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A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC RULE ON ADOPTION A. DOMESTIC ADOPTION Section 1. Applicability of the Rule.

This Rule covers the domestic adoption of Filipino children. Section 2. Objectives. (a) The best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration in all matters relating to his care, custody and adoption, in accordance with Philippine laws, the nited !ations ( !) "onvention on the Rights of the "hild, ! #eclaration on $ocial and %egal Principles Relating to the Protection and &elfare of "hildren with $pecial Reference to Foster Placement and 'doption, !ationally and (nternationally, and the )ague "onvention on the Protection of "hildren and "ooperation in Respect of (nter*country 'doption. (b) The $tate shall provide alternative protection and assistance through foster care or adoption for every child who is a foundling, neglected, orphaned, or abandoned. To this end, the $tate shall+ (i) ensure that every child remains under the care and custody of his parents and is provided with love, care, understanding and security for the full and harmonious development of his personality. ,nly when such efforts prove insufficient and no appropriate placement or adoption within the child-s e.tended family is available shall adoption by an unrelated person be considered. (ii) safeguard the biological parents from ma/ing hasty decisions in relin0uishing their parental authority over their child1 (iii) prevent the child from unnecessary separation from his biological parents1 (iv) conduct public information and educational campaigns to promote a positive environment for adoption1 (v) ensure that government and private sector agencies have the capacity to handle adoption in0uiries, process domestic adoption applications and offer adoption*related services including, but not limited to, parent preparation and post*adoption education and counseling1 (vi) encourage domestic adoption so as to preserve the child-s identity and culture in his native land, and only when this is not available shall inter*country adoption be considered as a last resort1 and (vii) protect adoptive parents from attempts to disturb their parental authority and custody over their adopted child. 'ny voluntary or involuntary termination of parental authority shall be administratively or 2udicially declared so as to establish the status of the child as 3legally available for adoption4 and his custody transferred to the #epartment of $ocial &elfare and #evelopment or to any duly licensed and accredited child*placing or child*caring agency, which entity shall be authori5ed to ta/e steps for the permanent placement of the child. Section 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Rule+ (a) 3"hild4 is a person below eighteen (67) years of age at the time of the filing of the petition for adoption. (b) 3' child legally available for adoption4 refers to a child who has been voluntarily or involuntarily committed to the #epartment or to a duly licensed and accredited child*placing or child*caring agency, freed of the parental authority of his biological parents, or in case of rescission of adoption, his guardian or adopter(s). (c) 38oluntarily committed child4 is one whose parents /nowingly and willingly relin0uish parental authority over him in favor of the #epartment. (d) 3(nvoluntarily committed child4 is one whose parents, /nown or un/nown, have been permanently and 2udicially deprived of parental authority over him due to abandonment1 substantial, continuous or repeated neglect and abuse1 or incompetence to discharge parental responsibilities. (e) 3Foundling4 refers to a deserted or abandoned infant or child whose parents, guardian or relatives are un/nown1 or a child committed to an orphanage or charitable or similar institution with un/nown facts of birth and parentage and registered in the "ivil Register as a 3foundling.4 (f) 3'bandoned child4 refers to one who has no proper parental care or guardianship or whose parents have deserted him for a period of at least si. (9) continuous months and has been 2udicially declared as such. (g) 3#ependent child4 refers to one who is without a parent, guardian or custodian or one whose parents, guardian or other custodian for good cause desires to be relieved of his care and custody and is dependent upon the public for support. (h) 3!eglected child4 is one whose basic needs have been deliberately not attended to or inade0uately attended to, physically or emotionally, by his parents or guardian.

(i) 3Physical neglect4 occurs when the child is malnourished, ill*clad and without proper shelter. (2) 3:motional neglect4 e.ists when a child is raped, seduced, maltreated, e.ploited, overwor/ed or made to wor/ under conditions not conducive to good health or made to beg in the streets or public places, or placed in moral danger, or e.posed to drugs, alcohol, gambling, prostitution and other vices. (/) 3"hild*placement agency4 refers to an agency duly licensed and accredited by the #epartment to provide comprehensive child welfare services including, but not limited to, receiving applications for adoption, evaluating the prospective adoptive parents and preparing the adoption home study report. (l) 3"hild*caring agency4 refers to an agency duly licensed and accredited by the #epartment that provides ;<*hour residential care services for abandoned, orphaned, neglected or voluntarily committed children. (m) 3#epartment4 refers to the #epartment of $ocial &elfare and #evelopment. (n) 3#eed of 8oluntary "ommitment4 refers to the written and notari5ed instrument relin0uishing parental authority and committing the child to the care and custody of the #epartment e.ecuted by the child-s biological parents or in their absence, mental incapacity or death, by the child-s legal guardian, to be witnessed by an authori5ed representative of the #epartment after counseling and other services have been made available to encourage the biological parents to /eep the child. (o) 3"hild $tudy Report4 refers to a study made by the court social wor/er of the child-s legal status, placement history, psychological, social, spiritual, medical, ethno*cultural bac/ground and that of his biological family needed in determining the most appropriate placement for him. (p) 3)ome $tudy Report4 refers to a study made by the court social wor/er of the motivation and capacity of the prospective adoptive parents to provide a home that meets the needs of a child. (0) 3$upervised trial custody4 refers to the period of time during which a social wor/er oversees the ad2ustment and emotional readiness of both adopters and adoptee in stabili5ing their filial relationship. (r) 3%icensed $ocial &or/er4 refers to one who possesses a degree in bachelor of science in social wor/ as a minimum educational re0uirement and who has passed the government licensure e.amination for social wor/ers as re0uired by Republic 'ct !o. <=>=. (s) 3$imulation of birth4 is the tampering of the civil registry to ma/e it appear in the birth records that a certain child was born to a person who is not his biological mother, thus causing such child to lose his true identity and status. (t) 3?iological Parents4 refer to the child-s mother and father by nature. (u) 3Pre*'doption $ervices4 refer to psycho*social services provided by professionally*trained social wor/ers of the #epartment, the social services units of local governments, private and government health facilities, Family "ourts, licensed and accredited child*caring and child* placement agencies and other individuals or entities involved in adoption as authori5ed by the #epartment. (v) 3Residence4 means a person-s actual stay in the Philippines for three (=) continuous years immediately prior to the filing of a petition for adoption and which is maintained until the adoption decree is entered. Temporary absences for professional, business, health, or emergency reasons not e.ceeding si.ty (9@) days in one (6) year does not brea/ the continuity re0uirement. (w) 3'lien4 refers to any person, not a Filipino citi5en, who enters and remains in the Philippines and is in possession of a valid passport or travel documents and visa. Section 4. Who may adopt. The following may adopt+ (6) Any Fi i!ino citi"en of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude1 who is emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, at least si.teen (69) A:'R$ older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care for his children in /eeping with the means of the family. The re0uirement of a 69*year difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee or is the spouse of the adoptee-s parent1 (;) Any # ien !o$$e$$in% t&e $#'e ()# i*ic#tion$ #$ #+o,e *stated for Filipino nationals+ PR,8(#:#, That his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the P)(%(PP(!:$, that he has been living in the Philippines for at least three (=) ",!T(! , $ A:'R$ prior to the filing of the petition for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he has been certified by his diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency to have the legal capacity to adopt in his country, and that his government allows the adoptee to enter his country as his adopted child. Provided, further, That the re0uirements on residency and certification of the alien-s 0ualification to adopt in his country may be waived for the following+ (i) a former Filipino citi5en who see/s to adopt a relative within the fourth (<th) degree of consanguinity or affinity1 or (ii) one who see/s to adopt the legitimate child of his Filipino spouse1 or

(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citi5en and see/s to adopt 2ointly with his spouse a relative within the fourth (<th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouse. (=) The %)#-.i#n /it& -e$!ect to t&e /#-. after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of his financial accountabilities. )usband and wife shall 2ointly adopt, e.cept in the following cases+ (i) if one spouse see/s to adopt the legitimate child of one spouse by the other spouse1 or (ii) if one spouse see/s to adopt his own illegitimate child+ Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified his consent thereto1 or (iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other. (n case husband and wife 2ointly adopt or one spouse adopts the illegitimate child of the other, 2oint parental authority shall be e.ercised by the spouses. Section 0. Who may be adopted. The following may be adopted+ (6) 'ny person below eighteen (67) years of age who has been voluntarily committed to the #epartment under 'rticles 6B<, 6BB and 6B9 of P.#. !o. 9@= or 2udicially declared available for adoption1 (;) The legitimate child of one spouse, by the other spouse1 (=) 'n illegitimate child, by a 0ualified adopter to raise the status of the former to that of legitimacy1 (<) ' person of legal age regardless of civil status, if, prior to the adoption, said person has been consistently considered and treated by the adopters as their own child since minority1 (B) ' child whose adoption has been previously rescinded1 or (9) ' child whose biological or adoptive parents have died+ Provided, That no proceedings shall be initiated within six ( ! months from the time of death of said parents. (>) ' child not otherwise dis0ualified by law or these rules. Section 6. Venue. The petition for adoption shall be filed with the "amily #ourt of the province or city where the prospective adoptive parents reside. Section 1. Contents of the Petition. The petition shall be verified and specifically state at the heading of the initiatory pleading whether the petition contains an application for change of name, rectification of simulated birth, voluntary or involuntary commitment of children, or declaration of child as abandoned, dependent or neglected. 6) I* t&e #.o!te- i$ # Fi i!ino citi"en2 t&e !etition $&# # e%e t&e *o o/in%3 (a) The 2urisdictional facts1 (b) That the petitioner is of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights1 is of good moral character1 has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude1 is emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children1 is at least si.teen (69) years older than the adoptee, unless the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee or is the spouse of the adoptee-s parent1 and is in a position to support and care for his children in /eeping with the means of the family and has undergone pre* adoption services as re0uired by $ection < of Republic 'ct !o. 7BB;. ;) I* t&e #.o!te- i$ #n # ien2 t&e !etition $&# # e%e t&e *o o/in%3 (a) The 2urisdictional facts1 (b) $ub*paragraph 6(b) above1 (c) That his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines1 (d) That he has been certified by his diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency to have the legal capacity to adopt in his country and his government allows the adoptee to enter his country as his adopted child and reside there permanently as an adopted child1 and

(e) That he has been living in the Philippines for at least three (=) continuous years prior to the filing of the petition and he maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered. The re0uirements of certification of the alien-s 0ualification to adopt in his country and of residency may be waived if the alien+ (i) is a former Filipino citi5en who see/s to adopt a relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity1 or (ii) see/s to adopt the legitimate child of his Filipino spouse1 or (iii) is married to a Filipino citi5en and see/s to adopt 2ointly with his spouse a relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouse. =) I* t&e #.o!te- i$ t&e e%# %)#-.i#n of the adoptee, the petition shall allege that guardianship had been terminated and the guardian had cleared his financial accountabilities. <) I* t&e #.o!te- i$ '#--ie., the spouse shall be a co*petitioner for 2oint adoption except if+ (a) one spouse see/s to adopt the legitimate child of the other, or (b) if one spouse see/s to adopt his own illegitimate child and the other spouse signified written consent thereto, or (c) if the spouses are legally separated from each other. B) I* t&e #.o!tee i$ # *o)n. in%, the petition shall allege the entries which should appear in his birth certificate, such as name of child, date of birth, place of birth, if /nown1 se., name and citi5enship of adoptive mother and father, and the date and place of their marriage. 9) I* t&e !etition !-#y$ *o- # c&#n%e o* n#'e, it shall also state the cause or reason for the change of name. (n # !etition$, it $&# be # e%ed+ (a) The first name, surname or names, age and residence of the adoptee as shown by his record of birth, baptismal or foundling certificate and school records. (b) That the adoptee is not dis0ualified by law to be adopted. (c) The probable value and character of the estate of the adoptee. (d) The first name, surname or names by which the adoptee is to be /nown and registered in the "ivil Registry. ' certification of non*forum shopping shall be included pursuant to $ection B, Rule > of the 6CC> Rules of "ivil Procedure. Section 4. Rectification of $imulated %irth. (n case the petition also see/s rectification of a simulated of birth, it shall allege that+ (a) Petitioner is applying for rectification of a simulated birth1 (b) The simulation of birth was made prior to the date of effectivity of Republic 'ct !o. 7BB; and the application for rectification of the birth registration and the petition for adoption were filed within five years from said date1 (c) The petitioner made the simulation of birth for the best interests of the adoptee1 and (d) The adoptee has been consistently considered and treated by petitioner as his own child. Section 5. Adoption of a foundling& an abandoned& dependent or neglected child. (n case the adoptee is a foundling, an abandoned, dependent or neglected child, the petition shall allege+ (a) The facts showing that the child is a foundling, abandoned, dependent or neglected1 (b) The names of the parents, if /nown, and their residence. (f the child has no /nown or living parents, then the name and residence of the guardian, if any1 (c) The name of the duly licensed child*placement agency or individual under whose care the child is in custody1 and (d) That the #epartment, child*placement or child*caring agency is authori5ed to give its consent.

Section 10. #hange of name. (n case the petition also prays for change of name, the title or caption must contain+ (a) The registered name of the child1 (b) 'liases or other names by which the child has been /nown1 and (c) The full name by which the child is to be /nown. Section 11. Annexes to the 'etition. The following documents shall be attached to the petition+ '. ?irth, baptismal or foundling certificate, as the case may be, and school records showing the name, age and residence of the adoptee1 ?. 'ffidavit of consent of the following+ 6. The adoptee, if ten (6@) years of age or over1 ;. The biological parents of the child, if /nown, or the legal guardian, or the child*placement agency, child*caring agency, or the proper government instrumentality which has legal custody of the child1 =. The legitimate and adopted children of the adopter and of the adoptee, if any, who are ten (6@) years of age or over1 <. The illegitimate children of the adopter living with him who are ten (6@) years of age or over1 and B. The spouse, if any, of the adopter or adoptee. ". "hild study report on the adoptee and his biological parents1 #. (f the petitioner is an alien, certification by his diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency that he has the legal capacity to adopt in his country and that his government allows the adoptee to enter his country as his own adopted child unless e.empted under $ection <(;)1 :. )ome study report on the adopters. (f the adopter is an alien or residing abroad but 0ualified to adopt, the home study report by a foreign adoption agency duly accredited by the (nter*"ountry 'doption ?oard1 and F. #ecree of annulment, nullity or legal separation of the adopter as well as that of the biological parents of the adoptee, if any. Section 12. Order of (earing. (f the petition and attachments are sufficient in form and substance, the court shall issue an order which shall contain the following+ (6) the registered name of the adoptee in the birth certificate and the names by which the adoptee has been /nown which shall be stated in the caption1 (;) the purpose of the petition1 (=) the complete name which the adoptee will use if the petition is granted1 (<) the date and place of hearing which shall be set within si. (9) months from the date of the issuance of the order and shall direct that a copy thereof be published before the date of hearing at least once a wee/ for three successive wee/s in a newspaper of general circulation in the province or city where the court is situated1 Provided, that in case of application for change of name, the date set for hearing shall not be within four (<) months after the last publication of the notice nor within thirty (=@) days prior to an election. The newspaper shall be selected by raffle under the supervision of the :.ecutive Dudge. (B) a directive to the social wor/er of the court, the social service office of the local government unit or any child*placing or child*caring agency, or the #epartment to prepare and submit child and home study reports before the hearing if such reports had not been attached to the petition due to unavailability at the time of the filing of the latter1 and (9) a directive to the social wor/er of the court to conduct counseling sessions with the biological parents on the matter of adoption of the adoptee and submit her report before the date of hearing. 't the discretion of the court, copies of the order of hearing shall also be furnished the ,ffice of the $olicitor Eeneral through the provincial or city prosecutor, the #epartment and the biological parents of the adoptee, if /nown. (f a change in the name of the adoptee is prayed for in the petition, notice to the $olicitor Eeneral shall be mandatory.

Section 13. #hild and (ome $tudy Reports. (n preparing the child study report on the adoptee, the concerned social wor/er shall verify with the "ivil Registry the real identity and registered name of the adoptee. (f the birth of the adoptee was not registered with the "ivil Registry, it shall be the responsibility of the social wor/er to register the adoptee and secure a certificate of foundling or late registration, as the case may be. The social wor/er shall establish that the child is legally available for adoption and the documents in support thereof are valid and authentic, that the adopter has sincere intentions and that the adoption shall inure to the best interests of the child. (n case the adopter is an alien, the home study report must show the legal capacity to adopt and that his government allows the adoptee to enter his country as his adopted child in the absence of the certification re0uired under $ection >(b) of Republic 'ct !o. 7BB;. (f after the conduct of the case studies, the social wor/er finds that there are grounds to deny the petition, he shall ma/e the proper recommendation to the court, furnishing a copy thereof to the petitioner. Section 14. (earing. pon satisfactory proof that the order of hearing has been published and 2urisdictional re0uirements have been complied with, the court shall proceed to hear the petition. The petitioner and the adoptee must personally appear and the former must testify before the presiding 2udge of the court on the date set for hearing. The court shall verify from the social wor/er and determine whether the biological parent has been properly counseled against ma/ing hasty decisions caused by strain or an.iety to give up the child1 ensure that all measures to strengthen the family have been e.hausted1 and ascertain if any prolonged stay of the child in his own home will be inimical to his welfare and interest. Section 10. $upervised Trial #ustody. ?efore issuance of the decree of adoption, the court shall give the adopter trial custody of the adoptee for a period of at least si. (9) months within which the parties are e.pected to ad2ust psychologically and emotionally to each other and establish a bonding relationship. The trial custody shall be monitored by the social wor/er of the court, the #epartment, or the social service of the local government unit, or the child*placement or child*caring agency which submitted and prepared the case studies. #uring said period, temporary parental authority shall be vested in the adopter. The court may, motu proprio or upon motion of any party, reduce the period or e.empt the parties if it finds that the same shall be for the best interests of the adoptee, stating the reasons therefor. 'n alien adopter however must complete the 9*month trial custody e.cept the following+ a) a former Filipino citi5en who see/s to adopt a relative within the fourth (<th) degree of consanguinity or affinity1 or b) one who see/s to adopt the legitimate child of his Filipino spouse1 or c) one who is married to a Filipino citi5en and see/s to adopt 2ointly with his or her spouse the latter-s relative within the fourth (<th) degree of consanguinity or affinity. (f the child is below seven (>) years of age and is placed with the prospective adopter through a pre*adoption placement authority issued by the #epartment, the court shall order that the prospective adopter shall en2oy all the benefits to which the biological parent is entitled from the date the adoptee is placed with him. The social wor/er shall submit to the court a report on the result of the trial custody within two wee/s after its termination. Section 16. Decree of Adoption. (f the supervised trial custody is satisfactory to the parties and the court is convinced from the trial custody report and the evidence adduced that the adoption shall redound to the best interests of the adoptee, a decree of adoption shall be issued which shall ta/e effect as of the date the original petition was filed even if the petitioners die before its issuance. The decree shall+ '. $tate the name by which the child is to be /nown and registered1 ?. ,rder+ 6) the "ler/ of "ourt to issue to the adopter a certificate of finality upon e.piration of the 6B*day reglementary period within which to appeal1 ;) the adopter to submit a certified true copy of the decree of adoption and the certificate of finality to the "ivil Registrar where the child was originally registered within thirty (=@) days from receipt of the certificate of finality. (n case of change of name, the decree shall be submitted to the "ivil Registrar where the court issuing the same is situated. =) the "ivil Registrar of the place where the adoptee was registered+ a. to annotate on the adoptee-s original certificate of birth the decree of adoption within thirty (=@) days from receipt of the certificate of finality1

b. to issue a certificate of birth which shall not bear any notation that it is a new or amended certificate and which shall show, among others, the following+ registry number, date of registration, name of child, se., date of birth, place of birth, name and citi5enship of adoptive mother and father, and the date and place of their marriage, when applicable1 c. to seal the original certificate of birth in the civil registry records which can be opened only upon order of the court which issued the decree of adoption1 and d. to submit to the court issuing the decree of adoption proof of compliance with all the foregoing within thirty days from receipt of the decree. (f the adoptee is a foundling, the court shall order the "ivil Registrar where the foundling was registered, to annotate the decree of adoption on the foundling certificate and a new birth certificate shall be ordered prepared by the "ivil Registrar in accordance with the decree. Section 11. %oo) of Adoptions. The "ler/ of "ourt shall /eep a boo/ of adoptions showing the date of issuance of the decree in each case, compliance by the "ivil Registrar with $ection 69(?)(=) and all incidents arising after the issuance of the decree. Section 14. #onfidential *ature of 'roceedings and Records. 'll hearings in adoption cases, after compliance with the 2urisdictional re0uirements shall be confidential and shall not be open to the public. 'll records, boo/s and papers relating to the adoption cases in the files of the court, the #epartment, or any other agency or institution participating in the adoption proceedings shall be /ept strictly confidential. (f the court finds that the disclosure of the information to a third person is necessary for security reasons or for purposes connected with or arising out of the adoption and will be for the best interests of the adoptee, the court may, upon proper motion, order the necessary information to be released, restricting the purposes for which it may be used. Section 15. Rescission of Adoption of the Adoptee. The petition shall be verified and filed by the adoptee who is over eighteen (67) years of age, or with the assistance of the #epartment, if he is a minor, or if he is over eighteen (67) years of age but is incapacitated, by his guardian or counsel. The adoption may be rescinded based on any of the following grounds committed by the adopter+ 6) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter despite having undergone counseling1 ;) attempt on the life of the adoptee1 =) se.ual assault or violence1 or <) abandonment or failure to comply with parental obligations. 'doption, being in the best interests of the child, shall not be sub2ect to rescission by the adopter. )owever, the adopter may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in 'rticle C6C of the "ivil "ode.

Section 20. +enue. The petition shall be filed with the Family "ourt of the city or province where the adoptee resides. Section 21. Time within which to file petition. The adoptee, if incapacitated, must file the petition for rescission or revocation of adoption within five (B) years after he reaches the age of ma2ority, or if he was incompetent at the time of the adoption, within five (B) years after recovery from such incompetency. Section 22. Order to Answer. The court shall issue an order re0uiring the adverse party to answer the petition within fifteen (6B) days from receipt of a copy thereof. The order and copy of the petition shall be served on the adverse party in such manner as the court may direct. Section 23. ,udgment. (f the court finds that the allegations of the petition are true, it shall render 2udgment ordering the rescission of adoption, with or without costs, as 2ustice re0uires. The court shall order that the parental authority of the biological parent of the adoptee, if /nown, or the legal custody of the #epartment shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated and declare that the reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter and the adoptee to each other shall be e.tinguished. The court shall further declare that successional rights shall revert to its status prior to adoption, as of the date of 2udgment of 2udicial rescission. 8ested rights ac0uired prior to 2udicial rescission shall be respected. (t shall also order the adoptee to use the name stated in his original birth or foundling certificate. The court shall further order the "ivil Registrar where the adoption decree was registered to cancel the new birth certificate of the adoptee and reinstate his original birth or foundling certificate.

Section 24. $ervice of ,udgment. ' certified true copy of the 2udgment together with a certificate of finality issued by the ?ranch "ler/ of the "ourt which rendered the decision in accordance with the preceding $ection shall be served by the petitioner upon the "ivil Registrar concerned within thirty (=@) days from receipt of the certificate of finality. The "ivil Registrar shall forthwith enter the rescission decree in the register and submit proof of compliance to the court issuing the decree and the "ler/ of "ourt within thirty (=@) days from receipt of the decree. The "ler/ of "ourt shall enter the compliance in accordance with $ection 6> hereof. Section 20. Repeal. * This supersedes Rule CC on 'doption and Rule 6@@ of the Rules of "ourt.

6. INTER-COUNTR7 ADOPTION

Section 26. Applicability. The following sections apply to inter*country adoption of Filipino children by foreign nationals and Filipino citi5ens permanently residing abroad. Section 21. Objectives. The $tate shall+ a) consider inter*country adoption as an alternative means of child care, if the child cannot be placed in a foster or an adoptive family or cannot, in any suitable manner, be cared for in the Philippines1 b) ensure that the child sub2ect of inter*country adoption en2oys the same protection accorded to children in domestic adoption1 and c) ta/e all measures to ensure that the placement arising therefrom does not result in improper financial gain for those involved. Section 24. -here to "ile 'etition. ' verified petition to adopt a Filipino child may be filed by a foreign national or Filipino citi5en permanently residing abroad with the Family "ourt having 2urisdiction over the place where the child resides or may be found. (t may be filed directly with the (nter*"ountry 'doption ?oard. Section 25. -ho may be adopted. ,nly a child legally available for domestic adoption may be the sub2ect of inter*country adoption. Section 30. #ontents of 'etition. The petitioner must allege+ a) his age and the age of the child to be adopted, showing that he is at least twenty*seven (;>) years of age and at least si.teen (69) years older than the child to be adopted at the time of application, unless the petitioner is the parent by nature of the child to be adopted or the spouse of such parent, in which case the age difference does not apply1 b) if married, the name of the spouse who must be 2oined as co*petitioner e.cept when the adoptee is a legitimate child of his spouse1 c) that he has the capacity to act and assume all rights and responsibilities of parental authority under his national laws, and has undergone the appropriate counseling from an accredited counselor in his country1 d) that he has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude1 e) that he is eligible to adopt under his national law1 f) that he can provide the proper care and support and instill the necessary moral values and e.ample to all his children, including the child to be adopted1 g) that he agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child, as embodied under Philippine laws and the . !. "onvention on the Rights of the "hild, and to abide by the rules and regulations issued to implement the provisions of Republic 'ct !o. 7@<=1 h) that he comes from a country with which the Philippines has diplomatic relations and whose government maintains a similarly authori5ed and accredited agency and that adoption of a Filipino child is allowed under his national laws1 and i) that he possesses all the 0ualifications and none of the dis0ualifications provided in this Rule, in Republic 'ct !o. 7@<= and in all other applicable Philippine laws. Section 31. Annexes. * The petition for adoption shall contain the following anne.es written and officially translated in :nglish+ a) ?irth certificate of petitioner1

b) Farriage contract, if married, and, if applicable, the divorce decree, or 2udgment dissolving the marriage1 c) $worn statement of consent of petitioner-s biological or adopted children above ten (6@) years of age1 d) Physical, medical and psychological evaluation of the petitioner certified by a duly licensed physician and psychologist1 e) (ncome ta. returns or any authentic document showing the current financial capability of the petitioner1 f) Police clearance of petitioner issued within si. (9) months before the filing of the petitioner1 g) "haracter reference from the local churchGminister, the petitioner-s employer and a member of the immediate community who have /nown the petitioner for at least five (B) years1 h) Full body postcard*si5e pictures of the petitioner and his immediate family ta/en at least si. (9) months before the filing of the petition. Section 32. Duty of #ourt. The court, after finding that the petition is sufficient in form and substance and a proper case for inter*country adoption, shall immediately transmit the petition to the (nter*"ountry 'doption ?oard for appropriate action. Section 33. .ffectivity. * This Rule shall ta/e effect on 'ugust ;;, ;@@; following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

8.R. No. 143545

9) y 142 2003

406

ISA6ELITA S. LA:OM2 petitioner, vs. 9OSE MEL;IN SI6ULO <!-e,io)$ y -e*e--e. to #$ =DR. MEL;IN S. LA:OM=>2 respondent. ;ITU82 J.3

The bliss of marriage and family would be to most less than complete without children. The reali5ation could have li/ely prodded the spouses #r. #iosdado %ahom and (sabelita %ahom to ta/e into their care (sabelitaHs nephew Dose Felvin $ibulo and to bring him up as their own. 't the tender age of two, Dose Felvin en2oyed the warmth, love and support of the couple who treated the child li/e their own. (ndeed, for years, #r. and Frs. %ahom fancied on legally adopting Dose Felvin. Finally, in 6C>6, the couple decided to file a petition for adoption. ,n @B Fay 6C>;, an order granting the petition was issued that made all the more intense than before the feeling of affection of the spouses for Felvin. (n /eeping with the court order, the "ivil Registrar of !aga "ity changed the name IDose Felvin $ibuloI to IDose Felvin %ahom.I ' sad turn of events came many years later. :ventually, in #ecember of 6CCC, Frs. %ahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the Regional Trial "ourt (RT"), ?ranch ;;, of !aga "ity. (n her petition, she averred J I>. That . . . despite the proddings and pleadings of said spouses, respondent refused to change his surname from $ibulo to %ahom, to the frustrations of petitioner particularly her husband until the latter died, and even before his death he had made /nown his desire to revo/e respondentHs adoption, but was prevented by petitionerHs supplication, however with his further re0uest upon petitioner to give to charity whatever properties or interest may pertain to respondent in the future. ... ... ...

I6@. That respondent continued using his surname $ibulo to the utter disregard of the feelings of herein petitioner, and his records with the Professional Regulation "ommission showed his name as Dose Felvin F. $ibulo originally issued in 6C>7 until the present, and in all his dealings and activities in connection with his practice of his profession, he is Dose Felvin F. $ibulo. ... ... ...

I6=. That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in this city with only her household helps to attend to her, has yearned for the care and show of concern from a son, but respondent remained indifferent and would only come to !aga to see her once a year. I6<. That for the last three or four years, the medical chec/*up of petitioner in Fanila became more fre0uent in view of a leg ailment, and those were the times when petitioner would need most the care and support from a love one, but respondent all the more remained callous and utterly indifferent towards petitioner which is not e.pected of a son. I6B. That herein respondent has recently been 2ealous of petitionerHs nephews and nieces whenever they would find time to visit her, respondent alleging that they were only motivated by their desire for some material benefits from petitioner. I69. That in view of respondentHs insensible attitude resulting in a strained and uncomfortable relationship between him and petitioner, the latter has suffered wounded feelings, /nowing that after all respondentHs only motive to his adoption is his e.pectancy of his alleged rights over the properties of herein petitioner and her late husband, clearly shown by his recent filing of "ivil "ase !o. CC*<<9= for partition against petitioner, thereby totally eroding her love and affection towards respondent, rendering the decree of adoption, considering respondent to be the child of petitioner, for all legal purposes, has been negated for which reason there is no more basis for its e.istence, hence this petition for revocation,I6 Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on ;; Farch 6CC7, Republic 'ct (R.'.) !o. 7BB;, also /nown as the #omestic 'doption 'ct, went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption. $ection 6C of 'rticle 8( of R.'. !o. 7BB; now reads+ I$:". 6C. /rounds for Rescission of Adoption . J pon petition of the adoptee, with the assistance of the #epartment if a minor or if over eighteen (67) years of age but is incapacitated, as guardianGcounsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the following grounds committed by the adopter(s)+ (a) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling1 (b) attempt on the life of the adoptee1 (c) se.ual assault or violence1 or (d) abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations. IAdoption& being in the best interest of the child& shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s!. (owever& the adopter(s! may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 010 of the #ivil #ode.I (emphasis supplied) Dose Felvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending principally (a) that the trial court had no 2urisdiction over the case and (b) that the petitioner had no cause of action in view of the afore0uoted provisions of R.'. !o. 7BB;. Petitioner asseverated, by way of opposition, that the proscription in R.'. !o. 7BB; should not retroactively apply, i.e., to cases where the ground for rescission of the adoption vested under the regime of then 'rticle =<7;of the "ivil "ode and 'rticle 6C;= of the Family "ode. (n an order, dated ;7 'pril ;@@@, the trial court held thusly+ I,n the issue of 2urisdiction over the sub2ect matter of the suit, $ection B(c) of R.'. !o. 7=9C confers 2urisdiction to this "ourt, having been designated Family "ourt in '.F. !o. CC*66*@> $".

I,n the matter of no cause of action, the test on the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint, is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the "ourt could render a valid 2udgment in accordance with the prayer of said complaint ( De ,esus& et al. vs. %elarmino& et al ., CB Phil. =9B). I'dmittedly, $ection 6C, 'rticle 8( of R.'. !o. 7BB; deleted the right of an adopter to rescind an adoption earlier granted under the Family "ode. "onformably, on the face of the petition, indeed there is lac/ of cause of action. IPetitioner however, insists that her right to rescind long ac0uired under the provisions of the Family "ode should be respected. 'ssuming for the sa/e of argument, that petitioner is entitled to rescind the adoption of respondent granted on Fay B, 6C>;, said right should have been e.ercised within the period allowed by the Rules. From the averments in the petition, it appears clear that the legal grounds for the petition have been discovered and /nown to petitioner for more than five (B) years, prior to the filing of the instant petition on #ecember 6, 6CCC, hence, the action if any, had already prescribed. ($ec. B, Rule 6@@ Revised Rules of "ourt) I&):R:F,R:, in view of the foregoing consideration, the petition is ordered dismissed.I < +ia a petition for review on certiorari under Rule <B of the 6CC> Rules of "ourt, petitioner raises the following 0uestions1 vi2+ 6. Fay the sub2ect adoption, decreed on @B Fay 6C>;, still be revo/ed or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.'. !o. 7BB;K ;. (n the affirmative, has the adopterHs action prescribedK ' brief bac/ground on the law and its origins could provide some insights on the sub2ect. (n ancient times, the Romans undertoo/ adoption to assure male heirs in the family.B The continuity of the adopterHs family was the primary purpose of adoption and all matters relating to it basically focused on the rights of the adopter. There was hardly any mention about the rights of the adopted. 9 "ountries, li/e Ereece, France, $pain and :ngland, in an effort to preserve inheritance within the family, neither allowed nor recogni5ed adoption. > (t was only much later when adoption was given an impetus in law and still later when the welfare of the child became a paramount concern. 7 $pain itself which previously disfavored adoption ultimately relented and accepted the Roman law concept of adoption which, subse0uently, was to find its way to the archipelago. The 'mericans came and introduced their own ideas on adoption which, unli/e most countries in :urope, made the interests of the child an overriding consideration. C (n the early part of the century 2ust passed, the rights of children invited universal attention1 the Eeneva #eclaration of Rights of the "hild of 6C;< and the niversal #eclaration of )uman Rights of 6C<7,6@ followed by the nited !ations #eclarations of the Rights of the "hild, 66 were written instruments that would also protect and safeguard the rights of adopted children. The "ivil "ode of the Philippines6; of 6CB@ on adoption, later modified by the "hild and Aouth &elfare "ode6= and then by the Family "ode of the Philippines,6<gave immediate statutory ac/nowledgment to the rights of the adopted. (n 6C7C, the nited !ations initiated the "onvention of the Rights of the "hild. The Philippines, a $tate Party to the "onvention, accepted the principle that adoption was impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent was geared to favor the adopted child. R.'. !o. 7BB; secured these rights and privileges for the adopted. Fost importantly, it affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted child, not only in his new family but also in the society as well. The new law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave to the adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties created by adoption. Petitioner, however, would insist that R.'. !o. 7BB; should not adversely affect her right to annul the adoption decree, nor deprive the trial court of its 2urisdiction to hear the case, both being vested under the "ivil "ode and the Family "ode, the laws then in force. The concept of Ivested rightI is a conse0uence of the constitutional guaranty of due process 6B that e.presses apresent fixed interest which in right reason and natural 2ustice is protected against arbitrary state action1 69 it includes not only legal or e0uitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also e.emptions from new obligations created after the right has become vested. 6> Rights are considered vested when the right to en2oyment is a present interest,67 absolute, unconditional, and perfect6C or fi.ed and irrefutable. (n Republic vs. #ourt of Appeals,;@ a petition to adopt Dason "ondat was filed by Lenaida ". ?obiles on @; February 6C77 when the "hild and Aouth &elfare "ode (Presidential #ecree !o. 9@=) allowed an adoption to be sought by either spouse or both of them. 'fter the trial court had rendered its decision and while the case was still pending on appeal, the Family "ode of the Philippines (:.ecutive ,rder !o. ;@C), mandating joint adoption by the husband and wife, too/ effect. Petitioner Republic argued that the case should be dismissed for having been filed by Frs. ?obiles alone and without being 2oined by the husband. The "ourt concluded that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. The petition to adopt ,ason& having been filed with the court at the time when '.D. *o. 34 was still in effect , the right of Frs. ?obiles to file the petition, without being 2oined by her husband, according to the "ourt had become vested. (n Republic vs. 5iller,;6 spouses "laude and Dumrus Filler, both aliens, sought to adopt Fichael Fadayag. ,n ;C Duly 6C77, the couple filed a petition to formali5e FichaelHs adoption having theretofore been ta/en into their care. 't the time the action was commenced, P.#. !o. 9@= allowed aliens to adopt. 'fter the decree of adoption and while on appeal before the "ourt of 'ppeals, the Family "ode was enacted into law on @7 'ugust 6C77 dis0ualifying aliens from adopting Filipino children. The Republic then prayed for the withdrawal of the adoption decree. (n discarding the argument posed by the Republic, the $upreme "ourt ruled that the controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the petition was filed. (t was months after the effectivity of R.'. !o. 7BB; that herein petitioner filed an action to revo/e the decree of adoption granted in 6C>B. ?y then, the new law,;; had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the "ivil "ode and the Family "ode to rescind a decree of adoption. "onsistently with its earlier pronouncements, the "ourt should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after R.'. !o. 7BB; had come into force, no longer could be pursued. (nterestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is sub2ect to the five*year bar rule under Rule 6@@ ;= of the Rules of "ourt and that the adopter would lose the right to revo/e the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The e.ercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the re0uirements of a vested right entitled to protection. (t must also be ac/nowledged that a person has no vested right in statutory privileges. ;< &hile adoption has often been referred to in the conte.t of a Iright,I the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. ;B (t is a privilege that is governed by the stateHs determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child. ;9 Fatters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are sub2ect to regulation by the $tate. ;> "oncomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be ta/en away at anytime before it has been e.ercised.;7

&hile R.'. !o. 7BB; has un0ualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a conse0uential right to rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the "ourt to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be the hac/neyed truism that those caught in the law have to live with. (t is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recogni5ed by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely e.clude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate. &):R:F,R:, the assailed 2udgment of the court a 0uo is 'FF(RF:#. !o costs. $, ,R#:R:#.
Davide& ,r.& # ., .& 6nares7$antiago& #arpio and A2cuna& ,, .& concur.

8.R. No. 114410 M#-c& 252 1556

200

NERISSA ?. PERE?2 petitioner, vs. T:E COURT OF APPEALS <Nint& Di,i$ion> #n. RA7 C. PERE?2 respondents. ROMERO2 J.:p

Parties herein would have this "ourt duplicate the feat of Ming $olomon who was hailed in ?iblical times for his sagacious, if, at times unorthodo., manner of resolving conflicts, the most celebrated case being that when his authority was invo/ed to determine the identity of the real mother as between two women claiming the same infant. $ince there could only be one mother, the daunting tas/ that confronted the /ingG2udge was to choose the true one. (n the instant case, we are faced with the challenge of deciding, as between father and mother, who should have rightful custody of a child who bears in his person both their genes. &hile there is a provision of law s0uarely in point, the two courts whose authority have been invo/ed to render a decision have arrived at diametrically opposite conclusions. (t has fallen upon us now to li/ewise act as 2udge between the trial court, on the one hand, and the appellate, on the other. ,n the issue of custody over the minor Ray Pere5 ((, respondent "ourt of 'ppeals ruled in favor of the boyHs father Ray ". Pere5, reversing the trial courtHs decision to grant custody to !erissa L. Pere5, the childHs mother. Ray Pere5, private respondent, is a doctor of medicine practicing in "ebu while !erissa, his wife who is petitioner herein, is a registered nurse. They were married in "ebu on #ecember 9, 6C79. 'fter si. miscarriages, two operations and a high*ris/ pregnancy, petitioner finally gave birth to Ray Pere5 (( in !ew Aor/ on Duly ;@, 6CC;. Petitioner who began wor/ing in the nited $tates in ,ctober 6C77, used part of her earnings to build a modest house in Fandaue "ity, "ebu. $he also sought medical attention for her successive miscarriages in !ew Aor/. $he became a resident alien in February 6CC;. Private respondent stayed with her in the visa and was not employed. .$. twice and too/ care of her when she became pregnant. nli/e his wife, however, he had only a tourist

,n Danuary 6>, 6CC=, the couple and their baby arrived in "ebu. 'fter a few wee/s, only !erissa returned to the .$. $he alleged that they came home only for a five*wee/ vacation and that they all had round*trip tic/ets. )owever, her husband stayed behind to ta/e care of his sic/ mother and promised to follow her with the baby. 'ccording to Ray, they had agreed to reside permanently in the Philippines but once !erissa was in !ew Aor/, she changed her mind and continued wor/ing. $he was supposed to come bac/ immediately after winding up her affairs there. &hen !erissa came home a few days, before Ray ((Hs first birthday, the couple was no longer on good terms. That their love for each other was fading became apparent from their serious 0uarrels. Petitioner did not want to live near her in*laws and rely solely on her husbandHs meager income of PB,@@@.@@. 1 $he longed to be with her only child but he was being /ept away from her by her husband. Thus, she did not want to leave RD (Ray Dunior) with her husband and in*laws. $he wished for her son to grow up with his mother. ,n the other hand, Ray wanted to stay here, where he could raise his son even as he practiced his profession. )e maintained that it would not be difficult to live here since they have their own home and a car. They could live comfortably on his P6B,@@@.@@ monthly income 2 as they were not burdened with having to pay any debts. Petitioner was forced to move to her parentsH home on Eui5o $treet in Fandaue. #espite mediation by the priest who solemni5ed their marriage, the couple failed to reconcile. ,n Duly ;9, 6CC=, !erissa L. Pere5 filed a petition for habeas corpus 3 as/ing respondent Ray ". Pere5 to surrender the custody of their son, Ray L. Pere5 ((, to her. ,n 'ugust ;>, 6CC=, the court a 8uo issued an ,rder awarding custody of the one*year old child to his mother, !erissa Pere5, citing the second paragraph of 'rticle ;6= of the Family "ode which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The dispositive portion of the ,rder reads+ &):R:F,R:, foregoing premises considered, ,rder is hereby issued ordering the respondent to turn over the custody of their child Ray "ortes Pere5 ((, his passport and round trip tic/et to herein petitioner with a warning that if he will escape together with the child for the purpose of hiding the minor child instead of complying with this ,rder, that warrant for his arrest will be issued.
$, ,R#:R:#. 4

pon appeal by Ray Pere5, the "ourt of 'ppeals, on $eptember ;>, 6CC<, reversed the trial courtHs order and awarded custody of the boy to his father. 0 PetitionerHs motion for reconsideration having been denied, 6 she filed the instant petition for review where the sole issue is the custody of Ray Pere5 ((, now three years old. Respondent court differed in opinion from the trial court and ruled that there were enough reasons to deny !erissa Pere5 custody over Ray (( even if the child is under seven years old. (t held that granting custody to the boyHs father would be for the childHs best interest and welfare. 1

?efore us is the unedifying situation of a husband and wife in marital discord, struggling for custody of their only child. (t is sad that petitioner and private respondent have not found it in their hearts to understand each other and live together once again as a family. $eparated in fact, they now see/ the "ourtHs assistance in the matter of custody or parental authority over the child. The wisdom and necessity for the e.ercise of 2oint parental authority need not be belabored. The father and the mother complement each other in giving nurture and providing that holistic care which ta/es into account the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the child. ?y precept and e.ample, they mold his character during his crucial formative years. )owever, the "ourtHs intervention is sought in order that a decision may be made as to which parent shall be given custody over the young boy. The "ourtHs duty is to determine whether Ray Pere5 (( will be better off with petitioner or with private respondent. &e are not called upon to declare which party committed the greater fault in their domestic 0uarrel. &hen the parents of the child are separated, 'rticle ;6= of the Family "ode is the applicable law. (t provides+ 'rt. ;6=. (n case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be e.ercised by the parent designated by the "ourt. The "ourt shall ta/e into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. *o child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother . unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise . (:mphasis supplied). $ince the "ode does not 0ualify the word IseparationI to mean legal separation decreed by a court, couples who are separated in fact, such as petitioner and private respondent, are covered within its terms. 4 The Revised Rules of "ourt also contains a similar provision. Rule CC, section 9 ('doption and "ustody of Finors) provides+ $ec. 9. Proceedings as to child whose parents are separated. 'ppeal. &hen husband and wife are divorced or living separately, and apart from each other, and the 0uestions as to the care, custody, and control of a child or children of their marriage is brought before a "ourt of First (nstance by petition or as an incident to any other proceeding, the court, upon hearing the testimony as may be pertinent, shall award the care, custody, and control of each such child as will be for its best interest, permitting the child to choose which parent it prefers to live with if it be over ten years of age, unless the parent chosen be unfit to ta/e charge of the child by reason of moral depravity, habitual drun/enness, incapacity, or poverty. . . . *o child under seven years of age shall be separated from its mother& unless the court finds there are compelling reasons therefor. (:mphasis supplied) The provisions of law 0uoted above clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The use of the word IshallI in 'rticle ;6= of the Family "ode and Rule CC, section 9 of the Revised Rules of "ourt connotes a mandatory character. (n the case of 9acson v. $an ,ose79acson, 5 the "ourt declared+
The use of the word shall in article =9= 10 of the "ivil "ode, coupled with the observations made by the "ode "ommission in respect to the said legal provision, underscores its mandatory character. (t prohibits in no uncertain terms the separation of a mother and her child below seven years, unless such separation is grounded upon compelling reasons as determined by a court. 11

The rationale for awarding the custody of children younger than seven years of age to their mother was e.plained by the "ode "ommission+
The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her. !o man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. The e.ception allowed by the rule has to be for Icompelling reasonsI for the good of the child1 those cases must indeed be rare, if the motherHs heart is not to be unduly hurt. (f she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the divorce decree (relative divorce) will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Foreover, moral dereliction will not have any effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand her situation. (Report of the "ode "ommission, p. 6;) 12

The Family "ode, in reverting to the provision of the "ivil "ode that a child below seven years old should not be separated from the mother ('rticle =9=), has e.pressly repealed the earlier 'rticle 6>, paragraph three of the "hild and Aouth &elfare "ode (Presidential #ecree !o. 9@=) which reduced the childHs age to five years. 13 The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother finds its raison d:;tre in the basic need of a child for his motherHs loving care. 14 ,nly the most compelling of reasons shall 2ustify the courtHs awarding the custody of such a child to someone other than his mother, such as her unfitness to e.ercise sole parental authority. (n the past the following grounds have been considered ample 2ustification to deprive a mother of custody and parental authority+ neglect, abandonment, 10 unemployment and immorality, 16habitual drun/enness, 11 drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sic/ with a communicable disease. 14 (t has long been settled that in custody cases, 15 the foremost consideration is always the welfare and best interest of the child. (n fact, no less than an international instrument, the "onvention on the Rights of the "hild provides+ I(n all actions concerning children, whether underta/en by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.I 20 "ourts invariably loo/ into all relevant factors presented by the contending parents, such as their material resources, social and moral situations. 21 (n the case at bench, financial capacity is not a determinative factor inasmuch as both parties have demonstrated that they have ample means.

Respondent court stated that petitioner has no permanent place of wor/ in the .$.'. and has ta/en this point against her. The records, however, show that she is employed in a !ew Aor/ hospital 22 and was, at the time the petition was filed, still abroad. 23 $he testified that she intends to apply for a 2ob elsewhere, presumably to improve her wor/ environment and augment her income, as well as for convenience. 24 The "ourt ta/es 2udicial notice of the fact that a registered nurse, such as petitioner, is still very much in demand in the nited $tates. nli/e private respondent, a doctor who by his own admission could not find employment there, petitioner immediately got a 2ob in !ew Aor/. "onsidering her s/ill and e.perience petitioner should find no difficulty in obtaining wor/ elsewhere, should she desire to do so. The decision under review casts doubt on petitionerHs capability to ta/e care of the child, particularly since she wor/s on twelve*hour shifts thrice wee/ly, at times, even at night. There being no one to help her loo/ after the child, it is alleged that she cannot properly attend to him. This conclusion is as unwarranted as it is unreasonable. First, her present wor/ schedule is not so unmanageable as to deprive her of 0uality time for Ray ((. Nuite a number of wor/ing mothers who are away from home for longer periods of time are still able to raise a family well, applying time management principles 2udiciously. $econd, many a mother, finding herself in such a position, has invited her own mother or relative to 2oin her abroad, providing the latter with plane tic/ets and liberal allowances, to loo/ after the child until he is able to ta/e care of himself. ,thers go on leave from wor/ until such time as the child can be entrusted to day*care centers. #elegating child care temporarily to 0ualified persons who run day*care centers does not detract from being a good mother, as long as the latter e.ercises supervision, for even in our culture, children are often brought up by housemaids or IyayasI under the eagle eyes of the mother. Third, private respondentHs wor/ schedule was not presented in evidence at the trial. 'lthough he is a general practitioner, the records merely show that he maintains a clinic, wor/s for several companies on retainer basis and teaches part*time. 20 )ence, respondent courtHs conclusion that Ihis wor/ schedule is fle.ible (and h)e can always find time for his sonI 26 is not well*founded. Fourth, the fact that private respondent lives near his parents and sister is not crucial in this case. Fifth, petitionerHs wor/ schedule cited in the respondent courtHs decision is not necessarily permanent. )ospitals wor/ in shifts and, given a motherHs instinctive desire to lavish upon her child the utmost care, petitioner may be e.pected to arrange her schedule in such a way as to allocate time for him. Finally, it does not follow that petitioner values her career more than her family simply because she wants to wor/ in the nited $tates. There are any number of reasons for a personHs see/ing a 2ob outside the country, e.g. to augment her income for the familyHs benefit and welfare, and for psychological fulfillment, to name a few. (n the instant case, it has been shown that petitioner earned enough from her 2ob to be able to construct a house for the family in Fandaue "ity. The record describes s/etchily the relations between Ray and !erissa Pere5. The transcripts of the three hearings are inade0uate to show that petitioner did not e.ert earnest efforts and ma/e sacrifices to save her marriage. (t is not difficult to imagine how heart*rending it is for a mother whose attempts at having a baby were frustrated several times over a period of si. years to finally bear one, only for the infant to be snatched from her before he has even reached his first year. The motherHs role in the life of her child, such as Ray ((, is well*nigh irreplaceable. (n prose and poetry, the depth of a motherHs love has been immortali5ed times without number, finding as it does, its 2ustification, not in fantasy but in reality. &):R:F,R:, the petition for review is ER'!T:#. The decision of the "ourt of 'ppeals dated $eptember ;>, 6CC< as well as its Resolution dated Danuary ;<, 6CCB are hereby R:8:R$:# and $:T '$(#:. The ,rder of the trial court dated 'ugust ;>, 6CC= is hereby R:(!$T'T:#. "ustody over the minor Ray L. Pere5 (( is awarded to his mother, herein petitioner !erissa L. Pere5. This decision is immediately e.ecutory. $, ,R#:R:#.
Regalado& 'uno and 5endo2a& ,,.& concur.

Torres& ,r.& ,.& is on leave.

8.R. No. 15500 9#n)#-y 212 1545 IN T:E MATTER OF T:E PETITION FOR A @RIT OF :A6EAS CORPUS OF MINOR AN8ELIE ANNE C. CER;ANTES2 NELSON L. CER;ANTES #n. ?ENAIDA CARREON CER;ANTES2 petitioners, vs. 8INA CARREON FA9ARDO #n. CONRADO FA9ARDO2 respondents. 6olanda ". 9im for petitioners. +oltaire #. #ampomanes for respondents. R:$,% PADILLA2 J.: T(,!

This is a petition for a writ of (abeas #orpus filed with this "ourt over the person of the minor 'ngelie 'nne "ervantes. (n a resolution, dated B ,ctober 6C7>, the "ourt resolved to issue the writ returnable to the :.ecutive Dudge, Regional Trial "ourt of Pasig at the hearing of 6; ,ctober 6C7> at 7+=@ a.m. $aid Dudge was directed to hear the case and submit his report and recommendation to the "ourt. ,n = #ecember 6C7>, said :.ecutive Dudge, Regional Trial "ourt of Pasig submitted to the "ourt his report and recommendation, also dated = #ecember 6C7>. (t appears that the minor was born on 6< February 6C7> to respondents "onrado Fa2ardo and Eina "arreon, who are common*law husband and wife. Respondents offered the child for adoption to Eina "arreonHs sister and brother*in*law, the herein petitioners Lenaida "arreon*"ervantes and !elson "ervantes, spouses, who too/ care and custody of the child when she was barely two (;) wee/s old. 'n 'ffidavit of "onsent to the adoption of the child by herein petitioners, was also e.ecuted by respondent Eina "arreon on ;C 'pril 6C7>. 1 The appropriate petition for adoption ($p. Proc. !o. @B>*?) was filed by herein petitioners over the child before the Regional Trial "ourt of Ri5al, Fourth Dudicial #istrict, ?ranch 9> which, on ;@ 'ugust 6C7>, rendered a decision 2granting the petition. The child was then /nown as 'ngelie 'nne Fa2ardo. The court ordered that the child be Ifreed from parental authority of her natural parents as well as from legal obligation and maintenance to them and that from now on shall be, for all legal intents and purposes, /nown as 'ngelie 'nne "ervantes, a child of herein petitioners and capable of inheriting their estate .I 3 $ometime in Farch or 'pril 6C7>, the adoptive parents, herein petitioners !elson and Lenaida "ervantes, received a letter from the respondents demanding to be paid the amount of P6B@,@@@.@@, otherwise, they would get bac/ their child. Petitioners refused to accede to the demand. 's a result, on 66 $eptember 6C7>, while petitioners were out at wor/, the respondent Eina "arreon too/ the child from her IyayaI at the petitionersH residence in 'ngono, Ri5al, on the prete.t that she was instructed to do so by her mother. Respondent Eina "arreon brought the child to her house in ParaOa0ue. Petitioners thereupon demanded the return of the child, but Eina "arreon refused, saying that she had no desire to give up her child for adoption and that the affidavit of consent to the adoption she had e.ecuted was not fully e.plained to her. $he sent word to the petitioners that she will, however, return the child to the petitioners if she were paid the amount of P6B@,@@@.@@. Felisa Tansingco, the social wor/er who had conducted the case study on the adoption and submitted a report thereon to the Regional Trial "ourt of Ri5al in the adoption case, testified on ;> ,ctober 6C7> before the :.ecutive Dudge, Regional Trial "ourt of Pasig in connection with the present petition. $he declared that she had interviewed respondent Eina "arreon on ;< Dune 6C7> in connection with the contemplated adoption of the child. #uring the interview, said respondent manifested to the social wor/er her desire to have the child adopted by the petitioners. 4 (n all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latterHs welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (B) years of age, will not apply where the "ourt finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. 0 (n all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child concerned, ta/ing into account the resources and moral as well as social standing of the contending parents. !ever has this "ourt deviated from this criterion. 6 (t is undisputed that respondent "onrado Fa2ardo is legally married to a woman other than respondent Eina "arreon, and his relationship with the latter is a common*law husband and wife relationship. )is open cohabitation with co*respondent Eina "arreon will not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an upright and moral*minded person. ?esides, respondent Eina "arreon had previously given birth to another child by another married man with whom she lived for almost three (=) years but who eventually left her and vanished. For a minor (li/e 'ngelie 'nne ". "ervantes) to grow up with a sister whose IfatherI is not her true father, could also affect the moral outloo/ and values of said minor. pon the other hand, petitioners who are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the minor and giving her a future better than what the natural mother (herein respondent Eina "arreon), who is not only 2obless but also maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most li/ely give her. ?esides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full /nowledge and consent of respondents. ' decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child, e.cept where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall be e.ercised 2ointly by both spouses. 1 The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child 4 and e.ercise parental authority and responsibility over him. 5 '"",R#(!E%A, and as recommended by the :.ecutive Dudge, Regional Trial "ourt of Pasig, )on. :utropio Figrino, the Petition is ER'!T:#. The custody and care of the minor 'ngelie 'nne "ervantes are hereby granted to petitioners to whom they properly belong, and respondents are ordered (if they still have not) to deliver said minor to the petitioners immediately upon notice hereof This resolution is immediately e.ecutory. $, ,R#:R:#.
5elencio7(errera (#hairperson!& 'aras& $armiento and Regalado& ,,.& concur.

8.R. No. L-16104

Octo+e- 312 1562

TRUSTEES:IP OF T:E MINORS 6ENI8NO2 AN8ELA #n. ANTONIO # $)-n#'e. PERE? 7 TUASON2 P:ILIPPINE NATIONAL 6ANA2 9).ici# 8)#-.i#n o* 6ENI8NO PERE?2 ANTONIO M. PERE?2 2udicial guardian*appellant, vs. 9. ANTONIO ARANETA2 trustee*appellee. Alfonso "elix& ,r. for judicial guardian7appellant. Araneta and Araneta for trustee7appellee. CONCEPCION2 J.:

This is an appeal by writ of error from an order of the "ourt of First (nstance of Ri5al denying a motion of appellant, 'ntonio F. Pere5, as 2udicial guardian of his children, the minors ?enigno, 'ngela, and 'ntonio, all surnamed Pere5 y Tuason. (n pursuance of the provisions of the will of the late 'ngela $. Tuason J which was probated in $pecial Proceedings !o. B7B of said "ourt J appellee D. 'ntonio 'raneta was on Farch ;<, 6CB@, appointed, in $pecial Proceedings !o. N*>= of the same "ourt, as trustee of property be0ueathed by the deceased to some of her heirs, including her grandchildren, the aforementioned minors. ,n ,ctober <, 6CB@, appellee moved for the approval of accounts and the fi.ing of his compensation as such trustee. 'ppellantHs wife, 'ngela (. Tuason, hereafter referred to as Frs. Pere5, as well as the mother and guardian at the time, of said minors, ob2ected thereto and urged the court to remove appellee as trustee and appoint the Philippine Trust in his place and to revo/e, not only certain sale made by him, but, also, an order of the court dated Farch ;<, 6CB@, granting him the power to sell trust properties without special 2udicial authori5ation therefor. $ubse0uently, appellant 2oined his wife in see/ing this relief. 'fter appropriate proceedings, said "ourt issued on #ecember ;=, 6CB@, an order approving said accounts, deferring action on the compensation of the trustee, modifying in part said order of Farch ;<, 6CB@, and denying the motion of Frs. Pere5. The pertinent part of the aforementioned order of #ecember ;=, 6CB@, reads as follows+ (t being established that the trust was e.pressly created by the deceased, we shall now e.amine whether the trustee comes under the active supervision of the "ourt and whether our order of Farch ;<, 6CB@, granting to said trustee authority to sell the trust res without the need of 2udicial authori5ation erroneous or not. The "ourt accepts in view urged by the trustee that only when the testator Ihas omitted in his will to appoint a trusteeI may the "ourt appoint one. This is in a accordance with $ection ;, Rule CC, of the Rules of "ourt. &hen an e.press trust has been created, the powers of the trust shall be determined by the trust instrument itself. (n this particular case, the trustee D. 'ntonio 'raneta was given Iamplios poderes de vender los mismosI. The testatri. emphasi5es her desire that the trustee shall have ample powers when in another part of her will she states that the powers of said trustee shall be Ilos poderes mas amplios permitidos por la leyI. There is nothing against the law for a trustor to grant to the trustee ample powers, and when the deceased 'ngela $. Tuason granted said powers to the trustee, she emphasi5ed her intention that in the e.ercise of said powers by the trustee, there should be no court supervision. I?y the terms of trust, it may be left to the discretion of the trustee whether or not to e.ercise a power, or where he is directed to e.ercise the power, the time and manner of its e.ercise may be left to his discretion. To the e.tent to which the trustee has discretion, the "ourt will not control his e.ercise as long as he do not e.ceed the limits of the discretion conferred upon him. The court will not substitute its own 2udgment for his . . . . The cases are numerous in which it has been held that where discretion is conferred upon the trustee with respect to the e.ercise of a power, the court will not interfere with him in his e.ercise or failure to e.ercise the power so long as he is not guilty of an abuse of discretion. ($cott on Trusts, 8ol. ;, $ec. 67>)I $uch being the case, there is no reason for the court to intervene in the e.ecution by the trustee of the powers granted to him by the trustor. &e conclude, therefore, that our order of Farch ;<, 6CB@ granting authority to the trustee D. 'ntonio 'raneta to sell the trust res without 2udicial authority is correct. For the purpose, however, of safeguarding the interests of the beneficiaries of this trust, said order is hereby amended as follows+ (a) That the bond of the trustee is hereby increased from P6@,@@@.@@ to P=@,@@@.@@ and the premium for the bond (P=@,@@@.@@) shall be for the account of the trust1 (b) That the Trustee may sell, encumber or otherwise dispose of any of the trust res without the need of 2udicial authori5ation1 provided, that if the amount involved e.ceeds P=@,@@@.@@, the trustee shall notify the natural guardians or the 2udicial guardian in case there be one appointed by the "ourt of the beneficiaries ten (6@) days before the proposed sale or encumbrance is e.ecuted, and in case the amount involved be P=@,@@@.@@ or less, the trustee shall advise said guardians within ten (6@) days after e.ecuting a deed of sale or encumbrance. &):R:F,R:, (6) the accounts filed by the trustee as per 'nne.es ', ?, and " attached to his motion of ,ctober B, 6CB@ are hereby approved1 (;) the petition of trustee to fi. his compensation is hereby deferred until such time as he shall present it again1 (=) the petition filed by the parents of the minors for the removal of the trustee D. 'ntonio 'raneta is hereby denied. %i/ewise, their petition that the Philippine Trust "o. or 'tty. Fran/ &. ?rady be appointed co*trustee denied1 <) the petition that the sale of the bed in favor of 'ntonio Tuason, Dr. be revo/ed is hereby denied1 and (B) the petition that the order of this court, dated Farch ;<, 6CB@, giving the trustee power to sell without the need of 2udicial authori5ation be revo/ed is also hereby denied. ' reconsideration of this order having been denied, P Frs. Pere5 filed with the $upreme "ourt a petition E.R. !o. %*967; thereof J for certiorari, with preliminary in2unction, to annul said orders of Farch ;< and #ecember ;=, 6CB@. ' writ of preliminary in2unction was issued this by "ourt soon thereafter. (n a decision promulgated 'pril 6=, 6CBB, we denied said petition and dissolved said writ of preliminary in2unction.

(n pursuance of the aforementioned orders of Farch ;< and #ecember ;=, 6CB@, appellee wrote on Dune ;=, 6CBC, to appellant, as the then 2udicial guardian of said minor a letter informing him of a proposed sale to ,rtigas P "o., %td., of several lots under trusteeship, located in Fari/ina, Ri5al, and aggregating <;.9@C6 hectares, at the rate of P;.C= a s0uare meter. &e 0uote from said communicable petition+ Pursuant to the order of the "ourt of First (nstance of Nue5on "ity in trusteeship proceeding !o. N*>=, ( with to advise you that ten (6@) days after your receipt of this letter, (, in my capacity as trustee in said proceedings, shall e.ecute deed of sale with mortgage in favor of ,rtigas P "ompany %imited Partnership, the following lots located at Fari/ina which form part of the trust estate+

T.#.T. *o. (Ri2al! ;;=CB I I I I ;;=C9 I I

9ote *o. <C*"*=*'*=*"*6*'*; <C*"*=*'*=*"*;*'*;*? <C*"*=*'*=*"*6*'*6 <C*"*=*'*=*"*;*'*;*' <C*"*=*'*=*"*;*'*> <C*"*=*'*=*"*=*'*=*6*< <C*"*=*'*=*"*=*'*=*'*<*'*6 <C*"*=*'*=*"*=*'*=*'*<*'*=

'sd. ;CC9B I I I 67;<> ;CC9B I I

Area ($8 m.! ;<C 6=7,97; ;>= 6BC,@B< ;6,@7C ;<,@<@ >,C97 ><,>=9

The price is P6,;B@,@@@.@@ payable under the following conditions+ 6. pon acceptance of the proposal, the sum of P;@,@@@.@@. ;. pon signing the deed of sale with mortgage, the sum of P=@@,@@@.@@. =. The balance shall be paid within a period of one and a half*years, with interest at 9Q per annum. <. The property must be sold from all liens and encumbrances, particularly a guarantee that there are no s0uatters. B. ?ro/erHs commission shall be for buyerHs account. Three (=) days later, appellant informed appellee by letter (:.hibit ") of his (appellantHs) ob2ections to the proposed sale. Foreover, on Duly 6, 6CBC appellant filed, in the trusteeship proceedings, a motion praying for a writ of preliminary in2unction to restrain appellee from proceeding with the sale. $ubse0uently, the Philippine !ational ?an/, as guardian of the estate of ?enigno Pere5 y Tuason, one of the heirs of 'ngela (. Tuason, deceased, adopted said motion of appellant herein as its own. 't the instance of appellant, a notice of lis pendenswas, on Duly ;C, 6CBC, annotated on the original certificates of title to the property in 0uestion. 'fter due hearing, the lower court issued an order, dated ,ctober 6B, 6CBC, denying appellantHs motion and petition for a writ of preliminary in2unction. )ence, this appeal by 'ntonio F. Pere5. The Philippine !ational ?an/ has not 2oined him in the appeal. $ubse0uently, appellee effected the sale aforementioned to ,rtigas P "o., %td. The main issues are+ (6) whether or not the sum of P;.C= per s0uare meter agreed upon with ,rtigas P "o., %td., is the fair mar/et value of the property aforementioned1 and (;) whether the sale thereof would be in2urious to the interest of the beneficiaries or cestui 8ue trust. &ith respect to the first issue, appellant maintains that the fair mar/et value of the property above referred to is PB.@@ a s0uare meter, as stated in the report (:.hibit :) of his realty estate e.pert, Fr. '. 8arias. (t appears from this report that the conclusion therein reached by Fr. '. 8arias is based upon (a) some offers to sell properties located in the vicinity of the one involved in this case1 and (b) certain sales of real estate specified in the report. )owever, offers to sell are not competent evidence of the fair mar/et value of a property. $aid offers to sell are no better than offers to buy, which have been held be inadmissible as proof of said value. ("ity of Fanila :strada, ;B Phil. ;@71 Fanila Railroad "o. vs. 'guila =B Phil. 6671 "ity of #avao vs. #acudao %*=><6, Fay ;, 6CB;.) (ndeed, . . . To imagine a sale without a buyer would be absurd, for if there is no buyer the commodity would bring nothing . . . .

(n discussing the term Imar/et valueI the author of a well*/nown treaties on the sub2ect of damages observes that to ma/e a mar/et there must be both buying and selling1 and the Imar/et valueI says he, is that reasonable sum which the property would bring on a fair sale by a man willing but not obliged to sell to a man willing but not obliged to buy. ($edgewic/ on #amages, sec. ;<B1 cited in "ompagnie Franco*(ndo "hinoise vs. #eutsch*'ustraliache, =C Phil. <><.) The aforementioned report relies, also, upon the sale a lot of C,9>C s0uare meters at PB.>@ a s0uare meter and two (;) sales each of lot of ;@,@@@ s0uare meters and a sale of a lot of ;76,<B; s0uare meters, at P<.@@ s0uare meter. These transactions can not serve as basis for the determination of the value of the property in dispute for the lands involved in the former are much smaller than the latter, the area of which is <;9,@C6 s0uare meters, and it is a matter of common /nowledge that the price becomes lesser as the si5e of the property sold becomes bigger. Foreover, the lands covered by said transactions do not appear to be in the vicinity of the property in litigation. &hat is more, no effort has been made to prove that the nature and condition of the former are analogous, or at least, comparable to those of the latter. (n 5anila Railroad #o. vs. 5itchell (<C Phil. 7@6), this "ourt held+ . . . The e.hibits were clearly inadmissible in evidence and properly re2ected by the (lower) court. (n order that such evidence may be admitted, it is necessary that the properties sold be in the immediate neighborhood or within the 5one of the commercial activity with which the condemned property is identified. (:mphasis supplied.) pon the other hand, it appears that in 6CBB the niversal Te.tile Fills bought a lot of 66@,@@< s0uare meters near the trust properties in 0uestion at P;.B@ a s0uare meter, whereas a land of ;6=,<B7 s0uare meters, situated in the same neighborhood, was, in 6CB9, ac0uired by the Fanila ?ay $pinning Fill, at P6.B@ a s0uare meter. 'gain, prior to the sale of said trust properties to ,rtigas P "o., %td. offers to purchase the same neighborhood were made by nited %aboratories, (nc. and one Fr. Philipps at P;.B@ and P;.>@, respectively, a s0uare meter. (t would thus appear that the price of P;.C= a s0uare meter agreed upon with ,rtigas P "o., %td. is fairly representative of the mar/et value of said land, and this is borne out by the testimony of 'rturo Ruis and %auro Far0ue5, the real estate bro/ers who too/ the witness stand for herein appellee. (t is ne.t urged that the sale of the property in 0uestion is not only unnecessary, but also in2urious to the minors represented by appellant herein, by reason of possible devaluation, and high income ta.es. This pretense is predicated, however, upon sheer speculation. Furthermore, the last will and testament of 'ngela $. Tuason, in pursuance of which the trust was established, provides that+ "uarta. J (nstituyo como mis unicos herederos a mis mencionados tres hi2os a ra5on de una novena parte del caudal hereditario 0ue de2are para cada uno de rellos. %ego a mi hi2o 'ntonio otra porcion e0uivalente a dos novenas partes del caudal hereditario. %ego asi mismo a mis nietos 0ue fueren hi2os de mi hi2a !ieves, otra porcion e0uivalents a dos novenas partes del caudal hereditario. A finalmeinte lego a mis nietos 0ue fueren hi2os de mi hi2a 'ngela otra porcion e0uivalente a dos novenas partes del caudal hereditario. #ichos tres legados, sin embargo, estansuietos a la manda 0ue se menciona en el parrafo siguiente %os dos legados a favor de mis mencionados nietos seran administrados por mi 'lbacea D. 'ntonio 'raneta (y en defecto de este, su hermano, $alvador 'raneta), con amplios poderes de !ender los mismos, y con su producto ad0uirir otros bienes, y con derecho a cobrar por su administracion, honorarios ra5onables %os poderes de dicho administrador seran los de un trustee con los poderes mas amplias permitidos por la ley #ebera sin embargo, rendir trimestral mente cuenta de su administracion a los legatarios 0ue fueren mayores de edad y a los tutores de los 0ue fueren menores de edad A asimismo debera hacerles entrega de la participacion 0ue a cada legatario corresponda en las rentas netas de la administracion. %a administracion sobre un grupo cesara cuando todos mis nietos de dicho grupo llegaren a su mayoria de edad, y una mayoria de los mismos acordaren la terminacion de la administracion. Por nietos debe entenderse so nolamente a los nietos varones sino tambien a los nietos mu2eres. Referring to this provision of said will, we had occasion to say in E.R. !o. %*967;+ . . . throughout clause < of the will, one can see that the testatri. placed implicit confidence and trust in 'raneta whom she designated as trustee, and for him to continue for a long time, not only until the minor children of 'ngela $. Tuason including those yet unborn, attained the age of ma2ority but only when a ma2ority of them decided to end the trust. (n short, the trustor had such faith and confidence appellee that she relied fully upon his 2udgment and discretion. The e.ercise thereof by appellees should not be disturbed, therefore, e.cept upon clear proof of fraud or bad faith, or unless the transaction in 0uestion is manifestly pre2udicial to the interest of the minors aforementioned petitioned. $uch is not the situation obtaining in the present case. &):R:F,R:, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. (t is so ordered.
%eng2on& #.,.& 'adilla& %autista Angelo& Reyes& ,.%.9.& %arrera& 'aredes& Di2on& Regala and 5a)alintal& ,,.& concur.

A.M. No. 03-02-00-SC RE3 PROPOSED RULE ON 8UARDIANS:IP OF MINORS R:$,% T(,!

'cting on the letter of the "hairman of the "ommittee on Revision of the Rules of "ourt submitting for this "ourt-s consideration and approval the Proposed Rule on Euardianship of Finors, the "ourt Resolved to 'PPR,8: the same. The Rule shall ta/e effect on Fay 6, ;@@= following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation not later than 'pril 6B, ;@@=. 'pril 6, ;@@=. Davide& ,r. #.,.& %ellosillo& 'uno& +itug& 5endo2a& 'anganiban& <uisumbing& 6nares7$antiago& $andoval7/utierre2& #arpio& Austria75artine2& #orona& #arpio75orale2&#allejo $r.& A2cuna& ,,.& concur RULE ON 8UARDIANS:IP OF MINORS $ection 6. Applicability of the Rule. = This Rule shall apply to petitions for guardianship over the person or property, or both, of a minor. The father and the mother shall 2ointly e.ercise legal guardianship over the person and property of their unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment. (n such case, this Rule shall be suppletory to the provisions of the Family "ode on guardianship. $ec. ;. -ho may petition for appointment of guardian. = ,n grounds authori5ed by law, any relative or other person on behalf of a minor, or the minor himself if fourteen years of age or over, may petition the Family "ourt for the appointment of a general guardian over the person or property, or both, of such minor. The petition may also be filed by the $ecretary of $ocial &elfare and #evelopment and by the $ecretary of )ealth in the case of an insane minor who needs to be hospitali5ed. $ec. =. -here to file petition. = ' petition for guardianship over the person or property, or both, of a minor may be filed in the Family "ourt of the province or city where the minor actually resides. (f he resides in a foreign country, the petition shall be flied with the Family "ourt of the province or city where his property or any part thereof is situated. $ec. <. /rounds of petition.7The grounds for the appointment of a guardian over the person or property, or both, of a minor are the following+ (a) (b) (c) (d) death, continued absence, or incapacity of his parents1 suspension, deprivation or termination of parental authority1 remarriage of his surviving parent, if the latter (s found unsuitable to e.ercise parental authority1 or when the best interests of the minor so re0uire.

$ec. B. <ualifications of guardians. = (n appointing a guardian, the court shall consider the guardian-s+ (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) moral character1 physical, mental and psychological condition1 financial status1 relationship of trust with the minor1 availability to e.ercise the powers and duties of a guardian for the full period of the guardianship1 lac/ of conflict of interest with the minor1 and ability to manage the property of the minor.

$ec. 9. -ho may be appointed guardian of the person or property& or both& of a minor. = (n default of parents or a court*appointed guardian, the court may appoint a guardian of the person or property, or both, of a minor, observing as far as practicable, the following order of preference+ (a) (b) (c) (d) the surviving grandparent and (n case several grandparents survive, the court shall select any of them ta/ing (nto account all relevant considerations1 the oldest brother or sister of the minor over twenty*one years of age, unless unfit or dis0ualified1 the actual custodian of the minor over twenty*one years of age, unless unfit or dis0ualified1 and any other person, who in the sound discretion of the court, would serve the best interests of the minor.

$ec. >. #ontents of petition. = ' petition for the appointment of a general guardian must allege the following+ (a) (b) (c) (d) The 2urisdictional facts1 The name, age and residence of the prospective ward1 The ground rendering the appointment necessary or convenient1 The death of the parents of the minor or the termination, deprivation or suspension of their parental authority1

(e) (f) (g) (h)

The remarriage of the minor-s surviving parent1 The names, ages, and residences of relatives within the <th civil degree of the minor, and of persons having him in their care and custody1 The probable value, character and location of the property of the minor1 and The name, age and residence of the person for whom letters of guardianship are prayed.

The petition shall be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum shopping. )owever, no defect in the petition or verification shall render void the issuance of letters of guardianship. $ec. 7. Time and notice of hearing. &hen a petition for the appointment of a general guardian is filed, the court shall fi. a time and place for its hearing, and shall cause reasonable notice to be given to the persons mentioned in the petition, including the minor if he is fourteen years of age or over, and may direct other general or special notice to be given. $ec. C. #ase study report. The court shall order a social wor/er to conduct a case study of the minor and all the prospective guardians and submit his report and recommendation to the court for its guidance before the scheduled hearing. The social wor/er may intervene on behalf of the minor if he finds that the petition for guardianship should be denied. $ec. 6@. Opposition to petition. = 'ny interested person may contest the petition by filing a written opposition based on such grounds as the ma2ority of the minor or the unsuitability of the person for whom letters are prayed, and pray that the petition be denied, or that letters of guardianship issue to himself, or to any suitable person named in the opposition. $ec. 66. (earing and order for letters to issue. = 't the hearing of the petition, it must be shown that the re0uirement of notice has been complied with. The prospective ward shall be presented to the court. The court shall hear the evidence of the parties in support of their respective allegations. (f warranted, the court shall appoint a suitable guardian of the person or property, or both, of the minor. 't the discretion of the court, the hearing on guardianship may be closed to the public and the records of the case shall not be released without its approval. $ec. 6;. -hen and how a guardian of the property for non7resident minor is appointed? notice. = &hen the minor resides outside the Philippines but has property in the Philippines, any relative or friend of such minor, or any one interested in his property, in e.pectancy or otherwise, may petition the Family "ourt for the appointment of a guardian over the property. !otice of hearing of the petition shall be given to the minor by publication or any other means as the court may deem proper. The court may dispense with the presence of the non*resident minor. (f after hearing the court is satisfied that such non*resident is a minor and a guardian is necessary or convenient, it may appoint a guardian over his property. $ec. 6=. $ervice of final and executory judgment or order . The final and e.ecutory 2udgment or order shall be served upon the %ocal "ivil Registrar of the municipality or city where the minor resides and the Register of #eeds of the place where his property or part thereof is situated shall annotate the same in the corresponding title, and report to the court his compliance within fifteen days from receipt of the order. $ec. 6<. %ond of guardian? amount? conditions.7%efore he enters upon the e.ecution of his trust, or letters of guardianship issue, an appointed guardian may be re0uired to post a bond in such sum as the court shall determine and conditioned as follows+ (a) To ma/e and return to the court, within three months after the issuance of his letters of guardianship, a true and complete (nventory of all the property, real and personal, of his ward which shall come to his possession or /nowledge or to the possession or /nowledge of any other person in his behalf1 (b) To faithfully e.ecute the duties of his trust, to manage and dispose of the property according to this rule for the best interests of the ward, and to provide for his proper care, custody and education1 (c) To render a true and Dust account of all the property of the ward in his hands, and of all proceeds or interest derived therefrom, and of the management and disposition of the same, at the time designated by this rule and such other times as the court directs1 and at the e.piration of his trust, to settle his accounts with the court and deliver and pay over all the property, effects, and monies remaining in his hands, or due from him on such settlement, to the person lawfully entitled thereto1 and (d) To perform all orders of the court and such other duties as may be re0uired by law.

$ec. 6B. -here to file the bond? action thereon. = The bond posted by a guardian shall be filed in the Family "ourt and, (n case of breach of any of its conditions, the guardian may be prosecuted in the same proceeding for the benefit of the ward or of any other person legally interested in the property. &henever necessary, the court may re0uire the guardian to post a new bond and may discharge from further liability the sureties on the old bond after due notice to interested persons, if no in2ury may result therefrom to those interested in the property. $ec. 69. %ond of parents as guardians of property of minor . lf the mar/et value of the property or the annual (ncome of the child e.ceeds PB@,@@@.@@, the parent concerned shall furnish a bond (n such amount as the court may determine, but in no case less than ten per centurn of the value of such property or annual income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for general guardians. ' verified petition for approval of the bond shall be flied in the Family "ourt of the place where the child resides or, if the child resides in a foreign country, in the Family "ourt of the place where the property or any part thereof is situated. The petition shall be doc/eted as a summary special proceeding (n which all incidents and issues regarding the performance of the obligations of a general guardian shall be heard and resolved. $ec. 6>. /eneral duties of guardian. ' guardian shall have the care and custody of the person of his ward and the management of his property, or only the management of his property. The guardian of the property of a nonresident minor shall have the management of all his property within the Philippines.

' guardian shall perform the following duties+ (a) (b) To pay the 2ust debts of the ward out of the personal property and the income of the real property of the ward, (f the same is sufficient1 otherwise, out of the real property of the ward upon obtaining an order for its sale or encumbrance1 To settle all accounts of his ward, and demand, sue for, receive all debts due him, or may, with the approval of the court, compound for the same and give discharges to the debtor on receiving a fair and 2ust dividend of the property and effects1 and to appear for and represent the ward in all actions and special proceedings, unless another person is appointed for that purpose1 To manage the property of the ward frugally and without waste, and apply the income and profits thereon, insofar as may be necessary, to the comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ward1 and if such income and profits be insufficient for that purpose, to sell or encumber the real or personal property, upon being authori5ed by the court to do so1 To consent to a partition of real or personal property owned by the ward 2ointly or in common with others upon authority granted by the court after hearing, notice to relatives of the ward, and a careful investigation as to the necessity and propriety of the proposed action1 To submit to the court a verified inventory of the property of his ward within three months after his appointment, and annually thereafter, the rendition of which may be re0uired upon the application of an interested person1

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f) To report to the court any property of the ward not included in the inventory which is discovered, or succeeded to, or ac0uired by the ward within three months after such discovery, succession, or ac0uisition1 and (g) To render to the court for its approval an accounting of the property one year from his appointment, and every year thereafter or as often as may be re0uired.

$ec. 67. 'ower and duty of the court The court may+ (a) (b) Re0uest the assistance of one or more commissioners in the appraisal of the property of the ward reported in the initial and subse0uent inventories1 'uthori5e reimbursement to the guardian, other than a parent, of reasonable e.penses incurred in the e.ecution of his trust, and allow payment of compensation for his services as the court may deem 2ust, not e.ceeding ten per centum of the net income of the ward, if any1 otherwise, in such amount the court determines to be a reasonable compensation for his services1 and pon complaint of the guardian or ward, or of any person having actual or prospective interest in the property at the ward, re0uire any person suspected of having embe55led, concealed, or disposed of any money, goods or interest, or a written instrument belonging to the ward or his property to appear for e.amination concerning any thereof and issue such orders as would secure the property against such embe55lement, concealment or conveyance.

(c)

$ec. 6C. 'etition to sell or encumber property.7 &hen the income of a property under guardianship is insufficient to maintain and educate the ward, or when it is for his benefit that his personal or real property or any part thereof be sold, mortgaged or otherwise encumbered, and the proceeds invested in safe and productive security, or in the improvement or security of other real property, the guardian may file a verified petition setting forth such facts, and praying that an order issue authori5ing the sale or encumbrance of the property. $ec. ;@. Order to show cause. = (f the sale or encumbrance is necessary or would be beneficial to the ward, the court shall order his ne.t of /in and all personGs interested in the property to appear at a reasonable time and place therein specified and show cause why the petition should not be granted. $ec. ;6. (earing on return of order? costs. = At the time and place designated in the order to show cause, the court shall hear the allegations and evidence of the petitioner and ne.t of /in, and other persons interested, together with their witnesses, and grant or deny the petition as the best interests of the ward may re0uire. $ec. ;;. #ontents of order for sale or encumbrance and its duration? bond. (f& after full e.amination, it is necessary, or would be beneficial to the ward, to sell or encumber the property, or some portion of it, the court shall order such sale or encumbrance the proceeds of which shall be e.pended for the maintenance or the education of the ward, or invested as the circumstances may re0uire. The order shall specify the grounds for the sale or encumbrance and may direct that the property ordered sold be disposed of at public sale, sub2ect to such conditions as to the time and manner of payment, and security where a part of the payment is deferred. The original bond of the guardian shall stand as security for the proper appropriation of the proceeds of the sale or encumbrance, but the court may, if deemed e.pedient, re0uire an additional bond as a condition for the sale or encumbrance. The authority to sell or encumber shall not e.tend beyond one year, unless renewed by the court. $ec. ;=. #ourt may order investment of proceeds and direct management of property. = The court may authori5e and re0uire the guardian to invest the proceeds of sales or encumbrances, and any other money of his ward in his hands, in real or personal property, for the best interests of the ward, and may ma/e such other orders for the management, investment, and disposition of the property and effects, as circumstances may warrant. $ec. ;<. /rounds for removal or resignation of guardian. = &hen a guardian becomes insane or otherwise incapable of discharging his trust or is found thereafter to be unsuitable, or has wasted or mismanaged the property of the ward, or has failed to render an account or ma/e a return for thirty days after it is due, the court may, upon reasonable notice to the guardian, remove him as such and re0uire him to surrender the property of the ward to the person found to be lawfully entitled thereto. The court may allow the guardian to resign for 2ustifiable causes. pon the removal or resignation of the guardian, the court shall appoint a new one. !o motion for removal or resignation shall be granted unless the guardian has submitted the proper accounting of the property of the ward and the court has approved the same.

$ec. ;B. /round for termination of guardianship. = The court motu proprio or upon verified motion of any person allowed to file a petition for guardianship may terminate the guardianship on the ground that the ward has come of age or has died. The guardian shall notify the court of such fact within ten days of its occurrence. $ec. ;9. $ervice of final and executory judgment or order. = The final and e.ecutory 2udgment or order shall be served upon the %ocal "ivil Registrar of the municipality or city where the minor resides and the Register of #eeds of the province or city where his property or any part thereof is situated. ?oth the %ocal "ivil Registrar and- the Register of #eeds shall enter the final and e.ecutory 2udgment or order in the appropriate boo/s in their offices. $ec. ;>. .ffect of the rule. This Rule amends Rules C; to C> inclusive of the Rules of "ourt on guardianship of minors. Euardianship of incompetents who are not minors shall continue to be under the 2urisdiction of the regular courts and governed by the Rules of "ourt. $ec. ;7. .ffectivity. 7 This Rule shall ta/e effect on Fay 6, ;@@= following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation not later than 'pril 6B, ;@@=.

E.R. !o. 6697=B Farch B, 6CC7

'!T,!(:TT' E'R"(' 8#'. #: ") ', petitioner, vs. ", RT ,F 'PP:'%$ ($pecial :ight #ivision), ),!. D'P'% F. E ('!(, RT", ?ranch 6<, 6;th Dudicial Region, "otabato "ity, and F%,R(T' '. 8'%%:D,, as 'dministratri. of the :state of the late Roberto %. "hua, respondents.

M'P !'!, ,.@

'ssailed before us in this 'ppeal by #ertiorari under Rule <B of the Rules of "ourt is the decision of the "ourt of 'ppeals in "'*ER $p. !o. ==6@6, promulgated on 6C 'pril 6CC< affirming the decision of the Regional Trial "ourt, ?ranch 6<, of "otabato "ity in $pecial Procedure "ase !o. ==6. 's culled from the records, the following facts have been established by evidence+ #uring his lifetime, Roberto %im "hua lived out of wedloc/ with private respondent Florita '. 8alle2o from 6C>@ up to 6C76. ,ut of this union, the couple begot two illegitimate children, namely, Roberto Rafson 'lon5o and Rudyard Pride 'lon5o. ,n ;7 Fay 6CC;, Roberto "hua died intestate in #avao "ity. ,n ; Duly 6CC;, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial "ourt of "otabato "ity a Petition 1 which is reproduced hereunder+ (! R:+ P:T(T(,! F,R #:"%'R'T(,! ,F ):(R$)(P, E 'R#('!$)(P ,8:R T): P:R$,!$ '!# PR,P:RT(:$ ,F F(!,R$ R,?:RT R'F$,! '%,!L, $P. PR,". !,G ==6 and R #A'R# PR(#: '%,!L,, all surnamed ") ' and ($$ '!": ,F %:TT:R$ ,F '#F(!($TR'T(,!. F%,R(T' '%,!L, 8'%%:D,, Petitioner '.TATAO* ",F:$ !,& the petitioner assisted by counsel and unto this )onorable "ourt most respectfully states+ 6. That she is of legal age, Filipino, married but separated from her husband and residing at Nue5on 'venue, "otabato "ity, Philippines1 ;. That sometime from 6C>@ up to and until late 6C76 your petitioner lived with Roberto %im "hua as husband and wife and out of said union they begot two (;) children, namely, Robert Rafson 'lon5o "hua who was born in Eeneral $antos "ity on 'pril ;7, 6C>> and Rudyard Pride 'lon5o "hua who was born in #avao "ity on 'ugust =@, 6C>7. ' .ero. copy of the birth certificate of each child is hereto attached as anne. I'I and I?I, respectively. =. That the aforementioned children who are still minors today are both staying with herein petitioner at her address at Nue5on 'venue, "otabato "ity1 <. That Roberto %im "hua, father of the above*mentioned minors, died intestate on Fay ;7, 6CC; in #avao "ity. B. That the aforementioned deceased left properties both real and personal worth PB,@@@,@@@.@@ consisting of the following+ a) %ot in Ma/ar, "otabato "ity covered by T"T !o. T*6;7=B with an area of ;C@ s0. m. estimated at PB@,@@@.@@ b) %ot in Ma/ar, "otabato "ity covered by T"T !o. T*6;7=< with an area of =;= s0. m. B@,@@@.@@ c) %ot in #avao "ity covered by T"T !o. T*6;9B7= with an area of =@= s0. m. B@,@@@.@@

d) %ot in #avao "ity covered by T"T !o. T*6;9B7< with an area of =@= s0. m. B@,@@@.@@ e) Residential house in "otabato "ity valued at =@,@@@.@@ f) Residential house in #avao "ity valued at 9@@,@@@.@@ g) "ar, "olt %ancer with Fotor !o. <E==*= 'F9=C= ;6@,@@@.@@ h) "olt, Ealant $uper $aloon with Fotor !o. <E=>*E?@69B B<B,@@@.@@ i) "ar, "olt Ealant with Fotor !o. <EB;*B;#>B;<7 66@,@@@.@@ 2) Reo (su5u #ump Truc/ with Fotor !o. #'9<@*7=79=B =B@,@@@.@@ /) )ino #ump Truc/ with Fotor !o. :#6@@*T<>6<7 =B@,@@@.@@ l) $toc/holdings in various corporations with par value estimated at =,==B,@@@.@@ Total PB,@@@,@@@.@@ 9. That deceased Roberto %im "hua died single and without legitimate descendants or ascendants, hence, the above named minors Robert Rafson 'lon5o "hua and Rudyard Pride 'lon5o "hua, his children with herein petitioner shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. ('rticle C77 of the "ivil "ode of the Philippines). >. That the names, ages and residences of the relatives of said minors are the following, to wit+ *ames Relationship Ages Residence 6. "arlos "hua "otabato "ity ncle 9@ Nue5on 'venue,

;. 'ida "hua 'untie BB Rosary )eights, "otabato "ity =. Romulo y ncle <@ cGo ,verseas Fishing :.poration "o. (nc., Fatina, #avao "ity 9. That considering the fact that the aforementioned minors by operation of law are to succeed to the entire estate of Roberto %im "hua under the provisions of 'rticle C77 of the !ew "ivil "ode of the Philippines, it is necessary that for the protection of the rights and interest of Robert Rafson 'lon5o "hua and Rudyard Pride 'lon5o "hua, both minors and heirs of deceased Roberto %im "hua, a guardian over the persons and properties of said minors be appointed by this )onorable "ourt. >. That herein petitioner being the mother and natural guardian of said minors is also competent and willing to act as the guardian of minors Robert Rafson 'lon5o "hua and Rudyard Pride 'lon5o "hua both staying and living with her1 that petitioner possesses all the 0ualifications and none of the dis0ualifications of a guardian. &):R:F,R:, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed+ 6. That, upon proper notice and hearing, an order be issued declaring minors R,?:RT, R'F$,! '%,!L, ") ' and R #A'R# PR(#: '%,!L, ") ' as heirs to the intestate estate of deceased R,?:RT, %(F ") '1 ;. That %etters of 'dministration be issued to herein petitioner for the administration of the estate of the deceased R,?:RT, %(F ") '1 =. That the petitioner be also appointed the guardian of the persons and estate of minors R,?:RT R'F$,! '%,!L, ") ' and R #A'R# PR(#: '%,!L, ") '1 <. That after all the property of deceased Roberto %im "hua have been inventoried and e.penses and 2ust debts, have been paid, the intestate estate of Roberto %im "hua be distributed to its rightful heirs, the minors in this case, pursuant to the provisions of 'rticle C77 of the !ew "ivil "ode of the Philippines.

B. 'nd for such other reliefs and remedies this )onorable "ourt may consider fit and proper in the premises. "otabato "ity, Philippines, Dune ;C, 6CC;. ($gd.) F%,R(T' '%,!L, 8'%%:D, (Petitioner) The trial court issued an order setting the hearing of the petition on 6< 'ugust 6CC; and directed that notice thereof be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Faguindanao and "otabato "ity and or #avao "ity. ,n ;6 Duly 6CC;, herein petitioner 'ntonietta Earcia 8da. de "hua, representing to be the surviving spouse of Roberto "hua, filed a Fotion to #ismiss 2 on the ground of improper venue. Petitioner alleged that at the time of the decedentHs death #avao "ity was his residence, hence, the Regional Trial "ourt of #avao "ity is the proper forum. Private respondent filed an opposition to the Fotion to #ismiss 3 dated Duly ;@, 6CC; based on the following grounds+ (6) That this petition is for the guardianship of the minor children of the petitioner who are heirs to the estate of the late Roberto %. "hua and under $ection 6, Rule C; of the Rules of "ourt the venue shall be at the place where the minor resides1 (;) That the above*named minors are residents of "otabato "ity+ (=) That the movant in this case has no personality to intervene nor oppose in the granting of this petition for the reason that she is a total stranger to the minors Robert Rafson 'lon5o and Rudyard Pride 'lon5o, all surnamed "hua. (<) That deceased Roberto %. "hua died a bachelor. )e is the father of the above*named minors with the petitioner in this case1 (B) That movantGoppositor 'ntonietta "hua is not the surviving spouse of the late Roberto %. "hua but a pretender to the estate of the latter since the deceased never contracted marriage with any woman until he died. ,n 9 'ugust 6CC;, private respondent 8alle2o filed a Fotion for 'dmission of an 'mended Petition 4 Iin order that the designation of the case title can properly and appropriately capture or capsuli5e in clear terms the material averments in the body of the pleadings1 thus avoiding any confusion or misconception of the nature and real intent and purpose of this petition.I The amended petition 0 contained identical material allegations but differed in its title, thus+. (! R:+ P:T(T(,! F,R T): $:TT%:F:!T ,F T): (!T:$T'T: :$T'T: ,F R,?:RT, %. ") ', #:"%'R'T(,! ,F ):(R$)(P, E 'R#('!$)(P ,8:R T): P:R$,!$ '!# PR,P:RT(:$ ,F F(!,R$ R,?:RT '!# R #A'R#, all surnamed ") ' and ($$ '!": ,F %:TT:R$ ,F '#F(!($TR'T(,!. F%,R(T' '%,!L, 8'%%:D,, Petitioner. Paragraph < of the original petition was also amended to read as follows+ <. That Roberto %im "hua, father of the abovementioned minors is a resident of "otabato "ity and died intestate on Fay ;7, 6CC; at #avao "ity. The petition contained e.actly the same prayers as the original petition. Petitioner opposed the motion to amend petition alleging that at the hearing of said motion on ;< Duly 6CC;, private respondentHs counsel allegedly admitted that the sole intention of the original petition was to secure guardianship over the persons and property of the minors. 6 ,n ;6 'ugust 6CC;, the trial court issued an ,rder 1 denying the motion to dismiss for lac/ of merit. The court ruled that 'ntonietta Earcia had no personality to file the motion to dismiss not having proven her status as wife of the decedent. Further, the court found that the actual residence of the deceased was "otabato "ity, and even assuming that there was concurrent venue among the Regional Trial "ourts where the decedent had resided, the R.T.". of "otabato had already ta/en cogni5ance of the settlement of the decedentHs estate to the e.clusion of all others. The pertinent portions of the order read+ 't the hearing of the motion to dismiss on 'ugust 6C, 6CC;, counsel for movant 'ntonietta E. "hua presented 67 :.hibits in support of her allegation that she was the lawful wife of the decedent and that the latter resides in #avao "ity at the time of his death. :.h. I6I was the .ero. copy of the alleged marriage contract between the movant and the petitioner. This cannot be admitted in evidence on the ground of the timely ob2ection of the counsels for petitioner that the best evidence is the original copy or authenticated copy which the movant cannot produce. Further, the counsels for petitioner in opposition presented the following+ a certification from the %ocal "ivil Registrar concerned that no such marriage contract was ever registered with them1 a letter from Dudge 'ugusto ?an5ali, the alleged person to have solemni5ed the alleged marriage that he has not solemni5ed such alleged marriage. :.hibit I;I through I67I consist among others of Transfer "ertificate of Title issued in the name of Roberto %. "hua married to 'ntonietta Earcia, and a resident of #avao "ity1 Residence "ertificates from 6C77 and 6C7C issued at #avao "ity indicating that he was married and was born in "otabato "ity1 (ncome Ta. Returns for 6CC@ and 6CC6 filed in #avao "ity where the status of the decedent was stated as married1 passport of the decedent specifying that he was married and his residence was #avao "ity. Petitioner through counsels, ob2ected to the admission in evidence of :.hibits I;I through I67I if the purpose is to establish the

truth of the alleged marriage between the decedent and 'ntonietta Earcia. The best evidence they said is the marriage contract. They do not ob2ect to the admission of said e.hibit if the purpose is to show that #avao "ity was the business residence of the decedent. Petitioner through counsels, presented :.hibit I'I through IMI to support her allegation that the decedent was a resident of "otabato "ity1 that he died a bachelor1 that he begot two illegitimate children with the petitioner as mother. 'mong these e.hibits are (ncome Ta. Returns filed in "otabato "ity from 6C97 through 6C>C indicating therein that he was single1 birth certificates of the alleged two illegitimate children of the decedent1 Resident "ertificates of the decedent issued in "otabato "ity1 Registration "ertificate of 8ehicle of the decedent showing that his residence is "otabato "ity. (t is clear from the foregoing that the movant failed to establish the truth of her allegation that she was the lawful wife of the decedent. The best evidence is a valid marriage contract which the movant failed to produce. Transfer "ertificates of Title, Residence "ertificates, passports and other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when the petitioner has submitted a certification from the %ocal "ivil Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from the 2udge alleged to have solemni5ed the marriage that he has not solemni5ed said alleged marriage. "onse0uently, she has no personality to file the sub2ect motion to dismiss. ,n the issue of the residence of the decedent at the time of his death, the decedent as a businessman has many business residences from different parts of the country where he usually stays to supervise and pursue his business ventures. #avao "ity is one of them. (t cannot be denied that "otabato "ity is his actual residence where his alleged illegitimate children also reside. The place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element of 2urisdiction over the sub2ect matter. (t is merely constitutive of venue (Fule vs. "', %*<@B@;, !ovember ;C, 6C>9). :ven assuming that there is concurrent venue among the Regional Trial "ourts of the places where the decedent has residences, the Regional Trial "ourt first ta/ing cogni5ance of the settlement of the estate of the decedent, shall e.ercise 2urisdiction to the e.clusion of all other courts ($ection 6, Rule >=). (t was this "ourt which first too/ cogni5ance of the case when the petition was filed on Duly ;, 6CC;, doc/eted as $pecial Proceeding !o. ==6 and an order of publication issued by this "ourt on Duly 6=, 6CC;. &):R:F,R:, in view of the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is hereby denied for lac/ of merit. ,n =6 'ugust 6CC;, upon motion of private respondent, the trial court issued an order appointing Romulo %im special administrator of the decedentHs estate. 4 y, a first cousin of the deceased, as

,n the same day, the trial court, li/ewise, issued an ,rder appointing Florita 8alle2o as guardian over the persons and properties of the two minor children. 5 Thereafter, petitioner filed a Fotion dated ;B ,ctober 6CC= 10 praying that the letters of administration issued to 8alle2o be recalled and that new letters of administration be issued to her. $he, li/ewise, filed a Fotion dated B !ovember 6CC= 11 to declare the proceedings a mistrial. ?oth motions were denied by the trial court in its ,rder dated ;; !ovember 6CC=. 12 PetitionerHs motion for reconsideration of the order was denied by the trial court in an ,rder dated 6= #ecember 6CC=. 13 'ssailing the last two orders of the trial court, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition (Rule 9B) with the respondent "ourt of 'ppeals, doc/eted as "' E.R. !o. $p. ==6@6, alleging that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in+ (6) unilaterally and summarily converting, if not treating, the guardianship proceedings into an intestate proceeding1 (;) summarily hearing the intestate proceedings without 2urisdiction and without any notice to herein petitioner whatsoever1 and (=) issuing the 0uestioned order (sic) on the alleged pretension that herein petitioner has no personality to intervene in $P% Proc. !o. ==6 0uestioning the highly anomalous orders precipitately issued ex7parte by the public respondent R.T.". without notice to the petitioners. Petitioner in the main argued that private respondent herself admitted in her opposition to petitionerHs motion to dismiss filed in the trial court and in open court that the original petition she filed is one for guardianship1 hence, the trial court acted beyond its 2urisdiction when it issued letters of administration over the estate of Roberto %. "hua, thereby converting the petition into an intestate proceeding, without the amended petition being published in a newspaper of general circulation as re0uired by $ection =, Rule >C. The "ourt of 'ppeals, in its decision promulgated on 6C 'pril 6CC<, 14 denied the petition ratiocinating that the original petition filed was one for guardianship of the illegitimate children of the deceased as well as for administration of his intestate estate. &hile private respondent may have alleged in her opposition to the motion to dismiss that petition was for guardianship, the fact remains that the very allegations of the original petition unmista/ably showed a twin purpose+ (6) guardianship1 and (;) issuance of letters of administration. 's such, it was unnecessary for her to republish the notice of hearing through a newspaper of general circulation in the province. The amended petition was filed for the only reason stated in the motion for leave+ so that the Icase title can properly and appropriately capture or capsuli5e in clear terms the material averments in the body of the pleadings1 thus avoiding any confusion or misconception of the nature and real intent and purpose of this petition,I which was for guardianship over the persons and properties of her minor children and for the settlement of the intestate estate of the decedent who was their father. (n other words, there being no change in the material allegations between the original and amended petitions, the publication of the first in a newspaper of general circulation sufficed for purposes of compliance with the legal re0uirements of notice. Foreover, the appellate court ruled that the petitionerHs remedy is appeal from the orders complained of under $ection 6(f), Rule 6@C of the Rules of "ourt, not certiorari and prohibition. !ot satisfied with the decision of the "ourt of 'ppeals, petitioner comes to this "ourt contending that the appellate court committed the following errors+

( T): P ?%(" R:$P,!#:!T ", RT ,F 'PP:'%$ ER'8:%A '!# $:R(, $%A :RR:# (! ),%#(!E T)'T T): ,R(E(!'% P:T(T(,! ('nne. F, Petition) &'$ F,R ' T&(! P RP,$:, T, &(T+ F,R E 'R#('!$)(P '!# F,R (!T:$T'T: :$T'T: PR,"::#(!E$1 (( T): P ?%(" R:$P,!#:!T ", RT 'PP:'%$ $:R(, $%A :RR:# (! ),%#(!E T)'T T):R: ($ !, !::# T, P ?%($) T): 'F:!#:# P:T(T(,! F,R '#F(!($TR'T(,! ,F T): (!T:$T'T: :$T'T: T):R:?A ",!TR'8:!(!E T): R %:$ ,F ", RT '!# T): R %(!E$ ,F T): $ PR:F: ", RT. ((( T): P ?%(" R:$P,!#:!T ", RT ,F 'PP:'%$ $:R(, $%A :RR:# (! !,T ! %%(FA(!E T): ,R#:R$ ('nne. IPI to ITI) PR:"(P(T'T:%A ($$ :# .B7'ART. ?A T): P ?%(" R:$P,!#:!T R:E(,!'% TR('% ", RT (! T): (!T:$T'T: PR,"::#(!E$ &(T), T PR(,R ):'R(!E ,R !,T(": T, ):R:(! P:T(T(,!:R T):R:?A #:PR(8(!E T): %'TT:R ('!T,!(:TT' E'R"(' 8#'. #: ") ' ) ,F # : PR,":$$ '!# ,PP,RT !(TA T, ?: ):'R#. (8 T): P ?%(" R:$P,!#:!T ", RT ,F 'PP:'%$ ER'8:%A :RR:# (! $&::P(!E%A ),%#(!E T)'T P:T(T(,!:RH$ R:F:#A ($ 'PP:'%. 10 (n support of her first assignment of error, petitioner submits that the "ourt of 'ppealsH conclusion that the original petition was one for guardianship and administration of the intestate estate is contradicted by the evidence on hand, asserting that the original petition failed to allege and state the 2urisdictional facts re0uired by the Rules of "ourt in petitions for administration of a decedentHs estate, such as+ (a) the last actual residence of the decedent at the time of his death1 (b) names, ages and residences of the heirs1 and (c) the names and residences of the creditors of the decedent. Petitioner also reiterates her argument regarding private respondentHs alleged admission that the original petition was one for guardianship and not for issuance of letters of administration, pointing to the ,pposition to the Fotion to #ismiss dated ;@ Duly 6CC;, where the private respondent alleged. 6. That this petition is for guardianship of the minor children of the petitioner who are heirs to the estate of the late Roberto %. "hua and under $ection 6, Rule C; of the Rules of "ourt the venue shall be at the place where the minor resides. 16 as well as to the statements made by counsel for the private respondent during the ;< Duly 6CC; hearing on the motion to dismiss+ 'TTA. R:!#,!+ &e filed our opposition to the motion to dismiss the petition because this is a petition for guardianship of minors& not for intestate proceedings . $o this is a case where the mother wanted to be appointed as guardian because she is also the litigant here. ?ecause whenever there is an intestate proceedings, she has to represent the minors, and under the Rules of "ourt in any guardianship proceedings, the venue is at the place where the minor is actually residing. 11 The petition is devoid of merit. The title alone of the original petition clearly shows that the petition is one which includes the issuance of letters of administration. The title of said petition reads+ (! R:+ P:T(T(,! F,R #:"%'R'T(,! ,F ):(R$)(P$, E 'R#('!$)(P ,8:R T): P:R$,! '!# PR,P:RT(:$ ,F F(!,R$ R,?:RT, '%,!L, '!# R #A'R# '%,!L,, all surnamed ") ' and ($$ '!": ,F %:TT:R$ ,F '#F(!($TR'T(,!. 14 %i/ewise, the prayer of the petition states+ ;. That %etters of 'dministration be issued to herein petition for the administration of the estate of the deceased R,?:RT, %(F ") '. The original petition also contains the 2urisdictional facts re0uired in a petition for the issuance of letters of administration. $ection ;, Rule >C of the Rules of "ourt reads+ $ec. ;. "ontents of petition for letters of administration J ' petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as /nown to the petitioner+ (a) jurisdictional facts1 (b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs and the names and residences of the creditors, of the decedentH (c) The probative value and character of the property of the estate1.

(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed1 %ut no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration . (emphasis ours). The 2urisdictional facts re0uired in a petition for issuance of letters of administration are+ (6) the death of the testator1 (;) residence at the time of death in the province where the probate court is located1 and (=) if the decedent was a non*resident, the fact of being a resident of a foreign country and that the decedent has left an estate in the province where the court is sitting. 15 &hile paragraph < of the original petition stating+ (<) That Roberto %im "hua, father of the above mentioned minors, died intestate on Fay ;7, 6CC; in #avao "ity. failed to indicate the residence of the deceased at the time of his death, the omission was cured by the amended petitions wherein the same paragraph now reads+ (<) That Roberto %im "hua, father of the abovementioned minors is a resident of #otabato #ity and died intestate on Fay ;7, 6CC; at #avao "ity. 20 (:mphasis in the original.) 'll told the original petition alleged substantially all the facts re0uired to be stated in the petition for letters of administration. "onse0uently, there was no need to publish the amended petition as petitioner would insist in her second assignment of errors. ?e that as it may, petitioner has no legal standing to file the motion to dismiss as she is not related to the deceased, nor does she have any interest in his estate as creditor or otherwise. The Rules are e.plicit on who may do so+ $ec. <. ,pposition to petition for administration J 'ny interested person, may by filing a written opposition, contest the petition on the ground of incompetency of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed therein, or on the ground of the contestantHs own right to the administration, and may pray that letters issue to himself, or to any competent person or persons named in the opposition.. ,nly an interested person may oppose the petition for issuance of letters of administration. 'n interested person is one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor1 his interest is material and direct, and not one that is only indirect or contingent. 21 Petitioner was not able to prove her status as the surviving wife of the decedent. The best proof of marriage between man and wife is a marriage contract which 'ntonietta "hua failed to produce. The lower court correctly disregarded the photostat copy of the marriage certificate which she presented, this being a violation of the best evidence rule, together with other worthless pieces of evidence. The trial court correctly ruled in its ;6 'ugust 6CC; ,rder that+ . . . Transfer "ertificates of Title, Residence "ertificates, passports and other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when the petitioner has submitted a certification from the %ocal "ivil Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from the 2udge alleged to have solemni5ed the marriage that he has not solemni5ed said alleged marriage. . . . 22 nder her third assignment of error, petitioner claims that the trial court issued its orders, 'nne.es IPI to ITI without prior hearing or notice to her, thus, depriving her of due process. The orders referred to by petitioner are+ ,rder dated =6 'ugust 6CC; appointing Romulo %im y, first cousin of the deceased, as special administrator of the estate1 ,rder dated =6 'ugust 6CC; appointing private respondent as guardian over the person and property of the minors1 ,rder dated B 'ugust 6CC=, directing the transfer of the remains of the deceased from #avao "ity to "otabato "ity1 ,rder dated 9 $eptember 6CC= directing petitioner to turn over a Fitsubishi Eallant car owned by the estate of the deceased to the special administrator1 and ,rder dated ;7 $eptember 6CC=, authori5ing the sheriff to brea/ open the deceasedHs house for the purpose of conducting an inventory of the properties found therein, after the sheriff was refused entry to the house by the driver and maid of petitioner. 'part from the fact that petitioner was not entitled to notice of the proceedings of the trial court, not being able to establish proof of her alleged marriage to the deceased, or of her interest in the estate as creditor or otherwise, petitioner categorically stated in the instant petition that on ;B ,ctober 6CC= she filed a motion praying for the recall of the letters of administration issued by the trial court and another motion dated B 'ugust 6CC= praying that the proceedings conducted by the trial court be declared as a mistrial and the court orders relative thereto be set aside and nullified. Petitioner further stated that her motions were denied by the trial court in its ,rder dated ;; !ovember ;6, 6CC= and that on =@ !ovember 6CC= she filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of denial which in turn was denied by the trial court on 6= #ecember 6CC=. #ue process was designed to afford opportunity to be heard, not that an actual hearing should always and indispensably be held. 23 The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. 24 )ere, even granting that the petitioner was not notified of the orders of the trial court mar/ed as :.hibits IPI to IT,I inclusive, nonetheless, she was duly heard in her motions to recall letters of administration and to declare the proceedings of the court as a Imistrial,I which motions were denied in the ,rder dated ;; !ovember 6CC=. 20 ' motion for the reconsideration of this order of denial was also duly heard by the trial court but was denied in its ,rder of 6= #ecember 6CC=. 26 #enial of due process cannot be successfully invo/ed by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration. 21 's to the last assignment of errors, we agree with the "ourt of 'ppeals that the proper remedy of the petitioner in said court was an ordinary appeal and not a special civil action for certiorari1 which can be availed of if a party has no plain, speedy and ade0uate remedy in the ordinary course of law. :.cept

for her bare allegation that an ordinary appeal would be inade0uate, nothing on record would indicate that e.traordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition is warranted. Finally, petitioner further argues as supplement to her memorandum that the ruling of the "ourt of 'ppeals treating the $pecial Proceeding !o. ==6 as one for both guardianship and settlement of estate is in contravention of our ruling in /ome2 vs. Amperial, 24 which the petitioner 0uotes+ The distribution of the residue of the estate of the deceased is a function pertaining property not to the guardianship proceedings, but to another proceeding which the heirs are at liberty to initiate. PetitionerHs reliance on said case is misplaced. (n the /ome2 case, the action before the lower court was merely one for guardianship. Therefore said court did not have the 2urisdiction to distribute the estate of the deceased. &hile in the case at bar, the petition filed before the court was both for guardianship and settlement of estate. (! 8(:& ,F T): F,R:E,(!E, the petition of petitioner 'ntonietta "hua is hereby denied. $, ,R#:R:#.
*arvasa& #.,.& Romero and 'urisima& ,,.& concur.

E.R. !o. 6B6;<=

'pril =@, ;@@7

%,%(T' R. '%'F'AR(, petitioner, vs. R,FF:%, :%F:R, :R&(!, R,(%:R and 'F'!#', all surnamed P'?'%:, respondents.

#:"($(,!

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?efore this "ourt is a Petition for Review on #ertiorari 6 under Rule <B of the Rules of "ourt filed by petitioner %olita R. 'lamayri ('lamayri) see/ing the reversal and setting aside of the #ecision,; dated 6@ 'pril ;@@6, of the "ourt of 'ppeals in "'*E.R. "8 !o. B76==1 as well as the Resolution, = dated 6C #ecember ;@@6 of the same court denying reconsideration of its aforementioned #ecision. The "ourt of 'ppeals, in its assailed #ecision, upheld the validity of the #eed of 'bsolute $ale, dated ;@ February 6C7<, e.ecuted by !elly $. !ave (!ave) in favor of siblings Rommel, :lmer, :rwin, Roiler and 'manda, all surnamed Pabale (the Pabale siblings) over a piece of land (sub2ect property) in "alamba, %aguna, covered by Transfer "ertificate of Title (T"T) !o. T*==6> (;>9@<)1 and, thus, reversed and set aside the #ecision, < dated ; #ecember 6CC>, of the Regional Trial "ourt (RT") of Pasay "ity, ?ranch 66C in "ivil "ase !o. 9>B*7<*". B The ; #ecember 6CC> #ecision of the RT" declared null and void the two sales agreements involving the sub2ect property entered into by !ave with different parties, namely, $esinando F. Fernando (Fernando) and the Pabale siblings1 and ordered the reconveyance of the sub2ect property to 'lamayri, as !ave-s successor*in*interest. There is no controversy as to the facts that gave rise to the present Petition, determined by the "ourt of 'ppeals to be as follows+ This is a "omplaint for $pecific Performance with #amages filed by $esinando F. Fernando, representing $.F. Fernando Realty "orporation RFernandoS on February 9, 6C7< before the Regional Trial "ourt of "alamba, %aguna presided over by Dudge $alvador P. de Eu5man, Dr., doc/eted as "ivil "ase !o. 9>B*7<*" against !elly $. !ave R!aveS, owner of a parcel of land located in "alamba, %aguna covered by T"T !o. T*==6> (;>9@<). RFernandoS alleged that on Danuary =, 6C7<, a handwritten ICasunduan $a 'agbibilihanI ("ontract to $ell) was entered into by and between him and R!aveS involving said parcel of land. )owever, R!aveS reneged on their agreement when the latter refused to accept the partial down payment he tendered to her as previously agreed because she did not want to sell her property to him anymore. RFernandoS prayed that after trial on the merits, R!aveS be ordered to e.ecute the corresponding #eed of $ale in his favor, and to pay attorney-s fees, litigation e.penses and damages. R!aveS filed a Fotion to #ismiss averring that she could not be ordered to e.ecute the corresponding #eed of $ale in favor of RFernandoS based on the following grounds+ (6) she was not fully apprised of the nature of the piece of paper RFernandoS handed to her for her signature on Danuary =, 6C7<. &hen she was informed that it was for the sale of her property in "alamba, %aguna covered by T"T !o. T*==6> (;>9@<), she immediately returned to RFernandoS the said piece of paper and at the same time repudiating the same. )er repudiation was further bolstered by the fact that when RFernandoS tendered the partial down payment to her, she refused to receive the same1 and (;) she already sold the property in good faith to Rommel, :lmer, :rwin, Roller and 'manda, all surnamed Pabale Rthe Pabale siblingsS on February ;@, 6C7< after the complaint was filed against her but before she received a copy thereof. Foreover, she alleged that RFernandoS has no cause of action against her as he is suing for and in behalf of $.F. Fernando Realty "orporation who is not a party to the alleged "ontract to $ell. :ven assuming that said entity is the real party in interest, still, RFernandoS cannot sue in representation of the corporation there being no evidence to show that he was duly authori5ed to do so. $ubse0uently, Rthe Pabale siblingsS filed a Fotion to (ntervene alleging that they are now the land owners of the sub2ect property. Thus, the complaint was amended to include Rthe Pabale siblingsS as party defendants. (n an ,rder dated 'pril ;<, 6C7<, the trial court denied R!ave-sS Fotion to #ismiss prompting her to file a Fanifestation and Fotion stating that she was adopting the allegations in her Fotion to #ismiss in answer to RFernando-sS amended complaint. Thereafter, R!aveS filed a Fotion to 'dmit her 'mended 'nswer with "ounterclaim and "ross*claim praying that her husband, 'tty. 8edasto Eesmundo be impleaded as her co*defendant, and including as her defense undue influence and fraud by reason of the fact that she was made to appear as widow when in fact she was very much married at the time of the transaction in issue. #espite the opposition of RFernandoS and Rthe Pabale siblingsS, the trial court admitted the aforesaid 'mended 'nswer with "ounterclaim and "ross*claim. $till unsatisfied with her defense, R!aveS and 'tty. 8edasto Eesmundo filed a Fotion to 'dmit $econd 'mended 'nswer and 'mended Reply and "ross*claim against Rthe Pabale siblingsS, this time including the fact of her incapacity to contract for being mentally deficient based on the psychological evaluation report conducted on #ecember ;, 6C7B by #ra. 8irginia P. Panlasigui, F. '., a clinical psychologist. Finding the motion unmeritorious, the same was denied by the court a 8uo. R!aveS filed a motion for reconsideration thereof asseverating that in "riminal "ase !o. 6=@7*7B*" entitled IPeople vs. !elly $. !aveI she raised therein as a defense her mental deficiency. This being a decisive factor to determine once and for all whether the contract entered into by R!aveS with respect to the sub2ect property is null and void, the $econd 'mended 'nswer and 'mended Reply and "ross*claim against Rthe Pabale siblingsS should be admitted. ?efore the motion for reconsideration could be acted upon, the proceedings in this case was suspended sometime in 6C7> in view of the filing of a Petition for Euardianship of R!aveS with the Regional Trial "ourt, ?ranch =9 of "alamba, %aguna, doc/eted as $P !o. 6<9*79*" with 'tty. 8edasto Eesmundo as the petitioner. ,n Dune ;;, 6C77, a #ecision was rendered in the said guardianship proceedings, the dispositive portion of which reads+ I nder the circumstances, specially since !elly $. !ave who now resides with the ?rosas spouses has categorically refused to be e.amined again at the !ational Fental )ospital, the "ourt is constrained to accept the !euro*Psychiatric :valuation report dated 'pril 6<, 6C79 submitted by #ra. !ona Dean 'lviso*Ramos and the supporting report dated 'pril ;@, 6C7> submitted by #r. :duardo T. Faaba, both of the !ational Fental )ospital and hereby finds !elly $. !ave an incompetent within the purview of Rule C; of the Revised Rules of "ourt, a person who, by reason of age, disease, wea/ mind and deteriorating mental processes cannot without

outside aid ta/e care of herself and manage her properties, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and e.ploitation, said condition having become severe since the year 6C7@. $he and her estate are hereby placed under guardianship. 'tty. %eonardo ". Paner is hereby appointed as her regular guardian without need of bond, until further orders from this "ourt. pon his ta/ing his oath of office as regular guardian, 'tty. Paner is ordered to participate actively in the pending cases of !elly $. !ave with the end in view of protecting her interests from the pre2udicial sales of her real properties, from the overpayment in the foreclosure made by Fs. Eilda Fendo5a*,ng, and in recovering her lost 2ewelries and monies and other personal effects. $, ,R#:R:#.I ?oth RFernandoS and Rthe Pabale siblingsS did not appeal therefrom, while the appeal interposed by spouses Duliano and :vangelina ?rosas was dismissed by this "ourt for failure to pay the re0uired doc/eting fees within the reglementary period. (n the meantime, R!aveS died on #ecember C, 6CC;. ,n $eptember ;@, 6CC=, 'tty. 8edasto Eesmundo, R!ave-sS sole heir, she being an orphan and childless, e.ecuted an 'ffidavit of $elf*'d2udication pertaining to his inherited properties from R!aveS. ,n account of such development, a motion for the dismissal of the instant case and for the issuance of a writ of e.ecution of the #ecision dated Dune ;;, 6C77 in $P !o. 6<9*79*" (petition for guardianship) was filed by 'tty. 8edasto Eesmundo on February 6<, 6CC9 with the court a 8uo. RThe Pabale siblingsS filed their ,pposition to the motion on grounds that (6) they were not made a party to the guardianship proceedings and thus cannot be bound by the #ecision therein1 and (;) that the validity of the #eed of 'bsolute $ale e.ecuted by the late R!aveS in their favor was never raised in the guardianship case. The case was then set for an annual conference. ,n Danuary C, 6CC>, 'tty. 8edasto Eesmundo filed a motion see/ing the court-s permission for his substitution for the late defendant !elly in the instant case. !ot long after the parties submitted their respective pre*trial briefs, a motion for substitution was filed by %olita R. 'lamayre (sic) R'lamayriS alleging that since the sub2ect property was sold to her by 'tty. 8edasto Eesmundo as evidenced by a #eed of 'bsolute $ale, she should be substituted in his stead. (n refutation, 'tty. 8edasto Eesmundo filed a Fanifestation stating that what he e.ecuted is a #eed of #onation and not a #eed of 'bsolute $ale in favor of R'lamayriS and that the same was already revo/ed by him on Farch B, 6CC>. Thus, the motion for substitution should be denied. ,n Duly ;C, 6CC>, the court a 8uo issued an ,rder declaring that it cannot ma/e a ruling as to the conflicting claims of R'lamayriS and 'tty. 8edasto Eesmundo. 'fter the case was heard on the merits, the trial court rendered its #ecision on #ecember ;, 6CC>, the dispositive portion of which reads+ I&):R:F,R:, 2udgment is hereby rendered as follows+ 6. #eclaring the handwritten "ontract to $ell dated Danuary =, 6C7< e.ecuted by !elly $. !ave and $esinando Fernando null and void and of no force and effect1 ;. #eclaring the #eed of 'bsolute $ale dated February ;@, 6C7< e.ecuted by !elly $. !ave in favor of the RPabale siblingsS similarly null and void and of no force and effect1 =. Recogni5ing Fs. %olita P. R'lamayriS as the owner of the property covered by T"T !o. 666;<C of the land records of "alamba, %aguna1 <. ,rdering the RPabale siblingsS to e.ecute a transfer of title over the property in favor of Fs. %olita P. R'lamayriS in the concept of reconveyance because the sale in their favor has been declared null and void1 B. ,rdering the RPabale siblingsS to surrender possession over the property to Fs. R'lamayriS and to account for its income from the time they too/ over possession to the time the same is turned over to Fs. %olita R'lamayriS, and thereafter pay the said income to the latter1 9. ,rdering RFernandoS and the RPabale siblingsS, 2ointly and severally, to pay Fs. R'lamayriS+ a. attorney-s fees in the sum of P=@,@@@.@@1 and b. the costs.9 $.F. Fernando Realty "orporation, still represented by Fernando, filed an appeal with the "ourt of 'ppeals, doc/eted as "'*E.R. "8 !o. B76==, solely to 0uestion the portion of the ; #ecember 6CC> #ecision of the RT" ordering him and the Pabale siblings to 2ointly and severally pay 'lamayri the amount of P=@,@@@.@@ as attorney-s fees. The Pabale siblings intervened as appellants in "'*E.R. "8 !o. B76== averring that the RT" erred in declaring in its ; #ecember 6CC> #ecision that the #eed of 'bsolute $ale dated ;@ February 6C7< e.ecuted by !ave in their favor was null and void on the ground that !ave was found incompetent since the year 6C7@. The "ourt of 'ppeals, in its #ecision, dated 6@ 'pril ;@@6, granted the appeals of $.F. Fernando Realty "orporation and the Pabale siblings. (t ruled thus+

&):R:F,R:, premises considered, the appeal filed by $. F. Fernando Realty "orporation, represented by its President, $esinando F. Fernando as well as the appeal interposed by Rommel, :lmer, :rwin, Roller and 'manda, all surnamed Pabale, are hereby ER'!T:#. The #ecision of the Regional Trial "ourt of Pasay "ity, ?ranch 66C in "ivil "ase !o. 9>B*7<*" is hereby R:8:R$:# and $:T '$(#: and a new one rendered upholding the 8'%(#(TA of the #eed of 'bsolute $ale dated February ;@, 6C7<. !o pronouncements as to costs.> 'lamayri sought reconsideration of the afore*0uoted #ecision of the appellate court, invo/ing the #ecision, 7 dated ;; Dune 6C77, of the RT" in the guardianship proceedings, doc/eted as $P. PR,". !o. 6<9*79*", which found !ave incompetent, her condition becoming severe since 6C7@1 and thus appointed 'tty. %eonardo ". Paner as her guardian. $aid #ecision already became final and e.ecutory when no one appealed therefrom. 'lamayri argued that since !ave was already 2udicially determined to be an incompetent since 6C7@, then all contracts she subse0uently entered into should be declared null and void, including the #eed of $ale, dated ;@ February 6C7<, which she e.ecuted over the sub2ect property in favor of the Pabale siblings. 'ccording to 'lamayri, the Pabale siblings should be bound by the findings of the RT" in its ;; Dune 6C77 #ecision in $P. PR,". !o. 6<9*79*", having participated in the said guardianship proceedings through their father Dose Pabale. $he pointed out that the RT" e.plicitly named in its orders Dose Pabale as among those present during the hearings held on =@ ,ctober 6C7> and 6C !ovember 6C7> in $P. PR,". !o. 6<9*79*". 'lamayri thus filed on ;6 !ovember ;@@6 a Fotion to $chedule )earing to Far/ :.hibits in :vidence so she could mar/ and submit as evidence certain documents to establish that the Pabale siblings are indeed the children of Dose Pabale. 'tty. Eesmundo, !ave-s surviving spouse, li/ewise filed his own Fotion for Reconsideration of the 6@ 'pril ;@@6 #ecision of the "ourt of 'ppeals in "'* E.R. "8 !o. B76==, asserting !ave-s incompetence since 6C7@ as found by the RT" in $P. PR,". !o. 6<9*79*", and his right to the sub2ect property as owner upon !ave-s death in accordance with the laws of succession. (t must be remembered that 'tty. Eesmundo disputed before the RT" the supposed transfer of his rights to the sub2ect property to 'lamayri, but the court a 8uo refrained from ruling thereon. (n a Resolution, dated 6C #ecember ;@@6, the "ourt of 'ppeals denied for lac/ of merit the Fotions for Reconsideration of 'lamayri and 'tty. Eesmundo. )ence, 'lamayri comes before this "ourt via the present Petition for Review on #ertiorari under Rule <B of the Rules of "ourt, with the following assignment of errors+ ( T): ", RT ,F 'PP:'%$ :RR:# (! ),%#(!E T)'T T): F(!#(!E T)'T !:%%A $. !'8: &'$ (!",FP:T:!T (! $P:"('% PR,"::#(!E !,. 6<9*79*" ,! D !: ;;, 6C77 "'!!,T R:TR,'"T T, 'FF:"T T): 8'%(#(TA ,F T): #::# ,F $'%: $): :T:" T:# ,! F:?R 'RA ;@, 6C7< (! F'8,R ,F R:$P,!#:!T$ P'?'%:$. (( T): ", RT ,F 'PP:'%$ :RR:# (! ),%#(!E T)'T T): #:"($(,! (! $P:"('% PR,"::#(!E !,. 6<9*79*" #'T:# D !: ;;, 6C77 ($ !,T ?(!#(!E ,! R:$P,!#:!T$ P'?'%:$. ((( T): ", RT ,F 'PP:'%$ :RR:# (! #:!A(!E P:T(T(,!:R-$ F,T(,! T, $"):# %: ):'R(!E T, F'RM #," F:!T'RA :T)(?(T$ (! :8(#:!": T, :$T'?%($) T): (#:!T(TA ,F D,$: P'?'%: '$ T): F'T):R ,F R:$P,!#:!T$ P'?'%:$. C (t is 'lamayri-s position that given the final and e.ecutory #ecision, dated ;; Dune 6C77, of the RT" in $P. PR,". !o. 6<9*79*" finding !ave incompetent since 6C7@, then the same fact may no longer be re*litigated in "ivil "ase !o. 9>B*7<*", based on the doctrine of res judicata, more particularly, the rule on conclusiveness of 2udgment. This "ourt is not persuaded. Res judicata literally means Ia matter ad2udged1 a thing 2udicially acted upon or decided1 a thing or matter settled by 2udgment.I Res judicata lays the rule that an e.isting final 2udgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent 2urisdiction, upon any matter within its 2urisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other 2udicial tribunal of concurrent 2urisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit. 6@ (t is espoused in the Rules of "ourt, under paragraphs (b) and (c) of $ection <>, Rule =C, which read+ $:". <>. :ffect of 2udgments or final orders. The effect of a 2udgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having 2urisdiction to pronounce the 2udgment or final order, may be as follows+ .... (b) (n other cases, the 2udgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly ad2udged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subse0uent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity1 and

(c) (n any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been ad2udged in a former 2udgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so ad2udged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. The doctrine of res judicata thus lays down two main rules which may be stated as follows+ (6) The 2udgment or decree of a court of competent 2urisdiction on the merits concludes the parties and their privies to the litigation and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action either before the same or any other tribunal1 and (;) 'ny right, fact, or matter in issue directly ad2udicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which a 2udgment or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the 2udgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claims or demands, purposes, or sub2ect matters of the two suits are the same. These two main rules mar/ the distinction between the principles governing the two typical cases in which a 2udgment may operate as evidence.66(n spea/ing of these cases, the first general rule above stated, and which corresponds to the afore*0uoted paragraph (b) of $ection <>, Rule =C of the Rules of "ourt, is referred to as Ibar by former 2udgmentI1 while the second general rule, which is embodied in paragraph (c) of the same section and rule, is /nown as Iconclusiveness of 2udgment.I The Resolution of this "ourt in #alalang v. Register of Deeds provides the following enlightening discourse on conclusiveness of 2udgment+ The doctrine res judicata actually embraces two different concepts+ (6) bar by former 2udgment and (b) conclusiveness of 2udgment. The second concept J conclusiveness of 2udgment J states that a fact or 0uestion which was in issue in a former suit and was there 2udicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent 2urisdiction, is conclusively settled by the 2udgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent 2urisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the 2udgment remains unreversed by proper authority. (t has been held that in order that a 2udgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. (f a particular point or 0uestion is in issue in the second action, and the 2udgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or 0uestion, a former 2udgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or 0uestion was in issue and ad2udicated in the first suit (*abus vs. #ourt of Appeals, 6C= $"R' >=; R6CC6S). (dentity of cause of action is not re0uired but merely identity of issues. Dustice Feliciano, in $mith %ell D #ompany ('hils.!& Anc. vs. #ourt of Appeals (6C> $"R' ;@6, ;6@ R6CC6S), reiterated 9ope2 vs. Reyes (>9 $"R' 6>C R6C>>S) in regard to the distinction between bar by former 2udgment which bars the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action, and conclusiveness of 2udgment which bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action. The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or 0uestions which were in issue and ad2udicated in former action are commonly applied to all matters essentially connected with the sub2ect matter of the litigation. Thus, it e.tends to 0uestions necessarily implied in the final 2udgment, although no specific finding may have been made in reference thereto and although such matters were directly referred to in the pleadings and were not actually or formally presented. nder this rule, if the record of the former trial shows that the 2udgment could not have been rendered without deciding the particular matter, it will be considered as having settled that matter as to all future actions between the parties and if a 2udgment necessarily presupposes certain premises, they are as conclusive as the 2udgment itself.6; 'nother case, Orope2a 5ar)eting #orporation v. Allied %an)ing #orporation, further differentiated between the two rules of res judicata, as follows+ There is =+#- +y !-io- B).%'ent= when, as between the first case where the 2udgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, t&e-e i$ i.entity o* !#-tie$2 $)+Bect '#tte-2 #n. c#)$e$ o* #ction . (n this instance, the 2udgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. ,therwise put, the 2udgment or decree of the court of competent 2urisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action before the same or other tribunal. ?ut where t&e-e i$ i.entity o* !#-tie$ in the first and second cases, +)t no i.entity o* c#)$e$ o* #ction, the first 2udgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata /nown as=conc )$i,ene$$ o* B).%'ent.= $tated differently, any right, fact, or matter in issue directly ad2udicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which 2udgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the 2udgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or sub2ect matter of the two actions is the same.6= (n sum, conclusiveness of 2udgment bars the re*litigation in a second case of a fact or 0uestion already settled in a previous case. The second case, however, may still proceed provided that it will no longer touch on the same fact or 0uestion ad2udged in the first case. "onclusiveness of 2udgment re0uires only the identity of issues and parties, but not of causes of action. "ontrary to 'lamayri-s assertion, conclusiveness of 2udgment has no application to the instant Petition since there is no identity of parties and issues between $P. PR,". !o. 6<9*79*" and "ivil "ase !o. 9>B*7<*". No identity of parties $P. PR,". !o. 6<9*79*" was a petition filed with the RT" by 'tty. Eesmundo for the appointment of a guardian over the person and estate of his late wife !ave alleging her incompetence. ' guardian may be appointed by the RT" over the person and estate of a minor or an incompetent, the latter being described as a person Isuffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitali5ed lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind,

even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, wea/ mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, ta/e care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and e.ploitation.I 6< Rule C= of the Rules of "ourt governs the proceedings for the appointment of a guardian, to wit+ R) e 53 APPOINTMENT OF 8UARDIANS SECTION 1. -ho may petition for appointment of guardian for resident. 'ny relative, friend, or other person on behalf of a resident minor or incompetent who has no parent or lawful guardian, or the minor himself if fourteen years of age or over, may petition the court having 2urisdiction for the appointment of a general guardian for the person or estate, or both, of such minor or incompetent. 'n officer of the Federal 'dministration of the nited $tates in the Philippines may also file a petition in favor of a ward thereof, and the #irector of )ealth, in favor of an insane person who should be hospitali5ed, or in favor of an isolated leper. SEC. 2. #ontents of petition. ' petition for the appointment of a general guardian must show, so far as /nown to the petitioner+ (a) The 2urisdictional facts1 (b) The minority or incompetency rendering the appointment necessary or convenient1 (c) The names, ages, and residences of the relatives of the minor or incompetent, and of the persons having him in their care1 (d) The probable value and character of his estate1 (e) The name of the person for whom letters of guardianship are prayed. The petition shall be verified1 but no defect in the petition or verification shall render void the issuance of letters of guardianship. SEC. 3. #ourt to set time for hearing. *otice thereof. &hen a petition for the appointment of a general guardian is filed, the court shall fi. a time and place for hearing the same, and shall cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons mentioned in the petition residing in the province, including the minor if above 6< years of age or the incompetent himself, and may direct other general or special notice thereof to be given. SEC. 4. Opposition to petition. 'ny interested person may, by filing a written opposition, contest the petition on the ground of ma2ority of the alleged minor, competency of the alleged incompetent, or the unsuitability of the person for whom letters are prayed, and may pray that the petition be dismissed, or that letters of guardianship issue to himself, or to any suitable person named in the opposition. SEC. 0. (earing and order for letters to issue. 't the hearing of the petition the alleged incompetent must be present if able to attend, and it must be shown that the re0uired notice has been given. Thereupon the court shall hear the evidence of the parties in support of their respective allegations, and, if the person in 0uestion is a minor or incompetent it shall appoint a suitable guardian of his person or estate, or both, with the powers and duties hereinafter specified. .... SEC. 4. $ervice of judgment. Final orders or 2udgments under this rule shall be served upon the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the minor or incompetent person resides or where his property or part thereof is situated. ' petition for appointment of a guardian is a special proceeding, without the usual parties, i.e., petitioner versus respondent, in an ordinary civil case. 'ccordingly, $P. PR,". !o. 6<9*79*" bears the title+ An re@ /uardianship of *elly $. *ave for Ancompetency& +erdasto /esmundo y %anayo& petitioner , with no named respondentGs. $ections ; and = of Rule C= of the Rules of "ourt, though, re0uire that the petition contain the names, ages, and residences of relatives of the supposed minor or incompetent and those having him in their care, so that those residing within the same province as the minor or incompetent can be notified of the time and place of the hearing on the petition. The ob2ectives of an RT" hearing a petition for appointment of a guardian under Rule C= of the Rules of "ourt is to determine, first, whether a person is indeed a minor or an incompetent who has no capacity to care for himself andGor his properties1 and, second, who is most 0ualified to be appointed as his guardian. The rules reasonably assume that the people who best could help the trial court settle such issues would be those who are closest to and most familiar with the supposed minor or incompetent, namely, his relatives living within the same province andGor the persons caring for him. (t is significant to note that the rules do not necessitate that creditors of the minor or incompetent be li/ewise identified and notified. The reason is simple+ because their presence is not essential to the proceedings for appointment of a guardian. (t is almost a given, and understandably so, that they will only insist that the supposed minor or incompetent is actually capacitated to enter into contracts, so as to preserve the validity of said contracts and /eep the supposed minor or incompetent obligated to comply therewith.

)ence, it cannot be presumed that the Pabale siblings were given notice and actually too/ part in $P. PR,". !o. 6<9*79*". They are not !ave-s relatives, nor are they the ones caring for her. 'lthough the rules allow the RT" to direct the giving of other general or special notices of the hearings on the petition for appointment of a guardian, it was not established that the RT" actually did so in $P. PR,". !o. 6<9*79*". 'lamayri-s allegation that the Pabale siblings participated in $P. PR,". !o. 6<9*79*" rests on two ,rders, dated =@ ,ctober 6C7> 6B and 6C !ovember 6C7>,69 issued by the RT" in $P. PR,". !o. 6<9*79*", e.pressly mentioning the presence of a Dose Pabale, who was supposedly the father of the Pabale siblings, during the hearings held on the same dates. )owever, the said ,rders by themselves cannot confirm that Dose Pabale was indeed the father of the Pabale siblings and that he was authori5ed by his children to appear in the said hearings on their behalf. 'lamayri decries that she was not allowed by the "ourt of 'ppeals to submit and mar/ additional evidence to prove that Dose Pabale was the father of the Pabale siblings. (t is true that the "ourt of 'ppeals has the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate 2urisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. (n general, however, the "ourt of 'ppeals conducts hearings and receives evidence !-io- to the submission of the case for 2udgment. 6> (t must be pointed out that, in this case, 'lamayri filed her Fotion to $chedule )earing to Far/ :.hibits in :vidence on 21 No,e'+e- 2001. $he thus sought to submit additional evidence as to the identity of Dose Pabale, not only after "'*E.R. "8 !o. B76== had been submitted for 2udgment, but #*te- the "ourt of 'ppeals had already promulgated its #ecision in said case on 10 A!-i 2001. The parties must diligently and conscientiously present all arguments and available evidences in support of their respective positions to the court before the case is deemed submitted for 2udgment. ,nly under e.ceptional circumstances may the court receive new evidence after having rendered 2udgment167 otherwise, its 2udgment may never attain finality since the parties may continually refute the findings therein with further evidence. 'lamayri failed to provide any e.planation why she did not present her evidence earlier. Ferely invo/ing that the ends of 2ustice would have been best served if she was allowed to present additional evidence is not sufficient to 2ustify deviation from the general rules of procedure. ,bedience to the re0uirements of procedural rules is needed if the parties are to e.pect fair results therefrom, and utter disregard of the rules cannot 2ustly be rationali5ed by har/ing on the policy of liberal construction.6C Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the ad2udication of cases. "ourts and litigants ali/e are thus en2oined to abide strictly by the rules. 'nd while the "ourt, in some instances, allows a rela.ation in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only to proper cases and under 2ustifiable causes and circumstances. &hile it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is e0ually true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of 2ustice. ;@ Foreover, contrary to 'lamayri-s assertion, the "ourt of 'ppeals did not deny her Fotion to $chedule )earing to Far/ :.hibits in :vidence merely for being late. (n its Resolution, dated 6C #ecember ;@@6, the "ourt of 'ppeals also denied the said motion on the following grounds+ &hile it is now alleged, for the first time, that the Rherein respondents Pabale siblingsS participated in the guardianship proceedings considering that the Dose Pabale mentioned therein is their late father, Rherein petitioner 'lamayriS submitting herein documentary evidence to prove their filiation, even though admitted in evidence at this late stage, cannot bind Rthe Pabale siblingsS as verily, notice to their father is not notice to them there being no allegation to the effect that he represented them before the "alamba "ourt.;6 's the appellate court reasoned, even if the evidence 'lamayri wanted to submit do prove that the Dose Pabale who attended the RT" hearings on =@ ,ctober 6C7> and 6C !ovember 6C7> in $P. PR,". !o. 6<9*79*" was the father of the Pabale siblings, they would still not confirm his authority to represent his children in the said proceedings. &orth stressing is the fact that Dose Pabale was not at all a party to the #eed of $ale dated ;@ February 6C7< over the sub2ect property, which was e.ecuted by !ave in favor of the Pabale siblings. &ithout proper authority, Dose Pabale-s presence at the hearings in $P. PR,". !o. 6<9*79*" should not bind his children to the outcome of said proceedings or affect their right to the sub2ect property. $ince it was not established that the Pabale siblings participated in $P. PR,". !o. 6<9*79*", then any finding therein should not bind them in "ivil "ase !o. 9>B*7<*". No identity of issues !either is there identity of issues between $P. PR,". !o. 6<9*79*" and "ivil "ase !o. 9>B*7<*" that may bar the latter, by conclusiveness of 2udgment, from ruling on !ave-s competency in 6C7<, when she e.ecuted the #eed of $ale over the sub2ect property in favor the Pabale siblings. (n $P. PR,". !o. 6<9*79*", the main issue was whether !ave was incompetent at the time of filing of the petition with the RT" in 6C79, thus, re0uiring the appointment of a guardian over her person and estate. (n the cross*claim of !ave and 'tty. Eesmundo against the Pabale siblings in "ivil "ase !o. 9>B*7<*", the issue was whether !ave was an incompetent when she e.ecuted a #eed of $ale of the sub2ect property in favor of the Pabale siblings on ;@ February 6C7<, hence, rendering the said sale void. &hile both cases involve a determination of !ave-s incompetency, it must be established at two separate times, one in 6C7< and the other in 6C79. ' finding that she was incompetent in 6C79 does not automatically mean that she was so in 6C7<. (n #arillo v. ,aojoco,;; the "ourt ruled that despite the fact that the seller was declared mentally incapacitated by the trial court only nine days after the e.ecution of the contract of sale, it does not prove that she was so when she e.ecuted the contract. )ence, the significance of the two*year gap herein cannot be gainsaid since !ave-s mental condition in 6C79 may vastly differ from that of 6C7< given the intervening period. "apacity to act is supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue so long as the contrary be not proved1 that is, that at the moment of his acting he was incapable, cra5y, insane, or out of his mind. ;= The burden of proving incapacity to enter into contractual relations rests upon the person who alleges it1 if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be presumed.;<

!ave was e.amined and diagnosed by doctors to be mentally incapacitated only in 6C79, when the RT" started hearing $P. PR,". !o. 6<9*79*"1 and she was not 2udicially declared an incompetent until ;; Dune 6C77 when a #ecision in said case was rendered by the RT", resulting in the appointment of 'tty. %eonardo ". Paner as her guardian. Thus, prior to 6C79, !ave is still presumed to be capacitated and competent to enter into contracts such as the #eed of $ale over the sub2ect property, which she e.ecuted in favor of the Pabale siblings on ;@ February 6C7<. The burden of proving otherwise falls upon 'lamayri, which she dismally failed to do, having relied entirely on the ;; Dune 6C77 #ecision of the RT" in $P. PR,". !o. 6<9*79*". 'lamayri capitali5es on the declaration of the RT" in its #ecision dated ;; Dune 6C77 in $P. PR,". !o. 6<9*79*" on !ave-s condition Ihaving become severe since the year 6C7@.I ;B 6)t t&e-e i$ no +#$i$ *o- $)c& # .ec #-#tion. The medical reports e.tensively 0uoted in said #ecision, prepared by+ (6) #r. !ona Dean 'lviso*Ramos, dated 6< 'pril 6C79, ;9 and (;) by #r. :duardo T. Faaba, dated ;@ 'pril 6C7>, ;> both stated that upon their e.amination, !ave was suffering from Iorganic brain syndrome secondary to cerebral arteriosclerosis with psychotic episodes,I which impaired her 2udgment. There was nothing in the said medical reports, however, which may shed light on when !ave began to suffer from said mental condition. 'll they said was that it e.isted at the time !ave was e.amined in 6C79, and again in 6C7>. :ven the RT" 2udge was only able to observe !ave, which made him reali5e that her mind was very impressionable and capable of being manipulated, on the occasions when !ave visited the court from 6C7> to 6C77. )ence, for this "ourt, the RT" #ecision dated ;; Dune 6C77 in $P. PR,". !o. 6<9*79*" may be conclusive as to !ave-s incompetency from 6C79 onwards, but not as to her incompetency in 6C7<. 'nd other than invo/ing the ;; Dune 6C77 #ecision of the RT" in $P. PR,". !o. 6<9*79*", 'lamayri did not bother to establish with her own evidence that !ave was mentally incapacitated when she e.ecuted the ;@ February 6C7< #eed of $ale over the sub2ect property in favor of the Pabale siblings, so as to render the said deed void. 'll told, there being no identity of parties and issues between $P. PR,". !o. 6<9*79*" and "ivil "ase !o. 9>B*7<*", the ;; Dune 6C77 #ecision in the former on !ave-s incompetency by the year 6C79 should not bar, by conclusiveness of 2udgment, a finding in the latter case that !ave still had capacity and was competent when she e.ecuted on ;@ February 6C7< the #eed of $ale over the sub2ect property in favor of the Pabale siblings. Therefore, the "ourt of 'ppeals did not commit any error when it upheld the validity of the ;@ February 6C7< #eed of $ale. @:EREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED. The #ecision, dated 6@ 'pril ;@@6, of the "ourt of 'ppeals in "'*E.R. "8 !o. B76==, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. "osts against the petitioner %olita R. 'lamayri. SO ORDERED.
MINITA ;. C:ICO-NA?ARIO 'ssociate Dustice

E.R. !o. %*7B=;

,ctober 66, 6CB>

Euardianship of Dames :. $tegner, et al., minors, D '!(T' T. $T:E!:R, petitioner. P)(%(PP(!: TR $T ",., guardian*appellee, vs. "'T):R(!: $T:E!:R and F(%#R:# $T:E!:R, oppositors*appellants.

"eria& 5anglapus and Associates for appellee. 5arcelino 9onto) and 5arcelino 9onto)& ,r.& for oppositors.

F:%(T, ,.+

This is an appeal from an order of the "ourt of First (nstance of Fanila approving the consolidated statement of accounts filed by the Philippine Trust "ompany as guardian of the properties of the minors Dames, )enry, Ruth, "atherine and Fildred, all surnamed $tegner, and releasing said guardian from its responsibilities. The facts of the case are as follows+ &.'. $tegner, a citi5en of the provisions+ nited $tates, was at the time of his demise a resident of Pamplona, "agayan. )e left a will containing the following

(, &. '. $tegner, a lawful age, a resident of the municipality of Pamplona, Province of "agayan, Philippine (slands, and a citi5en of the nited $tates of Finnesota, nited $tates of 'merica, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, and not acting under undue influence or restrained of any /ind, do hereby ma/e, publish, and declare this to be my last will and testament, hereby revo/ing all other wills and testamentary dispositions by me made. ... ... ((( ( give, devise and be0ueth unto the e.ecutor and trustee hereafter named absolutely and in fee simple and of my property, real, personal and mi.ed of every /ind, nature and description whatsoever, of which ( may sei5ed or possesses or to which ( may be in any manner entitled, or in any manner interested at the time of my death in trust however, for the use and purposes hereinafter set out and same other, giving unto my said e.ecutor and trustee full power and authority to sell any of the property, real or personal, sub2ect to the trust hereby created, and to invest and reinvest the proceeds of any said sales, in such manner as my said e.ecutor and trustee my deem proper, all without the legal restrictions otherwise applicable to trustee1 to borrow money for the benefit of the trust1 to sell, lease, mortgage, pledge, improve or e.change any property, real or personal, hold hereunder for such price and upon such terms and conditions as may be seen advisable1 and to deal on behalf of the trust with any subsidiary or affiliate, without increase of liability and as freely as though dealing with an independent third party. ... ... (8 ( nominate and appoint the Philippine Trust "ompany e.ecutor of the trustee under this my last will and testament to serve without bond and as guardian of my children Dames of my children Dames :. $tegner, )enry E. $tegner, Ruth ). $tegner, and "atherine $tegner. This testator seems to have left the following properties+ "ash "ert. !o. @9=79, $erie I"I, for 6 share of I%a "ert. !o. @9CC9, $erie I"I, for 6 share of I%a "ert. !o. @>6<@, $erie I"I, for 6 share of I%a rbanaI at P;@@ per share rbanaI, at P;@@ per share rbanaI, at P;@@ per share rbanaI, at P;@@ per share P67,C>;.79 ;@@.@@ ;@@.@@ ;@@.@@ 9@@.@@ 6@,@@@.@@ P;9,9>;.79, ... ...

"ert. !o. @C696, $erie I#I, for three shares of I%a

('ccount receivable)* ?alance of Promissory !ote dated Fay 6@, 6C=B, e.ecuted by I%a Eran2a, (nc.,I in favor of &. '. $tegner T,T'% '$$:T$

and in addition thereto, the minors were to receive monthly pensions from the . $. 8eterans 'dministration. 'lthough there is no evidence on record, the decision of the trial "ourt states that the said will of &. '. $tegner was duly admitted to probate and this statement was never refuted by any of the parties. ,n !ovember 66, 6C=9, Duanita T. $tegner, widow of the deceased and mother of the minors, petitioned the "ourt of First (nstance of Fanila for the issuance in her favor of letters of guardianship over the person and properties of her children, which petition was granted by the "ourt in its order of !ovember 6=, 6C=9, upon the filing by the petitioner of a bond in the sum of PB@@. The 8eterans 'dministration, however, recommended that the guardianship over the properties be placed in the hands of a solvent trust company doing business in Fanila.

The Philippine Trust "ompany thereafter filed a petition, which was later amended, praying that in view of the will of &. '. $tegner appointing said company as guardian for the estates of the minors, letters of guardianship for the properties of Dames, )enry, Ruth, "atherine and Fildred $tegner be issued upon in its favor, and upon agreement of the parties, the "ourt set aside its previous order and appointed Duanita T. $tegner as guardian over the persons of the minors and the Philippine Trust "ompany as guardian of their properties. Dames :. $tegner reached the age of ma2ority and was conse0uently released from guardianship by order of the "ourt of Farch ;7, 6C<6, but it appears that he and his sister Ruth were /illed by the Dapanese in 6C<B. The remaining wards under guardianship having reached the age of ma2ority, the Philippine Trust "ompany on Fay ;9, 6CB=, filed a final consolidated statement of account and petition for discharge containing a detailed statement of cash receipts and disbursement made covering the period from Dune 6, 6C<;, to Fay ;@, 6CB=, in the case of )enry $tegner1 from Dune 6, 6C<6 to Fay ;@, 6CB= in the case of Ruth, "atherine and Fildred $tegner. (t also showed that the amount of P6B,66>.;C in Dapanese military notes which was invalidated by :.ecutive ,rders !os. ;B and <C was deducted from the balance of P69,;7;.=; remaining in favor of the wards1 that the participation in the notes of the %a Eran2a, (nc., had been eliminated upon discovery that the balance of the same was duly paid for on Danuary <, 6C<@, and was correspondingly noted in the inventory account of Duly 9, 6C<@, which was approved by the "ourt on 'ugust ;C of the same year1 that the value of the participation in the %a rbana was reduced from P=,;@@ to P<@@ in view of the fact that P;,7@@ had already been paid on 'pril 6;, 6C=7, as stated in the inventory account dated Dune ;C, 6C=7, and duly approved by order of the "ourt of !ovember =, 6C<71 that the company was entitled to B per cent of the total amount received by said guardian as fees. (t was, therefore, prayed that the statement of accounts be approved1 that it be authori5ed to collect the sum of P<67.>> as fees or commission and the amount of P<=>.=6 as attorneyHs fees1 that it be authori5ed to deliver the state of the deceased Ruth $tegner to her brother )enry and sisters "atherine and Fildred, in e0ual shares1 that the residuary estates of the wards be delivered to them1 that it be relieved from further responsibility as such guardian, and that the proceedings be declared closed and terminated. "atherine and Fildred $tegner opposed this petition alleging, among others, that although the guardianship commenced in 6C=>, the consolidated statement of accounts submitted by the Philippine Trust "ompany started only from 6C<61 that it did not e.plain why the minors should be pre2udiced by the sum of P6B,66>.;C allegedly invalidated1 that despite the absence of previous 2udicial authori5ation, the company invested the funds of the wards in the mortgage loans1 that said loans were not contested by the wards when they were informed of the same because they were still minors at the time1 that as the loans were in the name of the Philippine Trust "ompany and not in the names of "atherine and Fildred $tegner, these wards should not be pre2udiced by the payments made by the mortgagors during the enemy occupation amounting to P6B,66>.;C which was declared invalidated. They also assailed the validity of :.ecutive ,rders !os. ;B and <C on the ground that they were illegal and unconstitutional. Furthermore, oppositors ob2ected to the items listed as the companyHs commission, attorneyHs fees, the miscellaneous disbursements allegedly incurred for the wards1 and charged that the Philippine Trust "ompany did not e.ercise the diligence of a good father of a family to protect the interests of the minors with respect to the participation in %a Eran2a and %a rbana and which negligence resulted in the loss of PC,C@@ belonging to said minors. Thus, they as/ed the "ourt to disapprove the statement of accounts submitted by the company and that it be ordered to present a new one with the ob2ected items eliminated. ,n Duly ;C, 6CB<, the "ourt issued an order finding the opposition interposed by "atherine and Fildred $tegner as groundless and approved the statement of accounts submitted by the Philippine Trust "ompany, authori5ing the collection of its commission and attorneyHs fees1 and delivery to the wards )enry, "atherine, and Fildred $tegner of their respective residuary estates. The motion for the reconsideration of said order filed by oppositors having been denied for lac/ of merit, the matter was brought to this "ourt on appeal. "onsolidating the related 0uestions raised by oppositors, the main issue in the instant case is whether the Philippine Trust "ompany could be held liable for the investments of the funds of the wards made without securing the previous authori5ation of the "ourt and which resulted in the loss of P6B,66>.;C. (n defense of its actuation, petitioner*appellee contends that it relied on the provisions on trust corporations, specifically $ection 6=C of the "orporation %aw (repealed by Republic act !o. ==>, /nown as the Eeneral ?an/ing 'ct) which provides that deposits or moneys received by a trust corporation as guardian or trustee can be loaned and invested in accordance with the provisions governing loans and investments of savings and mortgage ban/s, unless otherwise directed by the instrument creating the trust. 'ppellants, on the other hand, maintain that the properties of the wards were received by the guardian in a fidei commissary capacity which parta/es of the nature of aI commodatumI for the benefit of said minors, thus re0uiring court authori5ation before said funds could be invested. 'lthough the conte.t of the will of &. '. $tegner unmista/ably conveys the testatorHs intention to create a trust and ma/e the Philippine Trust "ompany a trustee, it must be remembered that upon said companyHs application and by agreement of the parties, the "ourt in its order of February ;=, 6C=>, appointed the Philippine Trust "ompany as guardian (not as trustee) of the properties of the minors, and there is no showing either that when the will of &. '. $tegner was presented and allowed to probate in case !o. <C6>@ of the "ourt of First (nstance of Fanila, appellee was appointed as such trustee. )aving assumed office as IguardianI of the properties of the wards, the company should be governed, in the management of the funds of said minors, by the provisions of the Rules of "ourt on guardianship and not by the rules on trust corporations under the "orporation %aw. Petitioner*appellee, however, asserts that although it did not secure previous 2udicial approval of those investments, they were included in the annual accountings which were passed upon by the court from time to time. (n support of such contention, the 8ice*president of the Philippine Trust "ompany too/ the witness at and and testified that for the investments made in the mortgage of the Tambunting ?rothers, the 8eterans 'dministration when notified offered no ob2ection and recommended approval thereof, and such investment was approved by the "ourt on Duly ;;, 6C=C1 that the investments in the mortgages of "adsawan and T. de 8era were included in the inventory of Duly 9, 6C<@ and duly approved by the "ourt on ,ctober ;C,6C<@ without ob2ection from the 8eterans 'dministration1 that on Farch 7, 6C<6, the guardian filed a final accounting and a petition for discharge with respect to Dames $tegner himself confronted in writing. This final accounting which included the investments in the mortgages of Tambunting, and D. Pic/ering and "o. was approved by the order of the "ourt on Farch ;7, 6C<61 that on Duly 66,6C<;, an inventory was again filed with the written conformity of the 8eterans 'dministration in it appeared that certain amounts were invested in the mortgage of the $ervants of the )oly Ehost and that of D. Pic/ering P "o., which inventory was approved by the "ourt on 'ugust <, 6C<61 and that on Dune 6;, 6C<= an inventory with respect to )enry $tegner was filed wherein it showed that he had been paid his share of the investments in the mortgages and which accounting was duly approved by the "ourt on Dune >, 6C<=. The witness testified that in all these cases the mother and guardian over the persons of the minors, Duanita T. $tegner, was duly furnished copies of the accounting and apparently she offered no ob2ection whatsoever. (t was further brought out that the interests accruing out of such investments were duly credited to the wards and formed pact of their funds from which they made withdrawals every now and then. :vidence was also presented to prove that the corresponding mortgage participation certificates, specifying the amounts invested, were issued in the names of the wards (:.hibits '*6, '*;, '*=, ?*;, "*6, #*6, #*;, :*6). (t is to be noted in this connection that the mortgages of "adsawan and Pic/ering were settled and paid prior to the outbrea/ of the war and they are not 0uestioned in this case. The mortgages of the Tambunting brothers, $ervants of the )oly Ehost, T. de 8era, )ermoso and Francisco, which were also e.ecuted before the war were not yet due when the Dapanese forces invaded the Philippines, and soon after their occupation of Fanila the Dapanese

Filitary "ommand ordered the mortgage debtors of almost all ban/s herein established to settle their obligations immediately. This, undoubtedly, cause the mortgagors mentioned above to pay the balance of the respective debts in Dapanese military notes, which was then the legal tender, amounting to P6B,66>.;C, which after the liberation of the island was declared invalidated by :.ecutive ,rders !os. ;B and <C. $ection B, Rule C9 of the Rules of "ourt, provides that+ $:". B. ", RT F'A ,R#:R (!8:$TF:!T ,F PR,"::#$ '!# #(R:"T F'!'E:F:!T ,F :$T'T:. J The "ourt may authori5e and re0uire the guardian to invest the proceeds of sales or encumbrances, and any other of his wardHs money in his hands, in real estate or otherwise, as shall be for the best interest of all concerned, and may ma/e such orders for the management investment, and disposition of the estate and effects, as circumstances may re0uire. 'lthough the authority reffered to in this $ection may not have been secured prior to the investment of the properties of funds of the ward, yet &e believe that the courtHs approval of the annual inventories and accounts submitted by the guardian, with the conformity andGor ac0uiescence of the . $. 8eterans 'dministration and the mother of the minors, wherein the 0uestioned investment was mentioned and accounted for, amounts to a ratification of the acts of the guardian and compliance with the provisions of section B, Rule C9 aforecited. Passing upon the same 0uestion arising out of practically the same set of facts, this "ourt, spea/ing through "hief Dustice Ricardo Paras, held+ (t is not necessary for us to pass upon the applicability of section 6=C of 'ct !o. 6<BC, because we hold that, under section B of Rule C9 of the Rules of "ourt, the investments in 0uestion were valid and binding upon appellantHs ward. (t is noteworthy that in the four previous inventory accounts filed by the appellant with the lower court , the mortgage loans e.tended by the appellant and the interest collected thereon were plainly reported1 . . .&e are the opinion that this approval had the effect of impliedly validating appellantHs acts and ma/ing them binding upon its ward J (Philippine Trust "o. vs. ?allesteros, C7 Phil., 6@@>). 'side from the fact that the participations in %a Eran2a and %a rbana were duly included in the accounts approved by the "ourt and which &e hold to be unassailable, &e find no merit in the imputation of negligence on the guardian with respect to said assets after ta/ing into consideration the satisfactory e.planations made by said guardian. &herefore, the order of the "ourt, a 8uo of Duly ;C, 6CB<, appealed from is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs. (t is so ordered.
%eng2on& 'aras& #.,.& 'adilla& 5ontemayor& Reyes& A.& %autista Angelo& 9abrador& #oncepcion and .ndencia& ,,.& concur.

CA.M. No. RT9-55-1441. Se!te'+e- 212 2000D S!o)$e$ LEONARDO DARACAN #n. MA. TERESA DARACAN2 petitioners2 vs. 9UD8E ELI 8.C. NATI;IDAD2 RTC2 6-#nc& 442 S#n Fe-n#n.o2 P#'!#n%#2 respondent. RESOLUTION 7NARES-SANTIA8O2 J.3 ,n #ecember 67, 6CC7, the ,ffice of the "hief Dustice received from the $pouses Fa. Teresa #aracan and %eonardo #aracan a letter* complaintR6S against Dudge :li E.". !atividad, Presiding Dudge of the Regional Trial "ourt of $an Fernando, Pampanga, ?ranch <7 for gross ignorance of the law, oppression, gross partiality and /nowingly rendering an un2ust order for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment R;S relative to $pecial Proceedings !o. <67= entitled 3(n the Fatter of the Petition for Euardianship of the $pouses %oren5o E. Francisco and %oren5a #. Francisco.4 R=S The complaint was indorsed to the ,ffice of the "ourt 'dministrator (,"') which re0uired respondent to comment within ten (6@) days from receipt.R<S (n compliance with the ,"' directive, respondent filed his comment on Fay ;7, 6CC7 RBS praying for the dismissal of the complaint. Respondent Dudge alleges that the writ is the sub2ect of a petition for certiorari filed in the "ourt of 'ppeals which was doc/eted as "'*E.R. $P !o. <969C. Respondent Dudge also claims that contrary to the allegations of complainants*spouses, they were made involuntary parties of the proceedings prior to the issuance of the writ of attachment by the filing of the Fotion to "ite $pouses #aracan for :.amination dated !ovember ;6, 6CC>. R9S The records disclose that in a decision dated Farch <, 6CC7 R>S in "'*E.R. $P !o. <969C, the "ourt of 'ppeals held that the lower court clearly e.ceeded its 2urisdiction in issuing the writ of preliminary attachment since the case pending with the respondent court was for guardianship and not an action falling under any of the grounds enumerated in $ection 6, Rule B> of the 6CC> Rules of "ourt. R7S ' petition for review was subse0uently filed with the "ourt doc/eted as E.R. !o. 6=<@;> entitled 3 5a. .lissa +ele2& et al. v. #A& et al.E )owever, the same was thereafter dismissed and the decision therein became final and e.ecutory on Danuary 6=, 6CCC. (n its evaluation and report dated 'pril 6;, 6CCCRCS the ,"' recommended that * 6.S the case be doc/eted as a regular administrative case1 ;.S the parties be re0uired to manifest if they are willing to submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings already filed1 and thereafter, should they e.press their willingness that the same be done1 =.S respondent Dudge :li ". !atividad be declared guilty of Eross (gnorance of the %aw and that he be fined in the amount of P=,@@@.@@1 and <.S respondent be en2oined to e.ercise greater care and diligence in the performance of his duties as a 2udge with a warning that a repetition of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely. (n a Resolution dated Dune ;=, 6CCC, R6@S the "ourt resolved to+ aS doc/et the case as a regular administrative matter1 and bS re0uire the parties to manifest if they are willing to submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings already filed within ten (6@) days from notice. (n a Fanifestation dated ,ctober 6;, 6CCC,R66S respondent Dudge manifested his willingness to submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings already filed. )owever, earlier in a Resolution dated ,ctober 9, 6CCC, R6;S the "ourt considered its Resolution dated Dune ;=, 6CCC served upon complainants when the same was returned unserved by the postmaster with a notation 3moved.4 (n a Resolution dated !ovember ;C, 6CCC,R6=S the "ourt noted respondent-s manifestation of ,ctober 6;, 6CCC and referred the case to "ourt of 'ppeals 'ssociate Dustice $alvador D. 8alde5, Dr. for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (C@) days from notice. Thereafter, Dustice 8alde5 submitted a Report and Recommendation dated 'pril 6;, ;@@@ summing the facts thus+ The spouses Fa. Teresa and %eonardo #aracan charged Dudge :li E.". !atividad, Presiding Dudge of the Regional Trial "ourt, ?ranch <7, $an Fernando, Pampanga, with gross ignorance of the law, oppression, gross partiality and /nowingly rendering RanS un2ust order, all for issuing a writ of preliminary attachment in $p. Proc. !o. <67=, entitled 3(n the Fatter of the Petition for Euardianship of the $pouses %oren5o E. Francisco and %oren5a #. Francisco.4 The complainants alleged that on !ovember ;6, 6CC>, upon motion of the court*appointed guardian, %ina Francisco*8ele5, the respondent Dudge issued the sub2ect writ of preliminary attachment against their properties even as they are not parties to the guardianship proceedings. (n pursuance of the writ, an order to brea/ open was issued and, thus, #eputy $heriff :dgardo Labat of RT", $an Fernando, Pampanga, forced open their department store at midnight on !ovember ;9, 6CC> and once inside, ransac/ed, looted and appropriated the merchandise found therein with a value of not less than P9 million without ma/ing an inventory. The complainants furthermore averred that 3rumors had it that the issuance of the writ of attachment was ... for a consideration.4R6<S $ubse0uently, on Farch <, 6CC7, the "ourt of 'ppeals in "'*E.R. $P !o. <969C, entitled+ 3 $pouses 9eonardo Daracan and 5a. Teresa Daracan& 'etitioners vs. (on. .ly (sic! /.#. *atividad& etc.& et al.& RespondentsE declared null and void the writ of preliminary attachment on the finding that the respondent 2udge 3clearly e.ceeded (his) 2urisdiction4 in issuing it. R6BS ' petition for review on certiorari was thereafter filed with the $upreme "ourt but the same was dismissed.R69S :.plaining his side in the instant administrative case, the respondent 2udge pleaded R6>S that he thought all along that under $ection 9, Rule C9 of the Revised Rules of "ourt, he could issue the 0uestioned writ to protect and preserve the rights of the wards in the light of the sworn assertion of the guardian, %ina Francisco*8ele5, that the complainants were indebted to her wards, who were already senile, to the tune of PB million1 that even as the complainants had priorly been cited by the guardian in a motion to re0uire them to appear for e.amination as debtors of her wards and against whom she (guardian) had initiated the filing of si. (9) informations for violation of ?.P. ?lg. ;;, they (complainants) did not appear to oppose the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment1 that the department store of the complainants that the sheriff opened, because the former had abandoned the same, R67S was located at the Franda Fall, a building owned by the wards1 and that the opening of the store and the attachment of the items found therein, which were all inventoried, contrary to the claim of the complainants, were done in the presence of a senior police inspector and a )agawad of the barangay.

R6CS

Respondent 2udge vehemently denied having committed any fraud, dishonesty or corruption. )e put forward the submission that, if at all, he merely committed an error of 2udgment and set forth the prayer that+ &):R:F,R:, it is respectively prayed, and considering that the Respondent Dudge will be retiring on !ovember ;7, 6CCC and who has reached the age of wal/ing under the shadow of death and has no other means in life to support his remaining years of his life e.cept the benefits he may be given by the government for his duties or services, and for humanitarian reasons, the case be dismissed.4 R;@S 't the ensuing investigation, the complainants never appeared despite substituted service R;6S and service by mailR;;S on them of the notices of investigation. ,nly the respondent 2udge appeared and after his oral motion to dismiss R;=S had been denied,R;<She adduced evidence as heretofore recapped. Dustice 8alde5 differed with the findings of the ,"' that respondent 2udge be fined and warned that similar transgressions in the future would be dealt with more severely and instead recommended that the charges against him be dismissed for lac/ of merit, reasoning thus+ Re+ The charges for gross ignorance of the law and or !nowingly rendering un"ust order or "udgment. $ection 9, Rule C9 of the 6C9< Revised Rules of "ourt under which the respondent 2udge issued the 0uestioned writ of preliminary in2unction provides+ $ec. 9. 'roceeding when persons suspected of embe22ling or concealing property of ward. 7 pon complaint of the guardian or ward, or of any person having actual or prospective interest in the estate of the ward as creditor, heir or otherwise, that anyone is suspected of having embe55led, concealed or conveyed away any money, goods or interest or a written instrument, belonging to the ward or his estate, the court may cite the suspected person to appear for e.amination, touching such money, goods, interest or instrument and ma/e such orders as will secure the estate against such embe55lement, concealment or conveyance. (n the leading case of #ui vs. 'iccio&FGHIthe foregoing rule was construed as follows+ . . . its purpose is merely to elicit information or secure evidence from the person suspected of having embe55led, concealed or conveyed away any personal property of the ward. (n such proceeding the court has no authority to determine the right of property or to order delivery thereof. (f after the e.amination the court finds sufficient evidence showing ownership on the part of the ward, it is the duty of the guardian to bring the proper action. . . . . . . . . .R;9S . . . the 2urisdiction of the court in guardianship proceedings, ordinarily, is to cite persons suspected of having embe55led, concealed or conveyed property belonging to the ward for the purpose of obtaining information which may be used in an action later to be instituted by the guardian to protect the right of the ward1 and that only in e.treme cases, where property clearly belongs to the ward or where his title thereto has already been 2udicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to the guardian.R;>S ,n the other hand, the respondent 2udge 2ustified the disputed writ of preliminary in2unction he issued in this wise+ The legal guardian filed a verified Fotion To "ite $pouses %eonardo and Teresa #aracan To 'ppear For :.amination and Fanifestation &ith $upplemental Fotion praying that upon filing of these pleadings a writ of preliminary attachment be issued. (t appears from the verified motion that the spouses %eonardo and Faria Teresa #aracan is ( sic) indebted to the wards amounting to Five Fillion Pesos (PB,@@@,@@@.@@). That when the said spouses was ( sic) was (sic! charged by the wardRsS through the legal guardian of 8iolation of ?.P. ;;, said spouses started concealing and ta/ing away all the assets real and personal in order to pre2udice the wards and considering that the obligation or indebtedness was incurred through fraud, they have been concealing and disposing the property in order to avoid and frustrate the intention of the wardRsS to attach preliminarily their petition. (t was also alleged that $pouses #aracan are leasing a place located at the Franda Fall ?uilding owned by the Franda "orporation of which the wards are the ma2ority stoc/holders. )owever, they have been deliberately and by stealth removing all the wares and goods in the said $amut $ari #epartment $tore in order to pre2udice the said wards, their creditors. &):R:F,R:, a writ of preliminary attachment is hereby issued in this case in order to stop the further concealment or disposal of the assets of RtheS $pouses #aracan in order to pre2udice the wards herein as their creditors upon RtheS filing of a bond in the amount of three hundred thousand pesos (P=@@,@@@.@@), let a writ of preliminary attachment be issued in this case directing and ordering the #eputy $heriff of this "ourt to sei5e all the personal properties of the $pouses #aracan andGor real estate within the Province of Pampanga, for safe/eeping not to e.ceed F(8: F(%%(,! P:$,$ (PB,@@@,@@@.@@) until further orders from this "ourt. $, ,R#:R:#.R;7S (t is, therefore, beyond cavil that, as found by the "ourt of 'ppeals, the respondent 2udge 3clearly e.ceeded RhisS 2urisdiction4 in issuing the writ. (narguably, a guardianship court e.ercises but a limited 2urisdiction that cannot e.tend to the determination of 0uestions of ownership. 'part from that, the ?.P. ?lg. ;; cases filed by the wards against the herein complainants can not be utili5ed by the respondent 2udge as basis for the issuance of the writ simply because the cases are not before the guardianship court over which he was then presiding. $imilarly, the fact that herein complainants were deliberately and by stealth removing all their wares and goods from their store to the pre2udice of the wards to whom they (complainants) were

indebted to the tune of PB million is entirely foreign to the guardianship proceedings1 and the guardian-s remedy was to institute a collection suit against the complainants in the proper court and therein apply for a writ of attachment. ?e that as it may, the mind feels ill at ease to conclude that respondent 2udge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law or of /nowingly rendering an un2ust order. For it has been held that+ . . . if every error of the 2udge should be punished, then perhaps no 2udge, however good, competent, honest and dedicated he may be, can ever hope to retire from the 2udiciary without a blemished record and a tarnished image.R;CS (n Dela #ru2 v. #oncepcion&F43I later reiterated in -ingarts v. ,udge $ervillano 5. 5ejia&R=6S this "ourt had the occasion to e.pound on the nature and the wisdom behind the twin charges of gross ignorance of the law andGor /nowingly rendering an un2ust 2udgment. There we declared thus+ To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the sub2ect decision, order or actuation of the 2udge in the performance of his official duties must not only be contrary to e.isting law and 2urisprudence but, most importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. (n the case before us, the administrative complaint does not even allege that the erroneous decision of respondent was thus motivated. Mnowingly rendering an un2ust 2udgment is both a criminal and an administrative charge. 's a crime, it is punished under 'rt. ;@< of the Revised Penal "ode the elements of which are+ (a) the offender is a 2udge1 (b) he renders a 2udgment in a case submitted to him for decision1 (c) the 2udgment is un2ust1 and (d) the 2udge /nows that his 2udgment is un2ust. The gist of the offense therefore is that an un2ust 2udgment be rendered maliciously or in bad faith, that is, /nowing it to be un2ust. 'n un2ust 2udgment is one which is contrary to law or is not supported by evidence or both. The source of an un2ust 2udgment may be error or ill* will. There is no liability at all for a mere error. (t is well*settled that a 2udicial officer, when re0uired to e.ercise his 2udgment or discretion, is not liable criminally for any error which he commits, provided he acts in good faith. ?ad faith is therefore the ground of liability. (f in rendering 2udgment the 2udge fully /new that the same was un2ust in the sense aforesaid, then he acted maliciously and must have been actuated and prevailed upon by hatred, envy, revenge, greed or some other similar motive. 's interpreted by $panish courts, the term 3/nowingly4 means sure /nowledge, conscious and deliberate intention to do an in2ustice. Fere error therefore in the interpretation or application of the law does not constitute the crime. The nature of the administrative charge of /nowingly rendering an un2ust 2udgment is the same as the criminal charge. Thus, in this particular administrative charge, it must be established that respondent Dudge rendered a 2udgment or decision not supported by law andGor evidence and that he must be actuated by hatred, envy, revenge, greed or some other similar motive.R=;S True it is that subse0uently, the far stricter norm of allowing only permissible margins of error has been adopted, thus+ &e need not belabor 2urisprudence to accommodate respondent-s argument which in effect posits that not every 2udicial error bespea/s ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction. $o we have ruled and so we have acted, but only in cases within the parameters of tolerable 2udgment. &here, however, the issues are so simple and the facts so evident as to be beyond permissible margins of error, to still err thereon amounts to ignorance of the law which, hopefully, was not merely feigned to subserve an unworthy purpose. R==S ,nly recently, however, the doctrine of bad faith as the ground for accountability has again come to fore. Fr. Dustice %eonardo '. Nuisumbing wrote+ . . . To establish her guilt, it is indispensable that the chec/s she issued for which she was subse0uently charged, be offered in evidence because the gravamen of the offense charged is the act of /nowingly issuing a chec/ with insufficient funds. "learly, it was error to convict the complainant on the basis of her letter alone. !evertheless, despite this incorrect interpretation of a rule of evidence, we do not find the same as sufficiently constitutive of the charges of gross ignorance of the law and of /nowingly rendering an un2ust decision. Rather, it is at most an error in 2udgment, for which, as a general rule, he cannot be held administratively liable. (n this regard, we reiterate the prevailing rule in our 2urisdiction as established by current 2urisprudence+ &e have heretofore ruled that a 2udge may be held administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders. To un2ustifiably hold otherwise, assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would ma/e his position doubly unbearable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering 2ustice can be infallible in 2udgment. The error must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in evident bad faith. (t is only in this latter instance, when the 2udge acts fraudulently or with gross ignorance, that administrative sanctions are called for as an imperative duty of this "ourt. 's a matter of public policy then, the acts of a 2udge in his official capacity are not sub2ect to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. Eood faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a 2udge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge. 'nd in a later case, Fr. Dustice Nuisumbing was even more trenchant when he said+ The other charges, namely ignorance of the law and issuing an un2ust 2udgment, deserve consideration since the direct contempt order of respondent 2udge, under the attending circumstances it was issued, appears to be clearly erroneous. The supposedly contemptuous language used in a pleading was not submitted to respondent but filed in another court presided by another 2udge stationed in "ebu literally miles away from where respondent holds court in %eyte. 's this "ourt ruled in Ang vs. #astro@ se of disrespectful or contemptuous language against a particular 2udge in pleadings presented in another court or proceeding is indirect, not direct, contempt as it is not tantamount to a misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or 2udge as to interrupt the administration of 2ustice.

)owever, administrative liability for ignorance of the law andGor /nowingly rendering an un2ust 2udgment does not immediately arise from the bare fact of a 2udge issuing a decisionGresolutionGorder later ad2udged to be erroneous. ,therwise, perhaps no 2udge, however competent, honest or dedicated he may be, can ever hope to retire from the 2udiciary with an unblemished record. For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the 2udge in the performance of official duties must not only be found erroneous but, most importantly, it must also be established that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or some other li/e motive. $imilarly, a 2udge will be held administratively liable for rendering an un2ust 2udgment * one which is contrary to law or 2urisprudence or is not supported by evidence * when he acts in bad faith, malice, revenge or some other similar motive. #n fine$ bad faith is the ground for liability in either or both offenses. Conversely$ a charge for either ignorance of the law or rendering an un"ust "udgment will not prosper against a "udge acting in good faith. %bsent the element of bad faith$ an erroneous "udgment cannot be the basis of a charge for any said offenses$ mere error of "udgment not being a ground for disciplinary proceedings.C34D (n the case on hand, there is not a scintilla of evidence, not even any remote indication, that the respondent 2udge, in issuing his erroneous writ of preliminary attachment, was impelled by ill*will, malice, revenge, personal animosity, impulse to do an in2ustice, greed, corrupt consideration or any other similar motive. ,n the contrary, the testimony of the respondent stands out unrebutted because of the failure of the complainants to appear despite due notice. )e declared that he does not /now and had never seen the complainants before. R=BS )e was prompted to issue the assailed writ of attachment only * ?ecause these spouses #aracan were renting a big store in the Franda Fall owned and operated by the wardRsS who are now senile. That is the reason why ( granted the petition for 2udicial guardianship. 'nd when they learned that the wards who are the spouses are no longer handling the business in the mall, and there-s already a legal guardian, they too/ away the most valuable items of their big store dealing in dry goods and the store was then $amuJt $ari and they left without paying any rentals, without paying their obligation amounting to several millions of pesos padloc/ed the store and they only left old stoc/s which are almost valueless and, in fact, the items sei5ed by the sheriff is ( sic) intact in the office of the sheriff and despite the notice issued by the sheriff for them to retrieve the same in view of the fact that the preliminary writ of attachment was dissolved, they failed to do so. R=9S and that * . . . ( have been very careful in dealing with this matter as ( was on the verge of retiring at that time. (n fact, my last wor/ing day fell on !ovember ;9, 6CCC. 'nd on that very day when ( attended the last day of my public service, that was the time that ( suffered the heart attac/ and ( was hospitali5ed at the )eart "enter for two months and until now, ( am still under observation and medication and convalescing from my complicated disease, because my disease were pulmonary disease (sic). ( suffer pleurisy of the lungs. )owever, my /idney again functioned so the dialysis stopped and the only disease now that ( am suffering is the lung disease and the pulmonary disease. That is all, Aour )onor.R=>S The respondent 2udge furthermore e.plained that he was of the impression that the portion of $ection 9, Rule C9 of the Revised Rules of "ourt reading 3ma/e such orders as will secure the estate against such embe55lement, concealment or conveyance4 authori5ed him to issue the writ of attachment to preserve the status 8uo and the real rights of the wards.R=7S nder the obtaining circumstances, it is apropos to 0uote Dustice Nuisumbing once more+ 3(t ought to be remembered that bad faith is not presumed and he who alleges the same has the onus of proving it. (n this regard, the complainants have not discharged that burden of proof . . ..4R=CS Re+ The charges of oppression and gross partiality. $imilarly, there is no factual support to the charges of oppression and partiality. 'nd again, this is for the reason that the complainants, instead of presenting evidence, had played truant from the investigation. The "ourt finds the recommendation of Dustice 8alde5 well*ta/en. 'nent the charges of gross ignorance of the law and /nowingly rendering an un2ust 2udgment or order, the "ourt in #anson v. /architorenaR<@S restated the oft*0uoted dictum that+ 3R'Ss a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a 2udge in his 2udicial capacity are generally not sub2ect to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous.4 R<6S (n the recent case of $antos v. ,udge Orlino&R<;S we held+ The fundamental propositions governing responsibility for 2udicial error were more recently summari5ed in An Re@ ,oa8uin T. %orromeo.R<=S There the "ourt stressed, inter alia& that given the nature of 2udicial function and the power vested in the $upreme "ourt and the lower courts established by law, administrative or criminal complaints are neither alternative nor cumulative to 2udicial remedies where such are available, and must wait on the result thereof. :.isting doctrine is that 2udges are not liable for what they do in the e.ercise of their 2udicial functions when acting within their legal powers and 2urisdiction.R<<S "ertain it is that a 2udge may not be held administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders. R<BS To hold otherwise would render 2udicial office untenable for no one called upon to try the fact or interpret the law in the process of administering 2ustice can be infallible in his 2udgment.R<9S The error must be gross or patent, deliberate and malicious or incurred with evident bad faith.R<>S $tated succinctly, for administrative liability to attach it must be established that respondent was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other motiveR<7S and as defined * ?ad faith does not simply connote bad 2udgment or negligence1 it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obli0uity and conscious doing of a wrong1 a breach of a sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill*will1 it parta/es of the nature of fraud. R<CS (t contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self*interest or ill*will for ulterior purposes. RB@S :vident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause damage.RB6S

The record is devoid of any showing that respondent 2udge was moved by ill*will or bad faith in issuing the writ of preliminary attachment. "omplainants have not, in fact, adduced any proof to show that bad faith attended the issuance of the assailed order. To reiterate, bad faith is not presumed and he who alleges the same has the onus of proving it. RB;S 8iewed vis7K7vis the fact that complainants 3played truant to the investigation4 instead of presenting evidence to substantiate their charges, the complaint becomes reduced into a bare indictment or mere speculation. "oncededly, administrative proceedings are not strictly bound by formal rules on evidence. (t needs be pointed out, however, that the liberality of procedure in administrative actions is still sub2ect to limitations imposed by the fundamental re0uirement of due process. (ndeed, 3RTShe Rules even in an administrative case, demand that, if the respondent 2udge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence against him should be competent and should be derived from direct /nowledge.RB=S The 2udiciary to which the respondent belongs demands no less. ?efore any of its members could be faulted, it should only be after the presentation of competent evidence, especially since the charge is penal in character.4 RB<S To hold a 2udge liable for /nowingly rendering an un2ust 2udgment or order, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that the 2udgment or order is un2ust and that it was made with a conscious and deliberate intent to do an in2ustice. RBBS (n this regard, it is useful to reiterate the ruling in Ra8ui2a v. #astaneda& ,r.RB9S which stressed that * The ground for the removal of a 2udicial officer should be established beyond reasonable doubt. $uch is the rule where the charges on which the removal is sought is misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption, incompetency, etc. the general rule in regard to admissibility in evidence in criminal trials apply. (n short, this "ourt can not give credence to charges based on mere suspicion or speculation. RB>S For the foregoing considerations, the allegations of oppression and gross partiality must li/ewise fall in the absence of factual support to substantiate the charges. @:EREFORE, based on the foregoing, the complaint filed by the $pouses %eonardo #aracan and Fa. Teresa #aracan against Dudge :li E.". !atividad, Regional Trial "ourt, ?ranch <7, $an Fernando, Pampanga, is #($F($$:# for lac/ of merit. SO ORDERED.
#avide, Dr., ".D., ("hairman), Puno, Mapunan, and Pardo, DD., concur.

E.R. !o. 69;B>6

Dune 6B, ;@@B

'R!:% %. 'E $T(!, petitioner , vs. ),!. ", RT ,F 'PP:'%$ '!# F(!,R F'RT(! D,$: PR,%%'F'!T:, R:PR:$:!T:# ?A )($ F,T):RGE 'R#('! F: '!E:%' PR,%%'F'!T:, respondents.

#:"($(,!

",R,!', ,.@

't issue in this petition for certiorari 6 is whether or not the "ourt of 'ppeals ("') gravely erred in e.ercising its discretion, amounting to lac/ or e.cess of 2urisdiction, in issuing a decision ; and resolution= upholding the resolution and order of the trial court, < which denied petitioner-s motion to dismiss private respondents- complaint for support and directed the parties to submit themselves to deo.yribonucleic acid (#!') paternity testing. Respondents Fe 'ngela and her son Fartin Prollamante sued Fartin-s alleged biological father, petitioner 'rnel %. 'gustin, for support and support pendente lite before the Regional Trial "ourt (RT") of Nue5on "ity, ?ranch 6@9.B (n their complaint, respondents alleged that 'rnel courted Fe in 6CC;, after which they entered into an intimate relationship. 'rnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her =<th birthday on !ovember 6@, 6CCC. #espite 'rnel-s insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave birth to their child out of wedloc/, Fartin, on 'ugust 66, ;@@@ at the "apitol Fedical )ospital in Nue5on "ity. The baby-s birth certificate was purportedly signed by 'rnel as the father. 'rnel shouldered the pre*natal and hospital e.penses but later refused Fe-s repeated re0uests for Fartin-s support despite his ade0uate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. 'rnel also denied having fathered the child. ,n Danuary 6C, ;@@6, while Fe was carrying five*month old Fartin at the "apitol )ills Eolf and "ountry "lub par/ing lot, 'rnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fe-s leg. This incident was reported to the police. (n Duly ;@@6, Fe was diagnosed with leu/emia and has, since then, been undergoing chemotherapy. ,n Farch B, ;@@;, Fe and Fartin sued 'rnel for support.9 (n his amended answer, 'rnel denied having sired Fartin because his affair and intimacy with Fe had allegedly ended in 6CC7, long before Fartin-s conception. )e claimed that Fe had at least one other secret lover. 'rnel admitted that their relationship started in 6CC= but Ihe never really fell in love with (Fe) not only because (she) had at least one secret lover, a certain Dun, but also because she proved to be scheming and overly demanding and possessive. 's a result, theirs was a stormy on*and*off affair. &hat started as a romantic liaison between two consenting adults eventually turned out to be a case of fatal attraction where (Fe) became so obsessed with ('rnel), to the point of even entertaining the idea of marrying him, that she resorted to various devious ways and means to alienate (him) from his wife and familyU. nable to bear the prospect of losing his wife and children, 'rnel terminated the affair although he still treated her as a friend such as by referring potential customers to the car aircon repair shopI > where she wor/ed. %ater on, 'rnel found out that Fe had another erstwhile secret lover. (n Fay ;@@@, 'rnel and his entire family went to the nited $tates for a vacation. pon their return in Dune ;@@@, 'rnel learned that Fe was telling people that he had impregnated her. 'rnel refused to ac/nowledge the child as his because their Ilast intimacy was sometime in 6CC7.I 7 :.asperated, Fe started calling 'rnel-s wife and family. ,n Danuary 6C, ;@@6, Fe followed 'rnel to the "apitol )ills Eolf and "ountry "lub par/ing lot to demand that he ac/nowledge Fartin as his child. 'ccording to 'rnel, he could not get through Fe and the discussion became so heated that he had no Ialternative but to move on but without bumping or hitting any part of her body.I C Finally, 'rnel claimed that the signature and the community ta. certificate ("T") attributed to him in the ac/nowledgment of Fartin-s birth certificate were falsified. The "T" erroneously reflected his marital status as single when he was actually married and that his birth year was 6C9B when it should have been 6C9<. 6@ (n his pre*trial brief filed on Fay 6>, ;@@;, 'rnel vehemently denied having sired Fartin but e.pressed willingness to consider any proposal to settle the case.66 ,n Duly ;=, ;@@;, Fe and Fartin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to #!' paternity testing pursuant to Rule ;7 of the Rules of "ourt.6; 'rnel opposed said motion by invo/ing his constitutional right against self*incrimination. 6= )e also moved to dismiss the complaint for lac/ of cause of action, considering that his signature on the birth certificate was a forgery and that, under the law, an illegitimate child is not entitled to support if not recogni5ed by the putative father.6< (n his motion, 'rnel manifested that he had filed criminal charges for falsification of documents against Fe ((.$. !os. @;*B>;= and @;*>6C;) and a petition for cancellation of his name appearing in Fartin-s birth certificate (doc/eted as "ivil "ase !o. N*@;*<999C). )e attached the certification of the Philippine !ational Police "rime %aboratory that his signature in the birth certificate was forged. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to submit themselves to #!' paternity testing at the e.pense of the applicants. The "ourt of 'ppeals affirmed the trial court. Thus, this petition. (n a nutshell, petitioner raises two issues+ (6) whether a complaint for support can be converted to a petition for recognition and (;) whether #!' paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without violating petitioner-s constitutional right to privacy and right against self* incrimination.6B The petition is without merit. First of all, the trial court properly denied the petitioner-s motion to dismiss because the private respondents- complaint on its face showed that they had a cause of action against the petitioner. The elements of a cause of action are+ (6) the plaintiff-s primary right and the defendant-s corresponding primary duty, and (;) the delict or wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by which the primary right and duty have been violated. The cause of action is determined not by the prayer of the complaint but by the facts alleged.69

(n the complaint, private respondents alleged that Fe had amorous relations with the petitioner, as a result of which she gave birth to Fartin out of wedloc/. (n his answer, petitioner admitted that he had se.ual relations with Fe but denied that he fathered Fartin, claiming that he had ended the relationship long before the child-s conception and birth. (t is undisputed and even admitted by the parties that there e.isted a se.ual relationship between 'rnel and Fe. The only remaining 0uestion is whether such se.ual relationship produced the child, Fartin. (f it did, as respondents have alleged, then Fartin should be supported by his father 'rnel. (f not, petitioner and Fartin are strangers to each other and Fartin has no right to demand and petitioner has no obligation to give support. Preliminaries aside, we now tac/le the main issues. Petitioner refuses to recogni5e Fartin as his own child and denies the genuineness and authenticity of the child-s birth certificate which he purportedly signed as the father. )e also claims that the order and resolution of the trial court, as affirmed by the "ourt of 'ppeals, effectively converted the complaint for support to a petition for recognition, which is supposedly proscribed by law. 'ccording to petitioner, Fartin, as an unrecogni5ed child, has no right to as/ for support and must first establish his filiation in a separate suit under 'rticle ;7= 6> in relation to 'rticle ;9B 67 of the "ivil "ode and $ection 6, Rule 6@B6C of the Rules of "ourt. The petitioner-s contentions are without merit. The assailed resolution and order did not convert the action for support into one for recognition but merely allowed the respondents to prove their cause of action against petitioner who had been denying the authenticity of the documentary evidence of ac/nowledgement. ?ut even if the assailed resolution and order effectively integrated an action to compel recognition with an action for support, such was valid and in accordance with 2urisprudence. (n Tayag v. #ourt of Appeals&;@ we allowed the integration of an action to compel recognition with an action to claim one-s inheritance+ U(n 'aulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and successional rights from the putative or presumed parent, must prove his filiation to the latter. &e also said that it is necessary to allege in the complaint that the putative father had ac/nowledged and recogni5ed the illegitimate child because such ac/nowledgment is essential to and is the basis of the right to inherit. There being no allegation of such ac/nowledgment, the action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. The ratio decidendi in 'aulino, therefore, is not the absence of a cause of action for failure of the petitioner to allege the fact of ac/nowledgment in the complaint, but the prescription of the action. 'pplying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner contends that the complaint filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor "had "uyugan is an illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance, from the allegations therein the same may be considered as one to compel recognition. Further, t&#t t&e t/o c#)$e$ o* #ction2 one to co'!e -eco%nition #n. t&e ot&e- to c #i' in&e-it#nce2 '#y +e Boine. in one co'! #int i$ not ne/ in o)- B)-i$!-).ence. 's early as R6C;;S we had occasion to rule thereon in %ri2 vs. %ri2& et al. (<= Phil. >9= R6C;;S) wherein we said+ The 0uestion whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can in any event maintain a comple. action to compel recognition as a natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one which in the opinion of this court must be answered in the affirmative, provided always that the conditions 2ustifying the 2oinder of the two distinct causes of action are present in the particular case. In ot&e- /o-.$2 t&e-e i$ no #+$o )te nece$$ity -e()i-in% t&#t t&e #ction to co'!e #cEno/ e.%'ent $&o) . &#,e +een in$tit)te. #n. !-o$ec)te. to # $)cce$$*) conc )$ion !-io- to t&e #ction in /&ic& t&#t $#'e ! #inti** $eeE$ #..ition# -e ie* in t&e c&#-#cte- o* &ei- . "ertainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel ac/nowledgment as to re0uire that a rule should be here applied different from that generally applicable in other cases. . . . The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore e.plicitly formulated by this court, is undoubtedly to some e.tent supported by our prior decisions. Thus, /e &#,e &e . in n)'e-o)$ c#$e$2 #n. t&e .oct-ine ')$t +e con$i.e-e. /e $ett e.2 t&#t # n#t)-# c&i . &#,in% # -i%&t to co'!e #cEno/ e.%'ent2 +)t /&o &#$ not +een in *#ct e%# y #cEno/ e.%e.2 '#y '#int#in !#-tition !-ocee.in%$ *o- t&e .i,i$ion o* t&e in&e-it#nce #%#in$t &i$ co&ei-$ F F F1 and the same person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother . . .. (n neither of these situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling ac/nowledgment. The obvious reason is that in partition suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who might ta/e by inheritance are before the court1 and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings. ( nderscoring supplied) 'lthough the instant case deals with support rather than inheritance, as in Tayag, the basis or rationale for integrating them remains the same. &hether or not respondent Fartin is entitled to support depends completely on the determination of filiation. ' separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits, given how intimately related the main issues in both cases are. To paraphrase Tayag& the declaration of filiation is entirely appropriate to these proceedings. ,n the second issue, petitioner posits that #!' is not recogni5ed by this "ourt as a conclusive means of proving paternity. )e also contends that compulsory testing violates his right to privacy and right against self*incrimination as guaranteed under the 6C7> "onstitution. These contentions have no merit. Eiven that this is the very first time that the admissibility of #!' testing as a means for determining paternity has actually been the focal issue in a controversy, a brief historical s/etch of our past decisions featuring or mentioning #!' testing is called for. (n the 6CCB case of 'eople v. Teehan)ee;6 where the appellant was convicted of murder on the testimony of three eyewitnesses, we stated as an obiter dictum that Iwhile eyewitness identification is significant, it is not as accurate and authoritative as the scientific forms of identification evidence such as the fingerprint or the D*A test result(emphasis supplied).I ,ur faith in #!' testing, however, was not 0uite so steadfast in the previous decade. (n 'e 9im v. #ourt of Appeals,;; promulgated in 6CC>, we cautioned against the use of #!' because I#!', being a relatively new science, (had) not as yet been accorded official recognition by our courts. Paternity (would) still have to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating acts, verbal and written, by the putative father.I

(n ;@@6, however, we opened the possibility of admitting #!' as evidence of parentage, as enunciated in Tijing v. #ourt of Appeals+;= ' final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and e.pertise in using #!' test for identification and parentage testing. The niversity of the Philippines !atural $cience Research (nstitute ( P*!$R() #!' 'nalysis %aboratory has now the capability to conduct #!' typing using short tandem repeat ($TR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the #!' of a childGperson has two (;) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The #!' from the mother, the alleged father and child are analy5ed to establish parentage. ,f course, being a novel scientific techni0ue, the use of #!' test as evidence is still open to challenge. :ventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of #!' evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to re2ect said result is to deny progress. The first real brea/through of #!' as admissible and authoritative evidence in Philippine 2urisprudence came in ;@@; with our en banc decision in 'eople v. +allejo;< where the rape and murder victim-s #!' samples from the bloodstained clothes of the accused were admitted in evidence. &e reasoned that Ithe purpose of #!' testing (was) to ascertain whether an association e.ist(ed) between the evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected (were) sub2ected to various chemical processes to establish their profile.I ' year later, in 'eople v. ,anson&;B we ac0uitted the accused charged with rape for lac/ of evidence because Idoubts persist(ed) in our mind as to who (were) the real malefactors. Aes, a comple. offense (had) been perpetrated but who (were) the perpetratorsK )ow we wish we had #!' or other scientific evidence to still our doubtsVI (n ;@@<, in Tecson& et al. v. #O5.9.#;9 where the "ourt en banc was faced with the issue of filiation of then presidential candidate Fernando Poe Dr., we stated+ (n case proof of filiation or paternity would be unli/ely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, #!' testing, which e.amines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. ' positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. (n Ti2ing vs. "ourt of 'ppeals, this "ourt has ac/nowledged the strong weight of #!' testingU Foreover, in our en banc decision in 'eople v. 6atar&;> we affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape with homicide, the principal evidence for which included #!' test results. &e did a lengthy discussion of #!', the process of #!' testing and the reasons for its admissibility in the conte.t of our own Rules of :vidence+ #eo.yribonucleic 'cid, or #!', is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms. ' person-s #!' is the same in each cell and it does not change throughout a person-s lifetime1 the #!' in a person-s blood is the same as the #!' found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwa., mucus, urine, s/in tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells. Fost importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two individuals have the same #!', with the notable e.ception of identical twins. ... ... ... (n assessing the probative value of #!' evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following factors+ how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analy5ing the samples, whether proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the 0ualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. (n the case at bar, #r. Faria "ora5on 'bogado de ngria was duly 0ualified by the prosecution as an e.pert witness on #!' print or identification techni0ues. ?ased on #r. de ngria-s testimony, it was determined that the gene type and #!' profile of appellant are identical to that of the e.tracts sub2ect of e.amination. The blood sample ta/en from the appellant showed that he was of the following gene types+ v&' 6BG6C, T)@6 >G7, #)FRP;CG6@ and "$F6P, 6@G66, which are identical with semen ta/en from the victim-s vaginal canal. 8erily, a #!' match e.ists between the semen found in the victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open court during the course of the trial. 'dmittedly, we are 2ust beginning to integrate these advances in science and technology in the Philippine criminal 2ustice system, so we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively uncharted waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive 2urisprudence that has developed in other 2urisdictions. $pecifically, the prevailing doctrine in the .$. has proven instructive. (n Daubert v. 5errell Dow (B@C .$. B>C (6CC=)1 6;B %. :d. ;d <9C) it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Dudges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction of new /inds of scientific techni0ues. #!' typing is one such novel procedure. nder Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its e.istence or non*e.istence. 'pplying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the #!' evidence obtained through P"R testing and utili5ing $TR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a 8uo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology. $ignificantly, we upheld the constitutionality of compulsory #!' testing and the admissibility of the results thereof as evidence. (n that case, #!' samples from semen recovered from a rape victim-s vagina were used to positively identify the accused Doel IMawitI Aatar as the rapist. Aatar claimed that the compulsory e.traction of his blood sample for #!' testing, as well as the testing itself, violated his right against self*incrimination, as embodied in both $ections 6; and 6> of 'rticle ((( of the "onstitution. &e addressed this as follows+ The contention is untenable. The /ernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right against self*incrimination is simply against the legal process of e.tracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. (t does not apply where the evidence sought to be e.cluded is not an incrimination but as part of ob2ect evidence.

,ver the years, we have e.pressly e.cluded several /inds of ob2ect evidence ta/en from the person of the accused from the realm of self*incrimination. These include photographs,;7 hair,;C and other bodily substances.=@&e have also declared as constitutional several procedures performed on the accused such as pregnancy tests for women accused of adultery, =6 e.pulsion of morphine from one-s mouth =; and the tracing of one-s foot to determine its identity with bloody footprints.== (n ,imene2 v. #aLi2ares,=< we even authori5ed the e.amination of a woman-s genitalia, in an action for annulment filed by her husband, to verify his claim that she was impotent, her orifice being too small for his penis. $ome of these procedures were, to be sure, rather invasive and involuntary, but all of them were constitutionally sound. #!' testing and its results, per our ruling in 6atar,=B are now similarly acceptable. !or does petitioner-s invocation of his right to privacy persuade us. (n Ople v. Torres,=9 where we struc/ down the proposed national computeri5ed identification system embodied in 'dministrative ,rder !o. =@7, we said+ An no uncertain terms& we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good.. . (ntrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common good. )istorically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and sei5ures, => and the infringement of privacy of communication =7 where the constitutional right to privacy has been critically at issue. Petitioner-s case involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his right against self*incrimination is in 2eopardy holds no water. )is hollow invocation of his constitutional rights elicits no sympathy here for the simple reason that they are not in any way being violated. (f, in a criminal case, an accused whose very life is at sta/e can be compelled to submit to #!' testing, we see no reason why, in this civil case, petitioner herein who does not face such dire conse0uences cannot be ordered to do the same. #!' paternity testing first came to prominence in the nited $tates, where it yielded its first official results sometime in 6C7B. (n the decade that followed, #!' rapidly found widespread general acceptance.=C $everal cases decided by various $tate $upreme "ourts reflect the total assimilation of #!' testing into their rules of procedure and evidence. The case of -ilson v. 9umb<@ shows that #!' testing is so commonly accepted that, in some instances, ordering the procedure has become a ministerial act. The $upreme "ourt of $t. %awrence "ounty, !ew Aor/ allowed a party who had already ac/nowledged paternity to subse0uently challenge his prior ac/nowledgment. The "ourt pointed out that, under the law, specifically $ection B69 of the !ew Aor/ Family "ourt 'ct, the Family "ourt e.aminer had the duty, upon receipt of the challenge, to order #!' tests+<6 W B69*a. 'c/nowledgment of paternity. (a) 'n ac/nowledgment of paternity e.ecuted pursuant to section one hundred eleven*/ of the social services law or section four thousand one hundred thirty*five*b of the public health law shall establish the paternity of and liability for the support of a child pursuant to this act. $uch ac/nowledgment must be reduced to writing and filed pursuant to section four thousand one hundred thirty*five*b of the public health law with the registrar of the district in which the birth occurred and in which the birth certificate has been filed. !o further 2udicial or administrative proceedings are re0uired to ratify an unchallenged ac/nowledgment of paternity. (b) 'n ac/nowledgment of paternity e.ecuted pursuant to section one hundred eleven*/ of the social services law or section four thousand one hundred thirty*five*b of the public health law may be rescinded by either signator-s filing of a petition with the court to vacate the ac/nowledgment within the earlier of si.ty days of the date of signing the ac/nowledgment or the date of an administrative or a 2udicial proceeding (including a proceeding to establish a support order) relating to the child in which either signator is a party. For purposes of this section, the Idate of an administrative or a 2udicial proceedingI shall be the date by which the respondent is re0uired to answer the petition. 'fter the e.piration of si.ty days of the e.ecution of the ac/nowledgment, either signator may challenge the ac/nowledgment of paternity in court only on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mista/e of fact, with the burden of proof on the party challenging the voluntary ac/nowledgment. U!on -ecei,in% # !#-tyG$ c&# en%e to #n #cEno/ e.%'ent2 t&e co)-t $&# o-.e- %enetic '#-Ee- te$t$ o- DNA te$t$ *o- t&e .ete-'in#tion o* t&e c&i .G$ !#te-nity #n. $&# '#Ee # *in.in% o* !#te-nity2 i* #!!-o!-i#te2 in #cco-.#nce /it& t&i$ #-tic e . !either signator-s legal obligations, including the obligation for child support arising from the ac/nowledgment, may be suspended during the challenge to the ac/nowledgment e.cept for good cause as the court may find. (f a party petitions to rescind an ac/nowledgment and if the court determines that the alleged father is not the father of the child, or if the court finds that an ac/nowledgment is invalid because it was e.ecuted on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mista/e of fact, the court shall vacate the ac/nowledgment of paternity and shall immediately provide a copy of the order to the registrar of the district in which the child-s birth certificate is filed and also to the putative father registry operated by the department of social services pursuant to section three hundred seventy*two*c of the social services law. (n addition, if the mother of the child who is the sub2ect of the ac/nowledgment is in receipt of child support services pursuant to title si.*' of article three of the social services law, the court shall immediately provide a copy of the order to the child support enforcement unit of the social services district that provides the mother with such services. (c) ' determination of paternity made by any other state, whether established through the parents- ac/nowledgment of paternity or through an administrative or 2udicial process, must be accorded full faith and credit, if and only if such ac/nowledgment meets the re0uirements set forth in section <B;(a)(>) of the social security act. (emphasis supplied) #!' testing also appears elsewhere in the !ew Aor/ Family "ourt 'ct+<; WB=;. Eenetic mar/er and #!' tests1 admissibility of records or reports of test results1 costs of tests. a) The court shall advise the parties of their right to one or more genetic mar/er tests or #!' tests and, on the court-s own motion or the motion of any party, shall order the mother, her child and the alleged father to submit to one or more genetic mar/er or #!' tests of a type generally ac/nowledged as reliable by an accreditation body designated by the secretary of the federal department of health and human services and performed by a laboratory approved by such an accreditation body and by the commissioner of health or by a duly 0ualified physician to aid in the determination of whether the alleged father is or is not the father of the child. No $)c& te$t $&# +e o-.e-e.2 &o/e,e-2 )!on # /-itten *in.in% +y t&e co)-t t&#t it i$ not in t&e +e$t inte-e$t$ o* t&e c&i . on t&e +#$i$ o* -e$ B).ic#t#2 e()it#+ e e$to!!e 2 ot&e !-e$)'!tion o* e%iti'#cy o* # c&i . +o-n to # '#--ie. /o'#n . The record or report of the results of any such genetic mar/er or #!'

test ordered pursuant to this section or pursuant to section one hundred eleven*/ of the social services law shall be received in evidence by the court pursuant to subdivision (e) of rule forty*five hundred eighteen of the civil practice law and rules where no timely ob2ection in writing has been made thereto and that if such timely ob2ections are not made, they shall be deemed waived and shall not be heard by the court. I* t&e -eco-. o- -e!o-t o* t&e -e$) t$ o* #ny $)c& %enetic '#-Ee- o- DNA te$t o- te$t$ in.ic#te #t e#$t # ninety-*i,e !e-cent !-o+#+i ity o* !#te-nity2 t&e #.'i$$ion o* $)c& -eco-. o- -e!o-t $&# c-e#te # -e+)tt#+ e !-e$)'!tion o* !#te-nity2 #n. $&# e$t#+ i$&2 i* )n-e+)tte.2 t&e !#te-nity o* #n. i#+i ity *o- t&e $)!!o-t o* # c&i . !)-$)#nt to t&i$ #-tic e #n. #-tic e *o)- o* t&i$ #ct. (b) &henever the court directs a genetic mar/er or #!' test pursuant to this section, a report made as provided in subdivision (a) of this section may be received in evidence pursuant to rule forty*five hundred eighteen of the civil practice law and rules if offered by any party. (c) The cost of any test ordered pursuant to subdivision (a) of this section shall be, in the first instance, paid by the moving party. (f the moving party is financially unable to pay such cost, the court may direct any 0ualified public health officer to conduct such test, if practicable1 otherwise, the court may direct payment from the funds of the appropriate local social services district. (n its order of disposition, however, the court may direct that the cost of any such test be apportioned between the parties according to their respective abilities to pay or be assessed against the party who does not prevail on the issue of paternity, unless such party is financially unable to pay. (emphasis supplied) (n R... v. #...-.&<= a decision of the Fississippi $upreme "ourt, #!' tests were used to prove that ).&., previously thought to be an offspring of the marriage between '.".&. and ".:.&., was actually the child of R.:. with whom ".:.&. had, at the time of conception, maintained an adulterous relationship. (n .rie #ounty Department of $ocial $ervices on behalf of Tiffany 5.(. v. /reg /. ,<< the <th #epartment of the !ew Aor/ $upreme "ourt-s 'ppellate #ivision allowed E.E., who had been ad2udicated as T.F.).-s father by default, to have the said 2udgment vacated, even after si. years, once he had shown through a genetic mar/er test that he was not the child-s father. (n this case, E.E. only re0uested the tests after the #epartment of $ocial $ervices, si. years after E.E. had been ad2udicated as T.F.).-s father, sought an increase in his support obligation to her. (n /reco v. #oleman,<B the Fichigan $upreme "ourt while ruling on the constitutionality of a provision of law allowing non*modifiable support agreements pointed out that it was because of the difficulty of determining paternity before the advent of #!' testing that such support agreements were necessary+ 's a result of DNA testing, the accuracy with which paternity can be proven has increased significantly since the parties in this lawsuit entered into their support agreementU(current testing methods can determine the probability of paternity to CC.CCCCCCQ accuracy). )owever, at the time the parties before us entered into the disputed agreement, proving paternity was a very significant obstacle to an illegitimate childHs access to child support. The first reported results of modern DNA paternity testing did not occur until 6C7B. (I(n fact, since its first reported results in 6C7B, DNA matching has progressed to Hgeneral acceptance in less than a decadeHI). ,f course, while prior blood*testing methods could e.clude some males from being the possible father of a child, those methods could not affirmatively pinpoint a particular male as being the father. Thus, when the settlement agreement between the present parties was entered in 6C7@, establishing paternity was a far more difficult ordeal than at present. "ontested paternity actions at that time were often no more than credibility contests. "onse0uently, in every contested paternity action, obtaining child support depended not merely on whether the putative father was, in fact, the childHs biological father, but rather on whether the mother could prove to a court of law that she was only se.ually involved with one man**the putative father. 'llowing parties the option of entering into private agreements in lieu of proving paternity eliminated the ris/ that the mother would be unable meet her burden of proof. (t is worth noting that amendments to Fichigan-s Paternity law have included the use of #!' testing+ <9 W>;;.>69 Pretrial proceedings1 blood or tissue typing determinations as to mother, child, and alleged father1 court order1 refusal to submit to typing or identification profiling1 0ualifications of person conducting typing or identification profiling1 compensation of e.pert1 result of typing or identification profiling1 filing summary report1 ob2ection1 admissibility1 presumption1 burden of proof1 summary disposition. $ec. 9. (6) In # !-ocee.in% )n.e- t&i$ #ct +e*o-e t-i# 2 t&e co)-t2 )!on #!! ic#tion '#.e +y o- on +e&# * o* eit&e- !#-ty2 o- on it$ o/n 'otion2 $&# o-.e- t&#t t&e 'ot&e-2 c&i .2 #n. # e%e. *#t&e- $)+'it to + oo. o- ti$$)e ty!in% .ete-'in#tion$2 /&ic& '#y inc ).e2 +)t #-e not i'ite. to2 .ete-'in#tion$ o* -e. ce #nti%en$2 -e. ce i$oen"y'e$2 &)'#n e)Eocyte #nti%en$2 $e-)' !-otein$2 o- DNA i.enti*ic#tion !-o*i in%2 to .ete-'ine /&et&e- t&e # e%e. *#t&e- i$ iEe y to +e2 o- i$ not2 t&e *#t&e- o* t&e c&i .. I* t&e co)-t o-.e-$ # + oo. o- ti$$)e ty!in% o- DNA i.enti*ic#tion !-o*i in% to +e con.)cte. #n. # !#-ty -e*)$e$ to $)+'it to t&e ty!in% o- DNA i.enti*ic#tion !-o*i in%2 in #..ition to #ny ot&e- -e'e.ie$ #,#i #+ e2 t&e co)-t '#y .o eit&e- o* t&e *o o/in%+ <#> Ente- # .e*#) t B).%'ent #t t&e -e()e$t o* t&e #!!-o!-i#te !#-ty. <+> I* # t-i# i$ &e .2 # o/ t&e .i$c o$)-e o* t&e *#ct o* t&e -e*)$# )n e$$ %oo. c#)$e i$ $&o/n *o- not .i$c o$in% t&e *#ct o* -e*)$# . (;) ' blood or tissue typing or #!' identification profiling shall be conducted by a person accredited for paternity determinations by a nationally recogni5ed scientific organi5ation, including, but not limited to, the 'merican association of blood ban/s. ... ... ... (B) I* t&e !-o+#+i ity o* !#te-nity .ete-'ine. +y t&e ()# i*ie. !e-$on .e$c-i+e. in $)+$ection <2> con.)ctin% t&e + oo. o- ti$$)e ty!in% o- DNA i.enti*ic#tion !-o*i in% i$ 55H o- &i%&e-2 #n. t&e DNA i.enti*ic#tion !-o*i e #n. $)''#-y -e!o-t #-e #.'i$$i+ e #$ !-o,i.e. in $)+$ection <4>2 !#te-nity i$ !-e$)'e.. I* t&e -e$) t$ o* t&e #n# y$i$ o* %enetic te$tin% '#te-i# *-o' 2 o- 'o-e !e-$on$

in.ic#te # !-o+#+i ity o* !#te-nity %-e#te- t&#n 55H2 t&e cont-#ctin% #+o-#to-y $&# con.)ct #..ition# %enetic !#te-nity te$tin% )nti # +)t 1 o* t&e !)t#ti,e *#t&e-$ i$ e i'in#te.2 )n e$$ t&e .i$!)te in,o ,e$ 2 o- 'o-e !)t#ti,e *#t&e-$ /&o &#,e i.entic# DNA. (9) pon the establishment of the presumption of paternity as provided in subsection (B), either party may move for summary disposition under the court rules. this section does not abrogate the right of either party to child support from the date of birth of the child if applicable under section >. (emphasis supplied) (n Rafferty v. 'er)ins,<> the $upreme "ourt of Fississippi ruled that #!' test results showing paternity were sufficient to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy of a child born during the course of a marriage+ The presumption of legitimacy having been rebutted by the results of the blood test eliminating Per/ins as DustinHs father, even considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Per/ins, we find that no reasonable 2ury could find that :aster is not DustinHs father based upon the CC.C<Q probability of paternity concluded by the #!' testing. (n $.,.". and ,.#.". v. R.#.-.,<7 the !orth #a/ota $upreme "ourt upheld an order for genetic testing given by the "ourt of 'ppeals, even after trial on the merits had concluded without such order being given. $ignificantly, when D.".F., the mother, first filed the case for paternity and support with the #istrict "ourt, neither party re0uested genetic testing. (t was only upon appeal from dismissal of the case that the appellate court remanded the case and ordered the testing, which the !orth #a/ota $upreme "ourt upheld. The case of Cohl v. Amundson&<C decided by the $upreme "ourt of $outh #a/ota, demonstrated that even default 2udgments of paternity could be vacated after the ad2udicated father had, through #!' testing, established non*paternity. (n this case, Mohl, having e.cluded himself as the father of 'mundson-s child through #!' testing, was able to have the default 2udgment against him vacated. )e then obtained a ruling ordering 'mundson to reimburse him for the amounts withheld from his wages for child support. The "ourt said I(w)hile 'mundson may have a remedy against the father of the child, she submit(ted) no authority that re0uire(d) Mohl to support her child. "ontrary to 'mundsonHs position, the fact that a default 2udgment was entered, but subse0uently vacated, (did) not foreclose Mohl from obtaining a money 2udgment for the amount withheld from his wages.I (n 5.A.$. v. 5ississippi Dept. of (uman $ervices ,B@ another case decided by the $upreme "ourt of Fississippi, it was held that even if paternity was established through an earlier agreed order of filiation, child support and visitation orders could still be vacated once #!' testing established someone other than the named individual to be the biological father. The Fississippi )igh "ourt reiterated this doctrine in -illiams v. -illiams.B6 The foregoing considered, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public respondent for upholding the orders of the trial court which both denied the petitioner-s motion to dismiss and ordered him to submit himself for #!' testing. nder Rule 9B of the 6CC> Rules of "ivil Procedure, the remedy of certiorari is only available Iwhen any tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in e.cess of its or his 2urisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac/ or e.cess of 2urisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and ade0uate remedy in the ordinary course of law.IB; (n 9and %an) of the 'hilippines v. the #ourt of AppealsB= where we dismissed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 9B, we discussed at length the nature of such a petition and 2ust what was meant by Igrave abuse of discretionI+ Erave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical e.ercise of 2udgment as is e0uivalent to lac/ of 2urisdiction or, in other words, /&e-e t&e !o/e- i$ eFe-ci$e. in #n #-+it-#-y '#nne- +y -e#$on o* !#$$ion2 !-eB).ice2 o- !e-$on# &o$ti ity2 #n. it ')$t +e $o !#tent o- %-o$$ #$ to #'o)nt to #n e,#$ion o* # !o$iti,e .)ty o- to # ,i-t)# -e*)$# to !e-*o-' t&e .)ty enBoine. o- to #ct #t # in conte'! #tion o* #/ . The special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of 2urisdiction and not errors of 2udgment. The raison dJetre for the rule is when a court e.ercises its 2urisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the 2urisdiction being e.ercised when the error is committed. (f it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its 2urisdiction and every erroneous 2udgment would be a void 2udgment. (n such a scenario, the administration of 2ustice would not survive. )ence, where the issue or 0uestion involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decisionJnot the 2urisdiction of the court to render said decisionJthe same is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari. The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the "' is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule <B of the Revised Rules of "ourt. ,n the other hand, if the error sub2ect of the recourse is one of 2urisdiction, or the act complained of was perpetrated by a 0uasi*2udicial officer or agency with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac/ or e.cess of 2urisdiction, the proper remedy available to the aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule 9B of the said Rules. (emphasis supplied) (n the instant case, the petitioner has in no way shown any arbitrariness, passion, pre2udice or personal hostility that would amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the "ourt of 'ppeals. The respondent court acted entirely within its 2urisdiction in promulgating its decision and resolution, and any error made would have only been an error in 2udgment. 's we have discussed, however, the decision of the respondent court, being firmly anchored in law and 2urisprudence, was correct. :pilogue For too long, illegitimate children have been marginali5ed by fathers who choose to deny their e.istence. The growing sophistication of #!' testing technology finally provides a much needed e0uali5er for such ostraci5ed and abandoned progeny. &e have long believed in the merits of #!' testing and have repeatedly e.pressed as much in the past. This case comes at a perfect time when #!' testing has finally evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. &e therefore ta/e this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that #!' testing is a valid means of determining paternity. @:EREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby #:!(:#. The "ourt of 'ppeals- decision dated Danuary ;7, ;@@< in "'*E.R. $P !o. 7@C96 is hereby 'FF(RF:# in toto. "osts against petitioner.

$, ,R#:R:#.
Panganiban, ("hairman), $andoval*Eutierre5, "arpio*Forales, and Earcia, DD., concur.

E.R. !o. 69=9@<

Fay 9, ;@@B

R:P ?%(" ,F T): P)(%(PP(!:$, petitioner, vs. T): ),!. ", RT ,F 'PP:'%$ (Twentieth #ivision), ),!. PR:$(#(!E D #E: F,RT !(T, %. F'#R,!', RT"*?R. =B and 'P,%(!'R(' F'%(!', D,F,", respondents.

#:"($(,!

"'RP(,*F,R'%:$, ,.+

(n I(n the Fatter of #eclaration of Presumptive #eath of 'bsentee $pouse "lemente P. Domoc, 'polinaria Falinao Domoc, petitioner,I the ,rmoc "ity, Regional Trial "ourt, ?ranch =B, by ,rder of $eptember ;C, 6CCC,6 granted the petition on the basis of the "ommissioner-s Report ; and accordingly declared the absentee spouse, who had left his petitioner*wife nine years earlier, presumptively dead. (n granting the petition, the trial 2udge, Dudge Fortunito %. Fadrona, cited 'rticle <6, par. ; of the Family "ode. $aid article provides that for the purpose of contracting a valid subse0uent marriage during the subsistence of a previous marriage where the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years, the spouse present must institute $)''#-y !-ocee.in%$ for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee spouse , without pre2udice to the effect of the reappearance of the absent spouse. The Republic, through the ,ffice of the $olicitor Eeneral, sought to appeal the trial court-s order by filing a !otice of 'ppeal. = ?y ,rder of !ovember ;;, 6CCCs,< the trial court, noting that no record of appeal was filed and served Ias re0uired by and pursuant to $ec. ;(a), Rule <6 of the 6CC> Rules of "ivil Procedure, the present case being a special proceeding,I disapproved the !otice of 'ppeal. The Republic-s Fotion for Reconsideration of the trial court-s order of disapproval having been denied by ,rder of Danuary 6=, ;@@@,B it filed a Petition for #ertiorari9 before the "ourt of 'ppeals, it contending that the declaration of presumptive death of a person under 'rticle <6 of the Family "ode is not a special proceeding or a case of multiple or separate appeals re0uiring a record on appeal. ?y #ecision of Fay B, ;@@<,> the "ourt of 'ppeals denied the Republic-s petition on procedural and substantive grounds in this wise+ 't the outset, it must be stressed that the petition is not sufficient in form. (t failed to attach to its petition a certified true copy of the assailed ,rder dated Danuary 6=, ;@@@ Rdenying its Fotion for Reconsideration of the !ovember ;;, 6CCC ,rder disapproving its !otice of 'ppealS. Foreover, the petition 0uestioned the Rtrial court-sS ,rder dated 'ugust 6B, 6CCC, which declared "lemente Domoc presumptively dead, li/ewise for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac/ of 2urisdiction, yet, not even a copy could be found in the records. ,n this score alone, the petition should have been dismissed outright in accordance with $ec. =, Rule <9 of the Rules of "ourt. )owever, despite the procedural lapses, the "ourt resolves to delve deeper into the substantive issue of the validityGnullity of the assailed order. T&e !-inci!# i$$)e in t&i$ c#$e i$ /&et&e- # !etition *o- .ec #-#tion o* t&e !-e$)'!ti,e .e#t& o* # !e-$on i$ in t&e n#t)-e o* # $!eci# !-ocee.in%. (f it is, the period to appeal is =@ days and the party appealing must, in addition to a notice of appeal, file with the trial court a record on appeal to perfect its appeal. ,therwise, if the petition is an ordinary action, the period to appeal is 6B days from notice or decision or final order appealed from and the appeal is perfected by filing a notice of appeal ($ection =, Rule <6, Rules of "ourt). 's defined in $ection =(a), Rule 6 of the Rules of "ourt, Ia civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention of redress of a wrongI while a special proceeding under $ection =(c) of the same rule is defined as Ia remedy by which a party see/s to establish a status, a right or a particular fact ()eirs of Aaptinchay, et al. v. #el Rosario, et al., E.R. !o. 6;<=;@, Farch ;, 6CCC). "onsidering the aforementioned distinction, this "ourt finds that t&e in$t#nt !etition i$ in t&e n#t)-e o* # $!eci# !-ocee.in% #n. not #n o-.in#-y #ction. The petition merely see/s for a declaration by the trial court of the presumptive death of absentee spouse "lemente Domoc. (t does not see/ the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong. !either does it involve a demand of right or a cause of action that can be enforced against any person. ,n the basis of the foregoing discussion, the sub2ect ,rder dated Danuary 6=, ;@@@ denying ,$E-s Fotion for Reconsideration of the ,rder dated !ovember ;;, 6CCC disapproving its !otice of 'ppeal was correctly issued. T&e in$t#nt !etition2 +ein% in t&e n#t)-e o* # $!eci# !-ocee.in%2 OS8 $&o) . &#,e *i e.2 in #..ition to it$ Notice o* A!!e# 2 # -eco-. on #!!e# in accordance with $ection 6C of the (nterim Rules and Euidelines to (mplement ?P ?lg. 6;C and $ection ;(a), Rule <6 of the Rules of "ourt . . . (:mphasis and underscoring supplied) The Republic (petitioner) insists that the declaration of presumptive death under 'rticle <6 of the Family "ode is not a special proceeding involving multiple or separate appeals where a record on appeal shall be filed and served in li/e manner. Petitioner cites Rule 6@C of the Revised Rules of "ourt which enumerates the cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed and a record on appeal is re0uired for an appeal to be perfected. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse not being included in the enumeration, petitioner contends that a mere notice of appeal suffices. ?y Resolution of #ecember 6B, ;@@<,7 this "ourt, noting that copy of the $eptember ;>, ;@@< Resolution Cre0uiring respondent to file her comment on the petition was returned unserved with postmaster-s notation IParty refused,I Resolved to consider that copy deemed served upon her.

The pertinent provisions on the 8ene-# P-o,i$ion$ on S!eci# P-ocee.in%$ , Part (( of the Revised Rules of "ourt entitled $P:"('% PR,"::#(!E$, read+ RULE 12 SU69ECT MATTER AND APPLICA6ILIT7 OF 8ENERAL RULES $ection 6. $ubject matter of special proceedings. = Rules of special proceedings are provided for in the following+ (a) $ettlement of estate of deceased persons1 (b) :scheat1 (c) Euardianship and custody of children1 (d) Trustees1 (e) 'doption1 (f) Rescission and revocation of adoption1 (g) )ospitali5ation of insane persons1 (h) )abeas corpus1 (i) "hange of name1 (2) 8oluntary dissolution of corporations1 (/) Dudicial approval of voluntary recognition of minor natural children1 (l) "onstitution of family home1 (m) #eclaration of absence and death1 (n) "ancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. $ec. ;. Applicability of rules of civil actions. = (n the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings. ( nderscoring supplied) The pertinent provision of the "ivil "ode on presumption of death provides+ 'rt. =C@. 'fter an absence of seven years, it being un/nown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead *o- # !)-!o$e$2 e.cept for those of succession. . . . (:mphasis and underscoring supplied) pon the other hand, 'rticle <6 of the Family "ode, upon which the trial court anchored its grant of the petition for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse, provides+ 'rt. <6. ' marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subse0uent marriage, the prior spouses had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well* founded belief that the absent spouses was already dead. (n case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of 'rticle =C6 of the "ivil "ode, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. For the purpose pf contracting the subse0uent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouses present must institute a $)''#-y !-ocee.in% #$ !-o,i.e. in t&i$ Co.e for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without pre2udice to the effect of a reappearance of the absent spouse. (:mphasis and underscoring supplied) Rule <6, $ection ; of the Revised Rules of "ourt, on Fodes of 'ppeal, invo/ed by the trial court in disapproving petitioner-s !otice of 'ppeal, provides+ $ec. ;. 5odes of appeal. *

(a) Ordinary appeal. 7 The appeal to the "ourt of 'ppeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial "ourt in the e.ercise of its original 2urisdiction shall be ta/en by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the 2udgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. !o record on appeal shall be re0uired e.cept in $!eci# !-ocee.in%$ and other c#$e$ o* ') ti! e o- $e!#-#te #!!e# $ /&e-e t&e #/ o- t&e$e R) e$ $o -e()i-e. (n such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in li/e manner. (:mphasis and underscoring supplied) ... ?y the trial court-s citation of 'rticle <6 of the Family "ode, it is gathered that the petition of 'polinaria Domoc to have her absent spouse declared presumptively dead had for its purpose her desire to contract a valid subse0uent marriage. .rgo, the petition for that purpose is a I$)''#-y !-ocee.in%,I following above*0uoted 'rt. <6, paragraph ; of the Family "ode. $ince Title T( of the Family "ode, entitled $ FF'RA D #("('% PR,"::#(!E (! T): F'F(%A %'&, contains the following provision, inter alia+ ... 'rt. ;=7. nless modified by the $upreme "ourt, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in # c#$e$ provided for in this "odes re0uiring $)''#-y co)-t !-ocee.in%$. S)c& c#$e$ $&# +e .eci.e. in #n eF!e.itio)$ '#nne- /it&o)t -e%#-. to tec&nic# -) e$. (:mphasis and underscoring supplied) . . ., there is no doubt that the petition of 'polinaria Domoc re0uired, and is, therefore, a summary proceeding under the Family "ode, not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of "ourt appeal for which calls for the filing of a Record on 'ppeal. (t being a summary ordinary proceeding, the filing of a !otice of 'ppeal from the trial court-s order sufficed. That the Family "ode provision on repeal, 'rt. ;B<, provides as follows+ 'rt. ;B<. Titles (((, (8, 8, 8(, 8((, 8(((, (T, T( and T8 of ?oo/ ( of Republic 'ct !o. =79, otherwise /nown as the "ivil "ode of the Philippines, as amended, and 'rticles 6>, 67, 6C, ;>, ;7, ;C, =@, =6, =C, <@, <6 and <; of Presidential #ecree !o. 9@=, otherwise /nown as the "hild and Aouth &elfare "ode, as amended, and all #/$, decrees, e.ecutive orders, proclamations -) e$ and regulations, or parts thereof, incon$i$tent t&e-e/it& are hereby -e!e# e., (:mphasis and underscoring supplied), seals the case in petitioner-s favor. Finally, on the alleged procedural flaw in petitioner-s petition before the appellate court. Petitioner-s failure to attach to his petition before the appellate court a copy of the trial court-s order denying its motion for reconsideration of the disapproval of its !otice of 'ppeal is not necessarily fatal, for the rules of procedure are not to be applied in a technical sense. Eiven the issue raised before it by petitioner, what the appellate court should have done was to direct petitioner to comply with the rule. 's for petitioner-s failure to submit copy of the trial court-s order granting the petition for declaration of presumptive death, contrary to the appellate court-s observation that petitioner was also assailing it, petitioner-s 7*page petition 6@ filed in said court does not so reflect, it merely having assailed the order disapproving the !otice of 'ppeal. @:EREFORE, the assailed Fay B, ;@@< #ecision of the "ourt of 'ppeals is hereby R:8:R$:# and $:T '$(#:. %et the case be R:F'!#:# to it for appropriate action in light of the foregoing discussion. SO ORDERED.
'anganiban& (#hairman!& $andoval7/utierre2& #orona& and /arcia& ,,.& concur.

E.R. !o. %*<=9;

'ugust =6, 6CB6

F'T(F(!, '. E'R"(', petitioner*appellant, vs. P'TR,"(!(, P,!E'!, respondent*appellee.

Ramon Duterte& #ecillo /illamac& Antolin Rubillos and /audencio 5ontecillo for appellant. .leuterio R. Ramo for appellee.

F:R(', ,.+

' petition for habeas corpus was originally filed in the "ourt of First (nstance of "ebu by the petitioner the respondent Patrocinio Pongan, to recover the custody of Teonila Earcia born on !ovember 67, 6C=7, who is a natural child of both the petitioner and respondent because they were free to marry at the time of the conception of said child. 'fter the hearing, the lower court rendered 2udgment denying the appellantHs petition, and awarding to the respondent the rightful custody of said Teonila Earcia1 and the petitioner appealed from said 2udgment. $ection =66 of the new "ivil "ode provides that IThe father and mother 2ointly e.ercise parental authority over their legitimate children who are not emancipated,I and that Ithe recogni5ed natural and adopted children who are under age are under the parental authority of the father or mother recogni5ing or adopting them.I nder article =69 of the same code the effects of parental authority of the legitimate father and mother upon their unemancipated legitimate children, and of the father or mother over their minor recogni5ed natural children are, among others, the duty to support them and /eep them in their company. The parentsH duty of /eeping their legitimate and recogni5ed minor children in their company or giving them a place wherein to live, is a part of the due to them1 but this duty is at the same time a right which is incumbent upon them to facilitate compliance with their duties imposed upon the parents by said article =69. (f only one of the parents, for instance the father, has recogni5ed a natural child, there would be no 0uestion or doubt that in the e.ercise of his parental authority, he has the right to /eep the recogni5ed child in his company or to have it under his custody, and he can not be deprive of such right and may not even renounce or transfer it Ie.cept in cases of guardianship or adoption approved by the court, or emancipation by concession,I according to article =6= of the same "ode. ?ut in the present case, not only the appellant father, but also the respondent mother have recogni5ed the minor child Teonila Earcia, the former by 2udgment of the court, and the latter voluntarily testifying or stating under oath before the "ourt of First (nstance in this case, that said Teonila is her natural child, which is a new means of voluntary recognition of a natural child by his father or mother under article ;>7 of the new "ivil "ode, which says that IRecognition shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing.I $uch voluntary recognition does not re0uire 2udicial approval according to article ;76 of the same "ode, which provides that only Iwhen the recognition of a minor does not ta/e place in a record of birth or in a will 2udicial approval shall be necessary.I 'nd as the minor Teonila Earcia is over ten years and prefers to live with her mother, the court did not err in awarding to the appellee the care, custody, and control of said minor, there being no showing that she is unfit to ta/e charge of the child by reason of moral depravity, habitual drun/enness, incapacity or poverty, in accordance with the provision of section 9, Rule 6@@ of the Rules of "ourt, which reads as follows+ $:". 9. 'roceedings as to child whose parents are separated. Appeal. J &hen husband and wife are divorced or living separately and apart from each other, and the 0uestion as to the care, custody, and control of a child or children of their marriage is brought before a "ourt of First (nstance by petition or as an incident to any other proceeding, the court, upon hearing the testimony of either or both parents, and such other testimony as may be pertinent, shall award the care, custody, and control of each such child as will be for its best interest, permitting the child to choose which parent it prefers to live with if it be over ten years of age, unless the parent so chosen be unfit to ta/e charge of the child by reason of moral depravity, habitual drun/enness, incapacity, or poverty. . . . (t is true that the above*0uoted provisions refer to legitimate minor children whose parents are divorced or living separately and apart from each other, but it is not less true that they are also applicable to the present case by analogy. The law confers upon the courts the power to award the care, custody and control of the minor child to either of the parents whom the child prefers to live with if it is over ten years unless the parent so chosen be unfit, because either the father or the mother has a preferred right to such care, custody and control in the e.ercise of parental authority they have over the person of their unemancipated legitimate children. (n the present case, the minor Teonila Earcia having been legally recogni5ed by both the appellant and appellee as their natural child, either one of them has the right to have the care, control and custody of said minor by virtue of their parental authority over her. &herefore the order appealed from is affirmed with costs against the appellant. $o ordered.
'aras& #.,.& 'ablo& %eng2on& 'adilla& Tuason& Reyes& ,ugo and %autista Angelo& ,,.& concur.

A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC

A!-i 222 2003 RE3 PROPOSED RULE ON CUSTOD7 OF MINORS AND @RIT OF :A6EAS CORPUS IN RELATION TO CUSTOD7 OF MINORS RESOLUTION

'cting on the letter of the "hairman of the "ommittee on Revision of the Rules of "ourt submitting for this "ourt-s consideration and approval the Proposed Rule on custody of Finors and &rit of )abeas "orpus in Relation to "ustody of Finors, the "ourt Resolved to 'PPR,8: the same. The Rule shall ta/e effect on Fay 6B, ;@@= following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation not later than 'pril =@, ;@@=. 'pril ;;, ;@@= Davide& ,r.& #.,.& %ellosillo& 'uno& +itug& 'anganiban& 6nares7$antiago& $andoval7/utierre2& #arpio& Austria75artine2& #orona& #arpio75orales& #allejo& $r.& and A2cuna& ,,., concur. <uisumbing& ,., on official leave.

RULE ON CUSTOD7 OF MINORS AND @RIT OF :A6EAS CORPUS IN RELATION TO CUSTOD7 OF MINORS SECTION 1. %pplicability. * This rule shall apply to petitions for custody of minors and writs of habeas corpus in relation thereto. The Rules of "ourt shall apply suppletorily. Section 2. Petition for custody of minors& who may file.* ' verified petition for the rightful custody of a minor may be filed by any person claiming such right. The party against whom it may be filed shall be designated as the respondent. Section 3. Where to file petition. * The petition for custody of minors shall be filed with the Family "ourt of the province or city where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found. Section 4. Contents of petition. * The verified petition shall allege the following+ (a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and of the respondent1 (b) The name, age and present whereabouts of the minor and his or her relationship to the petitioner and the respondent1 (c) The material operative facts constituting deprivation of custody1 and (d) $uch other matters which are relevant to the custody of the minor. The verified petition shall be accompanied by a certificate against forum shopping, which the petitioner must sign personally. Section 0. S)''on$I !e-$on# $e-,ice on -e$!on.ent. * (f the court is satisfied that the petition is sufficient in form and substance, it shall direct the cler/ of court to issue summons, which shall be served together with a copy of the petition personally on the respondent. Section 6. 'otion to (ismiss. * ' motion to dismiss the petition is not allowed e.cept on the ground of lac/ of 2urisdiction over the sub2ect matter or over the parties. 'ny other ground that might warrant the dismissal of the petition may be raised as an affirmative defense in the answer. Section 1. Verified %nswer. * The respondent shall file an answer to the petition, personally verified by him, within five days after service of summons and a copy of the petition. Section 4. Case study& duty of social wor!er. * pon the filing of the verified answer or the e.piration of the period to file it, the court may order a social wor/er to ma/e a case study of the minor and the parties and to submit a report and recommendation to the court at least three days before the scheduled pre*trial. Section 5. Notice of mandatory pre)trial. * &ithin fifteen days after the filing of the answer or the e.piration of the period to file answer, the court shall issue an order+ (6) fi.ing a date for the pre*trial conference1 (;) directing the parties to file and serve their respective pre*trial briefs in such manner as shall ensure receipt thereof by the adverse party at least three days before the date of pre*trial1 and (=) re0uiring the respondent to present the minor before the court.

The notice of its order shall be served separately on both the parties and their respective counsels. The pre*trial is mandatory. Section 10. Contents of pre)trial brief. * The pre*trial brief shall contain the following+ (a) ' statement of the willingness of the parties to enter into agreements that may be allowed by law, indicating its terms1 (b) ' concise statement of their respective claims together with the applicable laws and authorities1 (c) 'dmitted facts and proposed stipulations of facts1 (d) The disputed factual and legal issues1 (e) 'll the evidence to be presented, briefly stating or describing its nature and purpose1 (f) The number and names of the witnesses and their respective affidavits which shall serve as the affiantHs testimony on direct e.amination1 and (g) $uch other matters as the court may re0uire to be included in the pre*trial brief. Failure to file the pre*trial brief or to comply with its re0uired contents shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre*trial. Section 11. *ffect of failure to appear at the pre)trial .*(a) (f the petitioner fails to appear personally at the pre*trial, the case shall be dismissed, unless his counsel or a duly authori5ed representative appears in court and proves a valid e.cuse for the non*appearance of the petitioner. (b) (f the respondent has filed his answer but fails to appear at the pre*trial, the petitioner shall be allowed to present his evidence e. parte. The court shall then render 2udgment on the basis of the pleadings and the evidence thus presented. Section 12. What may be done at pre)trial. * 't the pre*trial, the parties may agree on the custody of the minor. (f the parties fail to agree, the court may refer the matter to a mediator who shall have five days to effect an agreement between the parties. (f the issue is not settled through mediation, the court shall proceed with the pre*trial conference, on which occasion it shall consider such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the petition. Section 13. Provisional order awarding custody . * 'fter an answer has been filed or after e.piration of the period to file it, the court may issue a provisional order awarding custody of the minor. 's far as practicable, the following order of preference shall be observed in the award of custody+ (a) ?oth parents 2ointly1 (b) :ither parent, ta/ing into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the minor over seven years of age and of sufficient discernment, unless the parent chosen is unfit1 (c) The grandparent, or if there are several grandparents, the grandparent chosen by the minor over seven years of age and of sufficient discernment, unless the grandparent chosen is unfit or dis0ualified1 (d) The eldest brother or sister over twenty*one years of age, unless he or she is unfit or dis0ualified1 (e) The actual custodian of the minor over twenty*one years of age, unless the former is unfit or dis0ualified1 or (f) 'ny other person or institution the court may deem suitable to provide proper care and guidance for the minor. Section 14. +actors to consider in determining custody . * (n awarding custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the minor and shall give paramount consideration to his material and moral welfare. The best interests of the minor refer to the totality of the circumstances and conditions as are most congenial to the survival, protection, and feelings of security of the minor encouraging to his physical, psychological and emotional development. (t also means the least detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the growth and development of the minor. The court shall also consider the following+ (a) 'ny e.tra2udicial agreement which the parties may have bound themselves to comply with respecting the rights of the minor to maintain direct contact with the non custodial parent on a regular basis, e.cept when there is an e.isting threat or danger of physical, mental, se.ual or emotional violence which endangers the safety and best interests of the minor1 (b) The desire and ability of one parent to foster an open and loving relationship between the minor and the other parent1 (c) The health, safety and welfare of the minor1

(d) 'ny history of child or spousal abuse by the person see/ing custody or who has had any filial relationship with the minor, including anyone courting the parent1 (e) The nature and fre0uency of contact with both parents1 (f) )abitual use of alcohol, dangerous drugs or regulated substances1 (g) Farital misconduct1 (h) The most suitable physical, emotional, spiritual, psychological and educational environment for the holistic development and growth of the minor1 and (i) The preference of the minor over seven years of age and of sufficient discernment, unless the parent chosen is unfit. Section 10. Temporary visitation rights. * The court shall provide in its order awarding provisional custody appropriate visitation rights to the non* custodial parent or parents, unless the court finds said parent or parents unfit or dis0ualified. The temporary custodian shall give the court and non custodial parent or parents at least five daysH notice of any plan to change the residence of the minor or ta/e him out of his residence for more than three days provided it does not pre2udice the visitation rights of the non*custodial parent or parents. Section 16. ,old (eparture -rder. * The minor child sub2ect of the petition shall not be brought out of the country without prior order from the court while the petition is pending. The court, motu proprio or upon application under oath, may issue e. parte a hold departure order, addressed to the ?ureau of (mmigration and #eportation, directing it not to allow the departure of the minor from the Philippines without the permission of the court. The Family "ourt issuing the hold departure order shall furnish the #epartment of Foreign 'ffairs and the ?ureau of (mmigration and #eportation of the #epartment of Dustice a copy of the hold departure order within twenty*four hours from its issuance and through the fastest available means of transmittal. The hold departure order shall contain the following information+ (a) The complete name (including the middle name), the date and place of birth, the nationality and the place of last residence of the person against whom a hold departure order has been issued or whose departure from the country has been en2oined1 (b) The complete title and doc/et number of the case in which the hold departure order was issued1 (c) The specific nature of the case1 (d) The date of the hold departure order1 and (e) ' recent photograph, if available, of the party against whom a hold departure order has been issued or whose departure from the country has been en2oined. The court may recall the hold departure order motu proprio, or upon verified motion of any of the parties after summary hearing, sub2ect to such terms and conditions as may be necessary for the best interests of the minor. Section 11. Protection -rder. * The court may issue a Protection ,rder re0uiring any person+ (a) To stay away from the home, school, business, or place of employment of the minor, other parent or any other party, or from any other specific place designated by the court1 (b) To cease and desist from harassing, intimidating, or threatening such minor or the other parent or any person to whom custody of the minor is awarded1 (c) To refrain from acts of commission or omission that create an unreasonable ris/ to the health, safety, or welfare of the minor1 (d) To permit a parent, or a party entitled to visitation by a court order or a separation agreement, to visit the minor at stated periods1 (e) To permit a designated party to enter the residence during a specified period of time in order to ta/e personal belongings not contested in a proceeding pending with the Family "ourt1 and (f) To comply with such other orders as are necessary for the protection of the minor.

Section 14. Judgment. * 'fter trial, the court shall render 2udgment awarding the custody of the minor to the proper party considering the best interests of the minor. (f it appears that both parties are unfit to have the care and custody of the minor, the court may designate either the paternal or maternal grandparent of the minor, or his oldest brother or sister, or any reputable person to ta/e charge of such minor, or commit him to any suitable home for children. (n its 2udgment, the court may order either or both parents to give an amount necessary for the support, maintenance and education of the minor, irrespective of who may be its custodian. (n determining the amount of support, the court may consider the following factors+ (6) the financial resources of the custodial and non*custodial parent and those of the minor1 (;) the physical and emotional health, special needs, and aptitude of the minor1 (=) the standard of living the minor has been accustomed to1 and (<) the non*monetary contributions that the parents would ma/e toward the care and well* being of the minor. The court may also issue any order that is 2ust and reasonable permitting the parent who is deprived of the care and custody of the minor to visit or have temporary custody. Section 15. %ppeal. * !o appeal from the decision shall be allowed unless the appellant has filed a motion for reconsideration or new trial within fifteen days from notice of 2udgment. 'n aggrieved party may appeal from the decision by filing a !otice of 'ppeal within fifteen days from notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial and serving a copy thereof on the adverse parties. Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. * ' verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family "ourt. The writ shall be enforceable within its 2udicial region to which the Family "ourt belongs. )owever, the petition may be filed with the regular court in the absence of the presiding 2udge of the Family "ourt, provided, however, that the regular court shall refer the case to the Family "ourt as soon as its presiding 2udge returns to duty. The petition may also be filed with the appropriate regular courts in places where there are no Family "ourts. The writ issued by the Family "ourt or the regular court shall be enforceable in the 2udicial region where they belong. The petition may li/ewise be filed with the $upreme "ourt, "ourt of 'ppeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to a Family "ourt or to any regular court within the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits. pon return of the writ, the court shall decide the issue on custody of minors. The appellate court, or the member thereof, issuing the writ shall be furnished a copy of the decision. Section 21. Confidentiality of proceedings . * The hearings on custody of minors may, at the discretion of the court, be closed to the public and the records of the case shall not be released to non*parties without its approval. Section 22. *ffectivity. * This Rule shall ta/e effect on Fay 6B, ;@@= following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation not later than 'pril =@, ;@@=.

8.R. No. 105314

9) y 122 2001

FELIPE N. MADRIJAN2 Petitioner, vs. FRANCISCA R. MADRIJAN2 Respondent.

#:"($(,!

CORONA2 J.3

&hen a family brea/s up, the children are always the victims. The ensuing battle for custody of the minor children is not only a thorny issue but also a highly sensitive and heart*rending affair. $uch is the case here. :ven the usually technical sub2ect of 2urisdiction became emotionally charged. Petitioner Felipe !. FadriOan and respondent Francisca R. FadriOan were married on Duly >, 6CC= in ParaOa0ue "ity. They resided in $an 'gustin 8illage, ?rgy. Foonwal/, ParaOa0ue "ity. Their union was blessed with three sons and a daughter+ Ronnic/, born on Danuary =@, 6CC<1 Phillip, born on !ovember 6C, 6CC91 Francis 'ngelo, born on Fay 6;, 6CC7 and Mri5ia 'nn, born on #ecember 6;, ;@@@. 'fter a bitter 0uarrel on Fay 67, ;@@;, petitioner allegedly left their con2ugal abode and too/ their three sons with him to %igao "ity, 'lbay and subse0uently to $ta. Rosa, %aguna. Respondent sought the help of her parents and parents*in*law to patch things up between her and petitioner to no avail. $he then brought the matter to the9upong Tagapamayapa in their barangay but this too proved futile. Thus respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus of Ronnic/, Phillip and Francis 'ngelo in the "ourt of 'ppeals, alleging that petitioner-s act of leaving the con2ugal dwelling and going to 'lbay and then to %aguna disrupted the education of their children and deprived them of their mother-s care. $he prayed that petitioner be ordered to appear and produce their sons before the court and to e.plain why they should not be returned to her custody. Petitioner and respondent appeared at the hearing on $eptember 6>, ;@@;. They initially agreed that petitioner would return the custody of their three sons to respondent. Petitioner, however, had a change of heart6 and decided to file a memorandum. ,n $eptember =, ;@@;, petitioner filed his memorandum ; alleging that respondent was unfit to ta/e custody of their three sons because she was habitually drun/, fre0uently went home late at night or in the wee hours of the morning, spent much of her time at a beer house and neglected her duties as a mother. )e claimed that, after their s0uabble on Fay 67, ;@@;, it was respondent who left, ta/ing their daughter with her. (t was only then that he went to $ta. Rosa, %aguna where he wor/ed as a tricycle driver. )e submitted a certification from the principal of the #ila :lementary $chool in $ta. Rosa, %aguna that Ronnic/ and Phillip were enrolled there. )e also 0uestioned the 2urisdiction of the "ourt of 'ppeals claiming that under $ection B(b) of R' 7=9C (otherwise /nown as the IFamily "ourts 'ct of 6CC>I) family courts have e.clusive original 2urisdiction to hear and decide the petition forhabeas corpus filed by respondent.= For her part, respondent averred that she did not leave their home on Fay 67, ;@@; but was driven out by petitioner. $he alleged that it was petitioner who was an alcoholic, gambler and drug addict. Petitioner-s alcoholism and drug addiction impaired his mental faculties, causing him to commit acts of violence against her and their children. The situation was aggravated by the fact that their home was ad2acent to that of her in*laws who fre0uently meddled in their personal problems.< ,n ,ctober ;6, ;@@;, the "ourt of 'ppeals B rendered a decision9 asserting its authority to ta/e cogni5ance of the petition and ruling that, under 'rticle ;6= of the Family "ode, respondent was entitled to the custody of Phillip and Francis 'ngelo who were at that time aged si. and four, respectively, sub2ect to the visitation rights of petitioner. &ith respect to Ronnic/ who was then eight years old, the court ruled that his custody should be determined by the proper family court in a special proceeding on custody of minors under Rule CC of the Rules of "ourt. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the "ourt of 'ppeals decision but it was denied. )ence, this recourse. Petitioner challenges the 2urisdiction of the "ourt of 'ppeals over the petition for habeas corpus and insists that 2urisdiction over the case is lodged in the family courts under R' 7=9C. )e invo/es $ection B(b) of R' 7=9C+ $ection B. ,urisdiction of "amily #ourts. The Family "ourts shall have e.clusive original 2urisdiction to hear and decide the following cases+ ... ... ...

b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter1 ... Petitioner is wrong. (n Thornton v. Thornton,> this "ourt resolved the issue of the "ourt of 'ppeals- 2urisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in R' 7=9C giving family courts e.clusive original 2urisdiction over such petitions+ T&e Co)-t o* A!!e# $ $&o) . t#Ee co%ni"#nce o* t&e c#$e $ince t&e-e i$ not&in% in RA 4365 t&#t -e,oEe. it$ B)-i$.iction to i$$)e /-it$ o* habeas corpus in,o ,in% t&e c)$to.y o* 'ino-$. ... ...

...

...

...

&e rule therefore that RA 4365 .i. not .i,e$t t&e Co)-t o* A!!e# $ #n. t&e S)!-e'e Co)-t o* t&ei- B)-i$.iction o,e- habeas corpus c#$e$ in,o ,in% t&e c)$to.y o* 'ino-$. ... ... ...

The provisions of R' 7=9C reveal no manifest intent to revo/e the 2urisdiction of the "ourt of 'ppeals and $upreme "ourt to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of R' 7=9C, R' >@C; R'n 'ct :.panding the Durisdiction of the "ourt of 'ppealsS and ?P 6;C RThe Dudiciary Reorgani5ation 'ct of 6C7@S are absolutely incompatible since R' 7=9C does not prohibit the "ourt of 'ppeals and the $upreme "ourt from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of R' 7=9C must be read in harmony with R' >@;C and ?P 6;C that *#'i y co)-t$ &#,e conc)--ent B)-i$.iction /it& t&e Co)-t o* A!!e# $ #n. t&e S)!-e'e Co)-t in !etition$ *o- habeas corpus/&e-e t&e c)$to.y o* 'ino-$ i$ #t i$$)e.7 (emphases supplied) The 2urisdiction of the "ourt of 'ppeals over petitions for habeas corpus was further affirmed by '.F. !o. @=*@=*@<*$" ('pril ;;, ;@@<) in Re+ Rule on "ustody of Finors and &rit of (abeas #orpus in Relation to "ustody of Finors+ (n any case, /&#te,e- )nce-t#inty t&e-e /#$ &#$ +een $ett e. /it& t&e #.o!tion o* A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re3 R) e on C)$to.y o* Mino-$ #n. @-it o* :#+e#$ Co-!)$ in Re #tion to C)$to.y o* Mino-$. $ection ;@ of the rule provides that+ $ection ;@. 'etition for writ of habeas corpus . ' verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family "ourt. The writ shall be enforceable within its 2udicial region to which the Family "ourt belongs. ... ... ...

T&e !etition '#y iEe/i$e +e *i e. /it& t&e $upreme "ourt, Co)-t o* A!!e# $, or with any of its members #n.2 i* $o %-#nte.2 t&e /-it $&# +e en*o-ce#+ e #ny/&e-e in t&e P&i i!!ine$. The writ may be made returnable to a Family "ourt or to any regular court within the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits. From the foregoing, there is no doubt that t&e Co)-t o* A!!e# $ #n. S)!-e'e Co)-t &#,e conc)--ent B)-i$.iction /it& *#'i y co)-t$ in habeas corpus c#$e$ /&e-e t&e c)$to.y o* 'ino-$ i$ in,o ,e. .C(emphases supplied)
1avvphi1

&e note that after petitioner moved out of their ParaOa0ue residence on Fay 67, ;@@;, he twice transferred his sons to provinces covered by different 2udicial regions. This situation is what the Thornton interpretation of R' 7=9C-s provision on 2urisdiction precisely addressed+ RThe reasoning that by giving family courts e.clusive 2urisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the lawma/ers intended them to be the sole courts which can issue writs of habeas corpusS will result in an ini0uitous situation, leaving individuals li/e RrespondentS without legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children. (ndividuals who do not /now the whereabouts of minors they are loo/ing for would be helpless since they cannot see/ redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial 2urisdictions. T&)$2 i* # 'ino- i$ +ein% t-#n$*e--e. *-o' one ! #ce to #not&e-2 /&ic& $ee'$ to +e t&e c#$e &e-e2 t&e !etitione- in # habeas corpus c#$e /i +e e*t /it&o)t e%# -e'e.y. T&i$ #cE o* -eco)-$e co) . not &#,e +een t&e intention o* t&e #/'#Ee-$ /&en t&ey !#$$e. CRA 4365D.6@ Foreover, a careful reading of $ection B(b) of R' 7=9C reveals that family courts are vested with original e.clusive 2urisdiction in custody cases, not in habeas corpus cases. &rits of habeas corpus which may be issued e.clusively by family courts under $ection B(b) of R' 7=9C pertain to the #nci #-y -e'e.y that may be availed of in con2unction with a petition for custody of minors under Rule CC of the Rules of "ourt. (n other words, the issuance of the writ is merely ancillary to the custody case pending before the family court. The writ must be issued by the same court to avoid splitting of 2urisdiction, conflicting decisions, interference by a co*e0ual court and 2udicial instability. The rule therefore is+ when by law 2urisdiction is conferred on a court or 2udicial officer, all au.iliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer. 66 ,nce a court ac0uires 2urisdiction over the sub2ect matter of a case, it does so to the e.clusion of all other courts, including related incidents and ancillary matters. 'ccordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. "osts against petitioner. $, ,R#:R:#.
RENATO C. CORONA 'ssociate Dustice

8.R. No. 111140 No,e'+e- 162 1550

DAISIE T. DA;ID2 petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS2 RAMON R. ;ILLAR2 respondents.

MENDO?A2

J.:

Petitioner #aisie T. #avid wor/ed as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. 8illar, a businessman in 'ngeles "ity. Private respondent is a married man and the father of four children, all grown*up. 'fter a while, the relationship between petitioner and private respondent developed into an intimate one, as a result of which a son, "hristopher D., was born on Farch C, 6C7B to them. "hristopher D. was followed by two more children, both girls, namely "hristine, born on Dune C, 6C79, and "athy Fae on 'pril ;<, 6C77. The relationship became /nown to private respondentHs wife when #aisie too/ "hristopher D, to 8illarHs house at 8illa Teresa in 'ngeles "ity sometime in 6C79 and introduced him to 8illarHs legal wife. 'fter this, the children of #aisie were freely brought by 8illar to his house as they were eventually accepted by his legal family. (n the summer of 6CC6, 8illar as/ed #aisie to allow "hristopher D., then si. years of age, to go with his family to ?oracay. #aisie agreed, but after the trip, 8illar refused to give bac/ the child. 8illar said he had enrolled "hristopher D. at the )oly Family 'cademy for the ne.t school year. ,n Duly =@, 6CC6, #aisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of "hristopher D. 'fter hearing, the Regional Trial "ourt, ?ranch B7 at 'ngeles "ity, rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads+ &):R:F,R:, premises considered, 2udgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner and against the respondent+ 6. the rightful custody of the minor "hristopher D. T. #avid is hereby given to the natural mother, the herein petitioner #aisie T. #avid1 ;. respondent is hereby ordered to give a temporary support of P=,@@@.@@ a month to the sub2ect minor "hristopher D. T. #avid, "hristine #avid and "athy Fae #avid to ta/e effect upon the finality of this decision1 and =. to pay the costs of this suit. $, ,R#:R:#. ,n appeal, the "ourt of 'ppeals reversed, holding+ &e agree with the respondent*appellantHs view that this is not proper in a habeas corpus case. %aw and 2urisprudence wherein the 0uestion of custody of a minor child may be decided in a habeas corpus case contemplate a situation where the parents are married to each other but are separated. This is so because under the Family "ode, the father and mother have 2oint parental authority over their legitimate children and in case of separation of the parents there is need to determine rightful custody of their children. The same does not hold true in an adulterous relationship, as in the case at bar, the child born out of such a relationship is under the parental authority of the mother by e.press provision of the law. )ence, the 0uestion of custody and support should be brought in a case singularly filed for the purpose. (n point of fact, this is more advisable in the case at bar because the trial court did not ac0uire 2urisdiction over the other minor children of the petitioner*appellee and respondent*appellant and, therefore, cannot properly provide for their support. 'dmittedly, respondent*appellant is financially well*off, he being a very rich businessman1 whereas, petitioner*appellee depends upon her sisters and parents for support. (n fact, he financially supported petitioner*appellee and her three minor children. (t is, therefore, for the best interest of "hristopher D that he should temporarily remain under the custody of respondent*appellant until the issue on custody and support shall have been determined in a proper case. &):R:F,R:, the decision appealed from is hereby $:T '$(#:, and a !:& ,!: :!T:R:# dismissing the petition for habeas corpus in $pecial Proceeding !o. <<7C. #aisie in turn filed this petition for review of the appellate courtHs decision. Rule 6@;, W6 of the Rules of "ourt provides that Ithe writ of habeas corpus shall e.tend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.I (t is indeed true, as the "ourt of 'ppeals observed, that the determination of the right to the custody of minor children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are for some reason separated from each other. (t does not follow, however, that it cannot arise in any other situation. For e.ample, in the case of $alvaLa v. /aela, 1 it was held that the writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to enable parents to regain the

custody of a minor daughter even though the latter be in the custody of a third person of her free will because the parents were compelling her to marry a man against her will. (n the case at bar, "hristopher D. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father, private respondent Ramon R. 8illar, was married to another woman other than the childHs mother. 's such, pursuant to 'rt. 6>9 of the Family "ode, "hristopher D. is under the parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a conse0uence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. 2 $ince, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody of her child by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. (ndeed, Rule 6@;6 W6 ma/es no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child. The fact that private respondent has recogni5ed the minor child may be a ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. nder 'rt. ;6= of the Family "ode, Ino child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.I 3 !or is the fact that private respondent is well*off a reason for depriving petitioner of the custody of her children, especially considering that she has been able to rear and support them on her own since they were born. Petitioner is a mar/et vendor earning from P;,@@@ to P=,@@@ per month in 6CC= when the RT" decision was rendered. $he augments her income by wor/ing as secretary at the "omputer $ystem $pecialist, (nc. earning a monthly income of P<,B@@.@@. $he has an arrangement with her employer so that she can personally attend to her children. $he wor/s up to 7+@@ oHcloc/ in the evening to ma/e up for time lost during the day. That she receives help from her parents and sister for the support of the three children is not a point against her. "ooperation, compassion, love and concern for every member of the family are characteristics of the close family ties that bind the Filipino family and have made it what it is. #aisie and her children may not be en2oying a life of affluence that private respondent promises if the child lives with him. (t is enough, however, that petitioner is earning a decent living and is able to support her children according to her means. The Regional Trial "ourt ordered private respondent to give temporary support to petitioner in the amount of P=,@@@.@@ a month, pending the filing of an action for support, after finding that private respondent did not give any support to his three children by #aisie, e.cept the meager amount of PB@@.@@ a wee/ which he stopped giving them on Dune ;=, 6CC;. )e is a rich man who professes love for his children. (n fact he filed a motion for the e.ecution of the decision of the "ourt of 'ppeals, alleging that he had observed his son Ito be physically wea/ and pale because of malnutrition and deprivation of the lu.ury and amenities he was accustomed to when in the former custody of the respondent.I )e prayed that he be given the custody of the child so that he can provide him with the Iproper care and education.I 'lthough the 0uestion of support is proper in a proceeding for that purpose, the grant of support in this case is 2ustified by the fact that private respondent has e.pressed willingness to support the minor child. The order for payment of allowance need not be conditioned on the grant to him of custody of the child. nder 'rt. ;@< of the Family "ode, a person obliged to give support can fulfill his obligation either by paying the allowance fi.ed by the court or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who is entitled to support unless, in the latter case, there is Ia moral or legal obstacle thereto.I (n the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, "hristopher D., being less than seven years of age at least at the time the case was decided by the RT", cannot be ta/en from the motherHs custody. :ven now that the child is over seven years of age, the motherHs custody over him will have to be upheld because the child categorically e.pressed preference to live with his mother. nder 'rt. ;6= of the Family "ode, courts must respect the Ichoice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfitI and here it has not been shown that the mother is in any way unfit to have custody of her child. (ndeed, if private respondent loves his child, he should not condition the grant of support for him on the award of his custody to him (private respondent). &):R:F,R:, the decision of the "ourt of 'ppeals is R:8:R$:# and private respondent is ,R#:R:# to deliver the minor "hristopher D. T. #avid to the custody of his mother, the herein petitioner, and to give him temporary support in the amount of P=,@@@.@@, pending the fi.ing of the amount of support in an appropriate action. $, ,R#:R:#.
*arvasa& #.,.& Regalado and 'uno& ,,.& concur.

"rancisco& ,.& is on leave.

8.R. No. L-16115

M#-c& 302 1521

LEE 7ICA :ON2 petitioner*appellee, vs. T:E INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS2 defendant*appellant.

Attorney7/eneral "eria for appellant. *o appearance for appellee.

STREET2 J.:

This is an appeal by the (nsular "ollector of "ustoms from the action of the "ourt of First (nstance of Fanila in imposing upon him a fine of PB@ for an alleged contempt of court. The circumstances connected with the incident which gave rise to the proceeding are these+ (t appears that on Duly ;=, 6C;@, a petition for the writ of habeas corpus was filed in the "ourt of First (nstance of Fanila by one %ee Aic/ )on, alleging he had lately arrived from "hina at the port of Fanila with a view to entering the Philippine (slands, but was presented from so doing by the (nsular "ollector of "ustoms, who was detaining him for deportation. pon the presiding in $ala (8 of said court, cited the collector to appear and show cause in writing why the writ of habeas corpus should not be issued as prayed. This citation was served at about 66 a.m., at which house arrangement had already been perfected for the deportation of %ee Aic/ )on on a boat scheduled to leave Fanila for )ong/ong at noon on the same day1 and either by oversight or design the (nsular "ollector failed to contermand the order for his embarcation on that boat. The result was that %ee Aic/ )on was deported within two or three hours after the (nsular "ollector had been served with the citation to show cause in the habeas corpusproceeding. Thereupon contempt proceedings were instituted against the (nsular "ollector, with the result already stated. &e are of the opinion that the action of the lower court in imposing fine on the appellant cannot be sustained1 and the 2udgment must accordingly be reserved. The conditions under which a person can be punished for contempt are precisely defined in sections ;=6 and ;=; of the "ode of "ivil Procedure1 and unless the reprobated conduct legitimately falls under those provisions, it cannot be punished as for contempt. The first of these sections contemplates misbehavior in the presence of the court or so near the court of 2udge as to obstruct the administration of 2ustice. &ith this situation we are not here concerned, as the act which constitutes the alleged contempt was committed away from the presence of the court and if punishable at all, it falls under subsection (6) of section ;=;, wherein it is declared that nay person may be punished as for contempt who is guilty of Idisobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, 2udgment, or command of the court or in2unction granted by a court or 2udge.I (n this case before us, if it be as/ed what lawful writ, process, order, 2udgment or command of the court or 2udge below was disobeyed or resisted by the appellant, the answer must be+ !one whatever. The citation that was served upon the appellant re0uired him to appear at a stated time in the "ourt of First (nstance of Fanila and show cause if any there might be, why the writ prayed for should not issue. That citation was literally complied with when, on Duly =@, 6C;@, the 'ttorney*Eeneral, on behalf of the (nsular "ollector, filed his answer, wherein it was in effect stated that the case of %ee Aic/ )on had been regularly passed upon by the special ?oard of (n0uiry, and that it had been found that he had entered the Philippine (slands in contravention of the (mmigration and :.clusion 'cts, wherefore the (nsular "ollector had ordered his deportation. That answer, so far as appears in this case, has not been found to be false or insufficient1 and the sole ground relied upon to sustain the 2udgment finding the appellant guilty to contempt is that by allowing %ee Aic/ )on to be deported under the conditions stated he has frustrated the possible issuance of the writ of habeas corpus for which application had been made. 't this point attention should be directed to the fact that the order to show cause, a copy of which was served on the (nsular "ollector of "ustoms on Duly ;=, 6C;@, is not the peremptory writ of habeas corpus, unconditionally commanding the respondent to have the body of the detained person before the court at a time and place therein specified. The re0uisites of the peremptory writ of habeas corpus are stated in section B== of the "ode of "ivil Procedure1 and appropriate forms are supplied in section B=< of said "ode and in section 7; of Eeneral ,rders, !o. B7. The order served in the case before us was merely a preliminary citation re0uiring the respondent to appear and show cause why the peremptory writ should not be granted. The practice of issuing a preliminary citation of this character, upon applications for the writ of habeas corpus, has, as all legal practitioners are aware, become common in our courts1 and upon considerations of practical convenience, the usage has must be commend it, in cases where the necessity for the immediate issuance of the peremptory writ is not manifest. !evertheless in a case li/e that now before us, it is necessary to ta/e account of the difference between the preliminary citation and the real writ of habeas corpus1 and when advertence is had to this point, and the actual terms of the citation are considered, it is at one obvious that the appellant did not put himself in contempt by allowing %ee Aic/ )on to be deported. ,f course if the 2udge issuing the citation had his attention directed to the fact that the deportation of %ee Aic/ )on was imminent, and there had been any reason to fear that the "ollector of "ustoms might proceed with his deportation notwithstanding the service of the bare citation, his )onor could have penned a few additional words, adding to the citation an admonition to the effect that the petitioner should not be deported until his application for the writ of habeas corpus should be heard. (f a temporary restraining order of that /ind had been issued, it would no doubt have been respected. (n proceeding against a person alleged to be guilty of contempt of court, it is not to be forgotten that such proceedings are commonly treated as criminal in their nature even when the acts complained of are incidents of civil actions. For this reason the mode of procedure and rules of evidence in contempt proceedings are assimilated as far as practicable to those adapted to criminal prosecutions. (9 R. ". %., p. B=@.) Foreover, it is well settled that a person cannot be held liable for contempt in the violation of an in2unction or in fact of any 2udicial order unless the act which is forbidden or re0uired to be done is clearly and e.actly defined, so as to leave no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or re0uired. ( .$. vs. 'tchison, etc., R. "o., 6<9 Fed., 6>9, 67=.) ' party cannot be punished for contempt in failing to do something not specified in the order. (6= ". D., 6B.) (n the case before us, the deportation of the petitioner was not forbidden by any order of the court, and hence that act cannot be considered as disobedience to the court. pon principle the point is clear1 and although no case e.actly identical with the present one has been called to our attention from the decisions of 'merican courts, something very similar is found in .x parte %a/e (=> Te.. "rim. Rep. 9B91 99 'm. $t. Rep. 7<7). The facts involved in that case were these+ ,ne :dwards had been charged with the commission of a criminal offense in ,/lahoma, but he fled to the $tate of Te.as1 and upon re0uisition from the Eovernor of ,/lahoma, a warrant was issued by the Eovernor of Te.as for his arrest in that $tate. pon his being arrested, application was made in his behalf before on of the Te.as courts for the writ of habeas corpus to secure his release. #uring the period when the propriety of granting the

writ was under consideration in said court, one %a/e, the legally appointed e.tradition agent, acting under the authority of a proper warrant issued by the Eovernor of Te.as, obtained the custody of :dwards from the sheriff who had him in charge and hurriedly departed with the prisoner for ,/lahoma. The result was that the proceedings upon the application for the writ habeas corpus were frustrated and the writ was in fact never issued J as occurred in the case now before us. The 2udge before whom the application for the writ of habeas corpus was pending thereupon caused %a/e to be arrested and fined him B@ dollars for the supposed contempt. (t was held by the Te.as "ourt of "riminal 'ppeals that his action could not be sustained and the 2udgment was reversed. 'mong the reasons stated for this decision was the fact that the alleged contemner has disobeyed no order issued by the 2udge, for there was none of any character made in the case, Iand there was no order, decree, writ, or any other process in e.istence, forbidding him form doing 2ust what he didI. $pea/ing further of this aspect of the case, the court said+ I&e have found no case authori5ing punishment by contempt for such conduct as is attributed to %a/e, and we believe none can be found. The authorities have been closely and e.haustively e.amined, and the rule deducible therefrom, is that unless the court has 2urisdiction of the supposed contemner, or some order, decree, or process has been resisted or disobeyed, the court has no 2urisdiction to punish for contempt. Durisdiction over the party will not confer power to punish for contempt unless some order, decree, or process has been disobeyed or the party is guilty of some act of the nature of malpractice in the case, or has disobeyed the reasonable rules of the courtI. ( .x parte %a/e, supra.) The considerations found in that decision are applicable to the case now before us and corroborate the conclusion to be inevitably drawn form our own provisions relative to contempt, namely, that the deportation of %ee Aic/ )on by the (nsular "ollector under the circumstances stated was not a contempt of court. Dudgment is reversed and the defendant absolved, with costs de oficio. $o ordered.
5apa& #.,. and +illamor& ,.& concur.

Se!#-#te O!inion$

MALCOLM2 J.$ dissenting+

( am in complete accord with the decision of Dudge of First (nstance "oncepcion finding 8icente 'ldanese, (nsular "ollector for "ustoms, guilty of contempt of court and sentencing him to pay a nominal fine of PB@. This action of the trial court was 2ustified, considering that the "ollector of "ustoms deported a "hinese alien claiming to be a member to the household of the "onsul*Eeneral for "hina, during the pendency of the habeas corpusproceedings, in disregard of a 2udicial order, and to the great pre2udice of the rights of the alien. ' brief narration of the facts of record will serve to demonstrate the correctness of the foregoing statements. The "hinaman %ee Aic/ )on arrived at the port of Fanila and as/ed for admission into the Philippine (slands on the ground that he was the coo/ of the "hinese "onsul*Eeneral. )e was refused admission by a ?oard of $pecial (n0uiry. The (nsular "ollector of "ustoms, in a decision filed on Duly ;;, 6C;@, affirmed the findings of the ?oard of $pecial (n0uiry and ordered that the alien be deported from the Philippine (slands to "hina. (mmediately on receipt of this order, counsel for the alien filed in the "ourt of First (nstance of Fanila a petition for a writ of habeas corpusin which, among other things, it was alleged that the respondent "ollector of "ustoms held the petitioner for the purpose of deportation. :arly on the morning of Duly ;=, 6C;@, the )onorable Pedro "oncepcion, Dudge of Fist (nstance, (ssued an order directed to the "ollector of "ustoms re0uiring his appearance before the Dudge of First (nstance one wee/ later to show cause why the writ of habeas corpus prayed for should not issue. This order of the court was served on the (nsular "ollector of "ustoms by 'ntonio de la "ru5, deputy sheriff of the city of Fanila, in company with a representative of the counsel for the petitioner, at appro.imately 6@.=@ on the morning of Duly ;=. Fr. 'ldanese was told INue ese chino se va a deportar y por eso la orden es esta.I (That that "hinaman will be deported and therefore this is the order.) !evertheless, on the same afternoon at about < oHcloc/, the "hinese petitioner was placed on a boat and deported to )ong/ong. (t appears that when the (nsular "ollector of "ustoms received the order of Dudge "oncepcion, he merely passed it on to Fr. ,bieta of the same office, with this notation+ IForward these paper with the case to the 'ttorney*Eeneral. J 8. '.I Fr. ,bieta found the papers on his des/ at about = oHcloc/ in the afternoon, and forwarded them to Fr. $otelo, the chief of the immigration division. Fr. $otelo received the order on the following morning, that is, subse0uent to the deportation of the alien. 'pparently, the (nsular "ollector of "ustoms had no e.act /nowledge of what had actually occured, for on Duly ;<, he signed a letter re0uesting the 'ttorney*Eeneral to represent the interests of the Eovernment in the case. This the 'ttorney*Eeneral did by filing an answer on Duly =@, 6C;@, or e.actly one wee/ after the "hinaman had been sent out of the country. These facts constitute, in my opinion, constructive con*tempt. Paraphrasing the definitions of contempt, there has been a disregard of, or disobedience to, the orders of a 2udicial body. 'n act has been done not in the presence of the court but at a distance, which tends to belittle, to obstruct, to interrupt, and to embarrass the administration of 2ustice. (t matters not that Fr. 'ldanese had no malicious intention of refusing obedience to an order of the court, for it is the action done which determined whether a contempt has been committed. (n the words of "hief Dustice Taney, I's regards the 0uestion whether a contempt has or has not been committed, it does not depend on the intention of the party, but upon the act he has done. (t is a conclusion of law from the act1 disobedience to the legitimate authority of the court is, by law, a contempt, unless the party can show sufficient causes to e.cuse it.I (&artman vs. &artman R67B=S, ;C Fed. "as. !o. 6>;6@.) &hether intentionally or unintentionally, whether maliciously or negligently, the result is as disastrous to the rights of the person who might possibly have been granted admission to the Philippine (slands. Fines for contempt of court at least have the merit of ma/ing customs officials more careful in the performance of their duties. Faulty Eovernmental routine should not be permitted to defeat a writ as fundamental in nature as is habeas corpus. (t is said, however, by the ma2ority, that for there to have been a contempt of court, the order issued by the 2udge should not only have been one re0uiring attendance to show cause why the writ should not issue, but should further have contained a clause in the nature of a preliminary in2unction. There is no gainsaying that a negative always ma/es an affirmative stronger. 't the same time it is not usually considered necessary for courts to e.plain their meaning by restating it in an opposite manner. The order issued by Dudge "oncepcion was a 2udicial one, a replica of hundreds of other, which should have been respected by the respondent. (nstead, the action of the respondent made compliance impossible and served to defeat the

petition for habeas corpus. From the moment the order was received by the respondent, the person of the petitioner was technically in the custody of the law, and when the respondent interfered with such custody a contempt of court was committed. (t is not desired by this opinion to critici5e unduly the conduct of the (nsular "ollector of "ustoms. (t is only desired to uphold the hands of the lower court in the legitimate performance of its functions, and to ma/e /nown that such orders must be respected.
Araullo& ,.& concurs.

&R(T ,F 'FP'R, T): R %: ,! T): &R(T ,F 'FP'R, $ection 6. Petition. * The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover e.tralegal /illings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. $ec. ;. &ho Fay File. * The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any 0ualified person or entity in the following order+ 6. 'ny member of the immediate family, namely+ the spouse, children and parents of the aggrieved party1 ;. 'ny ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph1 or =. 'ny concerned citi5en, organi5ation, association or institution, if there is no /nown member of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party. The filing of a petition by the aggrieved party suspends the right of all other authori5ed parties to file similar petitions. %i/ewise, the filing of the petition by an authori5ed party on behalf of the aggrieved party suspends the right of all others, observing the order established herein. $ec. =. &here to File. * The petition may be filed on any day and at any time with the Regional Trial "ourt of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred, or with the $andiganbayan, the "ourt of 'ppeals, the $upreme "ourt, or any 2ustice of such courts. The writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. &hen issued by a Regional Trial "ourt or any 2udge thereof, the writ shall be returnable before such court or 2udge. &hen issued by the $andiganbayan or the "ourt of 'ppeals or any of their 2ustices, it may be returnable before such court or any 2ustice thereof, or to any Regional Trial "ourt of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred. &hen issued by the $upreme "ourt or any of its 2ustices, it may be returnable before such "ourt or any 2ustice thereof, or before the $andiganbayan or the "ourt of 'ppeals or any of their 2ustices, or to any Regional Trial "ourt of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred. $ec. <. !o #oc/et Fees. * The petitioner shall be e.empted from the payment of the doc/et and other lawful fees when filing the petition. The court, 2ustice or 2udge shall doc/et the petition and act upon it immediately. $ec. B. "ontents of Petition. * The petition shall be signed and verified and shall allege the following+ 6. The personal circumstances of the petitioner1

;. The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is un/nown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation1 =. The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits1 <. The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report1 B. The actions and recourses ta/en by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission1 and 9. The relief prayed for. The petition may include a general prayer for other 2ust and e0uitable reliefs. $ec. 9. (ssuance of the &rit. * pon the filing of the petition, the court, 2ustice or 2udge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The cler/ of court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court1 or in case of urgent necessity, the 2ustice or the 2udge may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputi5e any officer or person to serve it. The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not be later than seven (>) days from the date of its issuance. $ec. >. Penalty for Refusing to (ssue or $erve the &rit. * ' cler/ of court who refuses to issue the writ after its allowance, or a deputi5ed person who refuses to serve the same, shall be punished by the court, 2ustice or 2udge for contempt without pre2udice to other disciplinary actions. $ec. 7. )ow the &rit is $erved. * The writ shall be served upon the respondent by a 2udicial officer or by a person deputi5ed by the court, 2ustice or 2udge who shall retain a copy on which to ma/e a return of service. (n case the writ cannot be served personally on the respondent, the rules on substituted service shall apply. $ec. C. Return1 "ontents. * &ithin seventy*two (>;) hours after service of the writ, the respondent shall file a verified written return together with supporting affidavits which shall, among other things, contain the following+

6. The lawful defenses to show that the respondent did not violate or threaten with violation the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party, through any act or omission1

;. The steps or actions ta/en by the respondent to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for the threat, act or omission1

=. 'll relevant information in the possession of the respondent pertaining to the threat, act or omission against the aggrieved party1 and

<. (f the respondent is a public official or employee, the return shall further state the actions that have been or will still be ta/en+

6. to verify the identity of the aggrieved party1 ;. to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible1 =. to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or disappearance1 <. to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance1 B. to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance1 and 9. to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court. The return shall also state other matters relevant to the investigation, its resolution and the prosecution of the case. ' general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed. Republic of the 'hilippines $M'R.5. #OMRT 5anila .* %A*# A.5. *o. 3>7071G7$# October 1 & G33> . T(. RM9. O* T(. -RAT O" A5'ARO. (Amended $ection 0 D 11! R.$O9MTAO* 'ursuant to the action of the #ourt en banc in its session held on October 1 & G33>& .ections / and 00 of the Rule on the -rit of Amparo are hereby A5.*D.D to read as follows@ .ec. /. 1eturn& Contents. ) Within +#V* 234 W-15#N6 (%7. after service of the writ$ the respondent shall file a verified written return together with supporting affidavits which shall$ among other things$ contain the following: 2a4 The lawful defenses to show that the respondent did not violate or threaten with violation the right to life$ liberty and security of the aggrieved party$ through any act or omission& 2b4 The steps or actions ta!en by the possession to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for the threat$ act or omission& 2c4 %ll relevant information in the possession of the respondent pertaining to the threat$ act or omission against the aggrieved party& and 2d4 #f the respondent is a public official or employee$ the return shall further state the actions that have been or will still be ta!en: 2i4 to verify the identity of the aggrieved party& 2ii4 to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible& 2iii4 to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or disappearance& 2iv4 to determine the cause$ manner$ location and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance& 2v4 to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance& and 2vi4 to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.

$ec. 6@. #efenses not Pleaded #eemed &aived. * 'll defenses shall be raised in the return, otherwise, they shall be deemed waived. $ec. 66. Prohibited Pleadings and Fotions. * The following pleadings and motions are prohibited+ 6. Fotion to dismiss1 ;. Fotion for e.tension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit, position paper and other pleadings1 =. #ilatory motion for postponement1 <. Fotion for a bill of particulars1 B. "ounterclaim or cross*claim1 9. Third*party complaint1 >. Reply1 7. Fotion to declare respondent in default1 C. (ntervention1 6@. Femorandum1 66. Fotion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief orders1 and 6;. Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order. T(. '.RAOD TO "A9. A R.TMR* #A**OT %. .BT.*D.D .B#.'T O* (A/(96 5.RATORAOM$ /ROM*D. The return shall also state other matters relevant to the investigation& its resolution and the prosecution of the case. A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed@ .ec. 00. Prohibited Pleadings and 'otions.) The following pleadings and motion are prohibited: 2a4 'otion to dismiss& 2b4 'otion for e8tension of time to file opposition$ affidavit$ position paper and other pleadings& 2c4 (ilatory motion for postponement& 2d4 'otion for a bill of particulars& 2e4 Counterclaim or cross)claim& 2f4 Third)party complaint& 2g4 1eply& 2h4 'otion to declare respondent in default& 2i4 #ntervention& 2"4 'emorandum& 2!4 'otion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief orders& and 2l4 Petition for certiorari$ mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order. The amendments to the 1ule shall ta!e effect on -ctober 9:$ 9;;< following its publication in three 2=4 newspapers of general circulation. -ctober 0>$ 9;;< $ec. 6;. :ffect of Failure to File Return. * (n case the respondent fails to file a return, the court, 2ustice or 2udge shall proceed to hear the petition e. parte. $ec. 6=. $ummary )earing. * The hearing on the petition shall be summary. )owever, the court, 2ustice or 2udge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties. The hearing shall be from day to day until completed and given the same priority as petitions for habeas corpus. $ec. 6<. (nterim Reliefs. * pon filing of the petition or at anytime before final 2udgment, the court, 2ustice or 2udge may grant any of the following reliefs+ (a) Temporary Protection ,rder. * The court, 2ustice or 2udge, upon motion or motu proprio, may order that the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family be protected in a government agency or by an accredited person or private institution capable of /eeping and securing their safety. (f the petitioner is an organi5ation, association or institution referred to in $ection =(c) of this Rule, the protection may be e.tended to the officers involved.

The $upreme "ourt shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall e.tend temporary protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family, in accordance with guidelines which it shall issue. The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules and conditions that may be imposed by the court, 2ustice or 2udge. (b) (nspection ,rder. * The court, 2ustice or 2udge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may order any person in possession or control of a designated land or other property, to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any relevant ob2ect or operation thereon. The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. (t shall be supported by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal /nowledge of the enforced disappearance or whereabouts of the aggrieved party. (f the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the information, the court, 2ustice or 2udge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition. The movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to establish the right of the aggrieved party alleged to be threatened or violated. The inspection order shall specify the person or persons authori5ed to ma/e the inspection and the date, time, place and manner of ma/ing the inspection and may prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all parties. The order shall e.pire five (B) days after the date of its issuance, unless e.tended for 2ustifiable reasons. (c) Production ,rder. * The court, 2ustice or 2udge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may order any person in possession, custody or control of any designated documents, papers, boo/s, accounts, letters, photographs, ob2ects or tangible things, or ob2ects in digiti5ed or electronic form, which constitute or contain evidence relevant to the petition or the return, to produce and permit their inspection, copying or photographing by or on behalf of the movant. The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the information, in which case the court, 2ustice or 2udge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition. The court, 2ustice or 2udge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all the parties. (d) &itness Protection ,rder. * The court, 2ustice or 2udge, upon motion or motu proprio, may refer the witnesses to the #epartment of Dustice for admission to the &itness Protection, $ecurity and ?enefit Program, pursuant to Republic 'ct !o. 9C76. The court, 2ustice or 2udge may also refer the witnesses to other government agencies, or to accredited persons or private institutions capable of /eeping and securing their safety. $ec. 6B. 'vailability of (nterim Reliefs to Respondent. * pon verified motion of the respondent and after due hearing, the court, 2ustice or 2udge may issue an inspection order or production order under paragraphs (b) and (c) of the preceding section. ' motion for inspection order under this section shall be supported by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal /nowledge of the defenses of the respondent. $ec. 69. "ontempt. * The court, 2ustice or 2udge may order the respondent who refuses to ma/e a return, or who ma/es a false return, or any person who otherwise disobeys or resists a lawful process or order of the court to be punished for contempt. The contemnor may be imprisoned or imposed a fine. $ec. 6>. ?urden of Proof and $tandard of #iligence Re0uired. * The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence. The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence as re0uired by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty. The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that e.traordinary diligence as re0uired by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty. The respondent public official or employee cannot invo/e the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed to evade responsibility or liability. $ec. 67. Dudgment. * The court shall render 2udgment within ten (6@) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision. (f the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate1 otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. $ec. 6C. 'ppeal. * 'ny party may appeal from the final 2udgment or order to the $upreme "ourt under Rule <B. The appeal may raise 0uestions of fact or law or both. The period of appeal shall be five (B) wor/ing days from the date of notice of the adverse 2udgment. The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas corpus cases. $ec. ;@. 'rchiving and Revival of "ases. * The court shall not dismiss the petition, but shall archive it, if upon its determination it cannot proceed for a valid cause such as the failure of petitioner or witnesses to appear due to threats on their lives. ' periodic review of the archived cases shall be made by the amparo court that shall, motu proprio or upon motion by any party, order their revival when ready for further proceedings. The petition shall be dismissed with pre2udice upon failure to prosecute the case after the lapse of two (;) years from notice to the petitioner of the order archiving the case. The cler/s of court shall submit to the ,ffice of the "ourt 'dministrator a consolidated list of archived cases under this Rule not later than the first wee/ of Danuary of every year.

$ec. ;6. (nstitution of $eparate 'ctions. * This Rule shall not preclude the filing of separate criminal, civil or administrative actions. $ec. ;;. :ffect of Filing of a "riminal 'ction. * &hen a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs under the writ shall be available by motion in the criminal case. The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the writ of amparo. $ec. ;=. "onsolidation. * &hen a criminal action is filed subse0uent to the filing of a petition for the writ, the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action. &hen a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subse0uent to a petition for a writ of amparo, the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action. 'fter consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to apply to the disposition of the reliefs in the petition. $ec. ;<. $ubstantive Rights. * This Rule shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights recogni5ed and protected by the "onstitution. $ec. ;B. $uppletory 'pplication of the Rules of "ourt. * The Rules of "ourt shall apply suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent with this Rule. $ec. ;9. 'pplicability to Pending "ases. * This Rule shall govern cases involving e.tralegal /illings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof pending in the trial and appellate courts. $ec. ;>. :ffectivity. * This Rule shall ta/e effect on ,ctober ;<, ;@@>, following its publication in three (=) newspapers of general circulation.
Republic of the Philippines $ PR:F: ", RT Fanila :! ?'!" '.F. !o. @>*C*6;*$" $eptember GH& G33>

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'cting on the recommendation of the "hairperson of the "ommittee on Revision of the Rules of "ourt submitting for this "ourt-s consideration and approval the proposed Rule on the &rit of 'mparo, the "ourt Resolved to 'PPR,8: the same. This Rule shall ta/e effect on ,ctober ;<, ;@@>, following its publication in three (=) newspapers of general circulation. $eptermber ;B, ;@@>.

($gd.) R:!'T, $. P !, #hief ,ustice

8.R. No. 146640

Fe+-)#-y 112 2010

8EN. ALEKANDER 6. 7ANO2 C&ie* o* St#**2 A-'e. Fo-ce$ o* t&e P&i i!!ine$2 LT. 8EN. ;ICTOR S. I6RADO2 Co''#n.in% 8ene-# 2 P&i i!!ine A-'y2 #n. MA9. 8EN. RALP: A. ;ILLANUE;A2 Co''#n.e-2 1t& In*#nt-y Di,i$ion2 P&i i!!ine A-'y2 Petitioners, vs. CLEOFAS SANC:E? #n. MARCIANA MEDINA2 Respondents.

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CARPIO MORALES2 J.:

,n #ecember ;7, ;@@>, respondent "leofas $anche5 ("leofas) filed before this "ourt a petition doc/eted as E.R. !o. 67@7=C for issuance of a &rit of 'mparo with Fotion for Production and (nspection directed against Een. )ermogenes :speron (Een. :speron), the then "hief of $taff of the 'rmed Forces of the Philippines ('FP). ,n Danuary ;, ;@@7, the "ourt6 resolved to issue a &rit of 'mparo and ordered Een. :speron to ma/e a verified return of the writ before "ourt of 'ppeals Dustice :dgardo $undiam, who was ordered to hear and decide the case which was eventually redoc/eted as "'*E.R. $P !o. @@@6@ &RG'. "leofas amended her petition; on Danuary 6<, ;@@7 to include herein co*respondent Farciana Fedina (Farciana) as therein additional petitioner, and to implead other military officers= including %t. 'li $umangil (%t. $umangil) and $gt. Eil 8illalobos< ($gt. 8illalobos) as therein additional respondents. (n the 'mended Petition, "leofas and Farciana (respondents) alleged that on $eptember 6>, ;@@9 at around 7+@@ p.m., their respective sons !icolas $anche5 and )eherson Fedina were catching frogs outside their home in $itio #alin, ?arangay ?ueno, "apas, Tarlac1 that at around 6+@@ a.m. of the ne.t day, $eptember 67, ;@@9, !icolas- IwivesI %ourde5 and Rosalie $anche5, who were then at home, heard gunshots and saw armed men in soldiersuniforms passing by1 that at around <+@@ a.m. of the same day, %ourde5 and Rosalie went out to chec/ on !icolas and )eherson but only saw their caps, slippers, pana and airgun for catching frogs, as well as bloodstains1 and that they immediately reported the matter to the barangay officials. Respondents narrated that they, together with other family members, proceeded on $eptember 6C, ;@@9 to the "apas $tation of the Philippine !ational Police (P!P). 'ccompanied by officials of the !ational "ommission on (ndigenous Peoples (!"(P), B they also tried to search for !icolas and )eherson at the "amp #etachment of the >6st (nfantry ?atallion of the Philippine 'rmy ('rmy) in ?arangay ?urgos, $an Dose, Tarlac, and at the "amp of the ?ravo "ompany of the 'rmy-s >6st (nfantry ?atallion inside )acienda %uisita, Tarlac "ity, but to no avail. Furthermore, respondents alleged that Dosephine Ealang 8ictoria, also /nown as 'ntonina Ealang (Dosephine), niece of a neighbor, later informed them that she had seen two men inside "amp $ervillano '0uino of the !orthern %u5on "ommand (!olcom) in $an Figuel, Tarlac "ity on $eptember ;6, ;@@9, whom Dosephine later identified as !icolas and )eherson (the victims) after respondents had shown her their photographs1 and that Dosephine informed them that she saw the victims again on $eptember ;<, ;@@9 and !ovember 6, ;@@9, 9 this time at the "amp of the ?ravo "ompany of the 'rmy-s >6st (nfantry ?atallion inside )acienda %uisita, where she had occasion to tal/ to %t. $umangil and $gt. 8illalobos. Respondents filed a case on #ecember ;6, ;@@9 before the "ommission on )uman Rights (")R), which endorsed > the same to the ,mbudsman for appropriate action. "ontending that the victims- life, liberty and security had been and continued to be violated on account of their forced disappearance, respondents prayed for the issuance of a writ of 'mparo, the production of the victims- bodies during the hearing on the &rit, the inspection of certain military camps,7 the issuance of temporary and permanent protection orders, and the rendition of 2udgment under $ection 67 of the Rule on the &rit of 'mparo. C Feanwhile, a consolidated Return of the &rit, 6@ verified by Een. :speron, %t. $umangil, $gt. 8illalobos, Fa2. Een. Duanito Eome5 (Fa2. Een. Eome5) as "ommander of the 'rmy-s >th (nfantry #ivision, and %t. "ol. 8ictor ?ayani (%t. "ol. ?ayani) as "amp "ommander of "amp $ervillano '0uino of the !olcom in Tarlac "ity, was filed with the appellate court on Danuary ;<, ;@@7. %t. Een. 'le.ander Aano (%t. Een. Aano), "ommanding Eeneral of the 'rmy, filed a Return of the &rit upon his return from an official trip abroad. (n their Return, the military officers denied having custody of the victims. They posited that the proper remedy of respondents was to file a petition for the issuance of a &rit of )abeas "orpus, since the petition-s ultimate ob2ective was the production of the bodies of the victims, as they were allegedly abducted and illegally detained by military personnel1 66 that the petition failed to indicate the matters re0uired by paragraphs (c), (d) and (e), $ection B of the Rule on the &rit of 'mparo, such that the allegations were incomplete to constitute a cause of action, aside from being based on mere hearsay evidence, and are, at best, speculative1 that respondents failed to present the affidavits of some other competent persons which would clearly validate their claim that the military violated the victims- right to life, liberty or security by abducting or detaining them1 and that the petition did not allege any specific action or inaction attributable to the military officers with respect to their duties1 or allege that respondents too/ any action by filing a formal complaint or visiting the military camps adverted to in order to verify Dosephine-s claim that she saw the victims on two different occasions inside the camps, or that they too/ efforts to follow up on the P!P "apas $tation-s further action on their complaint. 6; #enying he violated the victims- right to life, liberty and security, Een. :speron specifically asserted that, in compliance with the #efense $ecretary-s directive in relation to cases of &rit of 'mparo against the 'FP, he issued directives to the !olcom "ommander and the 'rmy-s "ommanding Eeneral to investigate and establish the circumstances surrounding reported disappearances of victims insofar as the claim on the possible involvement of the military units was concerned1 and undertoo/ to bring any military personnel involved, when warranted by the evidence, to the bar of 2ustice. 6= Fa2. Een. Eome5 li/ewise denied having custody or /nowledge of the whereabouts of the victims, stating that it was not army policy to abduct civilians in his area of responsibility, 6< and that he was away on official business at the time of the alleged disappearance of the victims.6B %t. "ol. ?ayani attested that he was designated "amp "ommander only on $eptember 6, ;@@> and thus had no personal /nowledge about the victimsalleged disappearance or abduction on $eptember 67, ;@@91 that he was informed by his immediate predecessor that no individuals were detained in the camp as it did not even have detention facilities1 and that in compliance with Een. :speron-s directive, their command was conducting further investigation to verify the allegations in the petition.69

%t. $umangil denied having spo/en to Dosephine inside the camp on $eptember ;<, ;@@9, on which date civilians were not allowed to enter e.cept on official missions or when duly authori5ed to conduct transactions inside the camp. )e thus concluded that Dosephine lied in claiming to have seen the two victims inside the "amp of the ?ravo "ompany of the >6st (nfantry ?atallion inside )acienda %uisita on $eptember ;<, ;@@9 or at any time thereafter. )e instead recounted that on $eptember ;<, ;@@9, he spo/e for the first and only time, but only at the gate of the camp, with a person who identified herself as I'ntonina Ealang,I who informed him about the disappearance of the victims since $eptember 67, ;@@9. &arning him that these men were members of the !ew People-s 'rmy (!P'), she advised him not to entertain any 0ueries or complaints relative to their alleged disappearance.6> $gt. 8illalobos echoed $umangil-s disclaimer about having any of the victims in his custody or meeting anyone named Dosephine 8ictoria, or about the latter having entered the camp-s /itchen to drin/ water. %t. Een. Aano stated that upon his return from his official functions overseas, he immediately in0uired on the actions ta/en on the case. )e averred that he had never participated directly or indirectly1 or consented, permitted or sanctioned any illegal or illegitimate military operations. )e declared that it had always been his policy to respect human rights and uphold the rule of law, and to bring those who violated the law before the court of 2ustice. (n opposing the re0uest for issuance of inspection and production orders, the military officers posited that apart from compromising national security should entry into these military campsGbases be allowed, these orders partoo/ of the nature of a search warrant, such that the re0uisites for the issuance thereof must be complied with prior to their issuance. They went on to argue that such re0uest relied solely on bare, self*serving and vague allegations contained in Dosephine-s affidavit, for aside from merely mentioning that she saw !icolas and )eherson on board an army truc/ near the !olcom gate and, days later, inside the /itchen of the >6st (nfantry ?attalion "amp inside )acienda %uisita and while logging outside said camp, Dosephine had stated nothing more to ascertain the veracity of the places where she allegedly saw !icolas and )eherson. 67 ,n whether the impleaded military officers were either directly or indirectly connected with the disappearance of the victims, the appellate court, after hearing, absolved, by the assailed #ecision of $eptember 6>, ;@@7,6C Een. :speron, %t. Een. Aano, Fa2. Een. Eome5, and %t. "ol. ?ayani for lac/ of evidence lin/ing them to the disappearances, and further ruled as follows+ 'll said, this "ourt is convinced that petitioners have not ade0uately and convincingly established any direct or indirect lin/ between respondents individual military officers and the disappearances of !icolas and )eherson.!either did the concerned Philippine 'rmy nits have e.erted fully their efforts to investigate and unearth the truth and bring the culprits before the bar of 2ustice. The concerned Philippine 'rmy units (such as the !orthern "ommand and the >th (nfantry #ivision, which had 2urisdiction over the place of disappearance of !icolas and )eherson, should e.ert e.traordinary diligence to follow all possible leads to solve the disappearances of !icolas and )eherson. The Philippine 'rmy should be reminded of its constitutional mandate as the protector of the people and the $tate. R:%(:F$ &hile as &e stated hereinbefore that &e could not find any lin/ between respondents individual military officers to the disappearance of !icolas and )eherson, nonetheless, the fact remains that the two men are still missing. )ence, &e find it e0uitable to grant petitioners some reliefs in the interest of human rights and 2ustice as follows+ 6. (nspections of the following camps+ "amp $ervillano '0uino, $an Figuel, Tarlac "ity, any military camp of the >th (nfantry #ivision located in '0ua Farm, )acienda %uisita, Tarlac "ity, within reasonable wor/ing hours of any day e.cept when the military camp is on red alert status. ;. Thorough and (mpartial (nvestigation for the appropriate (nvestigating nit of the Philippine 'rmy at "amp $ervillano '0uino and the Philippine 'rmy, >th (nfantry #ivision in Fort Fagsaysay to conduct their respective investigation of all angles pertaining to the disappearances of !icolas and )eherson and to immediately file charges against those found guilty and submit their written report to this "ourt within three (=) months from notice. $, ,R#:R:#.;@ (underscoring supplied) The military officers filed a Fotion for Partial Reconsideration (Fotion), arguing in the main that since respondents failed to prove the allegations in their petition by substantial evidence, the appellate court should not have granted those reliefs.;6 The appellate court denied the Fotion by the assailed Resolution of Farch =, ;@@C.;; Ta/ing up the cudgels for the military, Een. 'le.ander Aano,;= %t. Een. 8ictor (brado,;< and Fa2. Een. Ralph 8illanueva;B (petitioners) filed the present petition for review of the appellate court-s assailed issuances, faulting it for . . . !,T "'T:E,R("'%%A #:!A(!E T): PR(8(%:E: ,F T): &R(T ,F 'FP'R, P R$ '!T T, $:"T(,! 67 ,F T): R %: ,! T): &R(T ,F 'FP'R, #:$P(T: (T$ F(!#(!E T)'T R:$P,!#:!T$ F'(%:# T, PR,8: T):(R '%%:E'T(,!$ (! T):(R P:T(T(,! F,R 'FP'R, ?A $ ?$T'!T('% :8(#:!":. . . . R'!#S . . . #(R:"T(!E P:T(T(,!:R$ T,+ (') '%%,& R:$P,!#:!T$ T, (!$P:"T "'FP $:R8(%%'!, 'N (!,, !,RT) % L,! ",FF'!#, P)(%(PP(!: 'RFA, $'! F(E :%, T'R%'" "(TA '!# '!A F(%(T'RA "'FP ,F T): >th (!F'!TRA #(8($(,! %,"'T:# (! 'N ' F'RF, )'"(:!#' % ($(T', T'R%'" "(TA1 '!#. (?) ",!# "T T),R, E) '!# (FP'RT('% (!8:$T(E'T(,! ,F T): #($'PP:'R'!": ,F T): 'EER(:8:# P'RT(:$, F(%: ")'RE:$ 'E'(!$T T),$: F, !# E (%TA '!# $ ?F(T &R(TT:! R:P,RT &(T)(! T)R:: F,!T)$ FR,F !,T(":. ;9 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The "ourt finds merit in the petition. (n ruling in favor of %t. $umangil and $gt. 8illalobos, the appellate court resolved the case on the basis of the credibility of Dosephine as a witness. (t arrived at the following findings+ To prove that these two military officers too/ or have custody of !icolas and )eherson, petitioners presented Dosephine Ealang 8ictoria, also /nown as 'ntonina Ealang, a niece of petitioner "leofas $anche5- neighbor, who allegedly saw !icolas and )eherson inside "amp $ervillano '0uino on $eptember ;6, ;@@9 when she visited her uncle, a certain Fa2or )enry Ealang, who is allegedly living inside the camp1 that a few days later, she again saw !icolas and )eherson at '0ua Farm at )acienda %uisita, where the camp of ?ravo "ompany of the >6st (nfantry ?attalion is located and where )eherson was seen sweeping the floor and !icolas was seen coo/ing, having wounds in their legs near the feet as if sustained from a gunshot wound1 that on !ovember 6, ;@@9, she went bac/ upon advice of %t. $umangil to give her a cellfone which Tech. $gt. 8illalobos handed to her for her to /now where !icolas and )eherson will be brought1 that they RsicS saw the two outside getting some woods under the watchful eye of a soldier when $umangil /ic/ed !icolas for being slow and thereafter, she did not see the two anymore. &hile Dosephine Ealang 8ictoria-s story of how she saw the sub2ect two missing persons (!icolas and )eherson) appeared initially as plausible, however, her credibility as a witness had been successfully destroyed by the following witnesses presented by the respondents. 6) ?arangay "aptain Rodolfo P. $upan of "ut*"ut ((, Tarlac "ity, attested that she /nows a certain woman named Dosephine Ealang 8ictoria who introduces herself as 'ntonina Ealang, niece through the cousin of his wife and a long*time resident of "ut*"ut (( since birth until she lived with her partner Philip 8ictoria and they still visit and goes to her auntie or sibling-s house1 that he /nows the reputation of Dosephine 8ictoria as bad regarding her telling the truth, her truthfulness and integrity, /nown to fool others and invents stories for money reasons, that she cannot be trusted even if she is under oath before Eod and the $tate. ;) 's if that is not yet enough, Eloria Ealang Fansalay testified that she is a resident of "ut*"ut (( since birth in 6C9< and she /nows Dosephine Ealang 8ictoria because she is her niece being the daughter of her older brother1 that she even too/ care of 'ntonina as a child but her general reputation in telling the truth, her fidelity and integrity is bad, /nown to fool others, a liar and invent RsicS stories for reason of money. =) "larita Ealang Ricafrente saying that she is a resident of "ut*cut (( and 'ntonina Ealang is a niece and attested the same negative reputations against 'ntonina. (t appears that said negative testimonies of Dosephine Ealang 8ictoria-s relatives were never successfully rebutted by her and the "ourt gives credence to them. !o ill motive RsicS were established against the said witnesses to testify against 'ntonina Ealang. Furthermore, 'ntonina Ealang stated that she was in "amp $ervillano '0uino when she first saw !icolas and )eherson riding in an army truc/ because she was visiting her uncle, Fa2or )enry Ealang, allegedly living in the camp. Parenthetically, this story of 'ntonina Ealang was put to doubt. T$E :dgard Reyes who attested that as a meter reader in the camp, Fa2or Ealang was no longer residing there in $eptember ;@@9. This testimony and revelation of T$E Reyes only bolstered the testimonies of the other witnesses on 'ntonina Ealang-s penchant to invent stories or tell a lie. (n sum, &e are not inclined to give credence to the claims of 'ntonina Ealang that the two missing person RsicS she saw first in "amp $ervillano '0uino and later, in '0ua Farm, were !icolas and )eherson. !otably, 'ntonina Ealang never did see the faces of the two but were /nown to her through photographs. "ertainly, there may be a difference between photographs and the faces in person. To be noted also is that even the two wives of !icolas did not ma/e an e.press attestation that they saw !icolas and )eherson in the company of those armed men who passed their place in the early morning of $eptember 67, ;@@9.;> (underscoring supplied) !,T'?%A, respondents neither moved for reconsideration nor appealed the appellate court-s $eptember 6>, ;@@7 #ecision. The entrenched procedural rule in this 2urisdiction is that a party who did not appeal cannot assign such errors as are designed to have the 2udgment modified. 'll that said appellee can do is to ma/e a counter*assignment of errors or to argue on issues raised at the trial only for the purpose of sustaining the 2udgment in his favor, even on grounds not included in the decision of the court a 8uo or raised in the appellant-s assignment of errors or arguments.;7 This tenet is enshrined as one of the basic principles in our rules of procedure, specifically to avoid ambiguity in the presentation of issues, facilitate the setting forth of arguments by the parties, and aid the court in ma/ing its determinations. ' party who fails to ac0uire complete relief from a decision of the court has various remedies to correct an omission by the court. )e may move for a correction or clarification of 2udgment, or even see/ its modification through ordinary appeal. There is thus no basis for the "ourt to s/ip the rule and e.cuse herein respondents for failure to properly avail themselves of the remedies in the face of the parties- contentions that have remained disputed.;C &hat is thus left for the "ourt to resolve is the issue of whether the grant of the R:%(:F$ =@ by the appellate court after finding want of substantial evidence are valid and proper. $ections 6> and 67 of the 'mparo Rule lay down the re0uisite standard of proof necessary to prove either party-s claim, vi5+ $:". 6>. ?urden of Proof and $tandard of #iligence Re0uired. * The parties shall establish their claim by substantial evidence. The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence as re0uired by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.

The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that e.traordinary diligence as re0uired by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty. The respondent public official or employee cannot invo/e the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed to evade responsibility or liability. $:". 67. Dudgment. * The "ourt shall render 2udgment within ten (6@) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision. (f the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate1 otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) The re0uisite standard of proof substantial evidence * spea/s of the clear intent of the Rule to have the e0uivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit 2udicially conducted, in resolving amparo petitions. To the appellate court, the evidence adduced in the present case failed to measure up to that standard substantial evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as ade0uate to support a conclusion. $ince respondents did not avail of any remedy against the adverse 2udgment, the appellate court-s decision is, insofar as it concerns them, now beyond the ambit of review. Feanwhile, the re0uirement for a government official or employee to observe e.traordinary diligence in the performance of duty stresses the e.traordinary measures e.pected to be ta/en in safeguarding every citi5en-s constitutional rights as well as in the investigation of cases of e.tra*2udicial /illings and enforced disappearances.=6 The failure to establish that the public official observed e.traordinary diligence in the performance of duty does not result in the automatic grant of the privilege of the amparo writ. (t does not relieve the petitioner from establishing his or her claim by substantial evidence. The omission or inaction on the part of the public official provides, however, some basis for the petitioner to move and for the court to grant certain interim reliefs. (n line with this, $ection 6< of the 'mparo Rule provides for inte-i' o- !-o,i$ion# -e ie*$ that the courts may grant in order to, inter alia, protect the witnesses and the rights of the parties, and preserve all relevant evidence, vi5+ $:". 6<. Anterim Reliefs. J reliefs+ pon filing of the petition o- #t #nyti'e +e*o-e *in# B).%'ent , the court, 2ustice or 2udge may grant any of the following

(a) Temporary 'rotection Order. J The court, 2ustice or 2udge, upon motion or motu proprio, may order that the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family be protected in a government agency or by an accredited person or private institution capable of /eeping and securing their safety. (f the petitioner is an organi5ation, association or institution referred to in $ection = (c) of this Rule, the protection may be e.tended to the officers involved. The $upreme "ourt shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall e.tend temporary protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family, in accordance with guidelines which it shall issue. The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules and conditions that may be imposed by the court, 2ustice or 2udge. (b) Anspection Order. J The court, 2ustice or 2udge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may order any person in possession or control of a designated land or other property, to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any relevant ob2ect or operation thereon. The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. (t shall be supported by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal /nowledge of the enforced disappearance or whereabouts of the aggrieved party. (f the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the information, the court, 2ustice or 2udge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition. The movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to establish the right of the aggrieved party alleged to be threatened or violated. The inspection order shall specify the person or persons authori5ed to ma/e the inspection and the date, time, place and manner of ma/ing the inspection and may prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all parties. The order shall e.pire five (B) days after the date of its issuance, unless e.tended for 2ustifiable reasons. (c) 'roduction Order. J The court, 2ustice, or 2udge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may order any person in possession, custody or control of any designated documents, papers, boo/s, accounts, letters, photographs, ob2ects or tangible things, or ob2ects in digiti5ed or electronic form, which constitute or contain evidence relevant to the petition or the return, to produce and permit their inspection, copying or photographing by or on behalf of the movant. The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the information, in which case the court, 2ustice or 2udge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition. The court, 2ustice or 2udge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all the parties. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

These provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a 2udicious determination of the amparo petition. For the appellate court to, in the present case, still order the inspection of the military camps and order the army units to conduct an investigation into the disappearance of !icolas and )eherson after it absolved petitioners is thus not in order. The reliefs granted by the appellate court to respondents are not in sync with a finding that petitioners could not be held accountable for the disappearance of the victims. Respondents posit that there appears to be some shared confusion as to whether the reliefs granted by the appellate court are final or interlocutory. They thus implore this "ourt to modify the appellate court-s 2udgment by considering the reliefs as temporary or interlocutory and by adding thereto an order for the production of logboo/s and reports.=; 't this late stage, respondents can no longer avail themselves of their stale remedies in the guise of praying for affirmative reliefs in their "omment. !o modification of 2udgment could be granted to a party who did not appeal.== (f respondents believed that the $eptember 6>, ;@@7 #ecision of the appellate court was merely interlocutory, they had every opportunity to 0uestion the conclusion of said court, but they did not. They could have opposed petitioners- motion for reconsideration filed with the appellate court, it being a prohibited pleading=< under the 'mparo Rule, but they did not. &):R:F,R:, the petition is ER'!T:#. The assailed $eptember 6>, ;@@7 #ecision and Farch =, ;@@C Resolution of the "ourt of 'ppeals, insofar as it grants the assailed earlier*0uoted reliefs are SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.
CONC:ITA CARPIO MORALES 'ssociate Dustice

8.R. No. 140506

Octo+e- 12 2004

T:E SECRETAR7 OF NATIONAL DEFENSE2 T:E C:IEF OF STAFF2 ARMED FORCES OF T:E P:ILIPPINES2 petitioners, vs. RA7MOND MANALO #n. RE7NALDO MANALO2 respondents.

#:"($(,!

PUNO2 C.J.3

&hile victims of enforced disappearances are separated from the rest of the world behind secret walls, they are not separated from the constitutional protection of their basic rights. The constitution is an overarching s/y that covers all in its protection. The case at bar involves the rights to life, liberty and security in the first petition for a writ of Amparo filed before this "ourt. This is an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule <B of the Rules of "ourt in relation to $ection 6C 6 of the Rule on the &rit of Amparo, see/ing to reverse and set aside on both 0uestions of fact and law, the #ecision promulgated by the "ourt of 'ppeals in ".'. E.R. A5'ARO !o. @@@@6, entitled IRaymond Fanalo and Reynaldo Fanalo, petitioners, versus The $ecretary of !ational #efense, the "hief of $taff, 'rmed Forces of the Philippines, respondents.I This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, (n2unction, and Temporary Restraining ,rder (TR,) ; filed before this "ourt by herein respondents (therein petitioners) on 'ugust ;=, ;@@> to stop herein petitioners (therein respondents) andGor their officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. Therein petitioners also sought ancillary remedies, Protective "ustody ,rders, 'ppointment of "ommissioner, (nspection and 'ccess ,rders, and all other legal and e0uitable reliefs under 'rticle 8(((, $ection B(B) = of the 6C7> "onstitution and Rule 6=B, $ection 9 of the Rules of "ourt. (n our Resolution dated 'ugust ;<, ;@@>, we (6) ordered the $ecretary of the #epartment of !ational #efense and the "hief of $taff of the 'FP, their agents, representatives, or persons acting in their stead, including but not limited to the "iti5ens 'rmed Forces Eeographical nit ("'FE ) to submit their "omment1 and (;) en2oined them from causing the arrest of therein petitioners, or otherwise restricting, curtailing, abridging, or depriving them of their right to life, liberty, and other basic rights as guaranteed under 'rticle (((, $ection 6< of the 6C7> "onstitution.B &hile the 'ugust ;=, ;@@> Petition was pending, the Rule on the &rit of Amparo too/ effect on ,ctober ;<, ;@@>. Forthwith, therein petitioners filed a Fanifestation and ,mnibus Fotion to Treat :.isting Petition as AmparoPetition, to 'dmit $upporting 'ffidavits, and to Erant (nterim and Final Amparo Reliefs. They prayed that+ (6) the petition be considered a Petition for the &rit of Amparo under $ec. ;99 of the Amparo Rule1 (;) the "ourt issue the writ commanding therein respondents to ma/e a verified return within the period provided by law and containing the specific matter re0uired by law1 (=) they be granted the interim reliefs allowed by the Amparo Rule and all other reliefs prayed for in the petition but not covered by the Amparo Rule1 (<) the "ourt, after hearing, render 2udgment as re0uired in $ec. 67> of the Amparo Rule1 and (B) all other 2ust and e0uitable reliefs.7 ,n ,ctober ;B, ;@@>, the "ourt resolved to treat the 'ugust ;=, ;@@> Petition as a petition under the AmparoRule and further resolved, vi2+ &):R:F,R:, let a &R(T ,F 'FP'R, be issued to respondents re0uiring them to file with the "' ("ourt of 'ppeals) a verified written return within five (B) wor/ing days from service of the writ. &e R:F'!# the petition to the "' and designate the #ivision of 'ssociate Dustice %ucas P. ?ersamin to conduct the summary hearing on the petition on !ovember 7, ;@@> at ;+@@ p.m. and decide the petition in accordance with the Rule on the &rit of Amparo.C ,n #ecember ;9, ;@@>, the "ourt of 'ppeals rendered a decision in favor of therein petitioners (herein respondents), the dispositive portion of which reads, vi2+ ACCORDIN8L7, the PRI;ILE8E OF T:E @RIT OF AMPARO is 8RANTED. The respondents SECRETAR7 OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and AFP C:IEF OF STAFF are hereby R:N (R:#+ 6. To furnish to the petitioners and to this "ourt within five days from notice of this decision all official and unofficial reports of the investigation underta/en in connection with their case, e.cept those already on file herein1 ;. To confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of FG$gt )ilario a/a Rollie "astillo and #onald "aigas within five days from notice of this decision. =. To cause to be produced to this "ourt all medical reports, records and charts, reports of any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the petitioners, to include a list of medical and (sic) personnel (military and civilian) who attended to them from February 6<, ;@@9 until 'ugust 6;, ;@@> within five days from notice of this decision. The compliance with this decision shall be made under the signature and oath of respondent 'FP "hief of $taff or his duly authori5ed deputy, the latterHs authority to be e.press and made apparent on the face of the sworn compliance with this directive. $, ,R#:R:#.6@ )ence, this appeal. (n resolving this appeal, we first unfurl the facts as alleged by herein respondents+ Respondent Raymond Fanalo recounted that about one or two wee/s before February 6<, ;@@9, several uniformed and armed soldiers and members of the "'FE summoned to a meeting all the residents of their barangay in $an (delfonso, ?ulacan. Respondents were not able to attend as they were not informed of the gathering, but Raymond saw some of the soldiers when he passed by the barangay hall.66

,n February 6<, ;@@9, Raymond was sleeping in their house in ?uhol na Fangga, $an (ldefonso, ?ulacan. 't past noon, several armed soldiers wearing white shirts, fatigue pants and army boots, entered their house and roused him. They as/ed him if he was ?estre, but his mother, :ster Fanalo, replied that he was Raymond, not ?estre. The armed soldier slapped him on both chee/s and nudged him in the stomach. )e was then handcuffed, brought to the rear of his house, and forced to the ground face down. )e was /ic/ed on the hip, ordered to stand and face up to the light, then forcibly brought near the road. )e told his mother to follow him, but three soldiers stopped her and told her to stay. 6; 'mong the men who came to ta/e him, Raymond recogni5ed brothers Fichael de la "ru5, Fadning de la "ru5, IPutiI de la "ru5, and IPulaI de la "ru5, who all acted as loo/out. They were all members of the "'FE and residing in Fanu5on, $an (ldefonso, ?ulacan. )e also recogni5ed brothers Randy Fendo5a and Rudy Fendo5a, also members of the "'FE . &hile he was being forcibly ta/en, he also saw outside of his house two barangaycouncilors, Pablo "unanan and ?ernardo %ingasa, with some soldiers and armed men.6= The men forced Raymond into a white %=@@ van. ,nce inside, he was blindfolded. ?efore being blindfolded, he saw the faces of the soldiers who too/ him. %ater, in his 67 months of captivity, he learned their names. The one who drove the van was Ri5al )ilario alias Rollie "astillo, whom he estimated was about <@ years of age or older. The leader of the team who entered his house and abducted him was IEanata.I )e was tall, thin, curly*haired and a bit old. 'nother one of his abductors was IEeorgeI who was tall, thin, white*s/inned and about =@ years old. 6< The van drove off, then came to a stop. ' person was brought inside the van and made to sit beside Raymond. ?oth of them were beaten up. ,n the road, he recogni5ed the voice of the person beside him as his brother ReynaldoHs. The van stopped several times until they finally arrived at a house. Raymond and Reynaldo were each brought to a different room. &ith the doors of their rooms left open, Raymond saw several soldiers continuously hitting his brother Reynaldo on the head and other parts of his body with the butt of their guns for about 6B minutes. 'fter which, Reynaldo was brought to his (RaymondHs) room and it was his (RaymondHs) turn to be beaten up in the other room. The soldiers as/ed him if he was a member of the !ew PeopleHs 'rmy. :ach time he said he was not, he was hit with the butt of their guns. )e was 0uestioned where his comrades were, how many soldiers he had /illed, and how many !P' members he had helped. :ach time he answered none, they hit him. 6B (n the ne.t days, RaymondHs interrogators appeared to be high officials as the soldiers who beat him up would salute them, call them Isir,I and treat them with respect. )e was in blindfolds when interrogated by the high officials, but he saw their faces when they arrived and before the blindfold was put on. )e noticed that the uniform of the high officials was different from those of the other soldiers. ,ne of those officials was tall and thin, wore white pants, tie, and leather shoes, instead of combat boots. )e spo/e in Tagalog and /new much about his parents and family, and a habeas corpus case filed in connection with the respondentsH abduction. 69 &hile these officials interrogated him, Raymond was not manhandled. ?ut once they had left, the soldier guards beat him up. &hen the guards got drun/, they also manhandled respondents. #uring this time, Raymond was fed only at night, usually with left*over and rotten food.6> ,n the third wee/ of respondentsH detention, two men arrived while Raymond was sleeping and beat him up. They doused him with urine and hot water, hit his stomach with a piece of wood, slapped his forehead twice with a .<B pistol, punched him on the mouth, and burnt some parts of his body with a burning wood. &hen he could no longer endure the torture and could hardly breathe, they stopped. They then sub2ected Reynaldo to the same ordeal in another room. ?efore their torturers left, they warned Raymond that they would come bac/ the ne.t day and /ill him. 67 The following night, Raymond attempted to escape. )e waited for the guards to get drun/, then made noise with the chains put on him to see if they were still awa/e. &hen none of them came to chec/ on him, he managed to free his hand from the chains and 2umped through the window. )e passed through a helipad and firing range and stopped near a fishpond where he used stones to brea/ his chains. 'fter wal/ing through a forested area, he came near a river and an (glesia ni Mristo church. )e tal/ed to some women who were doing the laundry, as/ed where he was and the road to Eapan. )e was told that he was in Fort Fagsaysay. 6C )e reached the highway, but some soldiers spotted him, forcing him to run away. The soldiers chased him and caught up with him. They brought him to another place near the entrance of what he saw was Fort Fagsaysay. )e was bo.ed repeatedly, /ic/ed, and hit with chains until his bac/ bled. They poured gasoline on him. Then a so*called IFamI or IFadamI suddenly called, saying that she wanted to see Raymond before he was /illed. The soldiers ceased the torture and he was returned inside Fort Fagsaysay where Reynaldo was detained. ;@ For some wee/s, the respondents had a respite from all the torture. Their wounds were treated. &hen the wounds were almost healed, the torture resumed, particularly when respondentsH guards got drun/.;6 Raymond recalled that sometime in 'pril until Fay ;@@9, he was detained in a room enclosed by steel bars. )e stayed all the time in that small room measuring 6 . ; meters, and did everything there, including urinating, removing his bowels, bathing, eating and sleeping. )e counted that eighteen people;; had been detained in thatbartolina, including his brother Reynaldo and himself.;= For about three and a half months, the respondents were detained in Fort Fagsaysay. They were /ept in a small house with two rooms and a /itchen. ,ne room was made into the bartolina. The house was near the firing range, helipad and mango trees. 't dawn, soldiers marched by their house. They were also sometimes detained in what he only /new as the I#T .I;< 't the #T , a male doctor came to e.amine respondents. )e chec/ed their body and eyes, too/ their urine samples and mar/ed them. &hen as/ed how they were feeling, they replied that they had a hard time urinating, their stomachs were aching, and they felt other pains in their body. The ne.t day, two ladies in white arrived. They also e.amined respondents and gave them medicines, including orasol, amo.icillin and mefenamic acid. They brought with them the results of respondentsH urine test and advised them to drin/ plenty of water and ta/e their medicine. The two ladies returned a few more times. Thereafter, medicines were sent through the ImasterI of the #T , IFasterI #el Rosario alias "arinyoso at Puti. Respondents were /ept in the #T for about two wee/s. &hile there, he met a soldier named :fren who said that Een. Palparan ordered him to monitor and ta/e care of them. ;B ,ne day, Ri5al )ilario fetched respondents in a Revo vehicle. They, along with :fren and several other armed men wearing fatigue suits, went to a detachment in Pinaud, $an (ldefonso, ?ulacan. Respondents were detained for one or two wee/s in a big two*storey house. )ilario and :fren stayed with them. &hile there, Raymond was beaten up by )ilarioHs men.;9 From Pinaud, )ilario and :fren brought respondents to $apang, $an Figuel, ?ulacan on board the Revo. They were detained in a big unfinished house inside the compound of IMapitanI for about three months. &hen they arrived in $apang, Een. Palparan tal/ed to them. They were brought out of the house to a bas/etball court in the center of the compound and made to sit. Een. Palparan was already waiting, seated. )e was about two armsH length away from respondents. )e began by as/ing if respondents felt well already, to which Raymond replied in the affirmative. )e as/ed Raymond if he /new

him. Raymond lied that he did not. )e then as/ed Raymond if he would be scared if he were made to face Een. Palparan. Raymond responded that he would not be because he did not believe that Een. Palparan was an evil man.;> Raymond narrated his conversation with Een. Palparan in his affidavit, vi2+ Tinanong a/o ni Een. Palparan, I!gayon na /aharap mo na a/o, di /a ba natata/ot sa a/inKI $umagot a/ong, I$iyempre po, natata/ot din...I $abi ni Een. Palparan+ I$ige, bibigyan /o /ayo ng isang pag/a/ataon na mabuhay, bastaHt sundin nHyo ang lahat ng sasabihin /o... sabihin mo sa magulang mo * huwag pumunta sa mga rali, sa hearing, sa Marapatan at sa )uman Right dahil nilolo/o lang /ayo. $abihin sa magulang at lahat sa bahay na huwag palo/o doon. Tulungan /ami na /ausapin si ?estre na sumu/o na sa gobyerno.I;7 Respondents agreed to do as Een. Palparan told them as they felt they could not do otherwise. 't about =+@@ in the morning, )ilario, :fren and the formerHs men * the same group that abducted them * brought them to their parentsH house. Raymond was shown to his parents while Reynaldo stayed in the Revo because he still could not wal/. (n the presence of )ilario and other soldiers, Raymond relayed to his parents what Een. Palparan told him. 's they were afraid, RaymondHs parents acceded. )ilario threatened RaymondHs parents that if they continued to 2oin human rights rallies, they would never see their children again. The respondents were then brought bac/ to $apang. ;C &hen respondents arrived bac/ in $apang, Een. Palparan was about to leave. )e was tal/ing with the four ImastersI who were there+ 'rman, Eanata, )ilario and "abalse.=@ &hen Een. Palparan saw Raymond, he called for him. )e was in a big white vehicle. Raymond stood outside the vehicle as Een. Palparan told him to gain bac/ his strength and be healthy and to ta/e the medicine he left for him and Reynaldo. )e said the medicine was e.pensive at Php=B.@@ each, and would ma/e them strong. )e also said that they should prove that they are on the side of the military and warned that they would not be given another chance.=6 #uring his testimony, Raymond identified Een. Palparan by his picture.=; ,ne of the soldiers named 'rman made Raymond ta/e the medicine left by Een. Palparan. The medicine, named I'live,I was green and yellow. Raymond and Reynaldo were each given a bo. of this medicine and instructed to ta/e one capsule a day. 'rman chec/ed if they were getting their dose of the medicine. The I'liveI made them sleep each time they too/ it, and they felt heavy upon wa/ing up.== 'fter a few days, )ilario arrived again. )e too/ Reynaldo and left Raymond at $apang. 'rman instructed Raymond that while in $apang, he should introduce himself as I,scar,I a military trainee from $ariaya, Nue5on, assigned in ?ulacan. &hile there, he saw again Eanata, one of the men who abducted him from his house, and got ac0uainted with other military men and civilians.=< 'fter about three months in $apang, Raymond was brought to "amp Tecson under the ;< th (nfantry ?attalion. )e was fetched by three unidentified men in a big white vehicle. :fren went with them. Raymond was then blindfolded. 'fter a =@*minute ride, his blindfold was removed. "hains were put on him and he was /ept in the barrac/s.=B The ne.t day, RaymondHs chains were removed and he was ordered to clean outside the barrac/s. (t was then he learned that he was in a detachment of the Rangers. There were many soldiers, hundreds of them were training. )e was also ordered to clean inside the barrac/s. (n one of the rooms therein, he met $herlyn "adapan from %aguna. $he told him that she was a student of the niversity of the Philippines and was abducted in )agonoy, ?ulacan. $he confided that she had been sub2ected to severe torture and raped. $he was crying and longing to go home and be with her parents. #uring the day, her chains were removed and she was made to do the laundry. =9 'fter a wee/, Reynaldo was also brought to "amp Tecson. Two days from his arrival, two other captives, Maren :mpeOo and Fanuel Ferino, arrived. Maren and Fanuel were put in the room with I'llanI whose name they later came to /now as #onald "aigas, called ImasterI or IcommanderI by his men in the ;<th (nfantry ?attalion. Raymond and Reynaldo were put in the ad2oining room. 't times, Raymond and Reynaldo were threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten up. (n the daytime, their chains were removed, but were put bac/ on at night. They were threatened that if they escaped, their families would all be /illed.=> ,n or about ,ctober 9, ;@@9, )ilario arrived in "amp Tecson. )e told the detainees that they should be than/ful they were still alive and should continue along their Irenewed life.I ?efore the hearing of !ovember 9 or 7, ;@@9, respondents were brought to their parents to instruct them not to attend the hearing. )owever, their parents had already left for Fanila. Respondents were brought bac/ to "amp Tecson. They stayed in that camp from $eptember ;@@9 to !ovember ;@@9, and Raymond was instructed to continue using the name I,scarI and holding himself out as a military trainee. )e got ac0uainted with soldiers of the ;<th (nfantry ?attalion whose names and descriptions he stated in his affidavit.=7 ,n !ovember ;;, ;@@9, respondents, along with $herlyn, Maren, and Fanuel, were transferred to a camp of the ;< th (nfantry ?attalion in %imay, ?ataan. There were many huts in the camp. They stayed in that camp until Fay 7, ;@@>. $ome soldiers of the battalion stayed with them. &hile there, battalion soldiers whom Raymond /new as IFarI and I?illyI beat him up and hit him in the stomach with their guns. $herlyn and Maren also suffered enormous torture in the camp. They were all made to clean, coo/, and help in raising livestoc/. =C Raymond recalled that when I,peration %ubogI was launched, "aigas and some other soldiers brought him and Fanuel with them to ta/e and /ill all sympathi5ers of the !P'. They were brought to ?arangay ?ayan*bayanan, ?ataan where he witnessed the /illing of an old man doing )aingin. The soldiers said he was /illed because he had a son who was a member of the !P' and he coddled !P' members in his house. <@ 'nother time, in another I,peration %ubog,I Raymond was brought to ?arangay ,rion in a house where !P' men stayed. &hen they arrived, only the old man of the house who was sic/ was there. They spared him and /illed only his son right before RaymondHs eyes.<6 From %imay, Raymond, Reynaldo, $herlyn, Maren, and Fanuel were transferred to Lambales, in a safehouse near the sea. "aigas and some of his men stayed with them. ' retired army soldier was in charge of the house. %i/e in %imay, the five detainees were made to do errands and chores. They stayed in Lambales from Fay 7 or C, ;@@> until Dune ;@@>.<;

(n Dune ;@@>, "aigas brought the five bac/ to the camp in %imay. Raymond, Reynaldo, and Fanuel were tas/ed to bring food to detainees brought to the camp. Raymond narrated what he witnessed and e.perienced in the camp,vi2+ (sang gabi, sinabihan /ami ni #onald ("aigas) na matulog na /ami. !a/ita /o si #onald na inaayos ang /anyang baril, at nilagyan ng silenser. $abi ni #onald na /ung mayroon man /aming ma/ita o marinig, walang nangyari. Minaumagahan, na/ita naming ang bang/ay ng isa sa mga bihag na dinala sa /ampo. Fayroong binuhos sa /anyang /atawan at itoHy sinunog. Fasansang ang amoy. Fa/araan ang isang lingo, dalawang bang/ay and ibinaba ng mga unipormadong sundalo mula sa 9 . 9 na tra/ at dinala sa loob ng /ampo. Fay naiwang mga ba/as ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bang/ay. !aamoy /o iyon nang nililinis ang ba/as. Fa/alipas ang isa o dalawang lingo, may dinu/ot sila na dalawang (ta. (tinali sila sa labas ng /ubo, piniringan, i/inadena at labis na binugbog. !a/ita /ong na/ata/as ang isa sa /anila at binaril siya ng sundalo ngunit hindi siya tinamaan. (yong gabi na/ita /ong pinatay nila iyong isang (ta malapit sa Post =1 sinilaban ang bang/ay at ibinaon ito. Pag/alipas ng halos 6 buwan, ; pang bang/ay ang dinala sa /ampo. (binaba ang mga bang/ay mula sa pic/ up tra/, dinala ang mga bang/ay sa labas ng ba/od. Minaumagahan na/ita /ong mayroong sinilaban, at napa/amasangsang ang amoy. Fay na/ilala rin a/ong 6 retiradong /oronel at 6 /asama niya. Pina/ain /o sila. $abi nila sa a/in na dinu/ot sila sa ?ataan. (yong gabi, inilabas sila at hindi /o na sila na/ita. ... ... ... (/inadena /ami ng = araw. $a i/atlong araw, nilabas ni %at si Fanuel dahil /a/ausapin daw siya ni Een. Palparan. !a/apiring si Fanuel, wala siyang suot pang*itaas, pinosasan. !ila/asan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasa/yan. #i nagtagal, narinig /o ang hiyaw o ungol ni Fanuel. $umilip a/o sa isang haligi ng /amalig at na/ita /ong sinisilaban si Fanuel. Minaumagahan, na/a*/adena pa /ami. Tinanggal ang mga /adena mga = o < na araw pag/alipas. $inabi sa amin na /aya /ami na/a/adena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo /ung papatayin /ami o hindi. Tinanggal ang aming /adena. Minausap /ami ni #onald. Tinanong /ami /ung ano ang sabi ni Fanuel sa amin. $abi ni #onald huwag na raw naming hanapin ang dalawang babae at si Fanuel, dahil mag/a/asama na yung tatlo. $abi pa ni #onald na /ami ni Reynaldo ay magbagong buhay at ituloy namin ni Reynaldo ang trabaho. $a gabi, hindi na /ami /ina/adena.<= ,n or about Dune 6=, ;@@>, Raymond and Reynaldo were brought to Pangasinan, ostensibly to raise poultry for #onald ("aigas). "aigas told respondents to also farm his land, in e.change for which, he would ta/e care of the food of their family. They were also told that they could farm a small plot ad2oining his land and sell their produce. They were no longer put in chains and were instructed to use the names Rommel (for Raymond) and Rod (for Reynaldo) and represent themselves as cousins from Ri5al, %aguna. << Respondents started to plan their escape. They could see the highway from where they stayed. They helped farm ad2oining lands for which they were paid Php;@@.@@ or Php<@@.@@ and they saved their earnings. &hen they had saved Php6,@@@.@@ each, Raymond as/ed a neighbor how he could get a cellular phone as he wanted to e.change te.t messages with a girl who lived nearby. ' phone was pawned to him, but he /ept it first and did not use it. They earned some more until they had saved Php6,<@@.@@ between them. There were four houses in the compound. Raymond and Reynaldo were housed in one of them while their guards lived in the other three. "aigas entrusted respondents to !onong, the head of the guards. RespondentsH house did not have electricity. They used a lamp. There was no television, but they had a radio. (n the evening of 'ugust 6=, ;@@>, !onong and his cohorts had a drin/ing session. 't about 6+@@ a.m., Raymond turned up the volume of the radio. &hen none of the guards awo/e and too/ notice, Raymond and Reynaldo proceeded towards the highway, leaving behind their sleeping guards and bar/ing dogs. They boarded a bus bound for Fanila and were thus freed from captivity. <B Reynaldo also e.ecuted an affidavit affirming the contents of RaymondHs affidavit insofar as they related to matters they witnessed together. Reynaldo added that when they were ta/en from their house on February 6<, ;@@9, he saw the faces of his abductors before he was blindfolded with his shirt. )e also named the soldiers he got ac0uainted with in the 67 months he was detained. &hen Raymond attempted to escape from Fort Fagsaysay, Reynaldo was severely beaten up and told that they were indeed members of the !P' because Raymond escaped. &ith a .<B caliber pistol, Reynaldo was hit on the bac/ and punched in the face until he could no longer bear the pain. 't one point during their detention, when Raymond and Reynaldo were in $apang, Reynaldo was separated from Raymond and brought to Pinaud by Ri5al )ilario. )e was /ept in the house of Mapitan, a friend of )ilario, in a mountainous area. )e was instructed to use the name IRodelI and to represent himself as a military trainee from Feycauayan, ?ulacan. $ometimes, )ilario brought along Reynaldo in his trips. ,ne time, he was brought to a mar/et in $an Dose, del Fonte, ?ulacan and made to wait in the vehicle while )ilario was buying. )e was also brought to Tondo, Fanila where )ilario delivered bo.es of I'liveI in different houses. (n these trips, )ilario drove a blac/ and red vehicle. Reynaldo was blindfolded while still in ?ulacan, but allowed to remove the blindfold once outside the province. (n one of their trips, they passed by Fort Fagsaysay and "amp Tecson where Reynaldo saw the sign board, I&elcome to "amp Tecson.I<9 #r. ?enito Folino, F.#., corroborated the accounts of respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Fanalo. #r. Folino speciali5ed in forensic medicine and was connected with the Fedical 'ction Eroup, an organi5ation handling cases of human rights violations, particularly cases where torture was involved. )e was re0uested by an !E, to conduct medical e.aminations on the respondents after their escape. )e first as/ed them about their ordeal, then proceeded with the physical e.amination. )is findings showed that the scars borne by respondents were consistent with their account of physical in2uries inflicted upon them. The e.amination was conducted on 'ugust 6B, ;@@>, two days after respondentsH escape, and the results thereof were reduced into writing. #r. Folino too/ photographs of the scars. )e testified that he followed the (stanbul Protocol in conducting the e.amination. <>

Petitioners dispute respondentsH account of their alleged abduction and torture. (n compliance with the ,ctober ;B, ;@@> Resolution of the "ourt, they filed a Return of the &rit of Amparo admitting the abduction but denying any involvement therein, vi2+ 6=. Petitioners Raymond and Reynaldo Fanalo were not at any time arrested, forcibly abducted, detained, held incommunicado, disappeared or under the custody by the military. This is a settled issue laid to rest in the habeas corpus case filed in their behalf by petitionersH parents before the "ourt of 'ppeals in ".'.*E.R. $P !o. C<<=6 against FG$gt. Ri5al )ilario a/a Rollie "astillo, as head of the ;< th (nfantry ?attalion1 Fa2. Een. Dovito Palparan, as "ommander of the > th (nfantry #ivision in %u5on1 %t. Een. )ermogenes :speron, in his capacity as the "ommanding Eeneral of the Philippine 'rmy, and members of the "iti5ens 'rmed Forces Eeographical nit ("'FE ), namely+ Fichael dela "ru5, Puti dela "ru5, Fadning dela "ru5, Pula dela "ru5, Randy Fendo5a and Rudy Fendo5a. The respondents therein submitted a return of the writ... ,n Duly <, ;@@9, the "ourt of 'ppeals dropped as party respondents %t. Een. )ermogenes ". :speron, Dr., then "ommanding Eeneral of the Philippine 'rmy, and on $eptember 6C, ;@@9, Fa2. (sic) Dovito $. Palparan, then "ommanding Eeneral, > th (nfantry #ivision, Philippine 'rmy, stationed at Fort Fagsaysay, Palayan "ity, !ueva :ci2a, upon a finding that no evidence was introduced to establish their personal involvement in the ta/ing of the Fanalo brothers. (n a #ecision dated Dune ;>, ;@@>..., it e.onerated FG$gt. Ri5al )ilario a/a Rollie "astillo for lac/ of evidence establishing his involvement in any capacity in the disappearance of the Fanalo brothers, although it held that the remaining respondents were illegally detaining the Fanalo brothers and ordered them to release the latter. <7 'ttached to the Return of the &rit was the affidavit of therein respondent (herein petitioner) $ecretary of !ational #efense, which attested that he assumed office only on 'ugust 7, ;@@> and was thus unaware of the Fanalo brothersH alleged abduction. )e also claimed that+ >. The $ecretary of !ational #efense does not engage in actual military directional operations, neither does he underta/e command directions of the 'FP units in the field, nor in any way micromanage the 'FP operations. The principal responsibility of the $ecretary of !ational #efense is focused in providing strategic policy direction to the #epartment (bureaus and agencies) including the 'rmed Forces of the Philippines1 7. (n connection with the &rit of Amparo issued by the )onorable $upreme "ourt in this case, ( have directed the "hief of $taff, 'FP to institute immediate action in compliance with $ection C(d) of the AmparoRule and to submit report of such compliance... %i/ewise, in a Femorandum #irective also dated ,ctober =6, ;@@>, ( have issued a policy directive addressed to the "hief of $taff, 'FP that the 'FP should adopt the following rules of action in the event the &rit of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the 'FP+ (6) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party1 (;) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible1 (=) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or disappearance1 (<) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance1 (B) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance1 and (9) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.<C Therein respondent 'FP "hief of $taff also submitted his own affidavit, attached to the Return of the &rit, attesting that he received the above directive of therein respondent $ecretary of !ational #efense and that acting on this directive, he did the following+ =.6. 's currently designated "hief of $taff, 'rmed Forces of the Philippines ('FP), ( have caused to be issued directive to the units of the 'FP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the petitioners. =.;. ( have caused the immediate investigation and submission of the result thereof to )igher head0uarters andGor direct the immediate conduct of the investigation on the matter by the concerned unitGs, dispatching Radio Fessage on !ovember @B, ;@@>, addressed to the "ommanding Eeneral, Philippine 'rmy ((nfo+ ",F!,%",F, "E, >6# P' and ", ;< (? P'). ' "opy of the Radio Fessage is attached as '!!:T I=I of this 'ffidavit. =.=. &e underta/e to provide result of the investigations conducted or to be conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the persons in whose favor the &rit of Amparo has been sought for as soon as the same has been furnished )igher head0uarters. =.<. ' parallel investigation has been directed to the same units relative to another Petition for the &rit of Amparo (E.R. !o. 6>CCC<) filed at the instance of relatives of a certain "adapan and :mpeOo pending before the $upreme "ourt. =.B. ,n the part of the 'rmed Forces, this respondent will e.ert earnest efforts to establish the surrounding circumstances of the disappearances of the petitioners and to bring those responsible, including any military personnel if shown to have participated or had complicity in the commission of the complained acts, to the bar of 2ustice, when warranted by the findings and the competent evidence that may be gathered in the process.B@ 'lso attached to the Return of the &rit was the affidavit of %t. "ol. Felipe 'nontado, (!F (E$") P', earlier filed in E.R. !o. 6>CCC<, another Amparo case in this "ourt, involving "adapan, :mpeOo and Ferino, which averred among others, vi2+

6@) pon reading the allegations in the Petition implicating the ;< th (nfantry ?atallion detachment as detention area, ( immediately went to the ;<th (? detachment in %imay, ?ataan and found no untoward incidents in the area nor any detainees by the name of $herlyn "adapan, Maren :mpeOo and Fanuel Ferino being held captive1 66) There was neither any reports of any death of Fanuel Ferino in the ;<th (? in %imay, ?ataan1 6;) 'fter going to the ;<th (? in %imay, ?ataan, we made further in0uiries with the Philippine !ational Police, %imay, ?ataan regarding the alleged detentions or deaths and were informed that none was reported to their good office1 6=) ( also directed "ompany "ommander 6st %t. Romeo Publico to in0uire into the alleged beachhouse in (ba, Lambales also alleged to be a detention place where $herlyn "adapan, Maren :mpeOo and Fanuel Ferino were detained. 's per the in0uiry, however, no such beachhouse was used as a detention place found to have been used by armed men to detain "adapan, :mpeOo and Ferino. B6 (t was e.plained in the Return of the &rit that for lac/ of sufficient time, the affidavits of Fa2. Een Dovito $. Palparan (Ret.), FG$gt. Ri5al )ilario a/a Rollie "astillo, and other persons implicated by therein petitioners could not be secured in time for the submission of the Return and would be subse0uently submitted.B; )erein petitioners presented a lone witness in the summary hearings, %t. "ol. Ruben . Dimene5, Provost Farshall, > th (nfantry #ivision, Philippine 'rmy, based in Fort Fagsaysay, Palayan "ity, !ueva :ci2a. The territorial 2urisdiction of this #ivision covers !ueva :ci2a, 'urora, ?ataan, ?ulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac and a portion of Pangasinan.B= The ;<th (nfantry ?attalion is part of the >th (nfantry #ivision.B< ,n Fay ;9, ;@@9, %t. "ol. Dimene5 was directed by the "ommanding Eeneral of the > th (nfantry #ivision, Fa2. Een. Dovito Palaran, BB through his 'ssistant "hief of $taff,B9 to investigate the alleged abduction of the respondents by "'FE au.iliaries under his unit, namely+ "'' Fichael de la "ru51 "'' Roman de la "ru5, a/a Puti1 "'' Fa.imo de la "ru5, a/a Pula1 "'' Randy Fendo5a1 e.*"'' Farcelo de la "ru5 a/a Fadning1 and a civilian named Rudy Fendo5a. )e was directed to determine+ (6) the veracity of the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Fanalo by the alleged elements of the "'FE au.iliaries1 and (;) the administrative liability of said au.iliaries, if any. B>Dimene5 testified that this particular investigation was initiated not by a complaint as was the usual procedure, but because the "ommanding Eeneral saw news about the abduction of the Fanalo brothers on the television, and he was concerned about what was happening within his territorial 2urisdiction.B7 Dimene5 summoned all si. implicated persons for the purpose of having them e.ecute sworn statements and conducting an investigation on Fay ;C, ;@@9.BC The investigation started at 7+@@ in the morning and finished at 6@+@@ in the evening. 9@ The investigating officer, Technical $gt. :duardo %ingad, too/ the individual sworn statements of all si. persons on that day. There were no other sworn statements ta/en, not even of the Fanalo family, nor were there other witnesses summoned and investigated96 as according to Dimene5, the directive to him was only to investigate the si. persons.9; Dimene5 was beside %ingad when the latter too/ the statements. 9= The si. persons were not /nown to Dimene5 as it was in fact his first time to meet them.9< #uring the entire time that he was beside %ingad, a subordinate of his in the ,ffice of the Provost Farshall, Dimene5 did not propound a single 0uestion to the si. persons.9B Dimene5 testified that all si. statements were ta/en on Fay ;C, ;@@9, but Farcelo Fendo5a and Rudy Fendo5a had to come bac/ the ne.t day to sign their statements as the printing of their statements was interrupted by a power failure. Dimene5 testified that the two signed on Fay =@, ;@@9, but the 2urats of their statements indicated that they were signed on Fay ;C, ;@@9. 99 &hen the $worn $tatements were turned over to Dimene5, he personally wrote his investigation report. )e began writing it in the afternoon of Fay =@, ;@@9 and finished it on Dune 6, ;@@9. 9> )e then gave his report to the ,ffice of the "hief of Personnel.97 's petitioners largely rely on Dimene5Hs (nvestigation Report dated Dune 6, ;@@9 for their evidence, the report is herein substantially 0uoted+ (((. ?'"MER, !# ,F T): "'$: <. This pertains to the abduction of R'AF,!# F'!'%, and R:A!'%#, F'!'%, who were forcibly ta/en from their respective homes in ?rgy. ?uhol na Fangga, $an (ldefonso, ?ulacan on 6< February ;@@9 by unidentified armed men and thereafter were forcibly disappeared. 'fter the said incident, relatives of the victims filed a case for 'bduction in the civil court against the herein suspects+ Fichael dela "ru5, Fadning dela "ru5, Puti #ela "ru5, Pula #ela "ru5, Randy Fendo5a and Rudy Fendo5a as alleged members of the "iti5en 'rmed Forces Eeographical nit ("'FE ). a) $worn statement of "'' Fa.imo F. dela "ru5, a/a Pula dated ;C Fay ;@@9 in (:.hibit I?I) states that he was at $itio Fo5on, ?rgy. ?ohol na Fangga, $an (ldefonso, ?ulacan doing the concrete building of a church located nearby his residence, together with some neighbor thereat. )e claims that on 6B February ;@@9, he was being informed by ?rgy. Magawad Pablo mayan about the abduction of the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Fanalo. 's to the allegation that he was one of the suspects, he claims that they only implicated him because he was a "'FE and that they claimed that those who abducted the Fanalo brothers are members of the Filitary and "'FE . $ub2ect vehemently denied any participation or involvement on the abduction of said victims. b) $worn statement of "'' Roman dela "ru5 y Faustino '/a Puti dtd ;C Fay ;@@9 in (:.hibit I"I) states that he is a resident of $itio Fu5on, ?rgy. ?uhol na Fangga, $an (ldefonso, ?ulacan and a "'' member based at ?ia/ na ?ato #etachment, $an Figuel, ?ulacan. )e claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Fanalo being his neighbors are active membersGsympathi5ers of the "PPG!P' and he also /nows their elder Rolando Fanalo X M' ?:$TR: of being an !P' %eader operating in their province. That at the time of the alleged abduction of the two (;) brothers and for accusing him to be one of the suspects, he claims that on February 6<, ;@@9, he was one of those wor/ing at the concrete chapel being constructed nearby his residence. )e claims further that he 2ust came only to /now about the incident on other day (6B Feb @9) when he was being informed by Magawad Pablo Munanan. That sub2ect "'' vehemently denied any participation about the incident and claimed that they only implicated him because he is a member of the "'FE .

c) $worn $tatement of "'' Randy Fendo5a y %ingas dated ;C Fay ;@@9 in (:.hibit I,I) states that he is a resident of ?rgy. ?uhol na Fangga, $an (ldefonso, ?ulacan and a member of "'FE based at ?ia/ na ?ato #etachment. That being a neighbor, he was very much aware about the bac/ground of the two (;) brothers Raymond and Reynaldo as active supporters of the "PP !P' in their ?rgy. and he also /new their elder brother IM F'!#:R ?:$TR:I T!+ Rolando Fanalo. ?eing one of the accused, he claims that on 6< February ;@@9, he was at ?rgy. Fagmarate, $an Figuel, ?ulacan in the house of his aunt and he learned only about the incident when he arrived home in their place. )e claims further that the only reason why they implicated him was due to the fact that his mother has filed a criminal charge against their brother Rolando Fanalo X M' ?:$TR: who is an !P' "ommander who /illed his father and for that reason they implicated him in support of their brother. $ub2ect "'' vehemently denied any involvement on the abduction of said Fanalo brothers. d) $worn $tatement of Rudy Fendo5a y %ingasa dated Fay ;C, ;@@9 in (:.hibit I:I) states that he is a resident of ?rgy. Farung/o, 'ngat, ?ulacan. )e claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Fanalo are familiar to him being his barriomate when he was still unmarried and he /new them since childhood. ?eing one of the accused, he claims that on 6< February ;@@9, he was at his residence in ?rgy. Farung/o, 'ngat, ?ulacan. )e claims that he was being informed only about the incident lately and he was not aware of any reason why the two (;) brothers were being abducted by alleged members of the military and "'FE . The only reason he /nows why they implicated him was because there are those people who are angry with their family particularly victims of summary e.ecution (/illing) done by their brother X M' ?estre Rolando Fanalo who is an !P' leader. )e claims further that it was their brother X M' ?:$TR: who /illed his father and he was living witness to that incident. $ub2ect civilian vehemently denied any involvement on the abduction of the Fanalo brothers. e) $worn statement of :.*"'' Farcelo dala "ru5 dated ;C Fay ;@@9 in (:.hibit IFI) states that he is a resident of $itio Fu5on, ?rgy. ?uhol na Fangga, $an (ldefonso, ?ulacan, a farmer and a former "'' based at ?ia/ na ?ato, $an Figuel, ?ulacan. )e claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Fanalo are familiar to him being their barrio mate. )e claims further that they are active supporters of "PPG!P' and that their brother Rolando Fanalo X M' ?:$TR: is an !P' leader. ?eing one of the accused, he claims that on 6< February ;@@9, he was in his residence at $itio Fu5on, ?rgy. ?uhol na Fangga, $an (ldefonso, ?ulacan. That he vehemently denied any participation of the alleged abduction of the two (;) brothers and learned only about the incident when rumors reached him by his barrio mates. )e claims that his implication is merely fabricated because of his relationship to Roman and Fa.imo who are his brothers. f) $worn statement of Fichael dela "ru5 y Faustino dated ;C Fay ;@@9 in (:.hibit IEI) states that he is a resident of $itio Fu5on, ?rgy. ?uhol na Fangga, $an (ldefonso, ?ulacan, the "hief of ?rgy. Tanod and a "'FE member based at ?ia/ na ?ato #etachment, $an Figuel, ?ulacan. )e claims that he /new very well the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Fanalo in their barangay for having been the Tanod "hief for twenty (;@) years. )e alleged further that they are active supporters or sympathi5ers of the "PPG!P' and whose elder brother Rolando Fanalo X M' ?:$TR: is an !P' leader operating within the area. ?eing one of the accused, he claims that on 6< Feb ;@@9 he was helping in the construction of their concrete chapel in their place and he learned only about the incident which is the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Fanalo when one of the ?rgy. Magawad in the person of Pablo "unanan informed him about the matter. )e claims further that he is truly innocent of the allegation against him as being one of the abductors and he considers everything fabricated in order to destroy his name that remains loyal to his service to the government as a "'' member. (8. #($" $$(,! B. ?ased on the foregoing statements of respondents in this particular case, the proof of lin/ing them to the alleged abduction and disappearance of Raymond and Reynaldo Fanalo that transpired on 6< February ;@@9 at $itio Fu5on, ?rgy. ?uhol na Fangga, $an (ldefonso, ?ulacan, is unsubstantiated. Their alleged involvement theretofore to that incident is considered doubtful, hence, no basis to indict them as charged in this investigation. Though there are previous grudges between each families (sic) in the past to 0uote+ the /illing of the father of Randy and Rudy Fendo5a by X M' ?:$TR: T!+ Rolando Fanalo, this will not suffice to establish a fact that they were the ones who did the abduction as a form of revenge. 's it was also stated in the testimony of other accused claiming that the Fanalos are active sympathi5ersGsupporters of the "PPG!P', this would not also mean, however, that in the first place, they were in connivance with the abductors. ?eing their neighbors and as members of "'FE Hs, they ought to be vigilant in protecting their village from any intervention by the leftist group, hence inside their village, they were fully aware of the activities of Raymond and Reynaldo Fanalo in so far as their connection with the "PPG!P' is concerned. 8. ",!"% $(,! 9. Premises considered surrounding this case shows that the alleged charges of abduction committed by the above named respondents has not been established in this investigation. )ence, it lac/s merit to indict them for any administrative punishment andGor criminal liability. (t is therefore concluded that they are innocent of the charge. 8(. R:",FF:!#'T(,!$ >. That "''s Fichael F. dela "ru5, Fa.imo F. #ela "ru5, Roman dela "ru5, Randy Fendo5a, and two (;) civilians Fa.imo F. #ela "ru5 and Rudy %. Fendo5a be e.onerated from the case. 7. pon approval, this case can be dropped and closed.9C (n this appeal under Rule <B, petitioners 0uestion the appellate courtHs assessment of the foregoing evidence and assail the #ecember ;9, ;@@> #ecision on the following grounds, vi2+ (.

T): ", RT ,F 'PP:'%$ $:R(, $%A '!# ER(:8, $%A :RR:# (! ?:%(:8(!E '!# E(8(!E F %% F'(T) '!# "R:#(T T, T): (!"R:#(?%:, !",RR,?,R'T:#, ",!TR'#("T:#, '!# ,?8(, $%A $"R(PT:#, R:):'R$:# '!# $:%F*$:R8(!E 'FF(#'8(TGT:$T(F,!A ,F ):R:(! R:$P,!#:!T R'AF,!# F'!'%,. ((. T): ", RT ,F 'PP:'%$ $:R(, $%A '!# ER(:8, $%A :RR:# (! R:N (R(!E R:$P,!#:!T$ ():R:(! P:T(T(,!:R$) T,+ (') F R!($) T, T): F'!'%, ?R,T):R($) '!# T, T): ", RT ,F 'PP:'%$ '%% ,FF("('% '!# !,FF("('% R:P,RT$ ,F T): (!8:$T(E'T(,! !#:RT'M:! (! ",!!:"T(,! &(T) T):(R "'$:, :T":PT T),$: '%R:'#A (! F(%: &(T) T): ", RT1 (?) ",!F(RF (! &R(T(!E T): PR:$:!T P%'":$ ,F ,FF("('% '$$(E!F:!T ,F FG$ET. )(%'R(, a/a R,%%(: "'$T(%%, '!# #,!'%# "'(E'$1 '!# (") "' $: T, ?: PR,# ":# T, T): ", RT ,F 'PP:'%$ '%% F:#("'% R:P,RT$, R:",R#$ '!# ")'RT$, '!# R:P,RT$ ,F '!A TR:'TF:!T E(8:! ,R R:",FF:!#:# '!# F:#("(!:$ PR:$"R(?:#, (F '!A, T, T): F'!'%, ?R,T):R$, T, (!"% #: ' %($T ,F F:#("'% P:R$,!!:% (F(%(T'RA '!# "(8(%('!) &), 'TT:!#:# T, T):F FR,F F:?R 'RA 6<, ;@@9 !T(% ' E $T 6;, ;@@>.>@ The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule on the &rit of Amparo (Amparo Rule). %et us hear/en to its beginning. The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition in the recommendations that resulted from a two*day !ational "onsultative $ummit on :.tra2udicial Millings and :nforced #isappearances sponsored by the "ourt on Duly 69*6>, ;@@>. The $ummit was Ienvisioned to provide a broad and fact*based perspective on the issue of e.tra2udicial /illings and enforced disappearances,I >6 hence Irepresentatives from all sides of the political and social spectrum, as well as all the sta/eholders in the 2ustice systemI>; participated in mapping out ways to resolve the crisis. ,n ,ctober ;<, ;@@>, the "ourt promulgated the Amparo Rule Iin light of the prevalence of e.tralegal /illing and enforced disappearances.I >= (t was an e.ercise for the first time of the "ourtHs e.panded power to promulgate rules to protect our peopleHs constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in the 6C7> "onstitution in response to the Filipino e.perience of the martial law regime. >< 's the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of Ie.tralegal /illingsI and Ienforced disappearances,I its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. I:.tralegal /illingsI are I/illings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or 2udicial proceedings.I >B ,n the other hand, Ienforced disappearancesI are Iattended by the following characteristics+ an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organi5ed groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect ac0uiescence of the government1 the refusal of the $tate to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to ac/nowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.I>9 The writ of Amparo originated in Fe.ico. IAmparoI literally means IprotectionI in $panish.>> (n 67=>, de Toc0uevilleHs Democracy in America became available in Fe.ico and stirred great interest. (ts description of the practice of 2udicial review in the .$. appealed to many Fe.ican 2urists. >7 ,ne of them, Fanuel "rescencio Re2Yn, drafted a constitutional provision for his native state, Aucatan, >C which granted 2udges the power to protect all persons in the en2oyment of their constitutional and legal rights. This idea was incorporated into the national constitution in 67<>, vi2+ The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the Republic in the e.ercise and preservation of those rights granted to him by this "onstitution and by laws enacted pursuant hereto, against attac/s by the %egislative and :.ecutive powers of the federal or state governments, limiting themselves to granting protection in the specific case in litigation, ma/ing no general declaration concerning the statute or regulation that motivated the violation.7@ $ince then, the protection has been an important part of Fe.ican constitutionalism. 76 (f, after hearing, the 2udge determines that a constitutional right of the petitioner is being violated, he orders the official, or the officialHs superiors, to cease the violation and to ta/e the necessary measures to restore the petitioner to the full en2oyment of the right in 0uestion. Amparo thus combines the principles of 2udicial review derived from the .$. with the limitations on 2udicial power characteristic of the civil law tradition which prevails in Fe.ico. (t enables courts to enforce the constitution by protecting individual rights in particular cases, but prevents them from using this power to ma/e law for the entire nation.7; The writ of Amparo then spread throughout the &estern )emisphere, gradually evolving into various forms, in response to the particular needs of each country.7= (t became, in the words of a 2ustice of the Fe.ican Federal $upreme "ourt, one piece of Fe.icoHs self*attributed Itas/ of conveying to the worldHs legal heritage that institution which, as a shield of human dignity, her own painful history conceived.I 7< &hat began as a protection against acts or omissions of public authorities in violation of constitutional rights later evolved for several purposes+ (6) Amparo libertad for the protection of personal freedom, e0uivalent to the habeas corpus writ1 (;) Amparo contra leyes for the 2udicial review of the constitutionality of statutes1 (=) Amparo casacion for the 2udicial review of the constitutionality and legality of a 2udicial decision1 (<) Amparo administrativo for the 2udicial review of administrative actions1 and (B) Amparo agrario for the protection of peasantsH rights derived from the agrarian reform process.7B (n %atin 'merican countries, e.cept "uba, the writ of Amparo has been constitutionally adopted to protect against human rights abuses especially committed in countries under military 2untas. (n general, these countries adopted an all*encompassing writ to protect the whole gamut of constitutional rights, including socio*economic rights.79,ther countries li/e "olombia, "hile, Eermany and $pain, however, have chosen to limit the protection of the writ of Amparo only to some constitutional guarantees or fundamental rights.7> (n the Philippines, while the 6C7> "onstitution does not e.plicitly provide for the writ of Amparo, several of the above Amparo protections are guaranteed by our charter. The second paragraph of 'rticle 8(((, $ection 6 of the 6C7> "onstitution, the Erave 'buse "lause, provides for the 2udicial power Ito determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac/ or e.cess of 2urisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Eovernment.I The "lause accords a similar general protection to human rights e.tended by the 'mparo contra leyes, Amparo casacion, and Amparo administrativo. Amparo libertad is comparable to the remedy of habeas corpus found in several provisions of the 6C7> "onstitution.77 The "lause is an offspring of the .$. common law tradition of 2udicial review, which finds its roots in the 67@= case of M#-+)-y ,. M#.i$on.7C &hile constitutional rights can be protected under the Erave 'buse "lause through remedies of in2unction or prohibition under Rule 9B of the Rules of "ourt and a petition for habeas corpus under Rule 6@;,C@ these remedies may not be ade0uate to address the pestering problem of e.tralegal /illings and enforced disappearances. )owever, with the swiftness re0uired to resolve a petition for a writ of Amparo through summary proceedings and the

availability of appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under the Amparo Rule, this hybrid writ of the common law and civil law traditions * borne out of the %atin 'merican and Philippine e.perience of human rights abuses * offers a better remedy to e.tralegal /illings and enforced disappearances and threats thereof. The remedy provides rapid 2udicial relief as it parta/es of a summary proceeding that re0uires only substantial evidence to ma/e the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner1 it is not an action to determine criminal guilt re0uiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages re0uiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility re0uiring substantial evidence that will re0uire full and e.haustive proceedings.C6 The writ of Amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of e.tralegal /illings and enforced disappearances. (t is preventive in that it brea/s the e.pectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses1 it is curative in that it facilitates the subse0uent punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subse0uent investigation and action. (n the long run, the goal of both the preventive and curative roles is to deter the further commission of e.tralegal /illings and enforced disappearances. (n the case at bar, respondents initially filed an action for IProhibition, (n2unction, and Temporary Restraining ,rderI C; to stop petitioners andGor their officers and agents from depriving the respondents of their right to liberty and other basic rights on 'ugust ;=, ;@@>, C= prior to the promulgation of the Amparo Rule. They also sought ancillary remedies including Protective "ustody ,rders, 'ppointment of "ommissioner, (nspection and 'ccess ,rders and other legal and e0uitable remedies under 'rticle 8(((, $ection B(B) of the 6C7> "onstitution and Rule 6=B, $ection 9 of the Rules of "ourt. &hen the Amparo Rule came into effect on ,ctober ;<, ;@@>, they moved to have their petition treated as an Amparo petition as it would be more effective and suitable to the circumstances of the Fanalo brothersH enforced disappearance. The "ourt granted their motion. &ith this bac/drop, we now come to the arguments of the petitioner. PetitionersH first argument in disputing the #ecision of the "ourt of 'ppeals states, vi2+ The "ourt of 'ppeals seriously and grievously erred in believing and giving full faith and credit to the incredible uncorroborated, contradicted, and obviously scripted, rehearsed and self*serving affidavitGtestimony of herein respondent Raymond Fanalo. C< (n delving into the veracity of the evidence, we need to mine and refine the ore of petitionersH cause of action, to determine whether the evidence presented is metal*strong to satisfy the degree of proof re0uired. $ection 6 of the Rule on the &rit of Amparo provides for the following causes of action, vi2+ $ection 6. 'etition. * The petition for a writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person whose -i%&t to i*e2 i+e-ty #n. $ec)-ity i$ ,io #te. o- t&-e#tene. /it& ,io #tion by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover e.tralegal /illings and en*o-ce. .i$#!!e#-#nce$ o- t&-e#t$ t&e-eo*. (emphasis supplied) $ections 6> and 67, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof re0uired, vi2+ $ec. 6>. %urden of 'roof and $tandard of Diligence Re8uired. * The parties shall establish their claims by$)+$t#nti# e,i.ence. ... ... ... $ec. 67. ,udgment. * ... (f the # e%#tion$ in t&e !etition #-e !-o,en +y $)+$t#nti# e,i.ence , the court shall %-#nt the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate1 ot&e-/i$e, the privilege shall be .enie.. (emphases supplied) $ubstantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as ade0uate to support a conclusion. CB 'fter careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the findings of the "ourt of 'ppeals that respondents were abducted from their houses in $ito Fu5on, ?rgy. ?uhol na Fangga, $an (ldefonso, ?ulacan on February 6<, ;@@9 and were continuously detained until they escaped on 'ugust 6=, ;@@>. The abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated by respondent Raymond Fanalo in a clear and convincing manner. )is account is dotted with countless candid details of respondentsH harrowing e.perience and tenacious will to escape, captured through his different senses and etched in his memory. ' few e.amples are the following+ I$umilip a/o sa isang haligi ng /amalig at na/ita /ong sinisilaban si Fanuel.I C9 I(!)ila/asan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasa/yan. #i nagtagal, narinig /o ang hiyaw o ungol ni Fanuel.I C> IFay naiwang mga ba/as ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bang/ay. !aamoy /o iyon nang nililinis ang ba/as.I C7 ITumigil a/o sa may palaisdaan /ung saan ginamit /o ang bato para tanggalin ang mga /adena.ICC ITinanong /o sa isang /apit*bahay /ung paano a/o ma/a/a/uha ng cell phone1 sabi /o gusto /ong i*te.t ang isang babae na na/atira sa malapit na lugar.I6@@ &e affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent Raymond FanaloHs affidavit and testimony, vi2+ ...the abduction was perpetrated by armed men who were sufficiently identified by the petitioners (herein respondents) to be military personnel and "'FE au.iliaries. Raymond recalled that the si. armed men who barged into his house through the rear door were military men based on their attire of fatigue pants and army boots, and the "'FE au.iliaries, namely+ Fichael de la "ru5, Fadning de la "ru5, Puti de la "ru5 and Pula de la "ru5, all members of the "'FE and residents of Fu5on, $an (ldefonso, ?ulacan, and the brothers Randy Fendo5a and Rudy Fendo5a, also "'FE members, served as loo/outs during the abduction. Raymond was sure that three of the si. military men were Eanata, who headed the abducting team, )ilario, who drove the van, and Eeorge. $ubse0uent incidents of their long captivity, as narrated by the petitioners, validated their assertion of the participation of the elements of the > th (nfantry #ivision, Philippine 'rmy, and their "'FE au.iliaries. &e are convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction was the suspicion that the petitioners were either members or sympathi5ers of the !P', considering that the abductors were loo/ing for Ma ?estre, who turned out to be Rolando, the brother of petitioners.

The efforts e.erted by the Filitary "ommand to loo/ into the abduction were, at best, merely superficial. The investigation of the Provost Farshall of the >th (nfantry #ivision focused on the one*sided version of the "'FE au.iliaries involved. This one*sidedness might be due to the fact that the Provost Farshall could delve only into the participation of military personnel, but even then the Provost Farshall should have refrained from outrightly e.culpating the "'FE au.iliaries he perfunctorily investigated... Een. PalparanHs participation in the abduction was also established. 't the very least, he was aware of the petitionersH captivity at the hands of men in uniform assigned to his command. (n fact, he or any other officer tendered no controversion to the firm claim of Raymond that he (Een. Palparan) met them in person in a safehouse in ?ulacan and told them what he wanted them and their parents to do or not to be doing. Een. PalparanHs direct and personal role in the abduction might not have been shown but his /nowledge of the dire situation of the petitioners during their long captivity at the hands of military personnel under his command bespo/e of his indubitable command policy that unavoidably encouraged and not merely tolerated the abduction of civilians without due process of law and without probable cause. (n the habeas proceedings, the "ourt, through the Former $pecial $i.th #ivision (Dustices ?u5on, chairman1 $antiago*%agman, $r., member1 and Romilla*%onto/, Dr., memberGponente.) found no clear and convincing evidence to establish that FG$gt. Ri5al )ilario had anything to do with the abduction or the detention. )ilarioHs involvement could not, indeed, be then established after :vangeline Francisco, who allegedly saw )ilario drive the van in which the petitioners were boarded and ferried following the abduction, did not testify. ($ee the decision of the habeas proceedings at rollo, p. B;) )owever, in this case, Raymond attested that )ilario drove the white %*=@@ van in which the petitioners were brought away from their houses on February 6<, ;@@9. Raymond also attested that )ilario participated in subse0uent incidents during the captivity of the petitioners, one of which was when )ilario fetched them from Fort Fagsaysay on board a Revo and conveyed them to a detachment in Pinaud, $an (ldefonso, ?ulacan where they were detained for at least a wee/ in a house of strong materials (:.hibit #, rollo, p. ;@B) and then )ilario (along with :fren) brought them to $apang, $an Figuel, ?ulacan on board the Revo, to an unfinished house inside the compound of Mapitan where they were /ept for more or less three months. (:.hibit #, rollo, p. ;@B) (t was there where the petitioners came face to face with Een. Palparan. )ilario and :fren also brought the petitioners one early morning to the house of the petitionersH parents, where only Raymond was presented to the parents to relay the message from Een. Palparan not to 2oin anymore rallies. ,n that occasion, )ilario warned the parents that they would not again see their sons should they 2oin any rallies to denounce human rights violations. (:.hibit #, rollo, pp. ;@B*;@9) )ilario was also among four Faster $ergeants (the others being 'rman, Eanata and "abalse) with whom Een. Palparan conversed on the occasion when Een. Palparan re0uired Raymond to ta/e the medicines for his health. (:.hibit #, rollo, p. ;@9) There were other occasions when the petitioners saw that )ilario had a direct hand in their torture. (t is clear, therefore, that the participation of )ilario in the abduction and forced disappearance of the petitioners was established. The participation of other military personnel li/e 'rman, Eanata, "abalse and "aigas, among others, was similarly established. ... ... ... 's to the "'FE au.iliaries, the habeas "ourt found them personally involved in the abduction. &e also do, for, indeed, the evidence of their participation is overwhelming.6@6 &e re2ect the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond FanaloHs statements were not corroborated by other independent and credible pieces of evidence.6@; RaymondHs affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo Fanalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared by forensic specialist #r. Folino, and the pictures of the scars left by the physical in2uries inflicted on respondents, 6@= also corroborate respondentsH accounts of the torture they endured while in detention. Respondent Raymond FanaloHs familiarity with the facilities in Fort Fagsaysay such as the I#T ,I as shown in his testimony and confirmed by %t. "ol. Dimene5 to be the I#ivision Training nit,I 6@< firms up respondentsH story that they were detained for some time in said military facility. (n O-ti" ,. 8)#te'# #,6@B a case decided by the (nter*'merican "ommission on )uman Rights, the "ommission considered similar evidence, among others, in finding that complainant $ister #iana ,rti5 was abducted and tortured by agents of the Euatemalan government. (n this case, $ister ,rti5 was /idnapped and tortured in early !ovember 6C7C. The "ommissionHs findings of fact were mostly based on the consistent and credible statements, written and oral, made by $ister ,rti5 regarding her ordeal. 6@9 These statements were supported by her recognition of portions of the route they too/ when she was being driven out of the military installation where she was detained. 6@> $he was also e.amined by a medical doctor whose findings showed that the 666 circular second degree burns on her bac/ and abrasions on her chee/ coincided with her account of cigarette burning and torture she suffered while in detention.6@7 &ith the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim during detention, it logically holds that much of the information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims themselves, and the veracity of their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in their written andGor oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other evidence such as physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmar/s they can identify in the places where they were detained. &here powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as no surprise. &e now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege of the writ of Amparo. There is no 0uarrel that the enforced disappearance of both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Fanalo has now passed as they have escaped from captivity and surfaced. ?ut while respondents admit that they are no longer in detention and are physically free, they assert that they are not Ifree in every sense of the wordI 6@C as their Imovements continue to be restricted for fear that people they have named in their Dudicial 'ffidavits and testified against (in the case of Raymond) are still at large and have not been held accountable in any way. These people are directly connected to the 'rmed Forces of the Philippines and are, thus, in a position to t&-e#ten -e$!on.ent$L -i%&t$ to i*e2 i+e-ty #n. $ec)-ity.I66@ (emphasis supplied) Respondents claim that they are under t&-e#t o* +ein% once #%#in #+.)cte.2 Ee!t c#!ti,e o- e,en Ei e., which constitute a direct violation of their -i%&t to $ec)-ity o* !e-$on.666 :laborating on the I-i%&t to $ec)-ity2 in %ene-# ,I respondents point out that this right is Ioften associated with liberty1I it is also seen as an Ie.pansion of rights based on the prohibition against torture and cruel and unusual punishment.I "onceding that there is no right to security e.pressly mentioned in 'rticle ((( of the 6C7> "onstitution, they submit that their rights Ito be /ept free from torture and from incommunicado detention and solitary detention places66; fall under the general coverage of the right to security of person under the writ of Amparo.I They submit that the "ourt ought to give an

e.pansive recognition of the right to security of person in view of the $tate Policy under 'rticle (( of the 6C7> "onstitution which enunciates that, IThe $tate values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.I Finally, to 2ustify a liberal interpretation of the right to security of person, respondents cite the teaching in Monc)!# ,. En-i e66= that Ithe right to liberty may be made more meaningful only if there is no undue restraint by the $tate on the e.ercise of that libertyI 66< such as a re0uirement to Ireport under unreasonable restrictions that amounted to a deprivation of libertyI66B or being put under Imonitoring and surveillance.I669 (n sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the t&-e#t to t&ei- -i%&t to i*e #n. i+e-ty, and a ,io #tion o* t&ei- -i%&t to $ec)-ity. Let )$ !)t t&i$ -i%&t to $ec)-ity )n.e- t&e en$ to .ete-'ine i* it &#$ in.ee. +een ,io #te. #$ -e$!on.ent$ #$$e-t. The -i%&t to $ec)-ity or the -i%&t to $ec)-ity o* !e-$on finds a te.tual hoo/ in 'rticle (((, $ection ; of the 6C7> "onstitution which provides, vi2+ $ec. ;. The -i%&t o* t&e !eo! e to +e $ec)-e in t&ei- !e-$on$ , houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and sei5ures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be in,io #+ e, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue e.cept upon probable cause to be determined personally by the 2udge... 't the core of this guarantee is the immunity of oneHs person, including the e.tensions of hisGher person * houses, papers, and effects * against government intrusion. $ection ; not only limits the stateHs power over a personHs home and possessions, but more importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself.66> The purpose of this provision was enunciated by the "ourt in Peo! e ,. CFI o* Ri"# 2 6-#nc& IK2 M)e"on City, vi2+667 The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and sei5ures is to prevent violations of private security in person and property and unlawful invasion of the security of the home by officers of the law acting under legislative or 2udicial sanction and to give remedy against such usurpation when attempted. ('dams v. !ew Aor/, 6C; .$. 7B71 'lvero v. #i5on, >9 Phil. 9=> R6C<9S). The right to privacy is an e$$enti# con.ition to t&e .i%nity #n. &#!!ine$$ #n. to t&e !e#ce #n. $ec)-ity o* e,e-y in.i,i.)# 2 /&et&e- it +e o* &o'e o- o* !e-$on$ #n. co--e$!on.ence. (TaOada and "arreon, Political %aw of the Philippines, 8ol. ;, 6=C R6C9;S). The constitutional inviolability of this great fundamental right against unreasonable searches and sei5ures must be deemed absolute as not&in% i$ c o$e- to # '#nL$ $o) t&#n t&e $e-enity o* &i$ !-i,#cy #n. t&e #$$)-#nce o* &i$ !e-$on# $ec)-ity . 'ny interference allowable can only be for the best causes and reasons.66C (emphases supplied) &hile the right to life under 'rticle (((, $ection 66;@ guarantees essentially the right to be alive6;6 * upon which the en2oyment of all other rights is preconditioned * the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure 0uality of this life, vi2+ IThe life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the government he established and consented to, will protect the security of his person and property. The ideal of security in life and property... pervades the whole history of man. (t touches every aspect of manHs e.istence.I 6;; (n a broad sense, the right to security of person Iemanates in a personHs legal and uninterrupted en2oyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. (t includes the right to e.ist, and the right to en2oyment of life while e.isting, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things which are necessary to the en2oyment of life according to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual.I6;= ' closer loo/ at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the e.ercise of this right. Fi-$t2 t&e -i%&t to $ec)-ity o* !e-$on i$ =*-ee.o' *-o' *e#-.= (n its IwhereasI clauses, the Uni,e-$# Dec #-#tion o* :)'#n Ri%&t$ ( #)R) enunciates that Ia world in which human beings shall en2oy freedom of speech and belief and *-ee.o' *-o' *e#- and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people.I (emphasis supplied) $ome scholars postulate that Ifreedom from fearI is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual international human right. 6;< (t is the Iright to security of personI as the word IsecurityI itself means Ifreedom from fear.I6;B 'rticle = of the #)R provides, vi2+ :veryone has the right to life, liberty and $ec)-ity o* !e-$on.6;9 (emphasis supplied) (n furtherance of this right declared in the right to security of person, vi2+ #)R, 'rticle C(6) of the Inte-n#tion# Co,en#nt on Ci,i #n. Po itic# Ri%&t$ ((""PR) also provides for the

6. :veryone has the right to liberty and $ec)-ity o* !e-$on. !o one shall be sub2ected to arbitrary arrest or detention. !o one shall be deprived of his liberty e.cept on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law. (emphasis supplied) The Philippines is a signatory to both the #)R and the (""PR.

(n the conte.t of $ection 6 of the Amparo Rule, Ifreedom from fearI is the right and #ny t&-e#t to t&e -i%&t$ to i*e2 i+e-ty o- $ec)-ity is the #ction#+ e /-on%. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction1 t&-e#t is a stimulus, ac#)$e o* #ction. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well*founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past e.perience with the stimulus. Thus, in the Amparo conte.t, it is more correct to say that the Iright to securityI is actually the =*-ee.o' *-o' t&-e#t.= 8iewed in this light, the Ithreatened with violationI "lause in the latter part of $ection 6 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.6;> Secon.2 t&e -i%&t to $ec)-ity o* !e-$on i$ # %)#-#ntee o* +o.i y #n. !$yc&o o%ic# inte%-ity o- $ec)-ity . 'rticle (((, $ection (( of the 6C7> "onstitution guarantees that, as a general rule, oneHs body cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant. 6;7 Physical in2uries inflicted in the conte.t of e.tralegal /illings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. (t may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. 's the degree of physical in2ury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. !otably, in criminal law, physical in2uries constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person. 6;C

Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily integrity. &hen employed to vitiate the free will such as to force the victim to admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating information, it constitutes an invasion of both bodily and psychological integrity as the dignity of the human person includes the e.ercise of free will. 'rticle (((, $ection 6; of the 6C7> "onstitution more specifically proscribes bodily and psychological invasion, vi2+ (;) !o torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him (any person under investigation for the commission of an offense). $ecret detention places, solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will * although not involving invasion of bodily integrity * nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in the sense of Ifreedom from threatI as afore*discussed. 'rticle (((, $ection 6; guarantees freedom from dehumani5ing abuses of persons under investigation for the commission of an offense. 8ictims of enforced disappearances who are not even under such investigation should all the more be protected from these degradations. 'n overture to an interpretation of the right to security of person as a right against torture was made by the :uropean "ourt of )uman Rights (:")R) in the recent case of Po!o, ,. R)$$i#.6=@ (n this case, the claimant, who was lawfully detained, alleged that the state authorities had physically abused him in prison, thereby violating his right to security of person. 'rticle B(6) of the :uropean "onvention on )uman Rights provides, vi2+ I:veryone has the right to liberty and security of person. !o one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law ...I (emphases supplied) 'rticle =, on the other hand, provides that I(n)o one shall be sub2ected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.I 'lthough the application failed on the facts as the alleged ill*treatment was found baseless, the :")R relied heavily on the concept of security in holding, vi2+ ...the applicant did not bring his allegations to the attention of domestic authorities at the time when they could reasonably have been e.pected to ta/e measures in order to ensure his $ec)-ity and to investigate the circumstances in 0uestion. ... ... ... ... the authorities failed to ensure his $ec)-ity in custody or to comply with the procedural obligation under 'rt.= to conduct an effective investigation into his allegations.6=6 (emphasis supplied) The .!. "ommittee on the :limination of #iscrimination against &omen has also made a statement that the protection of the bodily integrity of women may also be related to the right to security and liberty, vi2+ ...gender*based violence which impairs or nullifies the en2oyment by women of human rights and fundamental freedoms under general international law or under specific human rights conventions is discrimination within the meaning of article 6 of the "onvention (on the :limination of 'll Forms of #iscrimination 'gainst &omen). These rights and freedoms include . . . the right to liberty and $ec)-ity o* !e-$on.6=; T&i-.2 t&e -i%&t to $ec)-ity o* !e-$on i$ # %)#-#ntee o* !-otection o* oneL$ -i%&t$ +y t&e %o,e-n'ent . (n the conte.t of the writ of Amparo, this right is +)i t into t&e %)#-#ntee$ o* t&e -i%&t to i*e #n. i+e-ty under 'rticle (((, $ection 6 of the 6C7> "onstitution #n. t&e -i%&t to $ec)-ity o* !e-$on (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under 'rticle (((, $ection ;. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the $tate Iguarantees full respect for human rightsI under 'rticle ((, $ection 66 of the 6C7> "onstitution. 6== 's the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the "onstitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organi5ation of the government apparatus to e.tend protection to victims of e.tralegal /illings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) andGor their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of 2ustice. The (nter*'merican "ourt of )uman Rights stressed the importance of investigation in the ;e #$()e" Ro.-i%)e" C#$e,6=< vi2+ (The duty to investigate) ')$t +e )n.e-t#Een in # $e-io)$ '#nne- #n. not #$ # 'e-e *o-'# ity !-eo-.#ine. to +e ine**ecti,e . 'n investigation must have an ob2ective and be #$$)'e. +y t&e St#te #$ it$ o/n e%# .)ty2 not #$ # $te! t#Een +y !-i,#te inte-e$t$ t&#t .e!en.$ )!on t&e initi#ti,e o* t&e ,icti' o- &i$ *#'i y or upon their offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government.6=B This third sense of the right to security of person as a guarantee of government protection has been interpreted by the nited !ationsH )uman Rights "ommittee6=9 in not a few cases involving 'rticle C 6=> of the (""PR. &hile the right to security of person appears in con2unction with the right to liberty under 'rticle C, the "ommittee has ruled that the -i%&t to $ec)-ity o* !e-$on c#n eFi$t in.e!en.ent y o* t&e -i%&t to i+e-ty . (n other words, there need not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to be invo/ed. (n De %#.o P#e" ,. Co o'+i# ,6=7 a case involving death threats to a religion teacher at a secondary school in %eticia, "olombia, whose social views differed from those of the 'postolic Prefect of %eticia, the "ommittee held, vi2+ The first sentence of article C does not stand as a separate paragraph. (ts location as a part of paragraph one could lead to the view that the right to security arises only in the conte.t of arrest and detention. The travau. prZparatoires indicate that the discussions of the first sentence did indeed focus on matters dealt with in the other provisions of article C. T&e Uni,e-$# Dec #-#tion o* :)'#n Ri%&t$2 in #-tic e 32 -e*e-$ to t&e -i%&t to i*e2 t&e -i%&t to i+e-ty #n. t&e -i%&t to $ec)-ity o* t&e !e-$on. T&e$e e e'ent$ &#,e +een .e# t /it& in $e!#-#te c #)$e$ in t&e Co,en#nt. A t&o)%& in t&e Co,en#nt t&e on y -e*e-ence to t&e -i%&t o* $ec)-ity o* !e-$on i$ to +e *o)n. in #-tic e 52 t&e-e i$ no e,i.ence t&#t it /#$ inten.e. to n#--o/ t&e conce!t o* t&e -i%&t to $ec)-ity on y to $it)#tion$ o* *o-'# .e!-i,#tion o* i+e-ty. At t&e $#'e ti'e2 St#te$ !#-tie$ &#,e )n.e-t#Een to %)#-#ntee t&e -i%&t$ en$&-ine. in t&e Co,en#nt. It c#nnot +e t&e c#$e t&#t2 #$ # '#tteo* #/2 St#te$ c#n i%no-e Eno/n t&-e#t$ to t&e i*e o* !e-$on$ )n.e- t&ei- B)-i$.iction2 B)$t +ec#)$e t&#t &e o- $&e i$ not #--e$te. oot&e-/i$e .et#ine.. St#te$ !#-tie$ #-e )n.e- #n o+ i%#tion to t#Ee -e#$on#+ e #n. #!!-o!-i#te 'e#$)-e$ to !-otect t&e'. An inte-!-et#tion o* #-tic e 5 /&ic& /o) . # o/ # St#te !#-ty to i%no-e t&-e#t$ to t&e !e-$on# $ec)-ity o* non-.et#ine. !e-$on$ /it&in it$ B)-i$.iction /o) . -en.e- tot# y ine**ecti,e t&e %)#-#ntee$ o* t&e Co,en#nt .6=C (emphasis supplied)

The P#e" ruling was reiterated in 6/# y# ,. ?#'+i#26<@ which involved a political activist and prisoner of conscience who continued to be intimidated, harassed, and restricted in his movements following his release from detention. (n a catena of cases, the ruling of the "ommittee was of a similar import+ 6#&#'on.e ,. E()#to-i# 8)ine#,6<6 involving discrimination, intimidation and persecution of opponents of the ruling party in that state1T$&i$&i'+i ,. ?#i-e,6<; involving the abduction of the complainantHs husband who was a supporter of democratic reform in Laire1 Di#$ ,. An%o #26<= in,o ,in% t&e ')-.e- o* t&e co'! #in#ntL$ !#-tne- #n. t&e &#-#$$'ent &e <co'! #in#nt> $)**e-e. +ec#)$e o* &i$ in,e$ti%#tion o* t&e ')-.e-I #n. C&on%/e ,. ?#'+i#26<<involving an assassination attempt on the chairman of an opposition alliance. $imilarly, the :uropean "ourt of )uman Rights (:")R) has interpreted the Iright to securityI not only as prohibiting the $tate from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but imposing a positive duty on the $tate to afford protection of the right to liberty. 6<B The :")R interpreted the Iright to security of personI under 'rticle B(6) of the :uropean "onvention of )uman Rights in the leading case on disappearance of persons, A)-t ,. T)-Eey.6<9 (n this case, the claimantHs son had been arrested by state authorities and had not been seen since. The familyHs re0uests for information and investigation regarding his whereabouts proved futile. The claimant suggested that this was a violation of her sonHs right to security of person. The :")R ruled, vi2+ ... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive and procedural rules of national law but must e0ually be in /eeping with the very purpose of 'rticle B, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness... )aving assumed control over that individual it is incumbent on the authorities to account for his or her whereabouts. For this reason, A-tic e 0 ')$t +e $een #$ -e()i-in% t&e #)t&o-itie$ to t#Ee e**ecti,e 'e#$)-e$ to $#*e%)#-. #%#in$t t&e -i$E o* .i$#!!e#-#nce #n. to con.)ct # !-o'!t e**ecti,e in,e$ti%#tion into #n #-%)#+ e c #i' t&#t # !e-$on &#$ +een t#Een into c)$to.y #n. &#$ not +een $een $ince .6<> (emphasis supplied) 'pplying the foregoing concept of the right to security of person to the case at bar, we now determine whether there is a continuing violation of respondentsH right to security. Fi-$t2 t&e ,io #tion o* t&e -i%&t to $ec)-ity #$ *-ee.o' *-o' t&-e#t to -e$!on.ent$L i*e2 i+e-ty #n. $ec)-ity. &hile respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they escaped, their families, including them, would be /illed. (n RaymondHs narration, he was tortured and poured with gasoline after he was caught the first time he attempted to escape from Fort Fagsaysay. ' call from a certain IFam,I who wanted to see him before he was /illed, spared him. This time, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the threat to be /illed has come to pass. (t should be stressed that they are now free from captivity not because they were released by virtue of a lawful order or voluntarily freed by their abductors. (t ought to be recalled that towards the end of their ordeal, sometime in Dune ;@@> when respondents were detained in a camp in %imay, ?ataan, respondentsH captors even told them that they were still deciding whether they should be e.ecuted. Respondent Raymond Fanalo attested in his affidavit, vi2+ Minaumagahan, na/a*/adena pa /ami. Tinanggal ang mga /adena mga = o < na araw pag/alipas. $inabi sa amin na /aya /ami na/a/adena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo /ung papatayin /ami o hindi.6<7 The possibility of respondents being e.ecuted stared them in the eye while they were in detention. &ith their escape, this continuing threat to their life is apparent, moreso now that they have surfaced and implicated specific officers in the military not only in their own abduction and torture, but also in those of other persons /nown to have disappeared such as $herlyn "adapan, Maren :mpeOo, and Fanuel Ferino, among others. nderstandably, since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and protection by private citi5ens because of the threat to their life, liberty and security. The threat vitiates their free will as they are forced to limit their movements or activities. 6<C Precisely because respondents are being shielded from the perpetrators of their abduction, they cannot be e.pected to show evidence of overt acts of threat such as face*to*face intimidation or written threats to their life, liberty and security. !onetheless, the circumstances of respondentsH abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even e.ecuted. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of Amparo. NeFt2 t&e ,io #tion o* t&e -i%&t to $ec)-ity #$ !-otection +y t&e %o,e-n'ent . 'part from the failure of military elements to provide protection to respondents by themselves perpetrating the abduction, detention, and torture, they also miserably failed in conducting an effective investigation of respondentsH abduction as revealed by the testimony and investigation report of petitionersH own witness, %t. "ol. Ruben Dimene5, Provost Farshall of the >th (nfantry #ivision. The one*day investigation conducted by Dimene5 was very limited, superficial, and one*sided. )e merely relied on the $worn $tatements of the si. implicated members of the "'FE and civilians whom he met in the investigation for the first time. )e was present at the investigation when his subordinate %ingad was ta/ing the sworn statements, but he did not propound a single 0uestion to ascertain the veracity of their statements or their credibility. )e did not call for other witnesses to test the alibis given by the si. implicated persons nor for the family or neighbors of the respondents. (n his affidavit, petitioner $ecretary of !ational #efense attested that in a Femorandum #irective dated ,ctober =6, ;@@>, he issued a policy directive addressed to the 'FP "hief of $taff, that the 'FP should adopt rules of action in the event the writ of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the 'FP, which should essentially include verification of the identity of the aggrieved party1 recovery and preservation of relevant evidence1 identification of witnesses and securing statements from them1 determination of the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance1 identification and apprehension of the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance1 and bringing of the suspected offenders before a competent court.6B@ Petitioner 'FP "hief of $taff also submitted his own affidavit attesting that he received the above directive of respondent $ecretary of !ational #efense and that acting on this directive, he immediately caused to be issued a directive to the units of the 'FP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the respondents, and undertoo/ to provide results of the investigations to respondents.6B6 To this day, however, almost a year after the policy directive was issued by petitioner $ecretary of !ational #efense on ,ctober =6, ;@@>, respondents have not been furnished the results of the investigation which they now see/ through the instant petition for a writ of Amparo. nder these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion that there is a violation of respondentsH right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government.

(n sum, we conclude that respondentsH right to security as Ifreedom from threatI is violated by the apparent threat to their life, liberty and security of person. Their right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government is li/ewise violated by the ineffective investigation and protection on the part of the military. Finally, we come to the -e ie*$ granted by the "ourt of 'ppeals, which petitioners 0uestion. Fi-$t, that petitioners furnish respondents # o**ici# #n. )no**ici# -e!o-t$ o* t&e in,e$ti%#tion underta/en in connection with their case, e.cept those already in file with the court. Secon., that petitioners con*i-' in /-itin% t&e !-e$ent ! #ce$ o* o**ici# #$$i%n'ent o* MNS%t. :i #-io #E# Ro ie C#$ti o #n. Don# . C#i%#$ . T&i-., that petitioners cause to be produced to the "ourt of 'ppeals all 'e.ic# -e!o-t$2 -eco-.$ #n. c&#-t$2 #n. -e!o-t$ o* #ny t-e#t'ent %i,en o-eco''en.e. #n. 'e.icine$ !-e$c-i+e.2 i* #ny2 to t&e M#n# o +-ot&e-$ , to include a i$t o* 'e.ic# !e-$onne <'i it#-y #n. ci,i i#n> /&o #tten.e. to t&e' from February 6<, ;@@9 until 'ugust 6;, ;@@>. &ith respect to the *i-$t #n. $econ. -e ie*$, petitioners argue that the production order sought by respondents parta/es of the characteristics of a search warrant. Thus, they claim that the re0uisites for the issuance of a search warrant must be complied with prior to the grant of the production order, namely+ (6) the application must be under oath or affirmation1 (;) the search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be sei5ed1 (=) there e.ists probable cause with one specific offense1 and (<) the probable cause must be personally determined by the 2udge after e.amination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. 6B; (n the case at bar, however, petitioners point out that other than the bare, self*serving and vague allegations made by respondent Raymond Fanalo in his unverified declaration and affidavit, the documents respondents see/ to be produced are only mentioned generally by name, with no other supporting details. They also argue that the relevancy of the documents to be produced must be apparent, but this is not true in the present case as the involvement of petitioners in the abduction has not been shown. PetitionersH arguments do not hold water. The production order under the Amparo Rule should not be confused with a search warrant for law enforcement under 'rticle (((, $ection ; of the 6C7> "onstitution. This "onstitutional provision is a protection of the people from the unreasonable intrusion of the government, not a protection of the government from the demand of the people such as respondents. (nstead, the Amparo production order may be li/ened to the production of documents or things under $ection 6, Rule ;> of the Rules of "ivil Procedure which provides in relevant part, vi2+ $ection 6. Fotion for production or inspection order. pon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, boo/s of accounts, letters, photographs, ob2ects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control... (n M#te-i# Di$t-i+)to-$ <P&i .> Inc. ,. 9).%e N#ti,i.#. ,6B= the respondent 2udge, under authority of Rule ;>, issued a subpoena duces tecum for the production and inspection of among others, the boo/s and papers of Faterial #istributors (Phil.) (nc. The company 0uestioned the issuance of the subpoena on the ground that it violated the search and sei5ure clause. The "ourt struc/ down the argument and held that the subpoenapertained to a civil procedure that Icannot be identified or confused with unreasonable searches prohibited by the "onstitution...I Foreover, in his affidavit, petitioner 'FP "hief of $taff himself undertoo/ Ito provide results of the investigations conducted or to be conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the persons in whose favor the &rit of Amparo has been sought for as soon as the same has been furnished )igher head0uarters.I @it& -e$!ect to t&e $econ. #n. t&i-. -e ie*$ , petitioners assert that the disclosure of the present places of assignment of FG$gt. )ilario a/a Rollie "astillo and #onald "aigas, as well as the submission of a list of medical personnel, is irrelevant, improper, immaterial, and unnecessary in the resolution of the petition for a writ of Amparo. They add that it will unnecessarily compromise and 2eopardi5e the e.ercise of official functions and duties of military officers and even unwittingly and unnecessarily e.pose them to threat of personal in2ury or even death. ,n the contrary, the disclosure of the present places of assignment of FG$gt. )ilario a)a Rollie "astillo and #onald "aigas, whom respondents both directly implicated as perpetrators behind their abduction and detention, is relevant in ensuring the safety of respondents by avoiding their areas of territorial 2urisdiction. $uch disclosure would also help ensure that these military officers can be served with notices and court processes in relation to any investigation and action for violation of the respondentsH rights. The list of medical personnel is also relevant in securing information to create the medical history of respondents and ma/e appropriate medical interventions, when applicable and necessary. (n blatant violation of our hard*won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these rights are snuffed out from victims of e.tralegal /illings and enforced disappearances. The writ of Amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls. @:EREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The #ecision of the "ourt of 'ppeals dated #ecember ;9, ;@@> is affirmed. SO ORDERED.
RE7NATO S. PUNO "hief Dustice

8.R. No. 142444

9)ne 112 2004

DANIEL MASAN8AA7 TAPU?2 AURORA TAPU?-MADRIA8A2 LI6ERT7 M. ASUNCION2 LAD7L7N 6AMOS MADRIA8A2 E;ERL7 TAPU? MADRIA8A2 EKCEL TAPU?2 I;AN TAPU? AND MARIAN TIM6AS2 petitioners, vs. :ONORA6LE 9UD8E ELMO DEL ROSARIO2 in &i$ c#!#city #$ P-e$i.in% 9).%e o* RTC 6-. 0 A# i+o2 S:ERIFF NELSON DELA CRU?2 in &i$ c#!#city #$ S&e-i** o* t&e RTC2 T:E P:ILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE $t#tione. in 6o-#c#y I$ #n.2 -e!-e$ente. +y t&e PNP STATION COMMANDER2 T:E :ONORA6LE COURT OF APPEALS IN CE6U 14 DI;ISION2 SPOUSES 8RE8ORIO SANSON O MA. LOURDES T. SANSON2 respondents.
t&

RESOLUTION

6RION2 J.3

?efore us for the determination of sufficiency of form and substance (pursuant to $ections 1 and N of Rule H of the Revised Rules of #ourt? $ections 1 and H of the Rule on the -rit of Amparo 16 and $ections 1 and of theRule on the -rit of (abeas Data ;) is the petition for certiorari and for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data filed by the above*named petitioners against the )onorable Dudge :lmo del Rosario Rin his capacity as presiding 2udge of RT" ?r. B, MaliboS, $heriff !elson de la "ru5 Rin his capacity as $heriff of the RT"S, the Philippine !ational Police stationed in ?oracay (sland, represented by the P!P $tation "ommander, the )onorable "ourt of 'ppeals in "ebu, 67 th #ivision, and the spouses Eregorio $anson and Fa. %ourdes T. $anson, respondents. The petition and its anne.es disclose the following material antecedents+ The private respondents spouses Eregorio $anson and Fa. %ourdes T. $anson (the I private respondentsI), filed with the Fifth Funicipal "ircuit Trial "ourt of ?uruanga*Falay, '/lan (the I 5#T#I) a complaint= dated ;< 'pril ;@@9 for *o-ci+ e ent-y and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory in2unction against the petitioners #aniel Fasang/ay Tapu5, 'urora Tapu5*Fadriaga, %iberty F. 'suncion, %adylyn ?amos Fadriaga, :verly Tapu5 Fadriaga, :.cel Tapu5, (van Tapu5 and Farian Timbas (the I petitionersI) and other Dohn #oes numbering about 6;@. The private respondents alleged in their complaint that+ (6) they are the registered owners under T"T !o. =B76= of a 6.@@C=*hectare parcel of land located at $itio Pinaungon, ?alabag, ?oracay, Falay, '/lan (the I disputed landI)1 (;) they were the disputed landHs prior possessors when the petitioners * armed with bolos and carrying suspected firearms and together with unidentified persons numbering 6;@ * entered the disputed land by force and intimidation, without the private respondentsH permission and against the ob2ections of the private respondentsH security men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo structure. (n their 'nswer< dated 6< Fay ;@@9, the petitioners denied the material allegations of the complaint. They essentially claimed that+ (6) they are the actual and prior possessors of the disputed land1 (;) on the contrary, the private respondents are the intruders1 and (=) the private respondentsH certificate of title to the disputed property is spurious. They as/ed for the dismissal of the complaint and interposed a counterclaim for damages. The F"T", after due proceedings, rendered on ; Danuary ;@@> a decision B in the private respondentsH favor. (t found prior possession * the /ey issue in forcible entry cases * in the private respondentsH favor, thus+ IThe /ey that could unravel the answer to this 0uestion lies in the 'mended "ommissionerHs Report and $/etch found on pages ;<B to ;<7 of the records and the evidence the parties have submitted. (t is shown in the 'mended "ommissionerHs Report and $/etch that the land in 0uestion is enclosed by a concrete and cyclone wire perimeter fence in pin/ and green highlighter as shown in the $/etch Plan (p. ;<7). $aid perimeter fence was constructed by the plaintiffs 6< years ago. The foregoing findings of the "ommissioner in his report and s/etch collaborated the claim of the plaintiffs that after they ac0uired the land in 0uestion on Fay ;>, 6CC= through a #eed of $ale ('nne. H'H, 'ffidavit of Eregorio $anson, p. ;>9, rec.), they caused the construction of the perimeter fence sometime in 6CC= ('ffidavit of Eregorio $anson, pp. ;>6*;>B, rec.). From the foregoing established facts, it could be safely inferred that the plaintiffs were in actual physical possession of the whole lot in 0uestion since 6CC= when it was interrupted by the defendants (sic) when on Danuary <, ;@@B claiming to (sic) the )eirs of 'ntonio Tapu5 entered a portion of the land in 0uestion with view of inhabiting the same and building structures therein prompting plaintiff Eregorio $anson to confront them before ?$P , Police "hief (nspector Dac/ %. &an/y and ?arangay "aptain Elenn $acapaOo. 's a result of their confrontation, the parties signed an 'greement ('nne. H#H, "omplaint p. ;@) wherein they agreed to vacate the disputed portion of the land in 0uestion and agreed not to build any structures thereon. The foregoing is the prevailing situation of the parties after the incident of Danuary <, ;@@B when the plaintiff posted security guards, however, sometime on or about 9+=@ '.F. of 'pril 6C, ;@@9, the defendants some with bolos and one carrying a sac/ suspected to contain firearms with other Dohn #oes numbering about 6;@ persons by force and intimidation forcibly entered the premises along the road and built a nipa and bamboo structure ('nne. H:H, "omplaint, p. 66) inside the lot in 0uestion which incident was promptly reported to the proper authorities as shown by plaintiffsH "ertification ('nne. HFH, "omplaint, p. 6;) of the entry in the police blotter and on same date 'pril 6C, ;@@9, the plaintiffs filed a complaint with the ,ffice of the %upong Tagapamayapa of ?arangay ?alabag, ?oracay (sland, Falay, '/lan but no settlement was reached as shown in their "ertificate to File 'ction ('nne. HEH, "omplaint, p. 6=)1 hence the present action. #efendantsH (sic) contend in their answer that Hprior to Danuary <, ;@@B, they were already occupants of the property, being indigenous settlers of the same, under claim of ownership by open continuous, adverse possession to the e.clusion of other (sic)H. (Paragraph <, 'nswer, p. ;B). The contention is untenable. 's adverted earlier, the land in 0uestion is enclosed by a perimeter fence constructed by the plaintiffs sometime in 6CC= as noted by the "ommissioner in his Report and reflected in his $/etch, thus, it is safe to conclude that the plaintiffs where (sic) in actual physical possession of the land in 0uestion from 6CC= up to 'pril 6C, ;@@9 when they were ousted therefrom by the defendants by means of force. 'pplying by analogy the ruling of the )onorable $upreme "ourt in the case of Folina, et al. vs. #e ?acud, 6C $"R' CB9, if the land were in the possession of plaintiffs from 6CC= to 'pril 6C, ;@@9, defendantsH claims to an older possession must be re2ected as untenable because possession as a fact cannot be recogni5ed at the same time in two different personalities. #efendants li/ewise contend that it was the plaintiffs who forcibly entered the land in 0uestion on 'pril 67, ;@@9 at about =+@@ oHcloc/ in the afternoon as shown in their "ertification ('nne. H#H, #efendantsH Position Paper, p. 6=B, rec.).

The contention is untenable for being inconsistent with their allegations made to the commissioner who constituted (sic) the land in 0uestion that they built structures on the land in 0uestion only on 'pril 6C, ;@@9 (Par. #.<, "ommissionerHs 'mended Report, pp. ;<9 to ;<>), after there (sic) entry thereto on even date. %i/ewise, said contention is contradicted by the categorical statements of defendantsH witnesses, Rowena ,nag, 'polsida mambong, 'riel Eac, #arwin 'lvare5 and :dgardo Pinaranda, in their Doint 'ffidavit (pp. 6<=* H6<<, rec.) RsicS categorically stated Hthat on or about 'pril 6C, ;@@9, a group of armed men entered the property of our said neighbors and built plastic roofed tents. These armed men threatened to drive our said neighbors away from their homes but they refused to leave and resisted the intruding armed menH. From the foregoing, it could be safely inferred that no incident of forcible entry happened on 'pril 67, ;@@9 but it was only on 'pril 6C, ;@@9 when the defendants overpowered by their numbers the security guards posted by the plaintiffs prior to the controversy. %i/ewise, defendants (sic) alleged burnt and other structures depicted in their pictures attached as anne.es to their position paper were not noted and reflected in the amended report and s/etch submitted by the "ommissioner, hence, it could be safely inferred that these structures are built and (sic) situated outside the premises of the land in 0uestion, accordingly, they are irrelevant to the instant case and cannot be considered as evidence of their actual possession of the land in 0uestion prior to 'pril 6C, ;@@9 9.I The petitioners appealed the F"T" decision to the Regional Trial "ourt (I RT#,I ?ranch 9 of Malibo, '/lan) then presided over by Dudge !iovady F. Farin (I,udge 5arinI). ,n appeal, Dudge Farin granted the private respondentsH motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction through an ,rder dated ;9 February ;@@>, with the issuance conditioned on the private respondentsH posting of a bond. The writ > * authori5ing the immediate implementation of the F"T" decision * was actually issued by respondent Dudge :lmo F. del Rosario (the I respondent ,udgeI) on 6; Farch ;@@> after the private respondents had complied with the imposed condition. The petitioners moved to reconsider the issuance of the writ1 the private respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for demolition. The respondent Dudge subse0uently denied the petitionersH Fotion for Reconsideration and to #efer :nforcement of Preliminary Fandatory (n2unction in an ,rder dated 6> Fay ;@@>7. Feanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition. C The respondent Dudge nevertheless issued via a $pecial ,rder 6@ a writ of demolition to be implemented fifteen (6B) days after the $heriffHs written notice to the petitioners to voluntarily demolish their houseGs to allow the private respondents to effectively ta/e actual possession of the land. The petitioners thereafter filed on ; 'ugust ;@@> with the "ourt of 'ppeals, "ebu "ity, a Petition for Review 66(under Rule <; of the 6CC> Rules of "ivil Procedure) of the Permanent 'andatory #n"unction and -rder of (emolition of the 1TC of 5alibo$ ?r. > in Civil Case No. <//; . Feanwhile, respondent $heriff !elson R. dela "ru5 issued the !otice to 8acate and for #emolition on 6C Farch ;@@7. 6; (t was against this factual bac/drop that the petitioners filed the present petition last ;C 'pril ;@@7. The petition contains and prays for three remedies, namely+ a petition for certiorari under Rule 9B of the Revised Rules of "ourt1 the issuance of a writ of habeas data under the Rule on the &rit of )abeas #ata1 and finally, the issuance of the writ of amparo under the Rule on the &rit of 'mparo. To support the petition and the remedies prayed for, the petitioners present factual positions diametrically opposed to the F"T"Hs findings and legal reasons. Fost importantly, the petitioners maintain their claims of prior possession of the disputed land and of intrusion into this land by the private respondents. The material factual allegations of the petition * bases as well of the petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo * read+ I;C. ,n 'pril ;C, ;@@9 at about C+;@ a.m. armed men $!o-tin% 12 %#)%e $&ot %)n$ int-).e. into t&e !-o!e-ty o* t&e .e*en.#nt$ Rthe land in disputeS. They were not in uniform. They fired their shotguns at the defendants. %ater the following day at ;+@@ a.m. two houses of the defendants were burned to ashes. =@. These armed men Rwithout uniformsS removed the barbed wire fence put up by defendants to protect their property from intruders. Two of the armed men trained their shotguns at the defendants who resisted their intrusion. ,ne of them who was identified as $'F :% %,!E!, y E:E'!$,, 6C years old, single, and a resident of ?inun*an, ?atad, (loilo, fired twice. =6. T&e #-'e. 'en to-c&e. t/o &o)$e$ o* t&e .e*en.#nt$ -e.)cin% t&e' to #$&e$. C...D 32. T&e$e #ct$ o* TERRORISM #n. <&eino)$ c-i'e> o* ARSON /e-e -e!o-te. +y one o* t&e :EIRS OF ANTONIO TAPU? C...D. T&e te--o-i$t$ t-#ine. t&ei- $&ot%)n$ #n. *i-e. #t 'ino-$ n#'e y I;AN 8A9ISAN #n. MIC:AEL MA86ANUA2 /&o -e$i$te. t&ei- int-)$ion. T&ei- #ct i$ # + #t#nt ,io #tion o* t&e #/ !en# i"in% Act$ o* ;io ence #%#in$t /o'en #n. c&i .-en2 /&ic& i$ #%%-#,#te. +y t&e )$e o* &i%&-!o/e-e. /e#!on$. CPD =<. That the threats to the life and security of the poor indigent and unlettered petitioners continue because the private respondents $ansons have under their employ armed men and they are influential with the police authorities owing to their financial and political clout. =B. The actual prior occupancy, as well as the ownership of the lot in dispute by defendants and the atrocities of the terrorists Rintroduced into the property in dispute by the plaintiffsS are attested by witnesses who are persons not related to the defendants are therefore disinterested

witnesses in the case namely+ Rowena ,nag, 'polsida mambong, 'riel Eac, #arwin 'lvare5 and :dgardo Penarada. %i/ewise, the affidavit of !emia T. "armen is submitted to prove that the plaintiffs resorted to atrocious acts through hired men in their bid to un2ustly evict the defendants.6=I The petitioners posit as well that the F"T" has no 2urisdiction over the complaint for forcible entry that the private respondents filed below. "iting $ection == of The ,udiciary Reorgani2ation Act of 10O3& as amended by Republic Act *o. > 01 ,6< they maintain that the forcible entry case in fact involves issues of title to or possession of real property or an interest therein, with the assessed value of the property involved e.ceeding P;@,@@@.@@1 thus, the case should be originally cogni5able by the RT". 'ccordingly, the petitioners reason out that the RT" * to where the F"T" decision was appealed * e0ually has no 2urisdiction to rule on the case on appeal and could not have validly issued the assailed orders. OUR RULIN8 @e *in. t&e !etition$ *o- ce-tio-#-i #n. i$$)#nce o* # /-it o* &#+e#$ .#t# *#t# y .e*ecti,e2 +ot& in $)+$t#nce #n. in *o-'. T&e !etition *o- t&e i$$)#nce o* t&e /-it o* #'!#-o2 on t&e ot&e- &#n.2 i$ *#t# y .e*ecti,e /it& -e$!ect to content #n. $)+$t#nce. T&e Petition *o- Ce-tio-#-i &e conclude, based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition, that the petition for certiorari to nullify the assailed RT" orders has been *i e. o)t o* ti'e. (t is not lost on us that the petitioners have a pending petition with the "ourt of 'ppeals (the I #A petitionI) for the review of the same RT" orders now assailed in the present petition, although the petitioners never disclosed in the body of the present petition the e.act status of their pending "' petition. The "' petition, however, was filed with the "ourt of 'ppeals on ; 'ugust ;@@>, which indicates to us that the assailed orders (or at the very least, the latest of the interrelated assailed orders) were received on 0 %ugust 9;;< at the latest. The present petition, on the other hand, was filed on 'pril ;C, ;@@7 or more than eight months from the time the "' petition was filed. Thus, the present petition is separated in point of time from the assumed receipt of the assailed RT" orders by at least eight (7) months, i.e., beyond the reglementary period of si.ty (9@) days 6B from receipt of the assailed order or orders or from notice of the denial of a seasonably filed motion for reconsideration. &e note in this regard that the petitionersH counsel stated in his attached I"ertificate of "ompliance with "ircular [6*77 of the $upreme "ourtI69 (I#ertificate of #omplianceI) that Iin the meantime the RT# and the $heriff issued a *OTA#. TO +A#AT. A*D "OR D.5O9ATAO* not served to counsel but to the petitioners who sent photo copy of the same *OTA#. to their counsel on April 1O& G33O by 9%# .I To guard against any insidious argument that the present petition is timely filed because of this !otice to 8acate, we feel it best to declare now that the counting of the 9@*day reglementary period under Rule 9B cannot start from the 'pril 67, ;@@7 date cited by the petitionersH counsel. The !otice to 8acate and for #emolition is not an order that e.ists independently from the RT" orders assailed in this petition and in the previously filed "' petition. (t is merely a notice, made in compliance with one of the assailed orders, and is thus an administrative enforcement medium that has no life of its own separately from the assailed order on which it is based. (t cannot therefore be the appropriate sub2ect of an independent petition for certiorari under Rule 9B in the conte.t of this case. The 'pril 67, ;@@7 date cannot li/ewise be the material date for Rule 9B purposes as the above*mentioned !otice to 8acate is not even directly assailed in this petition, as the petitionHs Prayer patently shows. 6> ?ased on the same material antecedents, we find too that the petitioners have been guilty of willful and deliberate misrepresentation before this "ourt and, at the very least, of forum shopping. ?y the petitionersH own admissions, they filed a petition with the "ourt of 'ppeals (doc/eted as "' * E.R. $P !o. @;7BC) for the review of the orders now also assailed in this petition, but brought the present recourse to us, allegedly because I the #A did not act on the petition up to this date and for the petitioner (sic! to see) relief in the #A would be a waste of time and would render the case moot and academic since the #A refused to resolve pending urgent motions and the $heriff is determined to enforce a writ of demolition despite the defect of 9A#C O" ,MRA$DA#TAO* .I67 (nterestingly, the petitionersH counsel * while ma/ing this claim in the body of the petition * at the same time represented in his "ertificate of "ompliance6C that+ I. . . (e) the petitioners went up to the "ourt of 'ppeals to 0uestion the &R(T ,F PR:%(F(!'RA (!D !"T(,! copy of the petition is attached (sic)1 (f) t&e CA initi# y i$$)e. # -e$o )tion .enyin% t&e PETITION +ec#)$e it &e . t&#t t&e ORDER TO ;ACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION OF T:E :OMES OF PETITIONERS i$ not c#!#+ e o* +ein% t&e $)+Bect o* # PETITION FOR RELIEF , copy of the resolution of the "' is attached hereto1 (underscoring supplied) (g) Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on 'ugust >, ;@@> but up to this date the same had not been resolved copy of the FR is attached (sic). . . .I The difference between the above representations on what transpired at the appellate court level is replete with significance regarding the petitionersH intentions. &e discern ** from the petitionersH act of misrepresenting in the body of their petition that I the #A did not act on the petition up to this date I while stating the real "ourt of 'ppeals action in the "ertification of "ompliance ** the intent to hide the real state of the remedies the petitioners sought below in order to mislead us into action on the RT" orders without frontally considering the action that the "ourt of 'ppeals had already underta/en. 't the very least, the petitioners are obviously see/ing to obtain from us, via the present petition, the same relief that it could not wait for from the "ourt of 'ppeals in "'*E.R. $P !o. @;7BC. The petitionersH act of see/ing against the same parties the nullification of the same RT# orders before the

appellate court and before us at the same time, although made through different mediums that are both improperly used, constitutes willful and deliberate forum shopping that can sufficiently serve as basis for the summary dismissal of the petition under the combined application of the fourth and penultimate paragraphs of $ection =, Rule <91 $ection B, Rule >1 $ection 6, Rule 9B1 and Rule B9, all of the Revised Rules of "ourt. That a wrong remedy may have been used with the "ourt of 'ppeals and possibly with us will not save the petitioner from a forum*shopping violation where there is identity of parties, involving the same assailed interlocutory orders, with the recourses e.isting side by side at the same time. To restate the prevailing rules, Iforum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the other court would ma/e a favorable disposition. Forum shopping may be resorted to by any party against whom an adverse 2udgment or order has been issued in one forum, in an attempt to see/ a favorable opinion in another, other than by appeal or a special civil action for certiorari. Forum shopping trifles with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the administration of 2ustice and congest court doc/ets. &illful and deliberate violation of the rule against it is a ground for summary dismissal of the case1 it may also constitute direct contempt.I;@ 'dditionally, the re0uired verification and certification of non*forum shopping is defective as one (6) of the seven (>) petitioners * (van Tapu5 * did not sign, in violation of $ections < and B of Rule >1 $ection =, Rule <91 $ection 6, Rule 9B1 all in relation with Rule B9 of the Revised Rules of "ourt. ,f those who signed, only five (B) e.hibited their postal identification cards with the !otary Public. (n any event, we find the present petition for certiorari, on its face and on the basis of the supporting attachments, to be devoid of merit. The F"T" correctly assumed 2urisdiction over the private respondentsH complaint, which specifically alleged a cause for forcible entry and not * as petitioners may have misread or misappreciated * a case involving title to or possession of realty or an interest therein. nder $ection ==, par. ; of The Dudiciary Reorgani5ation 'ct, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.! *o. > 01 , e.clusive 2urisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases lies with the Fetropolitan Trial "ourts, Funicipal Trial "ourts and Funicipal "ircuit Trial "ourts. These first*level courts have had 2urisdiction over these cases * called accion interdictal * even before the R.'. >9C6 amendment, based on the issue of pure physical possession (as opposed to the right of possession). This 2urisdiction is regardless of the assessed value of the property involved1 the law established no distinctions based on the assessed value of the property forced into or unlawfully detained. $eparately from accion interdictalare accion publiciana for the recovery of the right of possession as a plenary action, and accion reivindicacion for the recovery of ownership.;6 'pparently, these latter actions are the ones the petitioners refer to when they cite $ection ==, par. =, in relation with $ection 6C, par. ; of The Dudiciary Reorgani5ation 'ct of 6C7@, as amended by Republic 'ct !o. >9C6, in which 2urisdiction may either be with the first*level courts or the regional trial courts, depending on the assessed value of the realty sub2ect of the litigation. 's the complaint at the F"T" was patently for forcible entry, that court committed no 2urisdictional error correctible by certiorari under the present petition. In $)'2 t&e !etition *o- ce-tio-#-i $&o) . +e .i$'i$$e. *o- t&e cite. *o-'# .e*iciencie$2 *o- ,io #tion o* t&e non-*o-)' $&o!!in% -) e2 *o&#,in% +een *i e. o)t o* ti'e2 #n. *o- $)+$t#nti,e .e*iciencie$. T&e @-it o* A'!#-o To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the e.traordinary rise in the number of /illings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lac/ of available and effective remedies to address these e.traordinary concerns. (t is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an e.traordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. @&#t it i$ not2 i$ # /-it to !-otect conce-n$ t&#t #-e !)-e y !-o!e-ty o- co''e-ci# . Neit&e- i$ it # /-it t&#t /e $&# i$$)e on #'o-!&o)$ #n. )nce-t#in %-o)n.$ . "onse0uently, the Rule on the &rit of 'mparo * in line with the e.traordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands * re0uires that every petition for the issuance of the Pwrit must be supported by 2ustifying allegations of fact, to wit+ I(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner1 (b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is un/nown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation1 2c4 The right to life$ liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent$ and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits 1 2d4 The investigation conducted$ if any$ specifying the names$ personal circumstances$ and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals$ as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation$ together with any report 1 (e) The actions and recourses ta/en by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission1 and (f) The relief prayed for. The petition may include a general prayer for other 2ust and e0uitable reliefs.I ;; The writ shall issue if the "ourt is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie e.istence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what e.tent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed. The issuance of the writ of amparo in the present case is anchored on the factual allegations heretofore 0uoted, ;=that are essentially repeated in paragraph B< of the petition. These allegations are supported by the following documents+

I(a) Doint 'ffidavit dated ;= Fay ;@@9 of Rowena ?. ,nag, 'polsida mambong, 'riel Eac, #arwin 'lvare5 and :dgardo Pinaranda, supporting the factual positions of the petitioners, id., petitionersH prior possession, private respondentsH intrusion and the illegal acts committed by the private respondents and their security guards on 6C 'pril ;@@91 (b) nsubscribed 'ffidavit of !emia "armen y Tapu5, alleging the illegal acts (firing of guns, etc.) committed by a security guard against minors * descendants of 'ntonio Tapu51 (c) nsubscribed 'ffidavit of Felanie Tapu5 y $amindao, essentially corroborating !emiaHs affidavit1 (d) "ertification dated ;= 'pril ;@@9 issued by Police ,fficer Dac/son Dauod regarding the incident of petitionersH intrusion into the disputed land1 (e) "ertification dated ;> 'pril ;@@9 issued by Police ,fficer 'llan R. ,tis, narrating the altercation between the Tapu5 family and the security guards of the private respondents, including the gun*po/ing and shooting incident involving one of the security guards1 (f) "ertification issued by Police ,fficer "hristopher R. Fendo5a, narrating that a house owned by Dosiel Tapu5, Dr., rented by a certain Dorge ?uenavente, was accidentally burned by a fire.I ,n the whole, what is clear from these statements * both sworn and unsworn * is the overriding involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to 0uestions of physical possession of the property disputed by the private parties. (f at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned e.cept to the e.tent that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the e.tent of the threats and harassments implied from the presence of Iarmed men bare to the waistI and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Not#+ y2 none o* t&e $)!!o-tin% #**i.#,it$ co'!e in% y $&o/ t&#t t&e t&-e#t to t&e -i%&t$ to i*e2 i+e-ty #n. $ec)-ity o* t&e !etitione-$ i$ i''inent o- i$ contin)in%. ' closer loo/ at the statements shows that at least two of them * the statements of !emia "arreon y Tapu5 and Felanie Tapu5 are practically identical and unsworn. The "ertification by Police ,fficer Dac/son Dauod, on the other hand, simply narrates what had been reported by one #anny Tapu5 y Fasang/ay, and even mentions that the burning of two residential houses was Iaccidental.I 's against these allegations are the cited F"T" factual findings in its decision in the forcible entry case which re2ected all the petitionersH factual claims. These findings are significantly complete and detailed, as they were made under a full*blown 2udicial process, i.e., after e.amination and evaluation of the contending partiesH positions, evidence and arguments and based on the report of a court*appointed commissioner. &e preliminarily e.amine these conflicting factual positions under the bac/drop of a dispute (with incidents giving rise to allegations of violence or threat thereof) that was brought to and ruled upon by the 'CTC1 subse0uently brought to the 1TC on an appeal that is still pending1 still much later brought to the appellate court without conclusive results1 and then brought to us on interlocutory incidents involving a plea for the issuance of the writ of amparo that, if decided as the petitioners advocate, may render the pending RT" appeal moot. nder these legal and factual situations, we are far from satisfied with the prima facie e.istence of the ultimate facts that would 2ustify the issuance of a writ of amparo. Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a continuing threat to the persons of the petitioners, the violent incidents alleged appear to us to be purely property7related and focused on the disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners wish to see/ redress and hold the alleged perpetrators criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the e.traordinary remedy of the writ of amparo. !or do we believe it appropriate at this time to disturb the F"T" findings, as our action may carry the unintended effect, not only of reversing the F"T" ruling independently of the appeal to the RT" that is now in place, but also of nullifying the ongoing appeal process. $uch effect, though unintended, will obviously wrea/ havoc on the orderly administration of 2ustice, an overriding goal that the Rule on the &rit of 'mparo does not intend to wea/en or negate. $eparately from these considerations, we cannot fail but consider too at this point the indicators, clear and patent to us, that the petitionersH present recourse via the remedy of the writ of amparo is a mere subterfuge to negate the assailed orders that the petitioners sought and failed to nullify before the appellate court because of the use of an improper remedial measure. &e discern this from the petitionersH misrepresentations pointed out above1 from their obvious act of forum shopping1 and from the recourse itself to the e.traordinary remedies of the writs of certiorari and amparo based on grounds that are far from forthright and sufficiently compelling. To be sure, when recourses in the ordinary course of law fail because of deficient legal representation or the use of improper remedial measures, neither the writ of certiorari nor that of amparo * e.traordinary though they may be * will suffice to serve as a curative substitute. The writ of amparo, particularly, should not issue when applied for as a substitute for the appeal or certiorari process, or when it will inordinately interfere with these processes * the situation obtaining in the present case. &hile we say all these, we note too that the Rule on the &rit of 'mparo provides for rules on the institution of separate actions, ;< for the effect of earlier* filed criminal actions,;B and for the consolidation of petitions for the issuance of a writ of amparo with a subse0uently filed criminal and civil action.;9 These rules were adopted to promote an orderly procedure for dealing with petitions for the issuance of the writ of amparo when the parties resort to other parallel recourses. &here, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no point in separately and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security * the personalconcern that the writ is intended to protect * is immediately in danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing. &e see no legal bar, however, to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the co*e.istence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case. T&e @-it o* :#+e#$ D#t#

$ection 9 of the Rule on the &rit of )abeas #ata re0uires the following material allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data+ I(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent1 (b! The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life$ liberty or security of the aggrieved partyI (c! The actions and recourses ta!en by the petitioner to secure the data or informationI (d! The location of the files$ registers or databases$ the government office$ and the person in charge$ in possession or in control of the data or information$ if !nownI (e! The reliefs prayed for& which may include the updating& rectification& suppression or destruction of the database or information or files )ept by the respondent. (n case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order en2oining the act complained of1 and (f) $uch other relevant reliefs as are 2ust and e0uitable.I $upport for the habeas data aspect of the present petition only alleges that+ I6. R U S $imilarly, a petition for a &R(T ,F )'?:'$ #'T' is prayed for so that the P!P may release the report on the burning of the homes of the petitioners and the acts of violence employed against them by the private respondents, furnishing the "ourt and the petitioners with copy of the same1 RUS 99. Petitioners apply for a &R(T ,F )'?:'$ #'T' commanding the Philippine !ational Police RP!PS to produce the police report pertaining to the burning of the houses of the petitioners in the land in dispute and li/ewise the investigation report if an investigation was conducted by the P!P.I These allegations obviously lac/ what the Rule on &rit of )abeas #ata re0uires as a minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally deficient. $pecifically, we see no concrete allegations of un2ustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty or security. The petition li/ewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated, any need for information under the control of police authorities other than those it has already set forth as integral anne.es. The necessity or 2ustification for the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure information, has not also been shown. (n sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than the I fishing expeditionI that this "ourt * in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas data * had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. (n these lights, the outright denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully in order. @:EREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the present petition OUTRI8:T for deficiencies of form and substance patent from its body and attachments. SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. 6RION 'ssociate Dustice

A. M. No. 04-1-16-SC

9#n)#-y 222 2004 T:E RULE ON T:E @RIT OF :A6EAS DATA RESOLUTION

'cting on the recommendation of the "hairperson of the "ommittee on Revision of the Rules of "ourt submitting for this "ourt-s consideration and approval the proposed Rule on the &rit of )abeas #ata, the "ourt Resolved to 'PPR,8: the same. This Resolution shall ta/e effect on February ;, ;@@7, following its publication in three (=) newspapers of general circulation. Danuary ;;, ;@@7. ***************************************************************************** T:E RULE ON T:E @RIT OF ,%?*%. (%T% SECTION 1. ,abeas (ata. * The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. SEC. 2. @&o M#y Fi e. * 'ny aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data. )owever, in cases of e.tralegal /illings and enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by+ (a) 'ny member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely+ the spouse, children and parents1 or (b) 'ny ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph1 or SEC. 3. @&e-e to Fi e. * The petition may be filed with the Regional Trial "ourt where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has 2urisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored, at the option of the petitioner. The petition may also be filed with the $upreme "ourt or the "ourt of 'ppeals or the $andiganbayan when the action concerns public data files of government offices. SEC. 4. @&e-e Ret)-n#+ eI En*o-ce#+ e. * &hen the writ is issued by a Regional Trial "ourt or any 2udge thereof, it shall be returnable before such court or 2udge. &hen issued by the "ourt of 'ppeals or the $andiganbayan or any of its 2ustices, it may be returnable before such court or any 2ustice thereof, or to any Regional Trial "ourt of the place where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has 2urisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored. &hen issued by the $upreme "ourt or any of its 2ustices, it may be returnable before such "ourt or any 2ustice thereof, or before the "ourt of 'ppeals or the $andiganbayan or any of its 2ustices, or to any Regional Trial "ourt of the place where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has 2urisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored. The writ of habeas data shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. Sec. 0. DocEet Fee$. * !o doc/et and other lawful fees shall be re0uired from an indigent petitioner. The petition of the indigent shall be doc/ed and acted upon immediately, without pre2udice to subse0uent submission of proof of indigency not later than fifteen (6B) days from the filing of the petition. SEC. 6. Petition. * ' verified written petition for a writ of habeas data should contain+ (a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent1 (b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party1 (c) The actions and recourses ta/en by the petitioner to secure the data or information1 (d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if /nown1 (e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or files /ept by the respondent.

(n case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order en2oining the act complained of1 and (f) $uch other relevant reliefs as are 2ust and e0uitable. SEC. 1. I$$)#nce o* t&e @-it. * pon the filing of the petition, the court, 2ustice or 2udge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The cler/ of court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court and cause it to be served within three (=) days from the issuance1 or, in case of urgent necessity, the 2ustice or 2udge may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputi5e any officer or person serve it. The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not be later than ten (6@) wor/ days from the date of its issuance. SEC. 4. Pen# ty *o- Re*)$in% to I$$)e o- Se-,e t&e @-it. * ' cler/ of court who refuses to issue the writ after its allowance, or a deputi5ed person who refuses to serve the same, shall be punished by the court, 2ustice or 2udge for contempt without pre2udice to other disciplinary actions. SEC. 5. :o/ t&e @-it i$ Se-,e.. * The writ shall be served upon the respondent by a 2udicial officer or by a person deputi5ed by the court, 2ustice or 2udge who shall retain a copy on which to ma/e a return of service. (n case the writ cannot be served personally on the respondent, the rules on substituted service shall apply. SEC. 10. Ret)-nI Content$. * The respondent shall file a verified written return together with supporting affidavits within five (B) wor/ing days from service of the writ, which period may be reasonably e.tended by the "ourt for 2ustifiable reasons. The return shall, among other things, contain the following+ (a) The lawful defenses such as national security, state secrets, privileged communications, confidentiality of the source of information of media and others1 (b) (n case of respondent in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information sub2ect of the petition1 (i) a disclosure of the data or information about the petitioner, the nature of such data or information, and the purpose for its collection1 (ii) the steps or actions ta/en by the respondent to ensure the security and confidentiality of the data or information1 and, (iii) the currency and accuracy of the data or information held1 and, (c) ,ther allegations relevant to the resolution of the proceeding. ' general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed. SEC. 11. Conte'!t. * The court, 2ustice or 2udge may punish with imprisonment or fine a respondent who commits contempt by ma/ing a false return, or refusing to ma/e a return1 or any person who otherwise disobeys or resist a lawful process or order of the court. SEC. 12. @&en De*en$e$ M#y +e :e#-. in C&#'+e-$. * ' hearing in chambers may be conducted where the respondent invo/es the defense that the release of the data or information in 0uestion shall compromise national security or state secrets, or when the data or information cannot be divulged to the public due to its nature or privileged character. $ec. 6=. Prohibited Pleadings and Fotions. * The following pleadings and motions are prohibited+ (a) Fotion to dismiss1 (b) Fotion for e.tension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit, position paper and other pleadings1 (c) #ilatory motion for postponement1 (d) Fotion for a bill of particulars1 (e) "ounterclaim or cross*claim1 (f) Third*party complaint1 (g) Reply1 (h) Fotion to declare respondent in default1 (i) (ntervention1

(2) Femorandum1 (/) Fotion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief orders1 and (l) Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order. SEC. 14. Ret)-nI Fi in%. * (n case the respondent fails to file a return, the court, 2ustice or 2udge shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte, granting the petitioner such relief as the petition may warrant unless the court in its discretion re0uires the petitioner to submit evidence. SEC. 10. S)''#-y :e#-in%. * The hearing on the petition shall be summary. )owever, the court, 2ustice or 2udge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties. SEC. 16. 9).%'ent. * The court shall render 2udgment within ten (6@) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision. (f the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall en2oin the act complained of, or order the deletion, destruction, or rectification of the erroneous data or information and grant other relevant reliefs as may be 2ust and e0uitable1 otherwise, the privilege of the writ shall be denied. pon its finality, the 2udgment shall be enforced by the sheriff or any lawful officers as may be designated by the court, 2ustice or 2udge within five (B) wor/ing days. SEC. 11. Ret)-n o* Se-,ice. * The officer who e.ecuted the final 2udgment shall, within three (=) days from its enforcement, ma/e a verified return to the court. The return shall contain a full statement of the proceedings under the writ and a complete inventory of the database or information, or documents and articles inspected, updated, rectified, or deleted, with copies served on the petitioner and the respondent. The officer shall state in the return how the 2udgment was enforced and complied with by the respondent, as well as all ob2ections of the parties regarding the manner and regularity of the service of the writ. SEC. 14. :e#-in% on O**ice-G$ Ret)-n. * The court shall set the return for hearing with due notice to the parties and act accordingly. SEC. 15. A!!e# . * 'ny party may appeal from the final 2udgment or order to the $upreme "ourt under Rule <B. The appeal may raise 0uestions of fact or law or both. The period of appeal shall be five (B) wor/ing days from the date of notice of the 2udgment or final order. The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas corpus and amparo cases. SEC. 20. In$tit)tion o* Se!#-#te Action$. * The filing of a petition for the writ of habeas data shall not preclude the filing of separate criminal, civil or administrative actions. SEC. 21. Con$o i.#tion. * &hen a criminal action is filed subse0uent to the filing of a petition for the writ, the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action. &hen a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subse0uent to a petition for a writ of habeas data, the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action. 'fter consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to govern the disposition of the reliefs in the petition. SEC. 22. E**ect o* Fi in% o* # C-i'in# Action. * &hen a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The relief under the writ shall be available to an aggrieved party by motion in the criminal case. The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the writ of habeas data. SEC. 23. S)+$t#nti,e Ri%&t$. * This Rule shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. SEC. 24. S)!! eto-y A!! ic#tion o* t&e R) e$ o* Co)-t. * The Rules of "ourt shall apply suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent with this Rule. SEC. 20. E**ecti,ity. * This Rule shall ta/e effect on February ;, ;@@7, following its publication in three (=) newspapers of general circulation. CPU6LIS:ED IN T:E MANILA 6ULLETIN2 T:E P:ILIPPINE STAR AND T:E P:ILIPPINE DAIL7 INMUIRER ON 20 9ANUAR7 2004D

8.R. No. 144165

Octo+e- 02 2010

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPAN72 ALEKANDER S. DE7TO and RU6EN A. SAPITULA2 Petitioners, vs. ROSARIO 8OPE? LIM2 Respondent.

#:"($(,!

CARPIO MORALES2 J.:

The "ourt is once again confronted with an opportunity to define the evolving metes and bounds of the writ of habeas data. Fay an employee invo/e the remedies available under such writ where an employer decides to transfer her wor/place on the basis of copies of an anonymous letter posted therein \ imputing to her disloyalty to the company and calling for her to leave, which imputation it investigated but fails to inform her of the details thereofK Rosario E. %im (respondent), also /nown as "herry %im, is an administrative cler/ at the Fanila :lectric "ompany (F:R'%",). ,n Dune <, ;@@7, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Fetering ,ffice of the 'dministration building of F:R'%", Plaridel, ?ulacan $ector, at which respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. The letter reads+ "herry %im+ F'T'P,$ F,!E %'F !(! %')'T !E ?(A'A' !E F:R'%",, !E'A,! !'F'! 'A E $T, F,!E P'%'F,! '!E ? ,!E M FP'!A' $' FE' ? &'A' !E E,?A:R!,. M'P'% !E F M)' F,, % F'A'$ M' R(T,, &'%'!E T'!E !' %,,?U. 6 "opies of the letter were also inserted in the loc/ers of F:R'%", linesmen. (nformed about it, respondent reported the matter on Dune B, ;@@7 to the Plaridel $tation of the Philippine !ational Police.; ?y Femorandum= dated Duly <, ;@@7, petitioner 'le.ander #eyto, )ead of F:R'%",-s )uman Resource $taffing, directed the transfer of respondent to F:R'%",-s 'labang $ector in Funtinlupa as I'GF ,TF$ "ler/,I effective Duly 67, ;@@7 in light of the receipt of IU reports that there were accusations and threats directed against RherS from un/nown individuals and which could possibly compromise RherS safety and security.I Respondent, by letter of Duly 6@, ;@@7 addressed to petitioner Ruben '. $apitula, 8ice*President and )ead of F:R'%",-s )uman Resource 'dministration, appealed her transfer and re0uested for a dialogue so she could voice her concerns and misgivings on the matter, claiming that the IpunitiveI nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due process. "iting the grueling travel from her residence in Pampanga to 'labang and bac/ entails, and violation of the provisions on 2ob security of their "ollective ?argaining 'greement ("?'), respondent e.pressed her thoughts on the alleged threats to her security in this wise+ .... ( feel that it would have been better . . . if you could have intimated to me the nature of the alleged accusations and threats so that at least ( could have found out if these are credible or even serious. ?ut as you stated, these came from un/nown individuals and the way they were handled, it appears that the veracity of these accusations and threats to be RsicS highly suspicious, doubtful or are 2ust mere 2o/es if they e.isted at all. 'ssuming for the sa/e of argument only, that the alleged threats e.ist as the management apparently believe, then my transfer to an unfamiliar place and environment which will ma/e me a Isitting duc/I so to spea/, seems to betray the real intent of management which is contrary to its e.pressed concern on my security and safety . . . Thus, it made me thin/ twice on the rationale for management-s initiated transfer. Reflecting further, it appears to me that instead of the management supposedly e.tending favor to me, the net result and effect of management action would be a punitive one.< (emphasis and underscoring supplied) Respondent thus re0uested for the deferment of the implementation of her transfer pending resolution of the issues she raised. !o response to her re0uest having been received, respondent filed a petition B for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against petitioners before the Regional Trial "ourt (RT") of ?ulacan, doc/eted as $P. Proc. !o. ;6=*F*;@@7. ?y respondent-s allegation, petitioners- unlawful act and omission consisting of their continued failure and refusalto provide her with details or information about the alleged report which F:R'%", purportedly receivedconcerning threats to her safety and security amount to a violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty and security, correctible by habeas data. Respondent thus prayed for the issuance of a writ commanding petitioners to file a written return containing the following+ a) a full disclosure of the data or information about respondent in relation to the report purportedly received by petitioners on the alleged threat to her safety and security1 the nature of such data and the purpose for its collection1 b) the measures ta/en by petitioners to ensure the confidentiality of such data or information1 and c) the currency and accuracy of such data or information obtained. 'dditionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining ,rder (TR,) en2oining petitioners from effecting her transfer to the F:R'%", 'labang $ector.

?y ,rder9 of 'ugust ;C, ;@@7, ?ranch > of the ?ulacan RT" directed petitioners to file their verified written return. 'nd by ,rder of $eptember B, ;@@7, the trial court granted respondent-s application for a TR,. Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition and recall of the TR, on the grounds that, inter alia, resort to a petition for writ of habeas data was not in order1 and the RT" lac/ed 2urisdiction over the case which properly belongs to the !ational %abor Relations "ommission (!%R"). > ?y #ecision7 of $eptember ;;, ;@@7, the trial court granted the prayers of respondent including the issuance of a writ of preliminary in2unction directing petitioners to desist from implementing respondent-s transfer until such time that petitioners comply with the disclosures re0uired. The trial court 2ustified its ruling by declaring that, inter alia, recourse to a writ of habeas data should e.tend not only to victims of e.tra*legal /illings and political activists but also to ordinary citi5ens, li/e respondent whose rights to life and security are 2eopardi5ed by petitioners- refusal to provide her with information or data on the reported threats to her person. )ence, the present petition for review under Rule <B of 6CC> Rules of "ivil Procedure and the Rule on the &rit of )abeas #ata C contending that 6) the RT" lac/ed 2urisdiction over the case and cannot restrain F:R'%",-s prerogative as employer to transfer the place of wor/ of its employees, and ;) the issuance of the writ is outside the parameters e.pressly set forth in the Rule on the &rit of )abeas #ata. 6@
1avvphi1

Faintaining that the RT" has no 2urisdiction over what they contend is clearly a labor dispute, petitioners argue that Ialthough ingeniously crafted as a petition for habeas data, respondent is essentially 0uestioning the transfer of her place of wor/ by her employerI66 and the terms and conditions of her employment which arise from an employer*employee relationship over which the !%R" and the %abor 'rbiters under 'rticle ;6> of the %abor "ode have 2urisdiction. Petitioners thus maintain that the RT" had no authority to restrain the implementation of the Femorandum transferring respondent-s place of wor/ which is purely a management prerogative, and that ,"'*"ircular !o. >C*;@@= 6; e.pressly prohibits the issuance of TR,s or in2unctive writs in labor*related cases. Petitioners go on to point out that the Rule on the &rit of )abeas #ata directs the issuance of the writ only against public officials or employees, or private individuals or entities engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding an aggrieved party-s person, family or home1 and that F:R'%", (or its officers) is clearly not engaged in such activities. The petition is impressed with merit. Respondent-s plea that she be spared from complying with F:R'%",-s Femorandum directing her reassignment to the 'labang $ector, under the guise of a 0uest for information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall within the province of a writ of habeas data. $ection 6 of the Rule on the &rit of )abeas #ata provides+ $ection 6. )abeas #ata. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose -i%&t to !-i,#cy in i*e2 i+e-ty o- $ec)-ity i$ ,io #te. ot&-e#tene. +y #n )n #/*) #ct o- o'i$$ion of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity en%#%e. in t&e %#t&e-in%2 co ectin% o$to-in% o* .#t# o- in*o-'#tion regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of 2udicial complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. (t is meant to provide a forum to enforce one-s right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a person-s right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information technology. (t bears reiteration that li/e the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given the lac/ of effective and available remedies, to address the e.traordinary rise in the number of /illings and enforced disappearances. (ts intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from those provided under prevailing Rules.6= "astillo v. "ru56< underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapu5 v. del Rosario 6B that the writs of amparo and habeas data will !,T issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invo/ed in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful. 69 :mployment constitutes a property right under the conte.t of the due process clause of the "onstitution. 6> (t is evident that respondent-s reservations on the real reasons for her transfer * a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of one-s employment * are what prompted her to adopt the e.traordinary remedy of habeas data. Durisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the !%R" and the %abor 'rbiters. (n another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any un2ustifiable or unlawful violation of respondent-s right to privacy vis*a*vis the right to life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners- refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to respondent-s safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in fact triviali5es these threats and accusations from un/nown individuals in her earlier*0uoted portion of her Duly 6@, ;@@7 letter as Ihighly suspicious, doubtful or are 2ust mere 2o/es if they e.isted at all.I67 'nd she even suspects that her transfer to another place of wor/ IbetrayRsS the real intent of managementSI and could be a Ipunitive move.I )er posture unwittingly concedes that the issue is labor*related. &):R:F,R:, the petition is ER'!T:#. The assailed $eptember ;;, ;@@7 #ecision of the ?ulacan RT", ?ranch > in $P. Proc. !o. ;6=*F*;@@7 is hereby R:8:R$:# and $:T '$(#:. $P. Proc. !o. ;6=*F*;@@7 is, accordingly, #($F($$:#. !o costs. $, ,R#:R:#.

CONC:ITA CARPIO MORALES 'ssociate Dustice

8.R. No. 142160

No,e'+e- 202 2005

PNSUPT. FELIK6ERTO CASTILLO2 POLICE OFFICERS ROMEO 6A8TAS2 RUPERTO 6ORLON8AN2 EDMUNDO DIONISIO2 RONNIE MORALES2 ARNOLD TRIA2 #n. 8IL6ERTO PUN?ALAN2 EN8R. RICASOL P. MILLAN2 EN8R. REDENTOR S. DELA CRU?2 MR. ANASTACIO L. 6ORLON8AN2 MR. ARTEMIO ES8UERRA2 =TISO72= #n. 9O:N DOES2 Petitioners, vs. DR. AMANDA T. CRU?2 NIKON T. CRU?2 #n. FERDINAND T. CRU?2 Respondents.

#:"($(,!

CARPIO MORALES2 J.:

Petitioners6 , employees and members of the local police force of the "ity Eovernment of Falolos, challenge the Farch ;7, ;@@7 #ecision of the Regional Trial "ourt (RT") of Falolos, ?ranch 6@ in a petition for issuance of writs of amparo and habeas data instituted by respondents. The factual antecedents. Respondent 'manda "ru5 ('manda) who, along with her husband Francisco E. "ru5 ($pouses "ru5), leased a parcel of land situated at ?arrio Euinhawa, Falolos (the property), refused to vacate the property, despite demands by the lessor Provincial Eovernment of ?ulacan (the Province) which intended to utili5e it for local pro2ects. The Province thus filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the $pouses "ru5 before the then Funicipal Trial "ourt (FT") of ?ulacan, ?ulacan. ?y #ecision of $eptember B, 6CC>, the FT" rendered 2udgment against the $pouses "ru5, which 2udgment, following its affirmance by the RT", became final and e.ecutory. The finality of the decision in the e2ectment case notwithstanding, the spouses "ru5 refused to vacate the property. They thereupon filed cases against the Province; and the 2udges who presided over the case. = Those cases were dismissed e.cept their petition for annulment of 2udgment lodged before ?ranch 67 of the RT" of Falolos, and a civil case for inB)nction 7==*F*;@@< lodged before ?ranch 6@ of the same RT" Falolos. The $pouses "ru5 sought in the case for in2unction the issuance of a permanent writ of in2unction to prevent the e.ecution of the final and e.ecutory 2udgment against them. ?y ,rder of Duly 6C, ;@@B, the RT", finding merit in the $pouses "ru5es- allegation that subse0uent events changed the situation of the parties to 2ustify a suspension of the e.ecution of the final and e.ecutory 2udgment, issued a permanent writ of in2unction, the dispositive portion of which reads+ @:EREFORE, the foregoing petitioners- Fotion for Reconsideration of the ,rder dated 'ugust 6@, ;@@< is hereby 8RANTED. ,rder dated 'ugust 6@, ;@@< is hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Further, the verified petition dated !ovember @B, ;@@; are hereby REINSTATED and MADE PERMANENT until the FT"*?ulacan, ?ulacan finally resolves the pending motions of petitioners with the same determines the metes and bounds of <@@ s0. meters leased premises sub2ect matter of this case with immediate dispatch. 'ccordingly, REMAND the determination of the issues raised by the petitioners on the issued writ of demolition to the FT" of ?ulacan, ?ulacan. $, ,R#:R:#.< (:mphasis in the original1 underscoring supplied) Finding that the fallo of the RT" Duly 6C, ;@@B ,rder treats, as a suspensive condition for the lifting of the permanent in2unction, the determination of the boundaries of the property, the Province returned the issue for the consideration of the FT". (n a Eeodetic :ngineer-s Report submitted to the FT" on 'ugust =6, ;@@>, the metes and bounds of the property were indicated. The FT", by ,rder of Danuary ;, ;@@7, approved the Report and ruled that the permanent in2unction which the RT" issued is ineffective. ,n motion of the Province, the FT", by ,rder of Danuary ;6, ;@@7, thus issued a $econd 'lias &rit of #emolition. ,n receiving notice of the Danuary ;, ;@@7 FT" ,rder, the $pouses "ru5 filed a motion before ?ranch 6@ of the RT" for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TR,) which it set for hearing on Danuary ;B, ;@@7 on which date, however, the demolition had, earlier in the day, been implemented. $uch notwithstanding, the RT" issued a TR,.B The $pouses "ru5, along with their sons*respondents !i.on and Ferdinand, thereupon entered the property, placed several container vans and purportedly represented themselves as owners of the property which was for lease. ,n February ;6, ;@@7, petitioners Police $uperintendent Feli.berto "astillo et al., who were deployed by the "ity Fayor in compliance with a memorandum issued by Eovernor Doselito R. Fendo5a instructing him to Iprotect, secure and maintain the !o$$e$$ion o* t&e !-o!e-ty,I entered the property.

'manda and her co*respondents refused to turn over the property, however. (nsisting that the RT" Duly 6C, ;@@B ,rder of Permanent (n2unction en2oined the Province from repossessing it, they shoved petitioners, forcing the latter to arrest them and cause their indictment for direct assault, trespassing and other forms of light threats. Respondents later filed on Farch =, ;@@7 a IRespectful Fotion*Petition for &rit of 'mparo and )abeas #ata,I doc/eted as S!eci# Ci,i Action No. 03-M-2004, which was coincidentally raffled to ?ranch 6@ of the RT" Falolos. Respondents averred that despite the Permanent (n2unction, petitioners unlawfully entered the property with the use of heavy e0uipment, tore down the barbed wire fences and tents, 9 and arrested them when they resisted petitioners- entry1 and that as early as in the evening of February ;@, ;@@7, members of the Philippine !ational Police had already camped in front of the property. ,n the basis of respondents- allegations in their petition and the supporting affidavits, the RT", by ,rder of Farch <, ;@@7, issued writs of amparo and habeas data.> The RT", crediting respondents- version in this wise+ Petitioners have shown by preponderant evidence that the facts and circumstances of the alleged offenses e.amined into on &rits of 'mparo and )abeas #ata that there have been an on*going hearings on the verified Petition for "ontempt, doc/eted as $pecial Proceedings !o. =@9*F*;@@9, before this "ourt for alleged violation by the respondents of the Preliminary (n2unction ,rder dated Duly 69, ;@@B RsicS in $p. "ivil 'ction !o. 7==*F*;@@;, hearings were held on Danuary ;B, ;@@7, February 6; and 6C, ;@@7, where the respondents prayed for an 'pril ;;, ;@@7 continuance, however, in the pitch dar/ness of February ;@, ;@@7, police officers, some personnel from the :ngineering department, and some civilians proceeded purposely to the Pinoy "ompound, converged therein and with continuing threats of bodily harm and danger and stone*throwing of the roofs of the homes thereat from voices around its premises, on a prete.t of an ordinary police operation when enterviewed RsicS by the media then present, but at 7+@@ a.m. to late in the afternoon of February ;6, ;@@7, 5oomed in on the petitioners, sub2ecting them to bodily harm, mental torture, degradation, and the debasement of a human being, reminiscent of the martial law police brutality, sending chill in any ordinary citi5en,7 rendered 2udgment, by #ecision of Farch ;7, ;@@7, in favor of respondents, disposing as follows+ I@:EREFORE, premises considered, the "ommitment ,rders and waivers in "rim. "ases !os. @7*>> for #irect assault1 "rim. "ase !o. @7*>> for ,ther Forms of Trespass1 and "rim. "ase !o. @7*>7 for %ight Threats are hereby DECLARED illegal, null and void, as petitioners were deprived of their substantial rights, induced by duress or a well*founded fear of personal violence. 'ccordingly, the commitment orders and waivers are hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary release of the petitioners is declared A6SOLUTE. &ithout any pronouncement as to costs. $, ,R#:R:#.IC (:mphasis in the original1 underscoring supplied) )ence, the present petition for review on certiorari, pursuant to $ection 6C 6@ of The Rule on the &rit of 'mparo ('.F. !o. @>*C*6;* $"),66 which is essentially reproduced in the Rule on the &rit of )abeas #ata ('.F. !o. @7*6*69*$").6; (n the main, petitioners fault the RT" for U giving due course and issuing writs of amparo and habeas data when from the allegations of the petition, the same ought not to have been issued as (6) the petition in RsicS insufficient in substance as the same involves property rights1 and (;) criminal cases had already been filed and pending with the Funicipal Trial "ourt in "ities, ?ranch 6, "ity of Falolos. ( nderscoring supplied) The petition is impressed with merit. The "ourt is, under the "onstitution, empowered to promulgate rules for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. 6= (n view of the heightening prevalence of e.tra2udicial /illings and enforced disappearances, the Rule on the &rit of 'mparo was issued and too/ effect on ,ctober ;<, ;@@> which coincided with the celebration of nited !ations #ay and affirmed the "ourt-s commitment towards internationali5ation of human rights. Fore than three months later or on February ;, ;@@7, the Rule on the &rit of (abeas Data was promulgated. $ection 6 of the Rule on the &rit of 'mparo provides+ $ection 6. 'etition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to #ny !e-$on /&o$e -i%&t to i*e2 i+e-ty #n. $ec)-ity i$ ,io #te. o- t&-e#tene. /it& ,io #tion +y #n )n #/*) #ct o- o'i$$ion of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover e.tralegal /illings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (:mphasis and underscoring supplied) $ection 6 of the Rule on the &rit of (abeas Data provides+

$ection 6. (abeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (:mphasis and underscoring supplied) From the above*0uoted provisions, the coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of rights to i*e2 i+e-tyand $ec)-ity. 'nd the writs cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions. $ecretary of *ational Defense v. 5analo6< teaches+ 's the 'mparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of Ie.tralegal /illingsI and Ienforced disappearances,I its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof.I:.tralegal /illingsI are I/illings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or 2udicial proceedings.I ,n the other hand, Ienforced disappearancesI are Iattended by the following characteristics+ an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organi5ed groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect ac0uiescence of the government1 the refusal of the $tate to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to ac/nowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.6B ( nderscoring supplied, citations omitted) To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold re0uirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission. :vidently, the present controversy arose out of a property dispute between the Provincial Eovernment and respondents. 'bsent any considerable ne.us between the acts complained of and its effect on respondents- right to life, liberty and security, the "ourt will not delve on the propriety of petitioners- entry into the property. Apropos is the "ourt-s ruling in Tapu2 v. Del Rosario@69 To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the e.traordinary rise in the number of /illings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lac/ of available and effective remedies to address these e.traordinary concerns. (t is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an e.traordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. @&#t it i$ not2 i$ # /-it to !-otect conce-n$ t&#t #-e !)-e y !-o!e-ty o- co''e-ci# . Neit&e- i$ it # /-it t&#t /e $&# i$$)e on #'o-!&o)$ #n. )nce-t#in %-o)n.$. "onse0uently, the Rule on the &rit of 'mparo in line with the e.traordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands re0uires that every petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported by 2ustifying allegations of fact, to wit+ .... The writ shall issue if the "ourt is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie e.istence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what e.tent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed.6> (:mphasis and italics in the original, citation omitted) Tapu2 also arose out of a property dispute, albeit between private individuals, with the petitioners therein branding as Iacts of terrorismI the therein respondents- alleged entry into the disputed land with armed men in tow. The "ourt therein held+ ,n the whole, what is clear from these statements both sworn and unsworn is the overriding involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to 0uestions of physical possession of the property disputed by the private parties. (f at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned e.cept to the e.tent that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the e.tent of the treats and harassments implied from the presence of Iarmed men bare to the waistI and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Not#+ y2 none o* t&e $)!!o-tin% #**i.#,it$ co'!e in% y $&o/ t&#t t&e t&-e#t to t&e -i%&t$ to i*e2 i+e-ty #n. $ec)-ity o* t&e !etitione-$ i$ i''inent o- contin)in%. 67(:mphasis in the original1 underscoring supplied) (t bears emphasis that respondents- petition did not show any actual violation, imminent or continuing threat to their life, liberty and security. ?are allegations that petitioners Iin unison, conspiracy and in contempt of court, there and then willfully, forcibly and feloniously with the use of force and intimidation entered and forcibly, physically manhandled the petitioners (respondents) and arrested the herein petitioners (respondents)I6C will not suffice to prove entitlement to the remedy of the writ of amparo. !o undue confinement or detention was present. (n fact, respondents were even able to post bail for the offenses a day after their arrest.;@ 'lthough respondents- release from confinement does not necessarily hinder supplication for the writ of amparo, absent any evidence or even an allegation in the petition that there is undue and continuing restraint on their liberty, andGor that there e.ists threat or intimidation that destroys the efficacy of their right to be secure in their persons, the issuance of the writ cannot be 2ustified. That respondents are merely see/ing the protection of their property rights is gathered from their Doint 'ffidavit, vi5+

.... 66. Mami ay humarang at humiga sa harap ng mga heavy e0uipment na hawa/ hawa/ ang nasabing /autusan ng RT" ?ranch 6@ (P:RF'!:!T (!D !"T(,! at RT" ,R#:R$ #'T:# February 6;, 6> at 6C ;@@7) upang ipaglaban ang dignidad ng /autusan ng /orte, ipaglaban ang prinsipyo ng I$:%F*):%PI at batas u/ol sa IPR,P:RTA R(E)T$I, &ala /aming nagawa ipagtanggol ang aming /arapatan sa lupa na <B years naming I(! P,$$:$$(,!.I ( nderscoring supplied) ,ddly, respondents also see/ the issuance of a writ of habeas data when it is not even alleged that petitioners are gathering, collecting or storing data or information regarding their person, family, home and correspondence. 's for respondents- assertion of past incidents;6 wherein the Province allegedly violated the Permanent (n2unction order, these incidents were already raised in the in2unction proceedings on account of which respondents filed a case for criminal contempt against petitioners.;; ?efore the filing of the petition for writs of amparo and habeas data, or on February ;;, ;@@7, petitioners even instituted a petition for habeas corpus which was considered moot and academic by ?ranch 6< of the Falolos RT" and was accordingly denied by ,rder of 'pril 7, ;@@7. Fore. Respondent 'manda and one of her sons, Francisco Dr., li/ewise filed a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data before the $andiganbayan, they alleging the commission of continuing threats by petitioners after the issuance of the writs by the RT", which petition was .i$'i$$e. for insufficiency and forum shopping. (t thus appears that respondents are not without recourse and have in fact ta/en full advantage of the legal system with the filing of civil, criminal and administrative charges.;=
1avvphi1

(t need not be underlined that respondents- petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data are e.traordinary remedies which cannot be used as tools to stall the e.ecution of a final and e.ecutory decision in a property dispute. 't all events, respondents- filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data should have been barred, for criminal proceedings against them had commenced after they were arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded against in accordance with $ection 9, Rule 66;;< of the Rules of "ourt. 8alidity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may be set up by respondents during trial and not before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data. The reliefs afforded by the writs may, however, be made available to the aggrieved party by motion in the criminal proceedings.;B @:EREFORE, the petition is ER'!T:#. The challenged Farch <, ;@@7 ,rder of ?ranch 6@ of the Regional Trial "ourt of Falolos is #:"%'R:# ! %% '!# 8,(#, and its Farch ;7, ;@@7 #ecision is RE;ERSED and SET ASIDE.$pecial "ivil 'ction !o. B=*F*;@@7 is #($F($$:#. SO ORDERED.
CONC:ITA CARPIO MORALES 'ssociate Dustice

8.R. No. 145100

Se!te'+e- 12 2010

IN T:E MATTER OF T:E PETITION FOR T:E @RIT OF %'P%1- AND T:E @RIT OF ,%?*%. (%T% IN FA;OR OF MELISSA C. ROKAS2 MELISSA C. ROKAS2 Petitioner, vs. 8LORIA MACAPA8AL-ARRO7O2 8IL6ERT TEODORO2 8EN. ;ICTOR S. I6RADO2 PNDIR. 8EN. 9ESUS AME ;ER?OSA2 LT. 8EN. DELFIN N. 6AN8IT2 PCNSUPT. LEON NILO A. DELA CRU?2 MA9. 8EN. RALP: ;ILLANUE;A2 PSNSUPT. RUD7 8AMIDO LACADIN2 AND CERTAIN PERSONS @:O 8O 67 T:E NAMECSD DEK2 RC AND ROSE2 Respondents.

#:"($(,!

PERE?2 J.:

't bench is a Petition For Review on "ertiorari 6 assailing the #ecision; dated ;9 'ugust ;@@C of the "ourt of 'ppeals in "'*E.R. $P !o. @@@=9*&R' J a petition that was commenced 2ointly under the Rules on the &rit of 'mparo ('mparo Rule) and )abeas #ata ()abeas #ata Rule). (n its decision, the "ourt of 'ppeals e.tended to the petitioner, Felissa ". Ro.as, the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data but denied the latter-s prayers for an inspection order, production order and return of specified personal belongings. The fallo of the decision reads+ &):R:F,R:, the Petition is P'RT('%%A F:R(T,R(, $. This "ourt hereby grants Petitioner the privilege of the &rit of 'mparo and )abeas #ata. 'ccordingly, Respondents are en2oined to refrain from distributing or causing the distribution to the public of any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers relative to Petitioner-s Felissa ". Ro.as, andGor Felissa Ro.as1 alleged ties to the "PP*!P' or pertinently related to the complained incident. Petitioner-s prayers for an inspection order, production order and for the return of the specified personal belongings are denied for lac/ of merit. 'lthough there is no evidence that Respondents are responsible for the abduction, detention or torture of the Petitioner, said Respondents pursuant to their legally mandated duties are, nonetheless, ordered to continueGcomplete the investigation of this incident with the end in view of prosecuting those who are responsible. Respondents are also ordered to provide protection to the Petitioner and her family while in the Philippines against any and all forms of harassment, intimidation and coercion as may be relevant to the grant of these reliefs. = &e begin with the petitioner-s allegations. Petitioner is an 'merican citi5en of Filipino descent. < &hile in the nited $tates, petitioner enrolled in an e.posure program to the Philippines with the group ?agong 'lyansang Fa/abayan* nited $tates of 'merica ( %A6A** $') of which she is a member. B #uring the course of her immersion, petitioner toured various provinces and towns of "entral %u5on and, in 'pril of ;@@C, she volunteered to 2oin members of %A6A**Tarlac9 in conducting an initial health survey in %a Pa5, Tarlac for a future medical mission. > (n pursuit of her volunteer wor/, petitioner brought her passport, wallet with Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P6B,@@@.@@) in cash, 2ournal, digital camera with memory card, laptop computer, e.ternal hard dis/, A'OD,7 wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope and medicines.C 'fter doing survey wor/ on 6C Fay ;@@C, petitioner and her companions, Duanito "arabeo ("arabeo) and Dohn :dward Dandoc (Dandoc), decided to rest in the house of one Fr. Desus Paolo (Fr. Paolo) in $itio ?agong $i/at,%arangay Mapani/ian, %a Pa5, Tarlac.6@ 't around 6+=@ in the afternoon, however, petitioner, her companions and Fr. Paolo were startled by the loud sounds of someone banging at the front door and a voice demanding that they open up.66 $uddenly, fifteen (6B) heavily armed men forcibly opened the door, barged inside and ordered petitioner and her companions to lie on the ground face down.6; The armed men were all in civilian clothes and, with the e.ception of their leader, were also wearing bonnets to conceal their faces. 6= Petitioner tried to protest the intrusion, but five (B) of the armed men ganged up on her and tied her hands. 6< 't this 2uncture, petitioner saw the other armed men herding "arabeo and Dandoc, already blindfolded and taped at their mouths, to a nearby blue van. Petitioner started to shout her name.6B 'gainst her vigorous resistance, the armed men dragged petitioner towards the vanJbruising her arms, legs and /nees. 69 ,nce inside the van, but before she can be blindfolded, petitioner was able to see the face of one of the armed men sitting beside her. 6>The van then sped away. 'fter about an hour of traveling, the van stopped. 67 Petitioner, "arabeo and Dandoc were ordered to alight. 6C'fter she was informed that she is being detained for being a member of the "ommunist Party of the Philippines*!ew People-s 'rmy ("PP*!P'), petitioner was separated from her companions and was escorted to a room that she believed was a 2ail cell from the sound of its metal doors. ;@ From there, she could hear the sounds of gunfire, the noise of planes ta/ing off and landing and some construction bustle. ;6 $he inferred that she was ta/en to the military camp of Fort Fagsaysay in %aur, !ueva :ci2a.;; &hat followed was five (B) straight days of interrogation coupled with torture. ;= The thrust of the interrogations was to convince petitioner to abandon her communist beliefs in favor of returning to Ithe fold.I ;< The torture, on the other hand, consisted of taunting, cho/ing, bo.ing and suffocating the petitioner.;B Throughout the entirety of her ordeal, petitioner was made to suffer in blindfolds even in her sleep. ;9 Petitioner was only relieved of her blindfolds when she was allowed to ta/e a bath, during which she became ac0uainted with a woman named IRoseI who bathed her. ;> There were also a few times when she cheated her blindfold and was able to pee/ at her surroundings.;7 #espite being deprived of sight, however, petitioner was still able to learn the names of three of her interrogators who introduced themselves to her as I#e.,I IDamesI and IR".I;C IR"I even told petitioner that those who tortured her came from the I$pecial ,perations Eroup,I and that she was abducted because her name is included in the I,rder of ?attle.I=@ ,n ;B Fay ;@@C, petitioner was finally released and returned to her uncle-s house in Nue5on "ity. =6 ?efore being released, however, the abductors gave petitioner a cellular phone with a $(F =; card, a slip of paper containing an e*mail address with password, == a plastic bag containing biscuits and

boo/s,=< the handcuffs used on her, a blouse and a pair of shoes. =B Petitioner was also sternly warned not to report the incident to the group Marapatan or something untoward will happen to her and her family. =9 $ometime after her release, petitioner continued to receive calls from R" via the cellular phone given to her. =>,ut of apprehension that she was being monitored and also fearing for the safety of her family, petitioner threw away the cellular phone with a $(F card. $ee/ing sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well as the suppression of any e.isting government files or records lin/ing her to the communist movement, petitioner filed a Petition for the &rits of 'mparo and )abeas #ata before this "ourt on 6 Dune ;@@C. =7 Petitioner impleaded public officials occupying the uppermost echelons of the military and police hierarchy as respondents, on the belief that it was government agents who were behind her abduction and torture. Petitioner li/ewise included in her suit IRose,I I#e.I and IR".I =C The 'mparo and )abeas #ata petition prays that+ (6) respondents be en2oined from harming or even approaching petitioner and her family1 (;) an order be issued allowing the inspection of detention areas in the >th (nfantry #ivision, Fort Fagsaysay, %aur, !ueva :ci2a1 (=) respondents be ordered to produce documents relating to any report on the case of petitioner including, but not limited to, intelligence report and operation reports of the >th (nfantry #ivision, the $pecial ,perations Eroup of the 'rmed Forces of the Philippines ('FP) and its subsidiaries or branchGes prior to, during and subse0uent to 6C Fay ;@@C1 (<) respondents be ordered to e.punge from the records of the respondents any document pertinent or connected to Felissa ". Ro.as, Felissa Ro.as or any name which sounds the same1 and (B) respondents be ordered to return to petitioner her 2ournal, digital camera with memory card, laptop computer, e.ternal hard dis/, (P,#, wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope, medicines and her P6B,@@@.@@ cash.<@ (n a Resolution dated C Dune ;@@C, this "ourt issued the desired writs and referred the case to the "ourt of 'ppeals for hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate action.<6 The Resolution also directed the respondents to file their verified written return.<; ,n 67 Dune ;@@C, the ,ffice of the $olicitor Eeneral (,$E), filed a Return of the &rits<= on behalf of the public officials impleaded as respondents. &e now turn to the defenses interposed by the public respondents. The public respondents label petitioner-s alleged abduction and torture as Istage managed.I << (n support of their accusation, the public respondents principally rely on the statement of Fr. Paolo, as contained in the $pecial Report <B of the %a Pa5 Police $tation. (n the $pecial Report, Fr. Paolo disclosed that, prior to the purported abduction, petitioner and her companions instructed him and his two sons to avoid leaving the house. <9 From this statement, the public respondents drew the distinct possibility that, e.cept for those already inside Fr. Paolo-s house, nobody else has any way of /nowing where petitioner and her companions were at the time they were supposedly abducted. <> This can only mean, the public respondents concluded, that if ever there was any IabductionI it must necessarily have been planned by, or done with the consent of, the petitioner and her companions themselves.<7 Public respondents also cited the Fedical "ertificate<C of the petitioner, as actually belying her claims that she was sub2ected to serious torture for five (B) days. The public respondents noted that while the petitioner alleges that she was cho/ed and bo.ed by her abductorsJinflictions that could have easily produced remar/able bruisesJher Fedical "ertificate only shows abrasions in her wrists and /nee caps. B@ For the public respondents, the above anomalies put in 0uestion the very authenticity of petitioner-s alleged abduction and torture, more so any military or police involvement therein. )ence, public respondents conclude that the claims of abduction and torture was no more than a charade fabricated by the petitioner to put the government in bad light, and at the same time, bring great media mileage to her and the group that she represents. B6 !evertheless, even assuming the abduction and torture to be genuine, the public respondents insist on the dismissal of the 'mparo and )abeas #ata petition based on the following grounds+ (a) as against respondent President Eloria Facapagal*'rroyo, in particular, because of her immunity from suit,B; and (b) as against all of the public respondents, in general, in view of the absence of any specific allegation in the petition that they had participated in, or at least authori5ed, the commission of such atrocities. B= Finally, the public respondents posit that they had not been remiss in their duty to ascertain the truth behind the allegations of the petitioner. B< (n both the police and military arms of the government machinery, in0uiries were set*up in the following manner+ Police 'ction Police authorities first learned of the purported abduction around <+=@ o-cloc/ in the afternoon of 6C Fay ;@@C, when %arangay "aptain Fichael F. Fanuel came to the %a Pa5 Funicipal Police $tation to report the presence of heavily armed men somewhere in %arangay Mapani/ian.BB 'cting on the report, the police station launched an initial investigation.B9 The initial investigation revolved around the statement of Fr. Paolo, who informed the investigators of an abduction incident involving three (=) persons Jlater identified as petitioner Felissa Ro.as, Duanito "arabeo and Dohn :dward DandocJwho were all staying in his house. B> Fr. Paolo disclosed that the abduction occurred around 6+=@ o-cloc/ in the afternoon, and was perpetrated by about eight (7) heavily armed men who forced their way inside his house.B7 ,ther witnesses to the abduction also confirmed that the armed men used a dar/ blue van with an un/nown plate number and two (;) )onda TRF motorcycles with no plate numbers.BC 't B+@@ o-cloc/ in the afternoon of 6C Fay ;@@C, the investigators sent a Flash Fessage to the different police stations surrounding %a Pa5, Tarlac, in an effort to trac/ and locate the van and motorcycles of the suspects. nfortunately, the effort yielded negative results. 9@ ,n ;@ Fay ;@@C, the results of the initial investigation were included in a $pecial Report 96 that was transmitted to the Tarlac Police Provincial ,ffice, headed by public respondent PG$ $upt. Rudy %acadin ($upt. %acadin). Public respondent $upt. %acadin, in turn, informed the Regional Police ,ffice of Region = about the abduction.9; Follow*up investigations were, at the same time, pursued.9=

,n ;9 Fay ;@@C, public respondent P"G$upt. %eon !ilo #ela "ru5, as #irector of the Regional Police ,ffice for Region =, caused the creation of $pecial (nvestigation Tas/ EroupJ"'R,D'! (Tas/ Eroup "'R,D'!) to conduct an in*depth investigation on the abduction of the petitioner, "arabeo and Dandoc.9< Tas/ Eroup "'R,D'! started its in0uiry by ma/ing a series of bac/ground e.aminations on the victims of the purported abduction, in order to reveal the motive behind the abduction and, ultimately, the identity of the perpetrators. 9B Tas/ Eroup "'R,D'! also maintained liaisons with Marapatan and the 'lliance for 'dvancement of People-s RightsJorgani5ations trusted by petitionerJin the hopes of obtaining the latter-s participation in the ongoing investigations.99 nfortunately, the letters sent by the investigators re0uesting for the availability of the petitioner for in0uiries were left unheeded. 9> The progress of the investigations conducted by Tas/ Eroup "'R,D'! had been detailed in the reports 97 that it submitted to public respondent Eeneral Desus 'me 8er5osa, the "hief of the Philippine !ational Police. )owever, as of their latest report dated ;C Dune ;@@C, Tas/ Eroup "'R,D'! is still unable to ma/e a definitive finding as to the true identity and affiliation of the abductorsJa fact that tas/ group "'R,D'! attributes to the refusal of the petitioner, or any of her fellow victims, to cooperate in their investigative efforts.9C Filitary 'ction Public respondent Eilbert Teodoro, the $ecretary of !ational #efense, first came to /now about the alleged abduction and torture of the petitioner upon receipt of the Resolution of this "ourt directing him and the other respondents to file their return. >@ (mmediately thereafter, he issued a Femorandum #irective>6 addressed to the "hief of $taff of the 'FP, ordering the latter, among others, to conduct an in0uiry to determine the validity of the accusation of military involvement in the abduction.>; 'cting pursuant to the Femorandum #irective, public respondent Eeneral 8ictor $. (brado, the 'FP "hief of $taff, sent an 'FP Radio Fessage>= addressed to public respondent %ieutenant Eeneral #elfin !. ?angit (%t. Een. ?angit), the "ommanding Eeneral of the 'rmy, relaying the order to cause an investigation on the abduction of the petitioner.>< For his part, and ta/ing cue from the allegations in the amparo petition, public respondent %t. Een. ?angit instructed public respondent Fa2or Eeneral Ralph '. 8illanueva (Fa2. Een. 8illanueva), the "ommander of the >th (nfantry #ivision of the 'rmy based in Fort Fagsaysay, to set in motion an investigation regarding the possible involvement of any personnel assigned at the camp in the purported abduction of the petitioner. >B (n turn, public respondent Fa2. Een. 8illanueva tapped the ,ffice of the Provost Farshal (,P8) of the >th (nfantry #ivision, to conduct the investigation. >9 ,n ;= Dune ;@@C, the ,P8 of the >th (nfantry #ivision released an (nvestigation Report >> detailing the results of its in0uiry. (n substance, the report described petitioner-s allegations as IopinionatedI and thereby cleared the military from any involvement in her alleged abduction and torture. >7 The #ecision of the "ourt of 'ppeals (n its #ecision,>C the "ourt of 'ppeals gave due weight and consideration to the petitioner-s version that she was indeed abducted and then sub2ected to torture for five (B) straight days. The appellate court noted the sincerity and resolve by which the petitioner affirmed the contents of her affidavits in open court, and was thereby convinced that the latter was telling the truth. 7@ ,n the other hand, the "ourt of 'ppeals disregarded the argument of the public respondents that the abduction of the petitioner was Istage managed,I as it is merely based on an unfounded speculation that only the latter and her companions /new where they were staying at the time they were forcibly ta/en.76 The "ourt of 'ppeals further stressed that the Fedical "ertificate of the petitioner can only affirm the e.istence of a true abduction, as its findings are reflective of the very in2uries the latter claims to have sustained during her harrowing ordeal, particularly when she was handcuffed and then dragged by her abductors onto their van.7; The "ourt of 'ppeals also recogni5ed the e.istence of an ongoing threat against the security of the petitioner, as manifested in the attempts of IR"I to contact and monitor her, even after she was released. 7= This threat, according to the "ourt of 'ppeals, is all the more compounded by the failure of the police authorities to identify the material perpetrators who are still at large. 7< Thus, the appellate court e.tended to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo by directing the public respondents to afford protection to the former, as well as continuing, under the norm of e.traordinary diligence, their e.isting investigations involving the abduction.7B The "ourt of 'ppeals li/ewise observed a transgression of the right to informational privacy of the petitioner, noting the e.istence of Irecords of investigationsI that concerns the petitioner as a suspected member of the "PP*!P'. 79 The appellate court derived the e.istence of such records from a photograph and video file presented in a press conference by party*list representatives Dovito Palparan (Palparan) and Pastor 'lcover ('lcover), which allegedly show the petitioner participating in rebel e.ercises. Representative 'lcover also revealed that the photograph and video came from a female "PP*!P' member who wanted out of the organi5ation. 'ccording to the "ourt of 'ppeals, the proliferation of the photograph and video, as well as any form of media, insinuating that petitioner is part of the "PP*!P' does not only constitute a violation of the right to privacy of the petitioner but also puts further strain on her already volatile security. 7> To this end, the appellate court granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data mandating the public respondents to refrain from distributing to the public any records, in whatever form, relative to petitioner-s alleged ties with the "PP*!P' or pertinently related to her abduction and torture.77 The foregoing notwithstanding, however, the "ourt of 'ppeals was not convinced that the military or any other person acting under the ac0uiescence of the government, were responsible for the abduction and torture of the petitioner. 7C The appellate court stressed that, 2udging by her own statements, the petitioner merely IbelievedI that the military was behind her abduction. C@ Thus, the "ourt of 'ppeals absolved the public respondents from any complicity in the abduction and torture of petitioner. C6 The petition was li/ewise dismissed as against public respondent President Eloria Facapagal*'rroyo, in view of her immunity from suit.C; 'ccordingly, the petitioner-s prayers for the return of her personal belongings were denied. C= Petitioner-s prayers for an inspection order and production order also met the same fate.C<

)ence, this appeal by the petitioner. 'FP'R, '. Petitioner first contends that the "ourt of 'ppeals erred in absolving the public respondents from any responsibility in her abduction and torture.CB "orollary to this, petitioner also finds fault on the part of "ourt of 'ppeals in denying her prayer for the return of her personal belongings. C9 Petitioner insists that the manner by which her abduction and torture was carried out, as well as the sounds of construction, gun*fire and airplanes that she heard while in detention, as these were detailed in her two affidavits and affirmed by her in open court, are already sufficient evidence to prove government involvement.C> Proceeding from such assumption, petitioner invo/es the doctrine of command responsibility to implicate the high*ran/ing civilian and military authorities she impleaded as respondents in her amparo petition. C7 Thus, petitioner see/s from this "ourt a pronouncement holding the respondents as complicit in her abduction and torture, as well as liable for the return of her belongings. CC "ommand Responsibility in 'mparo Proceedings (t must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the doctrine of command responsibility as the 2ustification in impleading the public respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not incorrect. The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party*respondent in an amparo petition. 6@@ The case of Rubrico v. 'rroyo,6@6 which was the first to e.amine command responsibility in the conte.t of an amparo proceeding, observed that the doctrine is used to pinpoint liability. Rubrico notes that+ 6@; The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its conte.t in the development of laws of war and armed combats. 'ccording to Fr. ?ernas, Icommand responsibility,I in its simplest terms, means the Iresponsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons sub2ect to their control in international wars or domestic conflict.I 6@= (n this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The )ague "onventions of 6C@> adopted the doctrine of command responsibility, 6@<foreshadowing the present*day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. 's then formulated, command responsibility is I#n o'i$$ion 'o.e o* in.i,i.)# c-i'in# i#+i it y,I whereby the superior is made responsible for c-i'e$ co''itte. by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators6@B (as opposed to crimes he ordered). (:mphasis in the orginal, underscoring supplied) $ince the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly invo/ed in a full*blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding. The obvious reason lies in the nature of the writ itself+ The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing 2udicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security. 6@9 &hile the principal ob2ective of its proceedings is the initial determination of whether an enforced disappearance, e.tralegal /illing or threats thereof had transpiredJthe writ does not, by so doing, fi. liability for such disappearance, /illing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable substantive law.6@> The rationale underpinning this peculiar nature of an amparo writ has been, in turn, clearly set forth in the landmar/ case of The $ecretary of !ational #efense v. Fanalo+6@7 . . . The remedy provides rapid 2udicial relief as it parta/es of a summary proceeding that re0uires only substantial evidence to ma/e the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner1 it is not an action to determine criminal guilt re0uiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages re0uiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility re0uiring substantial evidence that will re0uire full and e.haustive proceedings. 6@C(:mphasis supplied) (t must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect ac0uiescence. (n which case, commanders may be impleadedJnot actually on the basis of command responsibilityJbut rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability. (n Ra5on v. Tagitis,66@ the distinct, but interrelated concepts of responsibility and accountability were given special and uni0ue significations in relation to an amparo proceeding, to wit+ . . . Re$!on$i+i ity refers to the e.tent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this "ourt shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Acco)nt#+i ity, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who e.hibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above1 or who are imputed with /nowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure1 or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of e.traordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. Responsibility of Public Respondents 't any rate, it is clear from the records of the case that the intent of the petitioner in impleading the public respondents is to ascribe some form of responsibility on their part, based on her assumption that they, in one way or the other, had condoned her abduction and torture. 666 To establish such assumption, petitioner attempted to show that it was government agents who were behind her ordeal. Thus, the petitioner calls attention to the circumstances surrounding her abduction and tortureJi.e., the forcible ta/ing in broad daylight1 use of vehicles with no license plates1

utili5ation of blindfolds1 conducting interrogations to elicit communist inclinations1 and the infliction of physical abuseJwhich, according to her, is consistent with the way enforced disappearances are being practiced by the military or other state forces.66; Foreover, petitioner also claims that she was held inside the military camp Fort FagsaysayJa conclusion that she was able to infer from the travel time re0uired to reach the place where she was actually detained, and also from the sounds of construction, gun*fire and airplanes she heard while thereat. 66= &e are not impressed. The totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does not inspire reasonable conclusion that her abductors were military or police personnel and that she was detained at Fort Fagsaysay. First. The similarity between the circumstances attending a particular case of abduction with those surrounding previous instances of enforced disappearances does not, necessarily, carry sufficient weight to prove that the government orchestrated such abduction. &e opine that insofar as the present case is concerned, the perceived similarity cannot stand as substantial evidence of the involvement of the government. (n amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence of military involvement depends largely on the availability or non*availability of other pieces of evidence that has the potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. #irect evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. 'n amparo court cannot simply leave to remote and ha5y inference what it could otherwise clearly and directly ascertain. (n the case at bench, petitioner was, in fact, able to include in her ,ffer of :.hibits, 66< the cartographic s/etches66B of several of her abductors whose faces she managed to see. To the mind of this "ourt, these cartographic s/etches have the undeniable potential of giving the greatest certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of petitioner-s abductors. nfortunately for the petitioner, this potential has not been reali5ed in view of the fact that the faces described in such s/etches remain unidentified, much less have been shown to be that of any military or police personnel. ?luntly stated, the abductors were not proven to be part of either the military or the police chain of command. $econd. The claim of the petitioner that she was ta/en to Fort Fagsaysay was not ade0uately established by her mere estimate of the time it too/ to reach the place where she was detained and by the sounds that she heard while thereat. %i/e the "ourt of 'ppeals, &e are not inclined to ta/e the estimate and observations of the petitioner as accurate on its faceJnot only because they were made mostly while she was in blindfolds, but also in view of the fact that she was a mere so2ourner in the Philippines, whose familiarity with Fort Fagsaysay and the travel time re0uired to reach it is in itself doubtful.669 &ith nothing else but obscure observations to support it, petitioner-s claim that she was ta/en to Fort Fagsaysay remains a mere speculation. (n sum, the petitioner was not able to establish to a concrete point that her abductors were actually affiliated, whether formally or informally, with the military or the police organi5ations. !either does the evidence at hand prove that petitioner was indeed ta/en to the military camp Fort Fagsaysay to the e.clusion of other places. These evidentiary gaps, in turn, ma/e it virtually impossible to determine whether the abduction and torture of the petitioner was in fact committed with the ac0uiescence of the public respondents. ,n account of this insufficiency in evidence, a pronouncement of responsibility on the part of the public respondents, therefore, cannot be made. Prayer for the Return of Personal ?elongings This brings s to the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her personal belongings.

(n its decision, the "ourt of 'ppeals denied the above prayer of the petitioner by reason of the failure of the latter to prove that the public respondents were involved in her abduction and torture. 66> &e agree with the conclusion of the "ourt of 'ppeals, but not entirely with the reason used to support it. To the mind of this "ourt, the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her belongings is doomed to fail regardless of whether there is sufficient evidence to hold public respondents responsible for the abduction of the petitioner. (n the first place, an order directing the public respondents to return the personal belongings of the petitioner is already e0uivalent to a conclusive pronouncement of liability. The order itself is a substantial relief that can only be granted once the liability of the public respondents has been fi.ed in a full and e.haustive proceeding. 's already discussed above, matters of liability are not determinable in a mere summary amparo proceeding. 667 ?ut perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying the prayer of the petitioner, lies with the fact that a person-s right to be restituted of his property is already subsumed under the general rubric of property rightsJwhich are no longer protected by the writ of amparo. 66C $ection 6 of the 'mparo Rule,6;@ which defines the scope and e.tent of the writ, clearly e.cludes the protection of property rights. ?. The ne.t error raised by the petitioner is the denial by the "ourt of 'ppeals of her prayer for an inspection of the detention areas of Fort Fagsaysay. 6;6 "onsidering the dearth of evidence concretely pointing to any military involvement in petitioner-s ordeal, this "ourt finds no error on the part of the "ourt of 'ppeals in denying an inspection of the military camp at Fort Fagsaysay. &e agree with the appellate court that a contrary stance would be e0uivalent to sanctioning a Ifishing e.pedition,I which was never intended by the 'mparo Rule in providing for the interim relief of inspection order.6;; "ontrary to the e.plicit position6;= espoused by the petitioner, the 'mparo Rule does not allow a Ifishing e.peditionI for evidence. 'n inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to aid the court before ma/ing a decision.6;< ' basic re0uirement before an amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the place to be inspected is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party see/ing the order. &hile the 'mparo Rule does not re0uire that the place to be inspected be identified with clarity and precision, it is, nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of an inspection order that the supporting allegations of a party be sufficient in itself, so as to ma/e a prima facie case. This, as was shown above, petitioner failed to do.

$ince the very estimates and observations of the petitioner are not strong enough to ma/e out a prima facie case that she was detained in Fort Fagsaysay, an inspection of the military camp cannot be ordered. 'n inspection order cannot issue on the basis of allegations that are, in themselves, unreliable and doubtful. )'?:'$ #'T' 's earlier intimated, the "ourt of 'ppeals granted to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of habeas data, by en2oining the public respondents from Idistributing or causing the distribution to the public any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papersI relative to the petitioner-s Ialleged ties with the "PP*!P' or pertinently related to her abduction and torture.I Though not raised as an issue in this appeal, this "ourt is constrained to pass upon and review this particular ruling of the "ourt of 'ppeals in order to rectify, what appears to s, an error infecting the grant. For the proper appreciation of the rationale used by the "ourt of 'ppeals in granting the privilege of the writ of habeas data, &e 0uote hereunder the relevant portion6;B of its decision+ nder these premises, Petitioner prayed that all the records, intelligence reports and reports on the investigations conducted on Felissa ". Ro.as or Felissa Ro.as be produced and eventually e.punged from the records. Petitioner claimed to be included in the Eovernment-s ,rder of ?attle under ,plan ?antay %aya which listed political opponents against whom false criminal charges were filed based on made up and per2ured information. Pending resolution of this petition and before Petitioner could testify before s, :.*army general Dovito Palaparan, ?antay party*list, and Pastor 'lcover of the 'lliance for !ationalism and #emocracy party*list held a press conference where they revealed that they received an information from a female !P' rebel who wanted out of the organi5ation, that Petitioner was a communist rebel. 'lcover claimed that said information reached them thru a letter with photo of Petitioner holding firearms at an !P' training camp and a video "# of the training e.ercises. "learly, and notwithstanding Petitioner-s denial that she was the person in said video, there were records of other investigations on Felissa ". Ro.as or Felissa Ro.as which violate her right to privacy. &ithout a doubt, reports of such nature have reasonable connections, one way or another, to petitioner-s abduction where she claimed she had been sub2ected to cruelties and dehumani5ing acts which nearly caused her life precisely due to allegation of her alleged membership in the "PP*!P'. 'nd if said report or similar reports are to be continuously made available to the public, Petitioner-s security and privacy will certainly be in danger of being violated or transgressed by persons who have strong sentiments or aversion against members of this group. The unregulated dissemination of said unverified video "# or reports of Petitioner-s alleged ties with the "PP*!P' indiscriminately made available for public consumption without evidence of its authenticity or veracity certainly violates Petitioner-s right to privacy which must be protected by this "ourt. &e, thus, deem it necessary to grant Petitioner the privilege of the &rit of )abeas #ata. (:mphasis supplied). The writ of habeas data was conceptuali5ed as a 2udicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals.6;9 The writ operates to protect a person-s right to control information regarding himself, particularly in the instances where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. !eedless to state, an indispensable re0uirement before the privilege of the writ may be e.tended is the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim.6;> This, in the case at bench, the petitioner failed to do. The main problem behind the ruling of the "ourt of 'ppeals is that there is actually no evidence on record that shows that any of the public respondents had violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner. The act ascribed by the "ourt of 'ppeals to the public respondents that would have violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner, i.e.& /eeping records of investigations and other reports about the petitioner-s ties with the "PP*!P', was not ade0uately provenJconsidering that the origin of such records were virtually une.plained and its e.istence, clearly, only inferred by the appellate court from the video and photograph released by Representatives Palparan and 'lcover in their press conference. !o evidence on record even shows that any of the public respondents had access to such video or photograph. (n view of the above considerations, the directive by the "ourt of 'ppeals en2oining the public respondents from Idistributing or causing the distribution to the public any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papersI relative to the petitioner-s Ialleged ties with the "PP*!P',I appears to be devoid of any legal basis. The public respondents cannot be ordered to refrain from distributing something that, in the first place, it was not proven to have. 8erily, until such time that any of the public respondents were found to be actually responsible for the abduction and torture of the petitioner, any inference regarding the e.istence of reports being /ept in violation of the petitioner-s right to privacy becomes farfetched, and premature. For these reasons, this "ourt must, at least in the meantime, stri/e down the grant of the privilege of the writ of habeas data. #($P,$(T(,! ,F T): "'$: ,ur review of the evidence of the petitioner, while telling of its innate insufficiency to impute any form of responsibility on the part of the public respondents, revealed two important things that can guide s to a proper disposition of this case. ,ne, that further investigation with the use of e.traordinary diligence must be made in order to identify the perpetrators behind the abduction and torture of the petitioner1 and two, that the "ommission on )uman Rights (")R), pursuant to its "onstitutional mandate to Iinvestigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights and to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights,I 6;7must be tapped in order to fill certain investigative and remedial voids. Further (nvestigation Fust ?e nderta/en

(ronic as it seems, but part and parcel of the reason why the petitioner was not able to adduce substantial evidence proving her allegations of government complicity in her abduction and torture, may be attributed to the incomplete and one*sided investigations conducted by the government

itself. This Iaw/wardI situation, wherein the very persons alleged to be involved in an enforced disappearance or e.tralegal /illing are, at the same time, the very ones tas/ed by law to investigate the matter, is a uni0ue characteristic of these proceedings and is the main source of the Ievidentiary difficultiesI faced by any petitioner in any amparo case.6;C "ogni5ant of this situation, however, the 'mparo Rule placed a potent safeguardJre0uiring the Irespondent who is a public official or employeeI to prove that no less than Ie.traordinary diligence as re0uired by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.I 6=@ Thus, unless and until any of the public respondents is able to show to the satisfaction of the amparo court that e.traordinary diligence has been observed in their investigations, they cannot shed the allegations of responsibility despite the prevailing scarcity of evidence to that effect. &ith this in mind, &e note that e.traordinary diligence, as re0uired by the 'mparo Rule, was not fully observed in the conduct of the police and military investigations in the case at bar. ' perusal of the investigation reports submitted by Tas/ Eroup "'R,D'! shows modest effort on the part of the police investigators to identify the perpetrators of the abduction. To be sure, said reports are replete with bac/ground chec/s on the victims of the abduction, but are, at the same time, comparatively silent as to other concrete steps the investigators have been ta/ing to ascertain the authors of the crime. 'lthough conducting a bac/ground investigation on the victims is a logical first step in e.posing the motive behind the abductionJits necessity is clearly outweighed by the need to identify the perpetrators, especially in light of the fact that the petitioner, who was no longer in captivity, already came up with allegations about the motive of her captors. (nstead, Tas/ Eroup "'R,D'! placed the fate of their investigations solely on the cooperation or non*cooperation of the petitionerJwho, they claim, was less than enthusiastic in participating in their investigative efforts. 6=6 &hile it may be conceded that the participation of the petitioner would have facilitated the progress of Tas/ Eroup "'R,D'!-s investigation, this "ourt believes that the former-s reticence to cooperate is hardly an e.cuse for Tas/ Eroup "'R,D'! not to e.plore other means or avenues from which they could obtain relevant leads. 6=; (ndeed, while the allegations of government complicity by the petitioner cannot, by themselves, hold up as ade0uate evidence before a court of lawJthey are, nonetheless, a vital source of valuable investigative leads that must be pursued and verified, if only to comply with the high standard of diligence re0uired by the 'mparo Rule in the conduct of investigations. 'ssuming the non*cooperation of the petitioner, Tas/ Eroup "'R,D'!-s reports still failed to e.plain why it never considered see/ing the assistance of Fr. Desus PaoloJwho, along with the victims, is a central witness to the abduction. The reports of Tas/ Eroup "'R,D'! is silent in any attempt to obtain from Fr. Paolo, a cartographic s/etch of the abductors or, at the very least, of the one who, by petitioner-s account, was not wearing any mas/.
1avvphi1

The recollection of Fr. Paolo could have served as a comparative material to the s/etches included in petitioner-s offer of e.hibits that, it may be pointed out, were prepared under the direction of, and first submitted to, the ")R pursuant to the latter-s independent investigation on the abduction and torture of the petitioner.6== ?ut as mentioned earlier, the ")R s/etches remain to be unidentified as of this date. (n light of these considerations, &e agree with the "ourt of 'ppeals that further investigation under the norm of e.traordinary diligence should be underta/en. This "ourt simply cannot write finis to this case, on the basis of an incomplete investigation conducted by the police and the military. (n a very real sense, the right to security of the petitioner is continuously put in 2eopardy because of the deficient investigation that directly contributes to the delay in bringing the real perpetrators before the bar of 2ustice. To add teeth to the appellate court-s directive, however, &e find it fitting, nay, necessary to shift the primary tas/ of conducting further investigations on the abduction and torture of the petitioner upon the ")R. 6=< &e note that the ")R, unli/e the police or the military, seems to en2oy the trust and confidence of the petitionerJas evidenced by her attendance and participation in the hearings already conducted by the commission. 6=B "ertainly, it would be reasonable to assume from such cooperation that the investigations of the ")R have advanced, or at the very least, bears the most promise of advancing farther, in terms of locating the perpetrators of the abduction, and is thus, vital for a final resolution of this petition. From this perspective, &e also deem it 2ust and appropriate to relegate the tas/ of affording interim protection to the petitioner, also to the ")R. )ence, &e modify the directive of the "ourt of the 'ppeals for further investigation, as followsJ 6.) 'ppointing the ")R as the lead agency tas/ed with conducting further investigation regarding the abduction and torture of the petitioner. 'ccordingly, the ")R shall, under the norm of e.traordinary diligence, ta/e or continue to ta/e the necessary steps+ (a) to identify the persons described in the cartographic s/etches submitted by the petitioner, as well as their whereabouts1 and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant to petitioner-s abduction and torture. ;.) #irecting the incumbent "hief of the Philippine !ational Police (P!P), or his successor, and the incumbent "hief of $taff of the 'FP, or his successor, to e.tend assistance to the ongoing investigation of the ")R, including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel records circa the time of the petitioner-s abduction and torture, sub2ect to reasonable regulations consistent with the "onstitution and e.isting laws. =.) Further directing the incumbent "hief of the P!P, or his successor, to furnish to this "ourt, the "ourt of 'ppeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations and their recommendations, other than those that are already part of the records of this case, within ninety (C@) days from receipt of this decision. <.) Further directing the ")R to (a) furnish to the "ourt of 'ppeals within ninety (C@) days from receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and its corresponding recommendations1 and to (b) provide or continue to provide protection to the petitioner during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be determined by this "ourt. 'ccordingly, this case must be referred bac/ to the "ourt of 'ppeals, for the purposes of monitoring compliance with the above directives and determining whether, in light of any recent reports or recommendations, there would already be sufficient evidence to hold any of the public respondents

responsible or, at least, accountable. 'fter ma/ing such determination, the "ourt of 'ppeals shall submit its own report with recommendation to this "ourt for final action. The "ourt of 'ppeals will continue to have 2urisdiction over this case in order to accomplish its tas/s under this decision. @:EREFORE2 the instant petition is PARTIALL7 MERITORIOUS. &e hereby render a decision+ 6.) 'FF(RF(!E the denial of the petitioner-s prayer for the return of her personal belongings1 ;.) 'FF(RF(!E the denial of the petitioner-s prayer for an inspection of the detention areas of Fort Fagsaysay. =.) R:8:R$(!E the grant of the privilege of habeas data, without pre2udice, however, to any modification that this "ourt may ma/e on the basis of the investigation reports and recommendations submitted to it under this decision. <.) F,#(FA(!E the directive that further investigation must be underta/en, as followsJ a. 'PP,(!T(!E the "ommission on )uman Rights as the lead agency tas/ed with conducting further investigation regarding the abduction and torture of the petitioner. 'ccordingly, the "ommission on )uman Rights shall, under the norm of e.traordinary diligence, ta/e or continue to ta/e the necessary steps+ (a) to identify the persons described in the cartographic s/etches submitted by the petitioner, as well as their whereabouts1 and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant to petitioner-s abduction and torture. b. #(R:"T(!E the incumbent "hief of the Philippine !ational Police, or his successor, and the incumbent "hief of $taff of the 'rmed Forces of the Philippines, or his successor, to e.tend assistance to the ongoing investigation of the "ommission on )uman Rights, including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel records circa the time of the petitioner-s abduction and torture, sub2ect to reasonable regulations consistent with the "onstitution and e.isting laws. c. Further #(R:"T(!E the incumbent "hief of the Philippine !ational Police, or his successor, to furnish to this "ourt, the "ourt of 'ppeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations and their recommendations, other than those that are already part of the records of this case, within ninety (C@) days from receipt of this decision. d. Further #(R:"T(!E the "ommission on )uman Rights (a) to furnish to the "ourt of 'ppeals within ninety (C@) days from receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and its corresponding recommendations1 and (b) to provide or continue to provide protection to the petitioner during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be determined by this "ourt. B.) R:F:RR(!E ?'"M the instant case to the "ourt of 'ppeals for the following purposes+ a. To F,!(T,R the investigations and actions ta/en by the P!P, 'FP, and the ")R1 b. To #:T:RF(!: whether, in light of the reports and recommendations of the ")R, the abduction and torture of the petitioner was committed by persons acting under any of the public respondents1 and on the basis of this determinationJ c. To $ ?F(T to this "ourt within ten (6@) days from receipt of the report and recommendation of the "ommission on )uman Rights Jits own report, which shall include a recommendation either for the #($F($$'% of the petition as against the public respondents who were found not responsible andGor accountable, or for the 'PPR,PR('T: R:F:#('% F:'$ R:$, '$ F'A ?: '%%,&:# ?A T): 'FP'R, '!# )'?:'$ #'T' R %:$, T, ?: !#:RT'M:! as against those found responsible andGor accountable. 'ccordingly, the public respondents shall remain personally impleaded in this petition to answer for any responsibilities andGor accountabilities they may have incurred during their incumbencies. ,ther findings of the "ourt of 'ppeals in its #ecision dated ;9 'ugust ;@@C in "'*E.R. $P !o. @@@=9*&R' that are not contrary to this decision are 'FF(RF:#. $, ,R#:R:#.
9OSE PORTU8AL PERE? 'ssociate Dustice

8.R. No. 112263

9) y 52 2004

SPOUSES AUT:ER 8. AELLE72 9R. #n. DORIS A. AELLE72 "omplainants, vs. PLANTERS PRODUCTS2 INC. #n. 9OR8E A. RA8UTANA2 6 Respondents.

R:$,%

T(,!

CORONA2 J.:

Petitioner 'uther E. Melley, Dr. ('uther) ac0uired agricultural chemical products on consignment from respondent Planters Products, (nc. (PP() in 6C7C. #ue to 'uther-s failure to pay despite demand, PP( filed an action for sum of money against him in the Regional Trial "ourt of Fa/ati "ity, ?ranch B> (RT" Fa/ati "ity). This was doc/eted as "ivil "ase !o. C6*C@<. 'fter trial on the merits, the RT" Fa/ati "ity decided in favor of PP( and issued a writ of e.ecution. Pursuant thereto, respondent sheriff Dorge '. Ragutana sold on e.ecution real property covered by T"T !o. 6B@>C located in !aga "ity. ' certificate of sale was issued in favor of PP( as the highest bidder. 'fter being belatedly informed of the said sale, petitioners 'uther and his wife #oris '. Melley (#oris) filed a motion to dissolve or set aside the notice of levy in the RT" Fa/ati "ity on the ground that the sub2ect property was their family home which was e.empt from e.ecution. Petitioners- motion was denied for failure to comply with the three*day notice re0uirement. $ubse0uently, petitioners filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of levy and sale of the alleged family home with damages against Ragutana and PP( in the Regional Trial "ourt of !aga "ity, ?ranch 6C (RT" !aga "ity). This was doc/eted as "ivil "ase !o. ;@@@* @677. The case was, however, dismissed for lac/ of 2urisdiction and lac/ of cause of action. The dismissal was upheld by the "'. Petitioners now come to us in this petition for review on certiorari contending that the "' erred in upholding the dismissal of "ivil "ase !o. ;@@@*@677 by the RT" !aga "ity. They claim that #oris was a stranger ; to "ivil "ase !o. C6*C@< (in the RT" Fa/ati "ity) who could not be forced to litigate therein. Petitioners anchor their action in "ivil "ase !o. ;@@@*@677 on their contention that T"T !o. 6B@>C is the Melley family home. !o doubt, a family home is generally e.empt from e.ecution = provided it was duly constituted as such. There must be proof that the alleged family home was constituted 2ointly by the husband and wife or by an unmarried head of a family. < (t must be the house where they and their family actually reside and the lot on which it is situated.B The family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the con2ugal partnership, or of the e.clusive properties of either spouse with the latter-s consent, or on the property of the unmarried head of the family. 9 The actual value of the family home shall not e.ceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of P=@@,@@@ in urban areas and P;@@,@@@ in rural areas.> nder the Family "ode, there is no need to constitute the family home 2udicially or e.tra2udicially. 'll family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family "ode ('ugust =, 6C77) are constituted as such by operation of law. 'll e.isting family residences as of 'ugust =, 6C77 are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family "ode.7 The e.emption is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.C Foreover, the debts for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after 'ugust =, 6C77. ,therwise (that is, if it was incurred prior to 'ugust =, 6C77), the alleged family home must be shown to have been constituted either 2udicially or e.tra2udicially pursuant to the "ivil "ode. The rule, however, is not absolute. The Family "ode, in fact, e.pressly provides for the following e.ceptions+ 'rticle 6BB. The family home shall be e.empt from e.ecution, forced sale or attachment e.cept+ (6) For non*payment of ta.es1 (;) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home1 (=) For debts secured by a mortgage on the premises before or after such constitution1 and (<) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.
... ... ...

'rticle 69@. &hen a creditor whose claim is not among those mentioned in 'rticle 6BB obtains a 2udgment in his favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth more than the ma.imum amount fi.ed in 'rticle 6B>, he may apply to the court which rendered the

2udgment for an order directing the sale of the property under e.ecution. The court shall so order if it finds that the actual value of the family home e.ceeds the ma.imum amount allowed by law as of the time of its constitution. (f the increased actual value e.ceeds the ma.imum amount allowed by law in 'rticle 6B> and results from subse0uent voluntary improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the family home, by the owner or owners of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure shall apply. ... ... ...

&e grant the petition only to the e.tent of allowing petitioners to adduce evidence in the trial court that T"T !o. 6B@>C is in fact their family home as constituted in accordance with the re0uirements of law. This is in consonance with our ruling in /ome2 v. $ta. Anes6@ where we held+ RThe husband and childrenS were not parties to the Pasig RT" case and are third*party claimants who became such only after trial in the previous case had been terminated and the 2udgment therein had become final and e.ecutory. !either were they indispensable nor necessary parties in the Pasig RT" case, and they could not therefore intervene in said case. 's strangers to the original case, respondents cannot be compelled to present their claim with the Pasig RT" which issued the writ of e.ecution.... (n said case, the alleged family home was sold on e.ecution by the sheriff of the Pasig RT". The husband and children of the 2udgment debtor filed a complaint for annulment of sale of the levied property in ?ayombong, !ueva 8i5caya where the alleged family home was situated. 's they were considered strangers to the action filed in the Pasig RT", we ruled that the !ueva 8i5caya RT" had 2urisdiction over the complaint and that they could vindicate their alleged claim to the levied property there.66
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@:EREFORE, "ivil "ase !o. ;@@@*@677 captioned $pouses Auther /. Celley& ,r. and Doris A. Celley v. 'lanters 'roducts& Anc. and ,orge A. Ragutana is hereby REINSTATED and this case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial "ourt of !aga "ity, ?ranch 6C for determination whether or not the property covered by T"T !o. 6B@>C is a duly constituted family home and therefore e.empt from e.ecution. SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA 'ssociate Dustice

8.R. No. 140520

9) y 202 2010

9UANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS2 ALMA RAMOS @ORAA2 MANUEL T. RAMOS2 9OSEFINA R. ROT:MAN2 SONIA R. POST2 EL;IRA P. MUNAR2 #n. OFELIA R. LIM2 Petitioners, vs. DANILO PAN8ILINAN2 RODOLFO SUMAN82 LUCRECIO 6AUTISTA #n. ROLANDO ANTENOR2 Respondents.

#:"($(,!

CARPIO MORALES2 J.:

Respondents filed in ;@@= a complaint 6 for illegal dismissal against :.F. Ramos :lectric, (nc., a company owned by :rnesto F. Ramos (Ramos), the patriarch of herein petitioners. ?y #ecision; of 'pril 6B, ;@@B, the %abor 'rbiter ruled in favor of respondents and ordered Ramos and the company to pay the aggregate amount ofP6,996,<C@.=@ representing their bac/wages, separation pay, 6=th month pay P service incentive leave pay. The #ecision having become final and e.ecutory and no settlement having been forged by the parties, the %abor 'rbiter issued on $eptember 7, ;@@B a writ of e.ecution = which the #eputy $heriff of the !ational %abor Relations "ommission (!%R") implemented by levying a property in Ramos- name covered by T"T !o. =7C>7, situated in Pandacan, Fanila (Pandacan property). 'lleging that the Pandacan property was the family home, hence, e.empt from e.ecution to satisfy the 2udgment award, Ramos and the company moved to 0uash the writ of e.ecution. < Respondents, however, averred that the Pandacan property is not the Ramos family home, as it has another in 'ntipolo, and the Pandacan property in fact served as the company-s business address as borne by the company-s letterhead. Respondents added that, assuming that the Pandacan property was indeed the family home, only the value e0uivalent to P=@@,@@@ was e.empt from e.ecution. ?y ,rderB of 'ugust ;, ;@@9, the %abor 'rbiter denied the motion to 0uash, hence, Ramos and the company appealed to the !%R" which affirmed the %abor 'rbiter-s ,rder. Ramos and the company appealed to the "ourt of 'ppeals during the pendency of which Ramos died and was substituted by herein petitioners. Petitioners also filed before the !%R", as third*party claimants, a Fanifestation 0uestioning the !otice to 8acate issued by the $heriff, alleging that assuming that the Pandacan property may be levied upon, the family home straddled two (;) lots, including the lot covered by T"T !o. =7C>7, hence, they cannot be as/ed to vacate the house. The %abor 'rbiter was later to deny, by #ecision of Fay >, ;@@C, the third*party claim, holding that Ramos- death and petitioners- substitution as his compulsory heirs would not nullify the sale at auction of the Pandacan property. 'nd the !%R"9 would later affirm the %abor 'rbiter-s ruling, noting that petitioners failed to e.ercise their right to redeem the Pandacan property within the one 6 year period or until Danuary 69, ;@@C. The !%R" brushed aside petitioners- contention that they should have been given a fresh period of 6 year from the time of Ramos- death on Duly ;C, ;@@7 or until Duly =@, ;@@C to redeem the property, holding that to do so would give petitioners, as mere heirs, a better right than the Ramos-. 's to petitioners- claim that the property was covered by the regime of con2ugal partnership of gains and as such only Ramos- share can be levied upon, the !%R" ruled that petitioners failed to substantiate such claim and that the phrase in the T"T indicating the registered owner as I:rnesto Ramos, married to Duanita Trinidad, Filipinos,I did not mean that both owned the property, the phrase having merely described Ramos- civil status. ?efore the appellate court, petitioners alleged that the !%R" erred in ruling that the mar/et value of the property was P;,6>>,@@@ as assessed by the "ity 'ssessor of Fanila and appearing in the documents submitted before the %abor 'rbiter, claiming that at the time the Pandacan property was constituted as the family home in 6C<<, its value was way below P=@@,@@@1 and that 'rt. 6B= of the Family "ode was applicable, hence, they no longer had to resort to 2udicial or e.tra2udicial constitution. (n the assailed #ecision> of $eptember ;<, ;@@7, the appellate court, in denying petitioners- appeal, held that the Pandacan property was not e.empted from e.ecution, for while I'rticle 6B= 7 of the Family "ode provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence, RitS did not mean that the article has a retroactive effect such that all e.isting family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family "ode.I The appellate court went on to hold that what was applicable law were 'rticles ;;< to ;B6 of the "ivil "ode, hence, there was still a need to either 2udicially or e.tra2udicially constitute the Pandacan property as petitioners- family home before it can be e.empted1 and as petitioners failed to comply therewith, there was no error in denying the motion to 0uash the writ of e.ecution. The only 0uestion raised in the present petition for review on certiorari is the propriety of the "ourt of 'ppeals #ecision holding that the levy upon the Pandacan property was valid. The petition is devoid of merit.

(ndeed, the general rule is that the family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to en2oy such properties, which must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. (t cannot be sei5ed by creditors e.cept in certain special cases.C Melley, Dr. v. Planters Products, (nc.6@ lays down the rules relative to the levy on e.ecution over the family home, vi5+ !o doubt, a family home is generally e.empt from e.ecution provided it was duly constituted as such. There must be proof that the alleged family home was constituted 2ointly by the husband and wife or by an unmarried head of a family. (t must be the house where they and their family actually reside and the lot on which it is situated. The family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the con2ugal partnership, or of the e.clusive properties of either spouse with the latter-s consent, or on the property of the unmarried head of the family. The actual value of the family home shall not e.ceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of P=@@,@@@ in urban areas and P;@@,@@@ in rural areas. nder the Family "ode, there is no need to constitute the family home 2udicially or e.tra2udicially. 'll family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family "ode ('ugust =, 6C77) are constituted as such by operation of law. 'll e.isting family residences as of 'ugust =, 6C77 are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family "ode. The e.emption is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. Foreover, the debts for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after 'ugust =, 6C77. ,therwise (that is, if it was incurred prior to 'ugust =, 6C77), the alleged family home must be shown to have been constituted either 2udicially or e.tra2udicially pursuant to the "ivil "ode. (emphasis supplied) For the family home to be e.empt from e.ecution, distinction must be made as to what law applies based on when it was constituted and what re0uirements must be complied with by the 2udgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege. )ence, two sets of rules are applicable. (f the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family "ode or before 'ugust =, 6C77, then it must have been constituted either 2udicially or e.tra*2udicially as provided under 'rticles ;;B, ;;C*;=6 and ;== of the "ivil "ode. 66 Dudicial constitution of the family home re0uires the filing of a verified petition before the courts and the registration of the court-s order with the Registry of #eeds of the area where the property is located. Feanwhile, e.tra2udicial constitution is governed by 'rticles ;<@ to ;<; 6; of the "ivil "ode and involves the e.ecution of a public instrument which must also be registered with the Registry of Property. Failure to comply with either one of these two modes of constitution will bar a 2udgment debtor from availing of the privilege. ,n the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family "ode on 'ugust =, 6C77, there is no need to constitute e.tra2udicially or 2udicially, and the e.emption is effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under 'rt. 6B<6= actually resides therein. Foreover, the family home should belong to the absolute community or con2ugal partnership, or if e.clusively by one spouse, its constitution must have been with consent of the other, and its value must not e.ceed certain amounts depending upon the area where it is located. Further, the debts incurred for which the e.emption does not apply as provided under 'rt. 6BB 6< for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after 'ugust =, 6C77.
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'nd in both cases, whether under the "ivil "ode or the Family "ode, it is not sufficient that the person claiming e.emption merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for e.emption must be set up and proved.6B (n the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was constituted prior to 'ugust =, 6C77, or as early as 6C<<, they must comply with the procedure mandated by the "ivil "ode. There being absolutely no proof that the Pandacan property was 2udicially or e.tra2udicially constituted as the Ramos- family home, the law-s protective mantle cannot be availed of by petitioners. Parenthetically, the records show that the sheriff e.hausted all means to e.ecute the 2udgment but failed because Ramos- ban/ accounts69 were already closed while other properties in his or the company-s name had already been transferred,6> and the only property left was the Pandacan property. @:EREFORE, the petition is DENIED. $, ,R#:R:#.
CONC:ITA CARPIO MORALES 'ssociate Dustice "hairperson

8.R. No. L-15021

Octo+e- 302 1564

T:E PEOPLE OF T:E P:ILIPPINES2 plaintiff*appellee, vs. ESTE6AN R. C:A;ES2 defendant*appellant.

Office of the $olicitor /eneral for plaintiff7appellee. 5aximo P. 'acudan for defendant7appellant.

RE7ES2 9.6.L.2 J.:

'ppeal from an order of the "ourt of First (nstance of ,riental Fisamis, dated #ecember 6, 6C96, issued in "riminal "ase !o. 69@6, declaring a family home e.tra2udicially constituted not e.empt from the e.ecution levy issued at the instance of the offended party. The accused, :steban "haves, has been found by the "ourt of First (nstance ("rim. "ase !o. 69@6) and by the "ourt of 'ppeals ("'*E.R. !o. @@@B=* R) guilty of a violation, of Republic 'ct !o. 6<B, in that he had collected, in Danuary, 6C<7, a claim of Farcela Rambuyon for death benefits in the sum of ]<,;B;.;@ due her for the demise of her son, $'FF: veteran $antos :chaure1 the corresponding chec/ was cashed by "haves, who later delivered only P=,;@;.;@ to the claimant, and retained PB,=9;.;@ for himself. "haves was sentenced to undergo one year imprisonment, to indemnify the offended party in the sum of PB,=9;.;@ and to pay the costs. The conviction and sentence became final on 'pril 69, 6C96. The indemnity not having been paid, the offended party obtained a writ of e.ecution in Fay, 6C96, and the $heriff accordingly levied on a residential lot and building of the accused, but desisted from proceeding further when the accused e.hibit proof that the property had been e.tra2udicially constituted and recorded as a family home, in accordance with the provisions of the "ivil "ode. on #ecember B, 6CB=, after the filing of the information but before conviction. pon petition by the complainant, the "ourt issued the contested order declaring that the family home was not e.empt from the levy made by the $heriff because the accusedHs obligation to pay the amount wrongfully retained by him was anterior to the constitution of the family home. The motion of accused "haves for reconsideration of the order having been denied, he resorted to this "ourt on appeal. The issue is whether the family home e.tra2udicially constituted is entitled to e.emption, considering that 'rticle ;<= of the "ivil "ode of the Philippines is to the following effect+ 'RT. ;<=. The family home e.tra2udicially formed shall be e.empt from e.ecution, forced sale or attachment, e.cept+ (6) For nonpayment of debts, (;) For debts incurred before the declaration was recorded in the Registry of Property1 (=) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such re*cord of the declaration1 (<) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material*men and others who have rendered $ervice or furnished material for the construction of the building. 'ppellant ta/es the position that the indemnity due to the complainant became a IdebtI within the purview of this 'rticle only from the date of the 2udgment ordering indemnification, years after family home in 0uestion was established. &e see no merit in the appeal. The word IdebtI, as used in subdivision (;) of 'rticle ;<=, Iis not 0ualified and must, therefore, be ta/en in its generic senseI (Fontoya vs. (gnacio, B< ,ff. Ea5. C>7*C>C), i.e., of IobligationsI in general. The duty of "haves to reimburse the amount of the veteranHs benefits improperly retained by him certainly arose and came into e.istence from the date of his misappropriation (Danuary, 6C<7), and the 2udgment of 6C96 merely established the fact of the misappropriation beyond controversy and reasonable doubt. The 2udgment sentencing "haves to indemnify complainant was not the source of his duty to return, any more than a 2udgment on a promissory note would be the origin of the promissorHs duty to pay. That a 2udgment is not necessary to clothe a pree.isting debt with the privileged character of being enforceable against the family home e.tra2udicially established at a later date is apparent by comparison with 'rticle ;<> of the "ivil "ode. 'RT. ;<>. &hen a creditor whose claim is not mentioned in article ;<= obtains a 2udgment in his favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home of the 2udgment debtor is worth more than the amount mentioned in 'rticle ;=6, he may apply to the "ourt of First (nstance for an order directing the sale of the property under e.ecution. !ote that under this article it is only claims not mentioned in Article GN4 that must be reduced to 2udgment before being enforced against the family home. "ertainly, the Ihumane considerations,I for which the law surrounded the home with immunities from levy, did not include the intent to enable a debtor to thwart the 2ust claims of his creditors. (f in the case of a 2udicially established family home the law re0uires that the petitioning debtor should first give sufficient security for his unsecured debts before the family home is authori5ed ('rt. ;=6), there is no reason why in the case of the e.tra2udicial constitution, that creditors have no opportunity to oppose or protest, the constituting debtor should be enabled to escape payment of his 2ust debts, and leave the creditors holding an empty bag. The order appealed from is affirmed. "osts against appellant.
%eng2on& #.,.& %autista Angelo& #oncepcion& %arrera& 'aredes& Di2on& 5a)alintal& %eng2on& ,.'.& and Paldivar& ,.,.& concur. Regala& ,.& too/ no part.

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