Income Inequality and Voter Turnout

INcome INequalIty aND Voter turNout
Daniel Horn
GINI DIscussIoN PaPer 16 october 2011 GrOwInG InequALItIeS ImPACtS
Acknowledgement
Earlier version of this paper was presented at the GINI Year 1 conference in Milan, February 4-5. 2011. Comments from the participants and comments from Mrton Medgyesi and Tams Keller are warmly acknowledged. Remaining errors are solely mine.
October 2011 Daniel Horn, Amsterdam General contact: gini@uva.nl
Bibliographic Information
Horn, D. (2011). Income inequality and voter turnout - evidence from European national elections. Amsterdam, AIAS, GINI Discussion Paper 16.
Information may be quoted provided the source is stated accurately and clearly. Reproduction for own/internal use is permitted.
This paper can be downloaded from our website www.gini-research.org.
Income inequality and voter turnout

Evidence from European national elections
Daniel Horn
trKI Social research Institute (trKI) Institute of economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences
17 October 2011 DP 16
Daniel Horn
Page 4
table of contents
abstract ......................................................................................................................................................................7 1. Voter turNout aND INequalIty..................................................................................................................................11
1.1.Hypotheses ...............................................................................................................................................................16
2. Data aND methoD ...................................................................................................................................................17 3. results ...............................................................................................................................................................21

3.1.Declining turnout hypothesis 1 ...........................................................................................................................21 3.2.Income bias hypothesis 2a ...................................................................................................................................22 3.3.Inequality on the top and at the bottom hypothesis 2b .....................................................................................24 3.4.Universal welfare states hypothesis 3 ................................................................................................................25
4. coNclusIoN aND further commeNts ............................................................................................................................29 refereNces..................................................................................................................................................................31 aPPeNDIx ....................................................................................................................................................................33 GINI DIscussIoN PaPers ................................................................................................................................................47 INformatIoN oN the GINI Project.....................................................................................................................................49
Page 5
Daniel Horn
Page 6
Abstract
The paper looks at the link between inequality and voter turnout, and derives three hypothesis from previous literature. It is shown that inequality associates negatively with turnout at the national elections (hypothesis 1). Although this is not a very strong effect, but it is net of several factors affecting voter turnout that are empirically well proven such as individual characteristics or different features of the political system. The literature suggests that this negative association is either due to the lower turnout of the poor relative to the rich in high inequality countries (hypothesis 2) or due to the effects of the universal welfare state, which increases turnout through altered social norms as well as decreases inequality through government intervention (hypothesis 3). Although none of the hypotheses were refuted, neither was really supported by the data. I also tested whether inequalities at the top or at the bottom have a different affect on turnout. Although the results, again, are not very robust, it seems that larger differences in income between the very rich and the middle decreases overall turnout, while higher difference between the middle and the very poor increases turnout. This is just the opposite of what is expected from the Downsian rational voter model.
JEL codes: D72, D63
Page 7
Daniel Horn
Page 8
While effects of individual resources and institutional characteristics on political participation have long been established, there is no knowledge of the effect of inequality on political participation. In particular, does an increase in inequality mobilize or de-mobilize citizens to participate in politics? We know only a little how societal environment affects voter political participation. Inequality, for instance, can have an impact through changing social norms (Lister 2007), through altered political agenda (Solt 2010; Mueller and Stratmann 2003) or through other chanels (Paczynska 2005). It is thus likely that in societies with greater income inequalities, we should observe polarization of participation modes, where higher inequality will be associated with a larger divergence of participation. This paper looks only at one of these modes of political participation: voter turnout. Although voting can be seen as the least unequal type of participation, it is still far from being unbiased (Lijphart 1997). We know that voting is strongly conditioned on socio-economic position (Geys 2006b; Lijphart 1997; Blais 2006; Gallego 2007), on civic resources (Verba et al 1995), and also on country level factors (Geys 2006b, 2006a; Blais 2006). But we know less about the link between inequality and voter turnout. This paper will look at this link, and speculate about the possible reasons why inequality might influence voter turnout. In the following, I first review the current literature on the link between inequality and voter turnout, and derive some hypotheses from these. The next section introduces the European Election Survey (EES) data which is used to test the hypotheses, and executes the tests. The third section speculates about the results, while the last section concludes.
Page 9
Daniel Horn
Page 10
1.
Voter turnout and inequality

Voter turnout has been low and steadily declining, especially in the developed countries, throughout the last
decades (e.g. Lijphart 1997). The average European voter turnout was around 85% up until the mid-80s, and has dropped a massive 10-15 percentage points ever since. This drop is partly due to the introduction of the ten Central-Eastern European (CEE) countries into the European community, but can also be observed within the Western-European states, although to a smaller extent, as well as within the CEE part of Europe (see 1. figure below and 10. figure in the appendix).
1. 1. figure Average voter turnout in European countries figure Average voter turnout in European countries
Voter turnout, parlamentary elections
non-CEE
90
CEE
50 1940
Source:IDEA
60
70
80
1960
1980
2000
20201940
1960
1980
2000
2020
Year
Voter turnout, parlamentary elections 60 70 80 90
all Europe
1940
Source:IDEA
1960
1980 Year
2000
2020
Similarly, income inequalities have grown during the last couple of decades. This trend is
than two-thirds of the OECD countries, independent of the utilized measure (OECD 2008). Income inequalities tend to fluctuate much less than voter turnout (see 2. figure below and 11. figure in the appendix). Also, it is
observable in more than two-thirds of the OECD countries, independent of the utilized
Similarly, income inequalities have grown during the last couple of decades. This trend is observable in more
measure (OECD 2008). Income inequalities tend to fluctuate much less than voter turnout (see 2. figure below and 11. figure in the appendix). Also, it is questioned whether the observed
questioned whether the observed variance of the indicatorsdue to the actual to the actualof social inequalities or variance of the indicators of inequality are of inequality are due variance variance of social inequalities or rather due to measurement bias. rather due to measurement bias.
Nevertheless, both voter turnout and measures of income inequality vary considerably between countries. The argument that we should only observe income measures to change very little or very slowly would question the adequacy of time series models (unless data for a long period were available). But variance between countries offers the possibility to identify the relation between inequality and voter turnout using cross-country models.
Page 11
Daniel Horn
Nevertheless, both voter turnout and measures of income inequality vary considerably between countries. The argument that we should only observe income measures to change very little or very slowly would question the adequacy of time series models (unless data for a long period were available). But variance between countries of-
2. figure Average Gini coefficient in European countries
fers the possibility to identify the relation between inequality and voter turnout using cross-country models.
2. figure - Average Gini coefficient in European countries

non-CEE
32
CEE
Gini
26 1995
Source:Eurostat
28
30
2000
2005
2010
1995
2000
2005
2010
year
all Europe
Gini 28 28.5 29 29.5 30 30.5
1995
Source:Eurostat
2000
year
2005
2010
In order to minimize measurement bias, I use several indicators of inequality (see 2. table in
Beside the Eurostats income Gini coefficient I use a the appendix). Beside the EurostatsGini of earnings (SSO 2009), an s80/s20use (SSO 2009), the income Gini coefficient I ratio a Gini of earnings (SSO mean distance from the median indicator 2009), the mean distance a poverty rate from the indicator of Lancee 2009), an s80/s20 ratio (SSOof Lancee and van de Werfhorst (2011),from the medianStatistics on van de Werfhorst (SILC) database and two rate from one Statistics on Income andIncome and Living Conditions(2011), a poverty p95/p5 measures,the from the Luxembourg Income and Living Study (LIS) (Tth and Keller 2011) and one from the SILC database. These all one overall the Luxembourg Income Conditions (SILC) database and two p95/p5 measures,indicate from income inequali-
In order to minimize measurement bias, I use several indicators of inequality (see 2. table in the appendix).
Studyalso look (Tth and above and2011)the median. I from the SILC database. These indices ties. I (LIS) at inequalities Keller below and one use the above and below the median MDMI all indicate overall incomeand van de Werfhorst 2011) and the p95/p50 and p50/p5 figures fromand below the SILC databasesuse the above (Lancee inequalities. I also look at inequalities above the LIS and from the median. I and belowinthe appendix). MDMI indices (Lancee and van de Werfhorst 2011) and the p95/p50 (see 3. table the median and p50/p5 figures from the LIS and from the SILC databases (see 3. table in the appendix).
3. figure below shows the association between voter turnout and different measures of income
inequalities. Apparently, the association is not very strong, and negative if any. This mild association is unsurprising if we consider that voter turnout is directly influenced by many factors, mostly unrelated to inequalities. Below I summarize the main driving forces Page 12 of voter turnout and also present some hypotheses about the relation of inequality and
3. figure below shows the association between voter turnout and different measures of income inequalities. Apparently, the association is not very strong, and negative if any. This mild association is unsurprising if we consider that voter turnout is directly influenced by many factors, mostly unrelated to inequalities. Below I summarize the main driving forces of voter turnout and also present some
3. figure the association between measures of income inequality and voter turnout
hypotheses about the relation of inequality and turnout.
3. figure the association between measures of income inequality and voter turnout
100
MT
100
Voter turnout 40 60 80
IT
SI
HU FI CZ SK
IE
ES LV
PT FR EEUK BG PL LT RO
LU BE CY DK SE AT NL DE
GR
LU MT BECY DK GR SE NL AT IT DE ES HU FI CZ IE PT SI EE FR UK SK
LV LT PL RO
BG
20
20
25
30 35 Gini, Eurostat 2009
40
20 10
20
30 40 Poverty, SILC
50
60
100
DE
IT
SI CZ FI FR SK
ES HU IE EE LV UK PL
PT LT
DK SE NL AT
BE LU CY
100
GR
BE DK
LU CY GR SE AT ITNLDE ES HU IE FI CZ SI UK EE LV FR SK PL LT
PT
20
.3
.4
.5
MDMI
.6
.7
.8
20 .2
.25
.3 .35 earning Gini, SSO
.4
(source: European Election Study/Piredeu, Eurostat, SILC, Lancee-v.d.Werfhorst, SSO)
(source: European Election Study/Piredeu, Eurostat, SILC, Lanceev.d.Werfhorst, SSO)
The most often used model to predict individual voter turnout is the Downsian rational vote The most often used model to predict individual voter turnout is the Downsian rational voter model (Downs
model (Downs states that The model states that people decide whether they willexpected not base 1957). The model 1957). people decide whether they will vote or not based on an expected utility. The vote or
on an expected utility. The expected utility is versusbenefit from their choice elected, being th utility is the benefit from their choice (party) being the winner the the disutility of another party being (party)
winner versus probability of their vote being decisive and the costs ofelected, multiplied by the probability o the disutility of another party being voting subtracted from this. The paradox multiplied by the
of (not) voting is thus the fact that this equation is likely to be negative if many people vote (since the prob-
their vote being decisive and the costs of voting subtracted from this. The paradox of (no
ability of a vote being decisive is almost nil, while the costs of voting is likely to be greater than zero), but if few
voting is thus the fact that this equation is likely to be negative if many people vote (sinc
people vote the expected utility is certainly positive (since the probability of a vote being decisive is great). Many resolutions for this paradox have been developed (see Geys 2006b for a comprehensive review). The addition of
the probability of a vote being decisive is almost nil, while the costs of voting is likely to b
greater than zero), but if few people vote the expected utility is certainly positive (since th
probability of a vote being decisive is great). Many resolutions for this paradox have bee
consumption benefit (Riker developed (see Geys and Ordeshook 1968), taking ethical or altruistic preferences into account (Goodin 2006b for a comprehensive review). The addition of consumptio
benefit (Riker and Ordeshook 1968), taking ethical or altruistic preferences 13 into accoun Page
(Goodin and Roberts 1975), the minimax regret strategy (Ferejohn and Fiorina 1974) or gam
Daniel Horn
and Roberts 1975), the minimax regret strategy (Ferejohn and Fiorina 1974) or game theoretical approaches (Palfrey and Rosenthal 1983, 1985; Ledyard 1984) have all tried to address the paradox of voting. Indeed, the pure Downsian model of voting addresses the questions of marginal changes (why a middling person might vote) much better than the aggregate level of turnout (how many people vote) (Geys 2006b, p18). Although using the Downsian framework it is hard to explain aggregate levels of turnout, there are several, empirically well documented factors that increase or decrease ones probability to cast a vote. Individual characteristics certainly matter: richer, more affluent people are much more likely to vote, just as higher education leads to a higher probability of voting (Lijphart 1997). The literature, understandably, is more occupied with country level factors that affect turnout. For instance Blais (2006) and Geys (2006a) both provide comprehensive reviews about these factors. Geys (2006a) clusters country level factors into three groups: socio-economic, political and institutional variables. Examples of socio-economic factors are population size, population concentration, population stability, population homogeneity or previous turnout level. Political variables can be the closeness (or marginality) of an election (i.e. how close the outcome of the election is), campaign expenditures, or political fragmentation. Institutional variables are the electoral system (majority, proportional representation or plurality voting), compulsory voting, concurrent elections, registration requirements etc. Geys (2006a) in his review concludes that little agreement has been reached with many of the above factors. Institutional factors are the most consensual: compulsory voting, easier registration procedures, concurrent elections and proportional representation all foster higher turnout. Population size and electoral closeness also seem to be affecting turnout in general, although several of the analyzed papers had not found any link between them. The review also notes that population heterogeneity (homogeneous groups within the society) seem to have no effect on turnout, although theoretically as cohesion increases group solidarity (and social pressure), political participation in communities with high degree of socio-economic, racial or ethnic homogeneity should be higher than in areas where this is not the case (Geys 2006a p.644-645, emphasis in original). The question similar to population heterogeneity is in the focus of this paper as well, so this no-relationship finding is discouraging. However, the reviewed papers are mostly using a Herfindahl-Hirschmann concentration index to proxy heterogeneity, which is quite distant from the measures of inequality (used by this paper). Moreover, there are convincing new studies (e.g. Kaniovski and Mueller 2006; Yamamura 2009; Funk 2008) that argue that more heterogeneous communities
Page 14
are less likely to vote, in line with the expectations of the group-based model (see Uhlaner 1989; Grossman and Helpman 2002; Filer, Kenny, and Morton 1993). There are some studies that directly test the association of inequality and voter turnout. The most comprehensive study is Solts (2010) testing the Schattschneider hypothesis (Schattschneider 1960). In his book, Schattschneider wrote that large economic inequalities lead to low participation rates as well as a high income bias in participation. As the rich grow richer relative to their fellow citizens [] they consequently grow better able define the alternatives that are considered within the political system and exclude matters of importance to poor citizens (Solt 2010 p.285) Hence poor will less likely to cast a vote, as inequality goes up, since their expected benefit from voting declines. Solt (2010) uses American gubernatorial elections data to test the association between turnout and inequality. He uses state level Gini coefficient calculated for three years (1980, 1990, 2000) to proxy income inequality, while voter turnout is also for these years. Solt shows that income inequality associates negatively with electoral participation, while higher income people tend to vote relatively more as inequality rises. A similar conclusion is presented by Mueller ad Stratmann (2003), but with a different theoretical approach. They argue that if upper classes have higher participation rates than lower classes, and upper classes favor right of center parties, lower classes left of center parties, and right of center parties adopt policies that benefit the upper classes, while left of center parties adopt policies that favor the lower classes, then lower participation rates will lead to higher income inequalities. Hence their conclusion: voter turnout associates negatively with income inequality, but it is the decreasing participation rate that drives inequalities and not vice-versa. That is, their result is the same, but the line of argument is different from that of Schattschneider (1960). The Muller and Stratmann (2003) argument fits the Meltzer and Richard (1981) logic, namely that when the mean income rises relative to the income of the decisive voter, taxes rise, and vice versa. If fewer people vote, then relatively more rich people vote, so median voter income will be larger (with mean income unchanged), which decreases taxes (preferences for redistribution is smaller). One might also argue oppositely. Based on the Meltzer and Richard (1981) logic, if government decides only about the size of redistribution, then voter turnout should relatively be low if inequality is low, and turnout be high if inequality is high. When inequality is low, then poor people have little to gain, and rich little to lose if government redistributes, so why would they vote? Similarly if inequality is high, then poor have a lot to gain, and rich
Page 15
Daniel Horn
have a lot to lose from redistribution, hence they will vote. This, of course, is an overly simplified argument not taking into account several other incentives driving one to vote. While both Solt (2010) and Muller and Stratmann (2003) base the negative association of inequality and voter turnout on differences in participation rates between people with different incomes, Lister (2007) uses differences in social norms between countries to explain the negative association. He argues that the missing link (omitted variable) between inequality and turnout is institutions. Institutions affect social norms, which affect individual behavior. Universalist welfare states encourage solidarity and participation, and thus foster higher voter turnout than other types of welfare states. Nevertheless, his argument also leads to a negative relation between inequality and turnout: universal welfare states tend to have lower income inequalities and higher turnout. The Downsian median voter logic, on the other hand, might lead one to argue in a different way. Growing inequalities might increase the probability of the lower income/ lower class people to influence politics more, if they can coalesce with the middle. In other words, if rising inequalities are due to rising income on the top, then the redistributive preferences of middle will be closer to the bottom than to the top; thus the middle might unite with the lower income/lower classes to conquer the upper classes. This would mean that higher inequality on the top would lead to a relatively higher turnout for the lower class/lower income. On the other hand, if rising income is due to a relatively decreasing income for the poor (as compared to the middle), then the coalition of the middle with the upper classes seem theoretically more likely (Lupu and Pontusson 2011). Hence, when looking at the relation between inequality and turnout one has to look not only at measures of general income inequality but also at differences between the bottom and the middle and the top.
1.1.
1. 2.
Hypotheses
Inequality associates negatively with voter turnout, ceteris paribus the other factors that are shown to influence turnout. The reason for this negative association is that a. turnout for lower income people tend to be relatively smaller, when overall inequality is high (i.e. if inequality is high poor people tend to vote less, while rich tend to vote more, but this latter does not counterbalance the drop of poor-votes), or alternatively b. turnout for lower income people tend to be relatively smaller if inequality at the bottom is high, but turnout for lower income tend to be relatively higher if inequality on the top is high.
From the above literature I derive three separate hypotheses for testing:
or 3. Universal welfare states have higher turnout as well as lower income inequality.
Page 16
2.
Data and method

I use the 2009 PIREDEU European Election Study (EES 2010; van Egmond et al. 2010) to test the associa-
tion between inequality and turnout. The study was conducted right after the 2009 European parliamentary elections with the aim to research the EU elections. The main advantage of these surveys is that they contain all 27 European countries, with approximately 1000 responses from each. Besides the turnout measure it also contains a modest background questionnaire about individual characteristics, including education, gender and a subjective income measure (see below). The EES also provides substantial amount of data about the institutional system. The EES data was collected at one point in time in each country, thus the time since the last national election varies across countries, as a consequence the responses about actual turnout will also be differently overstated (people remember harder to an earlier election). 1. table below shows the participating countries and their aggregate voter turnout. The right column shows the actual turnout at the 2009 national elections. Unfortunately, the questionnaire did not have a question about actual turnout, but rather asked about the party vote. Nevertheless this question had the option did not cast a vote but many have refused to answer (e.g. in Italy, where voting is compulsory more than 26% of the voters did not answer), and also many had not remembered the action (e.g. in Latvia almost 20% did not know the answer). Nevertheless, I relied on those, who had definite answer; hence the turnout measure is those who voted over those who voted plus those who did not vote (reported figure column). Since surveys tend to overestimate the actual voter turnout and as can be seen, differences between the reported and the official figures are sometimes substantial (e.g. Slovakia or Romania) I used the ratio of the 2009 official/reported voter turnout ratio as weights in the estimations below.
Page 17
Daniel Horn
1. table Voter turnout, actual and observed

2009 austrIa belGIum bulGarIa cyPrus cZech rePublIc DeNmark estoNIa fINlaND fraNce GermaNy Greece huNGary IrelaND Italy latVIa lIthuaNIa luxembourG malta NetherlaNDs PolaND PortuGal romaNIa sloVakIa sloVeNIa sPaIN sweDeN uk
refuseD to aNswer Not VoteD VoteD Not elIGIble DoN't kNow rePorteD fIGure* offIcIal fIGure
13,60 17,47 10,60 9,00 5,59 1,10 3,57 4,80 16,40 12,75 5,60 11,24 5,39 26,30 3,20 6,90 8,29 30,90 3,18 4,29 14,60 7,78 6,50 8,30 10,90 3,29 6,80
2,90 4,79 19,80 4,50 21,67 3,40 19,86 8,10 7,70 5,48 6,10 14,53 6,79 5,80 15,08 23,40 9,69 2,50 5,57 22,65 8,80 18,64 14,86 7,60 8,30 2,00 11,60
77,60 68,86 56,80 78,70 65,49 92,50 64,15 76,40 61,70 71,41 84,50 69,75 74,53 57,60 58,14 58,10 62,64 60,80 86,17 62,97 65,00 64,61 69,78 76,60 76,80 88,22 73,40
1,30 1,90 2,20 2,80 2,55 1,00 2,48 1,80 3,50 3,39 2,20 1,19 3,50 1,00 4,40 1,90 8,19 2,00 1,49 2,20 4,40 0,50 2,46 0,80 1,60 2,50 3,50
4,60 6,99 10,60 5,00 4,71 2,00 9,93 8,90 10,70 6,97 1,60 3,28 9,79 9,30 19,18 9,70 11,19 3,80 3,58 7,88 7,20 8,47 6,40 6,70 2,40 3,99 4,70
0,96 0,93 0,74 0,95 0,75 0,96 0,76 0,90 0,89 0,93 0,93 0,83 0,92 0,91 0,79 0,71 0,87 0,96 0,94 0,74 0,88 0,78 0,82 0,91 0,90 0,98 0,86
0,79 0,91 0,56 0,89 0,64 0,87 0,62 0,65 0,60 0,78 0,87 0,68 0,67 0,78 0,62 0,49 0,92 0,93 0,80 0,54 0,64 0,39 0,55 0,63 0,74 0,82 0,62
meAn
9,56
10,46
70,49
2,47
7,02
0,87
0,74
*voted/(voted+ not voted) source: European Election Study/Piredeu 2009. The EES data allows for numerous individual controls. The base model (see 6. table in the appendix) includes individual level controls as well as country level controls. The individual controls are age, age squared, gender, age when the respondent finished education and a within country standardized subjective standard of living.1 Country level controls are compulsory voting, multiple election at the same time, size of population, existence of a threshold for a party to get in the parliament, electoral system (from proportional (0) to plurality (5)), presidential system, federalism, time since last national election (years), percentage of other nationalities, GDP as percentage
The question for the subjective standard of living was: Taking everything into account, at about what level is your familys standard of living? If you think of a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means a poor family, 7 a rich family, and the other numbers are for the positions in between, about where would you place your family? Since the country mean for this question tend to correlate with income inequalities I standardized the answers within country (0 mean, 1 sd).
Page 18
controls are for a party to get in the when the respondent finished education and a squared, gender, age threshold age, age age squared, gender, age when the respondent finished controlscontrols age squared, gender, age when parliament, electoral system (from a education (0) to are age, are age, the respondent finished education and proportional and a within country voting, multiple election at the of living.1 Country of population,are level controls existence of a compulsory standardized subjective standard same time, size last national election (years), plurality (5)), standardized subjective standard of living. within country standardized subjective standard of living.1 Country level controls are level controls are within countrypresidential system, federalism, time since 1 Country compulsory voting, party to election thethe same time, size of population,(from proportional multiple Income inequality threshold multiple electionget the at parliament, population, existence See allof a turnout in to system existence and voter compulsory voting, for other nationalities,same time, size ofelectoral size EU population,variables (0)the at in GDP as percentage of mean of 27. of a percentage of a compulsory voting, multiple election at the same time, existence of a threshold for a party to get in the parliament, electoral system (from proportional (0) to plurality (5)), get in the parliament, federalism, (from since last (0) to system, threshold for a party to presidential table. Ielectoral system timevariables asnational election (years), proportional controls in each of the appendix for table andsystem, federalism, all of since last national election proportional (0) to use time electoral system (from threshold a party get plurality See4.presidentialto 5. in the parliament, these of mean (5)),27. (5)), of other nationalities, 4. table and 5. table. use all of election 27. See(years), EU presidential system, federalism, time percentage of mean EU (years), all variables pluralitypercentage all variables in the appendix GDP as since last Inational these variables as controls in each in the estimations below. plurality (5)), presidential GDP as federalism, time 27. See all national the percentage of other nationalities, system, percentage of mean EUsince last variables inelection (years), percentage of otherbelow. of the estimations 4. table and 5. as percentage of all of EU 27. See all variables controls in each of the appendix nationalities, GDP table. I use mean these variables as in the appendix 4. table and nationalities, GDPof these variables as controls 27.each all the percentage of other 5. table. I use all as percentage of mean EU in See of variables in the appendix 4. table and 5. table. I use all of these variables as controls in each of the estimations below. I estimations three types of modelsthe test the association between inequality and simple turnout. A will use three types of models to test to association between inequality and voter turnout. A voter logit I will use appendix below. estimations below. 4. table and 5. table. I use all of these variables as controls in each of the
The logit model will beand a hierarchical model (3) will provide robustness checks for the logit estimation (2) the following: The logit model will modelfollowing: following: The logit be the will be for where V is the dummy the voting, Y is a factor of individual characteristics, while Z represents country level (1) model. the dummy for voting, Y is a factor of individual characteristics, while Z represents country level (1)where V is where (1)is including afor voting, Y isincome inequality; i characteristics, for individual and c for level V features the dummy measure of a factor of individual is an index while Z represents country country. are The dummy for will be is following: where V is thelogit model voting, Ythe a factor of individual characteristics, while Z represents country level features including tomeasure of for income inequality; is is an index forterm. are paramfeatures including a measure income inequality; factor of individual characteristics, country. represents country level i an individual and for country. are where V is the voting, Y parameters a bedummy of inequality; iis aani index index for individual and ccfor while Z features including a measureestimated, while is an idiosyncraticindividual and c for country. of income is for error are (1) parameters including a measure is an idiosyncratic error term.is an index for individual and c for country. to be estimated, while of income inequality; i features are Pooled-sample estimation idiosyncratic error term. parameters bebe estimated,while is foridiosyncratic is dependent variables struggle with stochasticZspecifications that differ eters to to estimated, while is an with binaryerrorfactor of individual characteristics, while represents country level an voting, Y a where V is estimation with binary dependent term. Pooled-sample the dummy variables struggle with stochastic specifications that differ parameters to with binary Franzese an idiosyncratic error term. Pooled-sample estimationIn these cases while is (2005) suggestswith researcherspecifications the use of a 2 step estimation. In across levels. be estimated,dependent variables struggle the stochastic to consider that differ features including with binary (2005) suggests the researcher with stochastic of a 2 step estimation. In are across levels. In these cases Franzesedependent inequality; i is an index for usespecifications for country. Pooled-sample estimation a measure of income variables struggleto consider the individual and c that differ across across levels. In these cases estimation with I estimate a predicted probabilityof awith stochastic specifications that differ Pooled-sample Franzese (2005) suggests the researcher variables struggle step respondent the 2 step estimation process binary dependent to consider the use for2 eachestimation. In within each country the 2 step estimation process Iwhile isaan idiosyncratic errorfor each respondent within each country parameters to be estimated, estimate predicted probability term. the 2 stepIn these casesInsttheseestimate a suggests the researcherthe consider the use of a 2 thecountry a 2 step estimation. In estimation process st cases each use across levels. Franzese (2005) predicted probability for each respondent consider nd step. of 2nd levels.separately in the step,step, I Franzese (2005) suggests to researcher to withinthe 2step estimation.I In the That is, I 2 the 1 I then use use the countryas the dependent dependent variable means variables the in separately st the 1 estimation then Ibinary dependent means as struggle with stochasticin That is, step. that differ in Pooled-sample then I use thewith the countryas the dependent variable variable2nd step. That is,specifications country means in the I separately in the 1 step, the 2 step estimation process I estimate a predicted for each respondent within estimate estimate theprocess I estimate a predicted probability for eachprobability within each country separately each country step estimation the In these cases Franzese (2005) suggests the respondent to consider the use of a 2 step estimation. In in the across levels. researcher estimate the st separately in the 1 step, then I use the country means as the dependent variable in the 2nd step. That is, I (2a) (2a) (2a) the 2 estimation process estimate a variable probability 1st step, then Istep predict the probabilityas Ithe dependentpredictedin the 2nd step.for each I respondent within each country estimate the equation, and the country means of voting for a 40-year-old male voter,male went to who went to school until age of 18, estimateuse predict the probability of voting for a 40-year-old who That is,school until age of 18, equation,the probability of voting for a 40-year-old male voter, who went to school until age of 18, and voter, equation, separately the the 1st step, then I use the country means as the dependent variable in the 2nd step. That is, I and predict in with mean standard of living. In order to correct for the different efficiency of the first step estimates I use the with(2a) living. In order to correct for the correct for the different efficiency of the first step estimates I use the mean with mean standard of standard of living. In order todifferent efficiency of the first step estimates I use the estimate the inverse standard deviation of the predicted probabilities as weight in the second step. equation, and of deviation of probabilities as weight in the second step. in the second step. inverse standard deviationpredict the probability of voting for a 40-year-old male voter, who went to school until age of 18, inverse standard the predicted the predicted probabilities as weight equation, (2b) predict the probability of voting for a 40-year-old male voter, who went to school until age of 18, and (2a) (2b) with(2b) standard of living. In order to correct for the different efficiency of the first step estimates I use the mean where PrVote is the predicted country meanof voting for a 40-year-old male between this went to school until age of 18, equation, and predict the probability of voting. The theoretical difference voter, who approach and the where PrVote is the predicted country mean of to correct probabilities as weight in the second step. estimates I use the voting. The and with mean standard of deviation of the predicted for the different efficiency of the first step the this approach and the inverse standard the predicted country meantheoretical difference between this approachbetween where PrVote is living. In order of voting. The theoretical difference logit model is that the 2 step estimation allows for different effects of the individual characteristics within with that the 2 step estimation allows for different effectsthe the individual characteristics withinstep estimates I use the mean standard of living. In order to correct for of different efficiency of the first logit model is countries, i.e. the 2 that of more flexible probabilities as for logit. the second of the logit(2b) model is step the 2 step estimation allows weight in inverse standard deviation is athe predicted model compared to thedifferent effects step. individual characteristics within countries,inverse2standardmore flexible model compared probabilities as weight in the second step. i.e. the step is a deviation of the predicted to the logit. Finally, IPrVote thehierarchicalamodel, wheremean of voting. Theto the logit. difference between this approach and the where estimate a 2 predicted country respondents are nested theoretical countries, i.e. is thestep is more flexible model compared in countries: Finally, I estimate a hierarchical model, where respondents are nested in countries: (2b)
1
simple logit below. estimations regression (1) with errors will be the base, a 2 step errors will and a hierarchical regression (1) with country clustered standardcountry clustered standardestimation (2) be the base, a 2 step I I will use three types of models to test the association inequality inequality and voter turnout. A will use three types of models to test the association between between and voter turnout. A estimation (2) and a hierarchical model (3) will provide robustness checks for the logit I will use three types of models to test the association between inequality and voter turnout. A model (3) will provide robustness checks for the logit model. simple logit regression (1) with with country clustered errors will be the base, a 2 step country clustered standard simple logit (1) with country clustered simple logit regressionregression models to teststandard errorsstandard errors awill be the base, a 2 step model. three types of (1) I will use (2) and a hierarchical model (3) will provide will be the base, 2 step logit turnout. A the association between inequality the voter estimation robustness checks for and The (2) and (2) and a hierarchical model (3) will provide robustness checks for the logit the following: estimation hierarchical model (3) estimationlogit modelawill be be the following: will provide robustness checks for the logit The logit simple model will model. logit regression (1) with country clustered standard errors will be the base, a 2 step model. model. (1)
logit model is that hierarchicalestimation allows for different effects of the individual characteristics within Finally, I estimate a the 2 step model, where respondents are nested in countries: where PrVote is the subjective standard mean of was: Taking theoretical into account, at aboutthis approach and the The question for the predicted country of living voting. The everything difference between what 1 The question for the subjective standard mean of was: Taking theoretical into account, at about what where countries, the predicted country of flexible think ofcompared to 1 to logit. 1 means athis approach and the PrVote is familys standard more living voting. a scale from the 7, where level is your i.e. the 2 step is aof living? If you modelThe everything difference between poor family, 7 logit family, and the the numbers are for the scale model is that estimation positions to 7, where effects of the individual level is your familys standardother 2 stepyou think of a allows for1different about where poor family, 7 characteristics within aFinally, I estimate a of living? If model, where of fromin between, 1 means a would intoplace your at about what rich 1 The question for hierarchical the subjective positions respondents are nested in countries: you account, living about a rich family, and thatother numbers arefor this questiondifferent effects of where would you place standardized counthe the countryestimation the standardin between,was:with income inequalities I your within for allows for tend to correlate Taking everything logit model isSince the 2 2 stepmeanmore flexible model compared to the logit. the individual characteristics family? countries, i.e. the step is a level is country mean standard living? If you think of a scale from 1 to standardized family?the answers within country (0 mean,of sd). Since the your familysfor this question tend to correlate with income inequalities I7, where 1 means a poor family, 7 1 a rich family, and a mean, 1 sd). the positions nested the answers within country (0the other numbers are forrespondents arein between, about where would you place your Finally, I estimate tries, i.e.The 2 step is a for hierarchical model, where of living was: Taking in countries: into account, at about what 1 the question more flexible modelstandard to the logit. the subjective compared10 family? Since the country mean for this question tend to correlate everything inequalities I standardized with income level is your within country (0 of living? If you think of a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means a poor family, 7 the answers familys standard mean, 10 1 sd). Finally, I estimate a hierarchical model, where respondents positions in between, about where would you place your a The question forthe other numbers are for the are nestedTaking everything into account, at about what 1 rich family, and the subjective standard of living was: in countries: family? Since the country mean for this question tend to scale fromwith income inequalities Ipoor family, 7 level is your familys standard of living? If you think10 a correlate 1 to 7, where 1 means a standardized of (3) the answers within country numbers 1 sd). the positions in between, about where would you place your a rich family, and the other (0 mean, are for where u Since the country mean for family? is a country level error term. this question tend to correlate with income inequalities I standardized 10 where the answers within country (0 mean, 1 sd). u is a country level error term. A big handicap of the 2 step estimation procedure is that it cannot handle interaction effects between individual A big handicap of the 2 step estimation procedure is that it cannot handlepredicting countrybetween individual anda group of and country level variables (by definition), and also 10 by interaction effects means, I pre-define that
people, whose turnout will be and also that variable in the second step. I pre-define a group of people, country level variables (by definition),the dependent by predicting country means, When testing hypotheses 2 I have to use
interaction terms: how the country level inequality affects the association between income and voter turnout. whose turnout will be the dependent variable in the second step. When testing hypotheses 2 I have to use interWithin hierarchical models, as well as within simple logit models, the interaction can easily be done. 2 step action estimation, on the otherlevel inequality affects the association results from the 2nd step can easilyWithin terms: how the country hand, has its advantage as well. The between income and voter turnout. be depicted (see below), unlike the estimates of the logit or the hierarchical estimates. hierarchical models, as well as within simple logit models, the interaction can easily be done. 2 step estimation, on
Results
The point estimates of the individual controls in the base model (6. table) are all as expected.
Declining turnout hypothesis 1
Page 19
Daniel Horn
the other hand, has its advantage as well. The results from the 2nd step can easily be depicted (see below), unlike the estimates of the logit or the hierarchical estimates.
Page 20
3.
3.1.
results
Declining turnout hypothesis 1
The point estimates of the individual controls in the base model (6. table) are all as expected. Age associates with higher turnout but at a declining rate, years spent in school education also increases turnout, richer tend to vote more, and women are just as likely to vote as men, if all above socio-economic characteristics are controlled for. From the country level features fewer factors are significant. The existence of a threshold decreases turnout, and presidential systems also have fewer people to cast a vote, while federalist states have a higher turnout. Nevertheless, since these country level characteristics are not in the focus of the paper, I leave them in the models as controls, even if they do not significantly associate with turnout. Tests for hypothesis 1 are in 7. table (logit), 8. table (2 step), and 9. table (hierarchical) in the appendix. All estimation procedures seem to provide the same results. Except the Eurostat Gini variable, and the s80/s20 ratio all income measures associate negatively with voter turnout, but very few are significant. Only the poverty rate shows significant association with the turnout across estimations, while the MDMI and the earnings Gini coefficients are also weakly (10% or less) significant in all models. The other four proxies (income Gini, s80/s20 and the two p95/p5 ratios) are all insignificantly related to voter turnout. However, if I consider that the models have taken into account several known influences of turnout, and that the number of countries are not very high I should conclude that these results are in line with the 1st hypothesis. It seems that inequality associates negatively with voter turnout, if we control for other factors which are claimed to influence turnout. 4. figure below depicts this association using the predicted probabilities from the 1st step of the 2 step procedure. It is apparent that the association between inequality and predicted voter turnout is not very strong, but negative. Especially the poverty rate associates closely with turnout, but all other indicators show a negative rather than a positive relation. Nonetheless, the reason for this negative association is not straightforward. The hypotheses above could allow for three different reasons: a) turnout for the poor declines as inequality goes up, b) turnout for the rich declines as inequality goes up or c) there is no change in the relative turnout of the different income people but universal welfare states drive the results.
Page 21
goes up, b) turnout for the rich declines as inequality goes up or c) there is no change in the relative turnout of the different income people but universal welfare states drive the results.
Daniel Horn
4. figure Association of inequality with turnout predicted probabilities from the 1st step estimates of the 2 4. figure Association of inequality with turnout predicted probabilities from the 1st step estimates of the 2 step step procedure
procedure
lowess smoother
voter turnout, pred. pr. .7 .8 .9 1
SI SE AT DK CY BE GR IT NL IE DE FR PT LU ES FI RO UK HU SK CZ
MT
SE DK
AT NL SI
BE CY IT DE FR LU ES FI SK HU UK
GR IE
PT
LV
LV EE PL LT
EE PL BG
LT
CZ
.6
20
25
40
.6 .3
.4 .5 .6 .7 Mean distance from the median
.8
SEAT MT CY DK BE GR IT IE NL DE SI ESPT FR LU FI UK HU SK CZ
RO LV LT PL
SE BE DK AT CY IE DE NL SI FRLU FI HU SK CZ
IT
GR PT RO LV
ES UK
EE
.6
.6
BG
EE PL
LT
BG
10
20
30 40 50 Poverty rate, SILC
60
6 8 p95/p5, SILC
10
note: predicted probabilities are for a 40 year old man with average income, who finished education at age 18
note: predicted probabilities are for a 40 year old man with average income, who finished education at age 18
Income bias hypothesis 2a 2a 3.2. Income bias hypothesis
Unfortunately the EES dataset does not contain an absolute measure of income or class. The income measure in the dataset is a subjective measure of income living. The income measure standard of or class. The respondents place Unfortunately the EES dataset does not contain an absolute themselves within seven categories as compared to others in the society, and thus are endogenous with the inequality measures (e.g. the greater the inequality, the more people are likely to consider themselves poor). For this reason the interaction between the subjective
pared to others in the society, and thus are endogenous with the inequality measures (e.g. the greater the inequality, standard of living and the inequality measure might be biased. The higher the inequality the more people tend to 12 the more people are likely to consider themselves poor). For this reason the interaction between the subjective be poor (because it is a subjective / self evaluated measure). So a person, with similar probability of voting might consider herself poor in one country with high inequality and not poor in a country with low inequality. And viceversa a person might consider herself rich in a low inequality country while not rich in a high inequality country, assuming identical turnout probabilities. Hence the effect of the interaction of income with inequality on turnout could be biased. Unfortunately the direction of the bias is also not clear. It depends on our assumption of inequality on the subjective evaluation of income. If average income people tend to de-valuate their income more in an unequal country than rich people, then the effect of income on voter turnout will be downwardly biased. But if rich
Page 22
in the dataset is a subjective standard of living. The respondents place themselves within seven categories as com-
tend to look at themselves as lesser rich in an unequal country as compared to the subjective income decline of an average income person, then income effect on voting will be upwardly biased. So the direction of bias of subjective income on turnout will depend on the relative evaluation of income across income groups. I could not find any suitable instrument that could solve this problem. I would need a variable that explains why one might consider herself poorer meanwhile being uncorrelated with voter turnout and only unconditionally correlated with inequality. Hence, the estimates of the interaction effect of lower income and inequality on turnout might be biased. In order to minimize bias I standardized the income proxy (subjective standard of living) within countries. By this, the cross-country correlation of the standardized income and the inequality measure will be zero, by definition. However, we do not rule out the fact that there will be more relatively poor people in higher income countries. Nevertheless, I believe that the size of this bias will be small (see argument about the direction of the bias), and thus only marginally affecting the substantial results. The lack of absolute income could also be a problem if we assume that absolute income matters as well as relative income (see Solt 2010). Within the Downsian framework, the lack of absolute income might not be a problem, if we disregard the hard costs of voting: people vote more likely when the probability of their vote being decisive goes up; hence their relative position within the society matters. However, if we assume that absolute income matters as well poorer people have troubles paying the costs of voting, e.g. traveling to the voting booth is costly the point estimates will be biased, due to an omitted variable bias. Although I must make the assumption that absolute costs does not matter, I believe that in developed countries casting a vote is not very expensive. 10. table and 11. table in the appendix shows that the subjective standard of living does not associate significantly with voter turnout through increased inequality: richer people are not more likely to vote as inequality goes up. None of the interaction effects are significant, moreover their signs are also not consistently negative or positive. Another way of looking at this income bias is to use the marginal effect if the subjective income on turnout from the 1st step estimation. 5. figure depicts the association of this marginal effect (estimated for the same 40 year old male schooled until age 18) with the different inequality measures. Apparently the same conclusion can be drawn: we cannot straightforwardly conclude that higher income people tend to vote more in more unequal countries.
Page 23
countries.
Daniel Horn
5. figure Income bias association of inequality with the marginal effect of income (standard of living) from individual level regressions of inequality with the marginal effect of income (standard of living) from individual 5. figure Income bias association
level regressions
lowess smoother
marginal effect, subj. st. of living 0 .02 .04 .06 .08
FI
FI
NL DK
PL ESBG FR EE DE LU CY IE UK IT GR
MT LT LV PT RO
NL DK FR PL LV HU UK DE SK LU BE CY IT IE GR ES EE LT
SI
CZ HU AT SK BE SE
SE
SI
CZ AT
PT
20
25
40
.3
.4 .5 .6 .7 Mean distance from the median

FI
.8
FI
NL DK MT ESEE FR CZ UK HU DE AT PT SK SI LU BECY IT GR IE SE
NL DK FR PL EE ES UK IT GR LT BG PT
LT
PL LV RO BG
CZ HU DE SKAT LU SI BE CY IE SE
LV RO
10
20
30 40 50 Poverty rate, SILC
60
6 8 p95/p5, SILC
10
Inequality on the top and at the bottom hypothesis 2b 12. table below shows the association between income inequality on the top and at the bottom with voter
p95/p5), which can be separated along income distribution, are themselves poor explanators of turnout. Thus we see no strong association between inequality on the top and inequality at the bottom with voter turnout. However,
3.3.
Inequality on the top and at the bottom hypothesis 2b
turnout. Results are not very robust, mainly due to the fact that the general indicators of inequality (MDMI and
the point estimates, as well as mild significance of the p95/p50 indicators and the p50/p5 LIS measure shows that higher inequality at the top associates with lower turnout, while higher inequality at the bottom goes together with
15 and the middle decreases overall turnout, while higher difference between the middle and the very poor does not
of the rich and the poor, as shown by the interaction terms, does not change when inequality changes on the top or
higher turnout (or rather no association at all at the bottom). That is, the higher the difference between the very rich
change (or mildly increases) turnout. 13. table shows no indication of income effects at all. So the relative turnout
at the bottom. Although the point estimates are insignificant, they are against hypothesis 2b. i.e. richer people tend to vote more if inequality on the top is higher, while poorer tend to vote more if inequality at the bottom is higher.
Page 24
This is just the opposite of what hypothesis 2b has assumed. These effects, however, are all insignificant, which might be due to the small number of countries, as well as the relatively unimportant effect of inequality. This is also what we see in 6. figure below: the different measures of income inequality on the top and at the bottom associate mildly with the predicted probability of voter turnout. Inequality on the top tend to go weakly and negatively together with turnout, while inequality at the bottom has no relation with turnout.
6. figure Association of inequality on the top and at the bottom with turnout predicted probabilities from step estimates of the 2 step procedure the 1st step estimates of the 2 step procedure
6. figure - Association of inequality on the top and at the bottom with turnout predicted probabilities from the 1st
lowess smoother
1 1
SE DK
voter turnout, pred. pr. .8 .9
AT NL BE CY DE SI FI IT FR ES
SE DK
GR IE PT
LU UK
AT CY BENL IE E GR D SI FI IT FR ES LU HU SK CZ EE
DKSE NL
AT BE IE E D FI SI LU
GR ES IT UK HU EE PL
UK
PT
SK HU LV CZ EE PL LT
RO PL LT
LV
BG
.7
.7
.4
.6 .8 1 1.2 MDMI, above the median 1
1.5
2 2.5 p95/p50, SILC
.7 1.5
2 2.5 p95/p50, LIS
GR ES IT PT UK LU
BE CY IE DE FI FR
NL SI
SE AT
DK
SE DK AT CY NL BE IE DE GR FI SI IT ES FR PT UK LU HU SK LV CZ EE PL LT BG RO
SE DK NL FI
AT
BE DE SI UK HU
IE GR
IT ES
LU
HU LV EE PL LT
SK CZ
EE PL
.7
.7
-.35 -.3 -.25 -.2 MDMI, below the median
2.5 3 3.5 p50/p5, SILC
.7 2
2.2
2.4 2.6 2.8 p50/p5, LIS
Universal welfare states hypothesis 3 3 3.4. universal welfare states hypothesis
Although Lister (2007) uses the Gini coefficient to proxy universal welfare states arguing that the lower the inequality the higher the state intervention is for the purposes of this paper this proxy would obviously not be useful. Therefore, in order to test hypothesis 3, I have to use alternative measures of the welfare state. I will utilize government spending as
useful. Therefore, in order to test hypothesis 3, have to use on social protection as percentage of GDP. percentage of GDP and government Ispending alternative measures of the welfare state. I will utilize inequality the higher the state intervention is for the purposes of this paper this proxy would obviously not be Although Lister (2007) uses the Gini coefficient to proxy universal welfare states arguing that the lower the
Both are similar, butpercentage of GDP and government spending on social protection as percentage of GDP. the government spending as widely used measures for the size of state interventions, and thus for universal the welfare state is. 7. figure and 8. figure below shows that government spending welfare state (e.g.widely used measures for the sizeI of state interventions, and thus the the welfare state (e.g. Both are similar, but Esping-Andersen 1990). assume that the larger for spending, the more
Esping-Andersen 1990). I assume that the larger the spending, the more universal the welfare state is. 7. figure and 8. figure below shows that government spending associates negatively with inequalities (the higher the spending
Listers (2007) argument could hold: we have observed that inequality associates negatively
Page 25
with turnout, and also that inequality associates negatively with the welfare state, which associates positively with turnout. Hence the link between inequality and turnout could
expected, and it also associates positively with voter turnout (8. figure and 9. figure). Thus associates negatively with inequalities (the higher the spending the lower the inequalities), as
Daniel Horn
the lower the inequalities), as expected, and it also associates positively with voter turnout (8. figure and 9. figure). Thus Listers (2007) argument could hold: we have observed that inequality associates negatively with turnout, and also that inequality associates negatively with the welfare state, which associates positively with turnout. Hence the link between inequality and turnout could indeed be driven by the welfare state. If universal welfare states are indeed an omitted variable, we should see the unbiased effect of income inequality on voter turnout after controlling for government spending.
7. figure - government expenditure vs. income inequality
7. figure government expenditure vs. income inequality
Government expenditure, Total, % of GDP, 2007

40 Gini, Eurostat 2009 25 30 35
PT ES BG PL CY CZ SI GR UK DE NL FI BE AT DK HU SE IT
Poverty rate, SILC 20 30 40 50
LV LT RO EE LU IE SK
MT
60
BG
RO LV LT SK EE IE LU ES
PL
FR
GR CY UK PT IT BE MT CZ SI DE NL FI AT
HU
DK
20
35 Mean distance from the median .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8
40
45
50
55 10
10
FR SE
35
RO LV
40
45
50
55
LT
BG PT
IE LV EE LU SK CZ SI ES PL CY
GR UK DE NL
p95/p5, SILC 6 8
PT
LT EE IE LU SK
IT HU BE FI AT
ES
PL CY SI CZ
GR UK DE
IT
FR
DK SE
FR BE NL FI AT HU DK SE
35
40
45
50
55
35
40
45
50
55
on social protection is included. Since there were no substantial differences between the results of the logit, the 2 step and the hierarchical estimations I show only the results from the logit regression for the tests of hypothesis 3.2
14. table and 15.15. table the logit models, where the government spendinggovernment spending and the 14. table and table shows shows the logit models, where the and the government spending
differences between the results of the logit, the 2 step and the hierarchical estimations I show only the results from the logit regression for the tests of hypothesis 3.2
It is apparent that government spending has a not very strong but positive effect on turnout, ceteris paribus
government spending on social protection is included. Since there were no substantial
individual and other country level factors. If we accept that the size of government spending proxies welfare state
It is apparent that government spending has a not very strong but positive effect on turnout, ceteris paribus individual and other country level factors. If we accept that the size of government spending proxies welfare state entrenchment well, we can conclude that universal welfare states tend to foster voter turnout. However, the point estimates of the different inequality measures did not change significantly after including government a bit of
entrenchment well, we can conclude that universal welfare states tend to foster voter turnout. However, the point estimates of the different inequality measures did not change significantly after including government spending.3
2 Results from the step and hierarchical estimations were, from the Eurostat, remained negative spending.3 All2 indicators, but the Gini again, almost identical and could be requested from the author. but lost 3 Only the p95/p5, LIS inequality indicator became significant but stayed negative after controlling for government spending on social protection (but controlling for the total spending did not have his effect), this is probably due to some outlier or high leverage case.
significance, due probably to increased multicollinearity between the variables.
Page 26
From this I conclude that although welfare states tend to have higher voter turnout, it does not seem to be the omitted variable that would explain the effect of inequality on turnout.
All indicators, but the Gini from the Eurostat, remained negative but lost a bit of significance, due probably to increased multicollinearity between the variables. From this I conclude that although welfare states tend to have higher voter turnout, it does not seem to be the 8. figure government expenditure on social protection vs. income inequality omitted variable that would explain the effect of inequality on turnout. 8. figure government expenditure on social protection vs. income inequality
8. figureGovernment expenditure, vs. income inequality government expenditure on social protection Social prot,
40 Gini, Eurostat 2009 2009 Gini, Eurostat 25 20 30 25 35 30 40 35 PovertyPoverty rate, SILC rate, SILC 2010 3020 4030 5040 6050 60
% of GDP, 2007
BG
GovernmentMT expenditure, Social prot, % ofBG GDP, 2007 LV

ROLT LV EE ROLT IE CY PT BG MT ES UK PL BG ES CZ GR IT PT LV RO LT SK LV RO EE LT CY IE SK EE CY IE PL FR LU DE GR NL DK UK BE IT AT PL FI SE HU FR LU DE SI NL DK BE FI AT SE HU PL HU
EE SK IE CY SK
CZ
5 5
10 10
LT
15 SI 15
PT
20 20
25 25
5 5
10 10 RO
RO LT EE LT IE CY EE SK IE CY SK
Mean distance from the median median Mean distance from the .3 .4 .3 .5 .4 .6 .5 .7 .6 .8 .7 .8 20
10 10
GR PT IT BE SI DE FR LU HU FI DK NL GRAT SE PT ES UK BEIT MT CZ SI DE FR FI DK NL AT 15 LU 20 SE ES MT CZ UK
25 25
LV
15
BG PT UK PL
20
p95/p5,p95/p5, SILC SILC 46 68 8 10
LV
IE LT ES
EE CY IE LV SK EE CY SK
CZ ES
UK PT PL HU IT LU BE GR DE FI FR UK PL SI HU NL IT LU BE AT DK DE SE FI FR AT 20 SE DK
GR
LV
BG ES
GR IT PT
DE
ES CZ
GR UK LU PL FR BEIT AT FI NL HU SI DE SE DK LU BE NL HU SI
5 5
10 10
CZ
15
20
25
15 SI NL
25
5 5
10
CZ
15 15
20 AT FI 20
FR SE DK
25 25
10
9. figure Government expenditure vs. predicted turnout

2 5
5 5

G ve m n oxp n e t e S cia p , S ciaG P %o7 D , 2 0 o rn eGe rn d nrexp n ituro %o l p t,, 2 0 G P 0 7 t veemitu , o dl ret, o f D 0 f e ro 2 5 5 5
FR DE FI FR HU PL HU BG PL LT CZ LUK U SK CZ RO EE LV SK EERO LV IE CY PT IT GR FR SE DK
DK SE AT DK SE
G ve m n oxp n e t e Te d %o T Dl,,%o7 D , 20 7 o rn eGe rn d nrexp ta itu ,f Gta 20 f G P 0 t veemitu , onl, re o P 0
2 0
5 0
HU FR IT FI PT UK CZ PT UK CZ
SE BE AT DK
1 5
LUK U PT
DE BE FI AT NL SI GR IT BE MT ES SI NL
2 0
5 0
HU
NL BE AT IT FI GR DE SI CY NL MT
4 5
4 5
PL BG
1 5
BG
MT ES IE CY
DE GR SI ES CY MT
1 0
4 0
PL BG
1 0
4 0
LT
RO LV LT EE SK
LU
3 5
ES IE
.7 5
3 5
.8 .9 voter turnout, pred. pr. .8 .9 voter turnout, pred. pr.
.7
LT
.8 .9 RO LU voterLV turnout, pred. pr. IE

EE SK
.7
.7
Conclusion and further comments
.8 .9 voter turnout, pred. pr.
The paper addressed the issue of the effect of inequality on voter turnout. Using the 2009
Conclusion and further comments PIREDEU European Election Study dataset I tested three different hypotheses. These Page 27
The paper addressed the issue of the effect of inequality on voter turnout. Using the 2009 hypotheses were derived from previous literature. The analyses could show that inequality PIREDEU European Election Study dataset I tested three different hypotheses. These
Daniel Horn
Page 28
4.
Conclusion and further comments

The paper addressed the issue of the effect of inequality on voter turnout. Using the 2009 PIREDEU European
Election Study dataset I tested three different hypotheses. These hypotheses were derived from previous literature. The analyses could show that inequality associates negatively with turnout at the national elections (hypothesis 1). This is not a very strong effect, but it is net of several factors affecting voter turnout that are empirically well proven such as individual characteristics or different features of the political system. The literature suggests that this negative association is either due to the lower turnout of the poor relative to the rich in high inequality countries (hypothesis 2) or due to the effects of the universal welfare state, which increases turnout through altered social norms as well as decreases inequality through government intervention (hypothesis 3). None of these were really supported by the data. Although none of the hypotheses were refuted, I did not find significant association of the interaction effect of the individual income with inequality i.e. income associates similarly with turnout in different inequality countries. Similarly, it seems that universal welfare states have a higher turnout, but this does not influence the association of inequality with turnout. I also tested whether inequalities at the top or at the bottom have a different affect on turnout. Although the results, again, are not very robust, it seems that larger differences in income between the very rich and the middle decreases overall turnout, while higher difference between the middle and the very poor increases turnout. This is just the opposite of what I have expected from the Downsian rational voter model.
Page 29
Daniel Horn
Page 30
references
Blais, Andr. 2006. What Affects Voter Turnout? SSRN eLibrary. Retrieved July 8, 2010. Downs, Anthony. 1957. An economic theory of voting. New York: Harper and Row. EES. 2010. European Parlament Election Study 2009, Voter Study, Advance release. van Egmond, Marcel H., Eliyahu V. Sapir, Wouter vad der Brug, Sara B. Hobolt, and Mark N. Franklin. 2010. EES 2009 Voter Study Advance Release Notes. Esping-Andersen, Gosta. 1990. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton, EUA : Princeton University Retrieved May 5, 2011. Ferejohn, John A., and Morris P. Fiorina. 1974. The Paradox of Not Voting: A Decision Theoretic Analysis. The American Political Science Review 68(2):525-536. Retrieved July 7, 2010. Filer, John E., Lawrence W. Kenny, and Rebecca B. Morton. 1993. Redistribution, Income, and Voting. American Journal of Political Science 37(1):63-87. Retrieved July 7, 2010. Franzese, Robert J. 2005. Empirical Strategies for Various Manifestations of Multilevel Data. Political Analysis 13(4):430 -446. Retrieved May 5, 2011. Funk, Patricia. 2008. Social Incentives and Voter Turnout: Evidence from the Swiss Mail Ballot System. SSRN eLibrary. Retrieved July 13, 2010. Gallego, Aina. 2007. Unequal Political Participation in Europe. International Journal of Sociology 37(4):10-25. Retrieved July 13, 2010. Geys, Benny. 2006a. Explaining voter turnout: A review of aggregate-level research. Electoral Studies 25(4):637663. Retrieved July 7, 2010. Geys, Benny. 2006b. Rational Theories of Voter Turnout: A Review. Political Studies Review 4(1):16-35. Retrieved July 7, 2010. Goodin, R. E., and K. W. S. Roberts. 1975. The Ethical Voter. The American Political Science Review 69(3):926928. Retrieved July 7, 2010. Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman. 2002. Special interest politics. MIT Press. Kaniovski, Serguei, and Dennis C. Mueller. 2006. Community Size, Heterogeneity and Voter Turnouts. Public Choice 129(3/4):399-415. Retrieved July 8, 2010. Lancee, Bram, and Herman van de Werfhorst. 2011. Income Inequality and Participation: A Comparison of 24 European Countries. GINI Discussion paper 6. Ledyard, John O. 1984. The Pure Theory of Large Two-Candidate Elections. Public Choice 44(1):7-41. Retrieved July 7, 2010. Lijphart, Arend. 1997. Unequal Participation: Democracys Unresolved Dilemma. The American Political Science Review 91(1):1-14. Retrieved July 8, 2010. Lister, Michael. 2007. Institutions, Inequality and Social Norms: Explaining Variations in Participation. The British Journal of Politics & International Relations 9(1):20-35. Retrieved April 22, 2011. Lupu, Noam, and Jonas Pontusson. 2011. The Structure of Inequality and the Politics of Redisribution. American Political Science Review Vol. 105(No. 2):316-336.
Page 31
Daniel Horn
Meltzer, Allan H., and Scott F. Richard. 1981. A Rational Theory of the Size of Government. The Journal of Political Economy 89(5):914-927. Retrieved July 8, 2010. Mueller, Dennis C., and Thomas Stratmann. 2003. The economic effects of democratic participation. Journal of Public Economics (87):21292155. OECD. 2008. Growing Unequal? Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries. Paczynska, Agnieszka. 2005. Inequality, Political Participation, and Democratic Deepening in Poland. East European Politics & Societies 19(4):573 -613. Retrieved April 23, 2011. Palfrey, Thomas R., and Howard Rosenthal. 1983. A Strategic Calculus of Voting. Public Choice 41(1):7-53. Retrieved July 7, 2010. Palfrey, Thomas R., and Howard Rosenthal. 1985. Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty. The American Political Science Review 79(1):62-78. Retrieved July 7, 2010. Riker, William H., and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1968. A Theory of the Calculus of Voting. The American Political Science Review 62(1):25-42. Retrieved July 7, 2010. Schattschneider, Elmer Eric. 1960. The Semisovereign People: A Realists View of Democracy in America. Solt, Frederick. 2010. Does Economic Inequality Depress Electoral Participation? Testing the Schattschneider Hypothesis. Political Behavior 32(2):285-301. Retrieved January 12, 2011. SSO. 2009. Annual Monitoring Report 2009, Social Situation Observatory. Tth, Istvn Gyrgy, and Tams Keller. 2011. Income Distributions, Inequality Perceptions and Redistributive Claims in European Societies. GINI Discussion paper 7. Uhlaner, Carole J. 1989. Rational Turnout: The Neglected Role of Groups. American Journal of Political Science 33(2):390-422. Retrieved July 8, 2010. Yamamura, Eiji. 2009. Effects of social norms and fractionalization on voting behaviour in Japan. Applied Economics. Retrieved July 9, 2010.
Page 32
Appendix
2. table indicators of overall iunequality GINI GINI earNING cNt GINI coeffI- GINI of Gross cIeNt, euroearNINGs IN stat 2009 cash for full(source:sIlc) tIme workers, sso (source: sIlc)
mDmI PoVerty rate P95/P5, lIs P95/P5, sIlc s80/s20, meaN DIstaNce PoPulatIoN P95/P5, lIs P95/P5, sIlc sso 2009 from the meat rIsk of (tth-keller 2007-2008 (source: DIaN (laNcee- PoVerty or 2011) (meDGyesI) sIlc) V.D.werfhorts socIal exclu2011) sIoN, eurostat 2005 (romaNIa 2007, bulGarIaN 2006)
3,658 3,893 6,459 4,072 3,395 3,425 4,869 3,709 4,540 5,370 3,557 4,395 4,887 7,058 5,658 3,904 3,739 5,014 6,076 6,966 3,309 3,262 4,926 3,321 5,346 16,8 22,6 61,3 25,3 19,6 17,2 25,9 17,2 18,9 18,4 29,4 32,1 25,0 25,0 45,8 41,0 17,3 20,6 16,7 45,3 26,1 45,9 32,0 18,5 23,4 14,4 24,8 16,8 22,6 61,3 25,3 19,6 17,2 25,9 17,2 18,9 18,4 29,4 32,1 25,0 25,0 45,8 41,0 17,3 20,6 16,7 45,3 26,1 45,9 32,0 18,5 23,4 14,4 24,8 4,8 4,9 4,4 4,5 9,1 4,9 4,1 3,8 6,1 4,3 4,5 5,6 6,7 4,3 5,1 6,3 9,5 7,0 4,9
s80/s20
austrIa belGIum bulGarIa cyPrus cZech rePublIc DeNmark estoNIa fINlaND fraNce GermaNy Greece huNGary IrelaND Italy latVIa lIthuaNIa luxembourG malta NetherlaNDs PolaND PortuGal romaNIa sloVakIa sloVeNIa sPaIN sweDeN uk
25,7 26,4 33,4 28,4 25,1 27,0 31,4 25,9 29,8 29,1 33,1 24,7 28,8 31,5 37,4 35,5 29,2 37,8 27,2 31,4 35,4 34,9 24,8 22,7 32,3 24,8 32,4
0,321 0,248 0,331 0,315 0,264 0,256 0,319 0,275 0,330 0,318 0,322 0,334 0,284 0,384 0,347 0,342 0,309 0,348 0,377 0,295 0,250 0,301 0,293 0,305 0,371
3,6 7,9 4,2 5,2 7,1 5,8 5,9 7,4
5,0 3,8 6,6
4,8 6,9 3,9 6,7
4,2 6,4 7,7 10,0 4,0 4,1 6,5 3,9 6,6
Page 33
Daniel Horn
3. table indicators of inequality above and below the median mDmI, aboVe P95/P50, lIs P95/P50, sIlc mDmI, below P50/P5, lIs cNt mDmI, aboVe the P95/P50, lIs P95/P50, sIlc mDmI, below the P50/P5, lIs meDIaN (laNcee(tth-keller (meDGyesI) meDIaN (laNcee- (tth-keller V.D.werfhorts 2011) V.D.werfhorts 2011) 2011) 2011) 0,47 2,19 2,122 -0,27 2,2 austrIa 0,55 2,11 2,027 -0,31 2,3 belGIum 2,855 bulGarIa 0,65 2,174 -0,29 cyPrus 0,51 2,070 -0,22 cZech rePublIc 0,38 1,78 1,839 -0,24 2,04 DeNmark 0,71 2,94 2,394 -0,31 2,69 estoNIa 0,55 1,97 2,035 -0,28 2,12 fINlaND 0,55 2,101 -0,29 fraNce 0,58 2,24 2,296 -0,29 2,34 GermaNy 0,79 2,56 2,469 -0,36 2,77 Greece 0,67 2,44 2,012 -0,31 2,37 huNGary 0,84 2,21 2,269 -0,3 2,67 IrelaND 0,63 2,53 2,328 -0,34 2,91 Italy 2011,01,06 2,945 -0,36 latVIa 0,78 2,574 -0,33 lIthuaNIa 0,64 2,24 2,255 -0,33 2,24 luxembourG malta 0,46 1,89 2,153 -0,24 1,99 NetherlaNDs 0,67 2,49 2,554 -0,35 2,66 PolaND 0,95 2,971 -0,34 PortuGal 2,719 romaNIa 0,57 1,926 -0,26 sloVakIa 0,43 2,01 1,919 -0,25 2,38 sloVeNIa 0,65 2,38 2,340 -0,36 2,9 sPaIN 0,38 1,89 1,848 -0,27 2,05 sweDeN 0,72 2,7 2,546 -0,34 2,49 uk
P50/P5, sIlc P50/P5, sIlc (meDGyesI)
2,054 2,215 3,174 2,254 1,962 2,068 2,557 2,115 2,156 2,436 2,697 2,137 2,255 2,721 3,215 2,736 2,163 1,956 2,512 2,602 3,661 2,086 2,129 2,784 2,130 2,595
Page 34
4. table - country level indicators 1 cNt multIPle (coNcurreNt)

electIoNs
comPulsory
VotING
thresholD
austrIa belGIum bulGarIa cyPrus cZech rePublIc DeNmark estoNIa fINlaND fraNce GermaNy Greece huNGary IrelaND Italy latVIa lIthuaNIa luxembourG malta NetherlaNDs PolaND PortuGal romaNIa sloVakIa sloVeNIa sPaIN sweDeN uk
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
elect. system: PresIDeNtIal ProPortIoNal system (0) Vs. PluralIty (5)

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 4 3 4 5 3 3 2 3 5 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 0 3 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 3 3 0 3 0 0 0
feDeralIsm
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Source: European Election Study/Piredeu 2009
Page 35
Daniel Horn
5. table country level indicators 2 cNt years from NatIoNal

electIoN
total PoPulatIoN, 2008
(owN research) austrIa belGIum bulGarIa cyPrus cZech rePublIc DeNmark estoNIa fINlaND fraNce GermaNy Greece huNGary IrelaND Italy latVIa lIthuaNIa luxembourG malta NetherlaNDs PolaND PortuGal romaNIa sloVakIa sloVeNIa sPaIN sweDeN uk
GDP, Per caPIta, % of eu 27 (eurostat ) GoVerNmeNt exPeNDIture, total, % of GDP, 2007

48,4 48,4 41,5 42,9 42,6 51 34,7 47,3 52,3 44,1 44,1 49,9 35,6 47,9 35,9 35 36,2 42,2 45,5 41,9 45,8 36,3 34,6 42,3 38,7 52,5 44,4
GoVerNmeNt exPeNDIture, socIal ProtectIoN, % of GDP, 2007

19,9 17,1 13,1 9,9 12,9 21,7 9,6 19,9 22,2 20,3 18,7 17,4 10,1 18,2 8,4 11 15,3 13,8 16 15,6 17,5 9,8 10,6 15,5 13 21,6 15,3
3,25 8318592 124 1,00 10666866 116 0,08 7640238 44 1,92 789269 98 0,92 10381130 82 2,42 5475791 121 1,75 1340935 64 1,83 5300484 113 0,30 63982881 108 0,42 82217837 116 0,75 11213785 93 0,83 10045401 65 1,92 4401335 127 2,84 59619290 104 1,33 2270894 52 3,00 3366357 55 0,00 483799 271 2,75 410290 81 1,00 16405399 131 2,42 38115641 61 0,42 10617575 80 3,42 21528627 46 1,00 5400998 73 3,34 2010269 88 2,75 45283259 103 1,25 9182927 118 0,92 61179256 112 Source: European Election Study/Piredeu 2009, unless otherwise noted
Page 36
10. figure Voter turnout in European countries 10. figure Voter turnout in European countries
10. figure Voter turnout in European countries

40 40 60 100 100 40 40 60 100 100 40 40 60 100 100 40 40 60 100 100 60 80 80 60 80 80 60 80 80 60 80 80
Austria Austria
Bulgaria Bulgaria
Czech Republic Czech Republic
Denmark Denmark
Estonia Estonia
Finland Finland
Voter turnout, parlamentary elections Voter turnout, parlamentary elections
France France
Germany Germany
Greece Greece
Hungary Hungary
Ireland Ireland
Italy Italy
Latvia Latvia
Liechtenstein Liechtenstein
Lithuania Lithuania
Malta Malta
Netherlands Netherlands
Norway Norway
Poland Poland
Portugal Portugal
Romania Romania
Slovakia Slovakia
Slovenia Slovenia
Spain Spain
1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
40 40 60 100 100 60 80 80
Sweden Sweden
Switzerland Switzerland
United Kingdom United Kingdom
1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
Source:IDEA Source:IDEA
Year Year
11. figure income Gini coefficient of European countries 11. figure income Gini coefficient of European countries 11. figure income Gini coefficient of European countries
AUSTRIA
20 25 30 35 40 40 20 25 30 35
BELGIUM BELGIUM
BULGARIA BULGARIA
CYPRUS CYPRUS
CZECH REPUBLIC CZECH REPUBLIC
DENMARK DENMARK
AUSTRIA
ESTONIA ESTONIA
FINLAND FINLAND
FRANCE FRANCE
GERMANY GERMANY
GREECE GREECE
HUNGARY HUNGARY
20 25 30 35 40 40 20 25 30 35
IRELAND IRELAND
ITALY ITALY
LATVIA LATVIA
LITHUANIA LITHUANIA
LUXEMBOURG LUXEMBOURG
MALTA MALTA
20 25 30 35 40 40 20 25 30 35
Gini Gini
NETHERLANDS NETHERLANDS
POLAND POLAND
PORTUGAL PORTUGAL
ROMANIA ROMANIA
SLOVAKIA SLOVAKIA
SLOVENIA SLOVENIA
20 25 30 35 40 40 20 25 30 35
1995
2000 2000
2005 2005
2010 2010
1995 1995
2000 2000
2005 2005
2010 2010
1995 1995
2000 2000
2005 2005
2010 2010
SPAIN
20 25 30 35 40 40 20 25 30 35
SWEDEN SWEDEN
UK UK
1995
SPAIN
1995 1995
2000 2000
2005 2005
2010 2010
1995 1995
2000 2000
2005 2005
2010 2010
1995 1995
2000 2000
2005 2005
2010 2010 year year
Source:Eurostat Source:Eurostat
27 27
Page 37
Daniel Horn
6. table Logit Base model (ORs)

VarIables aGe aGe squareD female aGe wheN fINIsheD eDucatIoN subjectIVe staNDarD of lIVING (wIthIN couNtry Z-score) comPulsory VotING multIPle (coNcurreNt) electIoNs PoPulatIoN thresholD elect. system: ProPortIoNal (0) Vs. PluralIty (5) PresIDeNtIal feDeralIsm years from NatIoNal electIoN % of other NatIoNalItIes GDP Per caPIta, % of eu27 coNstaNt obserVatIoNs
Odds ratios, robust clustered se in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
(1) Vote=1
1.089** (0.0124) 1.000** (0.000120) 1.040 (0.0629) 1.056** (0.0149) 1.196** (0.0320) 1.308 (0.284) 0.731 (0.583) 1.000 (4.21e-09) 0.500** (0.128) 1.053 (0.0913) 0.847* (0.0680) 1.772* (0.427) 1.076 (0.0761) 0.970+ (0.0173) 1.004 (0.00522) 0.142* (0.112) 20,202
Page 38
7. table Different measures of income inequality on turnout, logit (ORs) (1) (2) (3) (4) VarIables Vote Vote Vote Vote
subjectIVe staNDarD of lIVING (wIthIN couNtry Z-score) GINI, eurostat 2009
s80/s20, sso 2009
(5)
Vote
(6)
Vote
(7)
Vote
1.194** (0.0315) 1.017 (0.0268)
1.186** (0.0316)
1.203** (0.0347)
1.201** (0.0338)
1.198** (0.0318)
1.204** (0.0430)
1.190** (0.0318)
GINI, earNING, sso 2009 meaN DIstaNce from the meDIaN PoVerty rate, sIlc
P95/P5, lIs P95/P5, sIlc
1.041 (0.170) 0.982* (0.00702) 0.218+ (0.180) 0.976+ (0.0129) 0.751 (0.338) 0.942 (0.0816) 0.157+ (0.157) 19,603
coNstaNt obserVatIoNs
Robust seeform in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
0.0852* (0.105) 20,202
0.138+ (0.147) 18,964
0.249 (0.215) 20,202
0.181+ (0.177) 18,112
0.251 (0.218) 20,202
0.861 (1.581) 12,979
8. table Different measures of income inequality on turnout, 2 step (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) VarIables PreDIcteD ProbabIlIya, 2ND steP
GINI, eurostat 2009
s80/s20, sso 2009
(6)
(7)
0.000854 (0.00541) 0.00224 (0.0332) -0.00174 (0.00168) -0.338 (0.217) -0.00608* (0.00265) -0.0400 (0.0711) -0.00779 (0.0167) 0.849** (0.153) 26 0.587
coNstaNt obserVatIoNs r-squareD
0.792** (0.192) 27 0.575
0.831** (0.170) 25 0.602
0.864** (0.137) 27 0.603
0.875** (0.136) 24 0.648
0.943** (0.127) 27 0.685
1.024* (0.376) 17 0.627
Standard errors in parentheses, a for a 40 year old average income men, who finished education at age 18 ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Page 39
Daniel Horn
9. table Different measures of income inequality on turnout, hierarchical logit (ORs) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) VarIables Vote Vote Vote Vote Vote GINI, eurostat 2009 1.007
s80/s20, sso 2009
(6) Vote
(7) Vote
(0.0346) 0.944 (0.165) 0.979+ (0.0121) 0.0943+ (0.114) 0.964* (0.0141) 0.713 (0.291) 0.895 (0.0803) 0.300 (0.265) 0.499** (0.0774) 19,603 26
coNstaNt
sD(coNstaNt)
raNDom effects Parameters obserVatIoNs Number of GrouPs

seEform in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
0.166 (0.207) 0.529** (0.0795) 20,202 27
0.272 (0.262) 0.507** (0.0799) 18,964 25
0.380 (0.327) 0.499** (0.0758) 20,202 27
0.306 (0.273) 0.474** (0.0770) 18,112 24
0.501 (0.415) 0.473** (0.0718) 20,202 27
0.986 (2.091) 0.458** (0.0911) 19,603 26
Page 40
10. table Income bias, logit (ORs)

VarIables subjectIVe staNDarD of lIVING (wIthIN couNtry Z-score) GINI, eurostat 2009 * staNDarD of lIVING
s80/s20, sso 2009
(1)
Vote
(2)
Vote
(3)
Vote
(4)
Vote
(5)
Vote
(6)
Vote
(7)
Vote
1.029 (0.130) 1.018 (0.0269) 1.005 (0.00428)
0.773 (0.122)
1.011 (0.157)
1.118 (0.0987)
1.223* (0.0986)
1.239 (0.189)
1.182 (0.186)
* staNDarD of lIVING GINI, earNING, sso 2009 * staNDarD of lIVING meaN DIstaNce from the meDIaN * staNDarD of lIVING PoVerty rate, sIlc * staNDarD of lIVING
P95/P5, lIs
1.042 (0.170) 1.006 (0.0188)
0.982* (0.00726) 0.998 (0.00236)
0.222+ (0.184) 1.155 (0.202)
0.976+ (0.0129) 0.999 (0.00256)
* staNDarD of lIVING
P95/P5, sIlc
0.750 (0.338) 0.995 (0.0252)
* staNDarD of lIVING coNstaNt obserVatIoNs

Robust seeform in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 0.0833* (0.103) 20,202 0.137+ (0.146) 18,964 0.251 (0.218) 20,202 0.179+ (0.175) 18,112 0.252 (0.219) 20,202 0.866 (1.593) 12,979
0.942 (0.0819) 1.001 (0.0125) 0.156+ (0.158) 19,603
Page 41
Daniel Horn
11. table income bias, hierarchical logit (ORs) (1) (3) VarIables Vote Vote
subjectIVe staNDarD of lIVING (wIthIN couNtry Z-score) GINI, eurostat 2009 * staNDarD of lIVING
s80/s20, sso 2009
(5)
Vote
(7)
Vote
(9)
Vote
(11)
Vote
(13)
Vote
1.057 (0.176) 1.008 (0.0346) 1.005 (0.00545)
0.775 (0.194)
1.046 (0.207)
1.147 (0.136)
1.274** (0.0772)
1.231 (0.190)
1.228** (0.0945)
* staNDarD of lIVING GINI, earNING, sso 2009 * staNDarD of lIVING meaN DIstaNce from the meDIaN * staNDarD of lIVING PoVerty rate, sIlc * staNDarD of lIVING
P95/P5, lIs
0.944 (0.166) 1.003 (0.0189) 0.979+ (0.0121) 0.998 (0.00316) 0.0959+ (0.116) 1.139 (0.265) 0.964* (0.0141) 0.999 (0.00179) 0.713 (0.291) 0.999 (0.0251) 0.895 (0.0803) 0.998 (0.0120) 0.300 (0.265) 0.499** (0.0774) 19,603 26
P95/P5, sIlc
* staNDarD of lIVING coNstaNt raNDom effects Parameters obserVatIoNs Number of GrouPs

seEform in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 0.162 (0.202) 0.529** (0.0795) 20,202 27 0.271 (0.261) 0.507** (0.0799) 18,964 25 0.385 (0.331) 0.499** (0.0758) 20,202 27 0.303 (0.270) 0.474** (0.0769) 18,112 24 0.505 (0.418) 0.474** (0.0719) 20,202 27 0.988 (2.095) 0.458** (0.0911) 12,979 17
Page 42
12. table - Different measures of income inequality below and above the median on turnout, logit (ORs) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Vote Vote Vote Vote Vote VarIables mDmI, below the meaN 2.357
(6)
Vote
(7.290)
17.76** (17.43) 0.880 (0.342) 0.466 (0.409) 0.102+ (0.134) 0.108+ (0.142) 18,112 0.000592** (0.00119) 12,979 0.160 (0.229) 19,603 0.108* (0.0977) 18,112 27.45 (74.54) 12,979 0.550+ (0.191) 0.382 (0.467) 19,603
mDmI, aboVe the meDIaN

coNstaNt obserVatIoNs robust seeform IN PareNtheses ** P<0.01, * P<0.05, + P<0.1
13. table Income bias, below and above the median, logit (ORs) (1) (2) VarIables Vote Vote subjectIVe staNDarD of lIVING (wIthIN couNtry Z-score) 1.006 1.271
mDmI, below meDIaN * staNDarD of lIVING
P50/P5, lIs
(3)
Vote
(4)
Vote
(5)
Vote
(6)
Vote
(0.162) 2.174 (6.760) 0.566 (0.315)
(0.432)
1.195 (0.156)
1.160* (0.0846)
1.198 (0.267)
1.102 (0.174)
P50/P5, sIlc
17.66** (17.83) 0.980 (0.138)
* staNDarD of lIVING mDmI, aboVe the meDIaN * staNDarD of lIVING

P95/P50, lIs
0.880 (0.344) 0.998 (0.0520)
0.469 (0.412) 1.051 (0.108)
P95/P50, sIlc
0.102+ (0.134) 1.004 (0.0900)
* staNDarD of lIVING coNstaNt obserVatIoNs

Robust seeform in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 0.105+ (0.140) 18,112 0.000600** (0.00124) 12,979 0.160 (0.230) 19,603 0.108* (0.0971) 18,112 27.40 (74.71) 12,979
0.552+ (0.193) 1.035 (0.0715) 0.378 (0.465) 19,603
Page 43
Daniel Horn
14. table welfare state test 1 logit (ORs) (1) VarIables Vote
GoVerNmeNt exPeNDIture, total, % of GDP, 2007 GINI, eurostat 2009
s80/s20, sso 2009
(2)
Vote
(3)
Vote
(4)
Vote
(5)
Vote
(6)
Vote
(7)
Vote
1.075* (0.0345) 1.023 (0.0258)
1.067* (0.0343)
1.070* (0.0319)
1.059+ (0.0360)
1.065+ (0.0353)
1.098+ (0.0592)
1.068* (0.0330)
0.981 (0.133) 0.986+ (0.00832) 0.551 (0.576) 0.986 (0.0131) 0.990 (0.326) 0.957 (0.0744) 0.000777* 0.00709** (0.00276) (0.0120) 12,979 19,603
0.00259** 0.00695** (0.00507) (0.0126) 20,202 18,964
0.0101** (0.0164) 20,202
0.00850* (0.0174) 18,112
0.0113* (0.0208) 20,202
Page 44
15. table welfare state test 2 - logit

VarIables GoVerNmeNt exPeNDIture, socIal Prot, % of GDP, 2007 GINI, eurostat 2009
s80/s20, sso 2009
(1)
Vote
(2)
Vote
(3)
Vote
(4)
Vote
(5)
Vote
(6)
Vote
(7)
Vote
1.104* (0.0515) 1.009 (0.0247)
1.108* (0.0541)
1.098+ (0.0539)
1.076 (0.0543)
1.091+ (0.0567)
3.773** (0.603)
1.101* (0.0511)
0.897 (0.128) 0.986+ (0.00733) 0.300 (0.252) 0.983 (0.0130) 0.106** (0.0387) 0.931 (0.0754) 1.51e-10** 0.0385** (4.13e-10) (0.0444) 12,979 19,603
0.0241** (0.0314) 20,202
0.0351** (0.0425) 18,964
0.0538** (0.0599) 20,202
0.0528* (0.0698) 18,112
0.0572* (0.0726) 20,202
Page 45
Daniel Horn
Page 46
GInI Discussion Papers

Recent publications of GINI. They can be downloaded from the website www.gini-research.org under the subject Papers.
DP 15 Can higher employment levels bring down poverty in the eu?
Ive Marx, Pieter Vandenbroucke and Gerlinde Verbist October 2011

DP 14 Inequality and Anti-globalization Backlash by Political Parties
Brian Burgoon October 2011

DP 13 the Social Stratification of Social risks. Class and responsibility in the new welfare State
Olivier Pintelon, Bea Cantillon, Karel Van den Bosch and Christopher T. Whelan September 2011
DP 12 Factor Components of Inequality. A Cross-Country Study
Cecilia Garca-Pealosa and Elsa Orgiazzi July 2011

DP 11 An Analysis of Generational equity over recent Decades in the OeCD and uK
Jonathan Bradshaw and John Holmes July 2011

DP 10 whe reaps the Benefits? the Social Distribution of Public Childcare in Sweden and Flanders
Wim van Lancker and Joris Ghysels June 2011

DP 9 Comparable Indicators of Inequality Across Countries (Position Paper)
Brian Nolan, Ive Marx and Wiemer Salverda March 2011

DP 8 the Ideological and Political roots of American Inequality
John E. Roemer March 2011

DP 7 Income distributions, inequality perceptions and redistributive claims in european societies
Istvn Gyrgy Tth and Tams Keller February 2011

DP 6 Income Inequality and Participation: A Comparison of 24 european Countries + Appendix
Bram Lancee and Herman van de Werfhorst January 2011

DP 5 Household Joblessness and Its Impact on Poverty and Deprivation in europe
Marloes de Graaf-Zijl January 2011

DP 4 Inequality Decompositions - A reconciliation
Frank A. Cowell and Carlo V. Fiorio December 2010

DP 3 A new Dataset of educational Inequality
Elena Meschi and Francesco Scervini December 2010
Page 47
Daniel Horn
DP 2 DP 1
Are european Social Safety nets tight enough? Coverage and Adequacy of minimum Income Schemes in 14 eu Countries
Francesco Figari, Manos Matsaganis and Holly Sutherland June 2011

Distributional Consequences of Labor Demand Adjustments to a Downturn. A model-based Approach with Application to Germany 2008-09
Olivier Bargain, Herwig Immervoll, Andreas Peichl and Sebastian Siegloch September 2010
Page 48
Information on the GInI project

Aims
The core objective of GINI is to deliver important new answers to questions of great interest to European societies: What are the social, cultural and political impacts that increasing inequalities in income, wealth and education may have? For the answers, GINI combines an interdisciplinary analysis that draws on economics, sociology, political science and health studies, with improved methodologies, uniform measurement, wide country coverage, a clear policy dimension and broad dissemination. Methodologically, GINI aims to: exploit differences between and within 29 countries in inequality levels and trends for understanding the impacts and teasing out implications for policy and institutions, elaborate on the effects of both individual distributional positions and aggregate inequalities, and allow for feedback from impacts to inequality in a two-way causality approach. The project operates in a framework of policy-oriented debate and international comparisons across all EU countries (except Cyprus and Malta), the USA, Japan, Canada and Australia.
Inequality Impacts and Analysis

Social impacts of inequality include educational access and achievement, individual employment opportunities and labour market behaviour, household joblessness, living standards and deprivation, family and household formation/breakdown, housing and intergenerational social mobility, individual health and life expectancy, and social cohesion versus polarisation. Underlying long-term trends, the economic cycle and the current nancial and economic crisis will be incorporated. Politico-cultural impacts investigated are: Do increasing income/educational inequalities widen cultural and political distances, alienating people from politics, globalisation and European integration? Do they affect individuals participation and general social trust? Is acceptance of inequality and policies of redistribution affected by inequality itself ? What effects do political systems (coalitions/winner-takes-all) have? Finally, it focuses on costs and bene ts of policies limiting income inequality and its ef ciency for mitigating other inequalities (health, housing, education and opportunity), and addresses the question what contributions policy making itself may have made to the growth of inequalities.
Support and Activities

The project receives EU research support to the amount of Euro 2.7 million. The work will result in four main reports and a nal report, some 70 discussion papers and 29 country reports. The start of the project is 1 February 2010 for a three-year period. Detailed information can be found on the website.
www.gini-research.org
Page 49
Amsterdam Institute for Advanced labour Studies University of Amsterdam

Plantage Muidergracht 12 1018 TV Amsterdam The Netherlands Tel +31 20 525 4199 Fax +31 20 525 4301 gini@uva.nl www.gini-research.org
Project funded under the Socio-Economic sciences and Humanities theme.
Page 51
Amsterdam Institute for Advanced labour Studies University of Amsterdam

Plantage Muidergracht 12 1018 TV Amsterdam The Netherlands Tel +31 20 525 4199 Fax +31 20 525 4301 gini@uva.nl www.gini-research.org
Project funded under the Socio-Economic sciences and Humanities theme.
Page 53

Income Inequality and Voter Turnout

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Income Inequality and Voter Turnout

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

INcome INequalIty aND Voter turNout

GINI DIscussIoN PaPer 16 october 2011 GrOwInG InequALItIeS ImPACtS

October 2011 Daniel Horn, Amsterdam General contact: gini@uva.nl

This paper can be downloaded from our website www.gini-research.org.

Income inequality and voter turnout

Income inequality and voter turnout

Income inequality and voter turnout

JEL codes: D72, D63

Income inequality and voter turnout

Income inequality and voter turnout

Voter turnout and inequality

Voter turnout, parlamentary elections 60 70 80 90

2. figure Average Gini coefficient in European countries

2. figure - Average Gini coefficient in European countries

Income inequality and voter turnout

hypotheses about the relation of inequality and turnout.

30 35 Gini, Eurostat 2009

.3 .35 earning Gini, SSO

(source: European Election Study/Piredeu, Eurostat, SILC, Lancee-v.d.Werfhorst, SSO)

(source: European Election Study/Piredeu, Eurostat, SILC, Lanceev.d.Werfhorst, SSO)

Income inequality and voter turnout

Income inequality and voter turnout

Data and method

1. table Voter turnout, actual and observed

Declining turnout hypothesis 1

Income inequality and voter turnout

voter turnout, pred. pr. .7 .8 .9 1

30 35 Gini, Eurostat 2009

.4 .5 .6 .7 Mean distance from the median

voter turnout, pred. pr. .7 .8 .9 1

voter turnout, pred. pr. .7 .8 .9 1

30 40 50 Poverty rate, SILC

Income bias hypothesis 2a 2a 3.2. Income bias hypothesis

Income inequality and voter turnout

marginal effect, subj. st. of living 0 .02 .04 .06 .08

30 35 Gini, Eurostat 2009

.4 .5 .6 .7 Mean distance from the median

marginal effect, subj. st. of living 0 .02 .04 .06 .08

marginal effect, subj. st. of living 0 .02 .04 .06 .08

30 40 50 Poverty rate, SILC

Inequality on the top and at the bottom hypothesis 2b

Income inequality and voter turnout

voter turnout, pred. pr. .8 .9

voter turnout, pred. pr. .8 .9

voter turnout, pred. pr. .8 .9

.6 .8 1 1.2 MDMI, above the median 1

2 2.5 p95/p50, SILC

2 2.5 p95/p50, LIS

voter turnout, pred. pr. .8 .9

voter turnout, pred. pr. .8 .9

voter turnout, pred. pr. .8 .9

-.35 -.3 -.25 -.2 MDMI, below the median

2.5 3 3.5 p50/p5, SILC

2.4 2.6 2.8 p50/p5, LIS

Universal welfare states hypothesis 3 3 3.4. universal welfare states hypothesis

7. figure - government expenditure vs. income inequality

7. figure government expenditure vs. income inequality

Government expenditure, Total, % of GDP, 2007

Poverty rate, SILC 20 30 40 50

35 Mean distance from the median .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8

government spending on social protection is included. Since there were no substantial

significance, due probably to increased multicollinearity between the variables.

Income inequality and voter turnout