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International Journal of Philosophical Studies


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Temporal Finitude and Finitude of Possibility: The Double Meaning of Death in Being and Time
Havi Carel
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University of the West of England, Bristol, UK

Available online: 02 Nov 2007

To cite this article: Havi Carel (2007): Temporal Finitude and Finitude of Possibility: The Double Meaning of Death in Being and Time , International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 15:4, 541-556 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672550701602916

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International Journal of Philosophical Studies Vol. 15(4), 541556

Temporal Finitude and Finitude of Possibility: The Double Meaning of Death in Being and Time
Havi Carel
havi.carel@uwe.ac.uk Havi & (print)/1466-4542 0000002007 00 2007 HannahCarel Original Article 0967-2559Francis International Journal 10.1080/09672550701602916 (online) RIPH_A_260143.sgm Taylor and Francis of Philosophical Studies

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Abstract
The confusion surrounding Heideggers account of death in Being and Time has led to severe criticisms, some of which dismiss his analysis as incoherent and obtuse. I argue that Heideggers critics err by equating Heideggers concept of death with our ordinary concept. As I show, Heideggers concept of death is not the same as the ordinary meaning of the term, namely, the event that ends life. But nor does this concept merely denote the finitude of Daseins possibilities or the groundlessness of existence, as William Blattner and Hubert Dreyfus have suggested. Rather, I argue, the concept of death has to be understood both as temporal finitude and as finitude of possibility. I show how this reading addresses the criticisms directed at Heideggers death analysis as well as solving textual problems generated by more limited interpretations of the concept. Keywords: death; Heidegger; finitude; mortality; being-towards-death; temporality

Introduction The concept of death plays a pivotal role in Being and Time; it is a central element of Daseins structure and existence. Heidegger claims that death defines the limit of Daseins existence, thus structuring it ontologically. This limit has an existential significance because of Daseins ability to anticipate death, an ability that structures Daseins existence as a movement towards death, or what Heidegger calls being-towards-death (Sein-zum-Tode). But what does Heidegger mean by being-towards-death? Is it the fact that every living creature is constantly moving towards death? Is it Daseins capacity to understand its finitude? And in what sense is death a possibility, as Heidegger says (Being and Time, Macquarrie and Robinson translation (hereafter BT), p. 307; Sein und Zeit (hereafter SZ), p. 262)? The confusion surrounding Heideggers analysis of death has led to severe criticisms, some of which dismiss his analysis as incoherent or obtuse. In the words of one recent commentator, Heideggers allegedly deep analysis of death does not

International Journal of Philosophical Studies ISSN 09672559 print 14664542 online 2007 Taylor & Francis http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals DOI: 10.1080/09672550701602916

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contain significant philosophical insights. It is a mesmerising play with words, a masterly piece of rhetoric (Philipse, 1998: p. 354). I argue that Heideggers critics err by taking his concept of death to be identical to the ordinary concept. Heidegger is not talking about death in the ordinary sense, i.e. the event that ends life. But nor does his concept of death merely denote the finitude of Daseins possibility, or the groundlessness of existence, as William Blattner and Hubert Dreyfus have suggested. Rather, Heideggers concept of death must be understood as involving both temporal finitude and finitude of possibility. I argue that this interpretation makes sense of the relevant sections of Being and Time. It follows that Heideggers analysis of death is capable of withstanding many of the criticisms levelled against it. I begin by outlining the criticisms of Heideggers concept of death. I then present an alternative interpretation of death as limitation of possibility (the Dreyfus/Blattner interpretation) and show what is still lacking in this view. Finally I show how my suggested dual interpretation overcomes the criticisms, improves on the Dreyfus/Blattner interpretation and provides a coherent account of Heideggers concept of death. Criticisms of Heideggers View In his famous, trenchant critique, Paul Edwards judges the Heideggerian theses on death to be platitudes, clearly false and flagrant contradiction (1979: pp. 5960). He concludes that Heideggers death analysis is a grotesque pseudo-inquiry (1979: p. 60; see also 1976). Philipse (1998) has recently taken up Edwards critique and reformulated his claims. In this section, I outline the Edwards/Philipse critique of Heidegger and criticize its underlying assumptions. The first criticism is that if death is simply the absence of existence, then Heideggers definition of death as the possibility of impossibility becomes meaningless and obscure. It is meaningless because Heidegger defines possibility as a possible way of existing, so non-existence is not a possibility at all. It is obscure because death is not a possibility of anything, but is simply the lack of all possibility; therefore, death cannot meaningfully be defined as the possibility of impossibility, Edwards argues (1975; cf. Mulhall, 2005: p. 304). Secondly, Edwards takes Heideggers claim that death is non-relational to mean that all human beings die alone, a statement he takes to be false (1979: p. 5). Similarly, Philipse takes Heideggers description of death as Daseins ownmost possibility to mean that death is an essentially lonely affair. He then argues that Heideggers description is at best trivial and at worst false. It is obviously false that everyone dies alone whether we mean physically, emotionally or temporally alone. If we redefine dying on ones own as simply dying, then Heideggers description is true but trivial. 542

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Philipse concludes: it is impossible to interpret Heideggers statement as both true and informative (1998: p. 355). A third criticism is directed against Heideggers statement that death is non-substitutable, that no one can take Daseins dying away from it (BT, p. 284; SZ, p. 240). Philipse describes this claim as an empirical platitude because death, like any other bodily affair, cannot be removed or taken away from that particular body (1998: p. 358). Edwards says of the same thesis that it is true, but trite (1979: p. 13). It is true that someone could die instead of me, but also that no one can deliver me from my death. Heideggers statement does not assert any fact over and above the fact that I am going to die: it simply reasserts this fact and hence it is not a discovery or an insight or a contribution to our understanding of anything (1979: p. 14). A fourth and final problem identified by both critics concerns Heideggers pronouncements on the possibility of an afterlife.1 Philipse points to a contradiction between 49 and 53 of Being and Time. In 49 Heidegger says that his analysis does not rule out ontic notions of an afterlife, whereas in 53 he makes unqualified statements about the terminal nature of death. Philipse argues that if Heidegger wants to leave open the question of an afterlife, he cannot claim that death is the end of all possibility, as this claim rules out the ontic possibility of an afterlife. If Heidegger thinks that death is indeed the final point, he cannot claim that his analysis is compatible with any notion of afterlife (1998: pp. 3701). According to Edwards, this contradiction shows that much of the time the distinction between ontological and ontic questions is exceedingly nebulous (1979: p. 41). These criticisms may seem devastating for Heideggers analysis of death. Edwards and Philipse seem to have demonstrated that Heideggers analysis is inconsistent, plagued by linguistic trickery and contains nothing of philosophical value. However, both critiques stem from a failure to make two key distinctions. The first is the distinction between death and demise. The second is between the ordinary meaning of the term possibility (Mglichkeit) and the specific sense Heidegger gives it in Being and Time. This specific sense of possibility is crucial for understanding what Heidegger means when he defines death as a possibility. As we will see in the final part of the paper, once these two fundamental points are clarified, Edwards and Philipses seemingly powerful criticisms prove to be groundless. But first it is necessary to explicate the death/demise distinction and present Dreyfus and Blattners interpretation of the concept of death. Death is Not Demise The main problem with Edwards account, which is uncritically adopted by Philipse, is his understanding of death as the event that ends life. Heidegger makes it clear that he does not use death (Tod) to denote the event that ends 543

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Daseins life; the term reserved for that is demise (ableben). All organisms perish (verenden), but Dasein perishes in a particular way, indicated by the special term demise. It demises rather than perishes because of Daseins unique way of being, namely, existence, which Heidegger takes to be distinct from non-human animals way of being. Because Dasein exists, and is engaged in an interpretation of its existence, it is also aware of its demise. Heidegger captures this by distinguishing perishing from demise. But demise is not death, and certainly not dying (sterben). Demise is distinct from perishing, or other animals way of ending, because it is an intermediate phenomenon, not entirely fact and not entirely interpretation. This is based on Heideggers general distinction between factuality (Tatschlichkeit) and facticity (Faktizitt). For Heidegger factuality is the factum brutum of something present-at-hand (e.g. that I am 5 feet 4 inches tall), while facticity is the same fact viewed through the prism of Daseins being (that I interpret myself as short) (BT, pp. 82, 174; SZ, pp. 56, 135). Perishing is factual, for it is a biological fact that organic life is finite. Demise is the factical interpretation of that fact, which is unique to Dasein as self-interpreting (ibid. and see also Dreyfus, 1991: p. 309). Another common misinterpretation of demise is seeing it as the inauthentic end of ones life, as opposed to authentic dying. This interpretation is inconsistent and forces those who understand demise in this way to admit that there is certain instability in Heideggers use of the term demise (Mulhall, 2005: p. 302). But Heidegger does not say that demise is inauthentic death. Rather, he says that when Dasein relates inauthentically to its death, it turns its attention to demise instead (Blattner, 1994: p. 55). Dasein transforms anxiety in the face of death into fear of a future event, its demise. Demise is taken as a substitute for death, that can be dealt with by tranquilization, whereas anxiety cannot be similarly assuaged. So death and demise are clearly not the same. In this erroneous interpretation death is reduced to an ontic event because it is not understood as an existentiale, a way to be (Leman-Stefanovic, 1987: p. 62). By saying that Dasein is towards its end (Sein zum Ende), Heidegger picks out another feature of Daseins existence, which gives it its finite structure. This feature is the focus of Dreyfus and Blattners interpretations of Heideggers concept of death, to which I now turn. Armed with this new interpretation we will be able to return to the Edwards/Philipse critiques and provide a definitive reply to them. The Dreyfus/Blattner Interpretation On Dreyfus early view, what death illustrates in a perspicuous but misleading way is not the fact that Dasein is temporally finite, but that it is limited in another way: Dasein can never make any possibilities its own (1991: p. 310). Possibilities are always there for anyone, part of the public 544

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world, and therefore have no intrinsic meaning for Dasein. The only ownmost possibility is nullity, the groundlessness of Daseins being. So death in Heideggers sense, claims Dreyfus, is not the existentiell or ontic possibility of demise, but the existential ontological possibility of not having any possibilities. Not only is this existential nullity not exposed in demise, it is also covered over by thinking about death as an event that has not yet happened to me. As Dreyfus writes, The cover up consists in assuming that the anxiety of death is a response to the end of being alive or to the possibility of that end rather than to the true condition of Dasein (1991: p. 311). This interpretation of death as the existential condition of lack of all possibilities is further supported by Heideggers identification of beingtowards-death with anxiety (BT, p. 310; SZ, p. 266). Anxiety is the affective state allowing Dasein to uncover its groundlessness, its inability to project itself into a for-the-sake-of-which. In anxiety Dasein is cut off from its possibilities, which are usually taken up unreflectively and provide a mostly transparent, shared framework of everyday life. Once these possibilities are removed, the background that provides Daseins world and actions with intelligibility disappears as well, leaving Dasein unable to project itself into any particular possibility. Thus Dasein is, but is entirely unable to proceed in any intelligible pursuit. All action becomes impossible. It is the state of being cut off from the world and therefore incapable of action that being-towards-death and anxiety share. Heidegger picks this state out in his distinction between genuine (echt) and non-genuine (unecht) attitudes. This distinction is not analogous to the authenticity/inauthenticity distinction, and merits attention. As Heidegger points out in his discussion of understanding, understanding can be either authentic or inauthentic, but it is further qualified as genuine or not genuine. Genuine understanding must express being-in-the-world as a whole, whereas non-genuine understanding is partial or reductive, and loses the holistic character of Dasein as being-in-the-world. The moment of anxiety or authentic being-towards-death qualifies as authentic but nongenuine. These states are authentic because they disclose the world as a whole, but they are non-genuine because they cut Dasein off from its world and leave it unable to act (Dreyfus, 1991: p. 194). The result of anxiety is Dasein equipped with authentic understanding but unable to enact it. In order to achieve authentic and genuine understanding Dasein must be resolute, which allows it to act with a sight which is related primarily and on the whole to existence, which Heidegger calls transparency or perspicuity (Durchsichtigkeit) (BT, p. 186; SZ, p. 146). Death and anxiety are both conditions in which action is ruled out, in which Dasein is unable to be. A similar interpretation is proposed by Blattner (1994). He bases his rejection of the idea that death in Being and Time is the ending of ones life 545

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on a careful analysis of Heideggers concept of possibility. This, in turn, justifies the seemingly paradoxical view that death is a way to be in which Dasein is unable to be (1994: p. 49). On Blattners view, death is a condition in which Daseins being is at issue, but in which Dasein is anxiously unable to understand itself by projecting itself into some possible way to be (p. 50). This is so because Heidegger defines death as a possibility (of impossibility); this possibility is not a theoretical or logical concept, but an existentiale. Possibility does not mean a free-floating ability-to-be. Rather, possibility always involves an affective or motivational understanding, which requires Dasein already to take up an attitude towards a certain possibility, already to be caught up in concrete possibilities, rather than abstractly contemplate them (BT, p. 183; SZ, p. 144). On Blattners reading, in anxiety all possibilities become equally irrelevant for Dasein, and although it still is, it is unable to be in the thick sense of throwing oneself into a definite possibility. Blattner concludes that in anxiety Dasein is, but is unable to be (it is unable to press into possibilities), and this matches Heideggers characterization of death as the possibility of impossibility (1994: p. 62). Dreyfus and Blattner both understand anxiety as an extreme case of breakdown of Daseins world (Dreyfus, 2005: pp. xixxx).2 Both point to an experience of complete helplessness, of finitude, as the ontological breakdown Heidegger calls death. If we look at Dreyfus most recent formulation of what Heidegger means by death, we find the view that death is the structural condition that an individuals identity can always be lost. Dying is the resigned, heroic acceptance of this condition (2005: p. xxx). This formulation is close to Blattners idea of death as being unable to be anything; or in Dreyfus terms, losing ones identity. Dreyfus and Blattner have offered what I take to be the most coherent interpretation of the difficult passages on death found in Being and Time. The view that death is the inability to be, in the thick sense of being as pressing into possibility, and that this constant threat of loss of identity delineates Daseins existence, I refer to as the Dreyfus/Blattner view.3 Crucially the Dreyfus/Blattner view states that death is neither demise nor authentic demise, contrary to what Edwards and Philipse believe. When Heidegger discusses death, being-towards-death and anxiety, he is not referring to physical death or to our attitude towards physical death. In this respect the Dreyfus/Blattner view is clearly correct. This position shows that the Edwards/Philipse criticism is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the text. The Incompleteness of the Dreyfus/Blattner Interpretation But the Dreyfus/Blattner interpretation is incomplete. I add to it a notion of temporal finitude, which I take to be an essential aspect or a prototypical 546

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state of being unable to be. I believe that the Dreyfus/Blattner interpretation needs this additional dimension, which provides the otherwise missing link between death and temporal finitude. Death should be understood as involving two types of finitude: finitude in possibility and temporal finitude. The Dreyfus/Blattner interpretation solves local problems in specific sections of Being and Time, at the expense of the overall meaningfulness of the concept of death. Many central ideas of Being and Time only make sense in relation to Dasein as temporally finite. The discussion of temporality and the phenomenology of our attitudes towards the death of others, the characterization of death as certain and the analysis of other types of ending are all central elements of Being and Time. These issues cease to make sense if we understand death only through the Dreyfus/Blattner interpretation, namely, as the condition of being unable to be that is not linked to Daseins mortality. The Dreyfus/Blattner interpretation solves the problems and contradictions that seem to obfuscate Heideggers discussion of death, but at the same time their analysis is incomplete because it lacks the essential notion of temporal finitude that is so crucial to Division II of Being and Time. I therefore propose to maintain the Dreyfus/Blattner interpretation of death, but add to it a second and related analysis of being-towards-the-end, or dying, which I designate as temporal finitude. This essential element will enable the emphasis on temporality, historicality and finitude to be maintained and linked to Dasein via the notion of death. In what follows I use the term death as containing both temporal finitude and finitude of possibility (the Dreyfus/Blattner sense).4 It is crucial to my interpretation that the two types of finitude are internally related. They are both essential components of the transition to authenticity. The discussion of being-towards-the-end brings out Daseins mortality as a structuring principle and central concern (see Leman-Stefanovic, 1987: p. 6). Being-towards-the-end defines Dasein as finite temporality, as a constant movement towards its annihilation. Beyond all possible projections into the future lies the ultimate anticipation of shutting down Daseins temporal trajectory. Consequently, Daseins end is something that is only ever impending, but can never be made actual, that is, be experienced by Dasein. Moreover, whereas other things are possible only at certain times, Daseins end is possible at every moment. Our end is always and only a possibility (Mulhall, 2005: p. 303). In the same way that death was not a possibility in the ordinary sense of the word, but a possibility of being unable to take up any possibility, Daseins end is also not a possibility in the ordinary sense. Daseins end is not a possibility waiting to be realized, but an ontological condition underlying Daseins temporal structure. Both are conditions for the meaningfulness of all other possibilities and both are limit concepts that define the boundaries of meaningful experience. Daseins finitude is a fundamental 547

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although ungraspable aspect of its existence that accompanies every moment of life, making it mortal and finite. We can now see how finitude of possibility and temporal finitude are conceptually related. Both define the end or limitation of life, and as limit concepts they assign significance to life by delineating its confines. Beingtowards-the-end expresses temporal finitude; death (in the Dreyfus/Blattner sense) is the finitude of possibilities, the helplessness and limitation on what is achievable within life. The concepts are also related through the concept of anxiety. Anxiety is the state of being dead (in the Dreyfus/Blattner sense); it is also the affective state that discloses Dasein to itself as temporally finite, as being-towards-the-end. The question that emerges with respect to these two types of finitude is not how one ought to die, but how one ought to live knowing that one will die, taking into account both mortality and finitude. Our relation to our death is not something that is realized when we die, but something we either realize or fail to realize in our life (Mulhall, 2005: p. 303). Confronting life as Daseins ownmost possibility requires Dasein to acknowledge that its being is always an issue for it, that its life is something for which it is responsible, that it is its own to live (or to disown) (ibid., p. 306). Because death could come at any moment, the radical contingency of each individual life becomes apparent, and to acknowledge this is to acknowledge finitude, the fact that our existence has conditions or limits, that it is neither self-originating nor selfgrounding nor self-sufficient, that it is contingent from top to bottom (ibid.; see also Hatab, 1995: p. 411). Addressing the Criticisms With this explication in mind, let us now assess the Edwards/Philipse critique. As I said, two key distinctions are lacking from Edwards and Philipses interpretations. The first is the distinction between death and demise, which was explained above. The second is the specific sense Heidegger gives the term possibility (he defines death as the possibility of impossibility), which was briefly discussed earlier and to which we now return. Edwards maintains that Heidegger uses the term possibility in a special, technical sense throughout Being and Time, except when talking about death, and that this is, naturally, confusing (1975: p. 549). Edwards understands the technical sense of possibility as an action or strategy or a mode of life (p. 550), so the notion of death as possibility, death as an action or mode of living, seems puzzling, indeed a contradiction. This contradiction is also the starting point of Blattners analysis, but, as explained above, Blattner resolves the apparent paradox by reinterpreting death as the situation of anxiety, while Edwards searches for an alternative meaning of the term possibility when applied to death. 548

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As Edwards correctly points out, Heidegger explicitly rules out three possible misunderstandings of the term being-towards-death as beingtowards-a-possibility. Death is not a possibility that can be actualized. Death does not call for brooding (grbeln). Nor should we expect death, because expecting (erwarten) is essentially a waiting for actualization. The correct attitude is one of forerunning or anticipation (vorlaufen) in which death is understood as the possibility of impossibility, as utter nullity. For Edwards, who insists on possibility being understood as not actual, the possibility of impossibility is simply impossibility per se (1975: p. 558). Edwards rejects the existential meaning of possibility when he points out that Heidegger juxtaposes possibility with actuality. He calls this an incomplete disjunction because on his view death (and non-existence before birth) is total absence, and therefore neither a possibility nor an actuality at all (pp. 5601). But Heidegger is clear in his formulation: death is a possibility. As Blattner shows, death is not non-existence but existence without the ability to press into any specific possibility. This explains Heideggers seemingly baffling definition of death as the possibility of impossibility and why Edwards critique is unjustified. In Heideggers sense, death is not complete absence (this is the consequence of demise), but a peculiar situation in which Dasein is unable to take up any possibility and is therefore lacking the ability to act. Possibility has the fixed meaning it has throughout Being and Time, but death does not mean being dead, but being unable to be in the sense proposed by Blattner and Dreyfus. This addresses Edwards dismissal of the formulation as nonsensical. Philipse takes a different tack. He chooses to redefine possibility as knowing that one will die at the end (1998: pp. 362f.). This, Philipse feels, amounts to merely stating familiar facts, couched in pretentious and fantastically misleading language (p. 362, grammar modified). But death does not mean the knowledge of our mortality, but the situation of anxiety, of being unable to be anything, and this is indeed a possibility. So Philipses criticism depends on his mis-defining death. As shown by Blattner, death can coherently be seen as possibility if we distinguish death and demise, something both Philipse and Edwards fail to do. Additionally, as Blattner argues, dying is not Heideggers term for Daseins understanding of its demise, but of its death. Heidegger defines dying as that way of Being in which Dasein is towards its death (BT, p. 291; SZ, p. 247, my italics). Therefore Heidegger is not making the trivial point Philipse attributes to him. Philipse further argues that death is not available for phenomenological scrutiny and that in order to address this problem Heidegger redefines dying as knowing that one will die. But dying is not an epistemic condition of Dasein (i.e. the knowledge that it will die), but its ontological structure (the fact that it is temporally finite). The significant feature of dying is that 549

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Dasein is in fact progressing towards its end. Dasein is temporally finite. As Heidegger says, Dasein does not have an end at which it just stops, it exists finitely (BT, p. 378; SZ, p. 329). It is also unique in being the only kind of entity that is capable of interpreting itself as finite. The second claim is entirely reliant on the first, so Philipses epistemic interpretation of dying obscures the more fundamental ontological claim, as well as blurring the distinction between factuality and facticity discussed earlier. Nor does Heidegger claim that demise is significant for a phenomenological investigation of death, as he explicitly states and as many commentators point out (Leman-Stefanovic (1987); Dastur (1996); Mulhall (2005)). Demise is phenomenologically opaque: we cannot experience our demise or that of others (BT, p. 291; SZ, p. 247 and BT, p. 282; SZ, pp. 2389). Death, on the other hand, is a phenomenon of life and as such is phenomenologically available (BT, p. 290; SZ, p. 246; and see also Heidegger, 2000: p. 139; 1983: p. 100). The second criticism was that Heideggers definition of death as ownmost is trivial. Philipse defines ownmost as most on our own, and death as the terminal phase of ones life, the phase of dying, and then argues that Heideggers claim is at best trivial, if we redefine dying on ones own as just dying. At worst it is false because it is never true that everyone dies alone in any sense of the word (1998: p. 355). Philipse ignores Heideggers explicit claim that death is not the terminal phase of ones life, which Heidegger calls demise. Furthermore, Philipses interpretation of ownmost (eigenst) as most on our own is misleading and would not make sense in many of the other places in Being and Time in which Heidegger uses this term, most clearly when he talks about death as Daseins ownmost possibility (BT, p. 294; SZ, p. 250). Most our own is more appropriate, because Heidegger is not trying to pick out the ontic possibility of being alone in a certain situation, but the ontological transition that takes place when Dasein is wrenched away from its world, individuated by its death. The non-relational character of death is not expressed in a sense of loneliness at the time of demise, but in the loss of the network of significance that makes up Daseins world, a loss that is experienced in anxiety. Philipse misunderstands the characterization of death as individuating as making Dasein feel lonely, whereas for Heidegger individuation removes Dasein from its world, curtails its links to intelligibility and absorption. This decontextualizing is an ontological, not an affective, state. Philipse then turns to a second interpretation of the statement that death is our ownmost possibility, understanding death as the moment of our highest fulfilment, or an excellent possibility of Dasein (p. 356, italics in the original). The translation of ausgezeichnet as excellent is unhelpful and misleading. Edwards makes a similar point by suggesting splendid or distinguished while criticizing the Maquarrie and Robinson translation of 550

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ausgezeichnet as distinctive as weak and inaccurate (1975: p. 551, and cf. Stambaugh, who uses eminent). Attributing this death-fetishizing view to Heidegger, who explicitly resists a teleological view of Daseins death as fulfilment, ripening or exhausting of possibilities, is even less convincing. As Heidegger states, for the most part Dasein ends unfulfilled (BT, p. 288; SZ, p. 244). Neither death nor demise is seen as a fulfilment or culmination of Daseins existence. Philipse also runs together death and demise. In the above passage Heidegger does not mention demise, but speaks of being-towards-the-end (Ende). A little later he stipulates: Let the term dying stand for that way of Being in which Dasein is towards its death. Dasein can demise only as long as it is dying (BT, p. 291; SZ, p. 247). Demise is enabled by, and not identical with, dying. The third criticism is directed against Heideggers statement that death is non-substitutable (BT, p. 284; SZ, p. 240). Philipse thinks that this claim is an empirical platitude (p. 358). But this statement is neither empirical nor self-evident. Heidegger is not making the trivial claim that every Dasein must eventually physically cease to be alive. Rather, he is spelling out the ontological structure of Dasein as finite in the sense of not having possibilities of its own, or being the null basis of a nullity (BT, p. 331; SZ, p. 285). Thus Philipses claim that non-substitutability characterizes not only death but also all bodily functions is irrelevant, because death is not a bodily event. Heidegger is treating death as an ontological condition. As such it is non-substitutable, but it also has additional features, such as being an ownmost possibility that is not to be outstripped, which are absent in other bodily functions. Non-substitutability is a necessary but insufficient condition of death. Although it is true that no one can sneeze my sneezes, sneezing fails to match up to the two other elements in Heideggers tripartite existential characterization of death (Mulhall, 2005: pp. 3034). We can understand ownmost in either an analytic or an existential sense. The analytic sense is simply the fact that when I have a sensation or perception they are mine; they belong to me by definition. The existential sense of ownmost is different. It is the condition of owning up to or taking responsibility for something. It is the existential significance that is required for a correct understanding of the term ownmost. A further argument can be made even under Philipses mistaken interpretation of demise as non-substitutable. Philipse is correct in saying that all bodily functions are non-substitutable. It is also true, as Philipse and many other commentators before him point out, that this fact is suppressed in Being and Time because it lacks a discussion of embodiment (Philipse, 1998: p. 360; Levinas, 1969, pp. 125ff.; Chanter, 2001: pp. 78ff.; Carman, 1994: p. 215; Taminiaux, 1997: p. 45). But this does not render insignificant the fact that demise is non-substitutable. Carman argues that Philipse plays down the importance of death by assimilating it to what Philipse takes to be trivial 551

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mental and bodily analogues. But this attempt fails, Carman says, because there is nothing trivial about the mineness of bodily and mental phenomena (2003: p. 277n.).5 Indeed, demise and birth are the most significant of bodily events: the founding and closing off of a life. Their significance is not fully captured in the trivial analytic sense of mineness suggested by Philipse, but only in the existential sense. Heidegger is not trying to separate demise from other first-person processes; rather, he wants to contrast the non-substitutable character of death to social roles, which are substitutable.6 Philipses next argument is therefore directed at this view of social roles as entirely public, or substitutable. Philipse argues contra Heidegger and Dreyfus that the substitutability of social roles does not hold. If behaviour is not only determined by rules and roles but also by idiosyncratic features genetic make-up, personal history, etc. then the view that no possibility of existing can be exclusively my own is unsupported (1998: p. 361). This is not only another way of attacking Heideggers singling out of death, but also a critique of Heideggers alleged claim that existence is always inauthentic, except when we relate ourselves properly to our own death. Philipse attributes to Heidegger a view he does not hold. Heidegger does not claim that existence is always inauthentic except when Dasein relates properly to its death, but that authentic existence depends on its understanding itself as ultimately groundless (BT, pp. 330ff.; SZ, pp. 284ff.). It is not the case that the only situation in which authenticity is possible is one of relating to death. Rather, once Dasein has faced its finitude and has grasped its groundlessness, it can be authentic in any situation. Dreyfus emphasizes this in his discussion of genuine authenticity, in which Dasein is absorbed in its world. Additionally Philipse equates authenticity with idiosyncrasy, or in other words, he juxtaposes Daseins social dimension with authenticity. This view contradicts the later sections of Division II, where the possibility of an authentic community is presented (BT, SZ, 74). It is also not what Dreyfus holds in his interpretation of das Man as the neutral background of social practices. Philipses emphasis on the self as the kernel or source of authenticity only makes sense within an interpretation that takes the self to be such a source. Dreyfus (1995) squarely rejects this interpretation.7 It also distorts Heideggers view, which emphasizes Daseins inherently relational character. Finally, what is at stake in being or not being ones own is not behaviour, as Philipse thinks, but the significance of the behaviour, its uptake as social role. Roles and behaviours are very different, so the idiosyncratic element Philipse brings up as counter-example to Dreyfus claim that no possibility can be entirely my own pertains to behaviour but not to role and is therefore irrelevant. A particular way of existing can by no means be reduced to behaviour alone, because behaviour without interpretation, without a rich network of meaning and intelligibility, is hermeneutically meaningless. 552

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Dreyfus point is to show that behaviour is only intelligible within such a network. So although Dreyfus opposes the mentalistic language which certain interpretations impose on Heidegger, he is certainly not endorsing a bald behaviourist view.8,9 The Edwards/Philipse fourth and final objection has to do with the tension between the possibility of an afterlife and the finality of death. They claim that if Heidegger wants to leave open the question of an afterlife, he cannot claim that ontologically death is the end of all possibility, since this claim rules out the ontic possibility of an afterlife. If he wants to claim that it is indeed the final point, he cannot claim that his analysis is compatible with any notion of afterlife. This argument over-determines Heideggers position. What is final, in Heideggers view, is being-in-the-world, which indeed ends with Daseins demise. The possibility of another kind of existence, i.e. non-embodied or extra-worldly, does not have to be denied or indeed settled at all. Daseins existence as being-in-the-world comes to an end with its demise; all notions of an afterlife agree on this point. An afterlife, if it exists, does not take place in the world by an embodied entity (see also Polt, 1999: p. 87). Therefore in order to argue that Dasein ceases to exist, Heidegger does not need to deny the possibility of an afterlife, and can indeed claim that this is a moot point. The Edwards/Philipse critique ignores important dimensions of Heideggers analysis. Neither discusses Heideggers notion of temporality as ecstatic unity, or places the death analysis within the broader context of Being and Time. Similarly, Heideggers emphasis on Daseins understanding of itself as finite is conceived as trivial at best. Both fail to distinguish between death and demise and consequently read the discussion of death as a discussion of demise. Both fail to appreciate Heideggers unique use of the term possibility and therefore attribute to him a contradictory position. For these reasons they overlook Heideggers significant formulation of death as both temporal finitude and the finitude of possibilities. Conclusion Heideggers concept of death has been widely misunderstood and misinterpreted. These misinterpretations are the basis of criticisms of the concept which are ultimately unjustified. I have proposed a new reading of Heideggers concept of death that overcomes the criticisms, suggesting that the concept refers to two kinds of finitude: temporal finitude and finitude of possibility. I have shown why the Dreyfus/Blattner interpretation is insufficient on its own and how the combination of the two kinds of finitude provides a comprehensive and robust notion of death that is no longer susceptible to the Edwards/Philipse criticisms. University of the West of England, Bristol, UK 553

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Notes
1 Philipse and Edwards make a few additional minor criticisms, but these will not be addressed here for reasons of space and because they are inessential and derived from the main criticisms discussed here. For the full critical account see Philipse (1998) and Edwards (1975, 1979). Dreyfus stresses the difference between his account and Blattners and criticizes the latters understanding of being-towards-death as being ready for an anxiety attack (2005: pp. xx, xxx; 2000: p. 333). As Dreyfus notes, since an anxiety attack is sudden and unmotivated it is hard to see how one should live in order to be ready for it. Blattner does not even try to explain what a life of readiness for an anxiety attack would be like (2005: p. xix). He goes on to say that it is not clear that Heidegger holds that Dasein can be ready for this kind of attack, and moreover, that anticipatory or forerunning (vorlaufen) resoluteness is already constantly anxious (ibid.). In other words, if authentic Dasein is constantly anxious, it need not be ready for an anxiety attack. Dreyfus further suggests that an anxiety attack is the nearest experience an inauthentic Dasein can have to death. I deliberately bracket their disagreement about anxiety and forerunning resoluteness as the state of preparedness for such an attack, because I do not think that this specific issue is the central one; nor is it the strongest aspect of Blattners view. Polt suggests the term mortality (1999: p. 86). The problem with this term is that it does not designate the end of Daseins life, but the condition of being finite. Carman adds: indeed failing to take seriously the first/third-person asymmetries constituting [bodily and mental phenomena] is sure to yield profound philosophical confusion (2003: p. 277n.). Dreyfus thinks that mineness does not apply to private feelings or sensations, but to Daseins public stand on itself (1991: p. 26). This leaves statements about death as Daseins ownmost unintelligible. If Daseins mineness is the public stand it takes on itself (ibid.), what does the mineness of death, the most nonpublic condition of Dasein, mean? Dreyfus also criticizes John Haugelands (1982) broad interpretation of Dasein, pointing out that for Heidegger Dasein designates exclusively entities like each of us, that is, individual persons (ibid., p. 14). This makes the question even more pertinent, as one clear mark of individual persons is their being a finite organic unit. For a critique of Haugelands view see Stewart (1987). See also Dreyfus (1995) exchange with Carman (1994) and Olafson (1994a, 1994b) in Inquiry, and Ewings (1995) response to Dreyfus. For two social behaviourist views see Brandom (1983) and Haugeland (1982). For a critique of this approach see Stewart (1987), especially p. 96n. Many complex questions arise, though, from this objection. What is das Man? What is the nature of social roles? What is the relationship between authenticity and sociality? These questions stem mainly from the overlap of two existentiales that are meant to account for the social aspect of Dasein: das Man and Mitsein. Heidegger does not work out the relationship between the two in Being and Time, and the interpretation of this relationship remains a difficult problem to this day. Moreover, he does not mention the term das Man in other work from the same period. It is notably absent from The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, although naturally it appears in the earlier History of the Concept of Time, a lecture series given in 1925 that is an earlier version of Being and Time. Nor does he return to the notion in later writing, a fact that

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4 5 6

7 8 9

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some interpreters took to signify a rejection of this concept (Olafson, 1994a, p. 55). I discuss this issue elsewhere (Carel, 2006).

References
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(1996 [1927]) Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh, Albany: State University of New York Press. (2000) Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt, London and New Haven: Yale University Press. Leman-Stefanovic, I. (1987) The Event of Death: A Phenomenological Inquiry, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff. Levinas, E. (1969) Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press. Mulhall, S. (2005) Human Mortality: Heidegger on How to Portray the Impossible Possibility of Dasein, in H. Dreyfus and M. Wrathall, The Blackwell Companion to Heidegger, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 297310. Olafson, F. A. (1994a) Heidegger la Wittgenstein or Coping with Professor Dreyfus, Inquiry 37: 4564. (1994b) Individualism, Subjectivity, and Presence: A Response to Taylor Carman, Inquiry 37: 3317. Philipse, H. (1998) Heideggers Philosophy of Being, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Polt, R. (1999) Heidegger: An Introduction, New York and London: Routledge. Stewart, R. M. (1987) Intentionality and the Semantics of Dasein, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48(1): 93106. Taminiaux, J. (1997) The Early Levinass Reply to Heideggers Fundamental Ontology, Philosophy and Social Criticism 23(6): 2949.

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