From: Sent: To: Subject: Follow Up Flag: Flag Status:

Versluis, Rob <ROB.VERSLUIS@nuclear.energy.gov> Friday, March 25, 2011 8:19 AM RST01 Hoc; RST01B Hoc Fw: Hydrogen Follow up Flagged

Fyi Rob Versluis +1-301-903-1890(o)

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From: Kelly, John E (NE) To: DL-NERT-AII Sent: Fri Mar 25 00:10:21 2011 Subject: FW: Hydrogen Here is new information from the Japan AEC. I know GE thought that the vented via a wetwell line, but this is a different interpretation. This scenario means that the head bolts stretched, which GE didn't think was what happened. I will need the pressure histories for the first multiple hours of the situation (especially In the containment) in order to provide a response. Have we plotted that info yet?

b)(6) From: Akiraomoto [mailto:l Sent: Thursday, March 24, 2011 11:46 PM To: Kelly, John E (NE) Cc: Lyons, Peter; shunsuke.kondo@cao.go.jp; Binkley, Steve; SCHU; Poneman, Daniel; Connery, Joyce; akira.omoto@cao.go.jp Subject: Re: Hydrogen

Dear Mr. John Kelly, Akira OMOTO, a Commissioner in the AEC is writing to you. Thank you for sending your note. I thought that the following points need to be considered; 1) SAM (Severe Accident Management) procedure and modifications were finished in the 90's including containemnt "hardened" scrubbing venting to the main stack (NYT article is wrong) via wetwell air space, makeupo water using fire protection system from large size portable water storage tank, bus inter-connection to other units (this worked very well in unit 5 and 6 since one EDG continued operation), and others. 2) All the three units (IF] -3) experienced containment overpressure in the early phase of the accident, which caused excessive leakage from flange, ailocks and other peentrations. Hydrogen

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produced by Metal Water reaction in the core damage process must have escaped to the ractor buiding via this containment leakage path and acculmulated on the top and caused deflagration/detonation there. Further, containment was steam inerted and a large fraction of hydrogen escaped -by "hardened" venting. 3) Still radiolysis of water is ongoing and produces hydrogen/oxygen in the containement (hopefilly in the RPV). thus, still the risk of hydrogen deflagration/detonation exists, in my view. Remeber that if lodene and other Halogen elements exist in the water they function to retard or prevent recombination of hydrogen/oxygen. My paper oni hydrogen control in BWR (Nuclear engineering and Design, 2000) discussed this point. Study is ongoing in TEPCo; a) to open vent valve of RPV while keeping steam inert conditionm and b) to send nitrogen or other inert gas to the containment. However, to inject nitrogen containment isolation must be unlocked first and then valve operation must be done in an extremely harsh environment. A professor in Georgia (in eastern Europe) suggested injection of overcooled nitrogen (which had been used in Russaian and Eastern europe's research reactor) adn I am asking the details, but no answer yet. akira OMOTO iPhone 6 L1A
On 2011/03/25, at 5:06, "Kelly, John E (NE)" <John.l< evI6:.c!Nuclr. .I", l > wrote:

Pete and Dr Kondo

I've compiled our views on the questions that Dr. Kondo posed and these are in the

attached. Our technical analysis and/or judgments should not be considered in any way to be a
set of recommendations. John ----- Original Message ----From: Lyons, Peter Sent: Thursday, March 24, 2011 8:22 AM To: .:hniu.iAmdoj ciI!xop'; Binkley, Steve; Kelly, John E (NE) :,i10? .oiniw7,it: gojp Cc: SCHU; Poneman, Daniel; Comnery, Joyce; Subject: RE: Hydrogen Thank you for your note Dr. Kondo. We continue to watch your progress and all our hopes are with your teams for resolution of the issues. Secretary Chu has organized a scientific group to provide advice on key issues, and the issues you list are at the top of their list of concerns. I have added Steve Binkley, who is serving as the executive secretary of the scientific team, and John Kelly who is following the reactor issues most closely. I believe they have drafted some thoughts on at least some of your concerns and I

am hoping these can be provided to you promptly. Restoration of fresh water cooling is of great interest, as you note, and your efforts to restore such cooling by bringing in supplies from that dam are very positive. 1 believe there is also discussion of a Navy bargebringing in fresh water offshore. Thank you for your note and our thoughts are with you, Very best regards Pete Original ----- ----Message From: shu nsRu.-lo do (_ct, u.Q [maihto:shunsuke.kondoCcao.go.ip] Sent: Wednesday, March 23, 2011 7:55 PM To: Lyons, Peter Cc: SCHIU; Poneman, Daniel; Connery, Joyce; 1irz.otxmLcw ioCj: Subject: Hydrogen Dear Pete We are still in dangerous conditions. I want to ask your experts view on the following two points. Official contact between NISA and NRC is working but still slow from my viewpoint, though I am asking people in charge to improve. This is the reason why . want ask you a favor of gathering opinion of your people on these points informally. Yours, Shunsuke

Dfinition of the problem

I. Status of the reactor (1 Fukul,2 and 3) Currently, seawater is continuously injected to the RPV boundary through CS (unit I) or LPCI (unit 2 and 3) lines at a speed of around 10-15 Ton/hr. Water level close to TAF level (2/3 of fuel height covered) must have been achieved already even though the integrity of the RPV boundary may be lost and core fuel would have lost its integrity. Since the water is supplied by non-conven~tional method (Fire Engine and Seawater), stable and sustainable core makeup and cooling method must be established while minimizing risks arising from potential hydrogen deflagratiornidetonation inside the containment. In reality, the hydrogen explosion presumably occurred at reactor building top floor at I F1 and 3 indicates hydrogen leaked from containment penetration (airlocks, flanges, electric penetrations exposed to high pressure and temperature crated a condition of excessive leakage) or via containment vent path had accumulated outside of the containment and detonated. Containment re-inerting by injection of nitrogen is being studied by TEPCO. Restoration of electricity (already power is available to power centers but replacement of pump motors such as Make-up Water system pump motor at a harsh (in term of radiation) environment is causing delay of field work). Use of portable water from nearby dam is planned and onsite receiving tank has already received this water. Restoration of the supply line to tanks such as Condensate Storage Tank is planned by again in a harsh environment. Once fresh water supply is secured, seawater is to be replaced by fresh water.
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2. Your view is expected: a) Hydrogen Although temperature reading (RPV surface thermocouple) registered gradually lower numbers at unit 1, 2 and 3 (from 500 degC to 200-300 degC), still there is a risk of hydrogen deflagration/detonation inside the containment. What is the estimated potential of hydrogen deflagrationidetonation inside the containment and RPV? What action do you recommend to avoid this risk? b) Lonig-term stable cooling Given the potential of taking a long time for restoration of ordinary cooling function, what alternative cooling method is conceivable besides Fire Engine?

<Reactor plant status questions.doc>

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