The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order by Samuel P.

Huntington Review by: Robert Marks Journal of World History, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Spring, 2000), pp. 101-104 Published by: University of Hawai'i Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20078821 . Accessed: 08/02/2012 10:03
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Book Reviews

The Clash of Civilizations and theRemaking of World Order.

By Samuel p. Huntington. New York: Simon & Schuster,

1996. Pp. 367. $26 (cloth); $14 (paper).

has classified Samuel Hunt the Library of Congress Surprisingly, and the Remaking ofWorld Order as "his Clash of Civilizations ington^ is not, either in scope or in method. it assuredly Rather, tory," which in the realm of political science book belongs Huntington's specula to be "history"?or at tion, gussied up with what the author believes to "history tells us" or "throughout references least numerous history," to prove his points. So why isThe Clash of Civilizations being reviewed makes a big claim about history, and espe here? Because Huntington cially about historical
be made aware of.

continuity?a

claim

that world historians

should

thesis is that the bipolarity of the Cold War obscured Huntington's a fundamental fact about the world and its history: namely, that the units of common human action, and con identity, difference, largest are drawing which flict have been, and once again are, civilizations, once again the countries and peoples previously divided by together From this premise, Huntington Cold War politics. goes on to make its States: understand for the United foreign policy recommendations civi clear and leading role within Western bolster those civilization, its own borders, and bond with other states lizational elements within to Western in Europe up to the civilization (in particular belonging States should borders of the former Soviet Union). Further, the United sees as the two major gird itself for conflict with what Huntington to Western civilization?the Chinese (which he labels challengers that "Sinic") and Islamic civilizations. Huntington explicitly hopes his book will provide policymakers (and others?) with a new paradigm to replace of international relations the "realist" school's paradigm

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(governed by power maximization state as the primary actor in world Huntington begins by defining culture, in particular "values, beliefs, as revealed (p. 42), mostly through definition, lizations:

Taiwan, Korea, China, (Russia, Serbia, Islamic, Orthodox Japanese, Hindu, Latin American, and possibly African Greece), Western, (pp. 45-47). a thumbnail He then provides sketch (and quite standard) historical to the story of of the relations among civilizations, which boils down "the rise of the West" from 1500 on (pp. 49-50). This "rise" generated and Vietnam), in particular and the Chinese tells us" that civilizations and also?because Islamic, go "history to the West now through inevitable cycles of rise and fall?challenges a phase of decline that it is entering the Sinic and (chap. 4) while are on the "rise" (chap. 5). Islamic civilizations the rise of east Asia includes Chinese and Japan (which Driving ese civilizations) is rapid economic the rise of Islam is growth, while from other civilizations, of religious revival and high birth rates. by a combination powered . . . the Western-dominated sees all this as "destabilizing Huntington established international order" matters, (p. 121). Complicating is the absence in Islamic civilization of a "core believes, Huntington state" (unlike the West, which has the United States; the Orthodox, or the Sinic, which in "a which has Russia; has China), resulting source of threat to other civilizations" because there is no single power or Sinic civ with which the core states ofWestern, Orthodox, Hindu, thus points to "Islam's bloody ilizations can deal (p. 177)? Huntington as a particular kind of "fault line" war between borders" (pp. 254-58) civilizations, emphasizing with the West. and How has Huntington its history? Let me Islam's fundamental and continuing conflict resentment

identifies Huntington the Sinic (Chinese, which

in terms of primarily and social structures" institutions, this broad religion (p. 47). Using "seven or eight" contemporary civi includes

calculations, affairs). civilizations

viewing

the nation

in giving this picture of the world gone wrong count the ways. in at least five ways. First, good book is bad history Huntington's in the the place of their material and approach historians recognize a civilizationist context of other interpretations. Certainly approach one. But to world history, is a legitimate the one Huntington adopts, it's not the only one, as the work of world-systems theorists attests. to this other way of viewing world history: is oblivious Huntington to think is the history of civilizations. It is impossible "Human history in any other terms" (p. 40). Despite of humanity of the development from Braudel and listing Wallerstein, reveals his quoting Huntington

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ignorance of the field of world history, and of the debate over the units world history. He thus paints with a of analysis used for understanding in Protestant neither and Catholic broad brush, distinguishing very nor not discussing "the troubles" in Northern the West Ireland), (and in Islam, let alone finer but still important differ Sunni and Shi'ite ences among and between in virtually every part of the world. peoples A sole unit of analysis for understanding the world. is most Furthermore, Huntington impressed by the differences are attributed to the supposed most of which among civilizations, or nonexistent" contacts between civiliza "fact" of the "intermittent are tions. His fundamental of course, is that "civilizations" assumption, civilization is his

entities. Huntington thus appears to have read identifiable historical not his critique of that work but Rise of theWest, McNeill's William in this journal in 1990, in which after twenty-five years, published of "civiliza about the utility of the concept McNeill raised questions are more or less about the idea that civilizations tion," and especially not existing in a broader "ecumenical" world of interac autonomous, to imagine today a world of discrete is doomed tion. Thus Huntington Ladled on top of this curious view is his own outdated civilizations. in the the process of modernization modernization theory, whereby some people to modernize in forces other civilizations West (although states in other civilizations that what was needed believed mistakenly was Westernization). sources: Since comparative historians Second, rely on the work of to task for not having used Iwill not take Huntington other historians, of the secondary primary sources. His selection, use, and understanding is fair game. And his selection of sources on, and sources, though, in particular, in general and China the of, Asia understanding is poor. At times he seems part of the world I am most familiar with, to equate "Asia" with "East Asia," thereby lumping India and Pakistan with China and Japan (e.g., pp. 93 or 107), while at other times he as if he had forgotten his initial distinction talks about "East Asia" hence Not Sinic and Japanese civilizations. only is he confused to "Asia," but in the model about how to apply his own civilizational sources from the section on China he appears to rely on secondary sources for me to tell)? and 1960s (he does not cite enough 1950s particularly Harvard professors who created a "Western impact/Asian between a for understanding Chinese and Japanese history, response" model model that has not been used for well over a decade. He even resur rects the thoroughly thesis about "Oriental despotism," disreputable histories of Russia, the Ottomans, lumping the political stew (p. 140). Had others into the same undifferentiated and China, he looked for

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on from recent scholarship it, Huntington might have learned much on other parts of the world too. and Japan, and probably China anecdotes historical Third, method: Huntington pulls together times and places as evidence for his claims. He ismore from numerous the in social science model than in understanding interested building civilization, leading to grand generalizations history of any particular in the world has of languages like "throughout history the distribution of power in the world" (p. 62), or statements reflected the distribution humans about "the sources of conflict between history" throughout commits the anachronistic 208). In this last instance, Huntington (p. conditions historical (what he calls contemporary fallacy, projecting into the past, obscur "the classic [conflicts] of international politics") differences between past and present. ing fundamental claims that peoples and countries, Fourth, argument: Huntington of "Who am I?" and "Where do I questions asking the existential to others of like cultures, gravitate leading belong?" (p. 96), naturally to the natural civilizational of their interests and actions on clumping stage. And yet when he issue, the primary actors particular as the "realist school" predicts. To states will remain primary actors the world comes right down to analyzing any are not civilizations, but states, just does say that be sure, Huntington even in the clash of civilizations states will be deter between that the cleavages His favorite case study is Bosnia, a differences.

(p. 21), but he asserts mined by civilizational and Islamic "fault-line" civilizational Orthodox, bringing Western, into close contact and conflict civilizations 11). The problem (chap. on States is that the United intervened with this analysis, of course, does acknowledge which Huntington behalf of the Bosnian Muslims, as "a noncivilizational in the otherwise universal pattern of anomaly then spends some time explain kin backing kin" (p. 281); Huntington ing away this "anomaly" (pp. 288-91). as scholarship, this book is politics masquerading Lastly, morality: and to that extent it is obscene. The hidden question behind this book, is simply this: "With the end of the it is the answer, and to which States?" is now the enemy of the United who or what Soviet Union,

in understanding the past and the way it is not interested Huntington and international the present; rather, he has a domestic politi shapes is pushing. should be Historians that he cal agenda everywhere use of their discipline in conjuring offended by Huntington's up Chi to "Western civilization" nese and Islamic enemies and the state Hunt States. A little knowl the United ington sees as its primary defender, case, of history) certainly can be dangerous. edge (in Huntington's
ROBERT MARKS

Whittier College