Boer & Lycan - Who, Me

Philosophical Review
Who, Me? Author(s): Steven E. Boer and William G. Lycan Reviewed work(s): Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 89, No. 3 (Jul., 1980), pp. 427-466 Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2184397 . Accessed: 18/02/2012 14:21
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The PhilosophicalReview,LXXXIX,
No. 3 (July 1980)
WHO, ME? StevenE. Boer and William G. Lycan
which attribute firstorouslyand at lengththat sentences propositionalattitudesare semanticallyunique.1 This person number A revival. growing widespread enjoying viewis currently now maintain that the ascriptionof first-person of theorists "de or attitudes attitudes se" cannotbe reducedto theascription de of attitudes reor de dicto. Thesisisdisarmingly for The mainargument thisIrreducibility pairs: Considerthe following simpleand straightforward. is (1) a. John believesthat he himself in danger. b. John believesthat T is in danger. ('T' is to be reJohnbut term whichdenotes placed by any singular elementsuch as 'he himwhichcontainsno reflexive self.) (2) a. I believe that I am underpaid. b. I believe thatN is underpaid.('N' is to be replaced termwhichdenotes Johnbut which by any singular of containsno occurrence any formof 'I'.) is. (3) a. John knowswho he himself b. Johnknowswho T is. ('T' is again to be replacedby any singulartermwhichdenotesJohn but contains element.) no reflexive an sentence reports attitudede se and the In each pair, the first an the to by secondpurports express same proposition ascribing de argue that Castafiedaand his followers attitude reor de dicto. samenessof contentis impossible. thispurported Consider (la-b).' If some instanceof (lb) is understoodas
' See especially[9]-[12]. Castafiedacreditsthe original(but independent) attitudesto Geach [18]. of investigation first-person
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arguedvigCastafieda ago, Hector-Neri years ome fifteen
STEVEN E. BOER AND WILLIAM G. LYCAN
reporting beliefde dicto, a clearlyit would be inadequate as a paraphraseof (la): no matterhow we specifythe contentof John's belief in third-person terms(as the belief that T is in danger),willalwaysbe possible (lb) and (la) tohaveopposing it for For is truth-values. John may fail to be aware thathe himself T. And we cannotrectify matters simplyby makingthislatter as awareness part of the dictum, in (4) John believes that he himselfis T and that T is in danger lestthewholeproblem posed by theoccurrence 'he himself' of in an (1 a) breakout all overagain and trigger infinite regress. Yet an instance (Ib) wouldbe equallyinadequateiftakenas of reporting beliefde re.Granted,(la) is paraphrasedby a to (5) Johnbelieveshimself be in danger. can be paraphrased by And (lb), on a de re understanding, (6) T is such thatJohnbelieveshim to be in danger. But (6), which appears to be entailed by (5) if what replaces 'T' is a referential designator John,does notentail(5) in turn, of or so Castafiedaclaims. For it still seems possibleforJohn to believeT to be in danger(to believe of T that T is in danger) without believing himself be in danger,because (again) John to is may be unawarethathe himself T.2 Suppose Johnis looking at what he thinks a windowbut what is in facta large wallis to mirror. iswatching man in it; unbeknownst him,theman He a He homicidalmaniac witha hatchet is himself. sees a drooling creepingup behind the man "outside." Naturallyhe believes that man to be in danger and cries,'Look out behind you!', for butJohntakesno stepsto defend himself, he does notbelieve to himself be in danger. The truthof (6) explains his outcry; of inaction. thefalsity (5) explainshisregrettable subsequent
2 It is arguable that (5) is not equivalent to 'John believes of himself that he is in danger' on the ground that the latter, unlike the former, has an ordinary de re reading as well as a de se reading. Nothing in our present discussion hinges on this possibility.
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can be based upon (2a) and (3a). And the Parallel reasoning (again mutatis Irreducibility Thesis is usuallybroadenedfurther as mutandis) apply to spatial and temporaltoken-reflexives to membersof the following pairs are held well. Thus, the first (regardless respectively thesecondmembers to to be irreducible de of whether latterare understood reor de dicto): the now. (7) a. John believesthat the meetingstarts b. John believesthat the meetingstartsat t. ('t' is to be replacedby any designator thepresent of moment whichdoes not contain'now' or any of its indexical such as 'just' or 'ago'.) dependents ashoreon an uncharted island, Johnbelieved (8) a. Drifting he would findfood there. b. Drifting ashoreon an uncharted island, Johnbelieved he would findfoodat p. ('p' is to be replacedby any no of nonindexical designator the island containing elementssuch as 'he himself'.) reflexive Thesis use Those who are persuaded of the Irreducibility for of it as a springboard a variety additionalclaims on various takes the Thesis to be symptomatic topics.Castafiedahimself of a fundamentaldivision between the indexical references made bya speaker "indicators") and thosewhichthespeaker (via attributes others(via "quasi-indicators"like 'he himself'), to perwhich divisionin turn is held to betokenthe essentially spectivalcharacterof the propositionalattitudesthemselves. John Perry(in [30]; cf. [29]) takes the Thesis to show a need fordistinguishing between the "objects" of the attitudesand David Lewis(in [24]) and Roderick the"states"oftheir possessors. Chisholm (in [13]) independently employ it to motivatethe claim that all attitudesare at bottomattitudesde se. startling his relieson theThesis(in [34]) to bolster claim StephenSchiffer de directedupon the present thatonlyattitudes se and attitudes de Fodor uses the Thesis momentare genuinely reat all. Jerry (in [17]) to argue for the existenceof a semanticallyunique element,which he calls 'self, as a vocabularyelement of the
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language of thought.Romane Clark (in [14]) has turned the Thesis against some otherviews of Castafieda'sown. Andrew Oldenquisthas used it (in [27]) to bluntsome impressive traditionalarguments againstEthical Egoism. Lynne Rudder Baker (in [3]) has wielded it againstthe otherwise plausible idea that computers sometimes perform actions(e.g., whenplayingchess) (cf. also [4]). We are not persuaded.We believe the Irreducibility Thesis shouldbe repudiated.In what follows, shall set out our case we forrejecting the Thesis and formaintaining that a versionof de dicto the traditional re/de distinction adequate in itselfto is accommodateCastafieda'sdata. I Our argumentrestson two assumptions, each of which is widely acceptedthough entirely not uncontroversial. have not We the space to defendeitherof themhere; each has been argued at lengthelsewhere, both by us and by many others.We shall If ask the readerto accept themforthe sake of argument. our reasoning successful, shallat leasthave provedan interesting is we conditional conclusion. Our firstassumption(A) is that there are genuinelyde re attitudes towardordinary objects.Belief,forexample,is sometimesa genuine relationbetweena person (the believer) and anotherpersonor thing.To take the mosthackneyedexample we can think Ralph notonlybelievesthatthereare spiesand of, (because he is a competent logician) thatwhoeveris the tallest spyis a spy,but also believesofthe tallestspy (a hulkingSecret Serviceagent named 'Hooper') that he is a spy; Ralph knows and Hooper intimately manytimeshas seen him steal classified documents cafe and pass themon to a nefarious-looking patron. formulations: tallestspy,Hooper, is such that The (Alternative Ralph believeshim to be a spy; the tallestspy is believed by Ralph to be a spy.) Ralph is relatedto the tallestspy,in a way in which he is notrelated to (say) the shortest spy, merelyin virtueof believingthat there is a shortest spy. Exactly what relationthis is, is in dispute: it may be epistemic, causal, per430
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ceptual,or whatever. and it alone, allowsexistential It, generalizationof the sortcalled "quantifying in." A Assumption is not meant to implythat attitudesde reare irreducible attitudesde dicto;we and many othertheorists3 to have argued elsewherethat they are so reducible. On most accounts, beliefde reis a beliefin a dictum a whosesubjectterm has a special status.Thus, Ralph believesthat the shortest spy is a spymerely virtue believing in of thatsomespyis shorter than any other,but Ralph believesthat the tallestspy is a spy also in virtueof his acceptingsome dictum the formrN is a spy', of whereN is a singularterm of a preferred sort-it is "purely referential" (Quine [32]), "referential" opposed to "attrias butive" (Donnellan [16]), "rigid" (Kripke [21]), or whatever;4 it "represents" Hooper to Ralph (Kaplan [20]); itsuse on at least some occasions is "grounded in" its referent, Hooper himself (Devitt[15]). The termof the dictum Ralph acceptsbears a real relation-presumably causal or, other natural relation-to a Hooper,and it is thisfactwhichmediatesthe real relationthat Ralph himself bears to Hooper. No such relationobtainsin the case of the shortest spy. Our second assumption(B) is that English sentenceshave logicalforms, least in the sensethattheycan be associatedin at a principled of way withformulas a perspicuous logical theory, which formulascodify their truth-conditions relative to an of assignment values to theirindexical termsand other free variables.A theorythat assignslogical formsto sentencesof Englishin thiswayis called a "semantics for"English.As against it this, is thejob ofa "pragmatics" determine assignment to the of values to indexical termsrelativeto occasions of theiruse. Thus,a pragmatics Englishwould tellus thatwhena speaker for utters 'he' and pointssimultaneously a (male) personwho is to
suggested A 3Most notablyDavid Kaplan in [20]. Assumption is strongly by the view Kripke expressesin [21], though Kripke himselfrepudiates it in [22]. See also [7] and [15]. Castafieda himselfhas indicated to us in that he sees no substanceto A in any of its popular forms, correspondence however;and so he may agree with our conditional conclusion. We are Castafieda forhelpfuldiscussionand forhis generous grateful Professor to on comments our earlieressay [7]. between but the differences 'These notionsdo not coincide completely, themneed not troubleus here.
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present, thattokenof 'he' denotesthe personbeing pointedat. It would also tell us that any indexicaltokenof 'you' denotes the personbeing addressed,and that any tokenof 'I' denotes its utterer. Armedwithassumptions and B, we may turnback to the A questionof attitudesde se. Bluntly,what we contend is that de de attitudes se are simplyattitudes theirowners.(la) imputes to John the belief that John (that very person,regardlessof his being referred as "John" and of any other accidental to the properties has) is in danger. (2a) imputesto its utterer he of beliefthatthe utterer regardless our (again, thatveryperson, herecalling him or her 'the utterer' and of his or her uttering anything)is underpaid. (3a) is equivalent to the claim that Johnknowswho Johnis,just as Ralph may knowwho John is in the de re sense. Thus, to use a slightly more formalidiom, (la), (2a), and (3a) are respectively equivalentto (1c), (2c), and (3c): (1c) John believesofJohn that he is in danger. (2c) I believe of N that N is underpaid.('N' may be replaced by any de re third-person referenceto the speaker.) (3c) JohnknowsofJohnwho he is. Each of these sentences expresses the standard "real" or "genuine" de re relationbetweenits subject and the thingor personthat is the topic of the attitudein question;if anything is semantically noteworthy about them,it is that in thesecases thesubjectand thetopichappen to be one and thesame person. de Our denial thatattitudes (and references) se are a surd or kinkin semantics not a denial thatthereis something is special about the sortsofreflexives thatCastafiedahas singledout and abbreviatedby starredpronouns.Certainlythereis something is distinctive about them. Our contention that they are Pragsui in matically distinctive, semantically generic Castafieda's not for way. A correct pragmatics Englishwould contain a rule to the effect that reflexive back to the subjectsof pronounsrefer
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the dictain which theyoccur.5This rule or valuation function legislates that 'he himself'in (la) refers John,and that 'he to himselfin (3a) refers Johnalso. (No special reflexive to rule is needed to cover (2a), since 'I' everywhere refers the speaker to in any case.) Of course,thereare also uses of ordinary (not explicitly reflexive) pronouns thatcan have reflexive function; for example,(9) is pragmatically ambiguousas regardsthe topic of John'sbelief: (9) John believesthat he has the heartbreak psoriasis. of de 'He' in (9) could refer se to John,de reto some second party, or even anaphorically the topic of a beliefde dicto when to (as (9) immediately follows'John is thinking about your typical slum dweller'), depending on context. Attitudes de se are "special" in that they contain pronounswhose denotata are computedvia a highlydistinctive valuation function;it does not followthat thereis anything least bit odd about them the In contra semantically. particular, Castafieda,Perry, Lewis, and therest, need not admit thatthecontentofan attitudedese we is inexpressible any nonperspectival, by third-person sentence. The content John'sbeliefin (la) is the proposition of thatJohn is in danger(we mightthinkof thisproposition, la Russell,as a of and the property of being the pair consisting Johnhimself being in danger).The contentof the speaker'sbeliefin (2a) is theproposition thatthespeaker(thatveryperson)is underpaid. The content John'sknowledge (3a) is the proposition of in that Johnis such-and-such person, a wherethislast phraseexpresses what in the circumstances would call "who John is." Thus, we ifone holds thatthe objectsof propositional attitudes propare in ositions the traditional sense of that termor something like it, one can hold that the objectsof attitudesde se are ordinary in propositions just the same sense. Similarremarks apply to the spatial and temporalindexicals in occurring (7a) and (8a). 'Now' is simplya purelyreferential is or rigid designator whose referent a momentin time, and
'Actually the rule would have to be a bit morecomplicatedthan this.See Castafieda'sdiscussionin section3 of [12].
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there a pragmatic is ruleto theeffect a tokenof'now' always that refers the momentof its utterance.6 to 'There' in (8a) is a reflexive pronounwhichrefers back to the location menrigidly tionedjust before. Here, too, thereis nothing special about the semantic content of the propositionsexpressed; all that is distinctive the pragmaticrules that compute the indexical are terms' denotata. So farwe have onlystatedthisunpopularview,not defended it. But even to stateit makesa substantial contribution the to issue, sincemanypeople have becomeconvincedthatCastaiieda et al. are rightabout the Irreducibility Thesis simplyon the basis of lookingat examples such as (la)-(3a), thinking that thereis no alternative interpretation. There is an alternative: ours. However,Castafiedaand others have argued the Irreducifor bilityThesis, and so we must show what is wrongwith their To arguments. thatwe now turn. II The main argument that no nonperspectival, is third-person of sentence the formFS Vs thatT is 4' is synonymous with,or conveys just the same contentas, a corresponding sentenceof the formFS Vs that he* is 4'. For any singulartermT other than 'he*', the equivalence allegedlyfailsbecause of the truth
used attributively. Suppose that T is a definite description Let us compare(la) with the following instanceof (lb): (id) Johnbelievesthatthe onlypersonin the forest who is now about to be pounced on by a rabid leopard is in danger, where the definitedescription semantically denotesJohn but John is unaware of this. We may agree with Castafieda that (id) is not synonymous with (la). The definitedescription in
6A defenseof this suggestion, which prefigures presentattack on the our Irreducibility Thesis, appears in [25].
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of rS may not know that he* is T1.
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or (id) has narrowscope, and hence attributive predicative semantically, force; it functions forceratherthan referential saysit does. we believe, just as Russell'sTheoryof Descriptions Intuitively, contentof the beliefascribedto Johnby (id) is the not a generalproposition, a singularpredication. It is tempting thinkthe same of a propername. Consider to (le) John believesthatJohn is in danger. of The second occurrence 'John' in (le) mightbe attributiveor thatis, it mightabbreviatea description in some otherway material(cf. [5] and [6]). go proxyfora quantityof descriptive Johnmaynot is to In this case,too,Castafieda right complainthat readingof is knowthathe himself John.For on any attributive to properties expressed are 'John', "be John"is to have whatever by the matrixof the descriptionthat 'John' is abbreviating of in the contextin question, typicallyproperties John that are important speakerand hearerforthe purposesat hand. to and has those properties, John may not know that he himself "is hencemay not knowthathe himself John,"and hence may is believe that whoeverdoes have those properties in danger is withoutbelievingthat he himself in danger.Here, as in the the case of the attributive definite description, beliefascribed not toJohnby (le) is beliefin a generalproposition, in a singular description, as in the case of the attributive predication; and, de the beliefis straightforwardly dicto.So the nonequivalence of of(id) and (le) with(la) failsto countagainstour reduction de de attitudes se to attitudes re. So farwe have dealt only with the easy cases. The forceof de Castafieda'spositionlies in the factthat ostensibly re thirddo not seem to paraphrase de se person attitude ascriptions and relentlessly either.Let us now supposeexplicitly ascriptions of that the second occurrence 'John' in (le) is to be read not that but attributively, referentially; is, let us suppose that it is the personin question,and not to to functioning solelyto refer to attribute property him, so that we cannot any contingent between (le) and (la) in thewaythat explainaway thedifference between(id) and (la). Then we explainedaway the difference (le) ascribesan attitudede re.Again,we mightthinkof (le) as
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relating Johnto thepair(John,theproperty beingin danger>. of As we have said, ourclaim is thatthisrelation just thesame as is thatrecordedin (la), and that (la) is semantically equivalent to (le) on itsreferential reading. Yet there stilla strong is temptationto think thatthisis notso-that thecontent John'sbelief of as described (le) differs from by thatdescribed (la). Whence by thistemptation? All Castafiedahas to say on thispointis again thatJohnmay not know that he himselfis John. This remarkwe found to be obviouslytrue when interpreted and directed attributively againsttheattributive readingof(le). But nowwe are supposing that'John'in (le) is to be understood On purelyreferentially. thisunderstanding, what could be meant by (10)? (10) John may not knowthathe himself John. is By hypothesis, does not mean anythingof the formrJohn it maynotknowthathe himself the k',whererthekd an attribuis is tive description. does not mean "John may not know that It he himself called 'John'" or "John may not know that he is himselfis whatever person Castafieda is uniquely thinking of' or "Johnmay not knowthat he himself the war hero he is has been reading about." (10) can mean onlythat John may whatever is called or whatever he otheraccidental veryperson, properties mayhave). Now,we contend, is notat all obvious he it thatJohnmightnot knowthisfact;or, if thisis obvious,it no of longercountsagainstour reduction the de se to the de re.But thiswill take a fairamount of explaining. A "quasi-indicator"of Castafieda's type is not attributive in our sense (loosely borrowedfromDonnellan [16]).7 If it were,then the contentof the beliefascribed to John by (10) would be some singularpredication whose subject is the second occurrence 'John'in (10); and thisseems false,forprecisely of the reasonsCastafiedahimself has argued that (le) cannot be
'Lawrence Powers has pointed out to us that this claim is at odds with of one of Castafieda's own characterizations his position (cf. claim (v) on and shall not take it p. 441 of [12]). We believe the issue is terminological up here.
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not know that he himself is (strictly) identical with . . . (that
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synonymous with any de dicto belief-ascription. Presumably, if this last point is correct, the quasi-indicator functions to refer diaphanously to a person (John); we assume that this And ifthe quasi-indicator conditional, at least, is uncontroversial. refersto a person, it refersto that person without attributing any (accidental) propertyto the person (otherwise it would be attributive). Therefore it seems to be a purely referentialdesignator,even if it is not a referentialdesignator of the ordinary, nonperspectival sort; at least it picks out one and the same person in every possible world. And if so, then, since 'John' in (10) also picks out the same person in every possible world, that is the complement of (10) is an the identity-statement whose termsare rigid designators of one and identity-statement a the same personand which is therefore necessarytruth,contrary to the impressioncreated by impassioned repetitionof (10) when the referentialness 'John' in (10) is unemphasized. of identity of which How could John be ignorant of a necessary he himself is a term? There are two positions one might take here: John knows (P) He could not. Appearances to the contrary, any necessary identity provided that he knows that at least one of its terms exists. If we are tempted to say that John fails to know such an identity, this can only be because we are tacitly softening one of the relevant designators and thinking of the identity as really being contingent after all, via the Theory of Descriptions or some variation on it. Otherwise we would be taxing John with the inexplicable stupidity of failingto notice that ... (that veryperson) is identical with . . . (that very person)-that he is he! (Q) John could be ignorant of a necessary identity,because necessitydoes not guarantee aprioricity,as Kripke has pointed out (in [21]). Just as we can be ignorant of the (always necessary) truths of mathematics, we can be ignorant of other necessary truths, even very simple ones!
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We incline toward (P) rather than (Q). This is because of the appeal of a principle concerning referencethat we think is true, important,and veryeasily forgotten despite its importance. Here is the principle: C. When a purely referentialdesignator occurs transparently, even if within the scope of an operator that is capable of creating opacity, the designator is in the mouth of the uttererof the whole sentence, and in no way in the mouth of any subject to whom the utterer may be ascribing a propositional attitude. Thus, on its transparent(and true) reading, (11) carries not the least suggestion that Oedipus would own up to harboring the desire in question, were it expressed to him in those words: (11) Oedipus wanted to marry his mother.8 The designator 'his mother' is in ourmouths; we are using it to pick out the person whom we know to be the object of Oedipus' relational, de reattitude. Now likewise,let us suppose that 'John' in (12) is transparentlyreferential: (12) Ralph believes that John is a spy. (=John is such that Ralph believes him to be a spy.) (12) is, then, a de re belief-statementconcerning John, and carries no implication whatever that Ralph knowsJohn to be called 'John', that Ralph thinks of John as "John," or anything at all like that. 'John' is our (the utterer's) word; we are using it to refer to the person who is the other term of the relational predication we are making of Ralph. Applying principle C to someone's alleged ignorance of a we necessaryidentity, can support (P) at the expense of (Q). The occurrencesof 'John' in the complement of (13), let us suppose, are purely referentialdesignators:
8 Thus, in a sense, (or desires believes, Oedipus does notknowwhathe himself or wonders, ... ). Lynne Rudder Baker deploresthisfact,and a numberof that exploitit, in [2]. theories
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(13) Ralph believesthatJohn is John. Here again, by principleC, 'John' is used by us to refer the to in ever person question;itis notnecessarily usedoracknowledged by Ralph. Presuming that Ralph is aware thatJohn (that very person)exists, believesof him thathe is self-identical he under some name or description other(in order forthe belief to or be dere, name ordescription the mustsometimes have functioned referentially Ralph), and thatde rebeliefof Ralph's suffices for to make (13) true.A similarpointcan be made concerning (14) Ralph believesthatCicero is Tully. It is probablethatin any serious utterance (14) either of 'Cicero' or 'Tully' or both would be functioning flaccidly,since the belief ascribed to Ralph would normallybe an interesting beliefand not a trivialnecessaryidentity;but suppose, contraryto likelihood,that the names in (14)'s complementare understood referentially. Then what Ralph believesis that ... two ways in which we have chosen to designatethat person, and the apparent interestingness informativeness the or of complement an illusion. is The reasonthatit is hard to hear (14) in this way is that (a) it is a contemptibly weak assertion, crediting Ralph withbeliefonlyin a boring, trivially necessary of and (b) on thisreferential truth, reading,the shift designator from'Cicero' to 'Tully' would be pointless,distracting, and conversationally inept (cf. [19]). Likewise:since the singulartermsin (10)'s complement are being interpreted referentially, principleC rules that theyare to beingused by us to refer the personin question(John),and In notnecessarily byJohn ever himself. thekindofcase Castafieda is talkingabout, in particular(e.g., one in which John has amnesia or forsome otherreason does not realize that he is the personeverybody calling 'John'),theyare emphatically is not and noticeably used or countenanced John.(10)'s compleby utterer's ofexpressing factallegedly mentin thiscase is the way the to of unknown John;and so John'sown totalunawareness being called 'John' and of having any of the properties normally
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(that very person) is . . . (that very person), regardless of the
associatedwiththe name 'John'does not in the least count in it are And ifthesegrounds removed, is hard favor (10) itself. of for motivation (10). to findany further Ralph believesof John that he is a spy. Accordingto (13), Ralph also believes of John that he is he. Accordingto (14), believesofTully thathe is he, as alwayswithout Ralph further knowing that Tully is called 'Tully' or any relatedcontingent but not fact.Ralph believes,and perhapsknows,thesethings, it to speak) underourdescriptions them.Similarly, seems of (so to us, given thatJohn knowsthatJohn (that veryperson,reJohnpresumably of gardless his beingcalled 'John',etc.) exists, believesofJohn (of that veryperson,etc.) that he is identical with that veryperson;hence he believesthat,as we wouldsay refers referen(where'he himself' he inour present language, himself tiallyand so in ourmouthsto the personin question)is strictly referentially hence and identicalwithJohn(where'John'refers in our mouthsto that verysame person). This is one reason whywe want to accept (P) and deny(10).9 And if (10) is false, Castafieda'sargument collapses. response available toCastafiedais an objection The mostlikely in turnto our principleC. As we have deployed it, C entails of (theutterer's) in is that'he himself (10) and elsewhere a term our a languageand not necessarily termofJohn's.Of coursethisis 'he sinceobviously true, Johndoes notuse theexpression himself' as a name ofhimself. as Castafiedais at pains to insist, But John de 'I', does use anotherexpression, to make references se; and de of in generalascriptions attitudes se do somehowcommitthe to speakerto the subject's willingness assertthe complement, is' onlywith'I am' in place of'he himself (or to asserta suitable of translation the complement, only with the local versionof 'I am' in place ofthe local version 'he himself is'-a complicaof
(P) 9Actually,thereis an even moredecisivereason forpreferring to (Q), does knowthat ... (that one thatdoes not relyon PrincipleC: Johncertainly since presumably person)is . . . (that person)underone mode of designation, of he knowsthatJohn = John,whereboth occurrences 'John'are referential. he Therefore cannot at the same time fail to know it. Our discussionof (10) would apply equally to David Lewis's elaborated case (in [24]) of the two gods who allegedlydo not know that they themdesignatedinhabitantsof a world selvesare identicalwith certainneutrally omniscient. whichthe gods are (prepositionally) concerning
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purposes, may be ignored).So the quasitionwhich,forpresent as noncommittal regardsJohn's way(s) indicatoris not totally to himself, thewaythat(according C) an ordinary in ofexpressing designatoris. Surely, then, contraryto what is referential to in by suggested C, 'he himself' (la) and (10) refers John,not intimate but justreferentially, in somefurther way. specially We shall take up thisobjectionin some detail in Section IV thatour assumption below,but fornow let us remindourselves of B alreadyprovidesthe rudiments an answer.Of course 'he special but not himself'refers, just referentially, in a further in special way. way. Our claim is that it refers a pragmatically ' on constraint theuse of'he himself to the There is a pragmatic himself' inside the scope of a of that an occurrence 'he effect verbof propositional attitudedenotesthe subject of that verb; on pragmaticconstraints the use of intheremay be further dexical pronounsthatwill explain why(la) impliesor suggests thatJohn is willingto assert'I am in danger'. We conclude that our view is not refutedby Castafieda's alone (providedthat A and B are also acceptable). argument to Now, we may also add positivestrength our case by calling from Castafieda'sparadifferent attention a typeofsituation to the runssquarelyagainst Irreducibility digm,in whichintuition Thesis. Here is an example: PerryMason has just been approached by a murdersuspect,Larson E. Whipsnade. Whipsnade has told Mason all, asked Mason to defend him, and Mason has agreed.Justat thispoint,heavy paid him a retainer. conis official knocking heard at the door, and the following ensues. versation you and Mason: Here are the police now. They will arrest ask a lot of questions.
Whipsnade:Oh, God!
Mason: Tell them that I am your lawyer.And refuseto answerany questionspriorto the hearing.
(Police enter)
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Lt. Tragg: Good morning, counsellor. (Turning.) You're
Whipsnade! underarrest,
(to Whipsnade Tragg): Mr. Mason here is my lawyer. And
I won'tanswerany questionsuntilthe hearing.
Mason has issued the order (15) Tell them[the police] that I am yourlawyer. suppose that rTell X that P' here means Let us legalistically the precisely proposition rSayto X a sentencewhichexpresses that P'. Now, in his declarationto Tragg,Whipsnadehas told Thus etc.) is his lawyer. person, thepolicethatMason (thatvery command Whipsnadehas obeyed the unuttered (16) Tell the police that Mason (here) is yourlawyer. (16) is not equivalent Thesis is correct, But, ifthe Irreducibility by to (15) as uttered Mason, since Mason "may not knowthat is he himself Mason," and so on. And, accordingto Castafieda's view, Whipsnade has not obeyed (15), since the proposition sentencehe utteredto Tragg is not the by expressed the first as same proposition that (if any) expressedby (15)'s compleWhipsnade Thesis is correct, ment.Indeed, ifthe Irreducibility he sincenothing (Whipsnade) to is powerless obeyMason's order, what Mason expressed exactly could say to Traggwould express in using'I'. But thisconsequenceis absurd: surelyWhipsnade a can obey and has obeyed Mason's order,in as strict sense of mightcare to invoke.So much the 'obey' as any nonpartisan Thesis. worseforthe Irreducibility We suspectCastafiedamightrespondthat 'I' has a special, that operates inside certain nonperspectivalinterpretation 10 in and operators thatis in force thiscase in particular. sentential for cannot be sustained, Mason's utterance But thissuggestion de in can and should stillbe reported perspectival, se terms:
10 Such uses are discussedby Castafieda on p. 147 of [9] and on pp. 5-6 of [10]. 442
WHO, ME?
(17) Mason orderedWhipsnadeto tell the police that he himself was Whipsnade'slawyer. And one can imagine an amnesiac Mason reactingto Whipsnade's statement Tragg by snapping,"Tell him that I am to yourlawyer, you idiot,not that thisMason personis!" So faras we can see,theonlyoptionavailable to theIrreducibilityTheoristis to deny that Whipsnade has literally obeyed Mason's orderand to swallow the consequencethat the order cannotbe obeyed,but only somehowapproximated. effect, In thislatterclaim is just a special case of what the Irreducibility Thesis asserts;so perhapsour PerryMason argument begs the Castafiedain an extendedsense of that term. questionagainst But we take the argumentto show that the Irreducibility amnesiac cases Thesis'splausible consequencesforCastanfeda's and mirror cases are offset least to some degreeby itscrassly at implausible consequencesforothercases. Earlier we concluded only that our view had not been refuted ofhand by Castafieda'sdata alone. Our PerryMason out claim that our argument now entitles to make the stronger us viewis tenable, sinceintuition notaltogether theside ofthe is on adversepartyeither.This tenability our view opens the way of to a further invidiouscomparison.Since our view makes use only of semanticand pragmaticnotionsthat are already in play,while Castafieda'srequiresthe introduction a semantiof cally anomalous device (to say nothingof the complications that Perry, Lewis and the restpropose to make in our metait physicsof propositions and even in our psychology), seems to us that our view should be preferred. us explain more Let fullywhat it is that promptsus to characterizeCastafieda's starred or pronounas a surd anomalyin semantics. One would thinkthat the logical formof a propositionalin attitudeascription would be expressible standardlogic plus theappropriate sentential operator (and perhapsan intensional even if the values of some of its variablesand conabstractor), stants were intentionalobjects such as properties,Fregean senses, individual concepts, possible worlds, or world-lines. For example,the logical formof the de re ascription(12) can be plausiblyformulated follows: as
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AND WILLIAM G. LYCAN STEVEN E. BOOER
(18) BELIEVES (Ralph, John, Xx (x is a spy)).11
of that the logical forms de se But Castafiedacontendsin effect are withinthisalreadyvery attitudeascriptions not expressible rich logical idiom. In what way would he assign a semantic in variablewhichwould figure the interpretation the starred to would attribute logicalform thathis theory irreducibly reflexive to (la)?:
(19) BELIEVES (John.,,he*X, Xy (y is in danger)).
simplyby being assigned a 'He*x' in (19) is not interpreted accordingto Castafieda; if it were,our view, and denotatum, correct.Nor can the not his view, would be straightforwardly 'x' onlyto indicatethatJohn subscript (whichwe have inserted as pronoun)be regarded a variable is thereferent thereflexive of as as bound by a name functioning a quantifier, in (20) (Johnx) BELIEVES (x, x, Xy (y is in danger)), Xz for(20) attributes Johnthe property (z believesz to be in to of to danger)-i.e., the property believingoneself be in dangerwhich anyone may have, while according to Castafieda the by ascribedto Johnby (la) can be exemplified no one property is (19) to receive, then? butJohn.What semantic interpretation We mightsimplyannounce that 'he *x' "expressesJohn's ineffable concept"or the like,but forour moneythat first-person would have all the explanatoryforceof intoning'O magnum up mysterium!' offering a prayer. and
" This formulais open to considerablefurther interpretation and reinon abstract may be terpretation, at least two counts. First, the property understood as to (by inscriptionalists) a reference an open sentence,or (by some item of the Sellarsians) as a dot-quoted open sentencerepresenting servethe Russellianidea toward languageof thought. Second,we may better which we gesturedin Section I above by pairing (18)'s second and third that Ralph elements and treating that pair as being the singularproposition characterizabelieves;by doing thiswe also permita moregeneralsyntactic whose members are a (possiblynull) orderedn-tupleand an open or closed proposition/sentence.
444 tion of our primitive 'BELIEVES', as always relating its subject to some pair
WHO, ME?
genuine Lewisand Chisholmin parallel(cf.[24] and [13]) offer each proposesto treatall attitudes approachesto our difficulty: de that for as being special cases of attitudes se. Lewis suggests Johnto believe that grassis greenis forJohn to "self-ascribe" the property inhabitinga possible world in which grass is of green;Chisholmmaintainsthat it is forJohn to "directlyattributeto himself"some individuating property such as: conceiving of exactly one propositionconcerninggrass at that momentand that proposition's being true.But, cleveras it is, the expedientof insisting that all attitudes are reallya species dese is an awfully ofattitudes desperate lunge,and it is motivated only Castafieda'sdata (combined with a natural desire to by Again, of providea uniform category objectsforthe attitudes). if interpretation those data of therefore, a tenable alternative shouldpresent as itself, it has earlierin thissection,the LewisChisholmexpedientshould be eschewed. (We daresay Lewis the and Chisholmthemselves would agree.) Further, expedient involvesthe creationof a new theoretical which is primitive This factis obscuredby thecozy but onlydubiously intelligible. occurrenceof 'ascribe' in Lewis's term purely orthographic 'self-ascribe' and that of 'attribute' in Chisholm's 'directly attribute oneself.Ascription attribution, we understand to as or thisnotion,is a triadic relationbetweena person,a personor and But "self-ascription" "direct otherthing,and a property. relationsbetween a attribution oneself' are simple dyadic to Thus, it would have been less single personand a property. misleadingof Lewis and Chisholmto have introduceda new and semanticallyprimitivedyadic predicate to syntactically theserelations, such as 'glop'. Now, how are we to grasp express a the meaningof 'Johnglops the property inhabiting world of in whichgrassis green'? starred We have explained the sense in which Castanfeda's them) are a surd in semantics.It is pronouns(as he interprets to aid worthpointingout that theyoffer and comfort surds in is nature well.SupposeJohncorrectly believesthathe himself in as is and and thatthistruebelief completely nondefectively danger, etc.). Then it seemsthatJohn justified is notbeinggettiered, (he a fact. this But fact notexpressible anyordinary is knows certain by From thisand the or proposition. third-person nonperspectival
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fact thatany scientific is expressible entirely worthy assumption in objective,nonperspectival it terms, followsthat what John to knowsis inaccessible science."2Yet what he knowsis no Cartriumph, morethan is his knowing any tesianmystery gnostic or thathe himself weighs200 pounds.The factshe knowsarefacts Thesis. ofnature, and so muchtheworsefortheIrreducibility to We maintain,then,that our view is to be preferred the Irreducibility Thesis so long as it is "tenable" in the sense of accommodatingCastafieda's data and claiming some independent intuitivesupport of its own-unless,of course, some further objectionshould be raised against it that turnsout to succeed.We assumethatsuch an objectionwould takethe form uneximportant of showing that our account leaves something datum forcesus to introduce plained and that some further pronouns.In the remainderof this paper irreducibly reflexive It we shall examineseveralproposedobjections. will perhapsbe a necessary overexplain bit,sinceCastafieda'sdata do have a to hold ofour intuitions evenwhenwe cannotcome wayofgetting of up withanysounddefense hisaccountofthemas againstours. III TheMirror There is a kind of case which illustrates Objection. Castafieda's intuitionwith particular vividness,and which seemsto enforce alleged distinction the betweenattitudesde re in and attitudesde se. We mentionedsuch a case briefly exThesis; here is another: Suppose pounding the Irreducibility some disthatJohn is in the forest and is lookingat a mirror tance away, but does not know that he is lookingat a mirror (he does not see its edges). What he sees (in it) is a man, and to behindthatman he seesa fierce jungle beastgathering spring. he his Wishingto express horror, quicklycoins a name forthat 'Gonzo is in danger'. man: 'Gonzo'. He thenwhispers himself, to
12 The conflict assumpThesis and our "worthy betweenthe Irreducibility termsand set tion" is broughtout, though expressedin entirelydifferent in a different context,by Charles Sayward in [33]; Sayward's argument is criticizedin [25]. Cf. also Thomas Nagel's suggestion(in [26]) that no willeverbe able to capturetheessentially objective, scientific accountofreality of perspectival character the mental.
446
WHO, ME?
of We maysupposethattheoccurrence 'Gonzo' in thisutterance is referential and rigid; all the rightcausal, epistemic,and The man, they maybe) are present. perceptual factors (whatever himself. John'scompanion,Ralph, observing of course,is John Gonzo frommuch the same point of view,idly tokens (if) John believesthat Gonzo is in danger. Since Ralph, too,is connectedin all theright causal, epistemic, Ralph's tokenof'Gonzo' etc.,wayswiththeimagein themirror, in (I f) is also referential rigid,so that (I f) is a de rebeliefand ascription. But Ralph does not assert(la), forJohn shows no is signsat all of believingthat he himself in danger. Save for his altruisticconcern for Gonzo, John is to all appearances carefree. And had we time to ask him a fewleading questions, and perhaps thathe himself in danger, is he woulddenybelieving or offer submitto the most searchingpsychoanalysis truth to serumto help establishthis.In this case, therefore, seems (If) fromthe to be truewhile (la) seems to be false.But it follows in the foregoing section that (la) view we have put forward and (if) are exactlythe same in semanticcontent:both ascribe differ onlypragmatically. We are committed the conclusionthateither(la) and (If) to are both true or theyare both false.Which? Again, plausible could be made eitherway, such as the following: arguments (R) Both are true. (1f) is true because John is connected via a referential designatorto Gonzo (=John), and this suffices our standard account of belief de re on to ensurethatJohn'sbeliefis a real or genuinerelation between himselfand Gonzo (=John). (la) is true for exactly the same reason. (la) is still unacceptable or deviant, however,because, even though its truthflawed in conditionis fulfilled, (la) is pragmatically some way yet to be explained. (la) may even be syntactically deviant due to mislexicalization(cf. [8], ch. 5). (More on thisbelow.)
447
to John the belief that . . . (that very person) is in danger, and
(S) Both are false. (la) is falsebecause John simplydoes (=John) that he is in danger. not believe of himself becausea "reference" to (if) is false, contrary hypothesis, which is mediated by a mirrorimage to something it could not really be purely referential; could not etc., conditionsfor satisfy rightcausal, epistemic, the for referentiality, reasonsyet to be explained. as We have no clear preference between(R) and (S). One might inclinetoward (S) due to a suspicionof causal or perceptual trickis not but the mirror chains that pass throughmirrors, essentialto this kind of case."3Luckily,we need not make or defenda choice againstthe MirrorObjection in orderto save What we are able to show incounterexample. our view from stead is thatthe same kindof problemarisesforstandardcases variation. of purelyde rebelief.Considerthe following again, watchinga man-this time, a John is in the forest real (second) man, whom he has dubbed 'Wilfrid'. Wilfrid seemsto Johnto be well situatedand to have an enviable lease on life.John idly casts his eye in anotherdirectionand seems jungle to see still anotherman; behind this man is our fierce fig. in predator fullpredatory Hastilydubbingthisman 'Van', 'Van is in danger!' The alert reader will have John whispers, and that guessedthatJohnis again lookingat a distantmirror, whathe seesin it is a reflection Wilfrid; mirror showing the is of him Wilfridfroma different angle, in such a way that John can see the threatening animal in the mirror, thoughnot in the flesh. as Ralph is present beforeand tokens (21) John believesthat Van is in danger. to But Ralph would refuse assentto is (22) John believesthat Wilfrid in danger.
1"Edmund Gettier(in conversation) cases in which a person has offered sees or feelsa part of that person'sown body withoutrealizingthat directly
it is his own.
448
WHO, ME?
Johnwould not admit to believingthatWilfrid And, as before, leads a charmedlife. is in danger;he maybelievethatWilfrid of This is a nastyproblemforthe theory beliefdere.(Schiffer involvingsimple disguises.)14 If [34] raises a similardifficulty we assume that Ralph's tokensof 'Van' and 'Wilfrid'are both we purelyreferential, have the same two choices as before: (T) Both (21) and (22) are true. (21) is straightforwardly to true; (22) is true,contrary John'sand Ralph's protests,because (by principle C) the term 'Wilfrid' is in our mouthswhen we consider (22)-we have inuse heritedits referential fromits being passed along to us in the littlestorywe were told two paragraphs in the rightcausal, epistemic,etc., way, the truthconditionof (22) as we are usingit is fulfilled. (U) Neither(21) nor (22) is true.(22) is straightforwardly false. (21) is false, contrary appearances, because to a "reference" something to which is mediated by a it mirror image could not reallybe transparent; could etc., conditions not satisfy rightcausal, epistemic, the for referentiality, reasons yet to be explained. for at (21) might thesame timebe trueon some (Of course,
de dictoreading.) back. Since John is related to . . . (that very person)
As in the previouscase, we need not make a definitechoice to here.Our point in calling attention the presentcase is just case that is alleged to that it is exactlyparallel to the mirror de of cause troubleforour assimilation attitudes se to attitudes de re.The problems the same. Therefore, the case of Van if are and Wilfridhas a solution,the case of Gonzo has a solution. case Further: onlydoes themirror notpointto an irreducible not
14Schiffer ends up taking the view that our assumptionA is false-that but ourselvesand the present to we cannot make pure references anything could agree with our conditional conmoment.Thus, nominally,Schiffer Thesis is groundless, clusionthat ifA and B are true,thenthe Irreducibility and also with our claim that attitudesde se are simplyattitudes(purely)de theirowners.
449
split betweenthe de se and the de re,it supports view that our the de se is merely (pragmatically) a special case of the de re. So muchtheworse, de some maysay,forattitudes re.Perhaps the problem of Van and Wilfridshould make us reconsider whether our vague intuitive notionof an attitude"de re" is as coherent and/oras serviceable it has seemedto its patrons;" as de the mirror problemimpugnsattitudes regenerally. We have some sympathy withthisline. But to take it is simplyto reject our assumption and so to change the rulesof the (standard) A, It are gamewe are playing. remains evident thatifthere attitudes deordinary objects and other persons, thesort of thatphilosophers have traditionally thoughtthat there are, then no evidence de has yetbeen provided showwhyattitudes se are not(semanto ticallyspeaking)merely attitudesof that sort. reducibility Theoristmay attemptto bolsterhis initial appeal to our intuitions about the difference between(1a) and (I f) by in pointingto an alleged difference theirexplanatory powers. in has emphasizedthisstrategy [30].) Peo(Perryin particular ple's beliefsare supposed to be relevantto explaining their verbaland nonverbal and in the mirror behavior, case we need an explanation why of Johnshoutsa warning towardthe mirror
15 Ernest Sosa argued some years ago (in [35]) against our elitistidea of a "real relationin nature" betweena believerand the topic of his belief. More recently, numberof philosophers a have taken up this fairlyradical claim thatthere no attitudes re"in thesensewe have made use ofhere. "de are (Mark Pastin in [28]; Howard Burdick,in a talk presentedat the 1978 AustralasianAssociation of Philosophy Conference;Richard Grandy, in a talk presentedat the University South Carolina conference Pragof on matics(April,1979).) Attackshave also been made, from different a quarter, on our still vague notion of "purely referential" designation,in termsof "de whichattitudes se" are supposedly be explained.(Diana Ackerman, in to [1]; Saul Kripke, in [23].) Either or both sorts of attack may eventually be seen to succeed. So we do not insiston the truthof assumptionA. If A is false,then an entirely new pictureof reference, opacity,quantifying in, and the like,would have to be developed (forbeginnings, [1] and [31]). see Once the dust had settledfollowing this development, would then have we to return Castafieda'sissue and see whether to attitudesde se were not then reducibleto elementsof the standardapparatus of the new theory. That is a questionwhich plainlycannot be decided in advance of seeingwhat that new apparatus mightbe.
The "Explanatory Asymmetry" At this point the IrObjection.
450
WHO, ME?
Surely(it is claimed) buttakesno stepsto defend ownperson. his part of the mostnaturaland obviousexplanationis thatJohn believesthat Gonzo is in danger but does not believe that he (1f) and the denial of (la) is just himself in danger.Uttering is whatan ordinary personwould do whencalled upon to explain de John'sinutilebehavior.But if (if), understood re,is logically equivalentto (la), then no such explanationis possible. The Thesis, challenge to those of us who reject the Irreducibility a construct plausibleexplanation is then, to showhow one might containany quasi-indicator ofJohn'sactionsthatdoes not itself falsereferring Johnand thatdoes not also entail extraneous to hoods. task,but not just because of the oddness of This is a tricky of John'ssituationor because of the peculiar properties CasFor no action, howeveruncomplicated,is tanieda'sreflexives. by explainedsimply allusionto a singlebeliefheld by theagent, of even when a fairlydetailed description the agent's desires in and goals is thrownin. Beliefsfunction the productionof and doubtlessonlyin the actiononlyjointlywithotherbeliefs, contextof other of the agent's psychologicalstates, such as memoriesand perceptual conditions,even when the agent's desires held fixed. are psychoJohnmaywellhave somerelevant a him thatdistinguishes from man who thinks logical property for somemoreordinary reason(suchas hearing warning a shout) animal is about to pounce on him. Certainly that a ferocious it is agreed by all concerned(indeed, emphasized by Perry) thatJohn is in a psychological state different fromthat which reason.The afferent he would be in, had he a "more ordinary" the of and fixes reference his use of visualsignalwhichprompts the brain quite different 'Gonzo' takesa causal route through information by from thatwhichwould be traversed theauditory a shoutthatprompted use of'I' instead; generated a warning by and we may suppose (thoughcash forthis suppositioncould and cognitive be provided onlyby majoradvancesin perceptual that psychology) thesignalset up by theshoutwould reachand and intimate affect control unitin a moredirect John'sexecutive element sinceit is likely containan imperative to way,especially marked priority, for suchas 'Look out!' or thatis psychologically to thattheefferent it 'Duck!' Further, is not unreasonable think
451
signals that would result fromthe processingof the mirror view of Gonzo and the warningshoutrespectively would leave executivecontrol by accordinglydifferent routes, producing different behavioral responses.(This suggestionis much the psychological equivalent of our semioticthesisthat, although the beliefs ascribedto John by (la) and instancesof (lb) have the this is exactly same propositional content, content computed different by entirely sortsof pragmaticvaluation rules. And perhapsit givessome substanceto Perry's plausible claim that, althoughwhat John believes is the same in each of the two cases, he believesit "in different ways"-we mightadd, thirdin as personishly our case but first-personishlya resultof the warning shout.) we Fortunately, need not offer any more adequate response to the challengeat hand in orderto ward offthe Explanatory Asymmetry Objection; forwe may revert the same strategy to as that which collapsed the MirrorObjection: viz., to show that a parallel line of reasoningimpugnsbeliefde re generally if it impugnsanything. Let us returnto the case of Van and Wilfrid.We may suppose that John, having whispered'Van is in danger!',thereupon shouts,in the direction the mirror, of 'Van, look out!' But of course he does not shout anythingin Wilfrid's unless it is to add, 'Lucky so-and-so!'We direction, need an explanation of his shoutingin the directionof the mirror doingnothing but usefulin the direction Wilfrid, of the actual incipientvictim. As before,the problem is that any beliefthatJohn has de Van (that veryperson) is one that he has de Wilfrid(that very same person), tautologously;so it seemsthatwe are denied the obviousand naturalexplanation, viz.,thatJohnbelievesVan to be in dangerbut does notbelieve to Wilfrid be in danger. of This, too,is a nastyproblemforthetheory beliefdere;and, the just as before, exact parallel betweenthisproblemand the Explanatory Asymmetry Objection to our view countsin favor of our view and against the objection.One may be inclined to have doubts about the generalnotionof beliefde re on the basis of this sort of example, but (again) that is just to have doubtsabout our assumption and not to inclinetowardthe A, Irreducibility Thesis in its standardform.
452
WHO, ME?
It may still be feltthat we owe the reader more than just difference the hint we have given of how a merelypragmatic between disparatebehavior. belief-states could issuein strikingly offer detail no If so, let us pointout thatIrreducibility Theorists on thispointeither.They simplytake it as obvious that somebeliefcontent, perhaps or one's peculiarly ineffable first-person thatperson's willingness assert'I am in danger',would result to in his duckingor runningaway, whileJohn's nonperspectival beliefcontentand unwillingness use 'I' explainsJohn'sown to inaction.Whateveractual account of this causal connection they mayeventually fitto givemaywell be equally available see to us; the psychology theirineffable semantics, when attending explaarticulated, might readilybe takenoverintoa pragmatic nationof the sortwe have pointedtoward. The literature containsseveral variantson the Mirrorand can Explanatory Asymmetry Objections, each ofwhichvariants we easilybe seen to succumbto thestrategy have been pursuing re (thatofmatching dese/de difficulty a paralleldifficulty a with de 6 generated a pair ofordinary reformulations).But thereis by one argument the nonparaphrasability de se by de re forfor of mulations seemsto fail. againstwhich that strategy IV in [12]: 441) that any de se ascription impliesits subject'swillto the person, while ingness express ascribedattitudein thefirst no nonreflexive carries any such implication. attitude-ascription Thus (la) impliesthatJohnwould be willingto assert'I am in de danger',whileno instanceof (lb), even a frankly reinstance, implies this; therefore (la) is not equivalent to any instance of (lb). No parallel difficulty obtains in the case of Van and Wilfrid. difference a In thepreceding section mentioned pragmatic we de a difde between se attributions their recorrelates, striking and to in ference thevaluationrulesaccording whichthedenotataof
16E.g., Perry's argument concerning Heimson and Hume (in [29]); Perry's remarks concerning disagreement and contradiction (in [30]); and Lewis's "two gods" case (in [24]). Cf. note 9 above.
The "Special Implicatum"Objection. Castafieda contends (e.g.,
453
their respective objectterms computed. are Thereare other interesting pragmatic differences well.We intendto arguethat(la) as "implies"John'swillingness use 'I' onlypragmatically to and/ or surface-syntactically, not semantically the sense of and in entailment. we are rightin this,then the difference "imIf in plications,"which we grant,fails to count against the logical or semanticalequivalence of (la) and instancesof (Ib). But before the Special Implicatum Objection or any argument in rebuttalcan be assessed,we must inquire both what, more exactly, allegedimplicatum and whatsort "implication" the is, of the objectorhas in mind. Theoristswho take the Special Implicatum line usually express theirobjectionas we did above: that(la) impliesJohn's to willingness speak in a certainmode. And by 'implies' they characteristically seem to mean an apodeictic relation,in the sensethat in no conceivablecircumstances would (la) be true or assertibleunlessJohn were willingto expressthe relevant beliefin the first person.This strong conjointclaim can easily be seen to be wrong.For (la) may clearlybe trueeven though (23) is false: (23) John is willing to assert'I am in danger' (or some translation thereof into his lansuitablyfirst-person guage)Johnmay not be willingto assertanything, havingbeen handsomelybribedby Boer and Lycan (who will stop at nothingto gain their philosophicalends) never to assert anythingever again. Therefore:if (la) carries any "special implication," eitherthe implicatumis something otherthan (23) or else the "implication" in question is not apodeictic but is somehow defeasible. shallexamineeach ofthesealternatives turn. We in It seems clear that (la) apodeictically implies nothing(even about John's overtbehavior.For it is logically counterfactual) possibleforJohn to believe himselfto be in danger and yet neitherto behave in any particularway, nor to be counterfactuallydisposed to behave in that way (no matter what antecedent be conditions background mightfeasibly specified);
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WHO, ME?
logical behaviorismis false. Does (la) apodeictically imply something else, then? then perhaps of If any Sellarsiantheory believingis correct, "speech" about actual impliessomestatement (la) apodeictically interno about public verbalbehavior. rather thananything inforo tokening the It maybe truetoclaimthat(1a) implies actual inner of some 'I am in danger in John's "language of thought." But, as we have admitted,no instanceof (lb) impliesthis. BeforeSellarsiansamong us admit defeat and concede the Thesis, we must remindourselvesthat semantic Irreducibility is entailment not the only type of apodeictic or indefeasible What Grice has that can hold betweensentences. implication "conventionalimplicature"(as opposed to "conversacalled thatnotion, As tionalimplicature") another.17 we understand is certainwords implicates that p iff a sentenceS, conventionally of or expressions that are surfaceconstituents S, would be inchosen an utterer unlessitweretruethatp, where by appropriately the inappropriateness the indefeasibleand noncancellable is price of violatinga lexicalconventionof a certainkind. The (and hence the implicature)is "detachable" inappropriateness in Grice's sense, however,since anothersentenceS2 may be equivalentto S, in the senseof sharingS,'s truthsemantically condition,and yet not carry the conventionalimplicature, the lexical item that is governedby the due to not containing special conventionin question. The most obvious example of a lexical item of thiskind is the word 'but'. Consider but he's smart. (24) a. Hector is a philosopher b. Hector is a philosopher and he's smart. (24a) "implies" (25), while (24b) does not: tendsto precludebeingsmart. (25) Being a philosopher truthto Yet we would be reluctant suppose that (24a) differs from (24b); (24a) is notfalse (or "truth-valueless") conditionally
See Grice [19]. We believe that "conventional implicature,"whose reducibleto the notion essentialnatureGrice neverexplains,is importantly that we developedin chapter5 of [8]. of "lexical presumption"
17
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just because (25) is false.Rather,we feel,(24a) would just be inappropriately lexicalized: the utterer would have expressed a logical formthat is in facttrue,but chosen the wrongword in realizing thatlogical form thesurface. at Thus, (24a) implies (25) in an apodeictic way (the conventiongoverning 'but' is indefeasibleand noncancellable) but does not semantically entail (25). Ifwe can showthat(la)'s implication John'sinnertokening of of an * I am in danger' (grantedforthe sake of discussion)is in conventional thisway or something like it, then we will be able to turn aside the"apodeictic"version theSpecial Implicaof tum Objection, by explaining the felt implication without conceding the semantical nonequivalence of (la) and de re instances (lb). of To see how this may be done, let us join Quine, Davidson, and others regarding reporting otherpeople'sbeliefs in the of as a translational exercise. When Galileo said 'Eppur si muove' and Donald reports'Galileo said that the earth moves', Donald is notingGalileo's utterance (along withhis sinceredemeanor, it etc.) and in effect translating into words of Donald's own and his hearers'language: 'the earthmoves'.Likewise, may we of say,an utterer (la) is noting John'sassertion, in our case or innertokening, 'I am in danger' and transJohn'spresumed of lating it into the utterer's own speech. Of course,even when one speaker'sEnglishis being translated into anotherspeaker's English, certain permutationsmust be performed.If what Walterutteredin 1935 was 'The USA will put a man on the moonby theyear2000', we would now translate by ascribing it to Walterthe statement the beliefthatthe USA would or put a man on themoonby theyear2000. In general, pronouns, tenses, modal auxiliaries,and otherlexical itemsare shiftedin such in to from believer's the waysin response theoverallshift context overtor inner tokeningto the (normallysubsequent) beliefare And theseshifts largelya matterof convention. report. Let us continueto suppose thatJohn inwardlytokenedan I am in danger*. Certainly would be expectedto translate we in as this, thescope ofan assertion beliefoperator, 'He was in or ratherthan danger' (where'he' is equivalent to 'he himself'), as 'Johnis in danger' or even 'Johnwas in danger'. More to
456
WHO, ME?
the point,ifwe did ascribeto Johnthe beliefthat "he himself was in danger,"we would simplybe mistranslating whatJohn if actuallyhad tokenedwas not an I am in danger but some third-person utterance. But exactlywhat sortof solecismwould we have committed? Accordingto the Irreducibility Thesis, we would have mistranslated John in the sense of substituting forhis utterance semantically a inequivalentone. But this has not been proved.So far as has been shown,thereis simplya convention the effect translational to thatwe translate subject's a as designator 'he himself'when that subject is presumed to have tokened'I' (or an JIG).If this suggestion right,then is if a speakerused 'he himself'in the complementof a beliefreport concerning subject a whohad notat leastinwardly tokened 'I' (or an *I) but only some neutraldesignator, the speaker would have lexicalized that belief-report an inappropriate in and indefeasibly contraconventional way. But to say this is to precisely saythata sentence (1a) conventionally like implicates thatJohnspoke in the first if (la) conventionally person.And implicates that,nothing forces to admitthat(la) semantically us entails that-indeed, few sentencesdo entail what they also conventionally implicate. Incidentally, our notion of "lexical convention"(motivated in independently [8]) also will accountforthe existence what of we mightcall "reflexive verbs."1 Consider to the (26) a. Johnconfessed committing murder. b. JohnadmittedthatT had committed murder. the (27) a. John intendedto knockRalph's block offforconhim around. stantly following b. John intendedthat T knockRalph's block offfor him around. constantly following (28) a. John rememberedbeing tricked by mirrorsin the past.
8Jerry Fodor's argument (in [17]) for the existence of his syntactically unique morpheme 'set' is based on the behavior of such verbs. Herbert Heidelberger has called our attention to more examples.
457
b. John rememberedthat T had been trickedby mirrors the past. in (In each case, let 'T' be replaced as beforewith some purely of referential third-person but designator John.) A proponent of the Irreducibility Thesis would naturally deny that the to first members the threepairs are equivalent respectively of the second members.This is because (26a), (27a), and (28a) are feltto implyrespectively thatJohn'sadmissionwas made in thefirst was person, thathis intention (inwardly)formulated in thefirst whichexpressed person, and thatthe"innersentence" sentence. But notice that John's memorywas a first-person whatgoeswrong with(26a), (27a), and (28a) whentheseimplications are false is again that the speaker's superficialchoice of words is inappropriate:'confess','intended to', 'remember being'. is both possible and plausible to suppose that these It particularwords are governedby lexical conventionsof the same sort as 'but' is, and hence that the "implications"felt ratherthan entailments. hereare conventional implicatures The "apodeictic" version of the Special Implicatum Obour jectionhas failedto refute account.To settleany remaining doubt about this, let us employ a device recommendedby Kripke ([22]: 265): we can imagine a language which is just like English,except that we stipulate that our account is true of it. That is, in that language (called '"English" ') (la) and de othersuperficially se ascriptions semantically are equivalent simply to de re ascriptionswhich employ purely referential theirdistinctiveness being only pragthird-person designators, matic in the way(s) we have mentioned;and our lexical con"reflexive indirect and governing ventions discourse concerning verbs"are in force.(PrinciplesA, B, and C are also stipulated to be trueof"English".) We do notsee any way in which"Engfromthat of their verbal behaviorwould differ lish"-speakers' in the real world. If we are English-speaking counterparts at that therewould be no difference all in rightin thinking their speechhabits,thennothing provesour accountto be false; has shownor could show that English no datum or argument in the way we have stipulatedthat "Engitself does not work lish" does.
458
WHO, ME?
Thesis to Of course,we have not proved the Irreducibility argument of either; doubtthatanyknockdown we be false English Mason argument side,unlessourPerry is tobe obtainedon either qualifiesas one. All we have done is to show that our view is to tenable(which may have come as a surprise some students and to draw the teeth on of the literature indexicalreference) for of some leading objectionsto it. Our preference our account Thesis is based the Irreducibility over any that incorporates only on our reluctanceto accept "essentialindexicals"(to use Perry'sphrase) as surds in semanticsand "perspectivalfacts" as surdsin nature,when the data can be fairlyplausiblyaccommodatedwithin the familiarsemioticapparatus that we already do and must employ forhosts of otherpurposes.All reasonfor we are claimingis thatwe have one solid systematic reason rejecting Thesisand have been shownno convincing the foracceptingit. It remainsto returnto the non-"apodeictic"versionof the Special ImplicatumObjection. Accordingto this version,(la) this"suggestion" (23) strongly suggests in someway eventhough An feature and hencenotan entailment. interesting is defeasible between(la) and any instanceof (lb) of thisclaimed disparity to is thatit does not seem to be explicableby reference Gricean eventhough reasoning the associated conversational implicature, with conversational does account for frequently implicatures The reason it that are not entailments. "strongsuggestions" seemsas though Gricecannothelp us hereis thatconversational by unlikeconventional ones,are generated logical implicatures, forms sentence-meanings or themselves, quite apart fromthe vagariesof theirsurfacerealizations;hence, if (la) conversaof tionally implicates(23) and instances (Ib) do not, then (la) instanceof (lb).19 is not semantically equivalentto any in we Nevertheless, can explain the disparity "strongsuggesto tion" by reference Gricean considerations plus some further
19One can interpretat least some of Grice's "maxims" as relating to surface form. For example, the maxim 'Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity)' certainly suggests that one would be in violation of it if, given two ways one terse and the other verbose, one of expressing one and thesame proposition, were to utter the verbose candidate. The interpretation offered in the text, however, seems to us to be closer to the general spirit of Grice's essay.
459
STEVENE. BOER AND WILLIAM G. LYCAN
pragmatic factors that are sensitive to surface form. The mechanisms involvedare quite simple:(i) it is mutuallyknown that 'I' is pragmaticallydistinin our linguisticcommunity guished in English by the fact that a speaker who uses it (ii) automaticallymakes a self-reference. John is an English coma speakerand (by hypothesis) memberof our linguistic in to munity. (iii) People almostneverrefer themselves any but to or the first person;a personmakinga de rereference himself 'I' forthispurpose(though herself normally is expectedto use thisexpectathereare special conventions thatcan contravene tion in certainformalcircumstances, such as the authoringof formal reviews). Ifa personhas a proposi(iv) essays and literary de a personX, we would expectthe ownerof the tionalattitude to attitude voiceitbyreferring X in a contextually to appropriate as way.Therefore, ifX is one and thesame person thesubject (v) oftheattitude, would expectthesubjectto voice theattitude we 'I' in any appropriate Conenvironment. linguistic by tokening attributes to sequently, (vi) if one clearlyand unambiguously invitesone's audience John an attitudede John, one thereby that to to infer John'swillingness use 'I'. (Notice, incidentally, device the fact of John's idiolect'scontainingthe distinctive 'I' is purely hunchbackof gradeIgor,the infamous contingent. B horror to as movies,always refers himself 'Igor'; his idiolect It lacksthe first personaltogether. is solelyin virtueof the conwe tingent collateral information possess-i.e., the sort of inin formation recorded (i)-(iv) above-that we expectJohnto use to 'I', whether aloud or silently himself.) But why,then,do we not have this expectationanent any of just to showthatJohn's instance (Ib) or (Ic)? It is notenough to suggestedby (la): we willingness use 'I' is pragmatically in not mustalso showthatit is emphatically suggested thesame of formulations the same or any other way by nonreflexive The answerlies in the phrase 'clearly content.20 propositional
20 David Austin has reminded us of the need to explain whyJohn is not case of Castafieda's type, willing to use 'I' in, say, an amnesia or mirror de that he is still in a positionto make references John.It is hard to granted thinkof a plausible explanation; but again there is a parallel in the case ofVan and Wilfrid: whyis Johnnot willingto use 'Van' in alluding to what he direction looksin, or 'Wilfrid'in talkingabout what he he sees in thefirst sees in the mirror?
460
WHO, ME?
and unambiguously' conclusion(vi) above. in Due to the distinctive pragmaticvaluation rule governing de quasi-indicators like 'he himself,(la) is unambiguouslyre: it of is a de reascription whosepragmaticsuggestion the subject's indexical self-reference using 'I' is unclouded by misleading (Ib) will have connotations any sort.But nothing the form of of this pragmatically and syntactically unambiguous character. Any instance of (lb) will be at least potentiallyambiguous invitation in ways which cloud and cancel the conversational extended by (la). As we mentionedearlier,any instance of de (Ib) can be understood dicto well as de re: 'T' may be reas (or placed by an attributive name or description by a pronoun of lazinessechoingone of these).These de dicto understandings, which themselves course carryno suggestion the sort at of of issue, farmorecolloquialand mucheasiertohear.We suppose are thatthereare two reasonsforthis: (a) It seems that thereis a conversational maxim to the effect that one should be unamto extraordinary biguouswhenone is in a position do so without a gives effort; speakerwho tokensan instanceof (lb) therefore us reasonto suspectthatJohnis not willingto use 'I', or at least thatthe speakeris unpreparedto claim thatJohn is willingto do so. (If the speakerwere prepared to claim that and were also properly the concernedto be unambiguous, speakerwould since employ the properly reflexive himself construction, 'he that construction forcesthe de re reading.) (b) A pragmatic mechanismparallel to the one we sketchedabove concerning 'I' also governsreflexives Castafieda's type, including 'he of himself; as we have seen, this phrase is pragmaticallyvery makesa specialized,in thata speakerwho uses it automatically de rereference the subject of his sentence;since this special to device exists,people almost neverfail to use it when making de rereferences the relevanttype; therefore, a speakerexif of as fromusing a reflexive, when uttering (le), plicitlyrefrains hearershave statistical groundsforsupposingthat something is up-presumably that the belief being ascribed to John is The most obattitudede John himself. not a straightforward available alternativeis that the second occurrence trusively and of 'John' in (le) is functioning nonreferentially, hence ratherthan de re. thatthe beliefin questionis de dicto
461
suggestion Reason (b) can be regarded a Gricean-cum-lexical as speaker also. If thereis a maximto theeffect thata cooperative is colloquial when possible,an utterer (ic), who forgoesreof flexivization and thus speaks noncolloquially,is cooperative onlyifhe is not in a positionto be colloquial, viz., onlyifhe is notmaking straightforwardrereference Johnin tokening a de to 'John'forthe second time. As before, can imaginethatthereis an alien but Englishwe like language which worksin the way we have described; in fact, we can stipulate that our already imagined language, "English", does. And again it seems that nothingabout the actual speechor behaviorof English-speakers the real world in impugns hypothesis "English" and Englishare one and the that the same. We mentionedin introducing Special Implicatum Obthe it seemedto have no parallelin thecase ofa pair of jectionthat This suchas 'Van' and 'Wilfrid'. referential ordinary designators is true only on the objection's"apodeictic" version;thereis a termsthat we think two nonreflexive referential case involving of createsa parallel disparity "implications,"and that thereforeservesto show that if the Special Implicatum Objection the supports nonequivalenceof (la) with (ic) and instancesof de Suppose (lb), it impugns notionofbelief remoregenerally. the someonetokens (29) John believesthat 'Cicero' is an adjective. Since the quote-name ' 'Cicero' ' rigidly designates 'Cicero' and lacksany standardattributive (29) is a straightforward use, de reattribution, adequately paraphrasedby (30) Johnbelievesof 'Cicero' that it is an adjective. But, interestingly, people tend to hear (29) as suggesting (31) John accepts ' 'Cicero' is an adjective', eventhough (31) is clearlynotentailedby (29) or (30) evenwith thatJohn'slanguageis theadditionofour operative assumption
462
WHO, ME?
by English.The reason that (31) is suggested (29) and (30) is not farto seek:whatever is thatJohn "says to himself'must it involvesome rigiddesignator 'Cicero'; but ' 'Cicero'' is the of canonical name of 'Cicero' in our (=John's) language,and the absence of any other customaryrigid designatorof 'Cicero' uses ''Cicero'' makesit overwhelmingly likely thatJohnhimself to designate'Cicero'. Consequently, tend to hear (29) as we explainingsuch factsas thatJohnjust now uttered'Ralph is looking veryCicero today'.For,surely, Johnaccepts' 'Cicero' if is an adjective' (if (31) is true),then in virtueof the peculiar feature quote-names(that one can see what theydesignate), of Johncannotfailto be aware ofthefactthatthewordhe believes to be an adjectiveis thevery in wordhe employed hisutterance. Notice how the "diaphanous" character of quote-names parallelsthatof 'I': in each case we feelthatone who uses such an expression, long as he understands language,cannot so the fail to knowwhom or what he is designating. lightof this, In one can use (29) to mimic the originalargumentforthe IrreThesis.Tongue firmly cheek,we could claim that in ducibility the a (29) expressed special kind of belief-a beliefde verbo-on groundthat nothingof the form(32) can capture its force: (32) JohnbelievesthatW is an adjective.('W' is to be reof placed by any nonquotational designator 'Cicero'.) For John may fail to believe thatW = 'Cicero'! Now it seems are thatthere no clearin light theforegoing of discussion tolerably de parallelbetween irreducibly verbo beliefs; giventhepragmatic de de de beliefs verbo beliefs se, it seemsthat"irreducibly se" and beliefs down the same drain.Our pragmaticconsiderations are sui sort obviatetheneed for either generis ofattitude. positioning or There may be hidden difficulties, new objectionsno one we which resistboth the strategies have has yet put forward, in thispaper. But fornow it seemsto us thatthe most employed reasonableanswerto the skeptical'Who, me?' is 'Yes; you'.
The Ohio State University
21 We are gratefulto Max Cresswell,Edmund Gettier,Herbert Heidelberger, David Austin,Lynne Rudder Baker, and Murray Kiteley for very criticisms an earlierdraftof thisessay. of helpful
463

REFERENCES
[1] Ackerman, D.,
"Proper Names, Propositional Attitudes and NonDescriptive Connotations," Philosophical Studies 35 (1979). "Underprivileged Access," in preparation. "Why Computers Can't Act," American Philosophical Quarterly, forthcoming. "On Making and Attributing Demonstrative Reference," Synthese, forthcoming.
[2] Baker, L. R., [3] Baker, L. R., [4] Baker, L. R.,
[5] Boer, S., "Attributive Names," NotreDame Journalof Formal Logic 19 (1978). [6] Boer, S., "Proper Names and Formal Semiotic," Synthese (1978). 38 [7] Boer, S. and W. Lycan, [8] Boer, S. and W. Lycan, "Knowing Who," Philosophical Studies 28 (1975). "The Myth of Semantic Presupposition," in A. Zwicky (ed.) Papers in Nonphonology(Ohio State Working Papers in Linguistics, No. 21: May, 1976); also distributed by the Indiana University Linguistics Club.
[9] Castafieda, H.-N., [10] Castafieda, H.-N., [11] Castafieda, H.-N.,
"'He': A Study in the Logic of Self-Consciousness," Ratio 8 (1966). "Indicators and Quasi-Indicators," American 4 PhilosophicalQuarterly (1967). "On the Phenomeno-Logic of the I," Proceedingsof the XIVth International Congressof Philosophy (1968). 3 "On the Logic of Attributions of SelfKnowledge to Others," Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968).
[12] Castafieda, H.-N.,
[13] Chisholm, R., "On the Meaning of Proper Names," unpublished MS.
464
WHO, ME? [14] Clark, R., "Not Every Act of Thought Has a Matching Proposition," presented to the 1979 Oberlin Philosophy Colloquium.
[15] Devitt, M., Designation, (Columbia UniversityPress, forthcoming). [16] Donnellan, K.,"Reference and Definite Descriptions," The PhilosophicalReview 75 (1966). [17] Fodor, J., The Languageof Thought (Harvester, 1976). [18] Geach, P., "On Belief About Oneself," Analysis18 (1957). [19] Grice, H. P., "Logic and Conversation," in P. Cole and J. Morgan (eds.) Syntax and Semantics: SpeechActs,vol. 3 (Academic Press, 1975).
[20] Kaplan, D., "Quantifying In," Synthese (1968). 19 [21] Kripke, S., "Naming and Necessity," in D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds.) Semantics of Natural Language (D. Reidel, 1972). [22] Kripke, S., "Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference," Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 2 (University of Minnesota, Morris: 1977). [23] Kripke, S., "A Puzzle About Belief," in A. Margalit (ed.) Meaning and Use (D. Reidel, 1979). [24] Lewis, D., "Attitudes De Dicto and De Se," The Philosophical Review87 (1979).
[25] Lycan, W., "Eternal Sentences Again," Philosophical Studies 26 (1974). [26] Nagel, T., "What Is It Like to be a Bat?" The Philosophical Review82 (1974). "The Possibility of Selfishness," American PhilosophicalQuarterly (1980) 17
[27] Oldenquist, A.,
and Phenomenological [28] Pastin, M., "About De Re Belief," Philosophy Research34 (1974). [29] Perry,J., "Frege on Demonstratives," The PhilosophicalReview 87 (1977). [30] Perry,J., "The Problem of the Essential Indexical," Nouis 13 (1979).
465
STEVEN E. BOER AND WILLIAM G. L YCAN [31] Plantinga, A., "The Boethian Compromise," American Philosophical Quarterly (1978). 15 [32] Quine, W. V. O., [33] Sayward, C., [34] Schiffer, S., Wordand Object(M.I.T. Press, 1960).
"Propositions and Eternal Sentences," Mind 77 (1968). "The Basis of Reference," Erkenntnis (1978). 13
[35] Sosa, E., "Propositional Attitudes De Dicto and De Re," Journal ofPhilosophy (1970). 67
466

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Philosophical Review

No. 3 (July 1980)

WHO, ME? StevenE. Boer and William G. Lycan

arguedvigCastafieda ago, Hector-Neri years ome fifteen

STEVEN E. BOER AND WILLIAM G. LYCAN

STEVEN E. BOER AND WILLIAM G. LYCAN

STEVEN E. BOER AND WILLIAM G. LYCAN

STEVEN E. BOER AND WILLIAM G. LYCAN

of rS may not know that he* is T1.

STEVEN E. BOER AND WILLIAM G. LYCAN

not know that he himself is (strictly) identical with . . . (that

STEVEN E. BOER AND WILLIAM G. LYCAN

(that very person) is . . . (that very person), regardless of the

STEVEN E. BOER AND WILLIAM G. LYCAN

STEVEN E. BOER AND WILLIAM G. LYCAN

Lt. Tragg: Good morning, counsellor. (Turning.) You're

(to Whipsnade Tragg): Mr. Mason here is my lawyer. And

I won'tanswerany questionsuntilthe hearing.

AND WILLIAM G. LYCAN STEVEN E. BOOER

(18) BELIEVES (Ralph, John, Xx (x is a spy)).11

STEVEN E. BOER AND WILLIAM G. LYCAN

to John the belief that . . . (that very person) is in danger, and

STEVEN E. BOER AND WILLIAM G. LYCAN

STEVEN E. BOER AND WILLIAM G. LYCAN

The "Explanatory Asymmetry" At this point the IrObjection.

STEVEN E. BOER AND WILLIAM G. LYCAN

The "Special Implicatum"Objection. Castafieda contends (e.g.,

STEVEN E. BOER AND WILLIAM G. LYCAN

STEVEN E. BOER AND WILLIAM G. LYCAN

STEVEN E. BOER AND WILLIAM G. LYCAN

STEVENE. BOER AND WILLIAM G. LYCAN

STEVEN E. BOER AND WILLIAM G. LYCAN

STEVEN E. BOER AND WILLIAM G. LYCAN

[1] Ackerman, D.,

[2] Baker, L. R., [3] Baker, L. R., [4] Baker, L. R.,

[9] Castafieda, H.-N., [10] Castafieda, H.-N., [11] Castafieda, H.-N.,

[12] Castafieda, H.-N.,

[27] Oldenquist, A.,

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Boer & Lycan - Who, Me

Boer & Lycan - Who, Me