The Nature of Chinese Nationalism

A Research Paper

Sam Ross Asia in Comparative Perspectives

In 1994, Liu Xiaobo, a Chinese political dissident, commented that since June 4, 1989, China has suddenly been engulfed in a wave of nationalism and patriotism, which reaches every corner of the land and involves every person. (Zhao 2004, 11) The fifteen years since those words were spoken have seen a strongly assertive China; a somewhat fitting match to the countrys growing success. Curiously though, the promotion and encouragement of this nationalism by Chinas ruling party, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has taken on a somewhat contradictory tone from a historical and economic perspective. For example, in their efforts to spread awareness of and pride in Chinese culture, the CCP has become an important ally of Confucianism, despite having vilified the ancient scholar and his teachings for almost half a century since Chinas cultural revolution. (Ho 2009) On a broader scale, the Communist party also seems to struggle with some identity issues. China has become largely capitalist in the past decade, and has even moved towards a more liberalized public sector. One might even question: With communists like these, who needs capitalists? So what is the nature of Chinese nationalism, and how can these conflicting concepts be consolidated under one set of ideas? Several arguments to this matter exist, although most relate to subjective interpretations of the results of Chinas policies. From one perspective, Chinese nationalism grows from a sense of aggressive primordialism, a civilizational cohesiveness built on a shared set of ethnicity and/or values, in this case those that are thought to be uniquely Chinese. Others argue almost the opposite, that China, despite its consolidation under a single banner, is very much a collection of separate nation states, brought together artificially by the CCP under a one-China banner. (Guang 2005)

To come to a conclusion, one must take a historical accounting of both primordial and instrumentalist nationalism, and how their use in history has shaped China into the nation it is today. Chinese nationalism reflects both the cultural aspects of its development, from Confucianism to Maoist thought to widespread (and occasionally forced) cultural assimilation under the Han Chinese. Yet, this is not the totality of all that has had impact on molding the system of support for the nation, as Chinas historical struggles for sovereignty and status among other nations must also be recognized for their role in what defines what makes someone Chinese. Thus, although the nature of Chinas nationalism has fluctuated between defining the nation in primordial or instrumental modes, the country today, is a prime example of a country whose nationalism is rooted in a Constructed Primordialism a system that accommodates for both primordial and instrumentalist values. I. Primordialism vs. Instrumentalism vs. Constructed Primordialism Before we can delve into analysis of what compels China to display features of a constructed primordialism, several concepts must be defined more fully. The first is the nature of nations and nationalism and the second is a clearer explanation of primordialism, instrumentalism, and constructed primordialism; the systems in which a nation and nationalism can be produced and maintained. The term Nation has several definitions but one of the more accepted theories is that of Benedict Anderson in his 1983 book, Imagined Communities. In Andersons view, a nation is just that; an imagined political community and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. (Tonneson 1996, 7) The community is imagined in the sense that most members of the community, even if they never meet other members consider themselves to be
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connected in some collective fashion. Prior to nations, Anderson argues, there were two main systems for forming communities, religious and dynastic, which linked members of societies through their self-identified attributes. For nationalism, Tonneson and Antlov share an agreeable definition; an ideological movement for attaining or maintaining a nation-state. (Tonneson 1996, 2) It is at this point that we can begin to define the elements that can construct and perpetuate nationalism. Constructed primordialism contains elements of both primordialism and instrumentalism; thus it is only reasonable that their natures be looked at first. Primordialism is a theory of nation-building that focuses primarily on the connections brought about by the attributes of ethnicity and/or culture. Geertz postulates that primordialism represents connections developed by the givens of any particular society:
the assumed givens -- of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the giveness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, and following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of itself. (Geertz 1973, 260)

These givens can include any cultural commonality, be it language, race, or a perceived common point of descent in tradition or experience. Chandra expands on possible connections in her search for a definition of ethnicity. Ethic identities, she suggests, can be separated into two categories; nominal, in which an individual is eligible for membership based on attributes he or she possesses, and activated, groups in which she or he professes membership or to which she or he is assigned by others as a member. (Chandra 2009, 386) The former is related to attributes and an identity that cannot be changed (such as physical/racial characteristics), while the latter can be adjusted (i.e. national, geographical or political affiliation). Obviously, this can have profound implications on the idea of a common primordial connection. In either
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respect though, nationalism can be product of primordialism as a result of a community trying to build itself up and stand out or protect its own ideals and cultural values from other communities. On the other end of the spectrum is instrumentalism, a system that, if it has any use for ethnicity, exploits it. Instrumentalism is more based on structuralism and realism. Under an instrumentalist system, social groups are exploited by influential actors to compete for power and resources. This could include rallying an ethnic band under a common banner to get them to elect you to a political position, or drawing attention to an issue that will move the public in a direction you want them to go. Croucher perhaps sums it up best, postulating that under the instrumentalist theory, ethnicity is not about spiritual affinity but, rather, stems from utilitarian calculations and, as many analysts argue, self-serving manipulation by political elites. (Croucher 2004, 125) In case it wasnt already made obvious through the distinction of elites, instrumentalism also evokes elements of Marxism, in that it sees class and economic factors as strong mobilization tools. Through establishing divides internally to the nation or between the nation and its neighbors, one base can be incited to rise up against the other, especially if theres a large economic disparity between the two, fermenting resentment. Like primordialism, instrumentalism can produce nationalism through inspiring a notion of us-against-them, although it does so in a way that particularly designed to promote a certain partys interest rather than the interest of a whole community. In reflection of these definitions, this paper argues that Chinese nationalism runs on the principle of Contructed Primordialism, which is somewhat a combination of both
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primordialism and instrumentalism. In this system, ethnicity may be a constructed identity, but its construction relies on appeals to primordial sentiments of belonging. (Croucher 2004, 129) For example, a national identity may be constructed within a system (and may then be used for political means), but requires a conscious acceptance and recognition by the public based on historical context. It is constructed with reference to kinship, blood ties, shared origins, and common ancestry. (Croucher 2004, 129) Constructed primordialism allows for all of the combined benefits of primordialism and instrumentalism, allowing for each theorys individual flaws to be accommodated for by overlapping them. For example, in comparison to primordialism, constructed primordialism can explain shared nationalism that blooms in a nation with multiple disparate primordial ties. Likewise, it can also allow for nationalism that exists solely because of a primordial community, where instrumentalism does not. It cannot function as a catch-all theory for every nation, but as explained below seems to explain nationalism in China pretty functionally. II. Confucianism and Chinese-ness To explore the nature of contemporary Chinese nationalism, one finds some of the roots in ancient Chinese culturalism. Despite an obvious establishment of a state under Imperial governance, ancient China was decidedly not what could be defined as a nation. To clarify, the borders separating it from neighboring states were fluid and tenuous, and there was not one clearly established community united under the empire. The connections that made one Chinese were cultural, a set of universal principles that extended above or outside whatever other common ethnic ties that defined an individual or community. (Zhao 2004)

One of these primarily elements of Chinese culture was Confucianism, a system of rules governing social interaction, moral values, philosophy and politics that originated around 500 BC. These general principles reflected the idea that every living being held a specific place in a universal order, and that this natural order was reflected in human social relations with one another and their positions in a variety of relationships they maintained towards the family, community, and governing body. As Zhao explains, being Chinese depended on how well one adopted these universal principles of society, not on ones physical race or ethnic background:
When barbarian conquerors such as the Mongols and the Manchus adopted Confucian culture, the Chinese people could accept them because their primary loyalty was too the culture rather than to a particular nation. They believed that all conquerors of China, eventually had to turn to Chinese culture to rule the country. Thus, culture was seen as a great, lasting power that could bridge periods of disunity and infuse new governments, whether Chinese or alien, with values supportive of traditional Chinese civilization. (Zhao 2004, 42)

It should be noted that this is more an attitude of universalism rather than nationalism, which differs from the latter in that universalism promotes a common identity for all peoples rather than just those of a particular nation. Nationalism promotes a sense of uniqueness, while universalism in all its inclusiveness does not. Thats not to insinuate that in practice Confucianism always automatically lead to all Chinese being equal. The Han Chinese population that had existed before the Mongol invasion occurred in the late 1200s long considered themselves to be the true Chinese. These attitudes, along with unequal treatment under the Mongol hoard lead to the expulsion of the Mongols in 1368 to reestablish Han rule under the Ming dynasty. The Han were also significantly suppressed under Manchu rule. One of the more apparent sign of this was the forced adoption of the Manchurian hair queue, forbidding citizens of China against cutting their

hair. The regulation may seem odd in retrospect, but still required Han Chinese to submit ideological control to their Manchu conquerors. Such a demand was, in fact, an affront to Confucianism. The Classic of Filial Piety, in line with Confucian values about debts owed to ones elders,
suggests that a persons body and hair, being gifts from ones parents, are not to be damaged. (Wakeman 1985, 648) While some Confucian values to inspire a larger community may have been

shared (for example, its use as an ethical force to inspire loyalty to the imperial throne), suppression like this established to the Han (who remained the majority within the country) a distinction between their own culture and that of their oppressors. This would, in turn, affect future forms of Chinese nationalism. III. Rebellion and the stirrings of Nationalism There is very little belief among scholars that the concept of a Chinese nation to which all Chinese were patriotic to, existed before the 19th century. John Fitzgerald makes the claim that the Chinese custom of referring to their historical community by dynasty (Chaodai) rather than by country (guojia) implied that there was in fact, no Chinese nation at all (Zhao 2004, 45) As a result, Chinas confrontation with the western powers and Japan in the nineteenth century made it necessary to relinquish power to the universalistic pretentions of the empire, and to seek entrance into the family of nationsas one sovereign state among others. (Tonneson 1996, 277) The watershed events for this might have been the Opium wars fought with England over Chinese restriction of the trade of the drug in the mid- and late-1800s. Chinas defeats not only lead to its humiliation, but to a fear that Chinese culture might fall victim to western imperialism:
China was constantly in jeopardy of being carved up by the western powers and Japan. Foreign imperialists enjoyed the protection of extraterritoriality in their enclaves on Chinese soil and frequently

embarked on armed invasions to punish the Chinese for various acts of disobedience. Chinese political elites were most alarmed about what they called unequal treaties, [the Nanjing and Tianjin treaties] which had been forced on China by the foreign imperialists. (Zhao 2004, 48)

Thus it was little surprise that these attitudes made territorial sovereignty an important aspect in establishing China as a nation-state. Much emphasis was put on the connection between significant historical events and lands considered to be Chinese territory, and this has remained a strong aspect in defining the Chinese nation since. The failure of the Boxer Rebellion also encouraged a departure from Chinese traditionalism in an attempt to become a modern nation; although, what that modern nation consisted of became another conversation entirely. (Zhao 2004) Numerous scholars concluded that Chinese culture, including Confucianism and its hierarchical system, had little reference to the unprecedented conditions of the westerndominated world. (Zhao 2004, 57) Some even went so far as to argue that the Chinese written language was fit to convey the ideas of the modern age. (Tonneson 1996, 278) Simultaneously, the beginning of the 20th century was also seeing the rise of a different form of Chinese nationalism, one based on primordial ties of ethnicity. Since its initial invasion of China, the Manchu Qing dynasty had been significantly weakened from its battles with the west and Japan. Bitterness increased with the loss of Taiwan to Japan in the Sino-Japanese war, and inspired a nationalist revolution against the sitting dynasty in 1895 by Sun Yet-Sen, an internationally-educated radical intellectual who rallied the Han Chinese behind him. (Spence 1999) Although this initial revolution failed, it inspired Sun to compose The Three Peoples Principles, a set of guiding precepts that became the core of the next revolution and (more generally) future Chinese nationalist rhetoric. These principles were often described, even by Sun himself, as most derived and relatable to a line from Lincolns Gettysburg address that

called for a government of the people, by the people, and for the people. (Zheng 1999) These principles called the creation of a representative republic that encompassed all the people of China, and it wasnt until after the successful deposing of the Qing dynasty that many of the Han revolutionaries could conceive of Manchu having a place in that system. Rather, it was the general goal of many revolutionaries that China should take on the identity of a unitary nationstatewhere nearly all the residents were Han. (Zhao 2004, 66) Yet despite this, Sun, upon the success of the revolution in 1911, called for the unity and cooperation of the five most major subgroups of Chinese (Hans, Manchus, Mongols, Hui, and Tibetan) to form the nation of China. This had little to do with an altruistic of equal representation. Sun and other revolutionists were anxious to hang onto the land that the Manchu had control over during the Qing dynasty, something which was jeopardized as Mongols and Tibetans began clamoring for their own independence. Thus Sun was denying any individual national identity of these groups; all in China were Chinese, and it was their destiny to conform to the more pure Han majority and build a great nation. What Sun and his newly formed Kuomintang (Nationalist) party of China were essentially doing was something that Benedict Anderson might have described as spreading the short tight skin of the nation over the gigantic body of the empire, and the legitimization of the Han in charge. (Gladney 1994,99) This ethnic assimilation policy was a perfect manifestation of constructed primordialism, and one that survives in present day CCP practices. These five groups and the hundreds of smaller groups that made up China were all Chinese. Admittedly, it was somewhat instrumentalist in that the Han were automatically on top, but in principle it suggests the nation

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could not exist without the presence of those other ethnicities. It was not community based primordial ties that brought everyone together, but their inherent Chinese-ness. In the end, the nationalists were unable to promote their nation-state ideas effectively among the population, losing out to the recently formed Chinese Communist Party. Where the Kuomintang called for the establishment of the Han nation, the CCP promoted the idea of popular sovereignty among the more rural population, mobilizing citizens in a class-based revolution against the nationalist regime. As a response, the Kuomintang, then lead by Chiang Kai-Shek, accused the communists of being anti-patriotic and anti-nationalist. It is only too clear now, Chiang was quoted once as saying, that communists can never have any true sense of loyalty to their country; they are devoid of patriotism and national consciousness. (Tonneson 1996, 282) Its interesting that was the issue the Kuomintang brought to the public debate as the argument against communism, as the CCP ideals suggested (at least in theory) a national identity that extended beyond class or ethnic ties. (Tonneson 1996) Thus, the threat presented by the communist party was not one of ideological goals that they would use to represent, but to the power held by the Kuomintang. There was also a nationalist question of what the CCP represented, as the Soviet-composed Communist International group had had heavy influence in the creation and support of the CCP. Faced with this existential and amorphous threat, as well as the death of their leader Sun Yat-sen in 1926, the Kuomintang radically changed tactics, instituting violent cleansings of the party with Chiang launching sudden attacks on CCP headquarters. This blood bath forced the CCP to back away until they could figure out how to better reconcile ideas of communism and Chinese nationalism. (Zhao 2004)
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IV. One nation, under Mao The Kuomintang maintained its hold on power and suppression of the CCP until forced to fight against the Japanese in World War II. This allowed the CCP to rebuild itself, and eventually wrestle control away from the Kuomintang, allowing them to also re-identify China under the guiding hand of Mao Zedong. It was under Mao that Chinese nationalism changed radically to something entirely different; it started adopting some elements of instrumentalism. Drawing on the economic levels of the masses, Mao proposed that China was disadvantaged because it was subject to the whims of other outside nations which imposed as bourgeois over China, in the role of the proletariat. All those in league with imperialismare our enemies Mao stated, further suggesting that the Chinese nation could only be defined in its reactions toward the corrupt oppression he saw by imperialist states toward China. (Zhao 2004, 97) China was, and always had been defined by struggle and Marxist class conflict against imperialists. While also believing that China needed to separate itself from the west, Maos was a substantial departure from the perspective taken from Kuomintang leaders, like Chiang Kai-shek, who in the past had argued that Chinas salvation would rise from common primordial connections. Mao was rather indifferent to ethnic ties except in how they convenienced/inconvenienced him. For example, separating from previous ideas of Han superiority, Mao suggested that the CCP would allow Mongol, Hui, Tibet, Miao, Yao, Yi and Fan nationalities to have equal rights with the Han. (Zhao 2004, 175) He was however, a stern critic of Confucianism, since he saw it as counter revolutionary and a threat to the Marxism he sought to promote as Chinese identity:
The onslaught against Confucianism continued under the communists. Because Confucius wanted to eternalize certain privileges and powers for the aristocracy, modern proletarian leaders saw his followers

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as counter-revolutionaries. During the Cultural Revolution, Mao, who himself reverted to absolutism, called on the Red Guards to smash all historic relics and eradicate old thinking, habits and customs. (Bezlova 1999)

Overall though, Maos government was greatly defined by trying to establish China through imagined primordial conflict; one China against the world. This continued even once he had redefined China as a peoples republic, going so far as to argue that the Cultural Revolution was due to the Wests policy of containing China, as a way to promote what he called domestic development within the country. (Zheng 1999, 104) It was in this manner that China first began implementing principles of constructed primordialism to define its nationalism. V. Traditional Chinese Values (Sponsored by the Chinese Communist party) Post-Mao, the CCP has gone through some radical changes in the way it inspired nationalist fervor. For starters Maos successor, Deng Xiaoping went out of his way on several occasions to define patriotism in an instrumental supporting a stable state. Left in a chaotic state after the Cultural Revolution, Deng contended that it was the highest honor to love their socialist motherland and contribute all we have to her socialist construction. (Zheng 1999, 93) Essentially Deng was suggesting that supporting the institutions of socialism (and by proxy, the CCP) were the only way for China to return to its original glory, and to guarantee stability, also hedging off a threat from democracy. At least immediately following the Cultural Revolution, the CCP also relaxed some of its standards for ethnic nationalism, pursuing a full-fledged inducement policy that encouraged development of non-Han minority groups in the 1980s. This was less out of respect for primordial ties and more another attempt to bring in ethnic minority groups under the one united China idea. Despite high hopes, this has been less successful than the Chinese government would have hoped, since unique ethnic nationalism among Tibetan and Uighur
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community has only thrived as members who took advantage in the reform years engage in a struggle to keep their culture and national identity afloat. (Zhao 2004, 198) Despite the often violent Chinese reaction to the separatism this might represent, it has lead to some ethnic groups to influence what it means to be Chinese, particularly in reaction to the long preestablished systems of Han nationalism. Chinas nationalism, to some extent, has always been influenced by a need for a sense of sovereignty. Over the years, the Chinese leaders have come to embrace an absolutist notion of sovereignty, with watertight boundaries and internal control far more complete than anything that had ever existed before or appear likely to be present anytime soon. (Guang 2005, 501) The existence of separate ethnic minorities desiring their own states and independence from China threatens this. Like previous iterations of the governments before them, the CCP has adopted the idea that Chinese nationalism is represented by the Han Chinese, and that Chinese identity in minorities is based on how well they emulate that culture; forced on them if necessary. An example of this in particular of the past few years has been the Chinese government when dealing with the Uighur population of China. For years the CCP has tried to make inroads into Uighur culture in attempt to make them more Chinese. Effects of this policy range from subtle influencing of government aid that the community receives; i.e. schools that only teach in Mandarin Chinese to the more significant association of Uighur dissidents as comparable to the threat faced by the US in regards to Al-Queda. (Gladney 1994) In essence, the CCP has begun to establish a selective system of primordialist ties to define what it means for an individual to be Chinese. The motivation they ascribe to those
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who would desire a separate independent state outside of China is that of terrorism. Furthering the motives for locals to assimilate, the CCP has also been encouraging Han immigration to Uighur areas. Many Uighurs do not speak Mandarin Chinese, and thus Han dominate commerce in Xinjiang's urban areas and are frequently seen by the local as having the regions best jobs. (Chung 2002, 12) The message from the CCP is clear; one is Chinese as much as one is assimilated into Han culture. Anyone working against the Han influence is not only an outsider, but a terrorist as well. This is not the only primordial tie exploited by the CCP. Although originally a vicious opponent of Confucianism, the CCP in the early 90s become an advocate of his teachings and the historical cultural values they represent to the Chinese people. Without a doubt, this has had numerous benefits in the representation of China and the CCP:
By connecting itself so directly with Chinas past, it can be argued also that the CCP is trying to personalize its rule--in other words, the CCP wants to show that it is not simply staffed with static technocrats, or even non-academic officials. On the contrary, the CCP is trying to prove that it is concerned not only with reaching a specific GDP growth rate, but also attaining less tangible benefits to society, such as the Qing History Project and deepening the Chinese citizenry's appreciation of history. Unlike more technical subjects such as engineering or economics, history is something that all Chinese can enjoy and embrace. The CCP is trying to show it cares. (Ho 2009, 2)

When it comes down to it though, the CCP only cares to the extent though that it solidifies their position. Like with the revival of nationalism through the superiority of Han values, the promotion of Confucianism holds a significant strategic value in promoting nationalism through the exploitation of a shared ethnic tie. Ideologically, it allows the CCP to establish itself as being a party of values, and to separate itself from the Marxism that inspired the Cultural Revolution. The CCP can also be selective about the Confucian values it promotes, like those of hierarchy and stability, while stressing Confucian values of propriety in relationships as a means to encourage Chinese people to be loyal and obedient to the state. (Zhao 2004, 229) Interestingly
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enough, they are also being used to establish the nature of Chinese culture and identity world-wide, through the spread of Confucius Institutes, non-profit institutions built in cities around the globe that supposedly serve as representation of what it truly means to be Chinese:
The Confucius Institute Online is devoting to satisfy the need of people who are interested in Chinese learning all around the world, promoting the understanding of Chinese language culture, enhancing the educational and cultural cooperation between China and the world, developing the friendship between China and other countries, to help developing a multicultural environment and building up a harmonious world. (http://about.chinese.cn/en/node_4221.htm)

This self-expository statement on the Confucius Institutes cites the multiculturalist appeal of Confucius while keeping his values uniquely Chinese. Thus, in the same breath, those values could potentially be reproduced domestically to promote anti-west attitudes for their nonadherence to these values. Its state control under the guise of primordial values, inspiring patriotism and nationalism under an elaborate system of constructed primordialism. VI. Conclusion Although the nature of Chinas nationalism has fluctuated between defining the nation in primordial or instrumental modes, the country today, is a prime example of a country whose nationalism is rooted in a Constructed Primordialism a system that accommodates for both. The research presented in this paper acts as evidence to that. Throughout Chinese history, there have been significant cultural elements that have survived more or less throughout Chinas national and pre-national period. This includes the Confucianism which was maintained as the essence of what made someone Chinese for over a thousand years, and the additional establishment of Han Chinese as the pillar of Chinese identity.

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Both of these ideas have their place in modern Chinese society. Confucianism has made a comeback in civil society and government, again touted for its representation of a universal and grand Chinese culture. Yet whether or not these Confucian values empirically represent the Chinese experience is still up for debate. Ethnic minorities are still (occasionally forcefully) assimilated into Han Chinese culture so that their communities will someday reflect the united China under one ethnicity; a concept thats now being threatened as minorities gain more awareness of the other forms of primordial ties open to them. One can easily make the claim that both themes solely exist in their present-day incarnations as tools of the state; crass twisting and exploitation of the Chinese culture, so that the government, particularly the CCP can remain in power. Some have argued that because of its nature, this brand of nationalism is insubstantial at its core, a politicized and particularistic nationalism, pragmatically tailored to the interests of the ruling elite. (Zhao 2004, 230) However, this paper does not get into the ethics of the CCPs actions to promote Chinese nationalism or the legitimacy of nationalism composed from elements of constructed primordiality; just the association between Chinese nationalism and constructed primordiality. Although the communist party under Mao may have argued for nationalist institutionalism, Confucianism seems to have made a comeback as to representing what it is to be Chinese; a primordial value that still brings people together in the Andersons imaginary community of those who tie themselves together under the mantle of being Chinese. The same goes for endorsing Han Chinese culture as the definition for what makes one Chinese. But once these values are officially endorsed by the ruling political party it takes on a whole new shape entirely. At that point, primordial ties become artificial for the sake of furthering political goals and
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become constructed, a whole new thing entirely. The line has been blurred by constructivism, and it becomes less of a question of what is Chinese nationalism, than who or what defines Chinese nationalism.

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