The Developmental Consequences of Globalization* Henry Teune University of Pennsylvania Globalization is the flagship of change of our times.

It is supported and opposed on global, national, and local political fronts to gain and keep advantage. It stands as a symbol of an historical transformation from a world of international relations to one of global politics.1 Despite its dramatic economic consequences, globalization also impacts nearly all domains of human activities in different ways and at conflicting speeds. It has good and bad consequences not only for economic growth, but also equality, democracy, and political order. It generates winners and losers, immediate, long term, relative and absolute. Globalization is inevitable, but local and national governments, politically mobilized groups, and world opinion can direct and temper many of its effects. The foregoing assertions have crossed some threshold of consensus or conventional wisdom. Each, however, requires specification and evidence. The less obvious and more general consequences of globalization are both more theoretically important and practically relevant. Globalization has changed the nature of conflict and cooperation among nations and re-defined the status of human societies and groups. The most pervasive and long-term impact of globalization is on social and human development. The most important consequence of globalization on development in the 1990s is the acceleration of its rate. The second most important one is decentralization of the processes of development, shifting its sources from a few countries and regions as world centers to the world as a whole. It took more than the entire 19th century to move most people and the preponderance of their productive activities from farms to the cities in the industrializing countries. Something on that scale occurred at the end of the 20th century in many other countries in about two decades. Whereas for nearly all of human history nearly all human production and consumption was local, today most of it is connected to regional, national, and, indeed, global markets. Several countries became centers of world production during the past quarter of a century. During the past 20 years more than a half trillion new people started residing in families with discretionary income. Only a short time ago it was believed that the development of major urban centers of production in East and South Asia would require decades rather than years and that mega cities of over 10 million people pushed past the known limits of human organization. Today there are several mega urban agglomerations in the developing world. The claims and counter claims about the inevitability and virtues of globalization are points of debate, discussion, and, in very limited ways, research. On the positive side has been world economic growth on a rather steady basis for well over a quarter of a century, but especially in the 1990s.2 Life expectancies increased by more than 20 years in the developed world in the first 50 years of the 20th century. That was accomplished though improved diets assured by refrigerated transportation of food and cleaner water from central sources of treated supply. More dramatically and rapidly, about 20 years of life were added to human populations in most
* This is a revision of the paper of the same title presented to the Joint Meetings of the International Studies Associations, Hong Kong, and July 26-30, 2001.

areas of the less developed world regions in the second half of the 20th century. That was done through the global application of science by international institutions and global organizations, eradicating agents of infection, administrating vaccinations, and distributing pharmaceuticals. On the negative side of globalization are fears of world pollution, depletion of resources, collapse of local democracy, and loss of group identity and autonomy. The evidence for the achievements of globalization today, however, remains stronger than for the losses. Modernization, state formation, and economic growth and the conflicts embedded in these processes up until now have been the main categories of theoretical variables for thinking theoretically about long-term change.3 They divided the world into strong and weak states, the rich and the poor, the stable and contested political systems. The world system was one of competition among states, confrontations on world peripheries, and continuous preparation for wars of conquest and defense. It was also a world of both collectively free and subordinated peoples and individuals living in political systems ranging from having a great deal of freedom to nearly none. Whatever else globalization and development are today, they integrate human activities at higher levels of aggregation. This contrasts with integration through incorporation and subordination. Development as the integration of diversity, indeed, is the opposite of assimilation and control. Empires and states dominated through imposed conformity and hierarchy. Development as inclusion of diversity stands juxtaposed to the bounded solidarities of hierarchical territorial political systems. It is foundational for democratic governance. Whatever else democracy may be, its strong disposition to responsive and accountable authority is less hierarchical than all others forms of government as well more benign for its own populations and those of its neighbors.4 Globalization and its acceleration of development precipitated a quick, global Second Democratic Revolution after 1989. It was unlike the First Democratic Revolution of 1789 that slowly impacted only a few European political cultures. This rapid worldwide spread of democracy is causally connected to the globalization and development of the last three decades of the 20th century. The dynamics that changed the relationships among globalization, development, and democracy became the main forces of change of our times. Democracy, once the consequence of development, is now the facilitating, inclusive environment of global development. Development and Globalization Development is the cause of globalization. It inheres in developmental systems, which have changing components and, simultaneously, changing relationships among them. A tight theoretical explanation of development is not possible in that both the components and the relationships change at the same time. Unlike designed or natural mechanical systems where neither change, or living systems where either the components or the relationships change, developmental systems move beyond the logically tractable. They are amenable to analysis through simulations, most of which are unstable.5 Because development is a property of social systems characterized by change in both their components and relationships, theories of development can only sketch the broad outlines of their dynamics to predict the future. But development is the theoretical context of the important recent and future changes in human 2

history. Other potentially significant happeningsclimate change, earthquakes, and meteorites are calculated at such small probabilities over such long time periods that they are barely relevant to imperatives of everyday life that faces requirements of survival and competition for improvement. The parameters of the theory that is being used here to explain globalization are as follows. The development of Alocal societies@ is the mainspring of globalization involving processes of inclusion and incorporation into systems of greater scale. Development pushes local social systems to open up. Globalization is a developmental process that both projects the system outward and brings variety into it. It drives the export and import of variety and know how--the technologies about how to integrate variety. Globalization also feeds back into local developmental systems, stimulating them to acquire more connections at higher levels of human aggregation that become integrated into higher level systems, or even at the risk of destabilization and collapse. Globalization is an accelerator of development, which in turn accelerates more globalization. As a logical possibility, a system could develop through internal processes alone, if it were dominated by the integration of continuous innovation. Such systems are empirically unlikely. Development of closed systems under contemporary conditions would be unstable and nearly certain to stagnate. No closed countries today are developmental systems; indeed, their prospects of development depend directly on opening up to the world. Globalization is the process of human societies of the world becoming a single system. If there were a single human system, then any action of any and every individual would impact every characteristic and item of behavior of all other individuals.6 The concept of a perfectly integrated system includes the foregoing happening instantaneously and with certainty. That is a logical concept with no foreseeable prospect of being realized. It is possible, however, to identify those changes that move systems to approximate such conditions. To understand a process requires having knowledge about its termination points. In order to improve explanations of globalization, its consequences, and feedback dynamics it is necessary to go beyond historical descriptions of the recent encapsulation of the world into a single economic system of trade, production, and finance. Such explanations also must address why particular human systems broke out of their niches and became something different as part of more inclusive human systems. Integrating a village into a city, a city into a metropolis, a metropolis into a nation, nations into an international system, and an international system into a global one all can be described as processes of globalization. The alternative to local developmental processes connecting with those at higher levels is hierarchy. But hierarchical systems have limits to their capacities to control complexity. Exceeding those limits runs down the system. They defend their vulnerability through closure against intrusions of variety that threatens their control. They trade off development for stability and decline. Ecological vs. Developmental Systems The concept of an ecological system is the theoretical underpinning of nearly all macro social science theories. Its dynamic concepts are learning, adaptation, cooperation, conflict, dominance, decay, and destruction. The key to the analysis of ecological systems is dynamic equilibrium. What remain outside of ecological explanations, however, are transformations of systems into other kinds of systems. The great transformations of recent centuries--the industrial 3

revolution for material prosperity, the modern bureaucratic state for infrastructures of scale, and electronic communications for information and control--are explained, indeed described, by willy-nilly technological and organizational discoveries and their diffusion. Ecological theories do not explain technology. The two main ecological modes of human groups and societies dealing with others are war and exchange.7 Organization of scale for war and exchange to build empires, states, and large markets occurred in only a very few societies. In order to stabilize themselves, states asserted territorial sovereignty and either established rules that overlay a variety of human societies or simply excluded, expelled, or exterminated them. During the past 300 years or so, states institutionalized three tiers of governments: small societies in local political units; intermediate level provinces, reflecting large and stronger local elites; and the central authorities. The success of these territorial political systems was defined in ecological terms: expansion of territory through war; extension of their reach into other niches through markets; unobtrusive subversive incursions; direct and indirect administrative intrusions; and consolidation of internal control, a hardening of the niche. Where territorial control and market boundaries expanded together, polyethnic empires or states resulted. In recent centuries only a handful of societies ended up bonded as nation-states with a single ideology, a shared ancestry, and a common language. Empires succumbed to wars with nation-states and the benefits of their larger scale economies were lost in the rise of global markets. Empires are extinct for the foreseeable future and the future of states is under discussion. Human ecology is the study of groups of human beings adapting to changing physical niches. Its focus is responses to physical constraints in maintaining and expanding human settlements. Its greatest moment of theoretical interest was in explanations of the growth and shaping of the huge urban niches following the industrialization of European and North American cities in the late19th century.8 Today human ecology has potential for explaining the three and fourdimensional cities of vertical, horizontal, and angular locations emerging in the constrained urban spaces of Hong Kong, Los Angeles, and Singapore. Social ecology, the intellectual successor of human ecology, focused on relationships among human groups rather than between groups and physical space, especially those in expanding urban areas. The concept of social ecology, however, was broad enough to be applied to most kinds of relationships among identifiable groups, including relations among states and their competition for dominance. But the fundamentals of social ecology are similar to those the general ecological paradigm but with the components are peoples, moving about, destroying, dominating, and assimilating others. It is an unchanging world of games with winners and losers. The ecological paradigm is not a suitable theoretical language for explaining the transformations that are pushing developmental processes from countries and regions upward to the world as a whole. We mark the great transformations of human systems as agricultural, commercial, industrial (early), and modern (second industrial revolution), and recently a few others (service economy, technological/information society, and the new economy). Such transformations happen in ecological explanations through accident (mutation), accumulations of successful imitations, and unknowing adaptation through direct and indirect competition. Old systems disappear as new ones emerge. 4

Developmental systems, in contrast, are those whose internal structures and processes produce dynamics that lead to increasing scale, including generating new variety, which is integrated at higher levels. Development, interpreted as the scale of a system, is the same as organized social complexity but with the addition today of special relationships that specifically and consciously generates internal dynamics of change. What characterizes developmental systems, unlike biological or living systems, is their continual transformation in the direction of more integrated diversity. A few societies and countries today are purposefully developmental, designed to develop through research and change. More are trying to position themselves to acquire the capacity to choose the course of their development in an emerging global political economy. Globalization, Development, and International Relations A colleague and I discussed the developmental dynamics of globalization elsewhere.9 Globalization as a spatial concept is inclusion at higher levels of territorial aggregation and connectedness, the final level being the world as a system. When we outlined a general theory of developmental change over 20 years ago, we intentionally omitted all references to particular political communities (peoples) and politically organized territorial niches (countries). An international system of states evolved during the past few centuries through conflicting efforts to access and control territory, a social and political relationship to resources. A major consequence of development is the release of human activity from the domination of the constraints of territory and physical space.10 Territory changes from a parameter to a variable as a function of development. Although liberation from territory (and time) is conventionally marked by technological advances (rail, car, plane) reducing time/cost/distance to near zero, it is also part of long term collective learning processes about the costs and benefits of closure, conquest, and diversity. Concern for population growth came from ideas about scarcity of land and its limits for producing food, amended later by the negative effects of pollution and loss of resources in industrial production. Scarcity was used to justify conquest. Limits are the central concern in the analysis of ecological systems, whose components and relationships do not change and that concept has been a core theoretical component of modern theories of social and political change. Social development, however, has no known limits of physical space or resources as new technologies that are predicted will reduce the costs of connecting components as well as provide new items and ideas that yield unending technological innovations. Developmental systems, in contrast to ecological ones, are dominated by Apositive@ rather than negative feedback. Our theory of development involved globalizing processes that would transform the international system. The penultimate developmental transformation would be from an international system of competing and conflicting states to a world of global development, including global democratic development with autonomy and dignity of individuals. That qualitative change would occur at a point when positive sum relationships began to dominate those of zero-sum. That threshold was probably crossed in the 1990s, creating the most significant social transformation of our, and perhaps all, times. In a few years the globalization of markets became changed to a new global system with readily observed manifestations of 5

sharing new ideas and experiences. The positive sum world offers everyone the knowledge to produce and participate in an integrating and diversifying system. Globalization would go beyond Macdonaldization and having what is similar to a world providing access to whatever is responsive to unique individuals and their needs, preferences, and values through information, opportunities, and experiences. Some systems--cities, regions, and countries--are more decisively developmental than others. As globalization is part of the developmental processes, those systems are easily identified as world cities and regions with dominance and control. The same assessment would hold for corporations and professional organizations that advance new technologies that replace the old. The IBM Company of the 1960s and medical researchers of today that discover new pharmaceuticals are examples. These nodes of developmental dominance should be defined theoretically as leading sectors and enclaves of innovation and integration in specific time frames rather than as permanent places, organizations, or professions that control global development. Globalization has made development a characteristic of all human societies. Development has always been the foundation of civilizations. In the past, civilization was the possession of specific peoples, although it always spread through implanting and diffusion. Today, civilization has become part of all societies in a system of global development. Development is expansive in two main ways. First, systems locked into development processes reach out to other system for resources and variety. Growth/ecological systems seek only defined resources, not what is new and potentially disturbing. When variety is imported into growth systems, it is treated as infectious, possibly carrying the seeds of their destruction. In political terms, all empires and states seek to destroy disturbing elements as subversive. Developmental systems, in contrast, are variety intensive, seeking out what is new, even if disturbing. What is new is essential for their innovation driven production. Second, highly developed systems attract individuals and groups in other systems with the greatest variety. Either they migrate to or become attached to the more developed systems. Local Aelites@ on the peripheries become incorporated into one or several Ametropolitan@ centers. This is a general phenomenon of entities with less variety becoming attached to those with more. The most skilled people on the peripheries go to the center, and the better-educated rural young migrate to the cities. Both ways of expansion are explained with the Alaw of attractiveness of variety@. Relationships between more and less developed systems are hierarchical. In the context of relations among countries, the hierarchical patterns of dominance are less pronounced than three or so decades ago. The core of this relationship derives from the inequality in the integrated diversity between developed and less developed systems. Although that relationship is asymmetrical, increasing development makes it easier to distribute variety from the developed to the less developed in a non-competitive ways. Development generates conflicts of a kind different from that of ecological systems that are based on territory and occupation of exclusive physical niches. Conflicts between the less and more developed countries today are not only less intense but also they can be negotiated through transfers of technologies and exchanges of people without any direct loss to future innovation. Conflicts among groups or countries locked into the ecological mercantile and imperial system of the past, in contrast, generated zero-sum threats to survival, often sufficient to induce violent, destructive behavior. Conflicts in developmental contexts carry promises of future mutual benefits; those in ecological systems, 6

only readjustments of resources and changes in winners and losers. As globalization proceeds the more developed systems, enclaves, and sectors, threats of loss from the closure of any particular mode of access to resources and knowledge lessen in importance. That is for two reasons. First, globalization makes access to alternative locations easier, if only because more of them have opened. Second, developed systems have improving capacities to innovate at will at diminishing costs within shortening time frames. Not only are there increasing technological capacities of developed systems to project their reach over greater distances and at decreasing costs, but also any locational advantage in resources decreases because of alternatives in other places and in new technology. The value of resources, including those generally believed to sufficiently scarce to function as units of exchange--gold and diamonds, among them--has declined and will continue to do so in the long run. With global development, alternatives expand for all in more places as well as in technologies, as is happening in new explorations for and alternatives to carbon fuels. The Impact of Globalization on Development Globalization accelerates and institutionalizes development by spreading its impact across economic, political, and social forces of change. Its facilitates direct action to break down the barriers of political boundaries through political agreements and by distributing technologies of access to variety. Agreements about flows of items, peoples, and ideas are reached globally in new institutions. Counties with improved transportation and communication technologies have incentives to integrate them with others globally. Globalization, of course, has negative impacts on the human condition and costs that are especially high immediately after initial encounters with the penetration of globalization. The politics of globalization intensified after the 1990s after a decade of rapid globalization left a new vortex of conflict between the globalized and the marginalized sitting on top of the old, horizontal conflicts of group and territory. Three dimensions of globalization will be discussed. Each impacts the others. 1. Growth Globalization opens systems; openness stimulates economic growth, which contributes to development by increasing the number of similar properties shared among groups and individuals. Setting aside the basics of food, shelter and other fundamental human needs, similarities that are distributed throughout the population contributes to the integration of system. Once a system has the foundations of integration in a sufficient level of similarities among individuals, groups, and institutions, the most important being language and symbols, it can create and import variety, which makes for differences among the people. Automobiles were once an example of division between rich and poor. Today they are the modality of national transportation systems. In the wealthier countries, today the issue is the digital divide between those having access and knowledge to use the Internet and those who do not. Once a new item is distributed to more than half of a population, it contributes to similarity rather than differences with the system. A connected population will be the characteristic of the whole system. That is true of the Internet now for a few countries and will be for many more in a few years. The relationship between the openness of the economy and economic growth took decades to be understood and acknowledged. The ideologies of mercantilism died slowly. Both Korea and 7

China are recent examples of development and openness. The wealth and developmental potential of Germany and Japan, the last initiators of empires in the 20th century, are greater today as open systems than during their expansion through conquest and colonization.11 It is possible, however, for countries to have economic growth and not develop. Resource exporting countries are examples of wealth being increased, even distributed to individuals living there, with little development in terms of increasing the complexity of the societies as well as the individuals encapsulated within their boundaries. Economic growth is necessary for a system to integrate with common properties but not sufficient to generate or acquire new variety. 12 At high levels of development, values shift from those of exchanges of items and activities (services), calculated as GNP, to those of virtues, skills, and experiences. This has been called and researched as postmodern values. In the theory of development described here, the first stage of development is modernization with the production and distribution of object properties that occupy unique places in time and space and, hence, have the competitive characteristic of scarcity. The dominant relationships are those of exchange and conflict, indeed, subordination. Properties proper, in contrast, are knowledge, tastes, and personal well being.13 Their value translates into experiences. They are Atransacted or transmitted rather than exchange or seized. Object properties derive their relative worth and value from scarcity; properties proper from their abundant distribution. There may be only one original painting, but its value depends on how many people have seen it, know about it, or can access its reproductions. The more people know about or engage in a particular sport, the more socially valuable participation in that sport becomes. The costs of transactions in properties proper are always less than of exchanging objects and services. Both types of properties, however, have diminishing costs of distribution with the increased efficiencies in technologies of moving items and ideas. Although the theory expounded the force of development through innovation, it could not anticipate that the costs of transacting and distributing ideas and experiences symbolically would be reduced to near zero in less than a quarter of a century with the Internet. Neither was it possible to envision the speed of moving goods through electronic controls in distribution systems. 2. Democracy Democracy as participation and accountability, rather than as representation and voice, comes from a shift from systems dominated by exchange and conflict to those of transactions and flows. Globalization is an inclusive and variety seeking developmental process. A central value of democracy is inclusion of diversity. Democratic systems must be open to new items and ideas, if only because of their promise to promote and realize human betterment. Exclusion of any alternatives to protect local political interests thus cannot be morally justified. This means more than simply lower prices for material goods and services coming from globalization as world trade. It requires finding different ways to change conditions to improve the quality of life of all people by expanding opportunities to encompass all that are available anywhere. The legitimacy of democracy depends on its openness globally to assure the prospects for human betterment. There are several progressive democratic political developments interacting with development. The first is being included into a society that has relative parity with other societies in the world, an issue today of global democracy for alien residents and political 8

refugees. The second is participating in the public life of a society, most likely initially through voting rights in a local or national polity. This right was extended to women in the early 20th century and is now reaching younger people. A third is having the benefits of a developing society, in particular the security of having human needs met through welfare. It is clear that the developed countries have the capacity of guaranteeing that human needs will be attended to. Finally, there is the promise of democratic development of living in a just society. Only a few individuals today have the option of experiencing being a participant in a Ajust" society, as they define it. A significant individual psychological satisfaction is having been part of creating a good society and sharing its virtues. This requires having helped make that society good, taking credit (or blame) for it, and being secure in knowing about the availability of perhaps even better prospects. All democratic societies must allow the option for its members to move out. Having such choices is the gift of globalization to democracy. Individuals, as they acquire knowledge and skills and as their political systems open up to the global system, will assert their right to exit and seek democratic polities that are more compatible with their interests and beliefs about a just society.14 3. Equality The relationship between development and equality is curvi-linear but in progressively shorter time intervals. That relationship should hold globally, within countries as well as among local political systems. When a new and desired object is introduced into a country, whether made there or imported, it is not possible for everyone to get one at once. What is new is a wedge for increasing inequality and social division. A corollary is that during periods of rapid economic growth, income inequality will increase. The distribution of new growth will initially be concentrated with resulting inequality. Mass production of new products takes time to produce in sufficient quantities to distribute widely. That was the early experience of nearly all industrializing countries with large income differences between the owners and workers. The higher the level of development of a system, the higher will be the rate of its development. One reason for the level of development impacting its rate is that more developed systems can absorb new items of variety at a faster rate and use them to generate yet more variety. A zigzag innovation example is the story of watches, an item easy to distribute globally. A better watch dominates as an import from a single place; it loses its competitive position by a good watch at a much cheaper price (throwaway watches); and, finally, that watch is replaced by a new technology of watches at lower prices. The time intervals in the cycle of product change gets quicker. Further innovations in portable time keeping pieces now give way to competition based on design or style watches, not the price or quality of the time keeping mechanism itself. Tastes in style change quickly. More developed systems can turnover what is new faster, make something different in appearance, which may give an initial edge in value over others. Even though new items create inequalities, whether imported or discovered locally, because they cost more not only in terms of costs per unit of production, but also because of their relatively greater disturbing effects on the society as a whole. When automobiles become more numerous, the society becomes more accommodating with roads, repair places, fueling stations and the like. An item of initial difference and inequality becomes one of similarity as its total 9

price and negative social impact decline. This has been discussed as the AS@ shaped curve of growth and inequality. Something that divides people between the haves and have not becomes a characteristic of the systemthe privileged automobile or property owners to a nation of cars or homeowners. The inequalities deriving from what is new and necessary for development decline at increasing rates as the system becomes more developed. But as one kind of inequality disappears others emerge from the innovative developmental processes. It is but one of the dialectical dynamics of development Globalization, Development, and World Stability From a perspective that the global system has only now begun to emerge, spots of instability will occur in those places and sectors that have most recently changed the most. In the least developed areas, stability will be relatively high, challenged primarily by conflicts with neighbors. Places and sectors at intermediate levels of development will be subject to bouts of instability. Highly developed countries and sectors will be relatively stable. The countries and regions of Asia that have grown quickly in the past few years will have to make substantial adjustments socially and politically and are likely to experience more instability following even minor global fluctuations. Some adjustments have already been made in the open economies of East and Southeast Asia. Future shocks will be less de-stabilizing than those that came early after those economies became part of the global economy. Globalization as the process of integrating diversity on a world basis increases stability. This comes from both the obvious and subtle. In systems of large scale, any disturbance is relatively a smaller part of a larger number of diverse components. That is obvious. Thousands of job losses diminish in importance as a simple function of the size of and complexity of the labor force. To the extent that production is global, the consequences of any localized failure in production are lessened. Local disturbances can be fixed by moving the fallout to many other places. Systems at higher levels of integrated diversity have more alternatives that can be accessed and put together not only to repair breakdowns but also to substitute for losses. That is less obvious. If there is a public transit strike, there are more automobiles, car pools, parking places, roads, hotels, and work at home options in more developed systems. If the food supply system is contaminated in a highly developed area, not only can food be imported from more areas more quickly but also there is greater capacity to use other products to provide alternatives. If wheat or beef supplies are disrupted, developed systems have alternatives to grains and can compensate for meat from cattle. In highly developed areas of the world, the catchment area for bringing aid and help to respond to crises from natural forces extends way beyond their neighbors to the country as a whole, other countries, and international agencies. Another reason that the level of development accelerates the rate of developmental change, as discussed previously, is that as the system becomes more stable, it also becomes more predictable. Predictions facilitate targeted behavior by the components, which make innovations and efficiencies more likely. The system is less error prone. A fundamental assumption of this theory of developmental change is that all components, including individuals, seek out variety to make themselves distinctive in the system, which defines their relative value within the system. Those with more variety, more distinctiveness, have more capacity to know how to find and select variety and use it in distinctive, developmental ways. 10

World Conflict and War The main wars of the twentieth century were between countries for control of territories and populations. AInternal@ wars were violent conflicts among competing political forces within countries and governments killing groups of their own people that were judged difficult to control. Also there were wars of hatred, fear, revenge, gain, and fun. Wars among countries and governments killing to subdue their own populations most likely took on the order of an estimated 300 million or more lives, roughly equally divided between intrastate and international group violence.15 Most of that occurred during the first half of the 20th century, surely the most quantitatively bloody decades in human history. Development as it spreads worldwide will lessen the intensity of wars across boundaries. Even though it is less costly today to move armies across national borders, there have been fewer such incursions in the second half of the 20th century than since the beginnings of modern states. In the first decades of the 21st century, wars are expected to be local. The main reason for this is that the global political system can act to isolate conflict within a region and continue the processes of globalization with only minor disturbances. A conflict in the Balkans in 1914 stirred conflict all over Europe; several Balkan conflicts in the 1990s stayed isolated. Another reason for fewer and less intense wars is that globalization assures that most countries, the only organizations with the capacities to fight sustainable wars, will have some interests in all parties engaged in a localized conflict rather than exclusively in one of them. A continuing source of intensifying conflict in the developing global system will be between those isolated or marginalized from global developments and those that are part of them. As globalization proceeds, those places and populations will be relatively fewer and smaller. The logic of globalization is penetration of all human societies everywhere. In comparison to the more developed places and sectors, the marginalized are falling behind relative to the centers of developmental change, indeed, even faster than before. The important political points of comparison for satisfaction or activation, however, are improvements over time and the credibility of predications that they will continue. The newly expressed pressures for autonomy of national and ethnic groups are a consequence of globalization. The world system is not only an alternative to state suppression but it also provides leverage to change state behavior. Autonomy of groups and organizations is consonant with global development. As the global system takes shape, more components of the system will be smaller and more autonomous than most of the worlds states in todays international system. Also likely are more, smaller states as the pressures for group autonomy mount with the rise of the global system and as the relative decline of the state continues. Peoples seeking a state of their own as their ultimate protector will find that they are likely to be the last in the old international system of states and the first out of it. The weak institutions of new states will be easily influenced and absorbed by institutions and agents of globalization. Resistance to Development The ugly side of development is the destruction and rearrangement of local environments. 11

This is part of the globalization processes. Local environments, built up by human efforts or protected natural sites, reflect the familiar commonalties on which social and political communities were formed. Environments made by mechanized agriculture in the countryside and factories in cities in the 19th century are now focal points of preservation efforts to appreciate the many legacies of human experiences. Both local human ecologies however, are already developmentally obsolete. Those still on the farms and in declining urban areas are threatened and can be easily mobilized to resist globalization. This is one component of a potential political coalition to resist globalization, which has become the symbolic surrogate today for development. The more politically prominent localities of resistance to globalization are those most marginalized by developmental processes. Groups and institutions that are most closely identified with the industrialized societies of the late 19th and early 20th centuries are especially well placed to make their voices known in representative democracies with territorial voting systems that inflate the influence of low income groups and regionally peripheral farmers. These groups, marginalized by globalization and development are also candidates for political coalitions to resist expansion of trade, foreign investment, and technologies of transmitting information. Ethnic and nationality groups have ambivalent postures toward globalization. On the one hand, most of them believe the international system of states has stifled their aspirations for group autonomy and expression. Globalization, with its alternatives to the state to become linked to systems of greater scale, is an opportunity for liberation. Indeed, the break-up of the last empire of the 20th century allowed a few groups to achieve state autonomy without the predicted consequences of being too small to be viable. On the other hand, globalization threatens the ways of life of ethnic groups. They have to change in order to be recognized by institutions of the global system to obtain the legitimacy necessary to claim both security and prosperity. That will require internal political re-organization that displaces the leadership of past resistance and survival with one able to participate in a larger world. This challenge also applies to countries that believe that their day in the sun in an international system of states requires them to achieve status equal to or greater than that accorded states in the past. The question of whether such countries will seek regional influence of the traditional diplomatic and military kind or join the communities of nations remains a question. Efforts to establish regional hegemony, of course, represent hostile resistance to globalization. Global Development and Democracy: A Concluding Comment The history of globalization during the past few decades can be highlighted by two events. Globalization accelerated in middle of the 1970s, when financial institutions had to adjust to unprecedented amounts of money moving across borders following the oil crises of 1972. After these politically induced market shortages and massive transfers of currencies, banks learned to move capital quickly around the world. The buying and selling of national currencies radically increased to a point by the late 1990s that its weekly value about equaled the total yearly GNP of the wealthiest country, the United States. In less than two decades of that crisis, the world had a global economy at least in terms of Acapital markets@. A second spurt in globalization came in 1989-90 after the transformations of communist political systems in Central, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. The main immediate consequence was an extension of global forces to huge 12

areas of the world that were cut off by political barriers. Those two events of recent economic and political history account for much of what is interpreted today as globalization. Yet globalization has been going on a very long time before the 1970s and the process is now institutionalized. The events of oil shortages and currency surpluses and the demise of most of the worlds closed economies were shocking stimulants to a process that has its own logic. One theoretical revolution now taking place in this process is the turnaround of democracy being a consequence of economic globalization to democracy being the primary pillar and facilitator of globalization. Many local democracies resist globalization as disturbing intrusions into their communities, but in fact the guardians of those local communities, the states, are committed to the central values of both globalization and democracy: inclusive openness. The institutions of democracy that have been put into place in the past few years are much more difficult to change than simply diverting the flows of global development away or into specific localities. The slowing down or stopping of globalization will mean that democracy in the world is in trouble. If that happens global economic growth with be imperiled. Democratic institutions have become the foundation of economic freedoms that support globalization, economic growth, and its distribution. .

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See H. Teune (2000), Has Globalization Superceded Theories of International Relations? Paper presented to the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Los Angeles, CA, March, 2000. 2 For different reasons and yet appropriate perceptions, the economic growth of the 1990s and beyond was presented by M. Rush, A Gale of Creative Destruction: The Coming Economic Boom, 1992-2020, NY: Praeger, 1989. 3 See H. Teune (2000), Modernization, Development, Democracy and Conflict, in J. V. Ciprut (ed.), Fears and Foes: Security and Insecurity in an Evolving Global Political Economy. New York: Praeger. 4 R.J. Rummel (1996), Power Kills: Democracy as a Method of Nonviolence. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Press. Also see his web site: www.hawaii.edu/powerkills 5 An example of simulation of development is J. Brunner and G. Brewer (1971), Organized Complexity: Empirical Theories of Political Development. New York: The Free Press, 6 The position here is that globalization is a process of social systems. See, H. Teune (1999), Why the World Got Big for Everybody: A Decade of Thinking about Globalization (1999), Paper delivered to the Conference on Globalization, European Integration, National Identity. Ljubljana: Faculty of Social Sciences. 7 See R. Keeley (1996), War Before Civilization. New York: Oxford. 8 The Chicago school of human ecology brought the concepts and methods of analysis to the then dividing social science disciplines, but it took intellectual residence in sociology. See, for example, A. Hawley (1950), Human Ecology: A Theory of Community. New York: Ronald Press. 9 H.Teune and Z. Mlinar (2000), The Developmental Logic of Globalization, in J.Ciprut (ed), The Art of the Feud: Reconceptualizing International Relations. New York: Praeger. 10 H. Teune and Z. Mlinar (1978), The Developmental Logic of Social Systems. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. 11 See H.Teune and Z. Mlinar, (1973), Development and the Openness of Systems in R. Strassoldo (ed), Boundaries and Regions. Trieste: Lint. 12 For a general discussion of growth and development, see H. Teune (1988), Growth. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. 13 H. Teune and Z. Mlinar, op.cit., 1978. Other references that follow are from the general theory in The Developmental Logic of Social Systems. 14 These options were discussed by A. Hirschman (1970), Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Response to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. From a developmental perspective these choices are developmentally ordered. In a poor society with few choices there is loyalty or exclusion. With some level of development, choices become available and the individual can complain and join in. At high levels of development, individuals obtain the capacity to vote with their feet. This capacity depends on options that have become available through globalization. 15 Rummel, op.cit.
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