Mind Association

Same-Kind Coincidence and the Ship of Theseus Author(s): Christopher Hughes Reviewed work(s): Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 106, No. 421 (Jan., 1997), pp. 53-67 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2254770 . Accessed: 08/12/2011 19:11
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Same-KindCoincidenceand the Ship of 'Theseus

CHRISTOPHER HUGHES

Locke thoughtthat it was impossible for there to be two things of the same kind in the same place at the same time. I offer (what looks to me to like) a counterexample thatprinciple,involvingtwo ships in the same place at the same time. I then considertwo ways of explainingaway,and one way of denying, the apparent of counterexample Locke's principle, and I arguethatnone is successful.I concludethat,althoughthe case under discussiondoes not refuteLocke's principle,it constitutesa serious challengeto it.

I
the Supposethat,in the courseof repairs, planksa woodenship is made of areall (gradually) replaced duplicate by planks,in such a way thatthe end result is a ship exactly like the ship we startedwith. Supposealso that each originalplank is destroyedas soon as it has been replaced. Suppose, finally, that throughoutthe process of replacement of the planks we have a working ship. Then, it seems, the original ship still exists, albeitwith a new set of planks,afterall the originalplankshave been replaced. Supposeon the otherhandthata ship is disassembled, plankby plank, and thatthe planksremovedfromthe ship are not replacedas they are removed.Supposealso that the disassembledplanks are subsequently in reassembled, sucha way thatthe endresultis a shipjust like the original ship, made of all the sameplanks(in all the same places).Again, it seems, the originalship still exists. So, it appears, a ship will survivetotal (gradual, (i) structure-preservat ing) plank-replacement, leastin cases in whichthe replaced planksare And (ii) a shipwill survivethe disassembly destroyed uponremoval. and of subsequent reassembly its planks,at least in cases in whichthe planks removed fromthe shiparenotreplaced otherplanks.If thatis so, I shall by argue,two thingsof the samekind(viz., ships)canoccupythe sameplace at the sametime. Onthe islandof Nassos lives a sea-captain calledStathis.Onthatsame islandthereis a nauticalmuseumthatincludesin its collectionthe (surMind, Vol. 106 . 421 . January 1997 ? Oxford University Press 1997

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I prisinglywell preserved) ship of Theseus. The museumwas intended to be a magnetfor tourists,but failedsignallyto attract any;so it has been closed for years.AlthoughStathisdoes not knowit, the shiphe owns and captainsis, amazingly the enough,a plank-for-plank duplicate-of ship of As Theseusin theNassosmuseum. the yearspass, Stathisnoticesthathis ship needs a plankreplaced here,anda plankreplacedthere.He accordingly gives his firstmate,Klops, some money,and sends him off to buy the replacement partsneeded to repairhis ship. Unlike Stathis,Klops knowsthatinsidethe locked-up museuma perfectduplicate the shipof of Stathis is gathering dust. The unscrupulous Klops breaks into the museum, steals the appropriate planks from the ship of Theseus, and pocketsthe moneyStathisgave him to buy the replacement plankswith. After(unwittingly) puttingin the stolenplanks,Stathisdestroysthe original ones (say,usingthemfor firewood). Thisgoes on for years,untilnot a single plankof the ship of Theseusis left in the museum,and every in plankoriginally the shipof Stathishas been destroyed. At thispoint,by (i), the shipof Stathisstill exists,eventhoughnone of its originalplanksdo. So does the ship of Theseus,by (ii). After all the planksthatwere originallyin the ship of Stathishave been replacedby planksthatwere in the shipof Theseus,therearetwo ships Stathis'and Theseus'-made of the sameplanks,andoccupying sameplace at the the same time. Thoseships,on the face of it, constitute counterexample a to the Lockeanprinciplethat only differentkinds of things can be in the I sameplaceatthe sametime.(Forbrevity, shallhenceforth thisprincall
ciple the Lockeanprinciple, or Locke s principle.)

II In the De Corpore(II, 7, 2), Hobbessupposesthatthe ship of Theseus has gradually all itsplanksreplaced, thatthediscarded and planksaresubin sequentlyreassembled the sameway they were when they constituted the shipof Theseus.Therearenow two ships.Thefirstshipis spatio-temwiththe shipof Theseus,butis madeof different porallycontinuous matter from the matterthe ship of Theseus was originally made of. The secondshipis madeof the samematter together sameway) as the the (put of Theseuswas originallymade of. Whichof these ships, Hobbes ship asks,is the shipof Theseus?
' Whichshipis that-the one madeof the original planks,or the one madeof the planksthatreplacedthe originalones? For the purposesof this example,it doesn'tmatter.

Same-Kind Coincidence the Shipof Theseus 55 and

on According Simons(1987,pp. 198-204), it depends whatwe mean to by "ship". his account,thereare (whathe calls)form-constant On ships, which can survivethe replacement theirplanks,but cannotexist after of their planks have been disassembled(even if those planks are subseAnd there are matter-constant quentlyreassembled). ships, which can exist afterbeing disassembled subsequently and but reassembled, cannot of survivethe replacement (any of) theirplanks.Beforethe ship has any madeof the same of its planksreplaced,therearetwo differentartifacts planks-the form-constant of Theseus,andthe matter-constant ship ship of Theseus.Only the first of these artifactswill surviveplank-replaceand reasment,andonly the secondwill survivedisassembly subsequent Simonsholds,the sortal"ship" ambiguous is between sembly.Moreover, "form-constant ship"and"matter-constant ship".Becauseit is ambiguous in this way, we are inclinedbothto say thatthe ship whose plankswere is replaced the shipof Theseus,andto say thatthe shipwhoseplankswere reassembledis the ship of Theseus.Whatwe should say, accordingto Simons, is that there were two differentships all along-in different senses of "ship"--one of which survivesas a repaired ship, and one of which survivesas a reassembled ship. If Simonshas solved the puzzle of the ship of Theseus,then the case describedin ?1 is not a case of two ships in the same place at the same a time, anddoes not constitute counterexample the Lockeanprinciple. to As long as we stickto one sense of "ship", therewill be only one ship at the end of my story-Stathis's, if by "ship"we mean "form-constant ship",or Theseus's,if by "ship"we mean "matter-constant ship".And the of surely,if we arecounting number shipsin a placeat a time,we must stick to one sense of "ship".Doing otherwisewould be like saying that there are ten words on a page, on the groundsthatthereare five wordor tokens,andfive word-types,2 sayingthattherearefive bankswithina mile of King'sCollege,on the grounds therearefourmoneythat quarter banksandone river-bank. If Simonsis right,afterthe last of Stathis'sship'soriginalplankshave been replaced,therearen'ttwo ships, but thereare two artifacts,in the same place at the same time. This, however,is perfectlyconsistentwith The the Lockeanprinciple. two artifacts form-constant (a ship,anda matter-constant-ship) different have persistenceconditions,and accordingly
2 It may be thatword-types, unlikeword-tokens, aren'tin space, and hence aren'ton a page.But evensomeonewho thinksthatword-types multiplyspaare tiallylocateduniversals shouldnot say thatthereareten wordson a page,if there are only five word-tokens only five-wordtypes.At least, she shouldn'tsay and that, if, as Simons supposes,"word"is ambiguousbetween word-tokensand word-types opposedto generically (as denoting both).

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belong to differentkinds; and the Lockeanprincipledoes not exclude kindsbeing in the sameplace at the sametime. thingsof different In fact, though,I do not think Simons' accountof the sortal "ship" to counterexample to allowsus (satisfactorily) explainawaythe apparent that set principle outin thelastsection.Forit is verydoubtful the Lockean ship"and"matter-constant between"form-constant "ship"is ambiguous One night,when SupposeAngelikeworksin the Nassos shipyard. ship". asksherwhatshe didtoday.She she comeshomefromwork,herhusband a one repliesthatshe repaired ship(replacing few of its planks),andreasBut is On sembledanother. the face of it, herremark perfectlyin order. it ship" between"form-constant would not be, if "ship"were ambiguous wouldbe ship".In as muchas the ship she repaired and"matter-constant a ship in one sense, and the ship she reassembledwould be a ship in one she another, wouldnotbe entitledto say thatshe hadrefitted shipand magnate,and (SupposeAngelikewere a real-estate another. reassembled She and hadjust solda river-bank boughta money-bank. couldnot on that accountsay thatshe hadsold one bank,andboughtanother). ship"and"matter-conbetween"form-constant If "ship"is ambiguous andTheseus'sship don'tprovidea counstantship",then Stathis'sship doesn'tobviouslyhold. But to terexample Locke'sprinciple. the converse genericpredicate,trueof both form"Ship"mightbe an unambiguous ships.Orit mightbe whatField(1973) constant shipsandmatter-constant
calls a referentially indeterminate predicate, that partially denotes both

ships. In neithercase would form-constantships and matter-constant workslike a disjuncKlops'smisdeedsmeantroublefor Locke.If "ship" ship that pickingout anything is eithera form-constant or tive predicate, can occupythe ships ship, a matter-constant it will turnout thatdifferent shipswill be differsameplace at the sametime-but againthe different indetermiis entkindsof ships.If on the otherhand"ship" a referentially aboutships of natepredicate the sortdiscussedby Field,thena statement will be trueif it is truefor everypartialextensionof "ship",false if it is and false for everypartialextensionof "ship", neithertruenor false othaboutshipswill be true(false) if and erwise.(In otherwords,a statement aboutthe extension only if no matterhow we resolvethe indeterminacy So if "ship"partiallyor of "ship",it would still come out true(false).) ships and matter-constant refersto both form-constant indeterminately but ships, it will be not only untrue, false, thatStathisends up with two ship,or morethan ships,since he neverhas morethanone form-constant one matter-constant ship. denoteboth formor But does "ship"determinately indeterminately ships?I thinknot. The troublewith constantships and matter-constant denotesboth form-constant ships supposingthat "ship"(determinately)

Same-Kind Coincidence theShipof Theseus 57 and

andmatter-constant ships is thatwe end up with too manyships. Stathis will have two ships, not just after he has replacedhis ship's original planks,butevenbefore.Indeed,it will be impossible buildjust one ship to (since one cannotbuild a matter-constant withoutbuildinga formship It constantone, andvice versa).3 will also be impossibleto repaira ship, withoutbringinginto existence-or at any ratecompleting assembly the of-another one;andimpossible replaceanyof a ship'splanks,without to another are destroying ship.All these consequences highly counterintuitive. is The suggestionthat"ship" referentially indeterminate avoidsa ship surplus,but has problemsof its own. Whetherthe predicate"ship"is or ambiguous generic,therewill be no problemaboutour being able to or say trulythata certainshiphas survived, will or wouldsurvive,plankor replacement, plank-disassembly-and-reassembly.however,"ship" If, indeterminately denotes both form-constant ships and matter-constant for ships, andif Fieldhas giventhe rightsemantics indeterminate predilike will cates,thenstatements "Thisshipcouldhaveits planksreplaced" turnout to be neithertruenor false. The samegoes for "Thisship could be disassembled subsequently and reassembled". Perhaps,though, "ship"is a referentiallyindeterminatepredicate in whose referenceis made determinate contextually, accordancewith whatLewis(1983, pp. 244-6) calls a rule of accommodation. ThenI will be able to say trulythatthe ship I just builtcould surviveplank-replacement,andableto say trulythatthe shipI just builtcouldsurvivethe disof assemblyandsubsequent reassembly its planks.(The context,will, as it were, automatically delivera precisification allows what I said to that come out true.)Still, if all "ship"can referto is form-constant ships and matter-constant ships, then no context, howeveraccommodating,can make it come out truethata ship both could surviveplank-replacement, and But andcould survivedisassembly reassembly.4 it is true!Supposea builtthe SantaMaria(one of the shipsthatwentto mancalledFrancesco in that Americawith Columbus 1492). Supposefurther the SantaMaria was refittedand repaired Francescoon variousoccasions(havingat by beforeendingup in a museum least some of its originalplanksreplaced) in Madrid.Supposefinallythatthe planksof the SantaMariahavebeen
3At least,it will be impossible without unlesstheshipneverchangesits matter and losing its form,or vice-versa.If the shipneverchangesits matter, nevergets thenthe form-constant andthe matter-conand ship disassembled reassembled, is whether sucha case in stantshipwill havethe sameworldline. It- controversial or ship ship the form-constant andthematter-constant areidentical, arecoincident butmodallydiscemible,andhencedistinct. 4 Herewe mustnot confuse"bothcouldF andcould G"with "couldboth F andG".

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there(in shippedto a Genovesemuseum,andreassembled disassembled, the way they were assembledin Madrid)as partof an exhibitioncomColumbus's voyage to America.Only a philosopherin the memorating gripof a theorywouldhesitateto say thatthe shipon displayin the Genbuiltandlater is ovese museum theSantaMaria-the shipthatFrancesco in the and refitted repaired, shipthatspentmostof the lastthreecenturies the a museumin Madrid, ship thathas survivedbothplank-replacement anddisassembly-cum-reassembly.S Thereis a certainironyherefor Simons'saccountof the sortal"ship". fromthosewho feel resistance He notesthatthataccountmay encounter it multiplies artifacts beyond necessity. The central problem with though Simons'saccountis not, however,what it includes repairable unreassemblable "ships" and reassemblable though unrepairable and ships. (I "ships"-but what it leaves out repairable reassemblable ships use scarequotesherebecauseI am inclinedto thinkform-constant (at ships in virtueof being unrepairable least, unreand matter-constant or in pairable anyway thatwouldinvolveplank-replacement) unreassemblable,arenot shipsproprieloquendo.)If shipsboth can surviveplankthen and replacement, can surviveplank-reassembly, thereis no reasonto shipandTheseus'sshiparemadeof the same supposethatwhen Stathis's
builtcould survivethe reS It is admittedly less clearthatthe shipFrancesco than disassembly-cum-reassembly, it placement all of its parts,andsubsequent of the of is thatthatshipcouldsurvive replacement someof its parts,andsubsequent diassembly-cum-reassembly.That is because it is less clear that the ship of Francesco builtcould survivethe replacement all its parts,thanit is thatthat the of ship couldsurvive replacement some of its parts.(Justas true,I wouldsay, of butless clear.)Butifa shipcansurvivethereplacement all its parts,thenit can of disassembly-cum-reassurvivethe replacement all its parts,and subsequent lots sembly.SupposeI havebeen spending of moneygettingplankafterplankof all You my ship replaced. pointout thatat this rateI shallsoon havereplaced the buyinga planks,andaskwhy I don'tjust buy a new ship.I answerthatalthough economicpointof view, I am new shipwouldmakemoresense froma narrowly to attached my old ship,whichwas the firstone I ever owned.At sentimentally all planks)I haveto move;I acsome latertime(afterI havereplaced theoriginal to havetheboatdisassembled havethebitsshipped my destination. and cordingly insteadof sellingmy old ship,and Youask me why I'm going to all thattrouble, buyinga new one in the place I am movingto. I say thatI remainsentimentally attached the ship I havehad for all those years.You couldn'tvery well reply to to thatif I am sentimentally attached thatship,the lastthingI shoulddo is disasonceits planksaredisassembled. sembleit, becausethatshipwill be goneforever it to In orderto defendthe Lockean principle, is not sufficient denythata ship of can survivethe replacement all its planks.I couldgrantthatwhenyou say that of the unfalse, a shipcannotsurvive replacement all its planks,you say something with a ruleof accommodation. long as As or even something true,in accordance and undergo therearethingsthatcanhaveall theirplanksreplaced, subsequently disassemblyand reassembly-call themships-considered-as-repairable-and-reassemblable-they will maketroublefor the Lockeanprinciple,whetheror not suchthingsaredeterminately denotedby the sortal"ship".

and Same-Kind Coincidence theShipof Theseus 59

planks,they are ships in differentsenses, or ships of differentkinds, or of sortal ships accordingto differentprecisifications the indeterminate If "ship". theyarenot anyof thosethings,a defender ofthe Lockeanprinciple is not in a positionto acceptthat(at the end of the story)Stathis's ship andTheseus'sship aretwo different thingsin the sameplace at the of same time, and explainaway the apparent incompatibility this judgmentwiththe Lockeanprinciple.

III
There is a different way in which the Lockean principle might be set defendedagainstthe alleged counterexample out in ?1.6 It might be the maintained as the planksthathadconstituted shipof Theseusare that, Loweput it) exclusively put intothe shipof Stathis, they are(as Jonathan appropriated by the lattership. Thusat the end of the processof plankthe the replacement, planksthathadconstituted shipof Theseusconstitute the (only) the shipof Stathis: shipof Theseusno longerexists. I agreethatthereis, as it were,roomin logical spacefor the view that a shipcansurvivethe disassembly subsequent of and ordinary reassembly butnot disassembly subsequent and its planks, reassembly-cum-incorporationof its planksinto an alreadyexistingship. It is just thatthis view that does notaccordwithmy actualintuitions aboutshipidentity. Suppose afterthe lastplankfromthe shipof Theseushas beenput intothe ship of of Stathis,the disappearance the shipof Theseusfromthe museumis diswho offers a massive coveredby the museum'sfabulouslyrich curator, rewardfor its return.If Stathis is apprisedof Klops's misdeeds, and I returns ship(s)he is sailingon to themuseum, thinkhe wouldexpect, the andbe entitledto, his reward. don'tthinkthe curator, I the uponlearning facts of the case, would refuse to pay the rewardon the groundsthat the Stathishadreturned planksof the shipof Theseusto the museum,but not the ship itself. He's got the rightplanksto constitute ship of Thethe in seus,puttogether therightsortof way-so he's got the shipof Theseus. Of course,the plankswere not put togetherwith the intentof reassemAnd if it blingthe shipof Theseus,butI don'tsee why this shouldmatter. did, we could easily enoughchangethe storyso thatthe partswere put has together withthatintent.Suppose anantiquarian Ravenna hired that in Klops to smugglethe ship of Theseusout of Nassos for him. Suppose thereis no way for Klops to steal the ship of Theseusfromthe museum (in one piece) withoutgettingcaught;the most he can take away on any
6

Thanksto Jonathan Lowe for pointingthis out.

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Christopher Hughes

givenoccasionis a plankortwo. Supposealso thatthereis nowhere Klops could storethe stolenplankswithoutarousing suspicion.So he hits upon the stratagem gradually of replacingthe damagedplanksof the ship of Stathisby duplicate planksof the ship of Theseus(Klopscarriesout the repairs himself).Whenall of the original planksof the shipof Stathis have beenreplaced planksfromthe shipof Theseus,Klopsstealsthe ship(s), by sails themto Ravenna, deliversthemto the antiquarian, rewards and who for Klopshandsomely his ingenuityin gettinghimthe shipof Theseus.If a ship couldn'tsurvivereassembly-cum-incorporation, in the modithen fied story,Klops and the antiquarian would be operatingundera delusion-like the man in DavidKaplan'sstorywho thinkshe has stolenthe Nina whenall he has in his garageis a replicaof theNina madeof differare ent planks.7But-it seems to me-Klops and the antiquarian not deludedin thinking thatKlopshas smuggledthe shipof Theseusout that of Nassos.8 Letus supposeforthe sakeof argument whena plankis takenfrom that the ship of Theseusandput into another ship, it is exclusivelyappropriit atedby thatothership.Evenon thatassumption, shouldstill be possible for the ship of Theseusto reappropriate plank later on. Supposea that magnatewith a largefleet of shipswantsto smugglethe ship of Theseus out of Nassos and into Chioggia.Firsthe disassembles ship of Thethe then he puts one plankfromthe ship of Theseusinto each of his seus; manyships.Whenone of the shipsgets to Chioggia,its ship-of-Theseus plankis removed, set aside;whenall the ship-of-Theseus and plankshave arrived at Chioggia, they are reassembled. If the operation goes as the planned,andthe reassemblyis carriedout correctly, magnatesurely
7 In Kaplan's the to has story,a philosopher been commissioned disassemble and institute, reassempartsto the Smithsonian Nina, transport disassembled the eachplankhe carefully replaces philosopher ble thepartsthere.Theunscrupulous he removesfromthe Nina by a new one beforeremovingthe next.Afterwards, underthe delusionthatthe ship transports originalpartsto the Smithsonian, the in his garageis theNina (see Salmon1982,p. 221). 8 Does the inclination think the to that(in the casejust described) shipof Thesignifof dependon thinking thatshipas a historically seus makesit to Ravenna ship?Not obviously.Suppose workaday icant object,as opposedto an ordinary in A thatA lives in Portugal. Whilevacationing Oregon, sees a new woodenship, B andbuysit fromits builder who agreesto deliverit to Portugal. disassembles B, the ship into planks,loads the planksonto a truck,and drivesthe truckto New woodenship,belonging (duplicate) thereis another York.In theNewYorkharbor to B. Rather thanreassembling planksof A's ship in New York,B loadsthem the The onto his New Yorkship,and sets sail for Portugal. weatheris so bad on the or and planksaredamaged destroyed, ship'soriginal voyagethatall of the carrier planksfromA's ship. Thereis nothingobvineed to be replacedby (duplicate) ouslywrongwith saying(I wantto say) that(one of) the ship(s)B deliversto A in Portugal the shipA boughtin Oregon,in spiteof the factthatthe lattership is is significant object. not a historically

and Coincidence theShipof Theseus 61 Same-Kind

the will havesucceededin smuggling shipof TheseusintoChioggia.This the could be so only if the ship of Theseuscan reappropriate planksit into incorporation otherships. lost (temporarily) through that supposefor the sake of argument the ship of Stathis,at Similarly, all the end of ourstory,has exclusivelyappropriated of the planksof the shipof Theseus.It wouldstill be possibleto get the shipof Theseusback, it the replacing planksthatused to constitute (andnow conby gradually by stitutethe shipof Stathis) newplanks,settingasidethe old planks,and the reassembling old planksonce they have been completelyreplaced. that So-on the assumption as a resultof Klops'smisdeeds,the ship of of Theseusno longerexists-the curator our museum,once he had the shipof Stathisin his possession,couldget the shipof Theseusbackin the if Moreover, he wantedto havethe shipof Theseuswayjust described. of andno mereduplicate it-back in his museum,it wouldbe sensibleof him to do so. But, I wantto say, it wouldbe daftof him to go to all that that trouble,even supposing whathe wantsis the ship of Theseus,rather of thana duplicate it. It wouldbe daftbecauseonce Stathishas returned else doesn'tneedto do anything to the ship(s)to the museum,the curator get the shipof Theseusback. So, at least, it seems to me. But I could admitthat-in view of the vaguenessof the sortalship, andin line with a ruleof accommodationif someonesaysthatthe shipof Theseusdoes not survivethe disassembly and of andsubsequent "incorporation" its planksintoa pre-existing fully true.As faras findinga counterexamfunctional ship,she says something if it is ple to Locke'sprinciple concerned, is sufficient thereis some (permissible) way of construing-or reconstruing-"ship" on which that and sortalis trueof thingsthatcansurviveboth(total)plankreplacement, (cf. reassembly-cum-incorporation note 5). Presuming I am right about this, there remains something to be explained.Call a parta Thesean partjust in case, at the beginningof our that,when story,it was partof the ship of Theseus.It is at least arguable the firstfew planksareremovedfromthe shipof Theseusandputintothe ship of Stathis,the ship of Theseusloses Theseanparts.Supposenow, that-as I think-at the end of ourstory,the shipof Theseusandthe ship of Stathissharethe same parts.Then,it would seem, when the last few planksaretakenfromthe museumandput intothe ship(s)Stathisis sailit ing, the ship of Theseusdoes not lose Theseanparts.If anything, gains definitelydo Theseanparts.How is it that,while the firstplank-transfers not result in the ship of Theseus gaining Theseanparts, and arguably do definitely not resultin resultin its losingthem,the lastplank-transfers resultin its gaining parts,andarguably the shipof TheseuslosingThesean them?

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The answeris that at some point in the series of plank-transfers the ship of Theseus"moves"fromthe museumto the sea. I think it works somethinglike this: supposewe startwith a new,just-assembled ship S. Thenwe removeone of its ptanks,andputthatplankintoranother It ship. is obviousthatthe partsof S left behindhave,as it were, a betterclaimto (wholly) constituteS thanthe partremoved.(The partremovedhas no claim at all to (wholly)constitute while the partsleft behindmightbe S, thoughtto (wholly)constitute S-after, andnot before,the otherparthas been removed,of course.)Moreover-althoughI thinkour intuitionson this matterare none too clear-it is at least arguable thatthe partsleft behindhave a betterclaim to (wholly) constituteS thanthe sum of the partsleft behindandthe partremoved.If another plankis removedfrom S andput into another ship, once again,the partsleft behindwill clearly have a betterclaimto (wholly)constitute thanthe partsremoved(conS sideredindividuallyor jointly), and the partsleft behindwill arguably S have a betterclaimto (wholly)constitute thanthe sum of the partsleft behind and the partsremoved.Obviously,though, the process cannot at continueindefinitely: some point,the partsleft behindwon't sufficeto S. wholly constitute Whatthenwill becomeof S? It dependson the fate of the removed(andtransferred) parts.Theymay havegone out of existence. Thenwe shall say thatnothingconstitutes andthatS no longer S, exists. Or the partsmay have been dispersedand (multiply)appropriated, but not destroyed-as in the magnatesmugglerexample above. Then-presumingthatwe do not thinkships can go on existingin a disstate-we shall say once again that persed and multiply appropriated nothingconstitutes andthatS no longerexists-though it mightexist S, and Or again,if the planksarereappropriated reassembled. the removed partsmay havebeen put backtogetherin the sameway they were originally put togetherin S. Herethereare two cases. If the partshave been reassembled withoutbeing incorporated a pre-existing into ship (as happens at the end of the magnatesmugglercase) those partswill have a seriousclaimto (wholly)constitute S-perhaps a betterclaim to constitute S thanthe sum of the removedand reassembled partsandthe parts left behind. Moreover,they will not constituteany ship other than S. the Alternatively, partsmay havebeenreassembled while being incorporatedinto an alreadyexisting(duplicate) ship.In thatcase, thosepartstogether with the parts of the duplicate ship that have not yet been replacedby the partsof S left behind-have a seriousclaim to (wholly) constituteS-perhaps a betterclaim thanthe sum of the removedand reassembled parts and the parts left behind. If the parts removed, togetherwith the not yet replacedpartsof the duplicateship do consti-

Same-Kind Coincidence theShipof Theseus 63 and

tuteS, they will also constitute anothership (the duplicateship), as hapcase.9 pens in the Stathis/Theseus We can now see how it mightbe truethatthe firstplank-transfers from the museumto the harborresultin the ship of Theseus losing Thesean resultin the ship of Theseusgaining parts,while the last plank-transfers Theseanparts.Earlyon, what gets left behind(at a time) has a serious claimto (wholly)constitute shipof Theseus(at thattime) andwhatis the removedhas no claim at all to do that.If what gets left behindearly on does whollyconstitute shipof Theseus,then,earlyon, plank-transfers the resultin the shipof Theseuslosing(Thesean) parts.Lateon, whatgets left behind(at a time) has no claim at all to (wholly) constitutethe ship of Theseus (at that time), and (if I am right)what has been removedand withwhathasyet to be replaced, a seriousclaim transferred, together has to (wholly) constitutethe ship of Theseus. If the transferred Thesean withthe yet to be replaced planks,together partsof the duplicate ship,do the (wholly)constitute shipof Theseus,thenany subsequent plank-transfers will resultin the shipof Theseusgaining(Thesean) parts. It followsthat,in arguing the I against Lockean principle, neednotdeny the (not implausible)view that the ship of Stathisinitially exclusively appropriates partsof the ship of Theseus.I can say thatalthough ship the of Stathisinitiallyexclusivelyappropriates those parts,the ship of Theseus eventuallygets them (and all its otherparts)back-though not by getting them back from (not by taking them away from) the ship of Stathis.

IV In his discussionof the shipof Theseuspuzzle,Noonan(1985; 1989,pp. 152-68) arguesthat before the first of that ship's original planks are thereis a shipmadeof thoseplanksthatwill undergo replaced, and repair,
9 If this is accountis right,then-as Jonathan Lowepointedout to me-ships in can "move" funnyways. If, say,the presenceor absenceof a singleplankcan makethe difference betweenconstituting ship of Theseusand constituting the a of part(or ex-part) thereof,thenthe transfer a single plankfromthe museumto the sea canresultin the (whole)shipof Theseus'movingfromthe museumto the claimdoes not seem counterintuitive me, thoughnot all sea. This(conditional) to my readers may agree.We couldavoidaccepting conditional the claimby insisting thatthe ship of Theseusretainsownership (thoughnot exclusiveownership) of all its originalplanksthroughout series of planktransfers. we go this If the we how route,however, riskovercounting manyshipstherearein certain possible situations: Hughes(forthcoming). see

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The reassembly. shipmadeof thoseplanksthatwill undergo a (different) that line of thought leadshim to this conclusionis the following: of (1) A shipwill survivethereplacement its planksin cases in which reassembled. the replaced planksarenot subsequently (2) A shipwill survivethe removalof all its planks,andtheirsubsein quentreassembly, cases in which the removedplanksare not replaced. conor of (3) Whether not the replacement some planksaffordsthhe tinuedexistenceof a ship cannotdependon whathappensto the replacedplanks;whetheror not the reassemblyof some planks existenceof a shipcannotdependon whether the affords continue as the plankswere replaced theywereremoved. Let h, h', andh" be threepossiblehistoriesof the worldthatdivergeonly after time t-the time at which the ship(s?) of Theseus come(s?) into existence.In h the originalplanksof the ship(s)of Theseusarereplaced, reassembled the same way (in and the replacedplanksare subsequently events they were assembledbefore).In h' the same plank-replacement reasoccurthatoccurin h, but the replacedplanksare not subsequently and events sembled. In h" the same plank-removal plank-reassembly By planksarenot replaced. (1) and occurthatoccurin h, buttheremoved it is trueat t on h thata shipmadeof Theseus'sship'soriginalplanks (3), ship. (plank-replaced) By (2) and (3), it is true will surviveas a repaired at t on h thata shipmadeof Theseus'sship'soriginalplankswill survive planksandthe replaced as a reassembled ship. Giventhatthe replacing places at the same time, the and reassembled plankswill be in different ship thatwill be made of the replacingplanksand the ship thatwill be plankscannotbe the sameship.So we may conmadeof the reassembled cludethat that shiparemadeof the (4) It canhappen this shipandthat(distinct) same planksat the same time, and are in the same place at the sametime. From(4) it is a shortstep-though, as we shallsee, one thatNoonandoes not take-to (5) Two shipscan be in the sameplaceat the sametime and thence, by the considerationsadducedin ?11,to the denial of the Lockeanprinciple. the prinagainst Lockean So we havea new (mostlyNoonan)argument set ciple. While the argument out in the first section moves "forward" time,to shipsthat fromshipsthataremadeof different planksat an earlier moves are made of the same planks at a later time, the new argument from ships that are made of differentplanks at different "backwards" times,to shipsthataremadeof the sameplanksat an earliertime.

and Coincidence theShipof Theseus 65 Same-Kind

needspremisses(1)-(3) to get to the denialof Whilethe new argument needs at most the first two of the Lockeanprinciple,the old argument those premisses. (The old argumentdoes not need a premiss quite so (i) strongas (1), as may be seen by comparing fromthe firstsectionwith of (1).) Forthis reason,I thinkthe opponent the Lockeanprincipleis on than with the old argument withthe new.Afterall, someone saferground mightaccept(1) and(2), anddeny(3).10She might,for example,reason as follows: plankshadn'tbeenreplacedand If the shipof Theseus'soriginal we reassembled, wouldsay thatthe builderof thatshiphadbuilt just one shipfromthoseplanks.(We don'tthinkthatshipbuilders makemorethanone shipat a timefromthe sameset of ordinarily planks.)But how manyshipsthereare at an earliertime cannot will or dependon whatplankreplacements reassemblies or will not happenat a latertime. So even if the originalplanksof the the ship of Theseusare both replacedandreassembled, builder builtjust one shipfromthoseplanks-in whichcase (3) is false. against(3), orthatthere Thepointis notthatthisis a conclusiveargument against(3); it's simply that someonearguing are conclusivearguments fromtheweakis principle advisedto get its negation againsttheLockean l est possibleset of premisses." I notedearlierthatNoonandoes not in fact move from(4) to (5), and Thoughhe does not say thenceto the rejectionof the Lockeanprinciple. thatthe move from(4) to a greatdealaboutwhy he does not, he suggests (5) looks obviousonly if we are countingshipsby identity,andperhaps weakerthanidentity, countshipsby somerelation we may (legitimately) and with the resultthatthe ship of Theseusthatwill be repaired the ship thoughdistinct,count as one ship of Theseusthatwill be reassembled, (Noonan1989,pp. 165, 167). distinctshipsas one ship. of of I am suspicious the legitimacy counting it is truethatafterthe planksthatused to constituteTheseus's Suppose Stathis's,thereis just one ship have replacedthe planksthatconstituted Theseus'sship.Ifjust one to constitute ship madeof the planksthatused ship is madeof those planks,it seems, thereshouldbe an answerto the museum?" question,"hasit [theone ship]everbeenin theNassosnautical If, however,a shipmadeof thoseplankshas been in thatmuseum,anda there ship (different) madeof thoseplankshasneverbeenin thatmuseum, seems to be no (sensible)answerto thatquestion.
(1984, pp. 115-8). Nozick (1981, pp. 29-43) andShoemaker Forinstance, fact 11The mostlyNoonanargument bringout the interesting however, does, for thattherearearguments therebeingtwo shipsin the sameplace at the same a theoryof presuppose closest continuer time thatdo not explicitlyor imnplicitly who acceptsthe closestconprinciple of Evenan opponent the Lockean identity. tinuertheoryof identityshouldbe pleasedby this.
10

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that Suppose,however, this ship andthat(distinct)ship may be legitias matelycounted one shipwhiletheycoincide(thatis, while theyoccupy the sameregionof space).I don'tthinkthis will sufficeto save the Lockean principle usuallyunderstood. as Afterall, contemporary defenders of thatprinciplesuchas Simons(1987, pp. 221-8) andWiggins(1968, pp. 90-5) takeit to ruleout the possibilitythatthisK andthat(distinct) are K in the sameplaceat the sametime.Lockehimselfwrites: Forwe neverfinding,nor conceivingit possible,thattwo things of the samekindshouldexist in the sameplace at the sametime, we rightlyconcludethatwhateverexists anywhereat any time excludesall of the samekind.(Locke 1975,II, 27) Locke says here,notjust thattherecan'tbe two Ks in the same place at the sametime,but also thatif one K is herenow, thenevery(other)K is elsewhereor elsewhen.

The considerations advancedin this papercertainlydo not constitutea refutation the Lockean of principle. haveargued the defender the I that of Lockean is to principle committed somecounterintuitive judgments about the numberand identityof ships in certainpossible situations. such No can argument establish falsityof Locke'sprinciple, the since it is possible thatif we abandon principle, arecommitted equallycounterinthe we to tuitive,or even morecounterintuitive judgments. is no idle possibility (It that,whateverwe decide aboutthingsof the same kind coinciding,we shall end up havingto say somethingcounterintuitive aboutthe number andidentity shipsin certain of possiblesituations). hope,though,to have I provideda seriouschallengeto the Lockean principle.12
Department of Philosophy King s College London Strand London WC2R2LS UK CHRISTOPHERHUGHES

REFERENCES Field, Hartry1973: "TheoryChangeand the Indeterminacy Referof

ence". Journal of Philosophy, 70, pp. 462-81.
12Thanks Marcia to Mayeda JoWolffforencouragement; to Jonathan and and Lowe,an anonymous referee,andthe Editor, manyhelpfulsuggestions. for

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Hobbes, Thomas 1994: TheElements of Law, Natural and Politic. Part I: Human Nature; Part II: De Corpore Politico. ed. J.C.A. Gaskin.

Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press. Hughes, Christopher (forthcoming): "Aquinason Continuityand Identity". Mediaeval Philosophy and Theology.

Lewis, David 1983: "Scorekeeping a LanguageGame",in his Philoin sophical Papers, Volume 1. Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, pp. 233-50.
Locke, John 1975: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P.

Niddich.Oxford: Clarendon Press. Noonan, Harold 1985: "The Closest ContinuerTheory of Identity". Inquiry, pp. 195-229 28, 1989:PersonalIdentity. London: RoutledgeandKeganPaul.
Nozick, Robert 1981: Philosophical Explanations. Oxford: Clarendon

Press. Salmon,Nathan1982:Reference Essence.Oxford: and Blackwell. Shoemaker,Sydney and Swinbume,Richard1984: Personal Identity. Oxford: Blackwell. Simons,Peter1987:Parts:A Studyin Ontology. Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press. Wiggins,David 1968:"OnBeing in the SamePlace at the SameTime".
Philosophical Review, 77, pp. 90-5.