CHINA-TAIWAN CRISIS

Table on contents:
1. Abstract.....3 2. Hypothesis..3 3. Research questions.3 4. History of the conflict4 5. Importance of Taiwan for China..5 5.1 Cruising forward..5 5.2 Gateway to pacific....5 5.3 Sea power...5 6. THE TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS:.....6 6.1 First strait crisis (1954-1955)....6 6.2 Second strait crisis (1958)..6 6.3 Third strait crisis (1995-1996)...7 7. Chinas stance....7 8. Taiwans stance..8 9. Basis of us foreign policy towards Taiwan...8 9.1 The Shanghai Communiqu (February 1972)...9 9.2 The Normalization Communiqu (January 1979)...10 9.3 The Taiwan Relations Act (April 1979).10

9.4 The Six Assurances (July 1982)..12

10. Sino-US relations....12 11. Conclusion...14 12. References....17

ABSTRACT:
The island of Taiwan, located east of China, has been recognized under several names. The Portuguese who sighted it in the 16th century dubbed it Formosa. It is called Taiwan, formally the Republic of China, and sometimes is described as the Republic of China on Taiwan. This idea of identity is Taiwans central problem. Currently, the situation between Taiwan and China is one of self-determination. Taiwans close neighbor China claims jurisdiction, but Taiwan has been moving towards becoming a more independent state.

HYPOTHESIS:
Taiwan is a state fighting for its recognition as a sovereign state.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS:
1. What are the obstacles in the complete independence of Taiwan? 2. What are the interests of china in the Taiwan?

HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT:

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Long ago Taiwan was ruled by the Qing and Ming dynasties, only to fall under the possession of the Japanese. Taiwan stayed under the control of Japan until after World War II. The land was given back to China by the Cairo Conference of 1943, and then solidified by the Potsdam Conference. The cause of the civil war is rooted in the conversion from the old Manchu or Qing dynasty to the new Nanjing Republic with the Nationalists. the two main parties of China then The nationalist Party also known as Kuomintang, led by Chiang Kai-shek and the Communist party led by Mao Zedong started having their difference which eventually led to the Chinese civil war. The new Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek launched an attack on the Communists later in 1927. At the end of this strike, the new Republic of China was formed at Nanjing. Civil war continued on and off in China until World War II, where a temporary truce was called to fight off the Japanese. At the end of World War II, the Civil War continued again. Mao Zedongs communists and Peoples Liberation Army took over much of China, including Beijing. After losing the war, Chiang Kaisheks Nationalists fled to the island of Taiwan where they established the Republic of China with its capital at Taipei. The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) still considers Taiwan as a province and that eventually it will come to its senses and reunify with the mainland. Taiwan, acting as its own entity, has different thoughts. They see themselves as the true Chinese government, and in time will be recognized internationally as such.

IMPORTANCE OF TAIWAN FOR CHINA:

1. Cruising Forward
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To the Chinese Communist Party, otherwise triumphant, Taiwan is a lasting reminder of an alternative Chinese regime, which since 1949 has enjoyed the encouragement of Western foreign policies designed to contain China's communist government. China might well desire to use the island as a base from which to expand outward into the Pacific. In this reading, Taiwan is not the primary object of Chinese strategy, but rather a gateway to greater influence for a China that is growing more powerful. Control of Taiwan is imperative because of its geostrategic importance for a China with growing aspirations. 2. Gateway to the Pacific: Taiwan is most vital to Chinese strategists as a base from which to exert Chinese influence as a major Pacific rival to the United States and its closest East Asian ally, Japan. Moreover this is becoming increasingly relevant because of China's growing ability to exert influence. 3. Sea Power: China wants to establish itself as a sea power. Chinese statements also indicate that controlling the waves is a necessary part of winning the great power status that China so eagerly desires. Today, China is fueled by rapid economic growth and hungry for great power status, it is trying to secure raw materials and political influence around the globe and also seeks to adorn itself with the trappings of a great power--a space program, influence both through diplomacy and foreign aid, and a modern mechanized military, including a blue-water navy. It is easy to imagine that today the Chinese see the US Navy as threatening to bottle up Chinese maritime ambitions. Thus control over Taiwan would open new doors for this emerging regional power.

THE TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS:

1. First strait crisis (1954-1955): The First Taiwan Strait Crisis (also called the 1954-1955 Taiwan Strait Crisis, the Offshore Islands Crisis or the 1955 Taiwan Strait Crisis) was a short armed conflict that took place between the governments of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC). The PRC seized the Yijiangshan Islands, forcing the ROC to abandon the Tachen Islands. The United States and the ROC Navies joined forces to evacuate ROC military personnel and civilians from the Tachen Islands to Taiwan. 2. Second strait crisis (1958): Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, also called the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis, was a conflict that took place between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) governments in which the PRC shelled the islands of Matsu and Quemoy in the Taiwan Strait in an attempt to seize them from the Republic of China. The United States Eisenhower Administration responded to ROC's request for aid by reinforcing US naval units and ordering US naval vessels to help the Kuomintang Nationalist government protect Quemoy's supply lines. The Soviet Union dispatched its foreign minister to Beijing to discuss China's actions. This situation in 1958 continued for 44 days and took approximately 1,000 lives. 3. Third strait crisis (1995-1996): Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, also called the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis or the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, was the effect of a series of missile tests conducted by the People's Republic of China in the waters surrounding Taiwan including the Taiwan Strait from July 21, 1995 to March
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23, 1996. The first set of missiles fired in mid to late 1995 were allegedly intended to send a strong signal to the Republic of China government under Lee Teng-hui, who had been seen as moving ROC foreign policy away from the One-China policy. The second sets of missiles were fired in early 1996, allegedly intending to intimidate the Taiwanese electorate in the run-up to the 1996 presidential election. The U.S. government responded by staging the biggest display of American military might in Asia since the Vietnam War.

CHINAS STANCE:
The position of the PRC is that the ROC ceased to be a legitimate government upon the founding of the former on October 1, 1949 and that the PRC is the successor of the ROC as the sole legitimate government of China, with the right to rule Taiwan. The PRC argues that the ROC and PRC are two different factions in the Chinese Civil War, which never legally ended. Therefore both factions belong to the same sovereign countryChina. Since Taiwan's sovereignty belongs to China, the secession of Taiwan should be agreed upon by 1.3 billion Chinese citizens instead of the 23 million ROC citizens who currently live in Taiwan. Therefore, the PRC believes that it is within their legal rights to extend its jurisdiction to Taiwan, by military means if necessary. The People's Republic of China until the 1990s had made it clear that "there is only one China in the world", "Taiwan is an inalienable part of China" and "the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China".

TAIWANS STANCE:
The position of most supporters of Taiwans independence is that the PRC is the government of China, Taiwan is not part of China, and the 'Republic of China (Taiwan)' is an independent,
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sovereign state. The Democratic Progressive Party states that Taiwan has never been under the jurisdiction of the PRC, and that the PRC does not exercise any hold over the 23 million Taiwanese on the island. The ROC claims to meet all criteria of an independent state as it possesses a government exercising effective jurisdiction over well-defined territories with over 23
million permanent residents and a full-fledged foreign ministry.

BASES OF US POLICY TOWARDS TAIWAN :

Over the past twenty-plus years, U.S. policy toward Taiwan has been longstanding and consistent. The friendship of the American people and the people of Taiwan is firm, and the United States remains committed to faithful implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act. There are several elements of U.S. policy toward Taiwan. First, the U.S. acknowledges that there is one China; however, how to define and realize that is best left to the two sides of the Strait on a mutually acceptable basis. Second, Washington encourages the cross-strait dialogue but will remain evenhanded and will not apply pressure or mediation to either side. Because Taiwan is a democracy, any arrangements between the two sides will have to be acceptable to the people of Taiwan. Third, the U.S. insists that the Taiwan issue be resolved peacefully. The U.S. would regard hostile action against Taiwan as a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific and a as matter of grave concern. The fourth element of U.S. policy towards Taiwan is that, in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, the U.S. will provide defense articles and services necessary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient ability to defend itself. The fifth element regards Taiwans international space: in recognition of Taiwans importance role in international issues, the U.S. will support Taiwans

membership where statehood is not a prerequisite, and will support opportunities for Taiwans voice to be heard in organizations where its membership is not possible. 1. The Shanghai Communiqu (February 1972) When the Korean War broke out in 1950, the U.S. froze its relations with the PRC for twenty years. Washington imposed sanctions on Beijing, froze the PRCs assets in the U.S., embargoed trade and banned U.S. ships and aircraft from calling at the PRCs ports and airfields. Towards the end of the 1960s, relations across the Strait changed. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the border clashes between Chinese and Soviet forces in March 1969 made closer relations with the U.S. against the Soviet threat more attractive to Beijing. The Shanghai communiqu was signed during a state visit to mainland China by President Richard Nixon. However, in the communiqu, the U.S. merely acknowledged that both Taipei and Beijing agreed that there was only one China. The U.S. also reaffirmed its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves
2. The Normalization Communiqu (January 1979):

Beginning in 1978, the United States and the PRC developed a common perception that the Soviet threat was significantly growing. Both sides believed that normalization would serve to Offset their respective deteriorating strategic situation. In June 1978, President Jimmy Carter decided to permit Western nations to sell military equipment to Beijing. In July, he vetoed a plan to sell 50 F-4 fighter-bombers to Taiwan in what was interpreted as a move to gain favor with Beijing. Four months after, Carter rejected Taiwans request for F-5G fighter planes, leaving Taiwan no way to upgrade its air force. At the same time, he finally announced the normalization communiqu. On December 15, 1978, the U.S. and the
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PRC agreed to establish diplomatic relations as of January 1,1979. Both sides affirmed the principles of the 1972 Shanghai Communiqu and stated their desire to reduce the danger of international military conflict. The United States acknowledged the Chinese position that there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of it, while maintaining cultural, commercial and other unofficial relations with Taiwan. In its accompanying statements of the normalization communiqu, Washington further averred that, The United States is confident that the people of Taiwan face a peaceful and prosperous future. The United States continues to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and expects that Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully by the Chinese themselves.
3. The Taiwan Relations Act (April 1979):

When President Carter announced that diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the PRC would be established on January 1, 1979, his decision was not very well received in the U.S. The U.S. Congress crafted the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which was signed into law on April 10, 1979. The TRA is a unique domestic law of the United States. It establishes itself as the basis for a foreign relationship of the U.S. with Taiwan. Moreover, the U.S. Congress over several years made an effort to have the administration publicly acknowledge that a law such as the TRA took precedence over any communiqu. Under the TRA, the policy of the United States is: (a) To preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the U.S. and the people of Taiwan;
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(b) To declare that peace and stability in the area are in the political, security, and economic interests of the U.S., and are matters of international concern; (c) To make clear that the U.S. rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means; (d) To consider that any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts, or embargoes, to be a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the U.S.; (e) To provide Taiwan with defensive arms; and (f) To assert the right to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security or social and economic systems of the people of Taiwan.

4. The Six Assurances (July 1982):

On July 14, 1982, a month before the communiqu was announced, the U.S., through an appropriate channel, made six assurances known to the ROC that it: (a) Had not agreed to set a date certain for ending arms sales to Taiwan; (b) Had not agreed to engage in prior consultations with Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan; (c) Would not play any mediation role between Taipei and Beijing; (d) Had not agreed to revise the TRA; (e) Had not altered its longstanding position on the issue of sovereignty over Taiwan; and
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(f) Would not attempt to exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC.

SINO-US RELATIONS:
Since 1950s, China and the United States have confronted each other several times in the Taiwan Strait; misperceptions, misunderstandings, and miscommunication brought the two nations close to war on more than one of those occasions. This does not mean conict of national interest is not involved. For China, the United States, Taiwan, the resolution of Taiwans international status involves important, even vital, national interests. Probably the most dangerous misunderstanding in the entire conict scenario is the belief, prevalent in both the United States and China, that the United States has no signicant national interest at stake. This mistake alone could cause the two nations to stumble into war in the Taiwan Strait. Therefore, it is imperative that U.S. political leaders dene and explain, both to the American public and Chinese decision makers, what interests it has, why they are important, and to what extent the United States is prepared to defend them. The United States has a legal commitment under the Taiwan Relations Act to support Taiwan in defending itself against forcible integration into China; it also has a moral obligation going back more than a half century to provide for Taiwans defense. This moral obligation has only become stronger in the 15 years since Taiwan has taken the path of democracy. American failure to keep its word regarding Taiwan would cause regional allies to doubt U.S. commitment to them. Abandonment of Taiwan would be followed by a decrease of U.S. inuence in the Asia-Pacic region and an increase in Chinas ability to control the sea lines of communication Japan and South Korea need for their economic well-being and domestic stability. Some who do not see Taiwans democratic society, the security of Japan, and the credibility of American commitments as vital
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interests, still view conict in the Taiwan Strait as a danger to the peace and stability of the region. For them, regional peace constitutes a vital American interest. In any case, what happens in the Taiwan Strait is a concern for the United States, which needs to understand and proclaim this interest. Not to do so would weaken whatever ability the United States has to deter China from using military force to gain political control over Taiwan. Neither the United States nor China has considered sufficiently how the other country views it in terms of their relationship over the past 150 years. Each country knows full well what the other has done to it, but it thinks much less about what it has done or what the other thinks it has done to the other country. Each sees itself in terms of its intentions and interests.

CONCLUSION:
Does the United States have? The challenge facing the U.S. Government is to convince both the PRC and Taiwan to refrain from precipitous action toward unication and independence, respectively. This will be much less difcult with respect to Taiwan than the PRC. For more than 50 years, the deliberate American policy of strategic ambiguity has successfully deterred both the PRC and Taiwan from major conict. Domestic developments in both the PRC and Taiwan are requiring all three parties to reevaluate their policies and increasing the likelihood of the use of force by the PRC to gain control over Taiwan. The future success of American
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deterrence is questionable. The stated American policy that resolution of the conict, whatever the result might be, must be by peaceful means appears increasingly unlikely and does not adequately address U.S. interest in the region. That the United States can delay Chinese actions is almost certain; that it can indenitely deter Chinese action is unlikely. This paper considers the Taiwan situation in terms of deterrence theory and its application across cultures to see under what conditions the PRC might be convinced not to use force to resolve the Taiwan situation to its satisfaction. The perceptions and misperceptions of each of the parties involved; their interests, capabilities, and possible intentions; and how the PRC intends to deter U.S. intervention in the Taiwan Strait. An examination of the options available to each party concludes by suggesting the most likely courses of action and ways to increase the likelihood of successful U.S. deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. There is no presumption here that China will soon become a peer competitor to the United States. Chinese decision making and actions regarding Taiwan will be driven by what the PRCbut not necessarily other nationsviews as its domestic concerns. Unable to defeat the United States in a direct military confrontation any time in the foreseeable future, China is likely to seek to develop niche weapons and strategies that would make U.S. intervention too difcult or too costly. The complexity of the Taiwan Strait situation suggests any future American attempt at crisis deterrence will be exceedingly difcult, and success is unlikely unless at least one party to the conict makes enormous concessions to the others. The tangled relationship involves a combination of deterrence and coercive diplomacy. As the United States seeks to deter Chinese military action and Taiwanese provocation in the Strait, the PRC seeks to deter U.S. intervention and formal Taiwanese independence. China is also seeking to coerce Taiwan to reverse its tentative steps toward formal independence. A dangerous aspect of the relationship is the confrontation
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between an inconsistent U.S. policy regarding Taiwan and the PRC on one hand, and a PRC that exhibits simultaneous characteristics of paranoia, entitlement, victimization, and arrogance arising out of its history, on the other. This paranoia leads China to view all actions of potential adversaries as directed primarily against China. Its historical self-image as the paramount state in Asia causes China to view the behavior of regional rivals, the United States and Japan, as intended to weaken or marginalize China and deny it its rightful place in the international community.The complexity of Chinas self-image can be seen in its simultaneous expectation of being accorded the prestige and authority of permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council with the right to a decisive say on events in Asia, the claim to foreign aid from developed nations, the expectation of the preferential treatment given to developing nations, and opposition to any modication of the United Nations Charter to permit Japan a permanent Security Council seat because this would dilute Chinese primacy as the spokesman for Asian interests. Both the United States and the PRC see themselves as occupying the moral high ground in their international dealings. This makes compromise and communication difcult because each presumes it is in the right, while the other is acting wrongfully and must be brought around to its way of thinking. This moral self-image is deeply ingrained in both Chinese and American culture. The most desirable outcome would be for China to transform into a pluralistic, democratic society where Taiwan could be accommodated and feel comfortable but not necessarily required to integrate politically with the mainland.

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REFERENCES:
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press of America,USA
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affairs,retrieved from: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/60998/lucian-wpye/dangerous-strait-the-us-taiwan-china-crisis

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6. Atlas T. and Neikirk W.(1996), U.s., China Quietly Worked To Defuse Taiwan

Crisis,Chicago Tribune,retrieved from: http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1996-0331/news/9603310208_1_taiwanese-president-lee-teng-hui-taiwan-strait-china

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