AQIM book outline

Title: Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the future of political Islam in North Africa

Intro: 1. Who knows about AQIM? 2. Cliches and idees recues 3. One book in English, with one study. Many studies within the intelligence community but limited in scope. Nothing replaces a book. The Wikipedia scams 4. On in German, none in Arabic 5. But 6 books in French. Very concerned by AQIM, one of the gates to Europe, Tariq Ibn Ziad. Even wrote novels 6. Tragic events in Algeria leading to AQIM, the recent AQIM s actions of one of AQ s most active group 7. Fear of spreading to the south, of safe havens in the Sahara 8. The future in the context of the Arab Spring which might shake Algeria and Morocco. AQIM could become a major player in the region not because of its southern zone but because of its influence over Islamist orgs in the region

Chapter 1: History of Political Islam in North Africa (up to 1995) 1. Ambivalences: Sufism (Sanussi), Massaoui, Murabitun (Jihadists), symbolized by the Sheikh Bubba war. Quick history of Islam 2. Colonial influence,. Ignore Islam, bring Western ideologies (communism), Camus etc. 3. The Algerian war, COIN, disinformation, MILDEC, the Harki tragedy 4. post-colonial/socialist influences in Algeria, FLN, Libya 5. Regional influences (the Berbers/Tuareg movements) Amazigh, return to pre-Islam, regional identity 6. Islamic movements of the 1980 s 7. The return of the Afghans, the neo Jihadists 8. Political struggles in Algeria 9. Cancelation of the elections, the major injustice or the Algerian Nakba. A master narrative

Chapter 2: Algerian Jihad, the black years 1995-1998 1. Algerian Jihad

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Creation of the GIA, outside support, France, England, the Emirs Terror in France, the mistake The Algerian government fights back supported by France COIN in Algeria Reconciliation programs Blackout and PSYOP Conspiracy theories, up to now The monks story

Chapter 3: GSPC and Al Qaeda rapprochement. 1998-2001 1. AQ is being created in 1998 2. Linked between UBL and GIA already existed 3. GSPC replaces GIA, a more mature group, learning from the outside but still doesn t have an international goal 4. Algerian s COIN is working 5. Push to the East and West is failing (including Libya), getting closer to AQ seem a necessity

Chapter 4: Push to the South and the rise of AQIM 2001-2011 1. Everything changes in 2001. Global vision of the Jihad. Success 2. Limited success in North Africa (Casablanca, Gerba) but failure to create a sustainable presence there 3. 2003 Iraq, more success (Madrid, London) 4. Influence of AQI. Change of tactics in Algeria, propaganda videos, beginning of the Internet, VBIED, simultaneous attacks against civilians 5. Push to the South, encouraged by the Algerian gov who runs the CMOC but doesn t act on the other side of the border even if its soldiers get slaughtered 6. Smuggling (goods, cigarettes, weapons, humans, hashish, cocaine) All different, Polisario 7. Hostage taking, same TTP? Good causes? Robin Hood of the desert 8. The big question of financing. How does it work for AQIM? For AQAM, seems obvious. But for AQIM more complicated 9. Most of the money from hostage taking 10. Safe haven in Mali. Mountains, move to Ougadou forest? The reason: forced out of northern Mali by the Tuareg back from Libya? Mali accord 11. Attacks in Niger and Mauritania 12. Push toward the south, Burkina, Senegal, Guinea 13. Boko Haram. What is the relationship? Training? Moral support? Huge distance between Algiers and Abudja, allegiance to AQIM 14. AQIM in fiction, adventure in the desert

Chapter 5: Al Andalus, media and propaganda 1. Take advantage of the new media forms especially the Internet 2. Learn from AQI, AQAM 3. Al Libi, possibly the most dangerous AQAM leader, charismatic, from a long tradition of jihadist, the fact that he escaped from a US prison helps 4. Follows AQ master narrative 5. Idiosyncrasies (against France) 6. The Robin Hood effect

Chapter 6: AQIM master narrative and Arab Spring 1. A new ideology emerges of non violence, using social media, 2. Like everybody else taken aback, even pro US, centre 4S, the Europeans don t believe in it. Too threatening. 3. AQ adapts its narrative to mimic the Arab Spring (Annabi) 4. The Arab Spring trapped by Qadhafi, Syria and Yemen, use of violence, sectarian violence 5. AQ jumps on the opportunity, takes advantage of the situation, weapons, contacts 6. AQIM creates new groups in Tunisia, Libya, pushes toward Morocco and even further toward Somalia (east-west axis) while leaving alone Europe

Conclusion: 1. Review of major topics, historical approach 2. The main question doesn t seem to be what damage AQIM can do in West Africa or even Europe but what damage they can do in Maghreb region, a region to be grabbed. 3. How to react, seems like a win-win situation for AQIM, in both cases, the Arab Spring democratic, peaceful process succeeds or the armed jihad. 4. But a failure compared to Arab Spring, failure to galvanize the mass.