Climate Change: Source of Conflict or Promoter of Peace?

Tobias Ide University of Hamburg Department of Geography Research Group Climate Change and Security (CLISEC) Grindelberg 7 20144 Hamburg tobias.ide@zmaw.de Abstract Since 2007, the interest on environmental conflicts experienced a renaissance in the form of discussions about climate change-induced intrastate conflicts. This paper argues that existing classifications used to summarize various positions regarding the environment/climate-conflictnexus are delusive and incomplete, particularly those referring to the distinction between neomalthusians and cornucopias. By reviewing main theoretical arguments and latest empirical evidences, a comprehensive new typology is developed which distinguishes between four paradigms, each providing a different answer to the question whether climate change is a (potential) source of violent conflict. These are: (a) The Climate Conflict paradigm claims that climate change increases the risk for conflict onset. (b) The Social Conflict paradigm states that climate change is mostly unrelated to the outbreak of conflicts. (c) The Resource Abundance paradigm sees natural resource wealth as a source of conflict, implying that climate change can prevent violence via an increasing shortage of resources. (d) Finally, the Environmental Peacebuilding paradigm suggests that environmental problems and natural disasters, which can be exacerbated by climate change, may provide opportunities for initiating or intensifying peaceful cooperation. There are empirical evidence supporting each of these paradigms, so the central question of future research should not be whether climate change will bring more conflict (or peace), but rather under what conditions the claims of the different paradigms hold true.

Key words: violent conflict, climate change, environmental chance, resource abundance, environmental peacebuilding, disaster diplomacy 1 Introduction The world is facing several large trends as we begin the 21st century. One is climate change, caused by anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases, and estimated to raise the global mean temperature by 1.1 up to 6.4 degrees until 2100 with the higher end of this range being much more likely. The negative consequences of climate change include, inter alia, changed precipitation patterns, melting glaciers, rising sea level, worsening conditions for agriculture and more frequent natural disasters such as storms, floods and droughts (IPCC 2007). Another major trend is the rising importance of intrastate vis--vis interstate conflict (Themnr/Wallensteen 2010). This paper explores the interrelations between these two large and important trends by asking the question: Is climate change a source of conflict, or can it even be considered as a promoter of peace1? Consequentially, I will solely focus on the relation between climate change and conflict onset. But before proceeding, some basics should be clarified. First, some important definitions have to be spelled out. A conflict exists when the incompatible expectations of at least two social groups meet, become manifest and at least one of the actors uses direct, physical violence against humans in order to enforce or articulate his expectations2 (Bonacker 2009: 184). In this sense, the terms conflict and violent conflict are used interchangeably. A factor, situation or development is termed conflictive, conflict relevant or a source of conflict if it can be considered as a root cause of, a trigger of or an enabling condition for conflicts. However, a conflict is always the product of multiple factors, so there is never one single source of violence3.
1

The last IPCC report (2007) contains only a few statements on the climate-conflict-nexus, which rest on shaky empirical and theoretical foundations (Nords/Gleditsch 2009). 2 It should be noted that the authors cited in this paper use different definitions of the term conflict, so a minimal definition is given here. 3 This makes the term environmental conflict or climate conflict somewhat arbitrary, since even if climate change is a source of a certain conflict, its impact strongly depends on other factors, too (Schreiber 2011). Nevertheless, I will use these terms here since alternative formulations (such as climate change co-induced violent conflicts) are quite long and complicated.

Second, it is unlikely that climate change (or environmental change) contributes to large scale (Melander/Sundberg 2011; Theisen/Brandsegg 2007; Urdal 2008) or interstate conflict (Barnett 2000, 2003; Deudney 1990; Homer-Dixon 1994), so I focus mainly on small scale and exclusively on intrastate violence. Finally, there is a significant overlap of research on environmentally induced and on climate change-induced conflicts. This is no surprise since climate change manifests itself mainly in environmental changes and (a central issue of both debates) the shortage of natural, renewable resources. However, a certain difference can be noted since authors working on the environment-conflict-nexus take all kinds of environmental change into consideration, while the research on climate change and conflict only deals with the kinds of environmental change which can be considered a consequence of or closely related to climatic change. This paper will proceed as follows: First, some well-established classifications of the various positions concerning climate change-induced conflicts are introduced and criticized (2). In the following section (3), I will present a more comprehensive classification distinguishing between the Environmental/Climate Conflict (3.1), the Social Conflict (3.2), the Resource Abundance (3.4) and the Environmental Peacebuilding (3.5) paradigm. I review the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence concerning environmentally respectively climate change-induced conflicts provided by these paradigms in order to answer the main question of this paper. Especially section 3.3 examines the increasing number of large-N studies which have been conducted in order to support the Climate Conflict or the Social Conflict paradigm. Finally, a conclusion is drawn and some suggestions for future research are made (4). 2 Classifying Positions Regarding the Climate-Conflict-Nexus The most widely used way to sort the different positions regarding the connection between environmental problems/renewable resource scarcity and conflicts is the differentiation between (neo-)malthusian and cornucopian positions (e.g. Bernauer et al. 2010: 5f.; Frhlich 2010: 29; Theisen/Brandsegg 2007: 4f.; Urdal 2008: 592f.). This distinction suffers 3

from various problems. First, Thomas Malthus (1992) considered the discrepancy between the linear growth of agricultural output and the exponential growth of human populations as the cause for human misery and social conflict. Within the discussion about the climate-conflict-nexus, however, climate change and not population growth is the possible source of resource scarcity (and violence)4. Consequently, many studies on this topic do consider population issues not at all or only as one of many important factors. Second, Malthus assumed a deterministic connection between population growth, resource scarcity and misery. In contrast, many environmental conflict scholars underscore the importance of institutions and human agency, therefore dismissing any deterministic connections. Gnther Bchler (1998:32) already claimed:
However, passing the threshold of violence definitely depends on sociopolitical factors and not on the degree of environmental degradation as such. Critical sociopolitical factors include the lack of institutional capacities for peaceful conflict settlement, the readiness and/or capacity of authorities and leaders to organize and mobilize collective actors, the (mis-)perception of alternatives to resorting to violence, the preferences and opportunities of actors, and actor limitations.

Similarly, the label cornucopian greatly reduces the range of arguments criticizing the environmental/climate conflict thesis. Cornucopianism refers, broadly speaking, to positions claiming that societies can adapt to natural resource shortages, or that crucial natural resources are not getting scarce or can be substituted anyway (Lomborg 2001b; Simon 1981). However, most criticism of a connection between climate/environmental change and conflict is justified by a lack of theoretical plausibility, methodological problems and contrary empirical evidence (see sections 3.2 and 3.3). Finally, the simple distinction between neomalthusian and cornucopian positions ignores other crucial positions in the debate such as the one put forward by resource abundance and environmental peacebuilding scholars (see sections 3.4 and 3.5). Other attempts to classify positions regarding the environment-conflictnexus do hardly better (e.g. Brown 2005; Floyd 2008; Kahl 2006: 4-25; WBGU 2008: 25-30). They either term positions according to authors
4

Similarly, the environmental conflicts debate also deals with many environmental problems which are not (solely) caused by population growth (e.g. Homer-Dixon/Blitt 1998: 5-7).

(Homer-Dixon, de Soysa etc.), institutions (Toronto Group, PRIO etc.) or, less often, academic disciplines (neoclassical economics, political ecology etc.)5. All of these classifications do neither enlighten the broader lines of thought which compete in the discussion about environmentally induced conflict nor do they cover all central paradigms existing in this field of research. In the next section, I will therefore introduce a classification of positions which is intended to overcome these shortcomings in order to come closer to an answer of the question whether climate change will lead to more conflict or more peace. 3 Will Climate Change Breed More Violence? Four Core Paradigms of the Debate The four paradigms discussed here were all developed in the debate about the environment-conflict-nexus, but can be (and are) extended to the field of climate change-induced conflict. The presented categories are overlapping and not mutually exclusive. 3.1 Environmental/Climate Conflict The main argument of this paradigm can be summarized as follows: Environmental change, and therefore climate change, too, causes scarcity of natural, renewable resources and is therefore an important factor for the onset of conflicts. However, it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition and often not even the most important source of violence. The most likely forms climate change-induced conflicts will take are small-scale, subnational conflicts in poor, undemocratic regions with a history of violence and a low adaptive capacity.6 3.1.1 Environmental Conflict Since they constitute the basis of the research on the climate-conflictnexus, the four main causal paths suggested to connect resource scarcity

Very often, the various ways of classifying positions are mixed up. For instance, Kahl (2006: 4-25) identifies a Neo-Malthusian, a Neoclassical Economics and a Political Ecology perspective. 6 These regions are mostly located in the global south.

and conflicts are presented at first. Again, the pathways can coincidence and even interact: a) Need: When people absolutely lack the means to sustain their own livelihoods, they may resort to violence in order to capture the resources form other groups (Bchler 1998: 26f.; Scheffran/Link/Schilling 2012: 101ff.). This argument is not very popular in the environmental conflict literature, maybe because one can raise serious doubts about (a) whether people would wait that long with capturing resources and/or (b) the ability of wasted individuals to engage in organized violence (Barnett 2000; Nords/Gleditsch 2005). More recent research on very small-scale conflicts in Africa, however, provides some support for this pathway (Schilling et al. 2011). b) Grievance: Another reasoning contends that resource scarcity will reduce the well-being of individuals either directly or via reduced economic growth. Homer-Dixon/Blitt (1998) argue that absolute deprivation (people are worse off than before) and - more relevant relative deprivation (people are worse off than other groups or than they expect) provide strong motives for aggrieved people to fight privileged groups or the government. Similarly, resource scarcity can lead people to migrate, causing tensions about scarce resources or identity conflicts in the receiving area (Reuveny 2008). c) Opportunity: This style of argumentation can be traced back to the work of James Fearon and David Latin (2003: 76), who state:
Surely ethnic antagonisms, nationalist sentiments, and grievances often motivate rebels and their supporters. But such broad factors are too common to distinguish the cases where civil war breaks out.

Consequentially,

researchers

should

focus

on

the

opportunity

structure aggrieved individuals and groups face when they want to engage in conflict. Environmental change plays at least a fourfold role here (Homer-Dixon/Blitt 1998; Miguel/Satyanath/Sergenti 2004; Kahl 2006): First, environmental change weakens the state. It reduces (via its negative impact on economic growth7) tax revenues. Furthermore,
7

Environmental change can affect economic growth mainly via resource scarcity and physical destruction done by natural disasters.

in

times

of

scarce

resources,

natural

disasters

or

economic

turbulences, citizens may demand more support from the state. This reduces the state budget further or, if the government is unwilling or unable to deliver support, undermines the legitimacy of the state. Finally, resource scarcity will maybe also lead to intra-elite competition. A weakened state will be an easier target for rebel groups or be less able to prevent intercommunal violence on its territory. Second, if resource scarcity leads to lower yields and lower incomes, the opportunity costs for people to join a conflict group decline, making recruitment of fighters easier. Third, the recruitment of fighters also becomes easier since resource scarcity tends to strengthen group coherence8. Fourth, since resources that become scarce often increase in value, they can be used as selective incentives by elites in order to attain allies and stimulate conflict that serves their interests. d) Insecurity: The State Failure Hypothesis developed by Colin (Kahl 2006: 44) claims that there might be another connection between the weakening of states, resource scarcity and conflicts. If a state fails, a fundamental insecurity (security dilemma) between various social groups arises due to the lack of a neutral authority setting and implementing binding rules. If such a situation coincidences with resource scarcity, all social groups face incentives to change the destabilized order to their favor in order to acquire more of the scarce resources. Since all groups know about these incentives, they will (independent from their own ambitions) distrust other groups, further intensifying the climate of insecurity and making preventive strikes or the rapid escalation of single violent acts more likely9. One apprehension often articulated by environmental conflict scholars is that resource scarcity may lead to conflicts while conflicts themselves exacerbate environmental problems (UNEP 2009), therefore leading to a vicious cycle (e.g. Evans 2010).
8

This is because in times of scarce resources, people increasingly rely on their social networks or even have to join certain groups in order to acquire the resources necessary (Kahl 2006: 47f.). 9 Schilling et al. (2011) describe such a situation for the Turkana county in northern Kenya.

Most of the works concerning the environment-conflict-nexus mention several intervening variables and context factors that make their claims more precise. Unfortunately, an extended debate of this issue is not possible here. However, Alexander Carius, Dennis Tnzler and Judith Winterstein (2007) collected 73 incidences of environmental conflicts (including nonviolent and interstate ones) taking place between 1980 and 2005. They found the following context factors to be especially relevant: Unequal distribution of power and resources as well as corruption. Government competences. Already existing social, political and cultural tensions and insecurity. Insecurity of livelihood and poverty. Population pressure and multidimensional migration. Problematic socio-demographic structures or trends. Unequal possession of and access to land as well as natural and common-pool resources. Inadequate land use systems and technologies. failure and no adequate decentralization of

3.1.2 Climate Conflict Mostly from 2007 on (Brauch 2008), many of the basic arguments of environmental conflict scholars were adopted by the fast growing research on the climate-conflict-nexus. Jon Barnett and Neil Adger (2007), for example, convincingly connect grievance with opportunity arguments. They suggest that environmental degradation caused by climate change undermines human security, therefore raising grievances and lowering opportunity costs for violent behavior. This is particularly the case for poor areas with low capacities for adaptation and a strong dependence on natural resources. The most comprehensive study on the climate-conflict-nexus so far has been carried out by the German Advisory Council for Global Change (WBGU 2008). It identifies four conflict constellations which could be induced by climate change (WBGU 2008: 79-129). All dynamics are to a large extent influenced by several political, social, economic, cultural and natural scope conditions which cannot be discussed within this single paper: 8

a) Climate-induced degradation of freshwater resources: The melting of glaciers, a change in rainfall patterns and increasing evaporation may cause increasing regional scarcities of fresh water which can raise need, grievance, opportunities for conflicts and insecurity. Especially prone to this conflict constellation are regions that already face water stress or depend on water form glaciers, such as Peru, Southern Africa, central and parts of southern Asia as well as northern China. A very recent approach, so far only applied to small-scale African pastoralist conflicts, contents that higher rainfall variability10 instead of simply decreasing precipitation is conflictive. These works show that while water scarcity provides motives for (violent) cattle raiding in the sense of need or grievance, more rain leads to better conditions (or opportunities) for raiding, e.g. because animals can more easily be trekked over longer distances and more vegetation provides improved cover (Hendrix/Salehyan 2012; Raleigh/Kniveton 2012; Schilling et al. 2011). b) Climate-induced decline in food production: Climate change can reduce food production through higher temperatures, changed rainfall patterns, more (serve) natural disasters and acidification of the oceans. The question whether food insecurity stimulates conflict is answered by Brinkman/Hendrix (2011: 4) with a highly qualified yes. This claim is well founded in the empirical literature, where recent studies by Bessley/Persson (2008), Pinstrupand Andersen/Shimokava (2008), Sobek/Boehmer (2009),

Arezki/Brckner (2011) all find a statistically significant connection between some measurement of food insecurity and the risk of violence. A typical (but not solely) food-related type of conflict which could be exacerbated by climate change is farmer-herder or herderherder violence in Sub-Saharan Africa (Nijru 2012). Other regions at risk include parts of southern Asia, Central and North China as well as Amazonia.
10

This means that climate change increases the percentage of heavy rainfall events.

precipitation falling in

c) Climate-induced increase in storm and flood disasters: Bhavnani (2006: 38) nicely illustrates the mechanisms connecting natural disasters to violence11:
Natural disasters in general contribute to conflict because they create competition for scarce resources, exacerbate inequality with the unequal distribution of aid, change power relationships between individuals, groups, and the organizations that serve them, and can create power vacuums and opportunities for warlords to usurp power.

Hydro-meterological

disasters

are

especially

conflictive

if

the

government is identified as responsible for inadequate prevention, emergency relief or reconstruction measures (Goldstone 2001). Areas facing a high risk of flood- and storm-induced conflicts are the Caribbean, the east coast of India, Bangladesh and the east coast of China. d) Environmentally induced migration: Resource scarcity, natural disasters or a rising sea level as well as climate change-induced conflicts can act as a push factors12 for people to migrate to other places. In the receiving areas, competition for scarce resources or ethnic and political tensions between newcomers and longer-time resident have under certain circumstances the potential to be a source of conflict (Reuveny 2007). Refugee camps may also provide good opportunities to recruit fighters (Salehyan/Gleditsch 2006). A hypothesis not considered so far is that if Diasporas are an important factor in stimulating conflict in their homelands since they provide various forms of financial and organizational support (Collier/Hoeffler 2000), climate change induced migration may also raise the conflict risk of outsending areas13. Altogether, the regions most prone to the climate-migration-conflict-nexus are Latin America and the Caribbean, Northern Africa, the Sahel zone as well as South and East Asia. The WBGU (2008: 189) summarizes his findings as follows:
11

Nel/Righarts (2008: 162) also describe three broad pathways leading from disasters to conflicts: motive, incentive, opportunity. These strongly coincidence with the grievance, greed and opportunity pathways identified above. 12 Usually, three factors are considered to cause migration as exemplified by Reuveny (2008: 2): Push forces operate in A and cause people to leave A. Pull forces operate in B and attract people to move to B. Network forces assist in the move. 13 Smith (2007) concludes, however, that the scale and direction of the impact of diasporas on conflict in their homeland is far from clear.

10

Another important aspect is that not only climate change itself, but also attempts to mitigate or adapt to climate change can be conflictive (Gleditsch/Buhaug/Theisen 2008). Mitigation can stimulate conflicts through, for instance, the cultivation of biofuels or a rise of the price of fossil fuels (which can in turn negatively affect food prices) (Diefenbacher 2008; Nords/Gleditsch 2007). Examples of conflictive adaptation measures include adaptation funds, which can allow the funding of rebels or repressive regimes, and an increase of upstream irrigation agriculture leading to conflicts with parties located downstream at the same river (Tnzler/Maas/Carius 2010). However, since nearly no research has been conducted on these issues, well founded claims cannot be made yet. 3.2 Social Conflict Exponents of the Social Conflict paradigm argue that environmental change, natural resource scarcity and climate change are not or only very marginal sources of conflict. They suggest that the evidence in favor of a climateconflict-nexus is scientifically unfounded and rather speculative. Social factors, such as democracy, economic growth or poverty, are the relevant factors concerning the outbreak of conflict. The Social Conflict paradigm raises doubt about the theoretical plausibility of, the methodology underlying and the empirical evidence supporting the climate conflict thesis. 3.2.1 Theoretical Plausibility Many authors criticize climate conflict and especially environmental conflict scholars for underestimating or at least undertheorizing the role of social factors like institutions, culture or regime type. According to them, these scholars suggest a too direct (or deterministic) link between environmental change and conflict (Barnett 2003; Gleditsch 1998; Salehyan 2008). Especially remarkable is the lack of attention given to the local actors perceptions as well as local resource use institutions and conflict regulation 11

The conflict constellations analysed by WBGU show that unabated climate change will increase human vulnerability, worsen poverty and thus heighten societies susceptibility to crises and conflicts. The specific threats will depend on the dynamics of climate change, local environmental conditions and the affected societies and actors crisis management capacities. (S. 189)

mechanisms (Hagmann 2009; Martin 2005; Timura 2001). From a political ecology perspective, Nancy Peluso and Michael Watts (2001) argue that (the perception of) resource scarcity is always produced by and embedded into complex local and global relations of power, production, accumulation, commodification and culture, which are hardly taken into account when environmental conflicts are analyzed14. Besides these objections on the conceptual level, a common argument put forward against environmental conflicts is: They simply do not pay. Other responses to resource scarcity (such as increased imports, more efficient irrigation systems, desalination or the switch to more drought-resistant crops and cattle) are much more cost-efficient and less dangerous for participating individuals (Goldstone 2001; Salehyan 2008; Simon 1989). Joe Barnett (2000) raises another interesting point. He argues that Homer-Dixon (but this also applies to the majority of studies concerning the climateconflict-nexus) only shows how environmental change leads to poverty and underdevelopment, but fails to specify the mechanisms that cause such a situation, which is very common in large parts of the world, to cross the threshold to violence. 3.2.2 Methodology This line of argumentation contends that most studies confirming the Environmental/Climate Conflict paradigm are methodologically unsound and thus not very meaningful. Most of the fundamental objections raised only hold true for the case studies which were the predominant research design of the field in the 1990s. Nils Petter Gleditsch (1998) criticizes that the models developed by environmental conflict scholars are overly complex, impossible to test (this point surely applies to most models concerning the climate-conflict-nexus, too) and are often supported only by anecdotal evidence of singular cases15. According to Indra de Soysa (2000), case studies rely on statements made by the conflict actors, which will always try
14

But notice that Pelluso/Watts are often accused of interpreting the findings of proponents of the Environmental Conflict Paradigm simpler than they actually are (Homer-Dixon 2003; Matthew 2002). 15 This point clearly refers to the work of Homer-Dixon, who only examines instances of conflict and therefore does not vary the dependent variable. Schwarz/Deligiannis/HomerDixon (2000) discus and reject this objection.

12

to frame their actions in terms of grievance about resource scarcity and environmental discrimination, even if they are motivated by voracity for power or wealth. Other criticisms go beyond an exclusive focus on case studies and are therefore more comprehensive. Gleditsch (1998) points out that the simple correlation between environmental degradation and conflict does hardly tell us anything, since violence could also cause degradation or just coincidence with it. Similarly, many studies claiming climate change to be a source of conflict because of the conflictivity of land degradation or food insecurity suffer from serious endogeneity problems since these conditions can also be the result of, or indicators for, conflict, poverty or poor governance (Bernauer et al. 2010: 6). In parts, the WBGU study fits Gleditschs (1998: 393) imputation that environmental conflict scholars are Using the Future as Evidence. Richard Matthew (2002; Matthew/Gaulin/McDonald 2002) criticizes scholars claiming a environment-conflict-nexus for examining too short time periods, because resource-related violence could only be an episode in a larger process of societal transformation (e.g. democratization, decentralization). Finally, Tor Benjaminsen (2008) raises a particularly interesting point by claiming that many studies arguing in favor of a climate-conflict-nexus use out-dated or inadequate environmental data. For instance, most of the large-N studies claiming a significant correlation between land degradation and conflict (see part 3.2.3) use the Global Assessment of Soil Degradation (GLASOD) (Oldeman 1992) to operationalize their independent variable. But GLASOD bases solely on the view of around 250 different experts who do not use consistent definitions. 3.2.3 Empirical Evidence There are several claims that so far there is no convincing empirical evidence that environmental and climate change make conflict more likely, which stands in sharp contrast to some well established social factors rising the risk for violence (Dixon 2009; Hegre/Sambanis 2006). As a contrast to the bulk of case studies finding environmental degradation to be a relevant factor for conflict onset, there are also many cases in which resource scarcity and natural disasters were either epiphenomenal to the conflict 13

(Benjaminsen 2008; Bobrow-Strain 2001; Hagmann 2009; Turner 2004), did induce improved resource management and cooperation patterns (Adano et al. 2012; Juul 2005; Slettebak 2012) or did (as for example in North Korea or Malawi) simply not coincidence with conflict (Barnett 2000; Salehyan 2008). In a similar fashion, Buhaug/Gleditsch/Theisen (2008: 5) make us aware of the fact that
the many processes associated with global warming, which have truly started to appear only over the last fifteen years, have occurred during a time when we have witnessed a dramatic reduction in the frequency and severity of armed conflict.

More specific, many authors doubt that climate-change induced migration can be a source of conflict. This is the case because, if at all, climate change (in contrast to civil war or state failure) causes migration that is typically internal and short term (Raleigh/Jordan/Salehyan 2008: 4), of people that are too weak to engage in systematic violence, of people without weapons, organizational structures and contact to rebel organizations or warlords, and of people without strong concepts of enemy, conflictive political agendas or a motivation to influence conflicts in their homelands. The receiving, but also the outsending area can also benefit culturally and economically from the migrating people (Gleditsch/Nords/Salehyan 2007; Raleigh/Jordan/Salehyan 2008; Scheffran/Marmer/Sow 2012). Finally, I would like to discuss some of the objections formulated against the environmental conflict thesis by the already mentioned cornucopian authors. Bjrn Lomborg (2001a, b) and Jesse Ausubel (1998) try to prove that essential resources are not getting scarce because agricultural productivity is still increasing (compensating for production losses due to climate change, soil erosion etc.) and water is abundant, too, if efficient use is assured and desalination technologies are applied. Moreover, even if certain resources get scarce once, this will lead to technological innovation, substitution, or increasing imports (Simon 1981, 1989). However, the cornucopian perspective ignores that people may not always have the capacity to prevent or adapt to resource scarcity, especially in indigent and poor-governed regions, which are most prone to violence anyway (Homer14

Dixon 1995; Kahl 2006: 16-18). Thus, cornucopian arguments in general seem to be tremendously weaker than other points raised by the Social Conflict paradigm. It remains true, however, that some regions and groups indeed have well-developed adaptive capacities and a high social resilience, thus being less like to become involved in climate-chance induced conflicts (e.g. Adger/Lorenzoni/OBrien 2009; Smith/Vivekanada 2007: 33-36).

3.3 Climate Conflict vs. Social Conflict: Assessing the Statistical Evidence As already suggested, the existing case studies provide no clear picture whether climate change will lead to more conflict onsets or not. What about large-N studies? Some authors choose higher temperatures as the independent variable, which has the obvious advantage of being exogenous to local socioeconomic or cultural factors. But as shown in table 1, the various investigations regarding the temperature-conflict-nexus are unable to deliver a clear result. Table 1 also emphasizes that the results for reduced precipitation, lower availability of freshwater, increased rainfall variability, climate-related disasters and deforestation are similarly inconclusive. The picture changes slightly in favor of the Social Conflict scholars if we take out the studies against which major objections were put forward, namely those of Hauge/Ellingsen (1998), Miguel/Satyanath/Sergenti (2004) and Burke et al. (2009) (Buhaug 2010; Ciccone 2011; Theisen 2008). This applies especially for the conflictivity of fresh water availability. Only the conflictivity of land degradation seems to be nearly consensual, since six out of seven studies agree on that point. But one should be cautious about this finding, given the fact that most of the studies use the methodologically questionable GLASOD data16 and Fearon (2010) as well as Urdal (2005) find no correlation between cropland scarcity per capita and conflict17.
16

This is the case for all studies except of Biermann et al. (1998) and Hendrix/Glaser (2007). 17 While resource scarcity is the supposed mediating mechanism between land degradation and conflict, even a high level of land degradation may not lead to resource scarcity if the affected area is sparsely populated. Hence, cropland availability per capita may be the more relevant independent variable.

15

Consequence of conflictive climate change Higher Burke et al. 2009a temperatures Hsiang/Meng/Cane 2011d Reduced precipitation Hendrix/Glaser 2007b Hendrix/Salehyan 2012a Jensen/Gleditsch 2009b Levy et al. 2005 Miguel/Satyanath/Sergenti 2004b, 18 Raleigh/Kniveton 2012c Theisen/Brandsegg 2007b

non-conflictive Buhaug 2010a Bernauer et al. 2010 Wischnath/Buhaug 2012e Bernauer et al. 2010 Buhaug 2010a Buhaug/Theisen 2012a Brckner/Ciccone 2010b Burke et al. 2009 Nel/Righarts 2008 Theisen/Holtermann/Buhaug 2011/12a Wischnath/Buhaug 2012e Hendrix/Glaser 2007b Levy et al. 2005 Melander/Sundberg 2011b Theisen 2008 Koubi et al. 2012 Wischnath/Buhaug 2012e Hendrix/Glaser 2007b

Lower availability Hauge/Ellingsen 1998 of freshwater Raleigh/Urdal 2007 Increased rainfall Hendrix/Salehyan 2012a variability Raleigh/Kniveton 2012c Land degradation Biermann et al. 1998 Esty et al. 1999f

18

The critique of this study by Ciccone (2011) is convincingly rejected by Miguel/Satyanath (2011).

16

Hauge/Ellingsen 1998 Melander/Sundberg 2011b, g Raleigh/Urdal 2007 Theisen 2008 Climate-related Bhavnani 2006 Bergholt/Lujala 2012 natural disasters Drury/Olson 1998 Slettebak 2012 Nel/Righarts 200819 Deforestation Esty et al. 1998 Theisen 2008 Hauge/Ellingsen 1998 italic Major objections are raised against this study. a Focuses only on Africa. b Focuses only on Sub-Saharan Africa. c Focuses only on parts of East Africa. d Focuses only on countries affected by ENSO (El Nio/Southern Oscillation). e Focuses only on Asia. f Only valid for serve degradation that occurs at a rapid rate. g Only valid for regions with a high population density. Table 1: Overview about large-N studies concerning climate changeinduced conflicts20

There are no quantitative studies about the climate-migration-nexus, presumably because of inadequate or incomplete data (Reuveny 2008). Altogether, it should be noted that the large-N studies concerning the climate-conflict suffer from significant methodological problems21 and are therefore less meaningful than they appear at first glance (e.g. Cramer 2002; Kahl 2006: 58-60; Melander/Sundberg 2011; Zanker/Simons 2012).

3.4 Resource Abundance The main message of the Resource Abundance paradigm is (in contrast to the Social Conflict paradigm) that resources matter for conflict, but it is (in contrast to the Environmental/Climate Conflict paradigm) the abundance and not the scarcity of resources that is conflictive22. Stating this, it can be deduced that if climate change will lead to resource scarcity, conflict may become less likely.
19

A similar result is provided for earthquakes by Brancati (2007). Although earthquakes are no climate-related disasters, Brancati considers resource scarcity as the crucial mechanism connecting natural disasters to conflict. 20 The table contains only studies which deal with several countries. 21 Examples include inadequate data, e.g. for land degradation or conflict events, the inability to capture complex interrelationships, endogeneity and causality problems as well as difficulties regarding the appropriate spatial unit of analysis. 22 Resource abundance is, however, neither a sufficient nor a necessary cause of violence, as cases like Bosnia or Botswana show.

17

The Resource Abundance perspective became prominent through the work of Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (2004). They found resource abundance measured by primary commodity export as a percentage of total GDP - to be strongly related to the outbreak of civil wars23. Although serve criticism has been put forward against this perspective (see Brunnschweiler/Bulte 2009 for a short overview), six different mechanisms connecting resource abundance to conflict onset have been theorized (Humphreys 2005; Kahl 2006: 13-16; Lujala 2010; Ross 2004a). The first three mechanisms operate rather indirect and refer to the so-called Resource Curse (Auty 1993: 1): a) Economic Dutch Disease: There is a positive correlation between resource abundance and low levels of economic growth respectively a smaller GDP (Sachs/Warner 2001)24. These two factors are, in turn, strong predictors for civil war onset (Hegre/Sambanis 2006), presumably because they lower the recruitment costs for fighters and/or raise public grievances. b) Political Dutch Disease: Abundant resources can enable or encourage the establishment of patronage networks. Hence, states become less accountable and it is hard to acquire power, status or money peacefully outside of these networks. States with resource-fed budgets are often weak since they have only minor incentives to establish a strong bureaucratic apparatus (which is usually necessary to collect taxes) (Le Billon 2001, Renner 2002, Reno 2000; Humphreys 2005). c) [S]parse network mechanism: Macartan Humphreys (2005: 513) argues that resource dependence weakens the productive sector and thus internal economic integration, leading to lower cohesion and interdependence between the various inhabitants, thus reducing the costs for conflict. The three other, more direct mediating mechanisms are:

23

But the conflict risk starts to decline again in the rare cases where the threshold of 33% is passed because, according to Collier/Hoeffler, if the GDP/primary commodity exports ratio exceeds 33%, governments will have enough money to suppress rebellions. 24 Reasons for the weak economic performance of resource-rich countries are discussed by Auty (1998), de Soysa (2002b), Le Billon (2001b) and Renner (2002).

18

d) Greed: Also known as the honey pot thesis (de Soysa 2000: 115), Collier/Hoeffler (2000) initially explained their finding of an abundance-conflict-nexus by referring to greedy individuals or groups which are attracted by rents to gain from easily lootable resources (Le Billon 2001; Ross 2004a; Sorens 2011). e) Feasibility: More recently, Collier/Hoeffler/Rohner (2009) concluded that lootable resources matter for conflict not because they attract greedy warlords, but because they provide opportunities for conflict parties to finance soldiers and weapons (Ross 2004a). f) Grievance: The unequal appropriation of natural resources themselves or of the revenues that emanate from them, poor working conditions in the extractive industry, environmental degradation resulting from the extraction process or a worsening economic situation can all rise grievances that eventually may erupt into violence. With respect to this mechanism, a possible synthesis between the Environmental Conflict and the Resource Abundance paradigm is all too clear. The looting of an abundant resource (e.g. cooper in Bougainville) can lead to a scarcity of other resources (wood, clean water), raising needs or grievances and lowering recruitment costs (Fairhead 2001; Renner 2002). Besides the discussion about which of these mechanisms has the highest explanatory power (Humphreys 2005; Lujala 2010), the important question here is: Is this perspective relevant for climate change-induced conflicts? Most Resource Abundance scholars only deal with large-scale civil wars that include the government as one party, but their arguments about weakened states (which are easier to attack and less able to prevent intercommunal violence) and motivated as well as enabled individuals in theory also hold true for more diffuse, small-scale conflicts. More problematic is that although Collier/Hoeffler (2004) and Humphreys (2005) find a significant correlation between all types of natural resources and conflict, most studies (e.g. de Soysa 2000, 2002a; Lujala 2010, 2011; Ross 2004b, 2006) confirm this link only with regard to nonrenewable resources (mostly oil and

19

diamonds), which are not strongly influenced by climate change25. However, Karen Witsenburg and Wario Adano (2009; Adano et al. 2012) combine greed- and feasibility-arguments and point out that the abundance of water resources is providing stronger incentives (e.g. healthier cattle) and opportunities (e.g. better hideouts due to more vegetation) for violent raids in Kenya. This argument is supported by other authors, e.g. Schilling et al. (2011) or Theisen (2012). In summary, there is some evidence that climate change - via a reduced abundance of renewable resources - actually lowers the risk of conflict onset, but our knowledge about these processes is insufficient. Furthermore, as climate change will also lead to more precipitation and better agricultural conditions in some areas, it may also raise the risk of violence in these specific locations. 3.5 Environmental Peacebuilding The Environmental Peacebuilding paradigm suggests that environmental problems are - under certain circumstances - not sources of conflict, but chances and even catalysts for cooperation between rivaling groups. The underlying assumption is that even hostile parties may work together if they face a common thread of resource scarcity or environmental degradation affecting the well-being of each party. This cooperation can increase mutual trust, stimulate further cooperation and eventually transform the (conflictive) identities of the groups involved. Environmental problems own some attributes that eminently suit them as platforms for cooperation: They are, for instance, long-term, cross political borders, necessitate the involvement of segments of the civil society and constitute a common threat to several groups (Conca/Carius/Dabelko 2005; Harari/Roseman 2008; Feil/Klein/Westerkamp 2009). Since the authors cited here have, at least to some extent, very different understandings of the topic, I would like to use a rather wide definition: Environmental peacebuilding encompasses all forms of cooperation on environmental issues which simultaneously conceptually aims at or de facto
25

Welsch (2008) even discovered that agrarian resource abundance reduces the risk of conflict onset.

20

achieves the transformation of relations between hostile parties towards peaceful conflict resolution. A comprehensive collection of cases of environmental peacebuilding is provided by the three miscellanies introduced by Ali (2007), Conca (2002) and Feil/Klein/Westerkamp (2009). To sort these cases, Carius (2006) distinguishes between three (not mutually exclusive) types of environmental peacebuilding: a) Preventing ecologically induced conflicts through addressing the environmental problems which constitute the source of these conflicts. b) Using environmental issues to initiate or maintain cooperation during or before the outbreak of a conflict (which is not environmentally induced). c) Strengthening sustainable development, which is in a long-term perspective a prerequisite for peace. The conceptualization of the process of environmental peacebuilding itself remains disputed in the literature, but there is some implicit convergence towards a three-stage model which is explicated here (Lejano 2006; UNEP 2009): a) Cooperation about environmental issues: This form of cooperation is usually quite rational for all parties since they are ecologically interdependent and can profit from improving their common environment. A natural conservation zone, for example, can support the tourist industry of all abutters or function as a demilitarized puffer zone. b) Spill-Over: Once cooperation is established, two kinds of spill-over effects can occur: Either the cooperation further creates stronger desirable interdependence, which makes cooperation

(rationalist/functionalist perspective), or cooperation creates mutual trust and understanding, motivating the parties to deepen or broaden their cooperation (culturalist perspective) (Ali 2007; Carius 2006; Conca/Dabelko 2002; Harari/Roseman 2008). c) Transformation of values, perceptions, identities: In the last (more ideal-typic) stage, environmental peacebuilding and the further 21

cooperation it initiates improve the strategic climate (indicated e.g. by higher levels of trust and mutual understanding between the partys representatives) or even stimulate post-Westphalian relations, which is expressed by various societal linkages and the (partial) development of a common identity between the prior hostile parties (Conca 2002). It should be noted, however, that the process of environmental peacebuilding can also fail at the initial stage or before entering the second respectively third stage, with the potential to frustrate and alienate hostile groups even further26. So far, the literature on environmental peacebuilding focused mainly on interstate relations and carefully designed ecological peace initiatives. But first, if (interstate) environmental peacebuilding improves the living conditions of local populations (Carius 2006; Conca 2002), grievances decline and opportunity costs for engaging in violence rise, therefore making conflict onset more unlikely. Second, there are numerous examples of environmental peacebuilding occurring both spontaneous and/or on an intrastate level (e.g. Bichsel 2009; Dama 2009). A document of the UNDP (2004: 73) reports, for instance:
In Colombia, violently opposed local communities in the Department of Meta have worked together to mitigate the impact of floods as a means not only of protecting livelihoods, but also of building trust and reconciliation.

In a similar fashion, Scheffran/Marmer/Sow (2012) recognize that climate change-induced migration as a form of adaptation may contribute to the overall stability of the outsending region since it enables the transfer of knowledge, technology and remittances. Disaster diplomacy27 is a field of study quite similar to, and for the purpose of this paper conceptualized as a sub-category of environmental peacebuilding research. The central question of this line of research is: Can disaster-related activities induce cooperation amongst enemy countries? (Kelman 2006: 215) So far, the various works on this topic have produced

26

Intensive examinations of the factors supporting or complicating environmental peacebuilding can be found in the works of Carius (2006), Klein/Feil/Westerkamp (2009) and Wolf et al. (2005). 27 An excellent overview is provided by the homepage www.disasterdiplomacy.org.

22

four major findings (e.g. Kelman 2006, 2012; Le Billon/Waizenegger 2007; Renner/Zo 2007): a) Disasters can usually only catalyze or support already existing diplomacy between conflicting parties, but do not create completely new cooperation. The impacts of the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004 in Aceh, for example, were prompted by increased international attention as well as instances of solidarity and even cooperation between combatants and supporters of the rebelling Free Aceh Movement and the Indonesian government, thus supporting the already ongoing peace process (Gaillard/Cav/Kelman 2008). b) Disasters are relevant catalysts for diplomacy and negotiations only in the short term (several weeks till months), while in the long term, other factors (level of trust, conflictive memories etc.) are far more important. c) Disasters can have no relevant impact on or even increase tensions between groups. For instance, the same Tsunami the catalyzed cooperation in Aceh had an escalating effect on the civil war in Sri Lanka because tensions about the distribution of aid erupted and both parties perceived the other side as weakened (so military offensives promised to be successful). d) The peace-stimulating effect of disasters depends on several scope conditions, such as the existence of informal networks (of NGOs, scientists etc.) between both parties (see Kelman 2006, 2012; Renner/Zo 2007 for a more intense discussion). There are some hints in the quantitative literature on civil war that environmental degradation and natural disasters are indeed positively correlated with peace (see table 2). However, extreme caution is necessary because of the general weaknesses of quantitative work (see above) and since there has been no explicit test of the premises of environmental peacebuilding in large-N studies so far.
Buhaug 2010a de Soysa 2002a, b The incidence of major civil wars (1000 battle-related deaths per year) is higher in years following an unusually wet period. Land scarcity shows stronger correlations with the existence of peace than with the existence of civil war.

23

Esty et al. 1999 Hendrix/Glaser 2007b Hendrix/Salehyan 2012a Slettebak 2012 Urdal 2005 a Only b Only Table 2:

Soil degradation that is neither serve nor occurs at a rapid rate lowers the risk of state failure events. A low availability of freshwater per capita reduces the risk of civil war onset slightly. The risk of civil war onset is high in wetter-than-usual years.

The number of climate-related natural disasters and especially of droughts is negatively related to the onset of civil war. Land scarcity tends to reduce the risk of civil war onset. valid for Africa. valid for Sub-Saharan Africa. Large-N study findings supporting the Environmental

Peacebuilding paradigm

So, are we to conclude that climate change is actually a promoter of peace since it increases the necessity of environmental/disasters-related cooperation and thus induces trust and identity-building between former hostile groups? Unsurprisingly, the answer is no. The empirical evidence a couple of case studies (mostly conducted at the international level) and some incidental statistical findings - is far too small to make such general claims, especially vis--vis the findings presented by the Climate Conflict paradigm. In addition, many of the supportive authors themselves argue that environmental peacebuilding is only likely to happen under certain circumstances (which are not fully understood yet, either). The cases of coincidence between resource scarcity and less conflict can probably better be explained by the resource abundance perspective, arguing that harsh environmental conditions simply provide less opportunities and/or incentives for violence (Theisen 2012; Witsenburg/Adano 2009). Finally, environmental projects can also be quite conflictive if they ignore the needs of local inhabitants or are merely a framework for common resource exploitation by elites (Lejano 2006; Mason et al. 2009: 331; Swatuk 2002). In sum, Ken Concas (2002: 4) evaluation of the research field still holds true:
It remains unclear whether and exactly how environmental cooperation can reduce the likelihood, scope, or severity of environmentally induced violence, or of violence and insecurity more generally.

5 Conclusions 24

According to the four paradigms presented above, climate change can increase the risk of conflict onset (Climate Conflict), is mostly unrelated to the onset of conflict (Social Conflict), may lead to less abundant resources and thus reduces the risk for conflict onset (Resource Abundance), or provides opportunities for cooperation that establishes peace (Environmental Peacebuilding). Up to date, there is no convincing evidence to claim an analytical supremacy of one paradigm over the others, although some have for sure gained more attention from the scientific community28. The realization of the forecasts of each paradigm depends on a host of scope conditions and intervening variables which are not fully understood yet. Therefore, this paper concludes that climate change is neither a source of conflict nor a promoter of peace per se. The impacts of climate change will be different in various regions, depending on the different political, economic, cultural, historical and environmental circumstances that exist in the specific area. Therefore, research on the climate-conflict-nexus should maybe climb down a few stairs of the ladder of abstraction, not asking whether climate change will cause more conflict (or peace), but under what conditions the claims of the four paradigms identified above hold true. References Adano, Wario/Dietz, Ton/Witsenburg, Karen/Zaal, Fred (2012): Climate change, violent conflict and local institutions in Kenyas dryland. In: Journal of Peace Research 49 (1), 65-80. Adger, Neil/Lorenzoni, Irene/OBrien, Karen (eds.) (2009): Adapting to Climate Change: Thresholds, Values, Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ali, Saleem (2007): A Natural Connection between Ecology and Peace? In: Ali, Saleem (ed.): Peace Parks: Conservation and Conflict Resolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1-18. Arezki, Rabah/Brckner, Markus (2011): Food Prices and Political Instability. IMF Working Paper 11/62. Washington DC: IMF.
28

There are up to date only a few studies concerning environmental peacebuilding, and much more research about the effects of renewable resource abundance (particularly at local levels) is needed, too.

25

Ausubel, Jesse (1998): Resources and Environment in the 21st century: Seeing Past the Phantoms. In: World Energy Council Journal July 1998, 8-16. Auty, Richard (1993): Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The resource curse thesis. London: Routledge. Resource

Bchler, Gnther (1998): Why Environmental Transformations Causes Violence: A Synthesis. In: Environmental Change and Security Project Report 4, 24-44. Barnett, Joe (2000): Destabilizing the environment-conflict thesis. In: Review of International Studies 26(2), 271-288. Barnett, Jon (2003): Security and climate change, in: Global Environmental Change 13(1), 7-17. Barnett, Jon/Adger, Neil (2007): Climate change, human security, and violent conflict. In: Political Geography 26(6), 639-655. Benjaminsen, Tor (2008): Does Supply-Induced Scarcity Drive Violent Conflicts in the African Sahel? The Case of the Tuareg Rebellion in Northern Mali. In: Journal of Peace Research 45(6), 819-836. Bergholt, Drago/Lujala, Pivi (2012): Climate-related natural disasters, economic growth, and armed civil conflict. In: Journal of Peace Research 49(1), 147-162. Bernauer, Thomas/Kalbhenn, Anna/Koubi, Valley/Ruoff, Gabriele (2010): Climate Change, Economic Growth, and Conflict. Paper presented at the X. Berlin Conference on the Social Dimensions of Climate Change, Berlin. Besley, Timothy/Persson, Torsten (2008): The Incidence of Civil War: Theory and Evidence. NBER Working Paper 14585. Cambridge: NBER. Bhavnani, Rakhi (2006): Natural Disasters Conflicts. http://rakhibhavnani.ca/bhavnanisummary.pdf (30.10.2011). URL:

Bichsel, Christine (2009): Its about More Water. Natural Resource Conflicts in Central Asia. In: Pclard, Didier (ed.): Environmental Peacebuilding: Managing Natural Resource Conflicts in a Changing World. swisspeace Conference Paper 1/2009. Bern: swisspeace, 32-40. Biermann, Frank/Petschel-Held, Gerhard/Rohloff, Christian (1998): Umweltzerstrung als Konfliktursache? Theoretische Konzeptionalisierung und empirische Analyse des Zusammenhangs von >>Umwelt<< und >>Sicherheit<<. In: Zeitschrift fr Internationale Beziehungen 5(2), 273308.

26

Bobrow-Strain, Andrew (2001): Between a Ranch and a Hard Place: Violence, Scarcity, and Meaning in Chiapas, Mexico. In: Peluso, Nancy Lee/Watts, Michael (eds.): Violent Environments. Ithaca/London: Cornwell University Press, 155-185. Bonacker, Thorsten (2009): Konflikttheorien. In: Kneer, Georg/Schroer, Markus (eds.): Handbuch Soziologische Theorien. Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag, 179-197. Brancati, Dawn (2007): Political Aftershocks: The Impact of Earthquakes on Intrastate Conflict. In: Journal of Conflict Resolution 51(5), 715-743. Brauch, Hans Gnther (2008): Securitizing Climate Change. Paper presented on the 50th ISA Annual Convention, New York. Brinkman, Henk-Jan/Hendrix, Cullen (2011): Food Insecurity and Violent Conflict: Causes, Consequences, and Addressing the Challenges. WFP Occasional Paper 24. Rom: WFP. Brown, Oli (2005): The Environment and Our Security: How Our Understanding of the Links has Changend. URL: http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/security_env_peace_iran.pdf (30.10.2011): Brckner, Markus/Ciccone, Antonio (2010): International Commodity Prices, Growth, and the Outbreak of Civil War in Sub-Saharan Africa. In: The Economic Journal 120, 519-534. Brunnschweiler, Christa/Bulte, Erwin (2009): Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Resource Abundance, Dependece, and the Onset of Civil Wars. Oxford Economic Papers 61, 651-674. Buhaug, Halvard (2010): Climate not to blame for African civil wars. In: PNAS 28, 16477-16482. Buhaug, Halvard/Gleditsch, Nils Petter/Theisen, Ole Magnus (2008): Implications of Climate Change for Armed Conflict. Washington DC: World Bank. Buhaug, Halvard/Theisen, Ole Magnus (2012): On Environmental Change and Armed Conflict. In: Scheffran, Jrgen/Brzoska, Michael/Brauch, Hans Gnter/Link, Peter Michael/Schilling, Janpeter (eds.): Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict: Challenges for Societal Stability. Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer, 43-55. Burke, Marshall/Miguel, Edward/Satyanath, Shanker/Dykema, John/Lobell, David (2009): Warming increases the risk of civil war in Africa. In: PNAS 49, 20670-20674.

27

Carius, Alexander (2006): Environmental Peacemaking, Environmental Cooperation as an Instrument of Crisis Prevention and Peacebuilding: Condition for Success and Constraints. Berlin: Adelphi. Carius, Alexander/Tnzler, Dennis/Winterstein, Judith (2007): Weltkarte von Umweltkonflikten - Anstze zur Typologisierung: Externe Expertise fr das WBGU-Hauptgutachten Welt im Wandel: Sicherheitsirisko Klimawandel. Berlin: WBGU. Ciccone, Antonio (2011): Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: A Comment. In: American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 3, 215-227. Collier, Paul/Hoeffler, Anke (2000): Greed and Grievance in Civil War. World Bank Policy Research Paper 2355. New York: World Bank. Collier, Paul/Hoeffler, Anke (2004): Greed and grievance in civil war. In: Oxford Economic Papers 56, 563-595. Collier, Paul/Hoeffler, Anke/Rohner, Dominic (2009): Beyond greed and grievance: Feasibility and civil war. In: Oxford Economic Papers 61, 1-27. Conca, Ken (2002): The Case for Environmental Peacemaking. In: Conca, Ken/Dabelko, Geoffrey (eds.): Environmental Peacemaking. Baltimoore: John Hopkins University Press, 1-22. Conca, Ken/Carius, Alexander/Dabelko, Geoffrey (2005): Building Peace Through Environmental Cooperation. In: Worldwatch Institute (ed.): State of the World 2005: Redefining Global Security. Washington DC: Worldwatch, 144-157. Conca, Ken/Dabelko, Geoffrey (2002): The Problems and Possibilities of Environmental Peacemaking. In: Conca, Ken/Dabelko, Geoffrey (eds.): Environmental Peacemaking. Baltimoore: John Hopkins University Press, 220-233. Cramer, Christopher (2002): Homo Economicus Goes to War: Methodological Individualism, Rational Choice and the Political Economy of War. In: World Development 30(11), 1845-1864. Dama, Aly (2009): Preventing and Managing Natural Resource Conflicts in the Sahel. Experiences from Helvetas Mali. In: Pclard, Didier (ed.): Environmental Peacebuilding: Managing Natural Resource Conflicts in a Changing World. swisspeace Conference Paper 1/2009. Bern: swisspeace, 63-71. de Soysa, Indra (2000): The Resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven By Rapacity or Paucity? In: Berdal, Mats/Malone, Davis (eds.): Greed & Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner, 113-135. 28

de Soysa, Indra (2002a): Ecoviolence: Shrinking Pie or Honey Pot? In: Global Environmental Politics 2(4), 1-34. de Soysa, Indra (2002b): Paradise is a Bazaar? Greed, Creed and Governance in Civil War, 1989-99. In: Journal of Peace Research 39(4), 395416. Deudney, Daniel (1990): The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security. In: Millenium 19(3), 461-476. Diefenbacher, Hans (2008): Zum Konfliktpotential erneuerbarer Energien. In: Heinemann-Grder, Andreas/Hippler, Jochen/Weingardt, Markus/Mutz, Reinhard/Schoch, Bruno (eds.): Friedensgutachten 2008. Mnster: LITVerlag, 231-243. Dixon, Jeffrey (2009): What Causes Civil War? Integrating Quantitative Research Findings. In: International Studies Review 11 (4), S. 707-735 Drury, Alfred Cooper/Olson, Richard (1998): Disasters and Political Unrest: A Quantitative Investigation. In: Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 6(3), 153-161. Esty, Daniel/Goldstone, Jack/Gurr, Ted Robert/Harff, Barbara/ Levy, Marc/Dabelko, Geoffrey/Surko, Pamela/Unge, Allan (1999): State Failure Task Force Report: Phase II Findings. In: Environmental Change and Security Project Report 5, 49-72. Evans, Alex (2010): Resource Scarcity, Climate Change and the Risk of Violent Conflict. World Development Report 2011 Background Paper. Washington DC: World Bank. Fairhead, James (2001): International Dimensions of Conflict over Natural and Environmental Resources. In: Peluso, Nancy Lee/Watts, Michael (eds.): Violent Environments. Ithaca/London: Cornwell University Press, 213-236. Fearon, James (2010): Governance and Civil War Onset. World Development Report 2011 Background Paper. Washington DC: World Bank. Fearon, James/Laitin, David (2003): Ethnicity, Insurgency, Civil War. In: American Political Science Review 97(1), 75-90. Feil, Moira/Klein, Diana/Westerkamp, Meike: Regional cooperation on environment, economy and natural resource management: How can it contribute to peacebuilding? Synthesis report. Brssel: IFP. Floyd, Rita (2008): The Environmental Security Debate and its Significance for Climate Change. In: The International Spectator 43(3), 51-65. Frhlich, Christiane (2010): Der israelisch-palstinensische Wasserkonflikt: Diskursanalytische Betrachtungen. Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag. 29

Gaillard, Jean-Christophe/Clav, Elsa/Kelman, Ilan (2008): Wave of peace? Tsunami disaster policy in Aceh, Indonesia. In: Geoforum 39(1), 511-526. Gleditsch, Nils Petter (1998): Armed Conflict and The Environment: A Critique of the Literature. In: Journal of Peace Research 35(3), 381-400. Gleditsch, Nils Petter/Nords, Ragnhild/Salehyan, Idean (2007): Climate Change and Conflict: The Migration Link. New York: IPA. Goldstone, Jack (2001): Demography, Environment, and Security. In: Diehl, Paul/Gleditsch, Nils Petter (eds.): Environmental Conflict. Boulder: Westview Press, 84-108. Hagmann, Tobias (2009): Fighting in the Desert? Conflict and Resource Management in East African Drylands. In: Pclard, Didier (ed.): Environmental Peacebuilding: Managing Natural Resource Conflicts in a Changing World. swisspeace Conference Paper 1/2009. Bern: swisspeace, 22-27. Harari, Nicole/Roseman, Jesse (2008): Environmental Peacebuilding, Theory and Practice: A Case Study of the Good Water Neighbours Project and In Depth Analysis of the Wadi Fukin/Tzur Hadassah Communities. Amman/Bethlehem/Tel Aviv: FoEME. Hauge, Wench/Ellingsen, Tanya (1998): Beyond Environmental Scarcity: Causal Pathways to Conflict. In: Journal of Peace Research 35(3), 299-317. Hegre, Hvard/Sambanis, Nicholas (2006): Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset. In: Journal of Conflict Resolution 50(4), 508-535. Hendrix Cullen/Glaser, Sarah (2007): Trends and triggers: Climate, climate change and civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. In: Political Geography 26(6), 695-715. Hendrix, Cullen/Salehyan, Idean (2012): Climate change, rainfall, and social conflict in Africa. In: Journal of Peace Research 49(1), 35-50. Homer-Dixon, Thomas (1994): Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases. In: International Security 19(1), 5-40. Homer-Dixon, Thomas (1995): The Ingenuity Gap: Can Poor Countries Adapt to Resource Scarcity? In: Population and Development Review 21(3), 587612. Homer-Dixon, Thomas (2003): Debating Violent Environments. Environmental Change and Security Project Report 9, 89-93. In:

Homer-Dixon, Thomas/Blitt, Jessica (1998): Introduction: A Theoretical Overview. In: Homer-Dixon, Thomas/Blitt, Jessica (eds.): Ecoviolence: Links 30

Among Environment, Population, and Security. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1-17. Hsiang, Solomon/Meng, Kyle/Cane, Mark (2011): Civil associated with the global climate. In: Nature 476, 438-441. conflicts are

Humphreys, Macartan (2005): Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms. In: Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(4), 508-537. IPCC (2007): Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Genf: IPCC. Jensen, Peter Sandholt/Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede (2009): Rain, Growth, and Civil War: The Importance of Location. In: Defense and Peace Economics 20(5), 359-372. Juul, Kristine (2005): Transhumance, Tubes and Telephones: Drought Related Migration as a Process of Innovation. In: Gausset, Quentin/Whyte, Michael/Birch-Thomsen, Torben (eds.): Beyond Territory and Scarcity: Exploring Conflicts over Natural Resource Management. Stockholm: Elanders Gotab, 112-134. Kahl, Colin (2006): States, Scarcity, and Civil Strife in the Developing World. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kelmann, Ilan (2006): Acting on disaster diplomacy. In: Journal of International Affairs 59(2), 215-240. Kelmann, Ilan (2012): Disaster Diplomacy: How Disasters Affect Peace and Conflict. London: Routledge. Koubi, Valley/Bernauer, Thomas/Kalbhenn, Anna/Spilker, Gabriele (2012): Climate variability, economic growth, and civil conflict. In: Journal of Peace Research 49(1), 113-127. Le Billon, Philippe (2001): The political ecology of war: natural resources and armed conflicts. In: Political Geography 20(5), 561-584. Le Billon, Philippe/Waizenegger, Arno (2007): Peace in the Wake of Disaster? Secessionist Conflicts and the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. In: Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 32(3), 411-427. Lejano, Raul (2006): Theorizing Peace Parks: Two Modells of Collective Action. In: Journal of Peace Resarch 43(5), 563-581. Lenton, Timothy/Held, Hermann/Kriegler, Elmar/Hall, Jim/Lucht, Wolfgang/Rahmstorf, Stefan/Schellnhuber, Hans Joachim (2008): Tipping elements in the earths climate system. In: PNAS 105, 1786-1793.

31

Levy Marc/Torkelson Catherine/Vrsmarty, Charles/Douglas, Ellen/Humphreys, Marcartan (2005): Freshwater Availability Anomalies and Outbreak of Internal War: Results from a Global Spatial Time Series Analysis. Paper presented at the International Workshop Human Security and Climate Change, Asker. Lomborg, Bjrn (2001a): Resource Constraints or Abundance? In: Diehl, Paul/Gleditsch, Nils Petter (eds.): Environmental Conflict. Boulder: Westview Press, 125-152. Lomborg, Bjrn (2001b): The Sceptical Environmentalist: Measuring the Real State of the World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lujala, Pivi (2010): The spoils of nature: Armed civil conflict and rebel access to natural resources. In: Journal of Peace Research 47(1), S. 15-28. Malthus, Thomas (1992): An essay on the principle of population, or A view of its past and present effects on human happiness: with an inquiry into our prospects respecting the future removal or mitigation of the evils with its occasions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Martin, Adrian (2005): Environmental Conflict between Refugee and Host Communities. In: Journal of Peace Research 42(3), 329-346. Mason, Simon/Hagmann, Tobias/Bichsel, Christine/Ludi, Eva/Arsano, Yacob (2009): Linkages Between Sub-national and International Water Conflicts: The Eastern Nile Basin. In: Brauch, Hans Gnter/Oswald Springer, rsula/Grin, John/Mesjasz, Czeslaw/Kameri-Mbote, Patricia/Behera, Navnita Chadha/Chourou, Bchir/Krummenacher, Heinz (eds.): Facing Global Environmental Change: Environment, Human, Energy, Food, Health and Water Security Concepts. Berlin: Springer, 325-334. Matthew, Richard (2002): In Defense of Environment and Security Research. In: Environmental Change and Security Project Report 8, 109-118. Matthew, Richard/Gaulin, Ted/McDonald, Bryan (2002): The Elusive Quest: Linking Environmental Change and Conflict. In: Matthew, Richard/Fraser, Leah (ed.): Global Environmental Change and Human Security: Conceptual and Theoretical Issues. Irvine: GECHS. Melander, Erik/Sundberg, Ralph (2011): Climate Change, Environmental Stress, and Violent Conflict - Tests introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset. Paper presented on the 51st ISA Annual Convention, Montreal. Miguel, Edward/Satyanath, Shanker (2011): Re-examining Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict. In: American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 3, 228232.

32

Miguel, Edward/Satyanath, Shanker/Sergenti, Ernest (2004): Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach. Journal of Political Economy 112(41), 725-753. Nathan, Laurie (2005): The Frightful Inadequacy of Most of the Statistics: A Criqitue of Collier and Hoeffler on the Causes of Civil War. Crisis States Discussion Paper 11. London: Crisis States Research Centre. Nel, Philip/Righarts, Marjolein (2008): Natural Disasters and the Risk of Violent Conflict. In: International Studies Quarterly 52(1), 159-185. Nijru, Beth Njeri (2012): Climate Change, Resource Competition, and Conflict Amongst Pastoral Communities in Kenya. In: Scheffran, Jrgen/Brzoska, Michael/Brauch, Hans Gnter/Link, Peter Michael/Schilling, Janpeter (eds.): Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict: Challenges for Societal Stability. Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer, 513-527. Nords, Ragnhild/Gleditsch, Nils Petter (2005): Climate Conflict: Common Sense or Nonsense? Paper presented on the Human Security and Climate Change Workshop, Asker. Nords, Ragnhild/Gleditsch, Nils Petter (2009): IPCC and the climate-conflict nexus. Paper presented on the 50th ISA Annual Convention, New York. Oldeman, L.R. (1992): Global Extend of Soil Degradation. Bi-Annual Report 1991-1992. Nairobi: International Soil Reference and Information Center. Peluso, Nancy Lee/Watts, Michael (2001): Violent Environments. In: Peluso, Nancy Lee/Watts, Michael (eds.): Violent Environments. Ithaca/London: Cornwell University Press, 3-38. Pinstrup-Andersen, Per/Shimokawa, Satoru (2008): Do Poverty and Poor Health and Nutrition Increase the Risk of Armed Conflict Onset? In: Food Policy 33(6), 513-520. Raleigh, Clionadh/Jordan, Lisa/Salehyan, Idean (2008): Assessing the Impact of Climate Change on Migration and Conflict. Washington DC: World Bank. Raleigh, Clionadh/Kniveton, Dominic (2012): Come rain or shine: An analysis of conflict and climate variability in East Africa. In: Journal of Peace Research 49(1), 51-64. Raleigh, Clionadh/Urdal, Henrik (2007): Climate change, environmental degradation and armed conflict. In: Political Geography 26(6), 674-694. Renner, Michael (2002): The Anatomy of Resource Wars. Worldwatch Paper 162. Washington DC: Worldwatch. Renner, Michael/Chafe, Zo (2007): Beyond Disasters, Opportunities for Peace. Washington DC: Worldwatch. 33 Creating

Reno, William (2000): Shadow States and the Political Economy of Civil Wars. In: Berdal, Matts/Malone, David (eds.): Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. Boulder: Lyenne Rienner. Reuveny, Rafael (2007): Climate change-induced migration and violent conflict. In: Political Geography 26(6), 656-673. Reuveny, Rafael (2008): Ecomigration and Violent Conflict: Case Studies and Public Policy Implication. In: Human Ecology 36(1), 1-13. Ross, Michael (2004a): How Does Natural Resource Wealth Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases. In: International Organization 58(1), 3567. Ross, Michael (2004b): What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War? In: Journal of Peace Research 41(3), 337-356. Ross, Michael 2006): A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War. In: Annual Review of Political Science 9, 265-300. Sachs, Jeffrey/Warner, Andrew (1999): The big push, natural resource booms and growth. In: Journal of Development Economics 59(1), 43-76. Salehyan, Idean (2008): From Climate Change to Conflict? No Consensus Yet. In: Journal of Peace Research 45(3), 315-326. Salehyan, Idean/ Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede (2006): Refugees and the Spread of Civil War. In: International Organization 60(2), 335-366. Scheffran, Jrgen/Link, Michael, Schilling, Janpeter (2012): Theories and Models of Climate-Security Interaction: Framework and Application to a Climate Hot Spot in North Africa. In: Scheffran, Jrgen/Brzoska, Michael/Brauch, Hans Gnter/Link, Peter Michael/Schilling, Janpeter (eds.): Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict: Challenges for Societal Stability. Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer, 91-131. Scheffran, Jrgen/Marmer, Elina/Sow, Papa (2012): Migration as a contribution to resilience and innovation in climate adaptation: Social networks and co-development in Northwest Africa. In: Applied Geography 33, 119-127. Schilling, Janpeter/Akuno, Moses/Scheffran, Jrgen/Weinzierl, Thomas (2011): On Arms and Adaptation: Climate Change and Pastoral Conflict in Northern Kenya. CLISEC Working Paper 15. URL: http://clisec.zmaw.de/fileadmin/user_upload/fks/publications/workingpapers/Working_paper_CLISEC-15.pdf (24.01.2012). Schwartz, Daniel/Deligiannis, Tom/Homer-Dixon, Thomas (2000): The Environment and Violent Conflict: A Respond to Gleditschs Critique and 34

Some Suggestions for Future Research. In: Environmental Change and Security Project Report 6, 77-93. Schreiber, Wolfgang (2011): Darfur - der erste Klimakrieg? In: Brzoska, Michael/Kalinowski, Martin/Matthies, Volker/Meyer, Berthold (eds.): Klimawandel und Konflikte: Versicherheitlichung versus prventive Friedenspolitik. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 217-230. Simon, Julian (1981): The Ultimate Resource. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Simon, Julian: Lebensraum (1989): Paradoxically, Population Growth may Eventually End Wars. In: Journal of Conflict Resolution 33(1), 164-180. Simons, Claudia/Zanker, Franzisca (2012): Finding Cases That Fit: Methodological Challenges in Peace Research. Paper presented at the AFKNachwuchstagung 2012, Villingst. Slettebak, Rune (2012): Don't blame the weather! Climate-related natural disasters and civil conflict. In: Journal of Peace Research 49(1), 163-176. Smith, Dan/Vivekanada, Janani (2007): A Climate of Conflict: The links between climate change, peace and war. London: International Alert. Smith, Hazel (2007): Diasporas in international conflict. In: Smith, Hazel (ed.): Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-Makers or Peace-Wreckers? Tokio: United Nations University, 3-16. Sobek, David/Boehmer, Charles (2009): If They Only Had Cake: The Effect of Food Supply on Civil War Onset, 1960-1999. URL: http://digitalcommons.utep.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? article=1001&context=charles_boehmer (04.12.2011). Sorens, Jason (2011): Mineral production, territory, and ethnic rebellion: The role of rebel constituencies. In: Journal of Peace Research 48(5), 571-585. Swatuk, Larry (2002): Environmental Cooperation for Regional Peace and Security in Southern Africa. In: Conca, Ken/Dabelko, Geoffrey (eds.): Environmental Peacemaking. Baltimoore: John Hopkins University Press, 120-160. Tnzler, Dennis/Maas, Achim/Carius, Alexander (2010): Climate change adaption and peace. In: Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change 1(5), 741-750. Theisen, Ole Magnus (2008): Blood and Soil? Resource Scarcity and Internal Armed Conflict Revisited. In: Journal of Peace Research 45(6), 801-818.

35

Theisen, Ole Magnus (2012): Climate clashes? Weather variability, land pressure, and organized violence in Kenya, 1989-2004. In: Journal of Peace Research 49(1), 81-96. Theisen, Ole Magnus/Brandsegg, Kristian Bjarne (2007): The Environment and Non-State Conflicts. Paper presented on the 48th ISA Annual Convention, Chicago. Theisen, Ole Magnus/Holtermann, Helge/Buhaug, Halvard (2010): Drought, political exclusion, and civil war. Paper presented on the 51st ISA Annual Convention, New Orleans. Themnr, Lotta/Wallensteen, Peter (2011): Armed conflict, 1946-2010. In: Journal of Peace Research 48(4), 525-536. Timura, Christopher (2001): Environmental Conflict and the Social Life of Environmental Security Discourse. In: Anthropological Quarterly 74(3), 104113. Turner, Matthew (2004): Political ecology and the moral dimensions of resource conflicts: the case of farmer-herder conflicts in the Sahel. In: Political Geography 23(7), 863-889. UNDP (2004): Reducing Disaster Risk: A Challenge for Development. NewYork: UNDP. UNEP (2009): From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The Role of Natural Resources and the Environment. Nairobi: UNEP. Urdal, Hendrik (2005): People vs. Malthus: Population Pressure, Environmental Degradation, and Armed Conflict Revisited. In: Journal of Peace Research 42(4), 417-434. Urdal, Hendrik (2008): Population, Resources, and Political Violence: A Subnational Study of India, 1956-2002. In: Journal of Conflict Resolution 52(4), 590-617. WBGU (2008): Climate Change as a Security Risk. London: Earthscan. Welsch, Heinz (2008): Resource abundance and internal armed conflict: Types of natural resources and the incidence of new wars. In: Ecological Economics 67(3), 503-513. Witsenburg, Karen/Adano, Wario (2009): Of rains and raids: Violent livestock raiding in Northern Kenya. In: Civil Wars 11(4), 514-538. Wolf, Aaron/Kramer, Annika/Carius, Alexander/Dabelko, Geoffrey (2005): Managing Water Conflict and Cooperation. In: Worldwatch Institute (ed.): State of the World 2005: Redefining Global Security. Washington DC: Worldwatch, 80-95. 36