments, public institutions and the public collaboratively decide
on the allocation of resources and participate in nationwide fiscal decision making.
Prior to d‐Brain, Korea went through several budgeting and accounting difficulties:
1. Despite the change in economic and social structure over the past 50 years, the
budgeting accounting system was designed to fit early years of modernization.
2. There were no basis and technological system for strategic distribution of
national resources as information sharing among the central government, local
governments and the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF) was nonexistent
36
3. Feedback system for budget execution and performance were unsatisfactory,
delaying the process to rectify inefficiency
These issues have brought upon the need for a budgeting and accounting system based
on ICT that would make participatory decision making possible through real time
interaction among all elements of the society.
The d‐Brain and web‐based participatory budgeting system insures citizen’s
participation mechanism through whole budget cycle from budget preparation to audit.
Citizen participate in the process of budgeting through internet surveys, on‐line bulletin
board which sometimes could arise public opinion, on‐line bidding, cyber forum, d‐
budget participation corner, public hearings and so on. In addition, Budget Waste
Report Center is offering a hot‐line and on line system open to citizen to prevent central
government agencies and local government offices from misbehaving their budget
duties through citizen participation. If any allegedly reported example is turn to be true,
budget saving incentive bonus, at most $30,000, is prized to the citizen reporter (Hwang,
2008).
Two fundamental reasons behind the success of the d‐Brain case is the nationwide ICT
infrastructure and high ICT literacy. First, with strong political will to promote demand
for broadband connectivity and to make large investments in the e‐government
platform, Korea achieved the world’s second largest broadband penetration in early
2000 (ITU, 2003). Since 2003, Korea provides most services over the Web, and leads the
world in e‐elections and e‐voting. The easy access to relevant information and
government services further created demand for high‐speed connections. dBrain’s case
highlights the need for government to have an active role in promoting the demand for
internet based government activity. Demand side policies are often overlooked in
broadband policies or limited to e‐government, digital budgeting initiatives. The Korean
government has engaged in multiple programs to create demand subsidizing ICT
training, ICT hardware, broadband connectivity and incentivizing private sectors to
participate in the project. Secondly, while lower ICT literacy can be the biggest obstacle
for development of ICT based innovation in most countries, Korea’s world highest
internet user rate as a percentage of population (measured by ‘Ten Million People
Internet Education Project’ in 2000), played a great role in the actual usage of the d‐
Brain. The government promoted ICT literacy by including computer literacy as
requirement for entering colleges. This sets an exemplary case in ways to increase ICT
literacy for developing countries where low ICT literacy capabilities impede demand for
e‐government.
The other fact that makes the case of d‐Brain unique is that the initiative was supported
by both the private and public sector. While the Korean government was the driving
force of the project Samsung and LG CNS provided state of the art ICT technology. This
37
collaborative effort made the project to have a synergistic effect well worth over its cost
of $63 million.
The d‐Brain acts as the middleman for the central government, local government and
public agency to exchange information about the respective processes of fiscal activity
and provide them the basis for strategic planning. It allows treasury operations to be
more efficient by providing a transparent real time processing between agencies (i.e.
Electronic Fund Transfer module) and makes their payment collecting process easier
and faster (i.e. Electronic Bill Presentment & Payment module).
The most important impact of d‐Brain is that anyone can easily retrieve an accurate
picture of public institution’s fiscal activity at any point in time. This is used for
monitoring progress on nationwide projects and making improvements to them as the
project unfolds. Also this provides the public detailed information on what the
government’s expenditure are on different major nationwide projects.
In addition, the relevant actors of the government fiscal process have been satisfied
with the fiscal process. The rate of public participation in fiscal policy decision making
has increased as people are now able to easily access information regarding government
spending. People are interested in fiscal activities as more efficient use of funds by the
government is directly linked to lowering their taxation. For the congress, it has become
easier than ever to review budgeting and payment information on the different sub‐
ministry. Lastly, the budget authority is also able to make accurate budgeting decisions,
due to their increased ability to review financial statements of previous projects in
detail. They are able to better predict each expenditure line item of a future project, by
which means it can also systematically manage the financial risk of the project.
While d‐Brain have been successful in realizing and meeting the national financial
information needs and positioning itself as a world class financial information system,
there is room for improvements to be made. Firstly, the government needs to assess
new areas that can be linked to the system and reflect it in the system to continuously
maintain the efficiency of the system. Secondly, although public participation rate has
increased, it has shown that they have the tendency to remain as a passive user only
making electronic payments and transfers. The public institutes will have to devise a
way for them to become more active participants in the fiscal decision making process.
Websites and wikis provide an ideal tool for making information transparent, auditing
government services, as well as for dialogue and activism. The strongest advantage (and
perhaps also the most unpredictable) of Internet‐based campaigns is their “virality”, i.e.
the speed by which these initiatives proliferate and gather momentum. However, firstly
preconditions are needed for online transparency campaigns: a strong civil society
caucus, civic minded coders or "techies", a public which is willing to believe that
corruption can be challenged and transparency necessary, rather than accept the
38
former as a way of life, and most importantly, a technologically literate population. In
the case of Mumbai Votes, many politicians have very little information listed against
their profiles, which points to both a lack of resources in updating this, and perhaps a
lack of critical mass from the general public. Secondly, there is a question over the
factuality of the information being posted. In July 2011, a Minister accused the Mumbai
Votes website of being inaccurate, and that it should have checked the information with
the local government first (Sarkaritel.com, 2011). However, whether accurate or not,
what the website achieved in this case was raising the issue of transparency of
government information, and initiated a dialogue between the government and citizens.
Finally, the issue of the digital divide again emerges: one user comments of Mumbai
Votes that it is very useful for those who have Internet access, but it is the poor (the
user specifically points to the large slum population of Mumbai) who may be poorly
informed but more vulnerable to political corruption (Chityal, 2011), a comment which
could be leveled at any online initiative.
Therefore, it could be argued that such websites perpetuate a cycle of elitist
participation, which only really benefits the upper and middle classes. Although in a
2010 interview, Gilani stated that Mumbai Votes is producing an off‐line "telephone
directory" type guide of politicians (Singh, 2010), it has been argued that corruption
affects poorer demographics more (Knox, 2009). They are the ones to be less likely to
use online initiatives, due to the lack of a combination of factors including access to
ICTs, confidence in using them, a sense of security in making complaints, and basic
literacy. In this case, they may rely on the intermediation of government information
and services, and more research needs to be conducted on the role of these
intermediaries. Theoretically, an intermediary or kiosk operator at a village community
telecentre in India may be aware of a site such as www.Ipaidabribe.com, but the extent
to which this is used depends on how much he/she translates and publicizes the
concept, is willing to register complaints on behalf of others, and the relationship of
trust between user and intermediary.
5.2 Social media
5.2.1 Publicizing Information and Organizing Crowds
In many cases, transparency and accountability initiatives use existing social media. For
example, Ipaidabribe.com uses numerous platforms including Facebook and Twitter.
However, critical mass still needs to be achieved in the case: their web page on
Facebook had 10,796 supporters (on 13 September 2011), a small percentage of the
estimated 13 million Facebook users in India (although this could be because the
initiative is less than one year old). On the other hand, the NGO India against
Corruption, backing Anna Hazare's movement for stronger anticorruption laws, has over
518,559 followers, multiple chapters across the world, and has hosted several online
and off‐line events (13 September 2011). However, the same issues arise here as in the
39
case of nonsocial media specific websites: who are those using social media? Are they
already the more educated, civic minded, technologically literate segments of the
population? What impact do such movements have?
“Arab Spring” showed that “the mouse is mightier than the sword”. Two key roles social
media plays are in publicizing information, using the power of crowds to vocalize a
perspective and its ability to organize crowds. Both Facebook and Twitter were widely
used by crowds organizing where to convene in the events during “Arab Spring.” About
17 million people in the Arab region are using Facebook available in Arabic1, with 5
million in Egypt alone2, and demand is expected to grow on micro‐blogging sites. These
platforms enabled groups of people to organize, gather, and provide a singular voice of
protest to government policies.
5.2.2 Deepening Democracy and Long‐Term Impact
Examples where social media become the tools to demand transparency and
accountability are not limited to authoritarian and relatively less democratized states
and countries where internet penetration rates have been recently increasing.
According to Nielsen Korea, 82.8% Korean netizens have used social media of whom
75% cited Cyworld which Korean top internet SNS, 32% Twitter and 32% Facebook etc3,
and those SNSs take a critical role in organizing crowds. The 2008 Candlelight Vigil of
South Korea demonstrates how social media and internet effectively impact people to
act on political decisions. The gathering originally started as an on‐line discussion about
the opposing views on the US‐Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA), particularly regarding
beef imports. Concerns and news about the mad cow disease were shared and reported
rapidly through the Internet. Candlelight Vigil was organized through social media and
social network services (SNS). The protest lasted for two months and had far‐reaching
effects; it eventually even triggered the movement for impeachment of the president.
Webcast internet service such as Afreeca and Radio21 broadcasted the protest live.
More importantly, most video streams were self‐broadcasted by citizens and spread
from one SNS to another, including YouTube, Facebook and Daum. These were much
faster and powerful in transmitting the news than the traditional media channels.
Approximately 200 million viewers connected to those videocast. This incident shows
that SNS could also contribute to advancing democracy in an already democratic
1
“Facebook Population: Arabic The Fastest Growing, English Falls from The Majority Leadership,” Arab
Crunch, August 30, 2010, http://arabcrunch.com/2010/08/facebook‐population‐arabic‐the‐fastest‐
growing‐english‐falls‐from‐the‐majority‐leadership.html
2
“Egypt Facebook community largest in Arab world,” Spot‐On Public Relations, January 26, 2011,
http://www.pitchengine.com/spotonpr/egypt‐facebook‐community‐largest‐in‐arabworld/120523/
3
http://seoulspace.co.kr/2011/04/21/survey‐korea‐social‐media‐use
40
country. While the revolutions in Arab Spring were attempts to eliminate dictatorship to
establish democracy, the candle protest in South Korea represents a more advanced
form of participatory democracy.
The impact of social media can be more powerful under the following features:
1. Emotional narrative can be adopted. Again, it is crucial not to confuse tools and
motivations as Ghanam emphasizes4. An accessible emotional narrative of action
such as anti‐corruption, democracy, transparency and accountability calls for
people’s participation. Berki, Dunn, Oguzertem, Su and Upreti (2011) states
‘individuals who feel they can relate to an injustice committed against one
another are more likely to participate in collective action.’ (Berki, 2011)
2. On‐line communication can be executed through an off‐line action. It is
important to use the social media and internet to get off the internet.
3. Not only access to information and ICT infrastructure but also internet literacy
and informational capability is critical in guaranteeing the positive impact of
transparency and accountability initiatives.
Social media has increased a freedom of expression and association to the degree that
individual and collective capacities to communicate, mobilize, and gain technical
knowledge are expected to lead to even greater voice, political influence, and
participation over the next 10 years.
Although social media will clearly have a critical role in decentralizing power and
increasing transparency and accountability, it cannot be a panacea. In addition to digital
divide we discussed in section 4.1, the issue of big brother emerges again. Berki, Dunn,
Oguzertem, Su and Upreti (2011) points out that ‘repressive regimes are not only
capable of blocking access to certain internet outlets, but also becoming increasingly
adept at manipulating them to their advantage.’ That is to say, while recent ICT
revolution, the use of internet and World Wide Web, has expanded the range of topics
and ability of communication enabling citizens to have more political freedom and
power, it also makes it easy for a 'big brother' to keep watch on the citizens more
accurately and widely, infringing individual's freedom more so than the traditional
media. In Cairo, when Hosini Mubarak allowed again mobile phone and internet access,
he sent text messages to all registered mobile phone users in Egypt with his intended
patriotic slogans. It shows how regimes may first try to oppress by utilizing technology.
Last but not the least, because information on the social media can be spread much
faster, often times news spread without verification could cause ‘netizens’ to be misled
by false information. Thus, it is important to recognize that while ICT could increase
4
"In the Middle East, this is not a Facebook revolution", Washington Post, February 18, 2011,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/article/2011/02/18/AR2011021802935.html
41
freedom and be a tool for transparency and accountability, it is necessary to minimize
possible disadvantages that could be caused by it.
5.3 Interactive mapping
5.3.1 Mapping Election Results
Data visualization and navigation tools are a key feature in technology for accountability
initiatives. These tools are used on mobile phone platforms and websites in various
ways and help people make sense of data through a geographic lens. Data visualization
is used for different purposes such as mapping election violence and results. Elections
are a major space in which interactive mapping has had a prominent impact and are
directly related to the arena of transparency and accountability. These are used to
detect fraud, discrepancies in voting and to report violence. Ushahidi, one of the most
well‐known free platforms allows people to send in reports via e‐mail, text message,
Twitter, or a web form. The software then displays the reports on a map and on a
timeline. The visualization was originally used in the post‐election violence in Kenya to
map reports of violence. The underlying theory was to use citizens with mobile phones
to report violence and destruction locally, rather than relying on national or
international media, with mashups capturing these maps for posterity, to understand
political hotspots for the future. But it was adapted to monitor elections themselves and
has been used to map voting irregularities in several place including Afghanistan and
Lebanon. Ushahidi‐based projects, such as Sudan Vote Monitor, Cuidemos el Voto in
Mexico, Eleitor 2010 in Brazil, Vote Report PH in the Philippines, and Amatora mu
Mahoro in Burundi, created visuals on maps and timelines based on data received from
citizens and election monitors, In Sri Lanka, the Centre for Monitoring Election Violence
(CMEV) reports election‐related violence and irregularities in voting. The gathers
information from ground and publishes candidates and political parties involved in any
irregularities or violence. This enables voters to make informed decisions using this
detailed published information. The organization uses maps, audio podcasts and blog
posts to raise awareness, create debate and gather information. Similarly, mapping has
been used to show the discrepancies between official voting of legislative bills in a
certain area with actual citizens votes (Vote na Web).
5.3.2 Citizen Reporting issues
Similarly, Seeclickfix is a large‐scale "free mobile phone and web tool that allows citizens
to report and document nonemergency issues to communicate them to those
accountable for the public space" (SeeClickFix, 2011). The idea is that citizens in the
United States and Canada can report problems such as potholes in roads, traffic light
signaling problems, garbage disposal, lack of road marking etc on the website. These
issues are then passed on to the relevant party: for example, the local political
representative or utility company. Started in March 2008 in New Haven, Connecticut,
the website states that it is based on the principles of empowerment, efficiency and
42
engagement, and encourages a "self‐reinforcing loop" as the government cannot be in
all places all the time. Those who participate in fixing neighborhood problems, and see
them being fixed, are more likely to get involved (SeeClickFix, 2011).
Non‐emergency issues are traditionally reported in the US by citizens dialing 311, when
they are put through to an operator, and given a unique service request ID. The 311
service appears to be most commonly used in New York, where it was implemented in
2003, and reportedly fields over 50,000 calls a day (Johnson, 2010). Callers can then call
311 back repeatedly until the issue is resolved. SeeClickFix appears to differ in three
main ways. Firstly, rather than the citizen chasing up the issue, they receive e‐mail alerts
with status updates on their problem. Secondly, they can see all the problems reported
in their neighborhood on a map, seeing their issue in context. Finally, they can set up a
"watch area" which they can receive updates on, therefore establishing a more
concerted group effect. The team behind the website have already released Blackberry,
Android and iPhone apps for citizen reporting (SeeClickFix, 2011).
Seeclickfix is said to have been inspired by the British equivalent, FixMyStreet
(FixMyStreet, 2011). This is a similar intermediary website, designed by the non‐profit
mySociety (http://www.mysociety.org/), where a problem reported online is sent to the
local UK council. Similar facilities of anybody being able to update, and alerts sent to
those who sign up are provided. It is also gradually being integrated with UK councils,
where users can click through from council websites to the FixMyStreet site, (e.g.
http://barnet.fixmystreet.com/). However, technologically, the site does not appear as
sophisticated or interactive as SeeClickFix.
There are a number of queries about the effectiveness of websites such as SeeClickFix
and FixMyStreet. Firstly, the traditional North American 311 services are also available
online, for example the New York City 311 facility (311 Online, 2011) so there may be a
question of overlap. Many UK councils also have multiple outlets, in addition to their
own sites, such as through Twitter, Facebook, Flickr and YouTube. However, like
FixMyStreet, SeeClickFix is also working with local authorities (and the more traditional
311) in cities such as Toronto (Toronto 311, 2011) and Washington DC (The District of
Columbia 311 online, 2011) where the off‐line and online systems are being integrated.
It could also be asked how effective such websites are, or if in fact, they prolong the
complaints procedure through this "re‐intermediation" rather than the relevant local
authority being contacted directly. Thirdly, again, a negative element of the "self‐
reinforcing loop" could be that such websites exacerbate the digital divide, where those
who are technologically literate, and have access to websites and mobile tools are the
ones who get issues resolved (Donnelly, 2010). However, Ben Berkowitz, one of the co‐
founders, cites examples of reports from "traditionally underserved communities" using
the tool, such as a woman reporting three drug dealers from a low income housing
project, and New Haven police conducting a drugs raid from information on SeeClickFix
(Donnelly, 2010). Of course, the opposite is also possible, that such websites have no
effect. All these issues certainly deserve greater research, particularly the question of
43
just how much impact such citizen‐based websites are having. Although the SeeClickFix
website details success stories of how quickly issues were resolved once they were
reported on the website, there has been no systematic study of causality, or a
comparison of the nondigital and digital mechanisms. However, what is clear is that one
of the greatest benefits of these websites is their popularization of a technologically
savvy civic participation, perhaps especially the traditionally disenchanted younger
generations. SeeClickFix for example has received extensive media attention and
linkups, e.g. (Boston.com, 2011; The Dallas Morning News, 2011; The Inquirer Digital,
2011; The New York Times local, 2011).
5.3.3 Crime Mapping
Interactive mapping and visualizations are also used in mapping crime. CIPER uses data
visualization as a tool to tell the story of crime. It maps where and how different types
of robberies take place in Chile. This includes crimes accompanied by violence that take
place in Santiago. 5 Similarly, websites like Oakland Crimespotting and EveryBlock
automatically uses crime report data from police department websites and displays it on
a map interface. This can be filtered by time, location, and crime type. This enables
people to understand the spread of crime across location and time. (Avila)
5.3.4 Budgets and Financial Transactions
A third area of interactive mapping is with budgets and financial transactions. Mapping
can be used to display which organizations and individuals have donated to a specific
candidate’s campaign (Dinero y Política). Dinero y Política aggregates real time data with
the servers of electoral authorities. Some data navigation tools rely little, if at all, on
visualization techniques such as graphs and charts. Another example of interactive
mapping with financial transactions is the Budget Tracking Tool in Kenya. Using this
tool, citizens submit text messages containing their geographic district. They then
receive a response that outlines the amount of money that has been earmarked for
development projects in their particular district. It is also possible to see a district by
district breakdown of allocated funds via the project’s website.
Visualizations are also used to map marginalized communities which have been targets
of development agencies, yet have not previously been mapped. Map Kibera in Kibera,
Kenya is an example where a team of activists used GPS systems and open source
software to create a map of a community. They use maps to visualize daily water costs,
which are often on average ten times more expensive than the average wealthy Kenyan
neighborhood. This type of platform can be used by the citizens of Kenya to put
pressure on their government. But it can also be used by citizens to directly improve
5
CIPER Chile, “Mapa del robo: Dónde y cómo se roba en Santiago [Robbery Map: Where and
how robberies take place in Santiago],” http://ciperchile.cl/wp‐
content/uploads/multimedia/multimedia_delincuencia/portada_delincuencia.html (accessed
September 20, 2010).
44
their communities and give community members knowledge and insight without
depending on public officials.
5.3.5 The Case of Sithi: Mapping Human Rights Violations
http://transparency.globalvoicesonline.org/project/sithi
Sithi (which means ‘rights in Khmer) is a Cambodian human rights portal initiated by the
Cambodian Center for Human Rights. Sithi.org aims to create a single map‐based
database of human rights violations reports. Sithi.org has two overarching goals. First, it
aims to encourage civil society organizations and the human rights professional
community in Cambodia to be more effective with the provision of information and
resources to encourage greater specialism and collaboration. Its second goal is to
provide information on the human rights violations in Cambodia to increase awareness
and understanding of the situation in the country. The higher goals are to mobilize
action to protect and promote human rights through collaboration and advocacy. It
receives funding from USAID, Asia Foundation, Open Society Institute, East West
Management Institute, and the British Embassy in Phnom Penh.
Their interactive map illustrates human rights violations, numbers of journalists killed,
numbers of members of parliament, and rape cases reported in the newspapers in
Khmer and English. Contributors include human rights activists, organizations and
citizens from across the country. Users can submit reports about human rights violations
in the categories of judicial fairness, land tenure, and freedom of expression. Civil
society organizations welcomed Sithi.org as a way to highlight which human rights
violations are taken seriously by the government.
(http://transparency.globalvoicesonline.org/project/sithi)
The organization has faced constraints of low internet penetration lack of web designers
as well as challenges of building trust among NGO partners. According to Avila (2010),
Sithi.org is trying to get local bloggers to assist in the project in order to spread
awareness. They found that by giving more visible recognition to NGO partners, they
may be more willing to participate. Additionally the researchers noted that the
organization should approach donors to create “a strategic fund where NGOs, mostly
having common donors, will need to link to each other on human rights advocacy
effort".
45
5.4 SMS and Voice Based Reporting
5.4.1 Citizen Reporting Issues with Service Delivery
Two initiatives which have gained publicity recently are based on SMS and voicemail.
Daraja, a non‐profit based in Tanzania, encourages citizen reporting that enables
citizens to publicize failures and issues with service delivery to make governments more
accountable (www.daraja.org). Currently, they are running a three‐year program called
Maji which has three components. First, it makes information about Tanzania’s rural
water supply available to citizens. Second and most related to the citizen report card
concept is that it allows citizens to send a text message to a central number to report a
breakdown in the water supply. Finally it forwards that information to relevant
authorities and the media. By partnering with the media, the organization is able to
bring more attention to these citizen reports in order to put pressure on the
government to be more accountable. The SMS facility was switched on in three
Tanzanian districts in November 2010. Its founder, Ben Taylor, reports that 500 text
messages have been sent, 100 forwarded, "a few cases of problems solved", and that
there is "clear evidence that district water officials take media seriously‐can't be
ignored"(Taylor, 2011). However, once again, the case deserves extensive impact
assessment research.
5.4.2 The Case of CGNet Swara: localized citizen journalism
http://cgnetswara.org/
Voice remains the primary interface for mobile phone subscribers in India, as text
interfaces are hindered by low literacy (33% of adults in India are reportedly non‐
literate), and lack of font support, for example for tribal languages (Thies, 2011). Voice‐
based mobile phone citizen journalism therefore provides the ideal medium for the
millions who are not comfortable using the Internet, or do not have access to it, but
have readily integrated mobile phones in their everyday lives. It also empowers
marginalized citizens to participate both by creating and listening to local news, in a
country where there are very few media channels for tribal languages, most national
journalists do not know these languages, and it is not legal to broadcast news over FM
or community radio (the only news permitted is on the state owned All India
Radio)(Thies, 2011). In Chhattisgarh, India, CGNet Swara, working jointly with Microsoft
Research India, MIT and the International Centre for Journalists, enables citizen
reporters to call in and record a short update of their situation. Option one in the
system allows the journalists to record news. Moderators then vet and publish the
story. They also alert subscribers though text messages that a new report is available,
which they can dial into (option two) to access. They then hear the three most recent
46
news stories, as selected by the moderators (CGnet Swara, 2011). The voice access
system has been modeled by Bill Thies, from Microsoft Research India, as below:
Source: Attributed to Bill Thies (Pokharel, 2010)
Several success stories are reported from initial experiments. One is that when a
journalist reported non‐payment of NREGA (National Rural Employment Guarantee Act)
wages, a visit from The Hindu newspaper led to 1000 workers being paid six months
wages (CGnet Swara, 2011). A similar report led to overdue pavement of a year's wages
to teachers, and an official ordering a liquor shop to be removed from school vicinity
due to a local report (Thies, 2011). Over 25% of 110 reports analyzed by Thies (2011)
concerned grievances, and just under 25% performance of local government.
Although apparently conceived in July 2004 (Ray, 2010) by Shubhranshu Choudhary, a
former BBC journalist, originally from the area, and launched in February 2010 (Pandey,
2010), CGnet Swara still appears to be a fledgling initiative. It certainly holds the
potential to help measure quality and responsiveness of service providers in
governance. The integration of mobile phones and the messages posted on the Internet
and relayed back via SMS/voice mail could also incentivize providers to improve both
services if they are publicized by citizens and the media. However, when Thies (2011)
reports of a two‐day training course in citizen journalism of 29 participants, it emerges
that 66% were male, half had a college degree, and all but four had finished 10th
standard (10th grade). 80% owned a mobile phone, but less than half had sent an SMS.
This suggests that it is mainly the male, more educated, technologically comfortable
demographics of the population which is using the service, although the SMS element is
new to them. Secondly, Thies (2011) reports that most posts are in Hindi, although 10%
are in Kurukh. There are fewer posts in the tribal languages of Gondi, Chattisgarhi, and
Nagpuri. This negates Choudhary's initial aim to have more journalism in tribal
47
languages, because "when you are talking to someone who knows Hindi in those
villages, you are talking to someone who is from the upper class of the tribal
community" (Ray, 2010). The implication therefore is that it is still being used by Hindi
speaking, ostensibly, higher classes. Thirdly, out of 150 contributors, a top 10% are
responsible for 45% of the posts. These top 10% are often local social activists (Thies,
2011). Those who want to either leave a message or listen also have to pay for the
service (Thies, 2011). Finally, it appears that the moderators still control the flow of
information as they choose which three stories can be heard by listeners: these
intermediaries are therefore able to shape the news disseminated and their profiles and
roles need to be researched in greater detail. Therefore, although Thies (2011) does not
make this argument, it could be said that this technology is mainly being used by those
who are politically interested, technologically confident, and educated. In addition, as
with many technology initiatives, one could ask what the sustainability of such a model
is, as it is currently being supported by Microsoft Research India and MIT.
5.5 Hybrid and "older" technologies
The hybrid use of digital and nondigital technologies should not be forgotten in the
focus on online interventions, and interactive mapping. Slater and Tacchi (2004)
summarize the map of technologies used in any one context as the "communicative
ecology", which can include anything from roads to newspapers to "nodes" such as tea
shops. This holistic communicative ecology was illustrated in the case of the
overthrowing of President Mubarak in Egypt, where with a low mobile phone
penetration rate (allegedly 20%) and monitored Internet access, activists arranging the
first demonstrations in Tahrir Square circumvented these restrictions by devising a plan
to talk on their mobile phones while travelling by taxi. The assumption was that the taxi
drivers would overhear the plans to demonstrate, and pass the rumor on, therefore
melding different tools of communication.
Radio is another example, particularly community radio which is relatively cheap (as
opposed to PCs or using an Internet cafe), it has a wide catchment area, does not
require listeners to be literate, is intended to involve live listener participation (e.g.
phone‐ins) and be managed by the community itself. Listeners can also participate from
their homes, rather than entering telecentres or cyber cafes, which some segments of
the population may feel uncomfortable doing.
Innovative programs are often made, for example a radio play broadcast on local
corruption at Uva Community Radio in Sri Lanka (Slater & Tacchi, 2004), anonymous
polls on local politicians, a live recording of women complaining of water shortages
(which the local panchayat or governing body then rectified) and a live local election
broadcast, all on Namma Dhwani community radio in India (Nair, Jennaway, & Skuse,
2006). However, many countries strictly control the content of community radio, e.g. in
India, community radio was only legalized in 2006, can only be established by NGOs and
educational institutions (thereby relying on their agenda), and cannot broadcast news
48
programs; in Mexico, content is managed and approved by the National Commission for
the Development of Indigenous People; in Sri Lanka, "community radios" are strictly
controlled by the government body, the Sri Lankan Broadcasting Corporation.
6 Findings, discussion and policy recommendations
6.1 The value of ICTs
In terms of effectiveness, evidence suggests that "pre" or "non" ICT transparency and
accountability mechanisms have been effective in their immediate goals. They made
government information more transparent. Various stakeholders audited government
services and participated in budgeting decisions. They generated dialogue and activism
surrounding acceptable levels of government service delivery. Community monitoring
led to the publicity of information, implementation of citizen report cards and exposure
of corruption (Mc Gee & Gaventa, 2010). Initiatives have been successful in creating
awareness of entitlements, increasing citizen participation to demand accountability
and claiming rights. However, as McGee et al state, “despite demands for accountability
and exposure of corruption, experience suggests that the kinds of direct social
accountability mechanisms discussed… have little traction unless they are able to trigger
traditional accountability.” Hybrid accountability and continuous mechanisms are
necessary (Goetz & Jenkins, 2001). One such suggestion is that of horizontal
accountability (human rights ombudsman, corruption control agencies, legislative
investigative commissions, public enquiries and so on) (Ackerman, 2004; Goetz &
Jenkins, 2001).
Figure 4 therefore summarizes several factors that enable or constrain transparency and
accountability initiatives and efforts. There are several conditions from both the
demand side (in terms of promoting citizen voice) and the supply side (provider
delivering services to the poor). McGee et al find that on the state (or supply) side, the
level of democratization or context within which demands can be made for
accountability is an important factor. The ‘political will’ or support for accountability and
transparency initiatives as well as the political economy within which the initiatives
operate is influential. Enabling legal frameworks, incentives and mechanisms for
sanctions on public officials to influence behavior are all part of the political economy.
For example, McGee et al elaborate and discuss the need to actually investigate
corruption and impose formal sanctions or fines for delays in the provision of services
(Mc Gee & Gaventa, 2010). On the demand side, there are also several important
factors influencing transparency and accountability. Specifically, the capabilities of
citizens and civil society organizations to access and use information as well as the
capacity to mobilize are important. Linkages to broader forms of collective action and
mobilization can strengthen and support such initiatives.
49
However, we argue that not only ICTs smooth the transition from data> information>
action, they also conflate each of these stages, so that it becomes a seamless, iterative
cycle (the more data that is available online, the more it can be visualized in different
ways, leading to citizen action, more use of social mapping, more detailed becoming
available etc). If the Bangalore citizen report card experiment for example was to be
repeated online, it may not need to wait for the publicity from the media which it
needed in its early trials. Although media publicity would still be helpful, the simple use
of a website, and providing interactive facilities on it would help publicize the initiative,
and encourage citizen engagement (which the media could again take up, therefore
perpetuating the circle). In particular, this paper specifies that technologies enable
accountability, transparency and participation by:
reducing the distance between government service provider and user with more
access to decision makers’, information and platforms to raise concerns and issues
equally enabling horizontal, downwards and upwards flow of information, thereby
providing the potential for all parties to be transparent and accountable.
providing multi‐platform opportunities for dissemination and interaction with
information
50
providing visual tools for citizens to access government data and therefore
simplifying traditionally presented government information (e.g. budgets)
providing analytical tools for citizens to use (e.g. to compare year‐on‐year, or with
other departments, or states)
providing real‐time opportunities for citizen interaction and feedback
providing popular platforms for discussion among geographically disparate citizen
populations (e.g. Twitter, Facebook), while also giving governments and NGOs the
opportunity to establish their own platforms.
providing the "glare affect" (using ICTs to enable media attention to publicize
causes, draw attention to government behavior, and garnering immediate citizen
responses)
However, as Figure 4 indicates there are several structural issues that influence the
value that ICTs can add to transparency and accountability. Here, the role of the media
(and therefore a free media) is critical. The combination of a free media with ICTs being
used for accountability and transparency is powerful in the dissemination of information
and attention to locally relevant issues. The level at which ICTs can be used as an
effective tool depends on the ICT infrastructure itself, levels of connectivity throughout
a country, and broadband penetration. The ubiquity of devices can also determine who
is participating and contributing to the process of accountability and transparency. Both
general literacy and digital literacy are important factors that constrain the effectiveness
and level of use citizens feel when participating in these initiatives.
In addition, it is argued here that technology mediated interventions are largely based
on five principles: 1)they do not exclusively depend on one type of technology, but can
and usually do fuse technologies such as PC, mobile phones, and other platforms
working together with different applications such as social networking or geo‐mapping.
Rather than these tools being used in isolation, they work across the compute
continuum to maximize impact and reach 2) they provide a tangible opportunity for
citizen participation by allowing anybody to access and update complaints and feedback
on government services; 3) the results of that participation can be tracked and seen by
all; 4) they are usually mediated by a technologically savvy NGO or non‐profit
organization, and most 5) importantly, it is the "glare" effect, particularly when given
media attention, which puts pressure on local government.
This paper has highlighted the potential value that ICTs can play in the accountability
and transparency field. However, it is also important to acknowledge the limitations of
the practices and the use of ICTs for these purposes. For example, in the case of
mapping election results, the potential for transparency and accountability in the
election could be affected well before the actual Election Day through the use of public
advertising, or distribution of foods ahead of elections to influence voters, or the basic
51
effectiveness of political parties as representative bodies and its levels of transparency,
inclusion and accountability. There are several themes that emerge from our review of
ICTs for transparency and accountability that need to be considered when strategizing
and implementing these initiatives. Many of these themes have policy implications and
lay the ground for a research agenda which we highlight below.
6.2 Research and policy recommendations
6.2.1 Impact on the poor and information capabilities
As indicated earlier, there is an assumption that transparency and accountability
initiatives lead to greater participation of the poor and empowerment with greater
awareness of information and rights. The fact remains, and as discussed in section 4.5,
that for much of the world's population, ICTs, online petitions or any kind of online
interaction regarding transparency and accountability of government services is
inaccessible given access, cost, connectivity, and infrastructure issues. For this reason,
we strongly recommend multi‐platform initiatives, integrated with "older" technologies
such as SMS‐based mobile phone usage, community radio, even vehicles equipped with
loudspeakers circulating in rural areas, publicizing interventions (e.g. more information
or clarification on the Right to Information Act in India). Adoption and use of ICTs for
transparency and participation becomes more important to this population of citizens
given risks of exclusion and lack of voice in the political process. Shared access
telecenters and computer centers that include digital literacy programs, along with PC’s
for broadband access are examples of potential access points for these communities to
broaden the reach and impact of the initiatives.
Research indicates that people’s actual and meaningful use of ICTs, rather than access
to ICTs alone is an important precondition for ICTs to impact their well‐being (Gigler,
2011). Often there is an emphasis on access as the most important criteria for ICTs for
transparency and accountability initiatives to be successful. This paper argues, however,
that access is important but not sufficient for meaningful impact in terms of
enhancement of ICT capabilities and sustainable change for the poor. The technical
appropriation of ICTs by communities in accountability and transparency initiatives is an
important condition in attaining meaningful use. Enhancing peoples’ informational
capabilities through digital literacy is critical in determining the impact of accountability
and transparency initiatives on poor peoples’ well‐being.
More research therefore needs to be conducted on multi‐platform Daraja and CG Net
Swara and how these models may be replicated elsewhere. If the cost of ICT devices
such as mobile phones, PCs, tablets and other devices are prohibitive, participation will
be limited to higher income groups rather than be inclusive of the poor. It has been
argued that transparency initiatives often mainly benefit the upper and middle classes
(Wade, 2002). However, in many cases corruption affect poorer demographics more
52
than wealthier populations (Knox, 2009). Lower income groups are often less likely to
use transparency and accountability initiatives, due to a combination of lack of access to
ICTs, confidence in using them, a sense of security in making complaints, and basic
literacy (Madon & Sahay, 2002; Wade, 2002). For this reason, there needs to be more
research on intermediaries such as NGO practitioners and professionals acting on behalf
of poor communities. Furthermore, it is important not to confuse users with
beneficiaries, as there may be an indirect impact of ICTs (Heeks, 2011).
For policymakers, we recommend specifically accounting for lower income groups and
the poor when designing these initiatives and recognizing that their participation may
be constrained due to structural issues as well as lack of opportunities to enhance their
information capabilities. This may involve supporting digital literacy programs that
convey how to participate in transparency and accountability initiatives. It is also
important to recognize that data produced through crowd sourcing and interactive
maps may not be representative of all citizen information, data, and desires. But instead
may constitute an elite subset of the population, masking true needs of the most
marginalized groups.
For researchers: We recommend examining the actual use, participation, and impacts of
transparency initiatives on the very poor and marginalized groups in government citizen
feedback mechanisms, participatory budgeting, and interactive mapping. To what
extent does participation include these groups? What is the role of intermediaries
acting on behalf of these groups?
6.2.2 Online or offline impact/ Measuring social impact
It is still unclear what the actual impacts (social, political, economic) of these initiatives
are for both governments and citizens and how best to measure it. A case in point is
Ushahidi, replicated after Kenya in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake, Japan after 2011
earthquake and tsunami, and most recently in Syria. However none of these initiatives
appear to have had as much publicity as the initial intervention. What is the difference
between media attention and actual impact or change? Also ICTs are highlighted in the
context of these social changes as a key tool that is enabling change. What specifically
does social change mean in this context? What specific role did ICTs play and what is
impact? Can this truly be used for change? Is it publicity or one factor in a myriad? Can it
be used without elite support or does it necessarily require broad scale support?
For researchers: Further examination is needed to better understand the factors that
enable or constrain replication of initiatives and how together they create an enabling
environment for transparency and accountability. As the field of new technology is still
emerging, a great deal still remains to be discussed and analyzed. Why are some
initiatives successful, and yet, when copied in other contexts, not? Is it because of the
novelty element in the first instance, which loses its appeal? Or is it because of the
wider context? Studies of the same technological intervention in different country
contexts would therefore be beneficial.
53
For policymakers: Given the fact that there is little empirical research that is being done
in this area, funding for research on measuring the impact of these initiatives, convening
researchers to discuss impact, and incorporating those findings into the policy dialogue
is of paramount importance.
6.2.3 Comparison between ICT and non‐ICT enabled initiatives
In this paper, we have outlined some differences and factors that contribute to the
success of ICT enabled initiatives. However little empirical comparative data looking at
ICT and non‐ICT enabled transparency and accountability initiatives exist. What results
would an online community scorecard/citizen report card have in comparison with one
conducted face‐to‐face by NGO workers for example? What difference has technology
made to the campaign for anticorruption laws by Anna Hazare, mentioned earlier in this
paper? Although this received much publicity through Facebook (less so on Twitter, with
fewer users in India compared to Facebook), the ultimate method of protest used by
Hazare and his followers was hunger strike, modeled on Mahatma Gandhi, firmly pre‐
ICT. In fact, one academic argues that President Mubarak's decision to shut down the
Internet and mobile phone networks in Egypt in January during critical protests in Tahrir
Square only served to encourage more of face‐to‐face interaction, and spreading the
message to a wider demographic. The author writes that this decision: “implicated many
apolitical citizens unaware of or uninterested in the unrest; it forced more face‐to‐face
communication, i.e., more physical presence in streets; and finally it effectively
decentralized the rebellion on the 28th [January] through new hybrid communication
tactics, producing a quagmire much harder to control and repress than one massive
gathering in Tahrir” (Cohen, 2011). Technology may therefore hasten the process of
interaction, but it may also engender armchair discussions within elite groups or
complacency, where one may feel that online support is sufficient, without this
translating into actual action.
For researchers: There is a need for more comparative research between ICT and non‐
ICT based transparency and accountability initiatives. This entails understanding the role
and incremental value that may be added when ICTs are part of the process.
For policy makers: When designing and supporting new initiatives that are ICT based,
analysis of the actual value ICTs may have vs. a low tech solution is important. This has
cost effects as well as repercussions for who may be able to participate meaningfully.
6.2.4 A comprehensive database
Currently there is no comprehensive central database of all transparency and
accountability initiatives using ICTs worldwide as well as NGOs working in this field.
Although organizations such as http://www.transparency‐initiative.org/ and
http://globalvoicesonline.org/ provide useful case studies, there is no country by
country analysis, no analysis of comparative government bodies across the world, and
even when case studies are undertaken, these become rapidly out of date. For example,
54
Avila, Chak et al. 2010 commended Penang Watch, an online complaint channel in the
Penang region of Malaysia, but when accessed for the purposes of this research in
August 2011, it appeared that the website had been taken over by cyber squatters (for
this reason, we are also mindful of the longevity of case studies discussed in this paper).
For policymakers and researchers: Recommend a collaborative undertaking to work
together to build a comprehensive database that can be a resource to development
agencies, decision makers, governments, NGOs, and academics. Undertaking this will
not be an easy task, firstly because of the diversity of what is classified as "ICT based
transparency and accountability", and secondly because of the challenge in encouraging
stakeholders to work together in one central database or map. However, it will provide
an opportunity for all to learn from each other, create dialogue, and to see which NGOs
have experience in particular technology or initiatives. Because this is a rapidly changing
field, and as illustrated by the case of Penang Watch above, continuous updating is
essential to maintain the relevance of such a database.
6.2.5 Changing nature of state
With ICT enabled government initiatives, governments have the opportunity to portray
themselves as more open and accessible to its citizens (Kuriyan & Ray, 2009). How do
accountability and transparency initiatives change the way in which citizens experience
the state? How does it change how the state may or may not try to portray itself? Given
the efforts to be more transparent, is this simply a new ‘face’/brand of the state, or is it
truly able to give citizens insight into the state’s processes and actions?
For researchers: This is linked to the recommendation of measuring the impact of these
initiatives, but further research is needed to understand the extent to which these are
simply exercises by governments to rebrand itself to citizens versus meaningful actions
to given citizens more accessibility and agency.
6.2.6 Research methods
Currently, there is little academic research in the context of these initiatives. At the
moment the majority of research in this field is based on un‐theorized cases which
outline what the initiatives are expected to do and their general impact to date. While
survey data has its benefits in terms of covering a large population in providing
generalizability, qualitative research and hearing "voices" would also be very helpful, as
would participatory evaluation. In particular, there is a strong need for local researchers,
with the relevant language skills.
For researchers: More research is needed to understand which methods can be useful to
study the impact of such initiatives. Linked to this, there should be further research on
which particular technology or type of intervention impacts on a particular
demographic. Are we right to resume that certain technologies are used by certain
demographics, or are there new, hybrid methods of access in today's rapidly changing
technoscape, as in the Egyptian example in section 4.5?
55
It is also essential to situate this work within the context of the existing and burgeoning
research in the field of ICTs and development more broadly. In particular there is an
opportunity to build on the vast research on states and citizens. The use of ICTs as tools
to enable interactions may be new to the field, but these initiatives are built on long
standing, existing relationships between citizens and states. The challenge is to conduct
robust analytical research that builds on these existing bodies of work.
6.2.7 Robustness of data
As information is aggregated in interactive maps through crowdsourcing and individual
inputs, a question arises about the robustness of the data. If individuals are self‐
reporting data about elections, corruption, and wrongdoings by the government, is
there a way to verify the validity and quality of this data? Do people have incentives to
misreport because of personal motivations, misgivings and grievances with the state?
Currently there is little effort done to verify the validity of individual data other than
trusting in the integrity of individuals. When the aggregation of this data is used to
make large policy statements (i.e. Election results don’t match official reporting, or
there are high levels of corruption in particular regions), there is a risk of manipulation
in the process. There is also the potential for a self‐selection of elite people to be
represented in the process if vulnerable/more marginalized groups don’t feel confident
to contribute to the process. As a result a portrayal of a particular situation may be
biased or skewed towards a particular population and may not be representative. This is
linked to Goetz and Jenkins's (2001) argument that terms such as accountability and
transparency are frequently used carelessly, when we need greater clarifications on:
who is seeking accountability; from whom; where (in what form); how; and for what
(against which action or norms?)
For policymakers and researchers: More data analysis and strategy needs to be
developed to ensure the validity of data as well as to manage large quantities of data.
When so many individuals are inputting data, how does this data get managed,
aggregated and reported out? Should there be a set of standards and code of conduct to
which end users who are inputting this data should adhere.
6.2.8 Gender and participation
The technologies for transparency initiatives have implications for gender, particularly
on its impacts for women and girls. The case of gender budgeting demonstrates how the
use of gender analysis to evaluate the impact of budgets on females and males can
potentially respond to the needs of both women and men adequately. However, this is a
largely untapped area which seems to hold potential for women to use technologies as
a tool to enable better participation in public processes, demanding services, and
interacting with governments.
For policymakers: Explicitly take into account the role of women and girls in the
development and strategy of these initiatives. Without attention to potential gender
56
disparities, there is a risk that such initiatives will reinforce existing inequalities and
power dynamics.
For researchers: By making salient the parts of the political process in which women are
often excluded or play a minor role, it becomes easier to identify how technologies for
transparency may start to address these disparities. Research is needed to better
understand how these technologies may have a positive (or negative) impact in the lives
of girls and women.
6.2.9 Regulation and Ethics
Given recent events around the globe using ICTs for transparency, accountability and
open governance (such as Egypt, Tunisia, Kenya), it is clear that this is a rapidly changing
field in terms of the social and political impacts ICTs can have. There are implications
for how ICTs are used, what platforms should be used, and importantly how this is
regulated. Many questions are open as to the responsibility of technology companies
manufacturing the technologies that are enabling these social movements and changes.
For example, should Vodafone, a British‐based company, have acquiesced to Mubarak's
telecommunications blackout in Egypt? The company was criticized for later releasing a
"power to you" advertising campaign, suggesting that it had been a major tool for the
protests, particularly given its lack of resistance to Mubarak. If ICTs are used to incite a
riot vs. a revolution vs. a peaceful protest, what role do technology companies play in
these events? What responsibility do they have to the end users that are making
demands or even threats using these technologies? Who should be regulating these
activities? Who is responsible when ICTs are used in demanding open governance, yet in
the process violence ensues? What if the technology company enabling the ICT service
is based in one country, while the uses of the technology for various purposes takes
place in another—how should the legal system operate under these conditions? What
role do governments play vs. corporations vs. citizens themselves?
From an ethical perspective, there are several questions that emerge with transparency
and accountability initiatives. If a citizen uploads data to report human rights violations,
corruption or wrongdoings by the government, is there data secure? Are there any risks
or repercussions that may take place because citizens participate in these initiatives?
What steps are being taken to ensure people’s privacy and own human rights?
Finally, if we take the focus away from the technology element do we need more
dialogue and research on the processes of democracy itself? David Cameron, the British
Prime Minister, has consistently critiqued Internet censorship by countries such as China
and Egypt. He was quoted in February 2011 as saying new social media provided
immense opportunities for citizens of Egypt and Tunisia in the "Arab Spring", stating
social media "belongs to a new generation for whom technology — the Internet and
social media — is a powerful tool in the hands of citizens, not a means of repression. It
belongs to the people who’ve had enough of corruption, of having to make do with
what they’re given, of having to settle for second best" (Economist, 2011). Yet, after the
57
UK riots in August 2011, he called an emergency meeting on restricting the use of social
media, stating "everyone watching these horrific actions will be stuck by how they were
organized via social media. Free flow of information can be used for good. But it can also
be used for ill. And when people are using social media for violence we need to stop
them" (Halliday, 2011). Who decides what is "for ill" and "for good"? How and who will
legislate for this in the new paradigms of citizen‐government interaction?
For policymakers: There is much work to be done in defining a regulatory and legal
framework under which transparency and accountability initiatives can operate. This
requires open dialogue among governments, technology corporations, citizen groups
and organizations leading these initiatives to define and explore the possibilities,
boundaries and structures that may be most useful.
For researchers: Further examination of the regulatory environment is required from
both a legal and policy perspective. Additionally research is needed from the ethics
perspective as to the impacts of these initiatives on privacy, security, and human rights.
58
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63
The following section provides the peer reviewers comments (1 of the 4 reviews) which
contributed towards shaping this initial draft research paper.
Technologies for Transparency and Accountability: Implications for ICT Policy and
Implementation
Comments prepared by William Reuben ‐ The Coordinator of the World Bank s NGOs
and Civil Society network (October 31, 2011)
First of all, I would like to thank the team for asking me to comment this interesting
paper. It is going to play an important role in clarifying and suggesting different ways
and tools by which information technologies can improve and make more inclusive and
effective the demand for good governance and accountability.
I have organized my comments in three main sections:
General comments regarding the scope and audience of the paper.
Comments to the conceptual aspects of accountability and the so called
traditional accountability processes and mechanisms
Comments to the added value of information technologies to improving the
demand for good governance and accountability.
1. General comments regarding the scope and audience of the paper
The Introduction of the paper should include a sharper definition of its audience.
Sometimes it looks like it is addressed to policy makers and government decision
makers. However, the technical details provided in the last sections suggest that it is
addressed to practitioners and staff of international development agencies and
institutions. The conceptual discussion about participation in accountability processes at
times suggests that it aims at contributing to the general debate about the role of civic
engagement in governance, involving academics.
A sharper definition of the audience could help to define the scope of the paper. I
suggest that it defines a stronger focus on the role of information technologies. The
theoretical section and the presentation of the traditional accountability and
transparency processes could be shorter and basically placed as an introduction to a
more substantive discussion and exhaustive presentation of the role and experience of
ICT in governance.
2. Comments to the conceptual aspects of accountability and the so called traditional
accountability processes and mechanisms
In spite of my suggestion of making less ambitious and shortening these sections of the
paper, I would like to make some comments to its conceptual framework and the
presentation of the so called traditional or pre ICT accountability mechanisms.
64
The accountability triangle
I concur with the team that the accountability triangle defined in the WDR 2004 is a
good framework to the presentation and discussion of the role of accountability in
governance and more specifically to the different mechanisms of voice for improving
development policy results and service delivery. However, there are two issues that I
would like to highlight. First, I think that there is a misunderstanding of the so called
long and short routes of accountability. Second, the accountability triangle falls short in
terms of capturing broader and current governance and democratization processes to
which ICT has had and will have a tremendous potential to contribute and strengthen.
First. Many of the accountability processes presented in this paper do not belong to the
short route, as suggested in the paper. In other words, they are processes and
mechanisms of voice, rather than of client power, to improve the quality of service
delivery. All participatory initiatives in demand of more transparent and accountable
budgeting processes belong to the long route. The participatory budgeting, the gender
budgets, the citizens’ budget analyses, budget expenditure tracking and budget results
monitoring are different forms or expressions of citizen’s voice. They belong to the
realm of voice, along with electoral processes. They belong to the realm of the long
route, although thanks in part to ICT and traditional mass media they are “shorter” than
elections, in so far they do not have to wait for the established electoral cycle to have an
impact on decision makers and regulators.
Second. The resent social and civic uprisings that have taken place in the Middle East go
beyond the demand for accountability in service delivery which is what the triangle is
about. They are about redefining the way a society is governed and organized. The
paper could provide a deeper analysis of these social movements, focusing on the role
played by ICT in the formation and mobilization of new social capital.
Exclusion and the cost of participation
If you decide to keep in the document the discussion on issues concerning exclusion and
elite capture linked to participation, it would be then relevant to present a deeper
analysis of the limits of representation and internal accountability of participatory
processes (p. 7‐8). The cost of participation, as stated in the paper, is one of the factors
limiting the participation of the poor. But this is a limitation that can be addressed
through appropriate process designs (i.e. decentralization of fora, adequate schedules,
limiting the number and duration of meetings); and precisely through the use of ICT and
local media (mobile phones, internet booths, community radios, etc.) There are other
more decisive social exclusion factors, like gender and ethnic exclusion mechanisms, and
others related to the political environment, which are more difficult to overcome, and
therefore pose deeper challenges to the legitimacy of participation. In any case, I
suggest that the paper does not leave open the questions on the legitimacy of
participation. It is advisable that it presents a reasonable argument on the value of
65
citizens’ participation as a means to improve accountability and development results in
spite of its limitations. Otherwise what would be the justification for developing the
following sections? Even more, it would be interesting to hear what the authors have to
say about the role of ICT in overcoming those limitations.
The relationship between transparency, participation and accountability
The relationship between transparency, participation and accountability leads us to a
discussion about what are the factors enabling an effective participation of citizens and
users to hold governments and service providers accountable. SDV in the World Bank
has developed an important discussion about this through a set of papers and tools on
the enabling environment for civic engagement and social accountability. The so called
ARVIN factors, which stand for: Association, Resources, Voice, Information and
Negotiation. I suggest you consult these documents prepared and published by the
Participation and Civic Engagement Unit (2004‐5). They provide a good analysis of the
factors affecting the effectiveness of participation in accountability, including the quality
of and accessibility to information.
Classification of traditional transparency and accountability initiatives
I had a hard time trying to understand the classification you propose of the traditional
transparency and accountability initiatives. The distinction between social accountability
initiatives focusing on accessing information, assessing and adapting information and
acting upon information does not quite reflect what these initiatives are about. My
understanding is that all the initiatives you mention have to do with accessing, analyzing
and acting upon information. Let’s take the Open Budget Initiative for instance. The
OBI’s main focus is to assess the accessibility and quality of the budgeting process from
the point of view of citizens and the horizontal mechanisms of accountability, like the
congress and the budget auditing office. The OBI collects information about the
budgeting process cycle, assesses this information making use of a set of indicators to
enable the comparison across countries and through time periods with the purpose of
acting upon this information (advocating) and putting pressure on governments to
improve the accountability of the budgeting cycle.
Or let’s take the citizen’s report cards. They also are initiatives to collect information
about users’ satisfaction upon the quality of public services with the purpose of creating
pressure on regulators and service providers to improve service delivery. Hence, CRCs
produce information and make it accessible to users and citizens to act upon it to
improve the quality of the service.
Social monitoring too, involves accessing relevant and reliable information, analyzing it
and acting upon it to hold local governments accountable.
66
Participatory Budgeting
The section referring to the participatory budgeting is interesting as it provides an
overall description its origins, the process and its limitations. However, I suggest you
make use of reports of relevant impact assessments of the PB in Brazil, (Porto Alegre
and country wide), and Peru (country wide), produced by the WB. Both reports provide
a deep assessment of the potential and limitations of the PB, making use of
counterfactual evidence: World Bank (2008), Brazil: Towards a More Inclusive and
Effective Participatory Budget in Porto Alegre, Washington D.C.; and Banco Mundial
(2011), Peru: Evaluacion del Presupuesto Participativo y su Relacion con el Presupuesto
Por Resultados, Lima. Both conclude, based on strong evidence, that the PB has an
impact on resource allocations by better responding to the needs of the population, and
particularly of the poor. But they also reveal the prevalence of social exclusion factors
that limit the participation of the poorest and other excluded groups like women and
youth.
Citizens Report Cards
It would be relevant to acknowledge that CRCs show significant limitations when they
are used in rural contexts and country wide. The CRC has proven to be an effective
mechanism to hold accountable the quality of service providers in urban settings.
However, rural settings present serious challenges to the effectiveness of the
mechanism: users have a limited knowledge of quality standards and the possibility of
comparing with other service providers. This limitation became evident in Peru (2005). A
CRC applied country wide on the quality of basic health services revealed that the
communities showing the highest levels of satisfaction (usually rural ones) had the
lowest performance indicators in health and nutrition.
3. Comments on the added value of Information technologies
This is the most interesting and innovative section of the paper. It would benefit from a
brief conceptualization on the fundamental elements that make ICT a unique factor
potentiating the role of citizen participation in governance and accountability: (i)
enabling horizontal flows of information that make possible the establishment of
powerful and flexible networks and coalitions; (ii) strengthening downward, timely,
reliable and relevant information flows to improve the quality and credibility of
participation; (iii) empowering voice by creating upward information flows, which are
more inclusive, powerful and timely, to influence and inform decision making.
67
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