The Royal African Society

Disarming Somalia: The Contrasting Fortunes of United States and Australian Peacekeepers during United Nations Intervention, 1992-1993 Author(s): Robert G Patman Reviewed work(s): Source: African Affairs, Vol. 96, No. 385 (Oct., 1997), pp. 509-533 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal African Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/723817 . Accessed: 13/03/2012 23:46
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(1997),96, 509-533 Affairs Ahican

THE CONTRASTING DISARMINGSOMALIA: FORTUNESOF UNl l ED STATESD DURING PEACEKEEPERS AUSTRALIAN UNl l F;DNATIONS INTERVENTION, 1992-1993
G ROBERT PATMAN ABSTRACT duringthe the This articleexamines impactof 'microdisarmament' in intervention Somalia, Nations humanitarian United States/United natureof the the 1992-93. To this end, it considers controversial of experiences Americanand UNITAF mandate,the disarmament yielded and and in peacekeepers Mogadishu Baidoa thelessons Australian is that analysis. The argument emerges that the froma comparative reconand disarmament political linking strategy of absence a consistent the per ciliation,not peace enforcement se, largelycondemned UN itself,likethe Australians to operation failure. If the US hadpositioned for them,thepicture UN of instead between the above warlords in Baidoa, quitedifferent. The integrated may in interveniion Somalia havelooked concommunity, that ie international revealed approach Australian choiceian impotence may wii fronted oier Somalias, yethavea wider peace-enforcement. or muscular in CIVIL AND IN 1992, CONSTANT WAR DROUGHTSomaliahad combined to produce a catastrophic famine killing an estimated 300,000 people.1 Unable to amelioratethese conditions through UNOSOM I, a humanitarianassistancemission,the United Nations opted for directintervention. This consisted of two phases: UNITAF, a US-led humanitarianintervention with limited enforcement duties; and UNOSOM II, a UN-led humanitarian operation with extensive enforcement functions. Disarmament,which is understoodhere as a process involvingthe reduction, removalor eliminationof the means of violence, was not specifically writteninto UNITAF's mandatealthoughthe countrywas awashwith vast
Dr. RobertG. Patmanteachesin the Departmentof PoliticalStudies,Universityof Otago, for in undertaken Australia this that acknowledges the research New Zealand. He gratefully and Arms Control study was supportedby a Public AdvisoryCommitteeon Disarmament Paper162 for as versionof this paperappeared Working Fellowship. An earlier (PACDAC) September1996. NationalUniversity,Canberra, the Peace ResearchCentre,Australian 1. 'Editorial:No Time for Celebration',SomaliaNews Update(SNU) [Electronicmail], vol 3, no. 22, 27 August 1994; Ioan Lewis, Making Historyin Somalia:Humanitarian in intervention a statelesssociety,Discussion Paper 6 (Centre for the Study of Global London, September1993), p. 6. Governance, 509

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amounts of weaponryat the time.2 The effects of this omission became clear in Mogadishuwhen UNOSOM II's belated programmeof disarmament encountered the armed resistance of General Aideed's faction in June 1993. This confrontationeventuallyended the UN's experimentin peace-enforcementand led to the humiliatingwithdrawalof UN troops and personnel from Somalia on 2 March 1995. But the demise of the UN's first peace enforcementoperationin a failed state was by no means inevitable. In Baidoa, the Australian contingent in the international coalition achieved a remarkable transformation the security in environment. It involved, amongst other things, a policy of active disarmament.

UNintervention: a mandate disarm notto disarm? to or

Despite the prolongeddissolutionof the Somali state, the responseto the sufferingit occasioned was initiallyslow international and ineffective. With the heroic exception of the Red Cross and a number of nongovernment relief organizations, Somaliawas virtuallyabandonedin 1991 by the international community. Moreover, when the UN Security Councilfinallyaddressedthe Somali conflict in early 1992, the Organizationmade only slow progress. Having brokered a shaky cease-fire in March, SecurityCouncil passed Resolution751 the approving deploythe ment 500 Pakistani of UN troopsto providesecurityfor reliefoperationsin Mogadishu. But the mission, designatedUNOSOM I, took four months to obtainthe grudgingconsent of GeneralAideedfor deploymentand ien facedimpotence once deployed.3 Restrainedby very limited rules of engagement, lightly-armedPakistanis were powerless the to stop the looting secure the peace. or Unable to reversethe trend of starvationand disorder in Somalia, Dr Boutros Boutros-Ghali, new UN Secretary the General,concludediat the UN's policy in Somaliahad become 'untenable'.4 He believedthere was little alternativebut to adopt more forcefil measuresto protect humanitarian operations. On 24 November 1992, the Bush administration inforrned Boutros-Ghalithat the US was preparedto lead a multilateral enforcement operation in Somalia. During subsequent negotiations it became that the US was not proposingto establish plain a UN protectorate in Somalia and that any Americantroops deployed there would remain under US command. While voicing some reservations about these conditions, Boutros-Ghaliaccepted the US offer. On 3 December, the
2.Disarmament often definedas both a process is and an and Jeffrey Newnham, The Dictionaryof WorldPolitics end state. See GrahamEvans (HarvesterWheatsheaf,Hemel Hempstead, revisededition 1992), pp. 73-74. 3. John Drysdale, Whatever Happenedto Somalia? (Haan Associates, London, pp. 1994), 47-52. 4. Boutros-Ghali cited in Ken Menkhausand Terence Lyons, 'Whatare Learned Somalia?' from CSISAfricaNotes,no. 144, January1993, p. 4. the lessons to be

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Security Council unanimously endorsed the US initiative. Resolution 794 recognisedthat the 'humantragedycausedby the conflict'in Somalia constituted'a threatto international peace' and resolved'to restorepeace, stability and law and order with a view to facilitatingthe process of a political settlement ... in Somalia'.5 As a consequence, Resolution 794 authorized US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to use 'all necessary the means to establishas soon as possible a secure environmentfor humanitarianrelief operations'.6 Unrestrained the need for consent from the by parties to the Somali conflict, UNITAF troops were permitted under common rules of engagementthe possible use of deadly force, including 'pre-emptive action', beyond simple self-defence to accomplish the humanitarianmission. But this was uncharteredterritoryfor the UN. The UN Chartermade no provisionhow to deal with 'failedstates'.7 Within a week of launching Operation Restore Hope, the US and the UN publicly clashed over whether the mandate for the operation includedthe disarmingof Somalimilitias. Presidential spokesmanMarlin Fitzwater said 'disarmamentwas not a stated part of our mission and that has not changed'.8 According to US special envoy to Somalia, Robert Oakley, Security Council Resolution 794 was 'a clearly defined mission, which is to establish security conditions in Somalia to provide for the uninterrupted flow of relief supplies. It does not include disarmament'.9 He was supported by US commander of UNITAF, LieutenantGeneralRobertJohnstonwho said:'Peoplewill need to change the terms of my mission before I get into a wholesaledisarmament'.10 The UN, however, took a much broader interpretation of the mandate. In the view of the UN Secretary-General and other senior officials 'secure environment'was inconceivablewithout disarmament.1l Indeed, Boutros-Ghalibelieved he had a private understandingon this matterwith the Bush administration. But the Bush administration denied this. The UN wanted UNITAF to use its ovetwhelmingmilitaryadvantage to create an environmentthat would be both conducive to humanitarian operations and the process of national reconciliation before it handed over the operationto the UN. Withoutsubstantialdisarmament, the UN leadership believedthat inherentfinancialand logisticalconstraints would make the organizationacutely vulnerableto the armed menace of
5. UN Security Council Resolution dated 3 December 1992. 794, 6. UN Security Council Resolution 794.
7. Ismat Kittani, 'UN Peace Efforts in Somalia', in Kevin Clements and Christine Wilson

(eds.), UNrPeacekeeping the Crossroads at (Peace Research Centre, Australian National

University, Canberra, 1994), p 135 . 8. Reuters, December 1992. 14 9. TheIndependent (London), 15 December 1992; John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, Somalia Operation and Restore Hope,(United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC, 1995), p. 59 and p. 83. 10. TheAge (Melbourne), 15 December 1992. . Reuters, December 1992 and 15 December 1992. 12

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the bandits and organized factions in the follow-up peacekeeping operation.12 In other words, Boutros-Ghalifeared that if the gangs and factions were not disarmed, much of the humanitarianwork during OperationRestoreHope would be wastedin what would basicallybecome a Band-aidexercise. The disputebetween the US and the UN centredon what constituteda secure environment in Somalia. Political rather than strictly security considerationsshaped the Americanposition. A numberof factorswere involved. First, Washingtonmade a firm distinction between humanitarian and strategic intervention.l3 Because Somalia was deemed to belong to the formercategory,the Bush administration seemed anxiousto adhere to the norm of non-interference domestic aSairs. Underlying in this was a tacit recognition that ultimately civil wars are about the distribution of power and that disarmingwould by definition involve the US in the Somali political process. That entailed a long term commitment. Second, the US feared that systematic disarmamentin Somaliacould involvesignificantcasualties. As one seniorUS officerput it: 'If we go out and try to physicallydisarmpeople who don't want to be disarmed, we're talking about going to war against all the factions in Somalia'.l4 Third, the Axnericans were wary of the complexity of the securityenvironmentin statelessSomalia. A largepart of the population was armed. Guns were an ever-present featureof Somalilife and carrying them in public was commonplace. In these circumstances,accordingto LawrenceEagleburger,the US Secretaryof State, it was 'impossibleto imagine' that US-led forces could ever totally disarm Somalia. 15 Furthermore,how could UNITAF troops distinguish between Somali gun-holderswho were militia members,outlawsor those who simplyhad weapons for self-defence? Fourth, a policy of active disarmament would have been potentiallyexpensive. The US was probablykeen to keep its phase of the UN operationlimitedbecause it was payingthe cost of about $30 million a day to keep the troops in Somalia.l6 If disarmament was pursueclin a purposefialfashion, that figure would have risen sharply. Seen from the White House, these factors indicated that the political consensus supporting Operation Restore Hope could collapse if active disarmament became a majorgoal in Somalia.l7
12. Reuters, December 1992; TheEvening 15 Standard (London), 22 December 1992; The Guardian (London), 24 December 1992. 13. TheGuardian, December 1992. 16 14. TheEvening Post(Wellington), 30 December 1992. 15. Reuters, December 1992. 17 16. TheAge (Melbourne), 15 December 1992; Robert Oakley, the US Special Envoy to Somalia, noted that 'as long as UNITAF was in the field, the United States was picking up more than 75 percent of its cost'. See Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia,p. 109. 17. Clement Adibe, Managing Armsin PeaceProcesses: Somalia(United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, New York and Geneva, 1995), p. 60.

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Cosmetic disarmament Mogadishu in Guided by a narrow interpretationof the UN mandate, UNITAF adopteda consensualapproachto securityin Mogadishu. Two days after the launch of the US-led intervention on 11 December 1992, Robert Oakley,US SpecialEnvoy to Somalia,secureda fresh ceasefireagreement between the two main protagonistsin Mogadishu,Ali Mahdi and General Aideed.l8 Despite the veneer of agreement, this seven-point ceasefire brokeredby Oakleyrepresentedlittle substantiveprogress. Many of the points had in fact been agreed at varioustimes during the previousnine months. The major novel element, the removal of technicals from Mogadishu to designated areas outside the city, was essentially a concession to the new military realities of the US presence in the city. Moreover, Oakley's immediate dialogue with two of the key warlords shocked and dismayed many Somalis and foreign aid workers. The warlordswere widely seen as war criminalswho had plunged Somaliainto chaos and famine. Insteadof arresting warlords,the US treatedthem the as legitimatepoliticalplayersat a time when they were on the backfootand their authoritywas ebbing.l9 Thereafter, the UN's freedom of action in searching for a political solution was severely circumscribedby the involvementof the faction leaders. On 4 January1993, the UN SecretaryGeneral, Dr Boutros BoutrosGhali, opened a peace conference of 14 Somali faction leaders in Addis Ababa. Eventually,formal cease-fireand disarmamentagreementswere signed on 8 and 15 January respectively. Under the accords,the factions agreed to draw up a national charterand discuss forming a new interim governmentat a reconciliationconferencein Addis Ababa on 15 March. It was also agreed that UNITAF/UNOSOM I immediatelyestablish a cease-fire monitoringgroup comprisingrepresentatives from the Somali factions. The monitoringgroupwould take possessionof heavyweapons under the control of these movements until 'a legitimateSomali government can take them over'.20 Otherpoints in the agreementincluded the encampment of militias, the registrationof all weapons belonging to civilians and the return of all propertyunlawilly taken during previous
hostilities.2l

18. The Guardian,12 December 1992; AfricaResearch Bulletin(ARB), 1-31, December

1992, p. 10834. 19. Daniel Campagnon, 'The Lack of Consideration for Internal Political Dynamics in the International Intervention in Somalia', paper presented at International Colloquim on Integration and Regionalism, Talence, Bordeaux, 17-30 April 1994, p. 19. 20. ARB, 1-31 December 1992, p. 10869. 21. Report theCommission Inquiry of of Established Pursuant Security to Council Resolution 885

Them, Security Council Document Sl19941653, p. 13; ARB, 1-31 December 1992, p. 10834 and 1-31 January 1993, p. 10869.

(1993) to Investigate Armed Attackson UNOSOMII Personnel Whlich to Casualties Led Among

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Notwithstanding these solemn agreements, verylittle progresswas made in implementingthem. While the ceasefiremonitoringgroupidentifieda numberof Authorized WeaponsStorageAreas(AWSSs)wherethe factions agreed to deposit some of their tanks, armouredpersonnel carriersand technical vehicles, many of these heavy weapons were moved out of Mogadishueven beforeUNITAF arrived Somalia.22 At the same time, in the warlordswere unwillingor unable to comply with the agreementthat their armedfollowersregistertheirweaponswith the UNITAF authorities for eventual disarmament. Because the warlords benefited financially from the criminalactivitiesof their supporters,they had little incentiveto orderthe registration machine-guns,especiallyas it might involvea test of of theirleadershipcontrol.23 Consequently,many Somalisin Mogadishu remainedarmed. The initial American focus on voluntarydisarmamentin Mogadishu brought several small-scaleweapons incentive programmesto the fore. Variations of the 'food for guns' and 'cash for guns' concepts were considered. In January 1993, UNITAF Marine Forces (MARFOR) begangivinga receiptfor weaponssurrendered for information where or on to find weapons.24 These receipts could then be exchanged for food provided by the humanitarianrelief organizations. This scheme was largelyconcentratedin a sector of northernMogadishuunder the sway of Ali Mahdi. Italiantroopsorganizeda similarprogramme the same area in in March 1993.25 In both instances, however, the impact was very limited. Not only was the general food situation beginning to improve in early 1993, but many Somalis believed they would risk their lives surrenderingtheir weapons in what was still an insecure environment. Consequently, the number of weapons surrenderedwas modest and invariably consisted of poor qualityor aging arms. The proposalto pay for weapons turned in was also reviewed. Citing the Panama example of 1989 where 4,000 weapons were recoveredat a cost of about 8800,000, Dick Cheney, the US Secretaryof Defence, expressedearlyoptimismthat such a scheme could be just as effectivein Mogadishu.26 But this view soon gave way to a recognition that the Somali arms problem did not bear any meaningfulcomparison. At the beginning of US/UN intervention,something like one in ten Somalis in Mogadishu carried arms. One estimate put the total number of small arms in Mogadishu above 100,000.27 Given the large quantity of
22. Report theCommission Inquiry, 21; ARB, January 1-31, 1993, p. 10869. of of p. 23. TheObserver (London), 17 January 1993. 24. F. M. Lorenz 'Weapons Confiscation Policy During the First Phases of Operation "Restore Hope" ', Small Wars and Insurgencies, 3 (1994), pp. 414-15. 5, 25. Reuters, March 1993. 30 26. TheDaily Telegraph (London), December 1992. 21 27. 'The United Nations Operations in Somalia', Insight,New Zealand National Radio, 10 July 1994.

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weapons, any 'weapons for cash' plan in Mogadishu faced enormous difficulties. For one thing, it would have been prohibitivelyexpensive. Althoughthe price of AK-47s plungedat the beginningof the international intervention, pricessoon recoveredand rose in line with increaseddemand in January1993.28 So unless UNITAF was preparedto pay the market price, there was little incentive for gunmen to give up their quality arms. A weapons for cash programme also ran the risk of boosting the alreadythrivingarms trade in East Africa. By late January1993, the US finally abandoned the idea of weapons incentive programmes in
Mogadishu.29

The meagre results of voluntarydisarmamentcoincided with a steady deteriorationin Mogadishu's security situation. After an initial lull in hostilities, fighting between rival militias escalated from mid-December. The visit of PresidentBush to the city over the New Year was markedby sustained artillery,mortar and machine-gun exchanges just three miles north-eastof the Americanembassy.30 By 10 January,Mogadishu was gripped by the worst violence since the March 1992 ceasefire. Some estimatesput the death toll as high as 300.3l However,UNITAF did not intervene. US militaryspokesmen dismissed such fighting as 'internal' Somali incidents outside the scope of the UN mandate.32 UNITAF's seeming neutrality on intra-Somali conflict did not insulate it from violence. In earlyJanuary1993, 200 supporters GeneralAideed stoned of the UN headquarters Mogadishu,and forcedthe UN Secretary-General in Boutros Boutros-Ghalito cut short his visit to the Somali capital.33 By late February,US troops shot dead at least three Somalis and fought running battles with thousands of rioters after General Aideed publicly accused the US of favouring a rival warlord, Siad Hersi Morgan, in Kismayo.34 Mogadishualso fell victimto a soaringcrimerate. Once it becameclear to bandits they could keep their guns if they did not directly threaten UNITAF's operations,armedrobberyand extortiontook off.35 Reliefaid workersand foreign journalistsbecame favouritetargets as ie gunmen resumed control of large areas of the city. The subsequent upsurge of attackspersuadedprominentaid organizations the Save the Children like Fund to continuespendingnearly$10,000 per weekhiringlocal gunmento
28. The Sunday Times (London), 3 January 1993; Lieutenant Colonel Brian Millan,
Queenscliff Military Training College, interview with author, 23 January 1995. 29. F. M. Lorenz, 'Weapons Confiscation Policy', p. 415. 30. TheTimes (London), 1 January 1993. 31. Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal, Somalia Operation RestoreHope: A preliminary assessment (African Rights, London, May 1993), p. 29. 32. TheSundayTimes (London), 1 January 1993. 33. TheGuardian, January 1993. 4 34. TheDominion (Wellington), 25 February 1993; TheGuardian, February 1993. 25 35. Ioan Lewis, MakingHistory Somalia,p. 9; ARB, 1-28 February 1993, p. 10904. in

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provide'security'.36 Such spendingreflectedwhatwas seen as an ambiguous UNITAF commitment to relief agency security. In early March, when a groupof Aideed'sfollowersattemptedextortionoperationsagainst the Mogadishu offices of CARE and the World Food Programme,no attempt was made to arrest the culprits.37 The point was not lost on the gunmen themselves. Commenting on the US marine presence in Mogadishuone gunmanobserved:'They'renot troublingus. We do what we like'.38 The deteriorating securitysituationeventually joltedthe UNITAR forces in January1993 into periodicweapon searchesand confiscationsthat were independent of the disarmament agreements signed by the warring factions.39 But these did not form part of a comprehensive disarmament plan nor were they consideredby the US as a centralfeatureof the UN mandate. The aforementionedsplit between the US and UN over the role of disarmamentin the mission was compoundedby divisionswithin the US political and militaryestablishment. Amid some disquiet in the Pentagon about participatingin an operation defined in humanitarian terms by the White House, senior US officialsin the early stages of the interventionissued conflictingstatementsabout whetherUS troopswould be used to disarmgunmen.40 The absence of a clearUS vision on disarmament and open differences with the UN predictablymuddled policy in Mogadishu. Three episodes highlightedthis within the first week of OperationRestore Hope. First, US marinesdiscovereda large armscache in a buildingowned by Osman Ato, GeneralAideed's financierand close aide, but were instructednot to remove the guns or their owners.4l Second, US marines confiscated weapons from gunmen only to discover that a batch of 20 AK-47 machine-guns were subsequently returned to faction leader, General Aideed.42 Third, when French legionnairesseized weapons from some Somalis at road checkpoints they were rebuked by the Americans for exceeding the UN mandate and obliged to give them back to their owners.43 Yet, US Cobrahelicopterstook pre-emptive actionto destroya number of 'technicals' apparentlythreateningUNITAF. The discrepancy between the wide latitude given to UNITAF troops in the rules of engagement and the US refusal to embark on systematic searches for
36. TheSundayTimes, January 1993. 3 37. Walter S Clarke, 'Testing the World's Resolve in Somalia', Parameters, XXIII, 4 (1993-94), p. 49. 38. TheSundayTimes, January 1993. 3 39. Report theCommission Inquiry, 13. of of p. 40. Confidential source, State Department's Bureau of Intelligence, 25 January 1994. 41. TheOtagoDaily Times (New Zealand), 12 December 1992. 42. TheGuardian, December 1992. 15 43. Colonel M. Couton, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), interview with author, New York, 28 January 1994; Evening Post(Wellington), 26 December 1992.

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weapons left some senior US marines strugglingto make sense of the weapons Despite the uncertainties generated by an 'arms control' approach, UNITAF could not remain totally indifferentto worsening security in Mogadishu. In late December 1992, on the eve of a visit by President Bush, US forces seized arms, missiles and battle wagons in north-west Mogadishuand the contents of a smallerarsenalfrom a buildingopposite the US embassycompound in south Mogadishu.45 On 7 and 8 January 1993, US marines stormed weapons compounds belonging to General Aideed. Tanks, anti-aircraftguns, mortars and battle wagons were seized. UNITAF forces then turned their attention to the so called Argentine arms market located in Ali Mahdi's domain in north Mogadishu. This raid led to the confiscationof a tank, two armoured personnelcarriers,'technical'battle wagons, 250 riflesand machineguns, as well as mortars, rockets and shells.46 Perhaps the most spectacular armsseizureoccurredon 11 January1993 when 900 US marinesoccupied Mogadishu'smain arms marketat Bakaraand confiscatedfive truckloads of arms and ammunition.47 If anxietyabout securitypromptedad hoc disarmament, also led to a it belated UNITAF concern with law and order. Until mid-January 1993 the US Special Envoy to Somalia, Robert Oakley, said that the creation of local police forces was not on UNITAF's agenda. Nevertheless, increasingattacksagainstUS Marinesin MogadishugalvanisedIJNITAF into supportingefforts by a joint committee, establishedafter the ceasefire of 11 December 1992, to form a police constabulary in Mogadishu. On 6 February,a Somali police force consisting of more than 2,000 members began operationsin the Somali capital for the first time in two years.48 A judicial committee was also formed, with an equal number of magistratesand judges named by the Aideed and Ali Mahdi factions. But these efforts did little to restore the rule of law. The legal process was fundamentally compromisedby the involvement of appointeesfrom the two warringfactions. Neither group would permit the arrestof its own members.49 The penchant for quick-fix solutions to Somalia's security problems reflected UNITAF's determinationto withdrawfrom Somalia and hand over responsibilityto the United Nations. President Bush even spoke about getting out of Somalia by 20 January1993. While that timetable
policy.44

44. TheGuardian, December 1992. 15 45. TheGuardian, December 1992. 30 46. Reuters, January 7 1993; TheEvening Standard (London),8 January 1993; TheGuardian, 9 January1993. 47. TheGuardian, January1993. 12 48. ARB, 1-28 February,1993, p. 10904. 49. WalterS Clarke,'Testingthe World'sResolvein Somalia',p. 49.

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did not eventuate,Bush's successor,Bill Clinton, also sharedthe view that the US should not stay any longer than absolutely necessary. Thus, despite four days of riots and gun battles in Mogadishuin late February, the US militaryannouncedit was pressingahead with plans to withdraw 3,000 troops from Somalia.50 According to General Robert Johnston, UNITAF had accomplished mission:'We reverseda its devastating famine and now it is safe to walkthe streets. We have given Mogadishuand the towns backto the Somalis.5l UNITAF's intervention, it was claimedhad saved something like 250,000 Somalis from starvation,52 senior UN but officials,includingBoutros-Ghali, deniedAmericanclaimsthat the US-led force had created a secure environmentfor the deliveryof humanitarian assistance. It was in this context that the United Nations SecurityCouncil adopted resolution814 on 26 March 1993, expandingthe size and mandate of UNOSOM to include not only the protection of humanitarianrelief suppliesand personnelbut also to compel the Somali militiasto disarm. Unlike UNITAF, whose involvement in the disarmamentprocess was secondary derivedfrom the ceasefireand disarmament and agreementsof January 1993, the new UN mission-UNOSOM II-was mandated to disarm SomalimilitiasunderChapterVII of the United Nations Charter to createconditions for a political settlement.53 With the expansionof theUN mandate, pressureon the Somali factions increased. A UN sponsoredConference of National Reconciliationwas held in March 1993. After days bargaining,the 15 faction leaders 13 signed a peace accord on 27Marchwhich committedthe partiesto 'complete'disarmament within 90days.54 The agreementcalled on the multi-nationalforces to apply 'strong and effective sanctions' against violators of the Conference agreedto set up a TransitionalNationalcease-fire. The also Council (TNC) as country's supreme authorityduring what the was seen as a two-year transition democratic to government. But the warlords little intention had of implementingthe Addis Ababaaccords. Afterthe adjournment the of UN-sponsored conference, the warlords signed a second document in Addis Ababawhich went againstthe letter and spiritof the agreementsof 27 March.55
50. TheSunday-Star Times(Wellington), 28 February 1993. 51. ARB, May 1-31 1993, p. 11018. 52. Ambassador David Shinn, Director for East interview author, Washington DC, 24 January African Affairs, Department of State, with 1994. 53.Reportof the Commission Inquiry,p. of 14Intervention a Failed State', in Kevin ClementsBruce Lendon, 'Somalia: International in and Robin Ward International Community (Canberra, Allen and Unwin in association with (ed.), Building the Peace Research Centre, 1994), pp. 131-132. 54.The Washington Post,28 March 1993. 55.Report theCommzssion Inquiry, 17. of of p.

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On 4 May 1993, UNOSOM II formally took over from UNITAF. From the outset, the hastily-assembledUNOSOM II force was overstretched. The initial complementof 16,000 UN troops, drawn from a large numberof countries,struggledto fill the vacuum left by the 37,000 hardshort of operational strongUNITAF force.56 Althoughdesperately ware such as armouredpersonnel carriers(APCs),57UNOSOM II was expected to disarmthe warlordmilitiasand take chargeof the 60 percent of Somali territorypreviouslyoutside intemationalcontrol. Not surprisingly,the resolveof the new UN forcewas soon put to the test. On 5 June 1993, 24 Pakistanipeacekeeperswere brutallykilled duringpre-arranged weapons verification inspection visits to some of Aideed's authorized weapon storagesites (AWSS) in south Mogadishu. was In manyways, the attackon the Pakistanipeacekeepers a 'shoot-out waitingto happen'.58 BecauseUNITAF allowedmanySomaligunmento keep their arms, it was almost inevitablethat the most formidablefaction led by General Aideed would resist a visibly weakened UN presence. Aideed understoodthat UNOSOM II's new mandate was a direct challenge to a power base built on the arms of his followers. The 5 June incident exposed the danger of relying on the hope that international interventionwould somehow convertwarlordslike Aideed into consensus oriented politicians. The rest of the operation became a grim end game. The UN launched a manhunt for Aideed and tried to forcibly had disarmhis militia. But the window of opportunityfor disarmament long since closed. The ensuing bloody confrontation in Mogadishu mission. effectivelyended the peace-enforcement
Active disarmamentin Baidoa

In contrastto the Americanpredicamentin Mogadishu,the Australian contributionto the UNITAF operationwas widely seen as a UN success story.59 On 17 January1993, the 1st Battalion of the Royal Australian Relief Sector Regiment(1 RAR) took control of the BaidoaHumanitarian 142 French Legionnaires.60 Until the (HRS) from 700 US Marinesand arrivalof these troops on 16 December 1992, Baidoa was known as the
56. Elisabeth Lindenmayer, UN DPKO, interview with author, New York, 27 January 1994. 57. Colonel M. Couton, interview with author, 28 January 1994. 7 58. Relief aid worker cited in TheTimes, June 1993. 59. The Australian forces were the only army in the UN operation to receive a letter of commendation from the NGO community in Baidoa; see Peter Kieseker, 'Relationships between Non-Government and Multinational Forces in the Field' in Hugh Smith (ed.), for Challenges thefuture(Canberra, Australian Defence Force Academy, 1993), Peacekeeping: p. 68. There was also great national and international pressure for the Australians to extend their stay in Baidoa beyond May 1993. This point was made by Rear Admiral A. M. (Gerry) Carwardine, Australian Defence Force Academy, interview with author, 20 January 1995, and Colonel Bill Mellor, 'The Australian Experience in Somalia' in Smith (ed.), Peacekeeping, p. 64. Force Somalia in Defence of Aussies Eyes:Photographs theAustralian 60. Robert Breen, Through 1993 (Canberra, Department of Defence, 1994), p. 13.

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'City of Death' because afterMogadishuit was the area worst affectedby civil war and famine. Geographically, Baidoa HRS covered an area of nearly 17,000 squarekilometresin centralSomaliaand compriseda total populationof about 180,000.6l Baidoawas the majorpopulation centre in the HRS with 50-600,000 inhabitants, including20,000 refugees. The Australiandeployment, known as Operation Solace, lasted for just 17 weeks but managed to create a stable situation in Baidoa where relief agenciescould freelyoperateand fulfil their work. While Australiadid not have a historyof close ties with Somalia,several factorsprompted a positive response in mid-December 1992 to an US request for assistance there. First, the Keating government believed it was importantto reinforceold ties with the US during the uncertainties of the post-Cold War era. Linked by the ANZUS Treacy and the ABCA (America-Britain-Canada-Australia) servicing cross arrangements, Canberra perceivedthat the inter-operability Australianand US forces of wouldminimizethe operationalrisks of deploymentunder the leadership ofthe US Commander,LieutenantGeneralRobert Johnston.62 Second, the Somali situation seemed almost an ideal testing ground for part of Australia's Operational DeploymentForce (ODF). For five monthsprior tothe Somali deployment,1 RARunderwentintensive trainingin services protected evacuationexercises in northernAustralia. These involved a strongemphasis on civil-militaryrelations in conditions which bore a certain resemblance the terrainin Somalia.63 Third, therewas a moral to imperative assist the UN-sanctioned operationin Somalia. to Like other peoples, Australians were deeply moved by the hauntingtelevisionimages of famine and death in that country. Whateverthe calculations,the immediatesecuritychallenge facing the Australians Baidoawas forrnidable. In many ways, the in situationthere followed Mogadishupattern. The arrival US and French the of troops in Baidoa the outset of UNITAF initiallyhad a calming at effect. Quite a few heavy weapons, including 'technicals' were neutralized and many gunmen either buried their weapons or simply moved out. But by mid-January the gunmenbegan to re-assertthemselvesagain. 1993, The USMarines became the target of Somali ambushes and shootings Baidoa. On 12 January,one US Marine washit-and-run in killed and
61. Testimony of Colonel David Hurley to Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Defence Subcommittee, 8 April 1994, Hansard Report, Canberra, pp. 530-31. 62. Mellor, 'The Australian Experience in Somalia', p. 66; Testimony of Colonel Bill Mellor to Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Defence Subcommittee, 12 October 1994, Hansard Report, Canberra, p. 51. 63.Colonel David Hurley, 'An Application of the Laws of Armed Conflict: Operation Solace' Hugh Smith (ed.), Thre in Forceof Lazv:International and the land commander lazv (Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 1994), p. 180.

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another seriously wounded in separate incidents.64 In retaliation for casualtiestaken, the Marines assaulted severaltowns and villages in the Baidoa HRS. This heavy-handed response served only to increase tensions. On 14 January, Marinepatrolwas stonedby a groupof Somali a youths. A day later, the first contingentof Australiantroops to arriveat Baidoawas fired on at the airport.65 At the same time, humanitarian non-government organizations (NGOs) were subjected to criminal harassment. Food and equipment were frequently stolen from NGO compounds. Relations between the aid agencies and the US militarybecame very strained. The NGOs, which paid enormous amounts to hired gunman for 'protection'againstlooters, were told they would not get US security for their compounds or staff unless they requested it.66 From the NGOs standpoint, 'the interest which the US Marines and the French troops displayed in their own security . . . often compromisedthe protectionprovidedto the NGOs in Baidoa'.67 On 15 January,a Swiss NGO employee of the International Committeeof the Red Crosswas murderedand robbed. Three of the six gunmen involvedin the attackwere Red Cross employees. This incident and the lootingof a MedicinesSan Frontierscompoundconvincedmanyin the NGO communitythat it was impossiblefor US marinesto stop such activityby 'hidingbehind sandbagsat a heavilyprotectedairport'or 'riding around in a jeep'.68 For aid workerslike Lockton Morrisseyof CARE Australiait was clear what needed to be done: 'There is no way that the [Baidoa]operationcould be successfulin the long termunless the guns are taken out of circulation'.69 And the NGOs made it clear to Australian militaryofficialsthat if there was not an improvementin Baidoa'ssecurity situationthey would all pack up and leave town.70 Conscious that Operation Solace would fail unless a more secure environmentwas created, Colonel David Hurley, Commanderof 1 RAR, developed a robust but clear-cut strategy. He donned the mantle of 'militarygovernor' of the Baidoa HRS and positioned the Australians above the armed clansmen in a counter-insurgency scyle operation. It involvedthe 'aggressive' protectionof humanitarian work and the 'domination' of the HRS throughthe use of static securitypositions, patrolling and on-call quick reaction forces.7l In part, this approachreflected a
64. Breen, ThroughAussie Eyes, p. 14. 65. Breen, ThroughAussieEyes, p. 15. 66. The Guardian, 17 December 1992; Robert Oakley contests that point but concedes that 'UNITAF and the relief agencies could not find an overall solution to this problem of protection'. See Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia, p. 69. 67. Kieseker, 'Relationships between Non-Government Organisations', p. 71. 68. Kieseker, 'Relationships between Non-Government Organisations', p. 71. 69. The Times, 15 December 1992. 70. Breen, ThroughAussie Eyes, p. 15. 71. Hurley, 'An Application of the Laws', p. 180.

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range of combat capabilities and integral administrativesupport that allowedthe Australian contingentto operatein a virtually autonomousrole within the UNITAF framework. But it was also grounded in a hardheaded assessmentof the majorSomaliplayerson the ground. According to Australian military officials, Somali warlords and gunmen 'only respected the realities of power' and were quick to exploit perceived weakness.72 In such a 'dog-eat-dog'environment, was deemed psychoit logicallyimportantfor Australian troopsto call the bluff of Somaligunmen in any challenge to ensure local respect for the Australianpresence. Failure to do so, it was believed, would produce an irreparable 'loss of confidence' in the operation.73 In an early show of strength, the Australians engaged in a number of fire-fights with Somali gunmen. Overall,the Australians faced 11 majorcontacts. Five Somaliswerekilled and at least six were wounded. One Australian was killed.74 Disarmamentwas in effect part and parcel of the Australianstrategy. Unlike the US, Canberra adopted a broad interpretationof Security Council Resolution 794 mandatingthe creationof a secure environment for the provisionof humanitarian assistance. It was recognisedthat under US militaryleadership therewas no requirement takeguns and weapons to fromthe Somalipopulation. But while the Australian government openly acknowledged potentialrisksto troopsinvolvedin activedisarmament, the it clearlyindicated that it supportedthe UN's stand on the issue. 'We believe that for there to be an effectivelong-termsolution to Somaliawe will have to disarmthe people', said a spokesmanfor AustralianDefence Minister, SenatorRobertRay, 'and if we go aheadwith disarmament. . . the risk factor will be high to very high'.75 But, as Australiasaw it, the worst riskat this time was not to take any riskat all. Certainly,the Rules of Engagement(ROE) underwhich UNITAF troops operatedin Somalia were consideredsufficientin scope to permit the applicationof force in certainsituationsbeyond simple self-defence. Devised by the Americans and accepted by all coalition participants,following some minor, mainly grammaticalchanges, the ROE authorisedUNITAF troops to use 'all necessaryforce' againsthostile acts or hostile intent involving'crewserved weapons'or 'armedindividuals'.76 In this contextUNITAF Commander Lieutenant General Robert Johnston on 8 January1993 issued a policy
72. Brigadier Philip McNamara, Queenscliff Military Training College, interview with author, 23 January 1995. 73. Major Michael Kelly, 'Legal Regimes and Law Enforcement on Peace Operations' in Smith, (ed.), The Force of Law, p. 202. 74. Colonel Bill Mellor, interview with Pacific Research, 6, 4 November 1993; Breen, ThroughAussie Eyes, p. 53. 75. The Age (Melbourne), 29 December 1992. 76. Adibe, ManagingArms in Peace Processes: Somalia, p. 74; Colonel Bill Mellor, 'SomaliaA Catalyst for Change in the Command and Control of UN Operations' in Hugh Smith (ed.), International Peacekeeping:Building on the Cambodian experience(Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 1994), p . 162.

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directive on weapons confiscation.77 The directive allowed UNITAF Commandersin each HRS to confiscateweapons as and when the need arose. So Colonel David Hurley felt free to undertake 'offensive' measures including forcible disarmamentto protect humanitarianrelief work in Baidoa.78 From an early stage in OperationSolace the Australiansserved notice that arms could not be tolerated on the streets. Much of the heavy weaponrysuch as 'technicals'had been previouslyeliminatedby the US Marinesand French Legionnaires. However,the Australians introduced a systemof weaponsregistration. Under this scheme, Somalisworkingfor the NGOs and performingother essential tasks in the HRS could retain their registered weapons. But all other unauthorizedweapons in the township were confiscatedon sight and destroyed. The purpose of the registration was to strengthenNGO protectionby differentiating between those Somalis supportinghumanitarianactivities and those engaged in faction fighting or banditry.79 Disarmament, though, was linked and indeed reinforcedby a multi-facetedpeace-enforcement operation. Four tacticalaspectsstood out. First,the Australians guaranteed distribution the of humanitarian relief in the Baidoa HRS through escorting food convoys. By the end of Operation Solace, the battalion group had escorted a total of over 400 convoys carryingmore than 8,000 tonnes of grain to more than 130 locations.80 Second, the Australiansprovided security in the Baidoa township by maintaininga constant and visible presence. In responseto the NGO's dire need for protection,Australian troops occupied the compoundsand other facilitiesof these humanitarian organizations.81 Third, relentless patrolling was sustained throughout OperationSolace. Conductedby foot and ArmouredPersonnelCarriers, these around-the-clock patrols concentratedon the Baidoa township but also coveredadjacentruralareas. This presenceon the groundwas seen by the Australiansas the 'breadand butter' of the peace operation.82 It kept armed factions and bandits off-balanceand facilitatedthe enforcement of weapons reduction whether through house-to-house searches, counter-ambushactions, pursuit after contact, and cordon and search activities. Altogether, the Australiansconfiscated over 1,000 weapons duringtheir stay in Baidoa. That constituteda sizeableproportionof the 2,250 small armsand heavyweaponsseizedby UNITAF forces as a whole duringthe first 90 days of the multi-lateral intervention.83
77. Lorenz, 'Weapons Confiscation Policy', p. 415. 78. David Hurley, 'An Application of the Laws', p. 185. 79. Colonel David Hurley, Headquarters 1st Division, Australian Alllly, Enoggera, telephone interview with author, 25 January 1995. 80. Mellor, 'The Australian Experience in Somalia', pp. 62-63. 81. Kieseker, 'Relationships between Non-Government Organisations', p. 72. 82. Hurley, 'An Application of the Laws, p. 185. 83. Breen Through AussieEyes,p. 79; Lorenz 'Weapons Confiscation Policy', p. 424.

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Another importantaspect of operationsin the Baidoa HRS concerned civil-military relations. The civil militaryoperationsteam (CMOT) was, accordingto Colonel David Hurley, 'one of the keys to the success of OperationsSolace'.84 Its role was to provide an interfacebetween the Australian militaryand the civilianswith whom they needed to deal with on a dailybasis. As a startingpoint, the Australian armycultivatedthe NGO community in Baidoa. The relationship began before the arrival of Australiantroops. Organizationssuch as CARE Australia and World Vision were consulted in December 1992 about local personalitiesand conditionsin Baidoa.85 These consultations,along with a demonstrated willingnessto addressthe securityconcernsof the NGOs afterdeployment, forged a close bond between the Australian forces and aid workers. This relationship,as Colonel Hurley acknowledged, had wider implicationsfor the Australians Baidoa: in
By winningthe confidenceand the trustof the NGOs, thatthen percolateddown to the people. The NGOs who were feedingthem, lookingafterthem, educating them and so forthwere givingthem the messagethat the Australians were a competentand even-handed who could be dealtwith. They could taketheir lot problemsto us.86

Havingeased itselfinto the communitythroughthe NGOs, the Australians embarked a processof'bottom up' politicalreconstruction. This effort on centred on frequentmeetings with the clan elders, the semblanceof civil authority in Baidoa. 'By establishing good workingrelationship left a with them', noted Colonel Hurley, 'we could also get our messagedown to the people aboutwhatwe weretryingto achieve'.87 In March 1993, following two UN-sponsoredpeace conferencesin Addis Ababa,arrangements were made to convene a National Congressat Baidoa. Severalfactions competed for power. The Somali LiberationArmy (SLA) which was proAideed, two wings of the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM) and a new, thirdwing of the SDM, the SDM Baidoa. The Australians the saw latter as an authentic 'grass-rootsmovement' which it 'reallywanted to foster'. Such a stance 'caused some difficultyin Mogadishubetween the Australiansand the UN. The UN had a top-down approachto peacebuilding; they focused on the 14 faction leaders, which meant the grass-

roots movementsdid not get much attention.'88 The political emergence of SDM Baidoa was in no small way due to CMOT's determination to re-establish a local justice administration system. Upon arrival Baidoa,the Australians in discoveredthat the SLA
84. Hurley,'An Application the Laws',p. 181. of 85. Mellor,'The Australian Experience Somalia',p. 60; Kieseker,'Relationships in between Non-Government Organisations', 67. p. 86. Testimonyof Colonel David Hurleyto Joint StandingCommittee,p. 536. 87. Testimonyof Colonel David Hurleyto JointStandingCommittee,p. 536. 88. Mellor,interview, PacificResearch.

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ran a Mafia-stylerevenuegatheringempirebased on terror,intimidation, planned killings, and massacres.89 The prime function of this external element was to raise funds to support Aideed's broader ambitions in Somalia. While the Australianarmyquicklyfaced down earlychallenges from SLA gunmen and banditsin a numberof armedconfrontations, the SLA soon realisedthey could covertlymaintaintheirbanditempirewithout openly challenging the Australian troops. Indeed, the SLA tried to present itself as a legitimatepolitical authorityin Baidoa with whom the Australiansshould work in tandem.90 But the 'Mogadishuoption' was resisted. Ratherthe strategyadoptedto tackle this problemwas to build up the law and order structure in Baidoa. It was a joint UNITAFAustralian initiativewith considerable input fromlocal clan elders. When the US indicated it was preparedto set up an auxiliarysecurityforce in Mogadishuin earlyFebruary1993, the Australian'leapt on to that pretty quickly'.9l In Baidoa, Australian military police and a CMOT legal officer, Major Michael Kelly, as well as troops, were used to train the Somalis as police. By May 1993, a police force of over 200 had been recruited and deployed in Baidoa and outlying areas. Similarilywith the judiciary,Australia went further than any other UNITAF partner in restoring a fully functioning legal system based on the 1962 Somali penal code.92 Taken together,these measureshelped to rebuildlocal confidencein the rule of law and also encouragedsurvivingvictims of the SLA's criminal organization providedetailedinformationon its activities. As a conseto quence, the notorious and much feared commanderof the bandit empire known as Gutaale was arrestedand brought to trial in Baidoa.93 ASer appearances before the RegionalCourt and Court of Appeal, Gutaalewas convicted of the murdersof 32 people as well as relatedrobberycharges and sentenced to death in accordance with the Somali penal code. Accordingto MajorKelly, the executionof this 'strongman' had dramatic resultsin Baidoa. The remnantsof the SLA organization packedup and left town wiiin days. Meanwhile the 'atmosphereand security in the town improveddramatically'.94Something like 70 lesser known figures were also arrested or fled Baidoa. Because of these measures, the
89. Kelly, 'LegalRegimes',pp. 199-200. 90. MajorMichaelKelly, 'Australian Participation UN Peace Operations', in Submission to Australia's Participation Peacekeeping, in Submissions Incorporated and Documents, Australian Parliamentary Joint StandingCommitteeon ForeignAffairs,Defence and Trade, Defence Sub-Committee,Canberra, 3240, 1993, p. 17. 4, 91. Testimonyof Colonel David Hurleyto Joint StandingCommittee,p. 546. 92. ColonelRobertShoebridge, Departmentof Defence, interview with author,27 January 1995;MartinR. Ganzglass,'The Restoration the SomaliJusticeSystem',in WalterClarke of andJeffrey Herbst(eds.), Learning Somalia:Thelessons armed from of humanitarian intervention (Boulder,Westview,1997), pp. 20-41. 93. MichaelKelly, Legal Regimes,p. 201. 94. Kelly, 'Australian Participation UN Peace Operations', 18. in p.

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Australian troopswere able to ensure'therewas no outsideinterference' at the National Congress and SDM Baidoa emerged as the major political force in the township.95 This outcome was a triumphfor the 'bottomup' approachto reconstruction. By responding energeticallyto the elders' requeststo re-establisha police force and judicialsystem the Australians not only provided a model for the rest of the UN operation, but also consolidatedlocal supportfor disarmament the Baidoa HRS. In in this connection, Colonel Hurley said 'elders would sometimes walk as far as 90 kilometres reportweapons [dumps]whichthey felt the to Aussieswould have to deal with'.96 Nor did the elderstry to concealtheir contemptfor the Somali warlords. 'Whatwe don't understandis how you could have all 14 faction leadersin one room (at the UN-backed peace conferencein Addis Ababa in March 1993) and then let them go! We do not understand that.'97 When the Australiansleft in May 1993, the situation in Baidoa was stable. Warlordsand bandits no longer ruled the day. Armed militiamen and their barricadeshad disappearedwhile the surrounding villages werefree of the terroronce inflictedby armedgangs.98 Such progresswas possiblebecause the Australiansfocused both on the humanitarianand socio-politicalsymptoms of Somalia's civil conflict and on the material vehicles for perpetuating violence (like weapons and munitions). Operation Solace demonstrated that systematicweaponsreductioncan be atool for promotingstabilityin conditions of little or no civil authority. Quiteunderstandably,the Australiansbecame very popular in Baidoa. Andwhen the end of their operationapproached,Canberra had to resist tremendous local and internationalpressure to extend the stay of the battalion group.99 It is significant that the positive transformationof Baidoa's security environmentwas sustained by the 1,100 French UN troops that replacedthe Australians and their successors, the Indians, both whom also practised'totalimmersion'.l?? Baidoa of remaineda UN success until 1994 when it too succumbedto the violent turmoilthat had reappeared the rest of southem Somalia. in A comparative assessment Even allowingfor differencesin development,populationsize and clan composition between Mogadishu and Baidoa, a comparisonof ie disarmament effortsin the two cities is illuminating. At the beginningof the UN's humanitarian intervention,both places were full of the sights and sounds death and destruction. However, by the time of UNITAF was
95. Mellor, interview, PacificResearch. 96. Hurley, telephone interview, 25 January 1994. 97. Clan elder cited by Mellor, interview, Pacific Research. 98. Breen, Through AussieEyes,p. 110. 99. Carwardine, interview with author, 20 January 100. OtagoDaily Times,23 November 1993. 1995. The

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replacedby UNOSOM II in May 1993, the securitysituationin the two locations had markedlydiverged. Mogadishusaw a somewhatmarginal improvementwhile Baidoa underwent a positive transforrnation. The differencein outcome was relatedto three factors. US forces in Mogadishu constantly ran into difficultyover both the conception and duration of their commitment. From the outset, Washingtonstressed that UNITAF was a strictlyhumanitarian mission. That meant, in the words of President Bush, the US did not intend to 'dictate political outcomes'.l?l Furthermore,the US governmentqualified its supportfor securingthe environmentfor humanitarian relief. In this regard,Colin Powell, the US MilitaryChiefofStaffsaid: 'It is not a questionon our part or on the subsequentUN partthat we will guarantee a weapon-freeand violence-freeenvironment. But I think it will be an environmentthat is manageable... to ensure the continual delivery of humanitariansupplies to save lives.'l02 Such ambivalencereflected the conflictinggoals of doing something'about the starvingpeople that we're seeing on our televisionscreens' and an officialdetermination pull out to US troops from Somalia almost as soon as they had arrived.l03 As a consequence, the US operationin Mogadishudid not look to establisha new transitional politicalauthority,but adapteditself to 'workingwith the major faction leaders'. It manoeuvred in the direction of maximum consent and tacitlyacceptedthat activedisarmament the warring of parties constitutedan infringementof Somali sovereignty. As events transpired, US troopswere drawninto limited disarmament when humanitarian work was impeded by generallawlessnessand the level of arms in circulation. But this belated response was too ad hoc and unsystematicto have any significantimpact. Constant changes in the weapons policy served to strengthenthe resolveof the main warlordsand diminishedhopes that the NGOs and peaceful Somalis entertainedabc)uta concertedUS disarmament policy.l04 The very slow effortsto re-establisha law and ordersystem in the Somali capitalalso compoundedthat sense of disillusionment. On the otherhand, the Australians arrivedin Baidoawith a well-defined game plan. The fact the Australians were deployedfor a specifiedperiod of time was a distinct advantage. It facilitateda longer term perspective on the UN mission and the problems it faced. The Atlstralianssaw disarmament a crucialbut by no means exclusiveelement in creatinga as secure environment. Because Somaliawas a heavily armed 'failed state'
101. 'Substantial American Force Ordered to Somalia', USIA, EastAsia/Pacific Wireless File, 4 December 1992, p. 2. 102. Powell cited in 'US Mission to Somalia Necessary and Clear', p. 19. 103. Powell cited in 'US Mission to Somalia Necessary and Clear', p. 16. 104. Submissions of World Vision Australia to Australia's Participation Peacekeeping, in Submissions and Incorporated Documents, Australian Parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Defence Sub-Committee, Canberra, 4, 32-40, 1993, p. 15.

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with no effectivecivil authority,the Australians took the view therewas no sovereignty offend.l05 In placingthemselvesabovethe to belligerents, the Australiansnot only sought to maintain a ceasefire in Baidoa through forcible disarmament,but also re-establisha law and order structureas part of a wider social reconstructioneffort. Unlike the Americans,the Australian battalion subscribed to an 'arms spillover' security philosophy.l06 The belief was that if low-levelarmedcrimeor factional fighting was ignored or tolerated, similarcopy-cat incidents would surely follow, leading to a cycle of escalatingviolence and banditry. To counter this possibility,it was deemed necessaryto take the initiative,intervene in such incidents and confiscateweapons on a 'street by street, block by block' basis until an environmentof sustainablesecuritywas graduallycreated. But if these gainsin securitywereto be preserved, 'was it criticalin Somalia to re-establishthe law and order system quite quickly' because a large numberof clansweremovedby famineand civilwarinto areas held by other clans.l07 In Baidoa, the restorationof the traditionally 1962 Somali Penal Code effectivelypaved the way for the removalof the pro-Aideed SLA organizationfrom the town. Similar possibilities existed also in southMogadishu. In 1991, GeneralAideed'sHabirGedirclan foughtAli MahdiMohamed'sAbgalfollowersand took controlof much of the south side of the city, including Abgal homes and properties as well as the lucrative seaportand airport. However,the opportunity use the Somali to judiciary system to expel Aideed's foreign militia from south Mogadishu was soon lost when the Americans belatedlysoughtto restorelaw and order through warlordsin the Somali capital.l08 the The United States and Australiaalso demonstrated contrastingstyles ofpeacekeepingin Somalia. Viewed in terms of a continuum, the US pursuedwhat might be called the 'sheriff's posse' model of peacekeeping.109 the words of Colin Powell, the US In Commander-in-Chief, UNITAFwas 'like the cavalrycoming to the rescue, straightening things out a while, and then letting the marshalscome back in for to keep things under control'.ll? The US approachwas short-term,reactive,high-tech, crisis-oriented compartmentalised. At the otherend of the and spectrum, Australia exhibited a Community-oriented style of peacekeeping. This was specific in time, purposeful, low-tech, integratedand participatory. Overall, was a 'tough but tender' approachto peacekeeping. it
105. Kelly, 'Legal Regimes', p. 196. 106. The phrase is the author's but it is derived from views expressed by Hurley, telephone interview, January 1995. 25 107. Testimony of Colonel David Hurley to Joint Standing Committee, p. 546; The Washington 21 November 1993; Ioan Lewis, letter to TheTimes, Post, 4 December 1992. 108. Thomas J. Callahan, 'Some Observations on Somalia's Notes, March 1994, p. 6; Clarke, 'Testing the World's Past and Future', CSISAfrica 158, Resolve', p. 49. 109. Brian Urquhart 'Beyond the "Sheriff's Posse" ', Survival32, 3, 1990. 110. Powell cited in 'US Mission to Somalia Necessary and Clear', p. 17.

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In relation to disarmament,these differences in style added up to differencesin substance. First, there was the question of intelligence. To createa secureenvironment,UNITAF commandersneeded to be able to detect the movement of opposing forces, to determinethe location of hidden arms caches and to anticipatethe plans of those who might attach their forces or commit crimes. That required a sound information gathering system. But this proved elusive for the US forces in Mogadishu.1ll To be sure, the intricaciesof clan and factionalloyalties in the Somali capital always complicated the intelligence process. Nevertheless, the uncertainties associated with the length of the US deploymentand the extensiveuse of advancedtechnologyin a marginally developedcountryservedto limit contactswith the local population. The story in Baidoa, however, was quite different. Here, the Australians succeeded in establishingan intimatecommunityintelligencebase. As it was clear axllledgunmen and banditswere blendinginto the community, the Australiantroops which lacked helicoptersupport,fostered the communityas a source of human intelligence. Regularcontactswith the clan eldersand the revivalof a law and ordersystemwere 'critical'in providing 'intelligenceas to what was going on' in Baidoa.ll2 Second, relationsbetween US and Australianpeacekeepersand NGOs diverged considerably. It should be emphasised that humanitarian organizations such as Save the Childrenand CAREwere confrontingon a daily basis armedbandits and the 'arrnies' warlordsto ensurethat food of reached the starvinglong before the UNITAF operationwas launched. They did this withoutmilitary training,the securicy APCs, flakjacketsor of back-upforce to call on if arrangements went wrong.ll3 With one or two notableexceptions,the 'sheriff5s posse' style of US peace-keeping alienated a significantnumber of NGOs in Mogadishu. The US military were criticizedfor a tendency to treat aid workersas 'bleedinghearts', largely ignoring their knowledge of local security problems in Mogadishu and putting the lives of NGO personnel at risk by constantlychangingtheir policy toward the possession of arms in the city.ll4 Against this, Australia'scommunity-oriented peacekeepingnurtureda very good relationshipwith the variousNGOs in Baidoa. Convincedthey were engaged in a process of nation-building, Australians the stressedteamworkwith the NGOs and the clan-elders. 'Whatcan we do for you?' and 'How can we makeyourjob easier?' were amongthe questionsframing1 RAR'sdialogue
111. Confidential source, State Department's Bureau of Intelligence, 25 January, 1994. 1 12. Testimony of Colonel David Hurley to Joint Standing Committee, p. 546; Submission of Major Michael Kelly 'Australian Participation in UN Peace Operations', p. 3. 1 13. Kieseker, 'Relationships between Non-Government Organisations', p. 68. 114. Kieseker, 'Relationships Between Non-Government Organisations', p. 68- Ian Wishart, Manager of World Vision Australia's Relief Project Unit, cited in Submission of World Vision Australia to Australia's Participationin Peacekeeping,p. 15.

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with these groups. As an upshot, the Australiansdeveloped a 'product mix' that addressedlocal securityconcernsand provideda rangeof civilian assistancethat went farbeyond the US pre-occupation with convoyescorts for the deliveryof relief aid.115 Third, the issue of patrolling not given equalweightin the UNITAF was operation. Because the US commitment to a secure environment in Somaliawas limited, the 'sheriff'sposse' mode of peace-keepinginvolved relativelyfew foot and mobile patrols in Mogadishu. Except for US strongholdssuch as the UN compoundand the international airport,most of the streetsin south Mogadishuremainedin the hands of armedfactions and bandits. The US occasionallycontested this control but generally only responded to direct security challenges through rapid, 'in-out' manoeuvres (i.e. airliftingor transportingtroops to a troublespot on a temporary basis). The conspicuous absence of regular patrolling in Mogadishu undermined the US's authority through Somali eyes and certainlycompromisedany disarmamentefforts made there. By way of comparison, patrolling was the backbone of Australia's communityorientedpeace-keeping the BaidoaHRS. From the Australian in perspective, a trooppresenceon the groundamongstthe people was both a symbol of resolveand a prerequisite achievingotherhumanitarian security for and objectives,including disarmament. It gave) in the words of one senior Australianofficial,'a better outcome than havingtroopsworkingremotely from the population'. l6 l Finally, despite a Cold War connection with Somalia, the Americans evidentlyfound it difficultto adjustto the politicalcultureof the country. Historically,the Somalis have been a fierce, nomadic and proud people who eked out an existencefrom the land. In a harshenvironment,social co-operationwas often tempered by a willingnessto fight for access to pasture and water.ll7 Moreover,since the late 1980s) civil war and the proliferation modernarmserodedthe traditional of auiority of clan elders in moderatingcentrifilgaltendencies within Somali sociecy. Faced with this situation,the US, either because of culturalinsularicyll8 inexperior ence in international peace operations,ll9seemed unableto recognisethat
115. Murray Domney, International Policy Division, Department of Defence, Australia, interview with author, 27 January 1994: Kieseker, 'Relationships between Non-Government Organisations', pp. 71-3. 116. Testimony of Lieutenant General John Baker, Vice Chief of the Australian Defence Force, to Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. Defence Sub-committee, 8 April 1994, Hansard Report, Canberra, p. 481. 1 17. Lewis, MakingHistory Somalia,p. 2. in 1 18. According to Reginald Stuart, 'Americans have historically found it difficult to step outside of themselves when judging others. And they have rarely realized how much jcheirown values unconsciously smudged the lenses through which they viewed the world', cited in Bradford Perkins, TheCreation a Republican of Empire (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993) p. 12. 119. Major General Geoff Carter, Australian Defence Force Headquarters, Canberra, interview with author, 6 January 1995.

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an unwillingnessto disarmgunmen in Mogadishuwhen the opportunity existedwould serveto boost the warlords'standingand quicklydemoralize Somali supporters of the intervention. Puzzled and distressed by the gap between the US's awesome militarycapabilitiesand limited political will, many Somalis resignedthemselvesto the power of the warlordsand came to questionthe motivesfor the US presence:'Withoutdisarmament, the Americanshave missed the whole point. Unless they are going to disarm on a nation-wide basis, they might as well pack their bags and go home.l20 But the Australianshad comparatively problemsin relatingto the few populationof Baidoaregion. The key to this cultural'fit' appearsto have been a flexible approachto peacekeepingwhich combined a top-down military stance towards faction fighters or bandits with a bottom-up socio-politicalstrategytowardsordinarySomalis. On the one hand, the Australians assertedthemselvesas a local leviathan. A concertedeffortat weaponscontrolearlyin the missionwas partof a broaderAustralian effort to signal determinationto subdue any armed challengers. Interestingly, Australianmilitary officials believed that such firmness impressed both Somali gunmen and non-combatantsalike.l2l On the other hand, the Australiansadopted a low-key culturally supportive approach towards ordinary Somalis and respected community figures such as clan elders.l22 Accordingto severalaccounts, Australiantroops showed they 'did not feel superior'to the locals and were prepared'to do anythingin their power to assist people . . . worse off than themselves'.123 Pieced together, this combination of determinationand compassion helped to forge a bond between the Australiansand many Somalis in Baidoa. By curbing the power of the gunmen through active disarmament, the Australianspumped new life into the traditionalleadershipof the clan elders and, in doing so, facilitatedthe restorationof some of the vestiges of civil society. WhileAustralian militaryofficialshad few illusionsabout the Somali capacicyfor violence, they were clearlynot preparedto accept Colin Powell's view that Somaliawould alwaysbe a lawless society.l24
Conclusion

There was a relationship betweenthe 'disappointing' recordon disarmament and the absence of progress toward national reconciliation in
120. A Somali agriculturist cited in Omaar and de Waal, Somalia OperationRestoreHope, p. 20. 121. Hurley, telephone interview, 25 January 1995; McNamara, interview with author, 23 January 1995; Millan, interview with author, 23 January 1995. 122. Domney, interview with author, 27 January 1995. 123. Domney, interview with author, 27 January 1994; Testimony of Colonel David Hurley to Joint Standing Committee p. 531. 124. Powell cited in 'US Mission to Somalia Necessary and Clear', p. 21.

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Somalia.l25 As far as the US was concerned, a programmeof active disarmament was not a priorityduringthe UNITAF operation. Indeed, the first reallyserious attempt to implementa plan of voluntarydisarmament only beganin January1993. But in a failedstate like Somaliawhere no recognizable authorityexisted,the quest for disarmament consensus by provedelusive. It was not uncommonfor warlords GeneralAideedto like co-operatewith UNITAF forces one week and then to refuseco-operation the followingweek.l26 As an upshot, the US's 'arms control' approach, predicatedon the centralizedpolitical managementstructuresof a stateorientedsystem,provedunworkable the chaos of Mogadishuand set the in scene for the tragicevents of 5 June 1993 when UNITAF's much weaker successor,UNOSOM II, tried to enforce disarmament. It was a case of too little too late. Some observers, however, would dispute this interpretation. According to one school of thought, disarmamentin Somalia never had a chance because the UN made a fundamentalerror when it abandoneddiplomacyand the consensualprinciplesof traditional peacekeepingto interveneunilaterally Somalia'scivil war. By seeking in to imposepeace upon the warring factions,the UN compromised of its one main assets, namely political impartiality.l27 In the process, the IJN becamesimplyanotherpartyto Somalia'scivilwarand thus become partof the problemratherthan the solutionto the country'scrisis. On this view, Somalia demonstratedthat the internationalurge to 'do something' in troubled regions should be resisted unless the measures taken stood a reasonablechance of success on the ground. Of course, it has to be conceded that the UN faced a formidabletask in Somalia. It was no easy thing to foster nationalreconciliation when both the machineryof governmentand the traditionalhierarchiesof clan had been all but completelydestroyedby civil war. Moreover,a bloated, and somewhat antiquated UN organizationhad little precedent for such a role. Beyond that, however, the 'fundamentalist'school of thought remains unconvincing. First, in the age of a global communications revolution it was unrealisticto expect the UN to ignore the plight of Somalia,especiallyas a traditional peacekeeping operation(UNOSOM I), had not provento be up to the challenge. Second, peace enforcementin Mogadishuinitiallyflounderednot because the US used too much force but because the Americansadopted a cap-in-handapproachtowardsthe Somaliwarlordsand were unwillingto enforcedisarmament. By courting the warlords,the Americanssoughtto base a solutionto Somalia'stroubles
125. Mike McCurry, press spokesmanfor President Bill Clinton, cited in Reuters,3 November 1993; Hirschand Oakley,Somalia,p. 154. 126. 'Practitioners' Questionnaire WeaponsControl,Disarmament,and Demobilizaon: tion duringPeacekeeping Operations', Adibe, Managing in Anns in PeaceProcesses, 225. p. 127. RameshThakur,'From Peacekeeping Peace Enforcement: UN Operationin to the Somalia',3rournal Modern of African Studies 3 (1994). 32,

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on the very forces bearing considerable responsibilityfor tearing the country apart. Third, the Australiansdemonstratedin Baidoa that in a Chapter VII operation there is a range of options available, including coercive disarmament,to help bring bandits and warlordsto the sober realization that resistanceto peace is futile. In strikinga balancebetween cultural relativism and a measured willingness to use force to secure compliancewith UN demands, the Australiansindicated that successful peace-enforcementwas possible in a failed state situation. And while forcibledisarmament not itself automatically is tension-reducing, appliits cation within the context of multi-faceted peace-keeping can enhance rather than diminish the impartiality of the UN in a lawless environment.l28 That much was made clearby the Australians.
128. Miles Armitage, UN Political Section, DepartIllent of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, interview with author, 14 December 1994.