USMC Public Affairs Roadmap 2025

Date: 7 April 2009

DATE: Feb 23, 2010

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Today our Nation faces complex, diverse, and dynamic threats that will continue to evolve in the coming century. Although military action often will be required to address these challenges, lethal action alone will not suffice and, in some cases, may only complicate our ability to achieve military objectives. The military must take a broader approach to problem solving; it must fully leverage non-lethal capabilities, to include public affairs (PA). As a powerful, non-lethal capability with application across the range of military operations, PA builds understanding, credibility, trust and relationships with domestic and foreign publics publics that are critical to the Marine Corps mission success and the Nations larger strategic objectives. As information technology continues to emerge, transform, and complicate the operating environment, Marines must attain a greater level of sophistication to communicate effectively. To develop an advantage over adversaries in the information domain and thus create operational advantages for the MAGTF, the PA field must transform beyond its perceived role as a technical function that only distributes information. Rather, PA must redefine, re-engineer, and reconstruct itself as a strategic element of executive decision-making and operational design. If not, PA risks its relevancy in the operating environment. This Roadmap describes the future Marine Corps PA capability and its necessary evolution in response to the changing information environment. It describes a professional force, led by leaders with advanced degrees in communication, in which each member listens critically, thinks creatively, and acts decisively in support of Corps goals. It depicts a field that serves as senior advisors to commanders, helping to develop commanders understanding of physical, informational, cognitive, and social dimensions and their impact on the modern battlefield. It defines a community of disciplined planners who analyze the environment, develop a deep understanding of cultural narratives and biases, anticipate the perceptions and unintended consequences of planned actions, remain vigilant in ensuring the organizations deeds match its words, and conduct assessments to gauge progress and inform future planning. It discusses an occupational field with the manpower capacity, proper organization, and required material solutions to conduct all PA core competencies within every MAGTF as well as in the supporting establishment. Ultimately, the Roadmap outlines a vision of future PA capability integrated with other MAGTF capabilities, joint and interagency communities, and multinational allies for the advancement of Marine Corps, DOD, and national interests.

TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 1.1 2.0 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 5.0 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 7.0 7.1 8.0 INTRODUCTION.............................................. 1 PURPOSE................................................... 1 STRATEGIC GUIDANCE........................................ 1 MISSION................................................... 2 UNIQUE ATTRIBUTES......................................... 2 EXPEDITIONARY PA.......................................... 2 SUPPORTING ESTABLISHMENT PA............................... 2 MARKETING AND PA SUPPORT TO RECRUITING.................... 3 CORE COMPETENCIES......................................... 3 COMMUNICATION COUNSEL..................................... 3 RESEARCH.................................................. 3 STRATEGIC PLANNING........................................ 4 PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT......................................... 4 PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT AND DISSEMINATION..................... 4 ASSESSMENT AND EVALUATION................................. 5 ISSUE MANAGEMENT AND CRISIS COMMUNICATION................. 5 MARKETING................................................. 5 TRAINING AND EDUCATION.................................... 5 PERSONNEL................................................. 6 PROCESSES................................................. 7 STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION................................... 7 TRAINING.................................................. 7 EDUCATION................................................. 8 RESEARCH FOR ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT...................... 9 PLANNING.................................................. 9 COLLECTION AND PRODUCTION................................. 9 DISSEMINATION............................................. 9 MATERIEL REQUIREMENTS..................................... 9 COLLECTION AND TRANSMISSION............................... 9 CONCLUSION............................................... 10

4.10 PA FIELD MANAGEMENT....................................... 6

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1.0 INTRODUCTION As we prepare for a future of complex, diverse, and dynamic challenges, history reminds us that lethal action alone likely will not suffice and, in some cases, may only complicate our ability to achieve military objectives. The civilian population has become a central concern in military operations, and factors such as culture, perception, and public opinion are now as important to solving military problems as physical terrain and force ratios. Thus, the Corps must further develop and leverage capabilities in the cognitive realm capabilities like Public Affairs (PA). Complicating matters, however, is a modern information environment no longer confined by a centralized, broadcast model in which governments and institutions control information. Rather, today's environment represents a radical and irreversible shift in how human beings receive information, communicate, and form opinions. Emerging technologies empower the individual, allowing anyone to create content, share information and push microagendas to sympathetic audiences at little cost; readily filter out information that conflicts with their ideologies and biases; and join virtual, global networks based on common needs and interests regardless of geography. These changes give our enemies new advantage in discrediting our actions and building support for their causes. These changes also make it increasingly more difficult for the Marine Corps to be heard, understood, and believed. As a result, the job of the communicator has become exponentially more challenging. Accordingly, PA must evolve. It must build needed capacity and further mature its capability. It must transition from a collection of trained communication practitioners into a field of educated communication professionals who use research and assessment to improve counsel, develop communication strategies, deeply understand publics and cultural narratives, and anticipate unintended consequences of planned actions. It must shift its communication mindset from monologue to dialogue, from targeting audiences to engaging people with real needs and concerns, and from merely informing to building understanding, trust and relationships with key publics. Ultimately, PA must play an integral role in Marine Corps planning and decisionmaking processes. 1.1 PURPOSE This Roadmap describes the future Marine Corps PA capability and its necessary evolution in response to the changing information environment. It outlines a vision of future PA capacity and capabilities integrated with other government agencies for the advancement of Marine Corps, DOD, and national interests. 2.0 STRATEGIC GUIDANCE This Roadmap is guided by the direction and strategic guidance promulgated by Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025. It highlights the Corps six core competencies, all of which PA supports. It charges the Corps to develop the capability and capacity to operate effectively in media-intensive operational environments, describing this need as a critical warfighting requirement. It asserts that, as a result of the changing operational environment, the Corps must continually innovate across the institution and identify capabilities that require improvement. 1

3.0 MISSION Marine Corps PA will communicate and engage in order to build understanding, credibility, trust and mutually beneficial relationships with domestic and foreign publics on whom the Marine Corps success or failure ultimately depends. 3.1 UNIQUE ATTRIBUTES PA brings a complementary yet unique capability to the Marine Corps information arsenal that will provide increased flexibility, responsiveness, and utility if fully leveraged. For example, PA is unique in that it can legally communicate with all audiences foreign, domestic, friendly, neutral, and adversarial. It can rapidly release information products without a lengthy approval process, and can operate across the commanders Area of Operations and areas of Interest and Influence without seeking additional authorities. And it can legally operate from both the United States or overseas, resulting in continuous PA support from any location. 3.2 EXPEDITIONARY PA As a warfighting enabler and soft-power capability, PA will pre-actively1 and pro-actively2 communicate accurate, credible and timely information to shape the global information environment; create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to achievement of overall goals and objectives; and counter an adversarys ability to promote ideology, legitimize actions, recruit supporters, and intimidate populations. PA will communicate MAGTF capabilities and resolve to enhance support to multinational allies and deter potential adversaries. When adversaries are not deterred, PA activities will help publics form accurate perceptions of operations, increasing support for military objectives. PA will provide Marine Corps, Joint Force, and Combatant Commanders (COCOM) better trained and equipped personnel capable of incorporating communication strategy into operational planning in support of tactical, operational and strategic objectives. PA will provide analysis and assessment of the information environment, address perception in the course of operational planning, and provide for consistency in explicit and implicit communication. As part of the strategic communication process, PA will coordinate and synchronize its activities with other MAGTF capabilities, and appropriate joint, interagency and multinational organizations in order to achieve defined objectives. Numerous gray areas exist among the functions operating across the influence spectrum, and open collaboration will be critical to promote ethically sound PA planning and execution. 3.3 SUPPORTING ESTABLISHMENT PA PA will play an increasingly important role in the Supporting Establishment (SE) as Marine installations face a growing number of challenges. First, the American public's expectations for transparency, social responsibility, and accountability continue to increase. Second, the changes
1

Efforts to position the organization in advance of events that are likely to happen (e.g., IED attack, helicopter crash). 2 Efforts to actively shape the situation or environment in pursuit on a desired outcome.

in the information environment make it even more difficult to communicate with key publics. How the Marine Corps prepares for, communicates about, and responds to challenges such as land encroachment, environmental issues, training mishaps, disaster relief, and pandemics will greatly affect the Corps reputation and Americas trust in it. Through communication and engagement, PA will work to reconcile the publics expectations with Marine Corps goals, and build long-term relationships with the publics on which the Corps relies for its very existence. 3.4 MARKETING AND PA SUPPORT TO RECRUITING The Marine Corps Recruiting Command's (MCRC) communication mission is unique in that it seeks to persuade the domestic public. In future recruiting efforts, PA Marines will further leverage PA and marketing in an integrated communications approach. To achieve this, PA will increase marketing training by expanding the current Marketing and PA (MPA) Course, and will work with MCRC and Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA) to consider a new marketing MOS for MPA Course graduates that would qualify graduates for special duty at MCRC. 4.0 CORE COMPETENCIES Marines must abandon the overly-narrow definition that describes PA as three functions: internal communication, external communication and community relations. This definition is limiting and counterproductive; it confines our thinking and stifles our ability to transform. Rather, the below core competencies provide a broader and more helpful construct in which PA Marines should view their role and responsibilities. Additionally, this construct more effectively builds commanders understanding of PA, thereby shaping their expectations and employment of the capability. 4.1 COMMUNICATION COUNSEL PA professionals will increasingly serve as trusted advisors to commanders, providing objective counsel regarding proposed courses of action and policy decisions and their impact on key publics. They will use research and analysis to build a shared situational awareness with commanders and staff regarding emerging issues and public sentiment. They will bring focus to the impact the Marine Corps has on the operating environment and its publics, improve responsiveness to public interests, articulate potential unintended consequences of planned actions, and quickly identify perceived disparities between deeds and its words. Commanders and PA professionals will have a close relationship based on a mutual trust that facilitates implicit communication, a tenet of maneuver warfare that enables the rapid and decentralized decision-making and the initiative required by the modern information environment. 4.2 RESEARCH PA will further develop its current approach to problem solving which relies heavily on intuition, subjective analysis and historical precedent by improving research capability and capacity. Future PA professionals will use quantitative and qualitative research to better understand and define problems and opportunities, the operating environment, internal and external publics, and the cultural landscape. This information will inform the overall decision-

making process, guide planning efforts, and improve the quality of PA counsel. Research will be used to anticipate and identify changes in the environment, allowing leaders to adjust and respond as needed to ensure mission success. With increased knowledge of cultures, social and political structures, languages and religions, PA professionals will better understand audience needs and predispositions, and better design messages to increase audience understanding. 4.3 STRATEGIC PLANNING PA Marines officer and enlisted will be skilled in both the Marine Corps Planning Process and the four-step communication planning process of Research, Plan, Execute, Assess. During operational planning, PA involvement will begin before the first planning step Problem Framing and will use information gained through research to enhance the commanders understanding of the environment and the nature of the problem. This understanding will shape the commanders initial planning guidance and intent, which must include communication considerations. PA also will inform staff planning, to include development of constraints and restraints; identification of potential intended and unintended consequences of planned actions within the Areas of Operation, Interest, and Influence; and appreciation for the nature of information flow in varying cultural contexts. Any supporting communication plans will identify the communication problem or opportunity, identify and segment key publics, define communication goals, develop measurable objectives to achieve these goals, and develop communication strategies based on communication theory. Throughout planning, PA Marines will coordinate with other informational and operational capabilities, with higher, adjacent and subordinate military units, and with interagency and coalition partners. 4.4 PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT Viewing communication as a social process of dialogue and interaction among people versus a technical process of monologue and message delivery to a target audience, PA will continue to proactively engage American and foreign publics in both the domestic and operational environments. PA will increasingly use research and communication theory to identify and segment publics; develop creative communication strategies and outreach programs tailored for those publics; and evaluate and adapt strategies as needed. Engagement will focus on the internal Marine Corps audience, as well as external audiences such as the American public, hostnation publics, foreign publics, traditional news media, social media (i.e. bloggers), DOD, coalition and interagency partners, government leaders, community stakeholders, think tanks, academia, industry, and Veterans-service organizations. 4.5 PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT AND DISSEMINATION Future combat correspondents (CCs) will leverage new technology and more rapidly develop and disseminate communication products that support the commanders objectives. Products will include the written word, photographs, video, widgets (e.g., iPhone apps), and multimedia productions optimized for intended audience, distribution channel (particularly mobile), and ease of sharing by audiences to their networks. In the operational environment, CCs will attach to units at the lowest level, providing commanders with the ability to capture, document, and rapidly disseminate unit actions to prevent and counter adversary misinformation and

disinformation. PA will also exploit imagery and video captured by aircraft or other Marines to provide the first truth on the battlefield. Imagery captured by CCs will be archived for future use and historical purposes. 4.6 ASSESSMENT AND EVALUATION Measurement of PA plans, actions, and programs will be an integral part of the future practice of PA. Assessment will be incorporated into all planning and execution steps, and feedback will be used to adapt and adjust actions accordingly. PA evaluation also will measure the effectiveness of plans relative to target goals and objectives. This will create value for leadership, improve PA performance, and reduce future mistakes by measuring three different stages of PA activity: preparation, implementation and impact. Preparation evaluation will assess the quality and adequacy of problem framing and strategic planning. Implementation evaluation (i.e. measures of performance) will assess PA efforts and outputs, such as the number of visitors to a website. Impact evaluation (i.e. measures of effectiveness) will assess the impact of the plan or action, such as the change in knowledge, attitude, or behavior of a specific population. 4.7 ISSUE MANAGEMENT AND CRISIS COMMUNICATION PA professionals will be experts in issue management and crisis communication, and will consider it part of their daily duties. Rather than merely responding to problems as they arise, PA professionals will proactively conduct environmental scanning to identify emerging issues with potential impact to the Corps and its mission. Once issues are identified, PA Marines will analyze and prioritize them, recommend policies and actions to solve or mitigate these issues, implement action and communication programs, and evaluate program effectiveness. Preventing issues from becoming crises or more complex problems often will result in saved lives and increased trust and credibility. When crises do occur, PA Marines will determine the type (immediate, emerging, sustained) and will plan, respond, and organize resources accordingly. 4.8 MARKETING To better support the recruiting mission, PA Marines will implement marketing principles, guerilla marketing strategies, market segmentation and analysis, integrated communications theory, brand management, and persuasive communication/professional selling skills. 4.9 TRAINING AND EDUCATION PA Marines will serve as communication trainers and educators, increasing the Corps understanding about PAs mission, capabilities, role in the military planning process, and support to strategic communication efforts. PA will train Marines in interview techniques, social media, and the impact of individual actions on public perception and operational outcomes. PA will collaborate in curricula development with Marine Corps University and other military institutions of higher learning to ensure battlefield lessons are included in professional military education and senior leader development. These activities will raise leaderships expectations of PA, and indirectly improve PAs performance in its core competencies. While deployed, PA Marines will train personnel from foreign militaries to build PA capacity within those units.

4.10 PA FIELD MANAGEMENT PA Marines will be trained in the management of the PA occupational field since knowledge in these areas will better enable PA leaders to contribute to the fields development. Training will include manning and structure processes to include Table of Organization (T/O) and Equipment (T/E) Change Requests (TOECR); Uncompensated Review Boards (URB); Patients, Prisoners, Trainees and Transients (P2T2); deployment-to-dwell ratios; General Schedule (GS) system for civilian employees; and contracting. Training will also cover career progression and development for PA Marines, to include B billets; the Defense Information Schools Training Task Selection Board; the Marine Corps Task List (MCTL); the Program of Memorandum (POM) budgeting process to fund PA programs, activities, equipment, travel, and contract support; and the Expeditionary Force Development System (EFDS) and Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) for the development of PA doctrine, organization, training and education, materiel solutions, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) requirements. 5.0 PERSONNEL PA structure has changed little since the Vietnam War, a time when news and information flow was dominated by a few major news outlets that reported news once or twice a day. In fact, PA manning has decreased by 100 enlisted Marines over the last 40 years despite a revolution in the information environment. Currently, the Corps has 538 funded PA billets, with 93 officer billets and 443 enlisted billets. Only 31 percent of this structure (30 officers, 141 enlisted) is assigned to the operating forces; the other 69 percent is apportioned to the SE, to include MCRC. The senior PA Officer (PAO) is a Colonel, and the majority of billets are aligned with ranks too junior for the job. And PAs lack of structure results in inadequate manning scenarios, like at the MEF Command Element, which only rates one PAO. Current manning and organization are insufficient for the complexities of todays information environment. This lack of capacity results in a PA community that, historically, has been unable to execute many of its duties and deploy overseas in support of warfighters requirements without cannibalizing manpower from other operational commands and the SE. (Note: a solution of realigning manpower from the SE to the operational forces will only shift the problem from one area to another). To support V&S 2025 and the expanding communication requirements of COCOMs, future PA will: - Have the capacity to execute all core competencies at all commands/units assigned. Also, PA will create new structure as needed. For example, lessons learned from Iraq point to the benefit of assigning PA personnel to the Regimental Combat Team or the Marine Aircraft Group level. In addition, PA will have the capacity to establish at DivPA a doctrine and planning section, a research and assessment section, and a professional development section. It also will establish a deployment support team/reach-back capability within the PA community. - Align PA billets with the appropriate rank and experience level required for the job. In the current T/O billet structure, PA personnel are outranked by their commands' commensurate special staff. This often results in a diminished PA voice at the decision-making table. Also,

numerous PA billets are structured to be manned by officers too junior or lacking the required education, experience and sophistication to effectively serve as advisors and lead PA efforts. As a result, PA activities largely involve writing talking points and answering media queries, activities that are inadequate as a PA strategy. In the future, PA billets will be structured and manned by more senior officers. No longer should captains be assigned to Marine Division, Wing, or MEU headquarters as the senior PAO for those commands. - Be led by a General Officer (GO) who is a career PAO. Like the legal community, DivPA should be led by a PA GO who does not count against the Corps' Title X GO quota. This change would be consistent with Navy PA, which for the last 30 years has been led by a PA flag officer (FO) who doesn't count against the Navy's Title X FO quota. This change is necessitated by the complexities of the information environment, and is consistent with both Generals Petraeus and McChrystals decisions to have communication activities in Iraq and Afghanistan led by PA FOs (versus non-PA FOs). Additionally, DivPA also should have a Senior Executive Service (SES) deputy director to provide continuity to PA efforts and issues. PA manpower shortfalls within the reserve forces also must be addressed. In order to support mobilizations, deployments, and formal PA training, MARFORRES headquarters structure should match that of MARFORCOM and MARFORPAC, and PA structure even if minimal must be established at MARFORRES major subordinate commands (MSC). 6.0 PROCESSES 6.1 STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION (SC) SC is a dynamic, integrated process of planning and execution wherein the full range of available capabilities, such as PA, are coordinated and synchronized to achieve a desired end state. In both the Title X and operational environment, PA will continue serve as a key capability in this process by engaging in the planning process, continually analyzing the environment, identifying possible unintended consequences of planned actions, remaining vigilant in ensuring the organizations deeds match its words, and conducting assessments in order to gauge progress and inform future planning. Throughout this process, the PAO will continue in the role of advisor to the commander, providing PA counsel on the impact of proposed actions, the effect of emerging events on public perception, and continual changes in the commanders Areas of Influence. 6.2 TRAINING A continuum of PA Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) instruction occurs at a DOD school that focuses largely on the technical execution of PA (e.g., how to write articles, answer media queries, conduct community relations). This training is inadequate to sustain a PA Marine throughout his career. To develop communicators who can support MAGTF operations in complex environments, PA will continue its efforts to lobby the other military services to support changes to the curriculum.3

Curriculum changes can only occur when the majority of the services vote in favor of the changes.

In the future, PA Marines also will increase proficiency in non-MOS areas so that they can better understand and contribute to strategic communication efforts. PA Marines will attend training in such courses as information operations, cultural and language skills, military support to public diplomacy, civil affairs, and planning processes such as USAID's Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework. DivPA will host training opportunities, such as Marine Corps Planning Process workshops taught by the MAGTF Staff Training Program (MSTP). PA Marines will increase training with the units they support to build trust and confidence with the units' leaders and Marines. Training also will ensure that PA Marines remain proficient in basic rifleman skills through live-fire training, convoy operations and immediate action drills. In the future, PA will have the capacity to participate in all training exercises a reality that currently doesn't exist since participation is critical to PA success in a real-world scenario. Exercises will include Master Scenario Event Lists (MSEL) injects for PA and will assess PA performance as part of the exercise evaluation. Exercises will prepare PA for combat and will build habitual relationships with the commander, staff and other MAGTF elements. Face-to-face planning and coordination during exercises will build trust in combat when face-to-face coordination is not possible. This trust will help PA and other members of the MAGTF staff anticipate one another's actions, speed the decision-making process, beat the enemy's decisionmaking cycle, and more effectively counter adversary misinformation and disinformation. 6.3 EDUCATION To professionalize the force and empower PA Marines with the education required for todays information environment, PA leadership will compete to send Marines to both military and civilian schools throughout their careers. Currently, PA does not possess the personnel capacity to do so. In the future, both officer and enlisted PA Marines will continue to attend resident professional military education schools to expand their knowledge base, develop their criticalthinking skills, and better develop relationships with their peers. For officers, schools include career-level, intermediate-level, and top-level schools, as well as Joint PME II. For enlisted, schools range from the Sergeants Course to the Advanced Course. Additionally, PA Marines will receive education at civilian colleges and universities. Like the Navy, the Marine Corps goal will be to send its PA officers to civilian graduate school for communication. This education will include contemporary and emergent communication theory; communication planning (identifying the issue, segmenting publics, and developing communication goals, objectives, strategies, and tactics); communication management (staffing, budgeting, administering and evaluating PA programs); social science research methods (quantitative and qualitative); ethics; and communication law. Education in research methods will include research design and the execution of surveys, experiments, content analysis, focus groups, in-depth interviews, participant observation, conversation analysis, and ethnographic studies; use of computerized statistical analysis software to conduct techniques such as correlations, regression analysis, covariance structure and factor analysis; and the practical implementation of research to plan, track and evaluate PA programs. Elective courses will include topics such as intercultural communication; argumentation and persuasion; conflict management; technology, policy, and trends; communication case studies; anthropology; and psychology.

For enlisted Marines, the goal will be for SNCOs to receive an associates or bachelors degree in communication, English or another subject that supports the PA mission. Additionally, PA will seek to establish a short-course communication program like the former University of Oklahoma short course to provide enlisted Marines with graduate-level education. The PA field will also take advantage of community college and online courses. 6.4 RESEARCH FOR ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT In the future, the PA community will take full advantage of quantitative and qualitative research. PA Marines will conduct research themselves; draw on analysis conducted by the Open Source Center; leverage other open-source resources such as The Pew Research Center and Gallup Consulting; exploit research conducted by other Marine Corps, DOD, and U.S government agencies and Academia; or hire professional research firms to conduct studies. 6.5 PLANNING PA will be a full and equal partner in the Marine Corps Planning Process, whether in deliberate or crisis planning. PA will also lead communication-specific planning, and will ensure PA plans are fully coordinated and synchronized with the staff and strategic communication guidance. Because effective communication planning requires information that is often handled as Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), PA leaders will require a collateral Top Secret clearance and access to associated communication networks. 6.6 COLLECTION AND PRODUCTION Combat Correspondents will continue to adapt how they collect, produce and tailor information and multimedia products for domestic and foreign publics. Products will be optimized for a variety of mediums, to include Internet and mobile technologies. 6.7 DISSEMINATION As more people turn to the Internet for news, PA must re-evaluate the relevance of installation newspapers and employ its combat correspondents in innovative and effective ways. This includes leveraging the Web and media tools, consistent with relevant authorities, to further the Corps' mission in both the supporting establishment and operational environment. In addition, the Corps must further develop the capability of the Marines.mil website, which serves as the single online site for the collection and dissemination of all Corps information and content. In addition, PA will push release authority to the lowest levels feasible to capitalize on the creativity of individual Marines, enable Marines to seize initiative on the battlefield, and exploit enemy weaknesses. In some cases this might mean delegating that authority down to the combat correspondent. In all cases, PA Marines will continue to ensure that content is appropriate for public release, consistent with operations security and other relevant policies.

7.0 MATERIEL REQUIREMENTS 7.1 COLLECTION AND TRANSMISSION EQUIPMENT To provide publics with "first truth" accounts of Marine Corps actions and to counter rumors, misinformation and adversary propaganda, PA requires materiel solutions that enable the acquisition, production, transmission and dissemination of information and imagery directly from the Area of Operations to intended publics in near real time. PA will adopt a new material acquisition strategy that equips its forward-deployed Marines with simpler systems that permit faster dissemination in austere conditions or when dispersed across the battlefield. To do so, PA will require a mix of professional-grade and consumer-grade equipment such as digital cameras, computers, and global connectivity solutions using wireless and satellite technology. Also, PA Marines will require night vision camera equipment to support imagery collection at night. The movement of real-time still and video imagery requires substantive bandwidth, especially in the case of high-definition video. Currently, PA lacks the equipment and the necessary bandwidth to rapidly disseminate large quantities of high-resolution video, still imagery, and for print products to key publics and media organizations. PA must rectify this shortfall, while ensuring new transmission equipment is interoperable with receiving systems or equipment, such as Marines.mil. PA also requires a 24/7 news marketing hub for the dissemination of communication products and imagery. Additionally, PA will work with Combat Camera to invest in a globally accessible archive capability for non- releasable imagery. 8.0 CONCLUSION

Tomorrow's operating environment demands that the Marine Corps take a broad approach to problem solving in order to further develop its non-lethal as well as lethal capabilities. PA, as a powerful non-lethal capability, serves as a critical warfighting enabler across the range of military operations. By building understanding, credibility, trust and relationships with key domestic and foreign publics, PA plays an essential role in the achievement of mission success and the Nation's strategic objectives. However, the PA mission has become exponentially more difficult to execute and achieve as a result of the increasingly complex, decentralized and dynamic information environment. To meet these new challenges, the Marine Corps must further develop and mature its PA capability across the DOTMLPF spectrum. By building a sophisticated and robust PA capability, the Marine Corps will better position itself for success in the coming century.

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Appendix A- FOUO Public Affairs Fictional Scenario - Operation RESTORE TRUST Purpose. This scenario provides Marine leaders insight into how the Marine Corps Public Affairs capability will contribute to its operational success in 2016. This fictional scenario, termed Operation RESTORE TRUST, involves a SPMAGTFs actions against hybrid threats in Somalia. Background. From 2009-2016, the Somali terrorist organization Al Shabaab scored numerous tactical gains over the Republic of Somalias (RoS) fledgling government, resulting in Al Shabaabs control of the city of Kismayo and much of south and central Mogadishu. These victories fueled its propaganda efforts and attracted more than 1,000 foreign fighters from Canada, Egypt, the UK, U.S. and Yemen. As a result, southern Somalia disintegrated into chaos and placed the country on the verge of humanitarian disaster. In June 2016, the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution to provide food aid to the Somali people and U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) immediately began planning for a Joint Task Force intervention. As the UN launched relief operations with the World Food Program (WFP), Al Shabaab reacted by looting WFP distribution points and using the food as leverage to secure the loyalty of clan leaders and to coerce the support of the Somali people. As a result, the RoS faced losing broad popular support to Al Shabaab, which was believed to command the loyalty of nearly 40% of the southern Somali population despite its use of suicide attacks, which have killed more than 600 Somalis in the last year. As AFRICOM was directed to intervene and aid UN relief efforts, the Marine Corps received a deployment order for a MEB-sized SPMAGTF in support of Operation RESTORE TRUST. Scenario. The SPMAGTFs Public Affairs (PA) team is comprised of: a Maj PA Officer with a masters degree in communication; a Capt Plans Officer with a masters degree in communication; a 1stLt Engagement Officer; a MSgt PA chief with some graduate education in communication; an SSgt Plans and Engagement chief;

a SSgt Imagery Collection and Dissemination chief; and a handful of junior Marines and NCO photographers (still and video).

All PA officers and SNCOs have cultural training through the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning, attended the Joint Information Operations (IO) Planners Course (FMOS 0510), and undergone varying levels of training at the CIAs Open Source Academy and the State Departments Foreign Service Institute (e.g., Marketing and Communication College). Upon learning of the upcoming deployment, the PA team in close cooperation with MEB staff members such as the S-2, IO cell, and cultural experts begins conducting extensive research to build a deep understanding of Somalias operating environment, the information environment (physical, informational, cognitive, social dimensions). This involves an understanding of key publics (their values, beliefs, motivations, biases), the cultural landscape (e.g. political, religious structures), existing networks (how messages propagate, amplify and attenuate), and current public sentiment. This data will help improve PAs counsel to the commander, and will inform decision-making and planning efforts. Using this knowledge, the IO Cell builds the commanders situational awareness and understanding of the environment. This understanding helps shape the commanders initial planning guidance and intent, and ensures that communication considerations are included in his guidance. Research findings regarding the physical dimension of the information environment.

Telecom. While the telecommunications system, like most civil infrastructure, is underdeveloped and has suffered from years of war, wireless companies thrive in most major cities and provide better services than in many neighboring countries. Two in five Somalis have a wireless phone a ratio that out-paces adult literacy by more than 100%.

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Appendix A- FOUO Public Affairs Fictional Scenario - Operation RESTORE TRUST

Television. The Shabelle Media Network (SMN) TV station is based in Mogadishu and provides free, 24-hour Somali-language programming to a global audience via the Qatar Thaicom 3 satellite. Other Free-to-Air satellite programming produced in Egypt, the UK, and the U.S. is widely available to anyone with a satellite television receiver currently estimated to be one in six households. Radio. Radio is the number one source for news and information, with the most popular stations being BBC World Service in English, BBC Arabic, and BBC Somalia. Radio Gaalkacyo formerly known as Radio Free Somalia is an AM/FM station broadcasting in Somali and English. Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab also operate numerous mobile transmitters used for propaganda and religious broadcasts. However, there is little data or understanding on their reach and influence. Internet. Internet access was introduced to Somalia via satellite in 2000, and usage grew 44,900% thru 2007. Mobile wireless service and Internet cafs flourished. In 2009, an undersea fiber optic cable brought broadband access into Mombasa, and usage exploded. Today, 3G coverage in major population centers is comparable to that in the US. The average Somali spends 1.5 hours a day on the Internet most of that via mobile device. BBC Somali is the top online news source.

Speaking skills are highly valued in Somali society. Individual credibility and influence are correlated a leaders verbal adroitness. The Somali diaspora a group of more than one million Somalis who live abroad remain highly influential with Somalis still living in the country. High concentrations of Somalis live in nearby Kenya and many Western countries such as England and the U.S., where 200,000 live in the Minneapolis-St Paul area.

Finally, the IO cell offers its analysis of the adversarys interests and influence capacity, assessing strengths and weaknesses:

The cognitive and social dimensions of the information environment are more difficult to describe, but together the PAO, cultural experts, and the Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Officer present an analysis of human decisionmaking factors in the Somali culture:

Somali society is organized into five major clan families, which range from 100,000 to over one million in size. These clans are kinship-based, and are deeply valued as a strength in times of need and suffering. Almost all Somalis are Sunni Muslims, and Islam is vitally important to the Somali sense of national identity in a manner familiar to that of Sunni Muslims in Iraq. It is for this reason that Al Shabaab maintains its moral authority despite its brutal enforcement of sharia.

Al Shabaab must not be viewed as a single unit, as decision-making is decentralized. It is, however, ideologically coherent, which helps to explain its success in mobilizing support among the population. Despite the relative notoriety of a few charismatic leaders, Al Shabaab is not a hierarchical organization with a predictable chain of command. Local leaders have a great deal of latitude in planning operations and making alliances with local sub-clans. Al Shabaabs propaganda efforts are discordant. Its various factions often compete with one another, among their own sub-clans, between regional power centers, across micropolitical interests at the local level, against legitimate and criminal business interests, and certainly with the ROS. At the national level, Al Shabaab's western and eastern branches have distinct differences in their agendas. The western branch promotes a strategy of consolidation and building functioning authorities as a prelude to extension of Islamist emirates. The eastern branch, which includes SPMAGTF battlespace, is characterized by a more militant transnationalist agenda. While Al Shabaabs propaganda efforts are weakened by competing agendas, its ideology of transnational jihad and pan-Islamism is fairly well fixed for Somali standards.

After developing a shared understanding of the environment, the SPMAGTF command element convenes the Operational Planning

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Appendix A- FOUO Public Affairs Fictional Scenario - Operation RESTORE TRUST Team (OPT) and begins problem framing. The PAO continues his work within the IO cell and as a member of the OPT to inform the planning process with an understanding of the information battlespace. As experts in the human decision-making process, PA and IO professionals help inform constraints and restraints, identification of potential intended and unintended consequences of planned actions, Interest and Influence; and other potential information effects. During planning, the cell reaches back to subject matter experts at the State Departments Global Strategic Engagement Center (GSEC) staffed by uniformed colleagues and Foreign Service Officers and experts at the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC.) In accordance with the OPT problem framing, its inputs, staff estimates and the ongoing preparation of the battlefield, the commander approves the following: SPMAGTF Mission. On [DTG], SPMAGTF seizes the Port of Kismayo and Imam Ahmed Gurey Airport IOT provide unrestricted access for UN relief forces. O/O, SPMAGTF will conduct security operations IOT deny Al Shabaab a base of operations in Kismayo; disrupt the flow of foreign fighters through this port; facilitate the restoration of basic services; and promote the legitimacy of the RoS in Kismayo. Commanders Intent. We are here to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe, restore order, and drive the influence of Al Shabaab from Kismayo. We come to this nation at a critical time, and a decisive moment approaches. The support for Al Shabaab among the Somali people has never been higher, and hundreds of foreign fighters have entered Somalia through this port to be part of what they believe is a great jihad. They will strive to shake the peoples confidence in our ability to offer relief, and to convince the world that our efforts are futile. We must not underestimate them or their influence, but neither can we allow mass murderers to hold the initiative. The people of this nation have suffered at the hands of violent extremists for far too long, and our task to provide access to UN relief forces is crucial. The security we provide will be essential for Somalis to build a future. Only with security can the Somali government face the challenges confronting it and serve its citizens. The hopes of the Somali people rest with us but many Somalis have yet to understand this basic truth: in the end, it is Somalis who will decide the outcome of this struggle. It will be up to them to drive Al Shabaab into the open. To help the Somali people achieve this, we will live and fight alongside them just as we did in Al Anbar and Helmand. These are a people who value family and loyalty qualities that we Marines understand well. Together, we will face down the terrorists. We will gain the peoples trust, offer them the security they need to resist those who slaughter the innocent, and show them a hope they have not known for many years. The way ahead will not be easy, and there will be difficult times. But you know better than most that hard is not hopeless, and we must remain steadfast in our efforts if we are to help the people of Kismayo. End State: By February 2017, Kismayo is denied as safe haven for Al Shabaab; a stable city with independently functioning port facilities and expanding markets; and operating under a fully-functional local government and the full legitimacy of the sovereign RoS. As the OPT continues through the planning process, the PA team conducts a detailed communication mission analysis in collaboration with the IO cell. They produce the following: Specified Communication Tasks. 1. Disrupt, discredit, and marginalize Al Shabaab and other violent extremist actors. 2. Promote legitimacy of the RoS and increase support for UN relief/security forces. 3. Inform U.S. domestic, UN-member and partner audiences of SPMAGTF and UN progress in Kismayo. 4. Exploit the deadly effects of Al Shabaabs influence. 5. Promote Somali participation in the local political process.

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Appendix A- FOUO Public Affairs Fictional Scenario - Operation RESTORE TRUST 6. BPT aggressively refute misleading news reporting. inaccurate or design the communication strategy. Using HHQ Strategic Communication guidance, and in consultation with experts at NCTC and GSEC, they build a two-pronged approach: A structured approach to countering Al Shabaab propaganda, and a sequential approach to narrative engagement with the population: Deconstructing The Extremist Argument. Extremists use six rhetorical building blocks to construct the arguments they use to recruit, bolster morale, motivate violence, and build support among the population (see Fig 1). Undermining each of these elements undermines credibility and creates suspicion among the populations, thereby reducing their effectiveness. Fig.1 presents the foundation for a SPMAGTF counter-messaging campaign intended to build credibility with Somalis and undercut Al Shabaabs influence. (The communication strategy is well coordinated with PSYOP efforts and designed to be complimentary in effect.) Sequential Engagement with the Population. Al Shabaab is not well positioned to respond to SPMAGTF efforts aimed at cooperative problem-solving with Somali clan leaders. This provides us an opportunity for maneuver in the information battlespace. We will take advantage of this by positioning our engagement as a Great Endeavor, emphasizing that we seek cooperation to achieve positive goals in the community. This builds upon the general Somali Muslim consensus that conflict can be avoided, and offers us the opportunity to demonstrate our ability and, in contrast, Al Shabaabs inability to improve the lives of the people of Kismayo. This contrast will become increasingly apparent over time as the extremists resort to targeting innocents and thwarting development. Our approach, however, must be sequential, as we do not currently possess the credibility to undertake Great Endeavors. This is a long-term approach that must be synchronized with security actions. Fig. 2 presents a series of incremental communication objectives that build upon the credibility of the previous theme.

Implied Communication Tasks. 1. Sustain U.S. domestic support. 2. Demonstrate progress toward sustainable security. 3. Promote RoS political, security and economic progress. 4. Synchronize actions with the Public Diplomacy personnel within the U.S. Mission in Somalia (State Department). Essential Communication Tasks. 1. Disrupt, discredit, and marginalize Al Shabaab and other violent extremist actors. 2. BPT aggressively refute inaccurate or misleading reporting. 3. Promote RoS political, security and economic progress. Communication Mission. SPMAGTF Communication efforts discredit Al Shabaab and its partners, promote RoS capabilities and achievements, and refute inaccurate and misleading reporting, in order to marginalize violent extremist influence and advance political, security and economic development. Communication Intent. The primary means by which SPMAGTF communication efforts can isolate Al Shabaab and advance development is through the direct engagement of the Somali populace here, and the influence of Somali diaspora abroad. It is therefore our intent to undermine the Al Shabaab narrative and induce the Somalis in Kismayo to drive the violent extremists out of their communities. This is our top priority. Second, it is of fundamental importance that we continue to demonstrate our effectiveness to the U.S. and other international audiences through timely, honest, transparent, and contextual information. By leveraging security, political, and economic progress, we will maintain U.S. domestic support and preserve popular will, thereby securing the time necessary to achieve our end state. As the SPMAGTF planning process continues to develop Courses of Action (COA), the PA team works closely within the OPT and IO Cell to

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Appendix A- FOUO Public Affairs Fictional Scenario - Operation RESTORE TRUST The PAO and PSYOP Officer present the communication strategy as part of the COA brief. The commander directs that, as part of his COA evaluation criteria, the PA and PSYOP Staff assess each COA against the risk and/or support to the sequential engagement with the population. Once the primary COA is selected and orders development begins, the PAO briefs the COA to the PA staff. Immediately, a detailed PA engagement plan is developed, to include the identification and segmentation of key publics, the development of measurable objectives, specific engagement tactics using various modes, and evaluation metrics. Additionally, the Imagery Chief and photographers begin developing a supporting imagery collection and dissemination annex (video and still). It allocates collection assets among the various MEB elements, prioritizes imagery content requirements, and establishes restraints and constraints for imagery release: Asset Allocation. For operations Phases Zero thru III, photo assets will be divided among GCE, ACE, LCE, and MSOC at a 4:2:3:1 ratio. Imagery Content Priorities. For operations Phases Zero thru III, photographers will focus collection in support of the following messages: 1. Most victims of extremist violence are Muslim. 2. Extremist violence thwarts economic development and undermines stability 3. U.S. Forces assist Muslims in times of humanitarian crisis. Imagery Release Delegation Guidelines. To ensure first truth, collection assets attached to MEB elements are authorized release directly to AFRICOM and Defense Imagery Management Operations Center from the field. Each photo will include an embedded caption for context. Each Marine photographer is equipped with high-definition digital photography equipment that is readily available and simple to employ, as well as a man-packable transmission capability. Additionally, MEB elements have been fielded an array of thermal, infrared, and visible spectrum helmet and vehicle-mounted cameras that support imagery collection. As imagery is collected, photographers will embed captions into raw imagery and will immediately push the imagery to the SPMAGTF, AFRICOM and DoD via the global satellite broadband network. The PA Engagement Officer, who oversees engagement with key publics to include news media, has requested and received specific imagery release authority from AFRICOM. This permits him to push select images to networked virtual communities that will spread the imagery virally. Once the raw imagery is captured in the field, the Engagement Officer can hand pick images that reinforce the communication strategy and disseminate them globally in near-real time. As the SPMAGTF order is issued and the staff begins transition, an update to the intelligence picture complicates the situation: Kenyan authorities have apprehended three U.S.-born citizens children of Somali refugees attempting to enter Somalia with weapons and explosives obtained from a known Al Qaeda associate in Lamu. These three young men held U.S. passports and had entered Kenya legally through Mombassa. According to the FBI, they appear to have been recruited to Al Shabaab through a Mosque in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The Commander is concerned about this for a number of reasons, and he immediately directs the communication team to disrupt extremist recruiting efforts in the U.S. In consultation with the PSYOP team, the PAO reviews a number of products they have developed for use in Somalia on local radio. While the core messages are consistent with the overall communication strategy, the products need to be re-designed for the U.S. domestic audience. In coordination with the U.S. Northern Command, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and Minneapolis-area Muslim leaders, the PAO launches a counterrecruiting campaign that aims to demystify Al Shabaab among Somali youth in the Twin Cities, and to educate the Somali community of the violent extremist threat living among them. The campaign is designed in detailed coordination with the PSYOP officer, as the close communication between Somali diaspora

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Appendix A- FOUO Public Affairs Fictional Scenario - Operation RESTORE TRUST and clan members living in Somalia requires that both PA and PSYOP efforts be closely aligned in order to reinforce one another. D-Day arrives, and the SPMAGTF seizes the Imam Ahmed Gurey Airport more than 10 miles west of Kismayo in the early morning hours with minimal contact. Members of the international press embedded with the Marines immediately begin reporting live from the airfield, as the PA Engagement chief establishes a live video transmission capability near the COC. Within 20 minutes of the first Marine landing, the commander conducts live TV interviews with U.S. and international networks, which are broadcasting live as the first UN aircraft land and begin unloading supplies inside the protection of the Marine cordon. At the Port of Kismayo, an amphibious seizure is underway. Here, however, the operation is not going as smoothly. An LAR section (with a Marine photographer attached) tasked with establishing a blocking position on the causeway immediately comes into contact after coming ashore. The unit succeeded in establishing the blocking position, but has been taking intermittent harassing fire from technicals at the edge of the city. Additionally, A MARSOC MSOT is tasked with providing sniper overwatch of the blocking position Just after dawn, an F-35B Lightning is fired on by a surface-to-air missile as the jet engages technicals on the beach highway near the port. The pilot identifies the launch location as a mosque one kilometer west of the blocking position. The MSOT snipers quickly identify a spotter in the mosques minaret. A section of AH-1Zs moves in from the east and observes a half-dozen technicals moving in and out of the mosque compound. After surveilling the activity for several minutes, the pilots identify a recently-fired SA-7 launcher in the bed of a pickup at a corner of the compound. In accordance with the Rules of Engagement, they attack the truck with a TOW missile. Simultaneously, the enemy spotter in the minaret attempts to fire an RPG at the AH-1Ws, but is killed by the MSOT sniper before he gets the shot off. The SA-7 platform is destroyed, while the mosque and the minaret remain entirely intact. Immediately following the engagement, the Marine photographer transmits his photos and the MSOC sniper team also sends their products. The PA team consolidates this imagery along with the F-35B and AH-1Z gun-camera footage and conducts a targeted release via the Internet as part of an interactive storyboard that includes a timeline and decision points. Within hours, Al Shabaab has released digital phone video of smoke rising from the mosque compound along with a statement claiming the U.S. is willfully targeting Muslims worshiping in the mosque. Their claim, however, is undermined by a number of international news stories using the SPMAGTFproduced imagery showing Al Shabaab fighters firing on Marines from within the compound. With the airfield and port secure, the SPMAGTF continues its transition to Phase III Operations by establishing and expanding security zones in support of UN operations. Using communication theory and research to build recommendations, the PA team works with the PSYOP team to provide counsel to Civil Affairs teams and Marine commanders down through the platoon level that assists them in Key Leader Engagement (KLE). The GCE commander quickly identifies the mosque where the SA-7 was destroyed as a prime engagement opportunity, as a portion of the compound wall was destroyed and an adjacent madrasah was damaged by the AH-1Zs. With the agreement of the Imam, Marines begin clearing the damage. By the end of the first day, the commander has made an arrangement with the local clan leader to provide 10 men for skilled labor, and with the help of the LCE, they begin repairing the school. A Marine photographer attached to the unit captures images of the work and posts them directly to the Internet. Concurrently, the PA team works with BBC to clear and coordinate access to the population so a well-known international market and social research company can conduct a survey of the population for ABC News and BBC. While the independent research is not in direct support of the

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Appendix A- FOUO Public Affairs Fictional Scenario - Operation RESTORE TRUST SPMAGTF, the polling results will help inform planning for Phase IV operations. This data, along with research and analysis done by the U.S. intelligence community, will allow the PA staff and IO cell in developing measures of effectiveness for the communication strategy. Meanwhile, the MSOC begins a series of nighttime raids on Al Shabaab safe houses. Marine photographers support the raid force, collecting and documenting actions on the objective. The Marines find numerous weapons caches, as well as computers containing thousands of images and videos of Al Shabaab training and operations. In one case, the Marines discover a torture house littered with numerous corpses of young men all extended family members from a clan that refused to support Al Shabaab. The Marine photographer painstakingly documents the gruesome scene, then sends the images to the PA team. Together with the S-2 and IO Cell, the PAO identifies select images and briefs the commander with his dissemination plan. In order to undercut the extremist influence with the population and reinforce the message that most victims of extremist violence are Muslim, the PAO intends to release the images to Shabelle Media Network (SMN) first. Shortly thereafter, the PSYOP officer intends to launch a viral campaign optimized for the local G3 network using the images to malign the extremists. The commander initially is uncomfortable with releasing the brutal images, but consultation with his Foreign Area Officer and Pol-Mil advisor reassures him that the PAOs plan is culturally acceptable. The images should have the intended effect the commander authorizes the plan. Within 48 hours of the images being disseminated to SMN, counterintelligence Marines report that the pictures are popping up on cell phones around the city and are a major topic of conversation among men in the markets and cafes. Intel analysts confirm that anger toward Al Shabaab is building among key families in powerful area clans. The commander views this as an opportunity to unite a few influential clans against Al Shabaab and isolate the extremists from mainstream Somalis. If successful, he believes the SPMAGTF will have taken a major step toward the first element of his end state: Kismayo denied as safe haven for Al Shabaab. When the SPMAGTF transitions to Phase IV operations, the PA team continues to execute the sequential engagement plan, coordinated with other staff sections, to help the SPMAGTF build credibility and trust with the local population. As in Phases Zero through III, the communication strategy continues to build upon successes, aggressively meet the potential set-backs of unintended consequences, and maintain the relationships needed for stabilization. In addition to the tactical execution of communication, the PA team contracts research companies to conduct surveys of the local population in order help the SPMAGTF better understand public sentiment, and measure knowledge, attitude and behavior changes as desired by the communication plan and, more specifically, the operations plan.

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Figure 1. Deconstructing and Countering Extremist Arguments: A Structured Approach

Element History Extremist Message The world has gone awry What the element generates Provides a worldview and historical interpretation of the extremists world in decline. If undercut, then Without History, the extremist sees no decline to counter. Countermessages should Disrupt extremists interpretation of the US agenda, priorities, and character or their view of the world. Possible Countermessages include Here is what we really have been doing, what we want, and why we are pursing this course of action. VEs understanding of the situation is inaccurate and dangerous. Here is what is really going on. There are more than two parties involved in this situation it is not a pure us versus them situation. We share a common challenge and we need your wisdom, ingenuity, and help to meet it. We can do this together. Every time violent extremists move into an area, they make matters worse. VEs are trying to make you panic or be impatient. All avenues of recourse have not been exhausted. Some ingenuity may be required. The majority of victims of VEs actions are Muslim.

Two Camps

because of the actions of an enemy who hates or threatens what is good.

Identifies and demonizes an enemy who is to blame for the decline of the extremists' world and depicts extremists who resist that enemy as virtuous and heroic.

Without Two Camps, there is no enemy to combat.

Discredit extremists or disrupt their claims of a struggle being waged between a virtuous and selfless extremist alliance and a malevolent, menacing enemy.

Crisis Point

Now is the time

Creates a sense of panic that action must be taken now to counteract the enemy and that everything the extremist holds dear hangs in the balance. Provides the appropriate even heroic method for resistance and describes the dangers of failing to implement this method. Prevents compromise with the enemy by depicting it as dangerous to the movements success or the individuals soul. Compromise means you are complicit in the enemys agenda. Provides a motivating image of victory or paradise for the movement or the individual extremist.

Without Crisis Point, there is no sense that immediate action is required Without Method, there is no clearly defined way to resist the enemy. Without Fear of Contamination, dialogue and compromise are possible.

Ease panic or soothe anxiety that might otherwise spur individuals to immediate, extreme action.

Method

This action must be taken that will avert catastrophe.

Undermine the credibility or viability of the use of violence.

Fear of Contamination

If we stay true to our righteous course

Undermine extremists use of suspicion to thwart dialogue with the US. Create doubt in extremists claims of trustworthiness.

The US has defended Muslims in the past.. The US aided Muslims during humanitarian crises.

Reward

We will prevail.

Without Reward, there is no goal to work toward.

Undermine the desirability of the extremists goal.

VEs success would be disastrous, they only know how to fight. If VEs win, will they target you, your friends, or your family next?

Figure 2. US Counterterrorism Communications: A Sequential Approach to a Narrative of Engagement

Major Message Themes in Sequence 1. Extremism Hurts You This Message Theme Should Highlight that the costs of extremist violence outweigh the purported benefits to ordinary Muslims. Paint extremists as enemies rather than allies of ordinary Marines. Help counter extremists assertions that the United States is engaged in a war against Islam and poses a threat to Muslims. Reason to Beleive Most victims of extremist violence are Muslim. Extremist violence thwarts economic development and undermines stability. Actions That Could Undercut This Message Avoid the appearance of Overshadowing Muslim suffering by overemphasizing United States concerns and priorities.

2. We Are Not at War With Islam

Six of the seven US military interventions, since 1991, have been waged in defense of Muslims (in Kuwait, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq). The US Government and ordinary Americans aided Muslims after the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 and the Pakistan earthquake in 2005. The US has consistently opposed those who oppressed others, such as the Nazis, Communists, the Taliban, and al-Qaida and other VEs. Americans value life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. America has shaped its government and society around these values.

Linking extremist violence with Islam in public descriptions of the enemy. Ignoring or downplaying Muslim grievances. Allowing US speakers to become bogged down in back-and-forth debates with hostile audiences over the interpretations of historical events. Commenting on issues of religious legitimacy. Implying that Islam, Sharia, or ordinary Muslims advocate oppression. Failing to recognize the ideological differences and divisions that exist in the Muslim world. Allowing extremists to steer discussions toward the few specific actions they portray as American hypocrisies or failing to adequately explain those apparent hypocrisies if the topic cannot be avoided. Implying that the US forces Muslims to adopt American values, believing Muslims do not or cannot share the same basic values as American, or asserting that American values are intrinsically superior to those of Muslims. Fumbling the completion of Great Endeavors. Overpromising and underdelivering Great Endeavors, particularly those that require longterm investment of attention and resources. Pursuing Great Endeavors that would clearly benefit the US more than local publics. Painting nonparticipants in Great Endeavors as enemies..

3. We Are Against

Cast US actions as resulting from a desire to thwart oppression.

4. We Are For

Provide and alternative framework for interpreting US behavior and intentions. Highlight American values in ways that can be reflected by as many ordinary Americans as possible, including broadly enough that Muslim publics can accept and adhere to them without necessarily having to endorse US policies. Invite local to partner with the US to undertake Great Endeavors cooperative projects with tangible results- after identifying which Great Endeavors locals want and need.

5. We Should Undertake Great Endeavors* together

*Wars are NOT Great Endeavors; but war can PROTECT the Great Endeavor.

These Great Endeavors can be accomplished only if we work as a team and contribute our unique abilities. When you benefit, we all benefit. Extremists offer no Great Endeavors.