The Utility of Air Power: the Royal Air Forces Contribution to the Defence and Security of the United

Kingdom
INTRODUCTION The term air power encapsulates the way in which the behaviour of individuals, groups and states, or the course of events, can be influenced as a result of the military use of air and space. The inherent characteristics of air power mean that it is readily employable at any level or scale, from tactical actions, such as the immediate, precision firepower support provided to army patrols in Afghanistan by ground-attack aircraft, through to major air operations such as the Berlin airlift, which shaped the entire strategic calculus in Europe for a generation. These examples also demonstrate that while air power is exceptionally good at delivering precise and proportionate military force, its flexibility and speed of response mean that in some circumstances, it can be equally effective in making political points and providing policy options without recourse to weaponry or the physical destruction of targets: it can provide what Joseph Nye has described as smart power, rather than just hard power.1 Additionally, while air power is usually most effective when employed in conjunction with land and naval forces as part of a joint campaign, it has the unique ability to act alone and with discretion over the horizon, delivering force or providing influence where the potentially costly commitment of forces on the ground is either undesirable or impractical: a recent example is the air policing of no-fly zones over Iraq, which was conducted for the eleven years between 1992 and 2003 without a single casualty. British air power is primarily delivered by the Royal Air Force (RAF), complemented by the small, organic elements within the Royal Navy and the British Army2 which provide niche capabilities to their own services. The RAF was originally formed in 1918 after an independently commissioned report acknowledged that the provision of air power through separate Army and
1 2

Joseph Nye, http://csis.org/program/smart-power-initiative, last accessed 4 January 2010. The Fleet Air Arm and the Army Air Corps respectively.

Navy elements had been inefficient and wasteful;3 instead, a single, dedicated organisation was necessary to coordinate and deliver air power properly and effectively. As a result of this far-sighted decision, the RAF enjoys a proud heritage and ethos as the worlds longest established independent air force, with an unparalleled record of experience and success in every sort of military operation around the globe, ranging from the Battle of Britain in 1940, which ensured the survival of the nation and demonstrably altered the course of history, through to the twenty years of continuous air operations over Iraq which finally ended last year. This chapter will explain the four generic capability areas that air power contributes to the defence and security of the United Kingdom before outlining the utility of air power in actual, operational practice, both at home and overseas, and including current activities in Afghanistan. It will conclude by considering some of the challenges and issues currently facing British air and space power, and consider its future beyond Afghanistan. AIR POWER CAPABILITIES The RAF currently comprises some 39,400 uniformed men and women operating 1,100 aircraft from a dozen main operating bases within the United Kingdom and at a number of airfields overseas. 4 It provides four essential capabilities in support of the United Kingdoms defence mission. These are: Control of the Air; Air Mobility and Lift; Intelligence and Situational Awareness; and Attack.5

3 4

The Smuts Report, published on 17 August 1917.. Including Gibraltar, Ascension Island, Cyprus, the Falkland Islands and operational deployment bases in the Middle East and Afghanistan. 5 Full details of these roles are contained in AP3000 Fourth Edition: British Air and Space Doctrine, (London: Air Stafff, MOD), 2009, or available online at http://www.airpowerstudies.co.uk/ap3000.htm

Control of the Air Securing control of the air is the RAFs paramount duty: most importantly, in defence of the United Kingdom itself, but also on expeditionary operations, where control of the air guarantees the freedom of manoeuvre and action of friendly air, land and naval forces, while severely curtailing the activities and options open to adversaries. Control of the air is a fundamental prerequisite for any putative military endeavour in the twenty-first century, enabling all other activities; without sufficient control of the air, it would be impossible to deploy a fighting force in vulnerable transport ships and aircraft to a crisis zone in the first place, let alone move it freely around a theatre of operations after arrival. The fundamental importance of control of the air is recognised and understood by the enemies of the West, who contest it with every means at their disposal: this may result in air battles between opposing fighter (combat air) aircraft, for example in the early stages of the Gulf War in 1991, or between aircraft and enemy ground-based missiles and anti-aircraft guns. Because of its investment in first-class training and capable equipment, the RAF has been successful in ensuring that British forces have not suffered any casualties from enemy air attack since the Falklands War in 1982, where the images of Sir Galahad burning at Bluff Cove provide the starkest possible illustration of the consequences of a loss of air control.6 However, since the Falklands War and despite perceptions of easy victories - the RAF has had to fight hard for control of the air in all of its recent campaigns: in the Gulf War in 1991, against Iraqi Air Force aircraft and a dense network of missile and gun defences; against the effective Serbian air defence system during the Kosovo War in 1999, when despite NATOs superiority in the air, some 230 missiles were fired at alliance aircraft; and again, against the Iraqi air defence system as recently as 2003, when the Baghdad missile engagement zone remained as an active threat to coalition aircraft until the final fall of Saddam Husseins regime. These examples all demonstrate that control of the air can
6

On 8 June 1982 at Bluff Cove, Argentinean Skyhawk fighters attacked the Royal Fleet Auxiliaries Sir Tristram and Sir Galahad, killing 56 personnel and wounding another 150.

never be assumed or taken for granted and that without it, the provision of the broad range of other air power capabilities that are essential to the success of military operations is likely to be compromised. This is why Eurofighter Typhoon is necessary to provide a competitive, multi-role capability to insure against future contingencies, not least in deterring potential adversaries in a global environment where highly capable, state-ofthe-art, fifth-generation Russian and Chinese fighter aircraft, and equally sophisticated surface-to-air missiles, are freely available and widely exported, often to unstable or problematic states.7 Furthermore, in all of these cases, some of the niche capabilities that have been developed primarily for use in current counter-insurgency operations would have been of limited use; for example, in the Balkans, many of the uninhabited air vehicles (UAVs) that are proving to be so useful in Afghanistan were lost to either poor weather or enemy action. 8 This means that a balanced investment in a capability-mix of air platforms manned and unmanned aircraft, combat air (or fast jet) aircraft and helicopters and transports - is essential, if the United Kingdom is to retain the ability to conduct future military interventions beyond the level of the most limited stabilisation operations or counter-insurgencies in benign air environments. Even when adversaries lack a conventional air force, they will still contest control of the air; an RAF Hercules transport aircraft was downed by ground-fire in Iraq in 2005, and RAF helicopters in Afghanistan are often engaged by insurgents with small-arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades. Additionally, aircraft have been attacked on the ground by rockets and mortar fire, and this is why the specialist force protection provided by the RAF Regiment, familiar with air operations and flight profiles, is necessary to secure operating bases and landing areas. The advent and wide availability of small, man-portable anti-aircraft missiles often provided to insurgent proxies by state-sponsors such as Iran and Syria - exacerbates this threat and
7 8

For example, Venezuala has recently ordered Sukhoi Su-35 fighters. For example, as many as 70 of the Armys fleet of 198 Phoenix UAVs were lost to hostile action, poor weather or technical failure during operations in the Balkans and Middle East before their withdrawal from service last year.

demands continuing investment in suitable defensive aids and countermeasures, particularly for slower (and inevitably more vulnerable) transport aircraft and helicopters. The acquisition of Stinger man-portable missiles by the Taliban during the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan in the early 1980s marked a sudden step-change in capability which the Soviet Air Force could not counter; this meant that it was no longer able to support land forces effectively, and was one of the most significant factors informing the Kremlins final political decision to abandon the campaign and withdraw. This provides a further, salutary lesson about the need to invest in control of the air, and the consequences of failing to do so. Air Lift Air power invariably provides the only way for the United Kingdom to intervene in a crisis situation quickly enough to make an immediate difference, either to restore order, to provide security, or to deliver critical aid supplies. Strategic transports, such as the RAFs C-17s and Tristars, currently provide the United Kingdom with global reach, and these will be supplemented by the European A400M aircraft in the future.9 Once in a war zone or at the site of a natural disaster, roads may be non-existent or unusable, either because they have been washed away, or are mined or booby-trapped with Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs); consequently, tactical air lift often provides the only practical means of movement in difficult terrain. The RAFs Hercules aircraft and its support helicopter fleet (Chinook and Puma helicopters) are the lynch-pins of tactical mobility, moving people, soldiers, equipment, supplies and humanitarian aid around theatres of operation, and permitting air power to act as a force multiplier, by enabling relatively small forces to maintain a presence over wide areas. The closely integrated air-land operations conducted by RAF aircraft
9

In 2007, the RAF moved 211 185 passengers equivalent to the entire population of a town the size of Derby - to and from Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, a staggering 45 million kg of freight was transported this is the equivalent of moving Transport for Londons entire fleet of 8,000 double-decker buses to a hostile war zone.

and small units of Special Forces throughout the broad reaches of the Iraqi Western Desert in 2003 provide a classic example of the way in which air power can be used in conjunction with light and mobile land forces to dominate huge tracts of territory economically and effectively. Intelligence and Situational Awareness In crisis situations and conflicts, high quality and current (real-time) information is required to support effective decision-making at every level, in both the political and military arenas. Air and space surveillance may be used to develop an understanding of events in a given area without necessarily having to risk a presence on the ground, providing situational awareness in countless ways, from satellite pictures of suspected nuclear facilities or the mapping of poppy fields right down to the high-resolution video provided by weapon-aiming sensors on RAF combat air aircraft such as Typhoon, Tornado and Harrier. These can now be data-linked directly to soldiers on the ground through lap-top terminals, so commanders have access to a literally birds-eye view of the action as it unfolds. Communication signals from mobile phones and radios may be tracked by specialist signals intelligence aircraft, such as RAF Nimrods, and suspicious activity monitored in the same sort of way and with the same sort of picture quality - as the cameras used by police helicopters to produce the type of imagery familiar on news reports. In irregular warfare, insurgents will seek to merge with and fight amongst the civilian population, so understanding the situation and confirming the legitimacy of targets is arguably even more important than in conventional force-on-force wars, where armies fight other armies that are relatively easy to find and identify. Consequently, demand for enhanced situational awareness has continued to increase through the recent campaign in Iraq and into current operations in Afghanistan, and the thirst for the quality of information that can only be provided by air and space assets is only likely to increase in the future. The RAF has responded by balancing its force structure in favour of surveillance capabilities; these now include the Reaper unmanned aircraft, which can loiter for up to twelve hours over areas of 6

interest to provide persistent, high-quality, imagery, and Sentinel, an Airborne Stand Off Radar (ASTOR) system mounted in a business jet, providing a wide-area search capability that can be used to cue other assets, with narrower field-of-view sensors, on to points of interest: the analogy is searchlight to spotlight. The reach and broad coverage provided by equipment such as ASTOR is particularly useful in permitting air power to dominate the ungoverned spaces that would otherwise provide a safe haven for insurgents without a massive uplift in land forces and the attendant financial and human cost that this would inevitably entail. Attack The firepower available with current technology means that aircraft, including unmanned systems and attack helicopters, now have the capability to destroy identified targets rapidly and with precision. At one end of the spectrum, this is achieved when supporting troops actually in contact with the enemy at close-quarters, as is often the norm in Afghanistan, requiring very careful cooperation to avoid friendly-fire incidents. At the other end of the scale, air forces can act entirely independently of armies or naval forces to strike directly at the enemys leadership or will to make war, or at key facilities, a good example being the Israeli Air Forces successful destruction of a Syrian nuclear cache in 2007.10 The accuracy of the precision weaponry available today means that one bomb can be used to destroy a target where fifteen would have had to be used twenty years ago, and these weapons can now be used whatever the weather, day or night. Increasingly, armies are relying on air forces to provide the firepower to replace their own heavy equipment (such as artillery and tanks) so that they are lighter and more easily deployable, and can be configured more appropriately for peace-keeping and stabilization operations.11 In the campaign that overthrew Saddam Husseins regime in
10

Operation Orchard employed 8 IAF Eagle combat air aircraft to strike the Syrian facility on 6 September 2007. 11 General Sir Richard Dannatt, speech transcript the Land Environment Moving Towards 2018, RUSI Land Warfare Conference, 12 June 2008.

2003, over 75% of the 20,000 individual actions fought with Iraqi forces were brought to a conclusion by air power, and this was critical in minimizing casualties to British and American troops. The dependence of land forces on combat air for the provision of heavy firepower and the concomitant reorganisation of the Army to take advantage of it must be acknowledged and understood in discussions about future force structures, or the United Kingdoms capability to contribute to operations beyond limited counterinsurgencies will be compromised. The use of force is always a last resort, especially in wars where the consent of the local populace is an important factor, so the employment of precision attack capabilities also aims to influence behaviours causing an effect - by targeting an enemys will, rather than necessarily attacking his physical capabilities through the destruction of target sets. Because of the psychological dominance provided by air power in both Iraq and Afghanistan, fast and noisy fly-pasts have often been effective in dispersing crowds and keeping insurgents heads down without recourse to weaponry, and the mere presence of aircraft or helicopters often provides a powerful deterrent against attack. While no military operations can be conducted without the risk of civilian casualties, developments in weaponry (including the provision of small diameter bombs and non-fragmentary warheads) mean that if force is required, it can be used proportionately, while the very high standard of training of RAF pilots, the useful detachment provided by the airmens perspective over the battlefield, strict adherence to the Laws of Armed Conflict and a stringent targeting process all mean that it may be applied with much more discrimination than other forms of indirect fire, such as artillery, mortar or rocket fire.12

12

As of January 2010, no RAF pilots have been implicated in allegations of civilian casualties caused by air strikes in Afghanistan.

AIR POWER IN PRACTICE The four areas of air power capabilities provided by the RAF are used in direct support of the defence and security of the United Kingdom on both a day-to-day basis, and to meet unforeseen crises and contingencies. Air Power and the Security of the United Kingdom At home, the RAFs primary task is to guarantee control of the airspace above the United Kingdom, to ensure that the country is safe from aerial attack. At present, the most significant threat is a repetition of a 9/11-style event, with a hijacked airliner being used as a suicide bomb. Consequently, a force of Typhoon fighters is held at quick reaction alert all year round, day and night, with a remit to take-off or scramble within five minutes to intercept any aircraft that enters the United Kingdoms airspace without proper authorisation. This is a demanding requirement and, as demonstrated by the attack on the World Trade Centre, the consequences of a successful terrorist incident would be devastating: there is no margin for error. In 2007 alone, ninety-eight alerts were called and fighters scrambled forty-three times to check airliners that had failed to make proper contact with air traffic control and, on some occasions, to escort probing Russian military patrol aircraft away from the United Kingdoms airspace. As well as routine air defence cover, high profile events require particular attention, and the RAFs Typhoon fighter force, air defence radar system and specialist Sentry airborne warning radar aircraft will all be critical in ensuring the security of the 2012 Olympics. RAF search and rescue helicopters are also scrambled on a daily basis, not only on conventional rescue missions, but also to assist civilian agencies in the wake of events such as the widespread flooding in Cumbria and the Lake District in November 2009 and the harsh winter weather in January this year. Over 1,200 people in the United Kingdom and the Falkland Islands more than 100 every month are assisted or rescued by RAF helicopters every year. Maritime patrol aircraft are tasked with longer-range rescue operations, and also have an important role in monitoring the United 9

Kingdoms territorial waters, providing protection for the nations fisheries and other offshore interests. In addition to these critical, but routine duties, the RAF has to be ready to react to any unforeseen events or crises, so forces are held at readiness to support national, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and European Union (EU) response forces. This means that properly equipped aircraft and fully trained personnel are identified and ear-marked to be available to meet contingencies within a specified time-scale. The forces need to be balanced to cater for any eventuality, imposing an additional burden on personnel when they are recovering between operational tours of duty. About 3,000 of the RAFs people are deployed on operations at any one time, usually for periods of four to six months. Currently, some 20% of the RAFs trained uniformed strength are committed to operations in Afghanistan every year, and on average every member of the RAF will serve in a combat zone every two to three years, although the tempo of operations for key specialists and trades such as helicopter, fast jet and transport aircrew, paramedics and the RAF Regiment may be markedly higher. While manning operations, the RAF also has to sustain itself by training over 2,000 recruits every year, effectively replacing about 5% of its front-line strength annually. Air Power and Expeditionary Operations During the Cold War, the RAF was largely based in the United Kingdom and Germany and was largely configured to fight from static bases within the bounds of continental Europe. Since the fall of the Berlin wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the RAF has transformed itself into an expeditionary air force, able to deliver air power wherever it is required to support the United Kingdoms national interests around the globe. This has involved optimising equipment to make it mobile and air-transportable, changing the organisational structure into Expeditionary Air Wings that can be deployed as balanced packages of air power capability, equivalent to army brigades or naval task forces and, most importantly, training and equipping airmen and airwomen to operate in austere locations, where enemy attacks 10

may be expected at any time and from any direction, and where personnel of all ranks, branches and trades are able to defend themselves. In the post-Cold War era, British air power has played a key part across the entire spectrum of conflict, from conventional, high-intensity warfighting to low-intensity irregular warfare and humanitarian interventions. Significant operations have included the First Gulf War in 1991, Bosnia in 1995, Kosovo in 1999, Sierra Leone in 2000, the Iraq War in 2003, the Counter-insurgency in Iraq from 2003-2009 and the ongoing operation 13 in Afghanistan. Throughout this period, the RAF was also constantly deployed on enduring active operations, including Northern Ireland Operation Banner - and the air policing of the no-fly zones that were used to contain Saddam Husseins regime between the two wars with Iraq in 1991 and 2003. During this eleven year period, British and American aircraft flew over 300,000 missions without a single allied casualty, successfully neutering Iraq as a regional threat and constraining its ability to attack its own people. In contrast, since its direct intervention in Iraq in 2003, the United States alone has suffered over 4000 military deaths and the operation has cost in excess of $1 trillion or $12.5 billion per month; the joint cost of the no-fly zones was less than $1 billion per annum, or a gross 30 million to the United Kingdom.14 This indicates that in some circumstances, air power may provide viable alternative foreign policy solutions to the commitment of major ground forces. While there is a perception that air power is expensive, its costs are clearly marginal when set against the human and financial consequences of prolonged, high-intensity land fighting. Air power, therefore, has attributes that make it particularly relevant to expeditionary operations. It can respond very quickly, and with global reach to a crisis, providing either a deterrent presence or hard-edged capability. For example, RAF Tornado aircraft were deployed to Saudi Arabia, without prior notice, within seventy-two hours of the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, bounding the conflict by helping to deter further Iraqi aggression and providing
13 14

Operation Herrick. Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes, Three Trillion Dollar War, New York: Allen Lane, 2008.

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reassurance to allies within the region. Similarly, only air power can respond quickly enough to a natural disaster to provide humanitarian relief that makes a real difference in the immediate aftermath of a crisis. Following the earthquake in Pakistan in 2005, RAF C-17 and Hercules transport aircraft flew in food aid and vital supplies immediately and three RAF Chinook helicopters were operating in the region within a week. Although the requirement for access, basing and over-flight rights are often cited as a weakness of landbased aircraft, in reality, the employment of British air power in the post-Cold War era has been consistent with legal and moral justifications understood by states neighbouring the zone of crisis, and gaining host nation support has rarely proved to be a problem. Aircraft carriers can be a useful alternative, but the cost is very high, and the demanding nature of carrier operations means that the range and payload of carrier aircraft must be markedly reduced in comparison to their land-based contemporaries. Consequently, while carrier aviation may be useful in an emergency, in practice, aircraft would be deployed to operating bases on land as soon as practicable, to maximise capabilities and minimise costs. Air power can also be used to scale a response up or down in easily controllable steps at very short notice; in the no-fly zones, aircraft were usually employed to monitor and prevent Iraqi military activity, but when the Iraqis failed to comply with United Nations Security Council resolutions, air power was used to encourage cooperation through carefully targeted attacks such as Operation Desert Fox in 1998, when RAF Tornado combat air aircraft were used to bomb selected Iraqi command and control facilities. While air power is usually most effective when employed in conjunction with land or naval forces as part of a joint force, it does offer decision-makers the opportunity to influence behaviours or events without having to risk the commitment of major ground forces, with the political implications that this always entails. During Operation Deliberate Force in 1995, a United Nations mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, commanded by General Rupert Smith, employed an intense air campaign, in conjunction with a small ground force, to break the political stalemate. Within one month, the warring parties had 12

agreed to meet at the Dayton peace conference to hammer out a political solution to the five-year conflict; a classic example of the utility of force as a lever of national power. Air power, in the form of precision strike, close air support to otherwise vulnerable troops, and extensive reconnaissance, was used with great discrimination, within a well-analysed political context, to achieve precise political effects. Specifically, it was used to target the assets of the power-brokers, not the wider population, and was skilfully interleaved with the diplomatic process in a carrot-and-stick approach to coerce the opposing factions into negotiation. In this case, the real value of air power was its ability to deploy rapidly and act decisively, and then to remain poised to be re-committed to bolster diplomacy as and when required. The absence of a military footprint on the disputed territory itself removed a political liability and mitigated an area of risk, as there was widespread political concern within European capitals about the exposure of their forces on the ground in a hostile environment. This was why the Kosovo campaign four years later (Operation Allied Force) was also prosecuted as an air operation, with the RAF contributing Tornado and Harrier attack to the NATO plan which aimed to coerce Serbia into withdrawing its forces. Although the 78-day operation was more protracted than originally expected, it was eventually successful in forcing President Milosevic to negotiate and withdraw without the loss of a single Alliance casualty, and without the necessity for large-scale land fighting. Finally, while unforeseen or contingent operations inevitably act as a focus for attention, air power routinely contributes to the United Kingdoms wider security on a global basis. Afghanistan is overwhelmingly the current main effort for the RAF, but over 700 personnel are currently deployed elsewhere in the world, supporting United Nations missions in Africa, European Union operations in the Balkans and maintaining a significant presence in the Falkland Islands, where a small, but balanced force of fighter and transport aircraft and helicopters maintain the Islands sovereignty and security from Mount Pleasant Airfield. Another good example of the use of air power to support the broader security of the nation has been the success of 13

RAF Sentry radar aircraft in tracking drug-running light aircraft and small boats in the Caribbean, enabling significant seizures to be made and materially reducing the flow of illegal substances into the United Kingdom. Afghanistan Although the nature of current operations in Afghanistan is very specific to the theatre itself and the type of counter-insurgency warfare being conducted there, the scale and range of the RAFs contribution graphically demonstrates the utility of air power in the round. The significance of the air effort is not always well understood in what is sometimes erroneously perceived to be a solely army-led operation. In reality, the campaign is a closely integrated air-land operation, where army and air force are equal partners: the Army contributes the manpower and presence on the ground, while the RAF delivers effect, particularly situational awareness, mobility and when necessary firepower. The importance of air power is not always recognised, because by its very nature, it tends to be discrete, remote and often invisible. Consequently, while a lay observer can respond intuitively to media images of an army patrol moving through an Afghan village, the total reliance of those soldiers on all aspects of air power is not always as obvious: the patrol will be depending on situational awareness provided by unseen and unheard surveillance aircraft; the assurance of firepower support from on-call fighter aircraft and unmanned systems over the horizon; the mobility and resupply capability provided by tactical air transport; and will be bolstered by the knowledge that if necessary, medical evacuation helicopters are on hand to ensure that battle casualties will be delivered to first-class hospital care within the critical golden hour. Control of the air means that air power represents NATOs own asymmetric advantage over the Taliban, and that all of its capabilities can be fully exploited as a force multiplier. In the first place, strategic and tactical air lift continues to be vital. The air-bridge to Afghanistan is the United Kingdoms link with the operational theatre and is maintained continuously, despite other global commitments. For example, a Tristar tanker-transport aircraft was 14

recently taken from supporting the Afghan air effort to go to Ascension Island to refuel four Typhoons on deployment to the Falklands, to provide an air defence and deterrent capability in the Islands. The Tristar was back on the strategic air-bridge the next day, illustrating air power's unique flexibility to quickly deploy and redeploy, wherever required, on a global scale. Within theatre, tactical airlift shrinks the country, making security manageable with a smaller ground force and providing a tangible means of supporting Afghan government agencies, reinforcing the sense of national governance and mitigating insurgent activity. For example, RAF tactical air transport is used to ferry wheat seed into Helmand to support the harvest and has also been pivotal in building a more credible Afghan National Police force. Recruits are now trained in specialist training centres, remote from sometimes unhelpful tribal influences and mirroring the successful system used in the Afghan army. However, this depends on regular air transport to move the recruits around the country, requiring careful risk mitigation, as the volunteers - some of whom may well be ex-Taliban must be flown straight off the street. The Kandahar Prison breakout in June 2008 provides an excellent illustration of the broader utility of air power. Eleven hundred Afghan prisoners, including 400 Taliban hard-liners, escaped from the Afghan-run prison and into Kandahar City. Febrile news reporting predicted an impending political disaster for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), speculating that a resurgent Taliban would now be able to retake Kandahar. Within forty-eight hours this had become a non-story. The ISAF commander, General McKiernan, was determined that the problem must be handled primarily by Afghan security forces, but the most capable Afghan forces were based in Kabul, three days away by road. Consequently, RAF transport aircraft were diverted from routine tasking in flight to land at Kabul and move the Afghan army battalion to Kandahar. The task was complete by the same evening, permitting the Afghan army to plan to deploy into Kandahar city at first light.

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Overnight, all RAF missions were re-tasked to stabilize the situation and support Canadian ground forces in the city pending the arrival of the Afghan Army in the morning: Harrier combat air aircraft provided continuous over-watch, using their advanced, infra-red targeting pods to provide intelligence, sometimes conducting shows of force to deter insurgent action and keeping potential trouble-makers off the streets; RAF Reaper unmanned aircraft extended their mission-time to seventeen hours, using their state-ofthe-art surveillance systems to provide ground commanders with excellent intelligence; and the Hercules transports used in the airlift operation were reconfigured to drop leaflets to reassure the civilian population, an unexpected task executed within four hours of the receipt of the request. Notably, all of this was achieved without the use of lethal force, complying with the commanders direction that coalition forces should hold the ring as discretely as possible until the Afghan security forces were in place. At dawn, the Afghan army cleared the escapees from the populated areas of Kandahar quickly and efficiently and the potential crisis, with its attendant political liability, evaporated. Not only had the incident been resolved, but it had been turned to the Coalitions advantage by showcasing the developing prowess of the Afghan army. THE FUTURE OF BRITISH AIR POWER New Domains of Conflict All current trend forecasts emphasize the increasingly fragmented and disparate nature of conflicts and crises. In the coming years, the United Kingdom will need to deal with a multiplicity of sub-state threats and actors, but may also have to confront traditional states with similar high-technology capabilities to ourselves, either directly, or through proxies in ungoverned spaces.15 Adversaries in this future battlespace both state and non-state will therefore be highly agile, and are likely to have access to sophisticated capabilities. In this sort of environment, time is a weapon, and air power is best placed to exploit the fourth dimension by taking advantage of fleeting
15

HLOC Framework, page iv, para 6.

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opportunities as they arise. Future success will depend on effective decision making, based on accurate and timely information, underpinned by the agility delivered through flexible and adaptive capabilities. In particular, space and cyber-space will become increasingly important in military operations, and the RAFs core values as an institution make it particularly well-suited to lead the defence sector in the exploitation of these domains. The provision of accurate and timely information has always been critical to the effectiveness of all military activities, and the importance of the information domain is increasing as societies become more networked. The exponential growth in the availability of information means that the RAF must understand how to deliver and protect national interests - which may depend as much on perceptions as on hard realities - in the cyber domain. This means that a cadre of people must be developed who understand and can manage the modern networked environment, and are comfortable with the concept of treating information as a capability in itself. information management and network operation. Here, the organizational culture of the RAF is a real strength: it is steeped in a history of Fighter Commands air defence system during the Battle of Britain was a classic example, where information from radar and observers was collected, processed, fused and disseminated to provide battle-winning decision-superiority to the RAF commanders. This tradition of networking, driven by the particular requirement of air operations for timely information, has continued to the present day, forming the basis, for example, of the strategy that is being developed to create the best possible intelligence picture to counter the proliferation of improvised explosive devices in Afghanistan.16 One of the real current challenges for defence is in sharing information effectively, so that military capabilities may be integrated and synchronized at speed with the other services, government departments and coalition members that will be encountered on operations within the comprehensive approach that is now necessary to resolve complex crises. Additionally, as network capabilities are enhanced, so the susceptibility to computer network
16

Air Cmd Strategy for NEC in the Air Environment dated Dec 08.

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attack and computer network exploitation increases; 17 indeed, in a world where information is pre-eminent, it could also quickly become a critical vulnerability. Set against a backdrop of a dynamic and proliferating threat, 18 an effective computer network defence capability is therefore essential. This means identifying and addressing risks as early as possible in the capability development process, while developing tactics, techniques and procedures to provide resilience where networks are contested or compromised. Space is similarly vital to both our military operations and wider society. All nine sectors of the United Kingdoms critical national infrastructure depend to a greater or lesser extent on space and networked operations, 19 and there is a growing awareness across government of what a bad space day might look like, in terms of both military effectiveness and the economic viability of the United Kingdom as a functioning state. Up to 90% of all military capabilities depend on space, from surveillance to navigation and targeting and, most fundamentally, the accurate position and timing functions which are vital to nearly all activities.20 Inevitably, the United Kingdom will have to continue to rely on alliances and partnerships for access to space, leveraged through influence and specialist knowledge. The RAF has already forged important relationships with the United States and has developed the British Military Space Operations Coordination Centre to build a credible level of expertise to understand and exploit space power most effectively. However, prudence dictates that the United Kingdom casts the net as widely as possible to guarantee its access to space and also remains open to the technological developments that may offer the means to acquire an affordable indigenous space capability - nanotechnologies enabling small satellites are one example. What is certain is that despite treaty constraints, space will become an increasingly contested domain, and a concept of operations must be developed to deal with this. The United States Operationally Responsive

Operations to produce intelligence from CIS. (GCHQ Paper - The UK Framework for Computer Network Operations dated 16 Mar 06) 18 CDS Directive 06/08 - the number of detected deliberate attacks on MoD networks has increased over a 2 yr. period. 19 See:www.cpni.gov.uk. 20 FASOC 2009, p.1-2.
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Space Initiative provides one potential model for how flexible space capabilities may be delivered in short timescales in such an environment.21 Affordable Air Power The future strategic environment is uncertain, with diverse and unpredictable threats to security including religious fundamentalism, global warming, large-scale migration, competition for resources, poverty, inequality and poor governance. Within this problematic context, the global economic down-turn and the size of the United Kingdoms budget deficit mean that that the challenge for air power is to provide relevant capabilities that are matched directly to the nations security needs - but are also affordable. It is clear that a balanced force structure is necessary, so that the RAF can continue to deliver across all four of the air power roles and in the space and cyber domains too. Accomplishing this will not be easy, because of the variety, unpredictability and uncertainty of the threats likely to be faced in the future. This is where agility and adaptability in equipment and personnel is essential. Radical partnering arrangements with industry have been adopted to support the RAFs aircraft fleets, and these are on track to yield some 2 billion worth of savings over the next five years. Similarly, the Future Strategic Tanker and Transport Aircraft programme is another groundbreaking, world-leading initiative, which aims to deliver affordable capability through a joint military-civilian enterprise employing civilian personnel as RAF reservists and selling-back surplus capacity to the commercial sector. These innovations demonstrate real determination to wring the most out of every defence pound; implementation has required a high level of commitment to overcome the sometimes painful adjustments required in traditional working practices and processes. One of the RAFs enduring institutional strengths is its readiness and capacity to embrace emerging technologies and, in the relatively near-term, technical solutions are in prospect that may offer ways to square the circle
21

Ibid, C-1.

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between capability and cost. For example, the development of simulated and synthetic training technologies will enhance the quality of the learning experience while driving down the cost of flying training, not least its environmental impact. More fundamentally, the emergence of directed energy weapons may mark a revolutionary step-change in air power capabilities, potentially offering a low collateral alternative to the employment of more traditional and very expensive capabilities, such as low observable or stealthy platforms, as a means of, for example, securing control of the air; it may well be possible to neutralise a sophisticated air defence system by using directed-energy weapons in conjunction with cyber-attack without the necessity to physically destroy targets on the ground. Consideration of a balanced force is not, therefore, just a question of numbers of platforms (the proportion of fast jets to helicopters or transport aircraft) but rather the overall balance of capabilities. The key areas at stake include sensibly balancing the mix of manned and unmanned systems; the issue of capability versus mass; and the correct emphasis between high technology systems, with universal utility, against lower technology and less capable systems that are likely to be capable of niche employment only. None of these issues are likely to be either-or choices. For example, unmanned aircraft will contribute significantly to future capability, as they offer a very attractive and cost-effective option for dull, dirty and dangerous tasks, at minimal (or no) risk to their operators, all with impressive persistence. However, within the bounds of near-term technology, manned aircraft retain significant advantages over unmanned aircraft and their remote operators in terms of speed, payload, flexibility, discrimination and situational awareness. Additionally, the legal and ethical implications of flying unmanned aircraft in civilian-controlled airspace, and the role and status of their operators, are important concerns that are yet to be fully resolved. Adaptability can help to resolve force-balance dilemmas and genuine multi-role capabilities particularly in terms of manned and unmanned combat air aircraft mitigate some of the problems. For example, although the Tornado was originally planned as a Cold War bomber, over the last two 20

decades it has been used continuously in everything from intense, conventional high-technology combat - on four occasions, in the Gulf and in the Balkans - through low-intensity air policing over Iraq, to its current role as a counter-insurgency platform in Afghanistan. Although the original unit cost of the Tornado was 20 million, its intrinsic capability has provided the development potential that has permitted it to be adapted so successfully to different circumstances, and few other modern weapon systems can match its ubiquity. The Tornados remarkable track record demonstrates the importance of the Typhoon and Lightning (the Joint Strike Fighter) as the future of the RAFs combat air capability, as their multi-role adaptability will underpin three of the four air power roles: control of the air, intelligence and situational awareness, and attack. However, there are limits to the effects that multi-role adaptability can deliver, and there is a danger in investing exclusively in a diminishing number of highly capable platforms; this is where the capability versus mass argument comes into play, and new technologies and unmanned systems offer options to balance the capability-mix. Air power and Society The RAF is rooted in the community particularly through its 2,500 reservists, who routinely serve on active duty, and its 60,000-strong air cadet force, which is one of the countrys premier youth organisations. The RAF also employs 8,000 civilian staff directly, and has a huge impact as a wealth generator and employer on the economies of the often remote and rural areas where its major operating bases tend to be located. As a technology based fighting service, it is intimately linked to industry and the commercial aerospace sector. Aerospace is one of the United Kingdoms most significant export industries, the largest aerospace industry in Europe and second only to the USA in the world. In 2008, the sector generated a turnover of 21 billion and new orders of 35 billion.22 The RAFs reputation as a world class and highly respected air force underpins this success. The Al Yamamah Project, initiated in 1985 with Saudi Arabia, is a case in point. The largest contract ever awarded to a British company, it has generated a substantial portion of
22

The UK Trade and Investment website Aerospace (civil).

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Britains export earnings over the last two decades and its success has depended on the support and advocacy of the RAF. Recent export orders for Typhoon (seventy-two for Saudi Arabia and eighteen for Austria) demonstrate the confidence that other nations continue to retain in RAF equipment, training and aircraft. Projects such as Typhoon and Al Yamamah bring financial benefits in terms of exports and job creation and also have strategic significance through the maintenance of aerospace expertise and a defence industrial base. The long term support required for Typhoon and Lightning (the Joint Strike Fighter) means that the United Kingdom will be able to retain its aerospace engineering and design capability for the through-life management of these aircraft: at least twenty five years. Typhoon is estimated to have created 40,000 jobs in the United Kingdom, while the A400M aircraft programme has added another 8,000. Finally, the cutting-edge research and development involved in aerospace equipment projects creates technological spin-offs that can be harnessed to other sectors of industry, such as car manufacturing and engineering. CONCLUSION The RAF is the United Kingdoms prime provider of air power, with ninety-two years of experience and expertise in delivering capabilities across the entire spectrum of operations in support of the UKs national interests. Whilst the main effort for the RAF is focused on the Afghanistan campaign, recent history and future trends indicate that a balanced force structure must be maintained, to provide relevant capabilities for current operations, but also with the resilience to cater for future contingencies. In terms of affordability, this demands a mix of high-technology and less-capable platforms, including a significant, multi-role combat air element (both manned and unmanned), more specialist Intelligence and Situational Awareness platforms and an appropriate emphasis on transport aircraft and helicopters to meet the level of expeditionary ambition set out in any forthcoming defence and security White Paper. 22

In an uncertain world, where traditional threats endure and novel threats are proliferating, capable air power offers unique policy options and alternatives to decision-makers as one of the essential levers of national power, not least in underpinning conventional deterrence. The ability to fight for control of the air, to deliver precision strike, to gain information and awareness about the enemy, and to provide sufficient lift to support rapid deployment and maneuver on the battlefield will all remain as essential and non-discretionary capabilities for the United Kingdoms future defence and security. Moreover, the RAF is at the vanguard of developments in space and cyber-space, and is best placed to lead the defence sector in these new and important environments. [Word count 7,352]

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