Mountain Operations 3 - FM 3-19.6

FM3-97.
6 TABLE OF CONTENTS Mountain Operations
Terrain
Weather
Section II — Effects on Personnel
Nutrition
Altitude
Cold
Section III — Effects on Equipment
General Effects
Small Arms
Machine Guns
Antitank Weapons
Section IV — Reconnaissance and Surveillance
Reconnaissance
Surveillance
Chapter 2 COMMAND AND CONTROL
Section I — Assessment of the Situation
Mission
Enemy
Terrain and Weather
Troops and Support Available
Time Available
Civil Considerations
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FM3-97.6 TABLE OF CONTENTS Mountain Operations
Section II — Leadership
Section III — Communications
Combat Net Radio
Mobile Subscriber Equipment
Wire and Field Phones
Audio, Visual, and Physical Signals
Messenger
Section IV — Training
Initial Training Assessment
Physical Conditioning
Mountain Living
Navigation
Weapons and Equipment
Camouflage and Concealment
Fortifications
Military Mountaineering
Driver Training
Army Aviation
Reconnaissance and Surveillance
Team Development
Chapter 3 FIREPOWER AND PROTECTION OF THE FORCE
Section I — Firepower

Field Artillery
Mortars
Air Support
Electronic Warfare
Section II — Protection of the Force
Air Defense Artillery
Engineer Operations
NBC Protection
Chapter 4 MANEUVER
Section I — Movement and Mobility
Mounted Movement
Dismounted Movement
Mobility
Special Purpose Teams
Section II — Offensive Operations
Planning Considerations
Preparation
Forms of Maneuver
Movement to Contact
Attack
Exploitation and Pursuit
Motti Tactics

Section III — Defensive Operations
Preparation
Organization of the Defense
Reverse Slope Defense
Retrograde Operations
Stay-Behind Operations
Chapter 5 LOGISTICS AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Section I — Planning Considerations
Section II — Supply
Supply Routes
Classes of Supply
Section III — Transportation and Maintenance
Section IV — Personnel Support
Section V — Combat Health Support
Planning
Evacuation
Mountain Evacuation Teams
Treatment
Appendix
MOUNTAIN ILLNESSES AND INJURIES
A
Chronic Fatigue (Energy Depletion)

Dehydration
Giardiasis (Parasitical Illness)
Hypoxia
Acute Mountain Sickness (AMS)
High Altitude Pulmonary Edema (HAPE)
High Altitude Cerebral Edema (HACE)
Appendix
FORECASTING WEATHER IN THE MOUNTAINS
B
Indicators of Changing Weather
Applying the Indicators
GLOSSARY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
AUTHENTICATION
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release: distribution is unlimited.
* This publication supersedes FM 90-6, 30 June 1980.

FM 3-97.6 PREFACE
RDL Table of Document Download

Homepage Contents Information Instructions
Preface
FM 3-97.6 describes the tactics, techniques, and procedures that the United States (US)
Army uses to fight in mountainous regions. It is directly linked to doctrinal principles
found in FM 3-0 and FM 3-100.40 and should be used in conjunction with them. It
provides key information and considerations for commanders and staffs regarding how
mountains affect personnel, equipment, and operations. It also assists them in planning,
preparing, and executing operations, battles, and engagements in a mountainous
environment.
Army units do not routinely train for operations in a mountainous environment. Therefore,
commanders and trainers at all levels should use this manual in conjunction with TC 90-6-
1, Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) mission training plans, and the
training principles in FM 7-0 and FM 7-10 when preparing to conduct operations in
mountainous terrain.
The proponent of this publication is Headquarters TRADOC. Send comments and

recommendations on DA Form 2028 directly to Commander, US Army Combined Arms
Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-SWW, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-
6900.
Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer
exclusively to men.
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FM 3-97.6 INTRODUCTION

Introduction
The US Army has a global area of responsibility and deploys to accomplish missions in
both violent and nonviolent environments. The contemporary strategic environment and
the scope of US commitment dictate that the US Army be prepared for a wide range of
contingencies anywhere in the world, from the deserts of southwest Asia and the jungles of
South America and southeast Asia to the Korean Peninsula and central and northern
Europe. The multiplicity of possible missions makes the likelihood of US involvement in
mountain operations extremely high. With approximately 38 percent of the world's
landmass classified as mountains, the Army must be prepared to deter conflict, resist
coercion, and defeat aggression in mountains as in other areas.
Throughout the course of history, armies have been significantly affected by the
requirement to fight in mountains. During the 1982 Falkland Islands (Malvinas) War, the
first British soldier to set foot on enemy-held territory on the island of South Georgia did
so on a glacier. A 3,000-meter (10,000-foot) peak crowns the island, and great glaciers
descend from the mountain spine. In southwest Asia, the borders of Iraq, Iran, and Turkey
come together in mountainous terrain with elevations of up to 3,000 meters (10,000 feet).
Mountainous terrain influenced the outcome of many battles during the Iran-Iraq war of
the 1980s. In the mountains of Kurdistan, small Kurdish formations took advantage of the
terrain in an attempt to survive the Iraqi Army’s attempt to eliminate them. In the wake of
the successful United Nations (UN) coalition effort against Iraq, US forces provided
humanitarian assistance to Kurdish people suffering from the effects of the harsh mountain
climate.
Major mountain ranges, which are found in desert regions, jungles, and cold climate zones,
present many challenges to military operations. Mountain operations may require special
equipment, special training, and acclimatization. Historically, the focus of mountain
operations has been to control the heights or passes. Changes in weaponry, equipment, and
technology have not significantly shifted this focus. Commanders should understand a
broad range of different requirements imposed by mountain terrain, including two key
characteristics addressed in this manual: (1) the significant impact of severe environmental
conditions on the capabilities of units and their equipment, and (2) the extreme difficulty
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FM 3-97.6 INTRODUCTION
of ground mobility in mountainous terrain.
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FM 3-97.6 Chptr 1 Intelligence

Chapter 1
Intelligence
Before they can understand how to fight in mountainous environment, commanders must analyze the area
of operations (AO), understand its distinct characteristics, and understand how these characteristics affect
personnel and equipment. This chapter provides detailed information on terrain and weather necessary to
conduct a thorough intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), however, the IPB process remains
unaffected by mountains (see FM 2-01.3 for detailed information on how to conduct IPB).
SECTION I — THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT
1-1. The requirement to conduct

military operations in
mountainous regions presents
Contents
commanders with challenges
distinct from those encountered in Section I — The Physical Environment
less rugged environments and Terrain
demands increased perseverance, Weather
strength, will, and courage. Section II — Effects on Personnel
Terrain characterized by steep Nutrition
slopes, great variations in local Altitude
relief, natural obstacles, and lack
Cold
of accessible routes restricts
Section III — Effects on Equipment
mobility, drastically increases
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movement times, limits the General Effects

effectiveness of some weapons, Small Arms
and complicates supply Machine Guns
operations. The weather, variable Antitank Weapons
with the season and time of day,
Section IV — Reconnaissance and
combined with the terrain, can
greatly affect mobility and tactical Surveillance
operations. Even under nonviolent Reconnaissance
conditions, operations in a Surveillance
mountainous environment may
pose significant risks and dangers.
TERRAIN
1-2. Mountains may rise abruptly from the plains to form a giant barrier or ascend gradually
as a series of parallel ridges extending unbroken for great distances. They may consist of
varying combinations of isolated peaks, rounded crests, eroded ridges, high plains cut by
valleys, gorges, and deep ravines. Some mountains, such as those found in desert regions,
are dry and barren, with temperatures ranging from extreme heat in the summer to extreme
cold in the winter. In tropical regions, lush jungles with heavy seasonal rains and little
temperature variation frequently cover mountains. High, rocky crags with glaciated peaks
and year-round snow cover exist in mountain ranges at most latitudes along the western
portion of the Americas and in Asia. No matter what form mountains take, their common
denominator is rugged terrain.
MOUNTAINOUS REGIONS
1-3. The principal mountain ranges of the world lie along the broad belts shown in Figure 1-
1. Called cordillera, after the Spanish word for rope, they encircle the Pacific basin and then
lead westward across Eurasia into North Africa. Secondary, though less rugged, chains of
mountains lie along the Atlantic margins of America and Europe.

Figure 1-1. Mountain Regions of the World
1-4. A broad mountainous region approximately 1,600 kilometers wide dominates

northwestern North America. It occupies much of Alaska, more than a quarter of Canada
and the US, and all but a small portion of Mexico and Central America. The Rocky
Mountain Range includes extensive high plains and basins. Numerous peaks in this belt rise
above 3,000 meters (10,000 feet). Its climate varies from arctic cold to tropical heat, with
the full range of seasonal and local extremes.
1-5. Farther south, the Andes stretch as a continuous narrow band along the western region
of South America. Narrower than its counterpart in the north, this range is less than 800
kilometers wide. However, it continuously exceeds an elevation of 3,000 meters (10,000
feet) for a distance of 3,200 kilometers.
1-6. In its western extreme, the Eurasian mountain belt includes the Pyrenees, Alps,
Balkans, and Carpathian ranges of Europe. These loosely linked systems are separated by
broad low basins and are cut by numerous valleys. The Atlas Mountains of North Africa are
also a part of this belt. Moving eastward into Asia, this system becomes more complex as it
reaches the extreme heights of the Hindu Kush and the Himalayas. Just beyond the Pamir
Knot on the Russian-Afghan frontier, it begins to fan out across all parts of eastern Asia.
Branches of this belt continue south along the rugged island chains to New Zealand and
northeast through the Bering Sea to Alaska.
MOUNTAIN CHARACTERISTICS
1-7. Mountain slopes generally vary between 15 and 45 degrees. Cliffs and other rocky
precipices may be near vertical, or even overhanging. Aside from obvious rock formations

and other local vegetation characteristics, actual slope surfaces are usually found as some
type of relatively firm earth or grass. Grassy slopes may include grassy clumps known as
tussocks, short alpine grasses, or tundra (the latter more common at higher elevations and
latitudes). Many slopes will be scattered with rocky debris deposited from the higher peaks
and ridges. Extensive rock or boulder fields are known as talus. Slopes covered with smaller
rocks, usually fist-sized or smaller, are called scree fields. Slopes covered in talus often
prove to be a relatively easy ascent route. On the other hand, climbing a scree slope can be
extremely difficult, as the small rocks tend to loosen easily and give way. However, this
characteristic often makes scree fields excellent descent routes. Before attempting to
descend scree slopes, commanders should carefully analyze the potential for creating
dangerous rockfall and take necessary avoidance measures.
1-8. In winter, and at higher elevations throughout the year, snow may blanket slopes,
creating an environment with its own distinct affects. Some snow conditions can aid travel
by covering rough terrain with a consistent surface. Deep snow, however, greatly impedes
movement and requires soldiers well-trained in using snowshoes, skis, and over-snow
vehicles. Steep snow covered terrain presents the risk of snow avalanches as well. Snow can
pose a serious threat to soldiers not properly trained and equipped for movement under such
conditions. Avalanches have taken the lives of more soldiers engaged in mountain warfare
than all other terrain hazards combined.
1-9. Commanders operating in arctic and subarctic mountain regions, as well as the upper
elevations of the world’s high mountains, may be confronted with vast areas of glaciation.
Valleys in these areas are frequently buried under massive glaciers and present additional
hazards, such as hidden crevices and ice and snow avalanches. The mountain slopes of these
peaks are often glaciated and their surfaces are generally composed of varying combinations
of rock, snow, and ice. Although glaciers have their own peculiar hazards requiring special
training and equipment, movement over valley glaciers is often the safest route through
these areas (TC 90-6-1 contains more information on avalanches and glaciers, and their
effects on operations).
MOUNTAIN CLASSIFICATIONS
1-10. There is no simple system available to classify mountain environments. Soil

composition, surface configuration, elevation, latitude, and climatic patterns determine the
specific characteristics of each major mountain range. When alerted to the potential
requirement to conduct mountain operations, commanders must carefully analyze each of
these characteristics for the specific mountain region in which their forces will operate.
However, mountains are generally classified or described according to their local relief; for
military purposes, they may be classified according to operational terrain levels and
dismounted mobility and skill requirements.
Local Relief

1-11. Mountains are commonly classified as low or high, depending on their local relief and,
to some extent, elevation. Low mountains have a local relief of 300 to 900 meters (1,000 to
3,000 feet) with summits usually below the timberline. High mountains have a local relief
usually exceeding 900 meters (3,000 feet) and are characterized by barren alpine zones
above the timberline. Glaciers and perennial snow cover are common in high mountains and
usually present commanders with more obstacles and hazards to movement than do low
mountains.
Operational Terrain Levels
1-12. Mountain operations are

generally carried out at three Level Description
different operational terrain levels The bottoms of valleys and main lines of
(see Figure 1-2). Level I terrain is I
communications
located at the bottom of valleys The ridges, slopes, and passes that overlook
and along the main lines of II
valleys
communications. At this level,
III The dominant terrain of the summit region
heavy forces can operate, but
maneuver space is often
restricted. Light and heavy forces Figure 1-2. Operational Terrain Levels
are normally combined, since
vital lines of communication usually follow the valley highways, roads, and trails.
1-13. Level II terrain lies between valleys and shoulders of mountains. Generally, narrow
roads and trails, which serve as secondary lines of communication, cross this ridge system.
Ground mobility is difficult and light forces will expend great effort on these ridges, since
they can easily influence operations at Level I. Similarly, enemy positions at the next level
can threaten operations on these ridges.
1-14. Level III includes the dominant terrain of summit regions. Although summit regions
may contain relatively gentle terrain, mobility in Level III is usually the most difficult to
achieve and maintain. Level III terrain, however, can provide opportunities for well-trained
units to attack the enemy from the flanks and rear. At this terrain level, acclimatized soldiers
with advanced mountaineering training can infiltrate to attack lines of communication,
logistics bases, air defense sites, and command infrastructures.
Dismounted Mobility Classification
1-15. When conducting mountain operations, commanders must clearly understand the
effect the operational terrain level has on dismounted movement. Therefore, in addition to
the general mobility classification contained in FM 2-01.3 (unrestricted, restricted, severely
restricted), mountainous terrain may be categorized into five classes based on the type of

individual movement skill required (see Figure 1-3). Operations conducted in class 1 and 2
terrain require little to no mountaineering skills. Operations in class 3, 4, and 5 terrain
require a higher level of mountaineering skills for safe and efficient movement.
Commanders should plan and prepare for mountain operations based, in large part, on this
type of terrain analysis.
Class Terrain Mobility Requirements Skill Level Required*
1 Gentler slopes/ trails Walking techniques Unskilled (with some assistance)

2 Steeper/rugged terrain Some use of hands and Basic Mountaineers
3 Easy climbing Fixed ropes where exposed Basic Mountaineers (with assistance
4 Steep/exposed climbing Fixed ropes required from assault climbers)
5 Near vertical Technical climbing required Assault Climbers
* See Chapter 2 for a discussion of mountaineering skill levels
Figure 1-3. Dismounted Mobility Classification
WEATHER
1-16. In general, mountain climates tend to be cooler, wetter versions of the climates of the
surrounding lowlands. Most mountainous regions exhibit at least two different climatic
zones — a zone at low elevations and another at elevations nearer the summit regions. In
some areas, an almost endless variety of local climates may exist within a given
mountainous region. Conditions change markedly with elevation, latitude, and exposure to
atmospheric winds and air masses. In addition, the climatic patterns of two ranges located at
the same latitude may differ radically.
1-17. Like most other landforms, oceans influence mountain climates. Mountain ranges in
close proximity to oceans and other large bodies of water usually exhibit a maritime climate.
Maritime climates generally produce milder temperatures and much larger amounts of rain
and snow. Their relatively mild winters produce heavy snowfalls, while their summer
temperatures rarely get excessively hot. Mountains farther inland usually display a more
continental climate. Winters in this type climate are often bitterly cold, while summers can
be extremely hot. Annual rain- and snowfall here is far less than in a maritime climate and
may be quite scarce for long periods. Relatively shallow snow-packs are normal during a
continental climate’s winter season.
1-18. Major mountain ranges force air masses and storm systems to drop significant

amounts of rain and snow on the windward side of the range. As air masses pass over
mountains, the leeward slopes receive far less precipitation than the windward slopes. It is
not uncommon for the climate on the windward side of a mountain range to be humid and
the climate on the leeward side arid. This phenomenon affects coastal mountains, as well as
mountains farther inland. The deepest winter snow-packs will almost always be found on
the windward side of mountain ranges. As a result, vegetation and forest characteristics may
be markedly different between these two areas. Prevailing winds and storm patterns
normally determine the severity of these effects.
1-19. Mountain weather can be erratic, varying from strong winds to calm, and from
extreme cold to relative warmth within a short time or a minor shift in locality. The severity
and variance of the weather require soldiers to be prepared for alternating periods of heat
and cold, as well as conditions ranging from dry to extremely wet. At higher elevations,
noticeable temperature differences may exist between sunny and shady areas or between
areas exposed to wind and those protected from it. This greatly increases every soldier’s
clothing load and a unit’s overall logistical requirements. Figure 1-4 summarizes the effects
of mountain weather discussed below. FM 2-33.201 and FM 3-97.22 contain additional
information on how weather affects operations.
Flat to Moderate Terrain

Weather Condition Added Mountain Effects
Effects
● Increased risk of sunburn

● Sunburn and snow blindness
● Snow blindness ● Severe, unexpected
Sunshine ● Temperature differences temperature variations
between sun and shade between sun and shade
● Avalanches
● Increased risk and

severity of windchill
● Blowing debris or driven
● Windchill
Wind snow causing reduced
visibility
● Avalanches
● Landslides
● Reduced visibility
● Flash floods
Rain ● Cooler temperatures
● Avalanches

● Cold weather injuries

● Increased risk and
● Reduced mobility and
severity of common
visibility
Snow effects
● Snow blindness
● Avalanches
● Blowing snow
● Extended duration and

intensity greatly affecting
● Rain/snow
visibility and mobilit
● Reduced visibility
Storms y
● Lightning
● Extremely high winds
● Avalanches
● Reduced ● Increased frequency and

Fog mobility/visibility duration
● Greatly decreased
● Reduced visibility visibility at higher
Cloudiness
elevations
Figure 1-4. Comparison of Weather Effects
TEMPERATURE
1-20. Normally, soldiers encounter a temperature drop of three to five degrees Fahrenheit
per 300-meter (1,000-foot) gain in elevation. In an atmosphere containing considerable
water vapor, the temperature drops about one degree Fahrenheit for every 100-meter (300-
foot) increase. In very dry air, it drops about one degree Fahrenheit for every 50 meters (150
feet). However, on cold, clear, and calm mornings, when a troop movement or climb begins
from a valley, soldiers may encounter higher temperatures as they gain elevation. This
reversal of the normal situation is called temperature inversion. Additionally, during winter
months, the temperature is often higher during a storm than during periods of clear weather.
However, the dampness of precipitation and penetration of the wind may still cause soldiers
to chill faster. This is compounded by the fact that the cover afforded by vegetation often
does not exist above the tree-line. Under these conditions, commanders must weigh the
tactical advantage of retaining positions on high ground against seeking shelter and warmth
at lower elevations with reduced visibility.
1-21. At high elevations, there may be differences of 40 to 50 degrees Fahrenheit between

the temperature in the sun and that in the shade. This is similar in magnitude to the day-to-
night temperature fluctuations experienced in some deserts (see FM 3-97.3). Besides
permitting rapid heating, the clear air at high altitudes also results in rapid cooling at night.
Consequently, temperatures rise swiftly after sunrise and drop quickly after sunset. Much of
the chilled air drains downward so that the differences between day and night temperatures
are greater in valleys than on slopes.
WIND
1-22. In high mountains, the ridges and passes are seldom calm. By contrast, strong winds in
protected valleys are rare. Normally, wind velocity increases with altitude and is intensified
by mountainous terrain. Valley breezes moving up-slope are more common in the morning,
while descending mountain breezes are more common in the evening. Wind speed increases
when winds are forced over ridges and peaks (orographic lifting), or when they funnel
through narrowing mountain valleys, passes, and canyons (Venturi effect). Wind may blow
with great force on an exposed mountainside or summit. As wind speed doubles, its force on
an object nearly quadruples.
1-23. Mountain winds cause rapid temperature changes and may result in blowing snow,
sand, or debris that can impair movement and observation. Commanders should routinely
consider the combined cooling effect of ambient temperature and wind (windchill)
experienced by their soldiers (see Figure 1-5). At higher elevations, air is considerably dryer
than air at sea level. Due to this increased dryness, soldiers must increase their fluid intake
by approximately one-third. However, equipment will not rust as quickly, and organic
matter will decompose more slowly.

Figure 1-5. Windchill Chart
PRECIPITATION
1-24. The rapid rise of air masses over mountains creates distinct local weather patterns.
Precipitation in mountains increases with elevation and occurs more often on the windward
than on the leeward side of ranges. Maximum cloudiness and precipitation generally occur
near 1,800 meters (6,000 feet) elevation in the middle latitudes and at lower levels in the
higher latitudes. Usually, a heavily wooded belt marks the zone of maximum precipitation.
Rain and Snow
1-25. Both rain and snow are common in mountainous regions. Rain presents the same
challenges as at lower elevations, but snow has a more significant influence on all
operations. Depending on the specific region, snow may occur at anytime during the year at
elevations above 1,500 meters (5,000 feet). Heavy snowfall greatly increases avalanche
hazards and can force changes to previously selected movement routes. In certain regions,
the intensity of snowfall may delay major operations for several months. Dry, flat riverbeds
may initially seem to be excellent locations for assembly areas and support activities,
however, heavy rains and rapidly thawing snow and ice may create flash floods many miles
downstream from the actual location of the rain or snow.

Thunderstorms
1-26. Although thunderstorms are local and usually last only a short time, they can impede
mountain operations. Interior ranges with continental climates are more conducive to
thunderstorms than coastal ranges with maritime climates. In alpine zones, driving snow and
sudden wind squalls often accompany thunderstorms. Ridges and peaks become focal points
for lightning strikes, and the occurrence of lightning is greater in the summer than the
winter. Although statistics do not show lightning to be a major mountaineering hazard, it
should not be ignored and soldiers should take normal precautions, such as avoiding
summits and ridges, water, and contact with metal objects.
Traveling Storms
1-27. Storms resulting from widespread atmospheric disturbances involve strong winds and
heavy precipitation and are the most severe weather condition that occurs in the mountains.
If soldiers encounter a traveling storm in alpine zones during winter, they should expect low
temperatures, high winds, and blinding snow. These conditions may last several days longer
than in the lowlands. Specific conditions vary depending on the path of the storm. However,
when colder weather moves in, clearing at high elevations is usually slow.
Fog
1-28. The effects of fog in mountains are much the same as in other terrain. However,
because of the topography, fog occurs more frequently in the mountains. The high incidence
of fog makes it a significant planning consideration as it restricts visibility and observation
complicating reconnaissance and surveillance. However, fog may help facilitate covert
operations such as infiltration. Routes in areas with a high occurrence of fog may need to be
marked and charted to facilitate passage.
SECTION II — EFFECTS ON PERSONNEL
1-29. The mountain environment is complex and unforgiving of errors. Soldiers conducting
operations anywhere, even under the best conditions, become cold, thirsty, tired, and energy-
depleted. In the mountains however, they may become paralyzed by cold and thirst and
incapacitated due to utter exhaustion. Conditions such as high elevations, rough terrain, and
extremely unpredictable weather require leaders and soldiers who have a keen
understanding of environmental threats and what to do about them.
1-30. A variety of individual soldier characteristics and environmental conditions influence

the type, prevalence, and severity of mountain illnesses and injuries (see Figure 1-6). Due to
combinations of these characteristics and conditions, soldiers often succumb to more than

one illness or injury at a

time, increasing the
danger to life and limb.
Three of the most
common, cumulative,
and subtle factors
affecting soldier ability
under these variable
conditions are nutrition
(to include water
intake), decreased
oxygen due to high
altitude, and cold.
Preventive measures,
early recognition, and
rapid treatment help
minimize nonbattle
casualties due to these
conditions (see
Appendix A for detailed Figure 1-6. Environmental and Soldier Conditions Influencing
information on Mountain Injuries and Illnesses
mountain-specific illnesses and injuries).
NUTRITION
1-31. Poor nutrition contributes to illness or injury, decreased performance, poor morale,
and susceptibility to cold injuries, and can severely affect military operations. Influences at
high altitudes that can affect nutrition include a dulled taste sensation (making food
undesirable), nausea, and lack of energy or motivation to prepare or eat meals.
1-32. Caloric requirements increase in the mountains due to both the altitude and the cold. A
diet high in fat and carbohydrates is important in helping the body fight the effects of these
conditions. Fats provide long-term, slow caloric release, but are often unpalatable to soldiers
operating at higher altitudes. Snacking on high-carbohydrate foods is often the best way to
maintain the calories necessary to function.
1-33. Products that can seriously impact soldier performance in mountain operations
include:
● Tobacco. Tobacco smoke interferes with oxygen delivery by reducing the blood’s
oxygen-carrying capacity. Tobacco smoke in close, confined spaces increases the
amounts of carbon monoxide. The irritant effect of tobacco smoke may produce a
narrowing of airways, interfering with optimal air movement. Smoking can

effectively raise the "physiological altitude" as much as several hundred meters.

● Alcohol. Alcohol impairs judgement and perception, depresses respiration, causes
dehydration, and increases susceptibility to cold injury.
● Caffeine. Caffeine may improve physical and mental performance, but it also causes
increased urination (leading to dehydration) and, therefore, should be consumed in
moderation.
1-34. Significant body water is lost at higher elevations from rapid breathing, perspiration,
and urination. Depending upon level of exertion, each soldier should consume about four to
eight quarts of water or other decaffeinated fluids per day in low mountains and may need
ten quarts or more per day in high mountains. Thirst is not a good indicator of the amount of
water lost, and in cold climates sweat, normally an indicator of loss of fluid, goes unnoticed.
Sweat evaporates so rapidly or is absorbed so thoroughly by clothing layers that it is not
readily apparent. When soldiers become thirsty, they are already dehydrated. Loss of
body water also plays a major role in causing altitude sickness and cold injury. Forced
drinking in the absence of thirst, monitoring the deepness of the yellow hue in the urine, and
watching for behavioral symptoms common to altitude sickness are important factors for
commanders to consider in assessing the water balance of soldiers operating in the
mountains.
1-35. In the mountains, as elsewhere, refilling each soldier's water containers as often as
possible is mandatory. No matter how pure and clean mountain water may appear, water
from natural sources should always be purified or chemically sterilized to prevent parasitical
illnesses (giardiasis). Commanders should consider requiring the increased use of individual
packages of powdered drink mixes, fruit, and juices to help encourage the required fluid
intake.
ALTITUDE
1-36. As soldiers ascend in altitude, the proportion of oxygen in the air decreases. Without
proper acclimatization, this decrease in oxygen saturation can cause altitude sickness and
reduced physical and mental performance (see Figure 1-7). Soldiers cannot maintain the
same physical performance at high altitude that they can at low altitude, regardless of their
fitness level.
Altitude Meters Feet Effects
Low Sea Level — 1,500 Sea Level — 5,000 None.
Mild, temporary altitude

Moderate 1,500 — 2,400 5,000 — 8,000
sickness may occur

Altitude sickness and

High 2,400 — 4,200 8,000 — 14,000 decreased performance
is increasingly common
Altitude sickness and

Very High 4,200 — 5,400 14,000 — 18,000 decreased performance
is the rule
With acclimatization,
Extreme 5,400 — Higher 18,000 - Higher soldiers can function for
short periods of time
Figure 1-7. Effects of Altitude
1-37. The mental effects most noticeable at high altitudes include decreased perception,
memory, judgement, and attention. Exposure to altitudes of over 3,000 meters (10,000 feet)
may also result in changes in senses, mood, and personality. Within hours of ascent, many
soldiers may experience euphoria, joy, and excitement that are likely to be accompanied by
errors in judgement, leading to mistakes and accidents. After a period of about 6 to 12 hours,
euphoria decreases, often changing to varying degrees of depression. Soldiers may become
irritable or may appear listless. Using the buddy system during this early exposure helps to
identify soldiers who may be more severely affected. High morale and esprit instilled before
deployment and reinforced frequently help to minimize the impact of negative mood
changes.
1-38. The physical effect most noticeable at high altitudes includes vision. Vision is
generally the sense most affected by altitude exposure and can potentially affect military
operations at higher elevations. Night vision is significantly reduced, affecting soldiers at
approximately 2,400 meters (8,000 feet) or higher. Some effects occur early and are
temporary, while others may persist after acclimatization or even for a period of time after
descent. To compensate for loss of functional abilities, commanders should make use of
tactics, techniques, and procedures that trade speed for increased accuracy. By allowing
extra time to accomplish tasks, commanders can minimize errors and injuries.
HYPOXIA-RELATED ILLNESSES AND EFFECTS
1-39. Hypoxia, a deficiency of oxygen reaching the tissues of the body, has been the cause
of many mountain illnesses, injuries, and deaths. It affects everyone, but some soldiers are
more vulnerable than others. A soldier may be affected at one time but not at another.
Altitude hypoxia is a killer, but it seldom strikes alone. The combination of improper
nutrition, hypoxia, and cold is much more dangerous than any of them alone. The three most
significant altitude-related illnesses and their symptoms, which are essentially a series of
illnesses associated with oxygen deprivation, are:

● Acute Mountain Sickness (AMS). Headache, nausea, vomiting, fatigue, irritability,

and dizziness.
● High Altitude Pulmonary Edema (HAPE). Coughing, noisy breathing, wheezing,
gurgling in the airway, difficulty breathing, and pink frothy sputum (saliva).
Ultimately coma and death will occur without treatment.
● High Altitude Cerebral Edema (HACE). HACE is the most severe illness associated
with high altitudes. Its symptoms often resemble AMS (severe headache, nausea,
vomiting), often with more dramatic signals such as a swaying of the upper body,
especially when walking, and an increasingly deteriorating mental status. Early
mental symptoms may include confusion, disorientation, vivid hallucinations, and
drowsiness. Soldiers may appear to be withdrawn or demonstrate behavior generally
associated with fatigue or anxiety. Like HAPE, coma or death will occur without
treatment.
OTHER MOUNTAIN-RELATED ILLNESSES
1-40. Other illnesses and effects related to the mountain environment and higher elevations
are:
● Subacute mountain sickness. Subacute mountain sickness occurs in some soldiers

during prolonged deployments (weeks/months) to elevations above 3,600 meters
(12,000 feet). Symptoms include sleep disturbance, loss of appetite, weight loss, and
fatigue. This condition reflects a failure to acclimatize adequately.
● Carbon monoxide poisoning. Carbon monoxide poisoning is caused by the inefficient
fuel combustion resulting from the low oxygen content of air and higher usage of
stoves, combustion heaters, and engines in enclosed, poorly ventilated spaces.
● Sleep disturbances. High altitude has significant harmful effects on sleep. The most
prominent effects are frequent periods of apnea (temporary suspension of respiration)
and fragmented sleep. Sleep disturbances may last for weeks at elevations less than
5,400 meters (18,000 feet) and may never stop at higher elevations. These effects
have even been reported as low as 1,500 meters (5,000 feet).
● Poor wound healing. Poor wound healing resulting from lowered immune functions
may occur at higher elevations. Injuries resulting from burns, cuts, or other sources
may require descent for effective treatment and healing.
ACCLIMATIZATION
1-41. Altitude acclimatization involves physiological changes that permit the body to adapt
to the effects of low oxygen saturation in the air. It allows soldiers to achieve the maximum
physical work performance possible for the altitude to which they are acclimatized. Once
acquired, acclimatization is maintained as long as the soldier remains at that altitude, but is
lost upon returning to lower elevations. Acclimatization to one altitude does not prevent

altitude illnesses from occurring if ascent to higher altitudes is too rapid.
1-42. Getting used to living and working at higher

altitudes requires acclimatization. Figure 1-8 shows the ● Altitude
four factors that affect acclimatization in mountainous ● Rate of Ascent
terrain. These factors are similar to those a scuba diver ● Duration of Stay
must consider, and the consequences of an error can be ● Level of Exertion
just as severe. In particular, high altitude climbing must
be carefully paced and staged in the same way that
divers must pace and stage their ascent to the surface. Figure 1-8. Factors Affecting
Acclimatization
1-43. For most soldiers at high to very high altitudes,
70 to 80 percent of the respiratory component of acclimatization occurs in 7 to 10 days, 80
to 90 percent of overall acclimatization is generally accomplished by 21 to 30 days, and
maximum acclimatization may take several months to years. However, some soldiers may
acclimatize more rapidly than others, and a few soldiers may not acclimatize at all. There is
no absolute way to identify soldiers who cannot acclimatize, except by their experience
during previous altitude exposures.
1-44. Commanders must be aware that highly fit, motivated individuals may go too high too
fast and become victims of AMS, HAPE, or HACE. Slow and easy climbing, limited
activity, and long rest periods are critical to altitude acclimatization. Leaves that involve
soldiers descending to lower altitudes and then returning should be limited. Acclimatization
may be accomplished by either a staged or graded ascent. A combination of the two is the
safest and most effective method for prevention of high altitude illnesses.
● Staged Ascent. A staged ascent requires soldiers to ascend to a moderate altitude and
remain there for 3 days or more to acclimatize before ascending higher (the longer
the duration, the more effective and thorough the acclimatization to that altitude).
When possible, soldiers should make several stops for staging during ascent to allow
a greater degree of acclimatization.
● Graded Ascent. A graded ascent limits the daily altitude gain to allow partial
acclimatization. The altitude at which soldiers sleep is the critical element in this
regard. Having soldiers spend two nights at 2,700 meters (9,000 feet) and limiting the
sleeping altitude to no more than 300 meters per day (1,000 feet) above the previous
night’s sleeping altitude will significantly reduce the incidence of altitude sickness.
1-45. In situations where there is insufficient time for a staged or graded ascent,
commanders may consider using the drug acetazolamide to help accelerate acclimatization;
however, commanders must ensure soldiers are acclimatized before they are committed to
combat. When used appropriately, it will prevent symptoms of AMS in nearly all soldiers
and reduce symptoms in most others. It has also been found to improve sleep quality at high
altitudes. However, commanders should consult physicians trained in high-altitude or

wilderness medicine concerning doses, side effects, and screening of individuals who may
be allergic. As a non-pharmacological method, high carbohydrate diets (whole grains,
vegetables, peas and beans, potatoes, fruits, honey, and refined sugar) are effective in aiding
acclimatization.
COLD
1-46. After illnesses related to not being

acclimatized, cold injuries, both freezing and ● Frostbite (freezing)
nonfreezing, are generally the greatest threat. ● Hypothermia
Temperature and humidity decrease with increasing (nonfreezing)
altitude. Reviewing cold weather injury prevention, ● Trench/immersion Foot
training in shelter construction, dressing in layers, (nonfreezing)
and using the buddy system are critical and may ● Snow Blindness
preclude large numbers of debilitating injuries.
Figure 1-9 lists the cold and snow injuries most
common to mountain operations. See FM 3-97.11 Figure 1-9. Common Cold
Weather Injuries
and FM 4-25.11 for information regarding causes,
symptoms, treatment, and prevention.
1-47. Altitude sickness and cold injuries can occur simultaneously, with signs and
symptoms being confused with each other. Coughing, stumbling individuals should be
immediately evacuated to medical support at lower levels to determine their medical
condition. Likewise, soldiers in extreme pain from cold injuries who do not respond to
normal pain medications, require evacuation. Without constant vigilance, cold injuries may
significantly limit the number of deployable troops and drastically reduce combat power.
However, with command emphasis and proper equipment, clothing, and training, all cold-
weather injuries are preventable.
SECTION III — EFFECTS ON EQUIPMENT
1-48. No manual can cover the effects of terrain and weather on every weapon and item of
equipment within the Army inventory. Although not all-encompassing, the list at Figure 1-
10 contains factors that commanders should take into account when considering the effect
the mountainous environment may have on their weapons and equipment. Of these, the most
important factor is the combined effects of the environment on the soldier and his
subsequent ability to operate and maintain his weapons and equipment. Increasingly
sophisticated equipment requires soldiers that are mentally alert and physically capable.
Failure to consider this important factor often results in severe injury, lowered weapons and
equipment performance, and mission failure. The information provided within this manual,
combined with the information found in weapon-specific field manuals (FMs) and technical
manuals (TMs), provides the information necessary to know how to modify tactics,

techniques, and procedures to win

on the mountain battlefield. ● Operator/Maintenance Personnel
● Line-of-Sight
GENERAL EFFECTS ● Range
● Thermal Contrast
● Ballistics and Trajectory
1-49. In a mountainous
● Target Detection and Acquisition
environment, the speed and
● First Round Hit Capability
occurrence of wind generally
● Camouflage and Concealment/Noise
increase with elevation, and the
● Mobility
effects of wind increase with
● Wear and Maintenance
range (depending on the speed
● Aerodynamics and Lift
and direction). Due to these
● Functioning and Reliability
factors, soldiers must be taught
● Positioning/Site Selection
the effects of wind on ballistics
and how to compensate for them.
In cold weather, firing weapons
often creates ice fog trails. These Figure 1-10. Weapons and Equipment Factors
ice fog trails obscure vision and, Affected by the Environment
at the same time, allow the enemy
to more easily discern the location of primary positions and the overall structure of a unit’s
defense. This situation increases the importance of alternate and supplementary firing
positions.
1-50. Range estimation in mountainous terrain is difficult. Depending upon the type of
terrain in the mountains, soldiers may either over- or underestimate range. Soldiers
observing over smooth terrain, such as sand, water, or snow, generally underestimate ranges.
This results in attempting to engage targets beyond the maximum effective ranges of their
weapon systems. Looking downhill, targets appear to be farther away and looking uphill,
they appear to be closer. This illusion, combined with the effects of gravity, causes the
soldier shooting downhill to fire high, while it has the opposite effect on soldiers shooting
uphill.
1-51. Higher elevations generally afford increased observation but low-hanging clouds and
fog may decrease visibility, and the rugged nature of mountain terrain may produce
significant dead space at mid-ranges. These effects mean that more observation posts are
necessary to cover a given frontage in mountainous terrain than in non-mountainous terrain.
They also require the routine designation of supplementary firing positions for direct fire
weapons. Rugged terrain also makes ammunition resupply more difficult and increases the
need to enforce strict fire control and discipline. Finally, the rugged environment creates
compartmented areas that may preclude mutual support and reduce supporting distances.
SMALL ARMS

1-52. In rocky mountainous terrain, the effectiveness of small arms fire increases by the
splintering and ricocheting when a bullet strikes a rock. M203 and MK-19 grenade
launchers are useful for covering close-in dead space in mountainous terrain. Hand grenades
are also effective. Although it may seem intuitive, soldiers must still be cautioned against
throwing grenades uphill where they are likely to roll back before detonation. Grenades (as
well as other explosive munitions) lose much of their effectiveness when detonated under
snow, and soldiers should be warned that hand grenades may freeze to wet gloves.
1-53. As elevation increases, air pressure and air density decrease. At higher elevations, a
round is more efficient and strikes a target higher, due to reduced drag. This effect does not
significantly influence the marksmanship performance of most soldiers, however,
designated marksmen and snipers should re-zero their weapons after ascending to higher
elevations. (See FM 3-25.9 and FM 3-23.10 for further information on ballistics and weather
effects on small arms.)
MACHINE GUNS
1-54. Machine guns provide

long-range fire when visibility
is good. However, grazing fire
can rarely be achieved in
mountains because of the
radical changes in elevation.
When grazing fire can be
obtained, the ranges are
normally short. More often,
plunging fire is the result (see
Figure 1-11 and FM 3-21.7). In
mountainous terrain, situations
that prevent indirect fire support
from protecting advancing
forces may arise. When these
occur, the effects of machine-
guns and other direct fire
weapons must be concentrated Figure 1-11. Classes of Fire with Respect to the
to provide adequate supporting Ground
fires for maneuvering elements.
Again, supplementary positions should be routinely prepared to cover different avenues of
approach and dead space.
ANTITANK WEAPONS

1-55. The AT4 is a lightweight antitank weapon ideally suited for the mountainous
environment and for direct fire against enemy weapon emplacements. Anti-tank guided
missiles (ATGMs), such as the Javelin and the tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-
guided, heavy antitank missile system (TOW), tend to hinder dismounted operations
because of their bulk and weight. In very restrictive mountainous terrain, the lack of
armored avenues of approach and suitable targets may limit their utility. If an armored or
mechanized threat is present, TOWs are best used in long-range, antiarmor ambushes, while
the shorter-range Javelin, with its fire-and-forget technology, is best used from restrictive
terrain nearer the kill zone. However, their guidance systems may operate stiffly and
sluggishly in extreme cold weather.
SECTION IV — RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE
RECONNAISSANCE
1-56. During operations in a mountainous environment, reconnaissance is as applicable to

the maneuver of armies and corps as it is to tactical operations. Limited routes, adverse
terrain, and rapidly changing weather significantly increase the importance of
reconnaissance operations to focus fires and maneuver. Failure to conduct effective
reconnaissance will result in units being asked to achieve the impossible or in missed
opportunities for decisive action.
1-57. As in all environments, reconnaissance operations in a mountainous area must be

layered and complementary in order to overcome enemy attempts to deny critical
information to the friendly commander. In order to gather critical and timely information
required by the commander, the activities of reconnaissance assets must be closely
coordinated. Strategic reconnaissance platforms set the stage by identifying key terrain, as
well as the general disposition and composition of enemy forces. Operational level
commanders compare the information provided by strategic assets with their own
requirements and employ reconnaissance assets to fill in the gaps that have not been
answered by strategic systems and achieve the level of detail they require.
1-58. At the beginning of a campaign in a mountainous environment, reconnaissance

requirements will be answered by aerial or overhead platforms, such as satellites, joint
surveillance, target attack radar systems (JSTARSs), U2 aircraft, and unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs). In a mountain AO, it may often be necessary to commit ground
reconnaissance assets in support of strategic and operational information requirements.
Conversely, strategic and operational reconnaissance systems may be employed to identify
or confirm the feasibility of employing ground reconnaissance assets. Special
reconnaissance (SR) and long-range surveillance (LRS) teams may be inserted to gather
information that cannot be collected by overhead systems, or to verify data that has already
been collected. In this instance, satellite imagery is used to analyze a specific area for

insertion for the team. The potential hide positions for the teams are identified using
imagery and, terrain and weather permitting, verified by UAVs. See FM 3-100.55 for
detailed information on combined arms reconnaissance.
1-59. In harsh mountain terrain, ground reconnaissance operations are often conducted
dismounted. Commanders must assess the slower rate of ground reconnaissance elements to
determine its impact on the entire reconnaissance and collection process. They must develop
plans that account for this slower rate and initiate reconnaissance as early as possible to
provide additional time for movement. Commanders may also need to allocate more forces,
including combat forces, to conduct reconnaissance, reconnaissance in force missions, or
limited objective attacks to gain needed intelligence. Based upon mission, enemy, terrain
and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations (METT-TC),
commanders may need to prioritize collection assets, accept risk, and continue with less
information from their initial reconnaissance efforts. In these cases, they must use
formations and schemes of maneuver that provide maximum security and flexibility, to
include robust security formations, and allow for the development of the situation once in
contact.
1-60. Although reconnaissance patrols should normally use the heights to observe the
enemy, it may be necessary to send small reconnaissance teams into valleys or along the low
ground to gain suitable vantage points or physically examine routes that will be used by
mechanized or motorized forces. In mountainous environments, reconnaissance elements are
often tasked to determine:
● The enemy's primary and alternate lines of communication.

● Locations and directions from which the enemy can attack or counterattack.
● Heights that allow the enemy to observe the various sectors of terrain.
● Suitable observation posts for forward observers.
● Portions of the route that provide covert movement.
● Level of mountaineering skill required to negotiate routes (dismounted mobility
classification) and sections of the route that require mountaineering installations.
● Suitability of routes for sustained combat service support (CSS) operations.
● Trails, routes, and bridges that can support or can be improved by engineers in order
to move mechanized elements into areas previously thought to be impassable.
● Bypass routes.
● Potential airborne and air assault drop/pick-up zones and aircraft landing areas.
RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE
1-61. The compartmented geography and inherent mobility restrictions of mountainous

terrain pose significant risk for reconnaissance in force operations. Since the terrain
normally allows enemy units to defend along a much broader front with fewer forces, a
reconnaissance in force may be conducted as a series of smaller attacks to determine the

enemy situation at selected points. Commanders should carefully consider mobility

restrictions that may affect plans for withdrawal or exploitation. Commanders should also
position small reconnaissance elements or employ surveillance systems throughout the
threat area of operations to gauge the enemy’s reaction to friendly reconnaissance in force
operations and alert the force to possible enemy counterattacks. In the mountains, the risk of
having at least a portion of the force cut off and isolated is extremely high. Mobile reserves
and preplanned fires must be available to reduce the risk, decrease the vulnerability of the
force, and exploit any success as it develops.
ENGINEER RECONNAISSANCE
1-62. Engineer reconnaissance assumes greater significance in a mountainous environment

in order to ensure supporting engineers are properly task organized with specialized
equipment for quickly overcoming natural and reinforcing obstacles. Engineer
reconnaissance teams assess the resources required for clearing obstacles on precipitous
slopes, constructing crossing sites at fast-moving streams and rivers, improving and
repairing roads, erecting fortifications, and establishing barriers during the conduct of
defensive operations. Since the restrictive terrain promotes the widespread employment of
point obstacles, engineer elements should be integrated into all mountain reconnaissance
operations.
1-63. In some regions, maps may be unsuitable for tactical planning due to inaccuracies,
limited detail, and inadequate coverage. In these areas, engineer reconnaissance should
precede, but not delay operations. Because rugged mountain terrain makes ground
reconnaissance time-consuming and dangerous, a combination of ground and aerial or
overhead platforms should be used for the engineer reconnaissance effort. Data on the
terrain, vegetation, and soil composition, combined with aerial photographs and
multispectral imagery, allows engineer terrain intelligence teams to provide detailed
information that may be unavailable from other sources.
AERIAL AND OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE
1-64. During all but the most adverse weather conditions, aerial or overhead reconnaissance
may be the best means to gather information and cover large areas that are difficult for
ground units to traverse or observe. Airborne standoff intelligence collection devices, such
as side-looking radar, provide excellent terrain and target isolation imagery. Missions must
be planned to ensure that critical areas are not masked by terrain or other environmental
conditions. Additionally, aerial or overhead photographs may compensate for inadequate
maps and provide the level of detail needed to plan operations. Infrared imagery and
camouflage detection film can be used to determine precise locations of enemy positions,
even at night. Furthermore, AH-64 and OH-58D helicopters can provide commanders with
critical day or night video reconnaissance, utilizing television or forward-looking infrared.

1-65. Terrain may significantly impact the employment of overhead reconnaissance

platforms using radar systems to detect manmade objects. These systems may find
themselves adversely impacted by the masking effect that occurs when the mountain terrain
blocks the radar beam. Thus, the radar coverage may not extend across the reverse slope of a
steep ridge or a valley floor. Attempts to reposition the overhead platform to a point where it
can "see" the masked area may merely result in masking occurring elsewhere. This
limitation does not preclude using such systems; however, the commander should employ
manned or unmanned aerial reconnaissance when available, in conjunction with overhead
reconnaissance platforms in order to minimize these occurrences. The subsequent use of
ground reconnaissance assets to verify the data that can be gathered by overhead and electro-
optical platforms will ensure that commanders do not fall prey to deliberate enemy
deception efforts that capitalize on the limited capabilities of some types of overhead
platforms in this environment.
SURVEILLANCE
1-66. In the mountains, surveillance of vulnerable flanks and gaps between units is
accomplished primarily through well-positioned observation posts (OPs). These OPs are
normally inserted by helicopter and manned by small elements equipped with sensors,
enhanced electro-optical devices, and appropriate communications. Commanders must
develop adequate plans that address not only their insertion, but their continued support and
ultimate extraction. The considerations of METT-TC may dictate that commanders provide
more personnel and assets than other types of terrain to adequately conduct surveillance
missions. Commanders must also ensure that surveillance operations are fully integrated
with reconnaissance efforts in order to provide a3dequate coverage of the AO.
1-67. Long-range surveillance units (LRSUs) and snipers trained in mountain operations
also contribute to surveillance missions and benefit from the restrictive terrain and excellent
line-of-sight. Overhead platforms and air cavalry may also be used for surveillance missions
of limited duration. However, weather may impede air operations, decrease visibility for
both air and ground elements, and reduce the ability of ground surveillance elements to
remain hidden for prolonged periods without adequate logistical support. As with overhead
reconnaissance, terrain may mask overhead surveillance platforms.

FM 3-97.6 Chptr 2 Command and Control

Chapter 2
Command and Control
In the mountains, major axes of advance are

limited to accessible valleys and often separated
by restrictive terrain. The compartmented nature
Contents
of the terrain makes it difficult to switch the
effort from one axis to another or to offer Section I — Assessment of the Situation
mutual support between axes. The battle to Mission
control the major lines of communications of Enemy
Level I develops on the ridges and heights of Terrain and Weather
Level II. In turn, the occupation of the Troops and Support Available
dominating heights in Level II may leave a force Time Available
assailable from the restrictive terrain of Level
Civil Considerations
III. Each operational terrain level influences the
Section II — Leadership
application of tactics, techniques, and
procedures necessary for successful operations. Section III — Communications
Combat Net Radio
In mountainous terrain, it is usually difficult to Mobile Subscriber Equipment
conduct a coordinated battle. Engagements tend Wire and Field Phones
to be isolated, march columns of even small Audio, Visual, and Physical Signals

elements extremely long, and mutual support Messenger

difficult to accomplish. Command and control Section IV — Training
of all available assets is best achieved if Initial Training Assessment
command posts are well forward. However, the
Physical Conditioning
mountainous environment decreases the
commander’s mobility. Therefore, commanders Mountain Living
must be able to develop a clear vision of how Navigation
the battle will unfold, correctly anticipate the Weapons and Equipment
decisive points on the battlefield, and position Camouflage and Concealment
themselves at these critical points. Fortifications
Military Mountaineering
The success of a unit conducting mountain Driver Training
operations depends on how well leaders control Army Aviation
their units. Control is limited largely to a well-
Reconnaissance and Surveillance
thought-out plan and thorough preparation.
Team Development
Boundaries require careful planning in mountain
operations. Heights overlooking valleys should
be included in the boundaries of units capable of exerting the most influence over them. These boundaries
may be difficult to determine initially and may require subsequent adjustment.
During execution, leaders must be able to control direction and speed of movement, maintain proper
intervals, and rapidly start, stop, or shift fire. In the mountains, soldiers focus mainly on negotiating
difficult terrain. Leaders, however, must ensure that their soldiers remain alert for, understand, and follow
signals and orders. Although in most instances audio, visual, wire, physical signals, and messengers are
used to maintain control, operations may be controlled by time as a secondary means. However, realistic
timetables must be based on thorough reconnaissance and sound practical knowledge of the mountain
battlefield.
Commanders must devote careful consideration to the substantial effect the mountain environment may
have on systems that affect their ability to collect, process, store, and disseminate information. Computers,
communications, and other sophisticated electronic equipment are usually susceptible to jars, shocks, and
rough handling associated with the rugged mountain environment. They are also extremely sensitive to the
severe cold often associated with higher elevations. Increased precipitation and moisture may damage
electronic components, and heavy amounts of rain and snow, combined with strong surface winds, may
generate background electronic interference that can reduce the efficiency of intercept/direction finding
antennas and ground surveillance radars. Localized storms with low sustained cloud cover reduce the
effectiveness of most imagery intelligence (IMINT) platforms, to include unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs). The collective effect of mountain weather and terrain diminishes a commander’s ability to
achieve shared situational understanding among his subordinates. However, increased use of human
intelligence (HUMINT), clear orders and intents, and leaders capable of exercising initiative, allow
commanders to dominate the harsh environment of a mountain area of operations.
As in any environment, mountain operations pose both tactical and accident risks. However, since most

units do not routinely train for or operate in the mountains, the level of uncertainty, ambiguity, and friction
is often higher than in less rugged environments. Commanders must be able to identify and assess hazards
that may be encountered in executing their missions, develop and implement control measures to eliminate
unnecessary risk, and continuously supervise and assess to ensure measures are properly executed and
remain appropriate as the situation changes. Although risk decisions are the commanders’ business, staffs,
subordinate leaders, and individual soldiers must also understand the risk management process and must
continuously look for hazards at their level or within their area of expertise. Any risks identified (with
recommended risk reduction measures) must be quickly elevated to the chain of command (see FM 3-
100.14).
SECTION I — ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION
2-1. Although higher-elevation terrain is not always key, the structure of a mountain area of
operations (AO) often forms a stairway of key terrain features. Identification and control of
dominant terrain at each operational terrain level form the basis for successful mountain
maneuver. Key terrain features at higher elevations often take on added significance due to
their inaccessibility and ease of defense. To maintain freedom of maneuver, commanders
must apply combat power so that the terrain at Levels II and III can be exploited in the
conduct of operations. Successful application of this concept requires commanders to think,
plan, and maneuver vertically as well as horizontally.
2-2. Mountain operations usually focus on lines of communication, choke points, and
dominating heights. Maneuver generally attempts to avoid strengths, envelop the enemy,
and limit his ability to effectively use the high ground. Major difficulties are establishing
boundaries, establishing and maintaining communications, providing logistics, and
evacuating wounded. Throughout the plan, prepare, and execute cycle, commanders must
continuously assess the vertical impact on the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops
and support available, time available, civil considerations (METT-TC).
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Importance of Controlling Key Terrain:
Mustafa Kemal at Gallipoli (April 1915)

On 25 April 1915, the Allies launched their Gallipoli campaign. However, LTC Mustafa Kemal's
understanding of the decisive importance of the hilly terrain, his grasp of the enemy's overall intent, and
his own resolute leadership preserved the Ottoman defenses. His troops seized the initiative from
superior forces and pushed the Allied invasion force back to its bridgehead. The result was nine months
of trench warfare, followed by the Allies' withdrawal from Gallipoli.
German Fifth Army Commander General von Sanders expected a major Allied landing in the north, at
Bulair. The British, however, were conducting a feint there; two ANZAC divisions were already landing
in the south at Ari Burnu (now known as "ANZAC cove") as the main effort. The landing beaches here
were hemmed by precipitous cliffs culminating in the high ground of the Sari Bair ridge, a fact of great
importance to the defense. Only one Ottoman infantry company was guarding the area. Although prewar
plans had established contingencies for using 19th ID, Kemal, the division commander, had received no
word from his superiors regarding the developing scenario. Nevertheless, understanding that a major
Allied landing could easily split the peninsula, he decided that time was critical and set off for Ari Burnu
without waiting for his senior commander's approval. In his march toward Ari Burnu that morning, he
recognized that the hilly terrain in general and the Sari Bair ridge in particular were of vital strategic
importance: if the enemy captured this high ground they would be in an excellent position to cut the
peninsula in half.
Kemal now engaged the enemy. He impressed upon his men the importance of controlling the hilltops at
all costs, issuing his famous order: "I am not ordering you to attack. I am ordering you to die. In the time
it takes us to die, other forces and commanders can come and take our place." Despite being
outnumbered three-to-one, the Turkish counterattack stabilized their position and prevented the Allies
from capturing the Sari Bair ridge. Nightfall brought about a lull in the fighting. There was some sniping
and a few local encounters on 26 April, and on 27 April Kemal finally received major reinforcements.
The front stabilized and the opposing armies settled down into trench warfare. On 16 January 1926, the
Allies admitted defeat and withdrew.
The 19th ID's counterattack, which prevented the ANZAC from establishing themselves on the Sari Bair
ridge, may well have decided the outcome of the entire Gallipoli campaign. Despite his lack of
situational knowledge, Kemal instinctively understood the enemy's intent and, recognizing the
importance of controlling the hilltops and ridgelines, was committed to concentrating his combat power
to seize and hold this key terrain.
Compiled from "The Rock of Gallipoli," Studies of Battle Command, George W. Gawrych
MISSION
2-3. Mission analysis must include the spatial and vertical characteristics of the AO.
Although defeating the enemy continues to be the basic objective of tactical operations, the
task of controlling specific operational terrain levels will be paramount. At brigade level and
below, major tactical objectives are normally translated into tasks pertaining to seizing,
retaining, or controlling specific dominating heights at either Level II or Level III.

Therefore, it is imperative to identify the tasks and assets necessary to access each
operational terrain level.
2-4. At any operational terrain level, defending and delaying are easier at defiles, while
attacking is more difficult. Due to the compartmented terrain, units usually execute
offensive missions by conducting several simultaneous smaller-scale attacks, utilizing the
full height, width, and depth of their area of operations. Consequently, commanders must
always consider the impact of decentralization on security.
2-5. One method of maintaining freedom of action is to seize or hold key terrain. In the
mountains, key terrain is frequently identified as terrain that is higher than that held by the
enemy. Seizing this terrain often depends on long and difficult envelopments or turning
movements. Therefore, the specified and implied tasks associated with mobility and
sustainment, as well as command and control, must be considered in terms of their vertical
difficulty.
ENEMY
2-6. An enemy will normally

position forces in depth and ● Utilize the environment to his advantage
height along likely avenues of ● Conduct air operations
approach. Mountain terrain ● Conduct decentralized operations
facilitates wide dispersal, ● Utilize the terrain in Levels II and III
allowing relatively small units to ● Employ obstacles or barriers to restrict
hold dominant terrain in a maneuverability

connected system of strong ● Conduct limited-visibility operations
points. To prevent bypassing and ● Sustain his maneuver elements
envelopment attempts, the enemy

may adopt a many-tiered,
perimeter defense. Aside from the Figure 2-1. Factors Affecting Assessment of the
relative size of forces, the type of Enemy Situation
enemy units and their equipment
must be compared with those of friendly forces, to include a comparison of the suitability of
forces, tactics, and training. When considering the enemy's ability to operate in mountainous
terrain, commanders should consider how well the enemy can accomplish the tasks and
actions listed in Figure 2-1. Again, in analyzing both enemy and friendly factors during
mountain operations, the vertical, as well as the horizontal, perspective should be fully
integrated into all aspects of the assessment.
TERRAIN AND WEATHER
2-7. As in all military operations, terrain analysis involves observation and fields of fire,

cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach (OCOKA). Terrain
often influences the conduct of operations more in the mountains than on flatter terrain. The
mountains form the nonlinear and vertical structure of the battlefield, and the influences of
geography and climate dictate the extent to which commanders modify tactics. Examples of
these difficulties are often encountered in the concentration of forces, as well as in the
maintenance of command and control.
2-8. In the mountains, as elsewhere, surprise is easier to achieve for the force that knows the
terrain better and has the skills and equipment necessary to achieve greater mobility. The
appropriate use of vertical terrain improves the element of surprise if the terrain has been
analyzed properly to determine the best means to counter the enemy’s reactions. Once the
commander decides on a preliminary course of action, he should immediately initiate a
detailed terrain reconnaissance.
2-9. In a mountainous environment, the terrain normally favors the defender and
necessitates the conduct of limited visibility operations. Highly trained units can achieve
significant tactical gains and decisive victories by exploiting limited visibility. However,
limited visibility operations in mountainous terrain require precise planning, careful daylight
reconnaissance, exceptionally good command and control, and a high degree of training.
Imaginative and bold limited visibility operations can minimize the advantage of terrain for
the defender and shift the balance of combat power to the side that can best cope with or
exploit limited visibility.
OBSERVATION AND FIELDS OF FIRE
2-10. Although mountainous

terrain generally permits excellent 1. The ability to observe and identify
long-range observation and fields targets in conditions of bright sunlight
of fire, steep slopes and rugged 2. The ability to estimate range in clear air
terrain affect a soldier’s ability to 3. The ability to apply wind corrections
accurately estimate range and 4. The ability to shoot accurately up and
frequently cause large areas to be down vertical slopes
hidden from observation. The
existence of sharp relief and dead
space facilitates covert Figure 2-2. Factors Affecting Observation and
approaches, making surveillance Fields of Fire
difficult despite such long-range
observation. Four factors that influence what can be seen and hit in mountainous terrain are
listed in Figure 2-2.
COVER AND CONCEALMENT
2-11. The identification and proper use of the cover and concealment provided by

mountainous terrain are fundamental to all aspects of mountain operations. The ridge
systems found in Level II may provide covert approaches through many areas that are
hidden from observation by the vegetation and relief. The difficulties a force encounters in
finding available cover and concealment along ridges are fewer than those on the peaks,
especially above the timberline. Uncovered portions of an approach leave a force exposed to
observation and fire for long periods. The enemy can easily detect movement in this region,
leaving commanders with three primary options to improve cover and concealment:
1. Identify and exploit avenues of approach the enemy would consider unlikely, due to
their difficult ascent or descent.
2. Negotiate routes during periods of limited visibility.
3. Provide overwhelming route security.
OBSTACLES
2-12. Obvious natural obstacles include deep defiles, cliffs, rivers, landslides, avalanches,
crevices, and scree slopes, as well as the physical terrain of the mountains themselves.
Obstacles vary in their effect on different forces. Commanders must evaluate the terrain
from both the enemy and friendly force perspective. They must look specifically at the
degree to which obstacles restrict operations, and at the ability of each force to exploit the
tactical opportunities that exist when obstacles are employed. Man-made obstacles used in
conjunction with restrictive terrain are extremely effective in the mountains; however, their
construction is very costly in terms of time, materiel, transportation assets, and labor.
Commanders must know the location, extent, and strength of obstacles so that they can be
incorporated into their scheme of maneuver.
KEY TERRAIN
2-13. Key terrain generally increases in importance with an increase in elevation and a
decrease in accessibility. In the mountains, however, terrain that is higher than that held by
the opposing force is often key, but only if the force is capable of fighting there. A well-
prepared force capable of maneuver in rugged terrain can gain an even greater advantage
over an ill-prepared enemy at higher elevation levels.
2-14. The vast majority of operations in the mountains requires that the commander
designate decisive terrain in his concept of operations to communicate its importance to his
staff and subordinate commanders. In operations over mountainous terrain, the analysis of
key and decisive terrain is based on the identification of these features at each of the three
operational terrain levels. There are few truly impassable areas in the mountains. The
commander must recognize that what may be key terrain to one force may be an obstacle to
another force. He must also recognize that properly trained combatants can use high
obstructing terrain as a means to achieve decisive victories with comparatively small-sized
combat elements.

AVENUES OF APPROACH
2-15. In mountainous terrain,

there are few easily accessible ● Ability to achieve surprise
avenues of approach, and they ● Vulnerability to attack from
usually run along valleys, defiles, surrounding heights

or the crests and spurs of ridges. ● Ability to provide mutual support to
This type of geography allows the forces on other avenues of approach

defender to economize in difficult ● Effect on rates of advance
terrain and to concentrate on ● Effect on command and control
dangerous avenues of approach. ● Potential to accommodate deception
A typical offensive tactic is to operations

conduct a coordinated assault ● Ability to support necessary CS and CSS
with the main effort along operations

accessible avenues of approach, ● Access to secure rest and halt sites
and supporting efforts by one or ● Potential to fix the enemy and reduce the
more maneuver elements on possibility of retreat

difficult and unexpected avenues
of approach. Normally, high rates
of advance and heavy Figure 2-3. Factors Affecting Analysis of Avenues
concentration of forces are of Approach
difficult or impossible to achieve
along mountainous avenues of approach. Relief features may create large areas of dead
space that facilitate covert movement. Units may use difficult and unlikely avenues of
approach to achieve surprise; however, these are extremely high-risk operations and are
prone to failure unless forces are well trained and experienced in mountaineering
techniques. In mountainous terrain, the analysis of avenues of approach should be based on
a thorough reconnaissance and evaluated in terms of the factors listed in Figure 2-3.
WEATHER
2-16. As discussed in Chapter 1, weather and visibility conditions in the mountainous

regions of the world may create unprecedented advantages and disadvantages for
combatants. To fight effectively, commanders must acquire accurate weather information
about their AO. Terrain has a dominant effect on local climate and weather patterns in the
mountains. Mountainous areas are subject to frequent and rapid changes of weather,
including fog, strong winds, extreme heat and cold, and heavy rain or snow. Thus, many
forecasts that describe weather over large areas of terrain are inherently inaccurate.
Commanders must be able to develop local, terrain-based forecasts by combining available
forecasts with field observations (local temperature, wind, precipitation, cloud patterns,
barometric pressure, and surrounding terrain). Forecasting mountain weather from the field
improves accuracy and enhances the ability to exploit opportunities offered by the weather,

while minimizing its adverse effects (see Appendix B).
TROOPS AND SUPPORT AVAILABLE
2-17. Commanders must assess the operational and tactical implications of the restrictive
environment on mobility, protection, firepower, and logistics. The complex task of
arranging activities in time, space, and purpose requires commanders to fully understand the
impact of elevation, weather, and visibility on the capabilities of his subordinate elements
and relative combat power. Mountainous terrain and weather can greatly enhance the
relative combat power of defending forces and, conversely, it can drastically reduce those of
the attacking forces. For example, an infantry battalion may be inadequate to defeat a
defending infantry company in the mountains. Instead, an infantry battalion may only be
capable of defeating a well-positioned infantry platoon. However, commanders must
carefully consider each unique situation and weigh all tangible and intangible aspects of
combat power (maneuver, firepower, leadership, protection, and information) when
comparing strengths and determining the forces necessary to accomplish the mission.
2-18. Commanders must also assess the proper mix of heavy and light forces that capitalizes
on the unique strengths that each type of force can bring to mountain operations while
minimizing their limitations. While generally complicating command and control, an
appropriate mix allows commanders more flexibility in the synchronization of their
operations. Additionally, the difficulty providing combat support and combat service
support for mountain operations must be evaluated to determine if the proportion of support
troops to combat troops is sufficient.
2-19. Prior to and throughout an operation, commanders must continually assess the effect
that the rugged mountain environment and sustained combat operations has on the ability of
their soldiers to accomplish the mission. Commanders may need to slow the pace of their
operation, transition to the defense for short periods, or rotate units to ensure that their
soldiers are physically capable of striking effectively at decisive times and locations. Too
often, commanders consider only the operational readiness (OR) rate of equipment and
logistics levels when determining their overall ability to continue offensive actions. Failure
to consider this intangible human aspect may result in increased loss of lives and mission
failure.
2-20. Vertical operations are an integral part of mountain operations and are one means to
improve the success of decisive engagements. Commanders must review the state of training
of their units to ensure they are adequately prepared to maneuver and fight at various
elevations. Increased requirements for aviation support require aviation units to be capable
of operating in the specific mountain environment. Units must also have sufficient numbers
of pathfinders and trained air assault personnel to select and mark landing zones (LZs) and
prepare sling loads.

TIME AVAILABLE
2-21. In the mountains, proper

timing is fundamental to creating ● Adaptability of plans to the terrain and
opportunities to fight the enemy varying weather

on favorable terms. Restrictive ● Increased time needed to conduct
terrain, weather, the accumulation reconnaissance, execute movements, and

of chance errors, unexpected synchronize events on the battlefield
difficulties, and the confusion of ● Significant variance in the number of
battle increase the time necessary hours of visibility with season and
to assemble, deploy, move, elevation
converge, and mass combat
power, effectively decreasing the
amount of time available to plan Figure 2-4. Factors Affecting Time Available
and prepare. To optimize the time
available, commanders must continuously evaluate the impact of reduced mobility caused
by the weather and terrain. At times, commanders may need to conduct a tactical pause to
facilitate the concentration of combat power at a decisive point. However, they must
consider time with respect to the enemy as time available is always related to the enemy's
ability to execute his own plan, prepare, and execute cycle. Figure 2-4 summarizes the time
considerations that are different from or greater than those encountered on flatter terrain.
CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS
2-22. Generally, civilian population centers will be located at the lower elevations of Level I
close to sources of water and along major lines of communications. Refugees and displaced
civilians may increase congestion on the already limited road and trail networks normally
found in mountainous environments, further complicating maneuver and sustaining
operations.
2-23. Commanders must also consider the impact of operations on the often-limited civilian
resources available in the mountains. The wisdom of using local resources to lighten in-
theater supply requirements must be balanced against the impact on civilians and their local
economy. While the purchase of goods and services from the local economy is generally
welcomed, it may serve to inflate prices and make it impossible for local civilians to
purchase their own scarce and needed supplies.
2-24. In mountainous regions, commanders often encounter a populace of diverse political

and ethnic orientation that may support, oppose, or be ambivalent to US operations or the
presence of US forces. Depending on friendly force objectives, commanders may conduct
public relations, civil affairs, humanitarian assistance, and psychological operations
(PSYOP) to influence perceptions and attitudes of neutral or uncommitted parties. Even if

commanders choose not to commit resources to enlist civilian sympathy and support, they
must still adjust their operations to minimize damage and loss of life to innocent civilians.
SECTION II — LEADERSHIP
2-25. To help ease their anxiety in combat, soldiers must have confidence in their leaders.
This confidence may diminish rapidly unless leaders demonstrate the ability to lead over
formidable terrain and under the most difficult weather conditions. Superficial knowledge of
mountain warfare and ignorance or underestimation of mountain hazards and environmental
effects may result in mission failure and the unnecessary loss of soldiers’ lives.
2-26. Effective leadership in mountain operations combines sound judgment with a

thorough understanding of the characteristics of the mountain environment. Commanders
must first develop flexible and adaptable leadership throughout the chain of command. They
must then be able to understand and exploit the operational and tactical implications of the
mountain environment, as well as its effects on personnel, equipment, and weapons. The
keys to meeting this challenge are proper training and operational experience in the
mountains. To fight effectively, leaders creatively exploit the opportunities offered by the
mountain environment while minimizing the adverse effects it can have on their operations.
2-27. Leadership rapidly becomes the primary element of combat power on the mountain
battlefield. Commanders must recognize the distinctive effects created by decentralization of
command, develop a depth of leadership that forms the vital link to unity of effort, and
organize and direct operations that require minimum intervention. While specific situations
require different leadership styles and techniques, the nature of mountain warfare generally
necessitates that commanders embrace the philosophy of command and control known as
mission command (see FM 6-0). This type of command and control requires subordinates to
make decisions rapidly within the framework of the commander's concept and intent.
Commanders must be able to accept some measure of uncertainty, delegate, and trust and
encourage subordinate leaders at all levels to use initiative and act alone to achieve the
desired results, particularly when the situation changes and they lose contact with higher
headquarters.
SECTION III — COMMUNICATIONS
2-28. The communications means available to support operations in mountainous regions

are the same as those to support operations in other regions of the world. However, rapid
and reliable communications are especially difficult to achieve and maintain in mountainous
areas. The mountainous environment requires electronic equipment that is light, rugged,
portable and able to exploit the advantages of higher terrain. The combined effects of
irregular terrain patterns, magnetic and ionospheric disturbances, cold, ice, and dampness on
communications equipment increase operating, maintenance, and supply problems and

require precise planning and extensive coordination.
COMBAT NET RADIO
SINGLE-CHANNEL GROUND AND AIRBORNE RADIO SYSTEMS (SINCGARS)
2-29. The Single-channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) family of
frequency modulation (FM) radios is good for the control of battalion and smaller-sized
units operating in a mountainous environment (see FM 6-02.32 and FM 6-02.18). If
available, hands-free radios, such as helmet-mounted radios, are an excellent means of
communication for small unit tactics and close-in distances, particularly while negotiating
rugged terrain. In colder environments, shortened battery life greatly reduces the reliability
of manpacked systems that rely on constant voltage input to maintain maximum accuracy.
2-30. Since even a small unit may be spread over a large area, retransmission sites may be
needed to maintain communications and increase range. These sites require extensive
preparation and support to ensure the survival of personnel and the continued maintenance
of equipment. Retransmission systems are often placed on the highest accessible terrain to
afford them the best line-of-sight; however, through simple analysis, these locations are
often predictable and make them more vulnerable to enemy interdiction. The importance
and difficulty of maintaining adequate communications in mountainous terrain requires
commanders to devote additional resources for the protection of these limited assets and
operators skilled in the proper use of cover and concealment, noise and light discipline, and
other operations security (OPSEC) measures.
2-31. Physical range limitations, difficulties in establishing line-of-sight paths due to

intervening terrain, and limited retransmission capabilities often make it difficult to establish
a brigade and larger-sized radio net. However, commanders can, if within range, enter
subordinate nets and establish a temporary net for various contingencies. In the mountains
or if the mobile subscriber equipment network is not yet fully developed, commanders
should consider the increased need for the improved high frequency radio (IHFR) family of
amplitude modulation (AM) radios and single-channel tactical satellite communications
terminals for extended distances.
SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS (SATCOM)
2-32. Satellite communications (SATCOM) terminals are light, small, portable ground
terminals that are able to communicate in spite of rugged terrain. During operations in
mountainous areas having little or no infrastructure to support command and control,
satellite communications become the primary means of communications. Single channel
SATCOM are currently transmitted over the ultrahigh frequency (UHF) band and readily
support forces operating in the mountains, while providing worldwide tactical

communications, in-theater
communications, combat net ● Greater freedom from siting restrictions
radio (CNR) range extension, and ● Extended range, capacity, and coverage
linkage between elements of long- ● Mobility and rapid employment
range surveillance units (LRSUs) ● Extremely high circuit reliability
and Army special operations

forces (ARSOF). SATCOM can
network with multiple users, Figure 2-5. SATCOM Advantages
communicate while enroute,
penetrate foliage while on the ground, and has several other advantages making it an ideal
system for mountain communications (see Figure 2-5). However, limitations include
restricted access, low-rate data communications, and lack of antijam capability.
Commanders should review FM 6-02.11 for further information on the employment of
SATCOM.
COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) AIRCRAFT
2-33. Using C2 aircraft can assist the commander in overcoming ground mobility
restrictions and may improve communications that would otherwise limit his ability to direct
the battle. In the mountains, terrain masking, while making flight routing more difficult,
may provide the degree of protection needed to allow an increased use of aircraft. To avoid
radar or visual acquisition and to survive, C2 aircraft must use the same terrain flight
techniques employed by other tactical aviation units. This flight method often degrades FM
communications and reinforces the requirement for radio relay or retransmission sites.
ANTENNAS AND GROUNDS
2-34. Directional antennas, both bidirectional and unidirectional, may be needed to increase
range and maintain radio communications. Although easy to fabricate, directional antennas
are less flexible and more time-consuming to set up. Positioning of all antennas is also
crucial in the mountains because moving an antenna even a small distance can significantly
affect reception.
2-35. Antenna icing, a common occurrence at high elevations, significantly degrades

communications. Ice may also make it difficult to extend or lower antennas, and the weight
of ice buildup, combined with increased brittleness, may cause them to break. Antennas
should have extra guy wires, supports, and anchor stakes to strengthen them to withstand
heavy ice and wind loading. All large horizontal antennas should be equipped with a system
of counterweights arranged to slacken before wire or poles break from the excess pressures
of ice or wind. Soldiers may be able to remove wet snow and sleet that freezes to antennas
by jarring their supports, or by attaching a hose to the exhaust pipe of a vehicle and directing
the hot air on the ice until it melts. However, soldiers must exercise great care to ensure that
the antenna is not damaged in their attempts to dislodge the ice.

2-36. Ground rods and guy wires are often difficult to drive into rocky and frozen earth.
Mountain pitons are excellent anchors for antenna guys in this type of soil. In extreme cold,
ropes can be frozen to the ground and guys tied to these anchor ropes. Adequate grounding
is also difficult to obtain on frozen or rocky surfaces due to high electrical resistance. Where
it is possible to install a grounding rod, it should be driven into the earth as deep as possible
or through the ice on frozen lakes or rivers. Grounding in rocky soil may be improved by
adding salt solutions to improve electrical flow.
MOBILE SUBSCRIBER EQUIPMENT
2-37. Like FM, mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) requires a line-of-sight transmission
path and a tactical satellite or several relay sites to overcome mountainous terrain and
maintain MSE connectivity (FM 6-02.55 contains in-depth information concerning the
deployment and employment of MSE).
WIRE AND FIELD PHONES
2-38. Wire is normally one of the most reliable means of communication. Unfortunately, in
rugged mountains and particularly during the winter months, wire is more difficult and time
consuming to install, maintain, and protect. Wire may be dispensed in mountain areas by
tracked or wheeled vehicle, foot, skis, snowshoes, or oversnow vehicles. As in any
environment, units must periodically patrol their wire lines to ensure that they have
remained camouflaged and that the enemy has not tapped into them.
2-39. Snow-covered cables and wire can cause the loss of many man-days in recovering or
maintaining circuits. This can be avoided by pulling the cable from under the snow after
each snowfall and letting it rest just below the surface of the snow. Trees or poles can be
used to support wire. Allowances must be made for drifting snow when determining the
height above ground at which to support the lines. However, when crossing roads, it is
preferable to run the wire through culverts and under bridges rather than bury or raise wire
overhead. In addition to ease, this technique reduces maintenance requirements associated
with vehicles severing lines, particularly with higher volumes of traffic on limited road
networks. If long-distance wire communications are required, the integration of radio relay
systems must be considered.
2-40. Great care must be taken in handling wire and cables in extreme cold weather.
Condensation and ice on connectors make connecting cables difficult and can degrade the
signal path. When rubber jackets become hard, the cables must be protected from stretching
and bending to prevent short circuits caused by breaks in the covering. Therefore, all tactical
cable and wire should be stored in heated areas or warmed prior to installation. TC 24-20
provides more detailed information on the installation and maintenance of wire and cable.

2-41. Field phones are useful in a stationary position, such as a mountain patrol base or an
ambush site, although leaders must consider the weight and difficulties encountered in
laying and maintaining wire in these sites of limited duration. The batteries that are used to
operate field telephones and switchboards are subject to the same temperature limitations as
those used to power tactical radio sets.
2-42. When used with a hands-free phone, commercially available rope with a
communication wire in it is ideally suited for mountain operations. This system is
lightweight and easy to manage, and provides an added measure of security during limited
visibility operations. In addition to the standard uses, since it functions as both a rope and a
wire, it can be used to control movement on all types of installations, and it can serve as a
primary means of communication for climbing teams.
AUDIO, VISUAL, AND PHYSICAL SIGNALS
2-43. Leaders can use simple audio signals, such as voice or whistles, to locally alert and
warn. Sound travels farther in mountain air. Although this effect may increase the possibility
of enemy detection, interrupting terrain, wind conditions, and echoes can restrict voice and
whistle commands to certain directions and uses.
2-44. Like audio signals, visual signals such as pyrotechnics and mirrors have limited use
due to enemy detection, but may work for routine and emergency traffic at the right time
and place. Blowing sand or snow, haze, fog, and other atmospheric conditions may
periodically affect range and reliability.
2-45. Units should use hand and arm signals instead of the radio or voice whenever possible,
especially when close to the enemy. Luminous tape on the camouflage band, luminous
marks on a compass, or flashlights may be used as signals at night over short distances.
Infrared sources and receiving equipment, such as night vision goggles, aiming lights, and
infrared filters for flashlights, can be used to send and receive signals at night. However, an
enemy outfitted with similar equipment can also detect active devices.
2-46. A tug system is a common method of signaling between members of a roped climbing
team. However, tug systems are often unreliable when climbers are moving on a rope or
when the distance is so great that the friction of the rope on the rock absorbs the signals.
Separate tug lines can be installed in static positions by tying a string, cord, or wire from one
position to the next. Soldiers can pass signals quietly and quickly between positions by
pulling on the tug line in a prearranged code.
MESSENGER

2-47. Although slow, communication by messenger is frequently the only means available
to units operating in the mountains. Messengers should be trained climbers, resourceful,
familiar with mountain peculiarities, and able to carry their own existence load. During the
winter, advanced skiing skills may also be required. Messengers should always be
dispatched in pairs. Air messenger service should be scheduled between units and integrated
with the aerial resupply missions. Vehicles may also be employed to maintain messenger
communications when conditions of time, terrain, and distance permit.
SECTION IV — TRAINING
2-48. Because US forces do not routinely train in a mountain environment, they must make
extensive preparations to ensure individual and unit effectiveness. Ultimate success in the
mountains depends largely on developing cohesive, combat-ready teams consisting of well-
trained soldiers. To be successful, commanders must understand the stratification of
mountain warfare, recognize the unique aspects of leadership required, and implement
training programs that prepare soldiers for the rigors of mountain fighting.
2-49. In the mountains,

commanders face the challenge of ● Mountaineering skills
maintaining their units’ combat ● Air assault and air movement operations
effectiveness and efficiency. To ● Deception
meet this challenge, commanders ● Stealth and infiltration
conduct training that provides ● Limited visibility operations
soldiers with the mountaineering ● Patrolling
skills necessary to apply combat ● Reconnaissance
power in a rugged mountain ● Communications
environment, and they develop ● CS and CSS operations
leaders capable of applying
doctrine to the distinct
characteristics of mountain Figure 2-6. Training Areas of Emphasis
warfare.
2-50. The ability to apply doctrine and tactics in mountainous environments is not as easy to
develop as technical proficiency. Training, study, and garrison experimentation may provide
the basis for competence. However, only through experience gained by practical application
in the mountains will leaders become skilled in mountain warfare. Proficiency in the areas
listed in Figure 2-6 will provide commanders with a degree of flexibility in the application
of doctrine to a mountain area of operations.
2-51. The best combat and combat support plans cannot ensure victory unless commanders
concentrate on developing a leadership climate that is derived from the human dimension of
mountain warfare. The complexities of mountain combat make it extremely important to

establish training programs that modify the traditional application of tactics so that units can
reach their full potential. Training must simulate the tempo, scope, and uncertainty of
mountain combat to create the versatility required to capitalize on the harsh environment as
a force multiplier.
2-52. Competent units operate effectively in mountains and focus on the battle. Unprepared
units, however, may become distracted by the environment and end up expending as much
effort fighting the environment as they do fighting the enemy. Soldiers cannot be fully
effective unless they have the proper clothing and equipment, and are trained to protect
themselves against the effects of terrain and frequent and sudden changes in weather.
INITIAL TRAINING ASSESSMENT
2-53. In addition to the questions applicable to every mission, commanders must consider
the following when preparing for operations in a mountainous environment:
● What kind of mountains will the unit be operating in?

● What elevations will the unit be operating at?
● What are the climatic and terrain conditions of the AO?
● Are at least two years of accurate weather reports available (see Appendix B)?
● When must the unit be ready to move?

● What training resources are needed and available?
● Are local training areas and ranges available?
● If not, what alternative arrangements can be made?
● What available training areas most closely resemble the AO?
● What special equipment does the unit require?

● What training assistance is available?
● Does the unit have former mountain warfare instructors, military
mountaineers, or others with experience in a mountainous environment?

● Are instructors available from outside the unit?
● What special maintenance is required for weapons and equipment?

● What is the level of physical fitness?
● What additional combat, combat support, and combat service support units are
necessary to accomplish the operational missions?
● Can specific units be identified for possible coordinated training?
● Will allied and multinational troops participate?
2-54. As commanders get answers to these and other questions, they must develop training
programs to bring their units to a level where they will be fully capable of operating
successfully in mountainous conditions. To do this, they must establish priorities for
training. The training requirements listed in Figure 2-7 are only a guide. Commanders
should add, delete, and modify the tasks as necessary, depending on the specific AO, the
state of readiness of their units when they begin preparations for mountain operations, and

the time and facilities available (see FM 7-10).
Figure 2-7. Mountain Preparatory Training
PHYSICAL CONDITIONING
2-55. Soldiers who have lived and trained mostly at lower elevations tend to develop a sense
of insecurity and fear about higher elevations — many are simply afraid of heights in
general. With this in mind, leaders must plan training that accustoms soldiers to the effects
of the mountain environment. Physical conditioning must be strictly enforced, since "new
muscle" strain associated with balance and prolonged ascents/descents quickly exhausts
even the most physically fit soldiers. Even breathing becomes strenuous, given the thinner
atmosphere at higher altitudes. Therefore, training must emphasize exercises designed to
strengthen leg muscles and build cardiovascular (aerobic) endurance (see FM 3-25.20).
Frequent marches and climbs with normal equipment loads enhance conditioning and

familiarize soldiers with mountain walking techniques.
MOUNTAIN LIVING
2-56. Successful mountain living

requires that personnel adjust to ● Temperature extremes and clothing
special conditions, particularly requirements

terrain and weather. To develop ● Bivouac techniques and shelter
confidence, soldiers should train construction

in conditions that closely ● Elevation and rarified air effects
resemble those they will face. ● Hygiene, sanitation, and health hazards
Lengthy exercises test support ● Locating and purifying water
facilities and expose soldiers to ● Food-gathering techniques
the isolation common to mountain

operations. The mountain area of
operations can be harsh, and Figure 2-8. Mountain Living Training
training should develop soldiers
who possess the necessary field craft and psychological edge to operate effectively under
mountainous conditions. Although FM 4-25.10 and FM 3-25.76 do not specifically address
mountain environments, much of their information applies. Regardless of the level of
technical mountaineering training required, all soldiers deploying to a mountainous region
should be trained in the areas listed in Figure 2-8.
NAVIGATION
2-57. Navigation in the mountains is made more difficult because of inaccurate mapping,
magnetic attraction that affects compass accuracy, and the irregular pace of the soldiers. It is
easy to mistake large terrain features that are very far away for features that are much closer.
The increased necessity for limited-visibility operations restricts the use of terrain
techniques as the primary means of determining and maintaining direction. Individuals must
train to use a variety of equipment, such as a compass, an altimeter, global positioning
system devices, and maps, as well as learn techniques pertaining to terrestrial navigation,
terrain association, dead reckoning, resectioning, and artillery marking (see FM 3-25.26).
WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT
2-58. Nearly every weapon or piece of equipment familiar to the soldier is affected to some
degree by the mountain environment. In addition to honing skills, training must focus on the
specific operational area and ways to overcome anticipated environmental impacts when
using weapons and equipment.
2-59. Individual marksmanship training must emphasize the effect of wind and include

practical training in wind measurement techniques and adjusted aiming points (holdoff).
Practical training in range estimation techniques, combined with using laser range finders,
M19 binoculars, target reference points, and range cards, helps to overcome difficulties in
range estimation.
2-60. In the conduct of their preparations, commanders should strive to increase the number
of qualified snipers within their units, as they are ideal in the mountains and can be used to
adversely affect enemy mobility by delivering long range precision rifle fire on selected
targets. They can inflict casualties, slow enemy movement, lower morale, and add confusion
to enemy operations. A single sniper team in well-concealed positions, such as mountain
passes, can severely impede enemy movement (see FM 3-21.20 and FM 3-91.2 for further
information on sniper employment).
CAMOUFLAGE AND CONCEALMENT
2-61. The basic principles of camouflage and concealment also apply in mountain
operations (see FM 3-24.3). However, certain elements must be adjusted for snow. With
snow on the ground, standard camouflage nets and paint patterns are unsuitable. In areas
where snow cover is above 15 percent of the background, winter camouflage nets should
take the place of standard nets and temporary white paint should be used over the green
portions of vehicles. In terrain with more than 85 percent snow cover, the vehicles and
equipment should be solid white. However, with less than 15 percent snow cover, standard
patterns should be maintained.
2-62. Snow provides excellent conditions for threat thermal and ultraviolet sensor detection.
To counter these types of sensors, soldiers must be trained to utilize the terrain to mask
themselves and their weapons and equipment from enemy detection. The mountainous
terrain often limits the access routes to and from selected positions. Commanders must take
appropriate measures to conceal vehicle tracks and limit movement times to periods of
limited visibility. Snow presents a significant problem, making movement discipline an
absolute requirement. When moving, leaders should be trained to follow the shadows along
windswept drift lines as much as possible. Drivers should learn to avoid sharp turns, which
are easily recognizable in the snow, and follow existing track marks where possible.
FORTIFICATIONS
2-63. Fighting and protective positions in the mountains do not differ significantly from
other environments, except in areas of snow and rock (see FM 3-34.112 for more
information on common survivability positions and FM 3-97.11 for positions created in
snow). Digging positions in rocky ground is difficult and often impossible. If demolitions,
pneumatic drills, and jackhammers are available, positions may be blasted or drilled in the
rock to afford some degree of protection. More often, it will be necessary to build above-

ground positions by stacking boulders, stones, and gabions. If possible, existing rock
formations should be used as structural wall components.
2-64. If above-ground positions are to be used, considerable care should be taken to avoid
siting them in view of any likely enemy avenues of approach. Even a two-man position is
difficult to conceal if it is above the timberline. Camouflage nets and the use of background
rocks are necessary to break up the outline of the position and hide straight edges.
2-65. Positions should be built of the largest rocks available, wedged securely together.
Extreme care should be taken that the walls are stable and not leaning or sloping downhill.
An unstable wall is more of a liability than an asset, as the first impact may cause it to
collapse onto the defenders. Rocks and gabions should be stacked to systematically overlap
each joint or seam to help ensure stable construction. Larger rocks or stones can be used to
help bond layers of rock beneath. If possible, a layer of sandbags should be placed on the
top of and around the inside of the wall. Substantial overhead cover is normally required in
rocky areas. The effects of artillery bursts within and above a protective position are greatly
enhanced by rock and gravel displacement or avalanche. Figure 2-9 shows simple examples
of the right and wrong way to build these positions.

Figure 2-9. Fortifications in Rocky Soil
MILITARY MOUNTAINEERING
2-66. The skills required for movement are often difficult to learn and usually very
perishable. Commanders must understand the application and mechanics of technical
mountaineering systems needed for mobility and movement of soldiers and equipment. In
the mountains, a unit may be ineffective unless it has the prerequisite technical training.
However, some mountains may feature terrain that is relatively benign, requiring minimal
specialized techniques. Other areas will mandate the need for more advanced
mountaineering skills. One key to quickly determining the type and extent of training
required is to analyze and classify the level of individual movement required according to
the dismounted mobility classification table introduced in Chapter 1. Once commanders
have determined the specific level and tasks required, TC 90-6-1 will provide them with

detailed information on specific mountaineering techniques and equipment (described

below).
2-67. Military mountaineering training provides tactical mobility in mountainous terrain that
would otherwise be inaccessible. Soldiers with specialized training who are skilled in using
mountain climbing equipment and techniques can overcome the difficulties of obstructing
terrain. Highly motivated soldiers who are in superior physical condition should be selected
for more advanced military mountaineering training (Levels 2 and 3) conducted at
appropriate facilities. Soldiers who have completed advanced mountaineering training
should be used as trainers, guides, and lead climbers during collective training. They may
also serve as supervisors of installation teams (see Chapter 4) and evacuation teams (see
Chapter 5). Properly used, these soldiers can drastically improve mobility and have a
positive impact disproportionate to their numbers. Units anticipating mountain operations
should strive to achieve approximately ten percent of their force with advanced
mountaineering skills.
LEVEL 1: BASIC MOUNTAINEER
2-68. The basic mountaineer, a graduate of a basic mountaineering course, should be trained
in the fundamental travel and climbing skills necessary to move safely and efficiently in
mountainous terrain. These soldiers should be comfortable functioning in this environment
and, under the supervision of qualified mountain leaders or assault climbers, can assist in the
rigging and use of all basic rope installations. On technically difficult terrain, the basic
mountaineer should be capable of performing duties as the "follower" or "second" on a
roped climbing team, and should be well trained in using all basic rope systems. These
soldiers may provide limited assistance to soldiers unskilled in mountaineering techniques.
Particularly adept soldiers may be selected as members of special purpose teams led and
supervised by advanced mountaineers. Figure 2-10 lists the minimum knowledge and skills
required of basic mountaineers.
● Characteristics of the mountain

environment (summer and winter) ● Rope management and knots
● Mountaineering safety ● Natural anchors
● Use, care, and packing of individual ● Familiarization with artificial anchors
cold weather clothing and equipment ● Belay and rappel techniques
● Care and use of basic mountaineering ● Use of fixed ropes (lines)
equipment ● Rock climbing fundamentals
● Mountain bivouac techniques ● Rope bridges and lowering systems
● Mountain communications ● Individual movement on snow and ice
● Mountain travel and walking ● Mountain stream crossings (to include
techniques water survival techniques)
● Hazard recognition and route selection ● First aid for mountain illnesses and

● Mountain navigation injuries

● Basic medical evacuation
Figure 2-10. Level 1: Basic Mountaineer Tasks
2-69. In a unit training program, level 1 qualified soldiers should be identified and prepared
to serve as assistant instructors to train unqualified soldiers in basic mountaineering skills.
All high-risk training, however, must be conducted under the supervision of qualified level 2
or 3 personnel.
LEVEL 2: ASSAULT CLIMBER
2-70. Assault climbers are responsible for the rigging, inspection, use, and operation of all
basic rope systems. They are trained in additional rope management skills, knot tying, belay
and rappel techniques, as well as using specialized mountaineering equipment. Assault
climbers are capable of rigging complex, multipoint anchors and high-angle
raising/lowering systems. Level 2 qualification is required to supervise all high-risk training
associated with Level 1. At a minimum, assault climbers should possess the additional
knowledge and skills shown in Figure 2-11.
● Use specialized mountaineering

● Movement on moderate angle snow
equipment
and ice
● Perform multipitch climbing:
● Establish evacuation systems and
- Free climbing and aid climbing
perform high angle rescue
- Leading on class 4 and 5 terrain
● Perform avalanche hazard evaluation
● Conduct multipitch rappelling
and rescue techniques
● Establish and operate hauling systems
● Familiarization with movement on
● Establish fixed ropes with intermediate
glaciers
anchors
Figure 2-11. Level 2: Assault Climber Tasks
LEVEL 3: MOUNTAIN LEADER
2-71. Mountain leaders possess all the skills of the assault climber and have extensive
practical experience in a variety of mountain environments in both winter and summer
conditions. Level 3 mountaineers should have well-developed hazard evaluation and safe
route finding skills over all types of mountainous terrain. Mountain leaders are best
qualified to advise commanders on all aspects of mountain operations, particularly the

preparation and leadership required to move units over technically difficult, hazardous, or
exposed terrain. The mountain leader is the highest level of qualification and is the principle
trainer for conducting mountain operations. Instructor experience at a military
mountaineering training center or as a member of a special operations forces (SOF)
mountain team is critical to acquiring Level 3 qualification. Figure 2-12 outlines the
additional knowledge and skills expected of mountain leaders. Depending on the specific
AO, mountain leaders may need additional skills such as snowshoeing and all-terrain skiing.
● Glacier travel and crevice rescue

● Recognizing and evaluating peculiar
● Establish and operate technical high
terrain, weather, and hazards
angle, multipitch rescue and
● Preparing route, movement, bivouac, and
evacuation systems
risk management plans for all conditions
● Winter shelters and survival
and elevation levels
techniques
● Roped movement techniques on steep
● Leading units over technically
snow and ice
difficult, hazardous or exposed
● Multipitch climbing on mixed terrain
terrain in both winter and summer
(rock, snow, and ice)
conditions
Figure 2-12. Level 3: Mountain Leader Tasks
DRIVER TRAINING
2-72. Driving in mountains is

extremely difficult. To be ● Identification and recognition of
successful, drivers must know potential dangers
their equipment’s limitations and ● Movement along steep grades combined
capabilities. Training should with:
center on practical exercises in - Narrow roads and sharp curves
mountainous terrain that - Loose rock and gravel
gradually introduce drivers to - Ice and snow (to include using tire
more complex terrain and weather chains for wheeled vehicles)
conditions. The exact nature of - Towed loads
the mountainous terrain ● Increased cold weather maintenance
determines the training (see requirements
Figure 2-13).
Figure 2-13. Driver Training

ARMY AVIATION
2-73. The mountainous environment, particularly its severe and rapidly changing weather,

affects aircraft performance capabilities, accelerates crew fatigue, and influences basic flight
techniques. These techniques can be acquired only through a specific training program for
the particular type of mountainous terrain. Additionally, limited visibility operations in the
mountains are extremely hazardous and require extensive training for those aviation units
involved. Common problems associated with mountain operations become much more
complex at night, even when using night vision devices. Few Army aviation units regularly
train for mountain operations, so it is critical to alert them as soon as possible to facilitate
the required training to ensure safe and successful mission execution.
RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE
2-74. Training in reconnaissance and surveillance should focus on trafficability (route,

mobility, and bridge classification), potential drop zones or landing areas, likely defensive
positions, and potential infiltration routes. Infiltration and exfiltration are relatively easy in
mountainous terrain and constitute a significant threat to the maneuver elements and their
support units.
TEAM DEVELOPMENT
2-75. The decentralized nature of mountain combat and the need for the exercise of a
mission command philosophy of command and control involve assigning missions to
independently operating small teams that may be isolated from their higher headquarters.
The disruptive influences of the environment and sustained physical stress further increase
the perception of isolation (see FM 4-02.22). The most important factor that sustains a
soldier in combat is the powerful psychological support that he receives from his primary
group, such as a buddy team, squad, or platoon. He is less likely to feel the stress of
loneliness under the isolated conditions of mountain warfare if his primary group maintains
its integrity.
2-76. The soldier's ability to survive and operate in the mountains is the basis for the self-
confidence needed to feel accepted by the team. Leaders must develop small-unit cohesion
down to the buddy team. Each soldier must have a buddy to share both responsibilities and
rewards. The leader must not simply assign two soldiers as a buddy team, but pair soldiers
whose skills and attributes complement each other. Each soldier can then learn his buddy's
specialized skills adding depth to the unit if one soldier becomes disabled. Soldiers work
with their buddies, as well as function as part of the larger squad team. The combined
strengths of buddies enhance both unit effectiveness and combat power. FM 6-22 has more
information on team development.

FM 3-97.6 Chptr 3 Firepower and Protection of the Force

Chapter 3
Firepower and Protection of the Force
Employing fire support systems, which are an integral part of maneuver, is included in this chapter. This
arrangement, however, does not suggest any change in the close doctrinal relationship between fires and
maneuver during mountain operations.
SECTION I — FIREPOWER
FIELD ARTILLERY
Contents
3-1. The basic tactical principles
for artillery remain valid in Section I — Firepower
mountains, subject to the
Field Artillery
limitations imposed by terrain and
Mortars
weather.
Air Support
MOVEMENT AND POSITIONING Electronic Warfare
Section II — Protection of the Force
3-2. Rugged terrain and reduced Air Defense Artillery
mobility increase the reliance on Engineer Operations

field artillery fire support. NBC Protection

However, the employment and
positioning of field artillery
systems may be severely impacted by the extreme difficulty of ground mobility in
mountainous terrain. Self-propelled artillery is often limited to traveling on the existing road
and trail networks and positioning in their immediate vicinity. Towed field artillery is
usually more maneuverable; it can be brought into position with the aid of trucks, tractors,
and fixed or rotary-winged aircraft. Therefore, gun crews should be proficient in equipment-
rigging techniques and air assault procedures, and possess ample sling-load equipment.
Field artillery emplaced by helicopter normally requires continued airlift for subsequent
displacement and ammunition resupply, and often necessitates substantial engineer support.
3-3. Light field artillery may require forward displacement of gun sections by helicopter to
provide forward troops the necessary support. Medium field artillery may give the longer
range required, but may be limited by high-terrain crest clearance. Normally, field artillery
is employed far enough to the rear to take advantage of increased angles of fall. Flat areas,
such as dry riverbeds, villages and towns, and farmland, can usually accommodate firing
units, however, these positions present particular problems in the mountains for the
following reasons:
● Dry riverbeds are hazardous because of the danger of flash flooding.

● Towns and villages usually have adequate flat areas such as parks, schoolyards, and
playing fields but they are relatively scarce and often targeted by the enemy.
● Farmland is often difficult to negotiate from spring to fall. In the winter, if the
ground is frozen, farmland may provide good firing positions; however, frozen
ground may cause difficulty emplacing spades, base plates, and trails.
3-4. Good artillery positions, selected for cover, flash defilade, and accessibility to road nets
and landing zones (LZs), are difficult to find, and their relative scarcity makes it easier for
the enemy to target probable locations. In some instances, it may be necessary to by-pass the
best position for one less suitable to reduce the enemy’s counterfire effects. Commanders
must ensure that positions on dominant terrain provide adequate defilade. Positions on
commanding terrain are preferable to low ground positions because there is—
● A reduction in the number of missions requiring high-angle fires.

● A reduced amount of dead space in the target area.
● Less exposure to small arms fire from surrounding heights.
● Less chance of being struck by rockslides or avalanches.
3-5. Some weapons may be moved forward to provide long-range interdiction fires or, in
extreme cases, direct fires to engage a road-bound enemy in mountain passes or along valley
floors. Because of rugged terrain, higher angles of fire, and reduced ranges, it is generally
necessary to displace artillery more frequently than on level terrain to provide continuous

support. In the mountains, commanders must often employ field artillery in a decentralized
manner because of the limited space for gun positions.
ACQUISITION AND OBSERVATION
3-6. Because of high angle fire requirements, radar can be effective against enemy indirect
fire systems. In many instances, terrain masking and diminished line-of-sight may degrade
its effectiveness. Sites should be selected on prominent terrain to obtain the lowest possible
screening crest. However, it is often difficult to obtain a low and consistent screening crest
in mountainous terrain. Too low a screening crest drives the search beam into the ground.
Too high a screening crest allows the enemy to fire under the beam and avoid detection.
When positioning weapons locating radars, commanders should also consider the following:
● Although time-consuming, visibility diagrams are extremely useful in determining

the probability of acquiring targets within the sectors of search of the radar.
● To limit search areas, radars should focus on terrain that can be occupied by artillery
and mortars.
● Accurate survey control is essential because of the extreme elevation variations in
mountainous terrain. Helicopters may be useful in performing survey by use of the
Position Azimuth Determining System (PADS). If possible, digital radar maps may
be used to minimize the time required for height correction of the weapon system.
Digital maps allow the Firefinder systems to initially locate weapon systems to
within 250 meters. This allows the radar operator to make only two to three visual
elevation adjustments to accurately locate the weapon system.
● Impact predict is computed at the radar’s elevation, therefore, excessive errors in the
impact predict can be expected.
● Firefinder radars in the same area must not face one another and radiate at the same
time. This causes interference and emissions burnout, resulting in equipment failure.
If radars need to face one another to accomplish the mission, commanders must
coordinate to ensure that they do not radiate at the same time.
● Computing track volume may become a critical task in determining a radar’s
effectiveness for a proposed position (see FM 3-09.12 for computations).
● Units will use more shelling reports (SHELREPs) to determine enemy firing
locations.
3-7. The majority of all field artillery fires in mountains will be observed, especially close
support and defensive fires. Unobserved fires are frequently unreliable because of poor
maps and rapidly changing meteorological conditions that cause registration corrections for
high angle fire to be valid for only short periods of time.
3-8. Generally, field artillery observation posts should be emplaced on the highest available
ground to increase observation. Low clouds or fog may require moving them to preplanned
emplacements at lower elevations. Observers must be prepared to perform assault climbing

to reach the most advantageous observation site. Commanders may use aerial observers or
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to detect long-range targets and complement forward
observers by adjusting fires beyond terrain masks, in deep defilade, and on reverse slopes.
However, in extremely high mountains aerial observers may be confined to valleys and
lower altitudes due to altitude limitations on different types of aircraft.
3-9. Laser weapons demand increased emphasis on observation techniques. Laser target
ranging and designation systems help to overcome difficulties in range estimation by
providing accurate directional distance and vertical angle information for use in locating
enemy targets. However, when positioning with a laser designator, an observer should
consider line-of-sight with the target, as well as cloud height. Cloud ceilings that are too low
will not allow laser guided munitions enough time to lock on and maneuver to the target.
TARGETING
3-10. Because of the decentralized nature of mountain operations, targets warranting massed
fires may present themselves less often than in open terrain. However, narrow defiles used
as routes of supply, advance, or withdrawal by the enemy are potentially high payoff targets
for interdiction fires or large massed fires. Large masses of snow or rocks above enemy
positions and along main supply routes are also good targets, because they can be converted
into highly destructive rockslides and avalanches that may deny the enemy the use of roads
and trails, and may destroy elements in defilade. In the mountains, suppression of enemy air
defenses takes on added importance because of the increased dependence on all types of
aircraft. Commanders and their staffs should carefully review FM 3-60. A clear
understanding of the targeting methodology combined with the knowledge of the
capabilities and limitations of target acquisition and attack systems in a mountain
environment is crucial to the synchronization of all available combat power.
3-11. To provide accurate and timely delivery of artillery fires in mountainous terrain,
commanders must take into account the following:
● High angles of elevation and increased time of flight for rounds to impact.
● Targets on reverse slopes, which are more difficult to engage than targets on flat
ground or rising slopes, requiring more ammunition for the same coverage.
● Increased amounts of dead space that cannot be hit by artillery fires.
● Intervening crests that require detailed map analysis.
● When the five requirements for accurate predicted fire (target location and size,
firing unit location, weapons and ammunition information, meteorological
information, and computational procedures) are not achievable, registration on
numerous checkpoints becomes essential because of the large variance in elevation
(see FM 3-09.40 for more detailed information).
MUNITIONS

3-12. Terrain and weather also affect the use of field artillery munitions. Considerations for
munitions employment in the mountains are discussed below.
● Impact fuze, high explosives (HE) shells and dual-purpose improved conventional
munitions (DPICMs) are very effective on rocky ground, scattering stones and
splintering rocks, which themselves become missiles. However, deep snow reduces
their bursting radius, making them approximately 40 percent less effective. The
rugged nature of the terrain may afford added protection for defending forces;
therefore, large quantities of HE may be required to achieve the desired effects
against enemy defensive positions.
● Variable time (VT) or time fuzes should be used in deep snow conditions and are
particularly effective against troops on reverse slopes. There are some older fuzes
that may prematurely detonate when fired during heavy precipitation (M557 and
M572 impact fuzes and M564 and M548 time fuzes).
● Smoke, DPICM, and illuminating fires are hard to adjust and maintain due to
swirling, variable winds and steep mountain slopes. Smoke (a base-ejecting round)
may not dispense properly if the canisters become buried in deep snow. In forested
mountains, DPICMs may get hung up in the trees. These types of munitions are
generally more effective along valley floors.
● Using the artillery family of scatterable mines (FASCAM) and Copperhead is
enhanced when fired into narrow defiles, valleys, and roads. FASCAM may lose
their effectiveness on steep terrain and in deep snow. Melting and shifting snow may
cause the anti-handling devices to detonate prematurely the munitions, however, very
little settling normally occurs at temperatures lower than 5 degrees Fahrenheit.
Remote antiarmor mine system (RAAMS) and area denial artillery munitions
(ADAM) must come to rest and stabilize within 30 seconds of impact or the
submunitions will not arm, and very uneven terrain may keep the ADAM trip wires
from deploying properly.
MORTARS
3-13. Mortars are essential during mountain operations. Their high angle of fire and high
rate of fire is suited to supporting dispersed forces. They can deliver fires on reverse slopes,
into dead space, and over intermediate crests, and, like field artillery, rock fragments caused
by the impact of mortar rounds may cause additional casualties or damage.

3-14. The 60mm mortar is an ideal supporting weapon for

mountain combat because of its portability, ease of
concealment, and lightweight ammunition. The 81mm
mortar provides longer range and delivers more explosives
than the 60mm mortar. However, it is heavier and fewer
rounds (usually no more than two per soldier) can be man-
packed. The 120mm mortar may be more desirable in
some situations, since they can fire either white
phosphorous (WP) or HE at greater ranges than lighter
mortars and have a significantly better illumination
capability. However, because of the weight of these
mortars and their ammunition, it may be necessary to
transport fewer of them into mountainous terrain and use
the remaining gun crews as ammunition bearers, or position them close to a trail network in
a valley or at lower elevations. The second technique may be satisfactory if the movement
of the unit can be covered and sufficient firing positions exist.
AIR SUPPORT
3-15. Air interdiction and close air support operations can be particularly effective in
mountains, since enemy mobility, like ours, is restricted by terrain. Airborne forward air
controllers and close air support pilots can be used as valuable sources of information and
can find and designate targets that may be masked from direct ground observation. Vehicles
and personnel are particularly vulnerable to effective air attack when moving along narrow
mountain roads. Precision-guided munitions, such as laser-guided bombs, can quickly
destroy bridges and tunnels and, under proper conditions, cause landslides and avalanches to
close routes or collapse on both stationary and advancing enemy forces. Moreover, air-
delivered mines and long-delay bombs can be employed to seriously impede the enemy’s
ability to make critical route repairs. Precision-guided munitions, as well as fuel air
explosives, can also destroy or neutralize well-protected point targets, such as cave
entrances and enemy forces in defilade.
3-16. Low ceilings, fog, and storms common to mountain regions may degrade air support
operations. Although, global positioning system (GPS) capable aircraft and air delivered
weapons can negate many of the previous limitations caused by weather. Terrain canalizes
low altitude air avenues of approach, limiting ingress and egress routes and available attack
options, and increasing aircraft vulnerability to enemy air defense systems. Potential targets
can hide in the crevices of cliffs and the niches of mountain slopes, and on gorge floors.
Hence, pilots may be able to detect the enemy only at short distances, requiring them to
swing around for a second run on the target and giving the enemy more time to disperse and
seek better cover. Additionally, accuracy may be degraded due to the need for pilots to
divert more of their attention to flying while simultaneously executing their attack.

ELECTRONIC WARFARE
3-17. The ability to use electromagnetic energy to deceive the enemy, locate his units and
facilities, intercept his communications, and disrupt his command, control, and target
acquisition systems remains as important in the mountains as elsewhere. The effects of
terrain and weather on electronic warfare (EW) systems are often a result of the effects on
the components of those systems (particularly soldiers, communications, and aviation).
Although a number of the effects are discussed in more detail elsewhere in this manual (and
in applicable FMs and TMs), for ease some of the more common degrading effects of the
mountainous environment on the components of electronic warfare systems are described in
Figure 3-1.

Figure 3-1. Effects of the Mountainous Environment on EW Systems
SECTION II — PROTECTION OF THE FORCE
AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY
3-18. The severe mountain environment requires some modification of air defense
employment techniques. Suitable positions are scarce and access roads are limited. In some
instances, supporting air defense weapons may not be able to deploy to the most desirable
locations. Consequently, the man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) may be the
only air defense weapon capable of providing close-in protection to maneuver elements.
3-19. Mountain terrain tends to degrade the electronic target acquisition capabilities of air
defense systems. This degradation makes it more difficult for the air defense planner to
locate and select position to provide adequate coverage for the force, and increases the
importance of combined arms for air defense (CAFAD) and passive air defense measures
(see FM 3-01.8). Individual and crew-served weapons can mass their fires against air
threats. The massed use of guns in local air defense causes enemy air to increase their
standoff range for surveillance and weapons delivery, and increase altitude in transiting to
and from targets. These reactions may make the enemy air more vulnerable to air defense
artillery (ADA).
3-20. Enemy aircraft will probably use defiles and valleys in mountainous terrain for low-
altitude approaches to take advantage of terrain masking of radar. Congested roads and
trails, and their junctions, may become lucrative targets for enemy air strikes. Enemy pilots
may avoid early detection by using terrain-clearance or terrain-following techniques to
approach a target. Rugged mountain terrain degrades air defense detection, but, at the same
time, mountain ridges and peaks tend to canalize enemy aircraft. Detailed terrain analysis,
coupled with predictive analysis to identify probable enemy air avenues of approach, aids in
effective site selection.

3-21. Movement to and occupation

of positions in mountainous terrain
require additional time. Planners
must consider slope (pitch and
roll), site preparation, and access
route improvement prior to
movement. Bradley Stinger
fighting vehicle (BSFV) units often
are unable to accompany small,
lightly equipped maneuver
elements, and may be restricted to
supporting elements in more accessible areas of the battlefield. Avenger fire units can be
sling-loaded by heavy lift aircraft and MANPADS airlifted into otherwise inaccessible
positions. However, equipment emplaced by helicopters is resupplied and repositioned by
the same means. When moving dismounted, MANPAD teams are limited to one missile per
soldier, unless other members of the unit are tasked to carry additional missiles.
3-22. Because of terrain masking of radars and the difficulty in establishing line-of-sight
communications with the Sentinel or light and special division interim sensor (LSDIS)
radar, early warning for short-range air defense (SHORAD) systems may be limited.
Soldiers must maintain continuous visual observation, particularly along likely low-level air
avenues of approach. Therefore, when possible, Sentinel or LSDIS radars should be
emplaced on the highest accessible terrain that provides the best air picture for target
detection and early warning, not necessarily peaks and summits.
ENGINEER OPERATIONS
3-23. Engineer combat support requirements increase in mountainous terrain because of the
lack of adequate cover, the requirement for construction of field fortifications and obstacles,
and the need to breech or reduce enemy obstacles. With such an enormous multitude of
tasks, effective command and control of engineer assets is essential for the optimal
utilization of these relatively scarce resources (see also the discussion of engineer
augmentation and employment in the mobility section of Chapter 4).
3-24. Digging fighting positions and creating temporary fortifications above the timberline
is generally difficult because of thin soil with underlying bedrock. As described in Chapter
2, boulders and loose rocks may be used to build hasty, aboveground fortifications. Well-
assembled positions constructed in rock are strong and offer good protection, but they
require considerable time and equipment to prepare.
3-25. Engineers assist maneuver units with light equipment and tools carried in or brought
into position by ground vehicles or helicopters. Bulldozers, armored combat earthmovers

(ACEs), and small emplacement excavators (SEEs) can be used in some situations to help
prepare positions for command bunkers and crew-served weapons. They can also be used to
prepare positions off existing roads for tanks, artillery, and air defense weapons.
Conventional equipment and tools are often inadequate in rocky terrain, and extensive use
of demolitions may be required. In the mountains, a greater number of engineer assets will
be devoted to maintaining mobility and maneuver and unit commanders should assume that
available engineer support will be limited to assist them with their survivability efforts. To
enhance survivability and mobility a minimum of two soldiers per maneuver platoon should
be capable of using standard demolitions.
NBC PROTECTION
3-26. Terrain and weather dictate a requirement for a high degree of nuclear, biological, and
chemical (NBC) defense preparedness in mountainous areas. Due to limited mobility, viable
tactical positions, and limited communication abilities, friendly units must be self-sufficient
in protecting themselves against NBC weapon system effects.
3-27. Wearing mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) gear at high elevations, when
possibly combined with altitude sickness, increased dehydration, and increased physical
exertion, degrades performance and increases the likelihood of heat casualties. Commanders
should make every effort to keep soldiers out of MOPP gear until intelligence indicators
reveal that an NBC attack is imminent or it is confirmed that a hazard actually exists (see
FM 3-11.4 for a discussion on vulnerability analysis). When precautions must be taken
against hazards, commanders must make decisions early and allow extra time for tactical
tasks. Commanders should also refer to TC 3-10 for greater detail on tactics, techniques, and
procedures necessary to operate under NBC conditions.
NUCLEAR
3-28. A mountainous environment can amplify or reduce the effects of and distort the
normal circular pattern associated with nuclear blasts. The irregular patterns reduce the
accuracy of collateral damage prediction, damage estimation, and vulnerability analysis.
3-29. Air blast effects are amplified on the burst side of mountains (see Figure 3-2).
Mountain walls reflect blast waves that can reinforce each other, as well as the shock front.
Therefore, it is possible that both overpressure and dynamic pressure, and their duration will
increase. An added danger is the creation of rockslides or avalanches. A small yield nuclear
weapon detonated 30 kilometers or more from the friendly positions may still cause
rockslides and avalanches, and easily close narrow roads and canalized passes. On the other
hand, there may be little or no blast effects on the side of the mountain away from the burst.

Figure 3-2. Effects of Mountains on Radiation and Blast
3-30. Hills and mountains block thermal radiation, and trees and other foliage reduce it. Low
clouds, fog, and falling rain or snow can absorb or scatter up to 90 percent of a burst's
thermal energy. During colder weather, the heavy clothing worn by soldiers in the
mountains provides additional protection. However, the reflection from snow and the thin
atmosphere of higher elevations may increase the effects of thermal radiation. Snow and ice
melted by thermal radiation can result in flash flooding.
3-31. Frozen and rocky ground may make it difficult to construct shelters for protection
from the effects of nuclear weapons. However, natural shelters such as caves, ravines, and
cliffs provide some protection from nuclear effects and contamination. In some instances,
improvised shelters built of snow, ice, or rocks may be the only protection available. The
clear mountain air extends the range of casualty-producing thermal effects. Within this
range, however, the soldiers' added clothing reduces casualties from these effects.
3-32. In mountainous regions, the deposit of radiological contamination is very erratic in

speed and direction because of variable winds. Hot spots may occur far from the point of
detonation, and low-intensity areas may occur very near it. Limited mobility makes
radiological surveys on the ground difficult, and the difficulty of maintaining a constant
flight altitude makes air surveys highly inaccurate. Additionally, melting snow contributes
to the residual radiation pattern. After a nuclear detonation, streams should be checked for
radiation contamination before using them for drinking or bathing. As with the other effects,
the pattern of initial and induced nuclear radiation may be modified by topography and the
height of the burst.
BIOLOGICAL
3-33. Most biological pathogens and some toxins are killed or destroyed by the ultraviolet
rays in sunlight. Above the timberline, there is little protection from the sun; thus, the
effectiveness of a biological attack may be reduced. Downwind coverage may be greater

because of the frequent occurrence of high winds over mountain peaks and ridges.
Additionally, inversion conditions favor the downwind travel of biological agents through
mountain valleys. Typically, winds flow down terrain slopes and valleys at night and up
valleys and sunny slopes during the day. The effects of mountainous terrain and rapidly
changing wind conditions on the ability to predict and provide surveys of contamination for
biological agents are similar to that for nuclear radiation.
3-34. Temperatures and humidity also affect the survivability of biological agents.
Generally, cool temperatures favor survival, and higher humidity increases the effectiveness
of the agents. Extreme cold weather and snow deposited over a biologically contaminated
area can lengthen the effective period of the hazard by allowing the agent to remain alive
but dormant until it is disturbed or the temperature rises. If the use of biological agents is
known or suspected, commanders should ensure that soldiers pay added attention to
personal hygiene and consume only purified/treated water.
CHEMICAL
3-35. Wind and terrain can also cause the effectiveness of chemical agents to vary
considerably. Depending on conditions, effects can be significantly enhanced or almost
ineffective. High winds and rugged terrain cause chemical agent clouds to act in a manner
similar to radioactive fallout. Inversions in mountain valleys may also effectively cap an
area, slowing the dissipation rate. Because of terrain and winds, accurate prediction of the
downwind travel of toxic agent clouds is difficult.
3-36. In mountain warfare, chemical munitions are likely to be delivered by air. The
generally cooler daytime temperatures in mountainous terrain slow the evaporation process,
thus allowing a potential contamination hazard to remain active longer. Midday
temperatures favor using persistent or blister-type agents, since nonpersistent agents
dissipate too rapidly to cause any effect and unsupervised personnel are more likely to
remove protective clothing for comfort.
3-37. The actions to protect against chemical agents in the mountains are not significantly
different than from the requirements in less mountainous terrain. However, in extreme cold
weather, survey and monitoring is often limited to the individual team mission, the FOX
system may be limited to roads and trails, and the detection of vapor hazards is limited when
the temperature falls below 32 degrees Fahrenheit. Decontamination may be more difficult
due to freezing conditions, and the virulency period of contamination hazard for persistent
agents may increase.
SMOKE AND OBSCURANTS
3-38. Smoke operations in mountainous areas are characterized by difficulties encountered

due to terrain and wind. Inadequate roads enhance the military value of existing roads,

mountain valleys, and passes and add importance to the high ground that dominates the
other terrain. Planners can use smoke and flame systems to deny the enemy observation of
friendly positions, supply routes, and entrenchments, and degrade their ability to cross
through tight, high passes and engage friendly forces with direct and indirect fires.
3-39. Thermally induced slope winds that occur throughout the day and night increase the
difficulty of establishing and maintaining smoke operations, except in large and medium
sized valleys. Wind currents, eddies, and turbulence in mountainous terrain must be
continuously studied and observed, and their skillful exploitation may greatly enhance
smoke operations rather than deter them. Smoke screens may be of limited use, due to
enemy aerial observation, to include UAVs, and observation by enemy forces located on
high ground. Smoke units may be required to operate for extended periods with limited
resupply unless petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) supplies are emplaced in hide
positions with easy access.

FM 3-97.6 Chptr 4 Maneuver

Chapter 4
Maneuver
The mountain environment requires the

modification of tactics, techniques, and
procedures. Mountains limit mobility and the
Contents
use of large forces, and restrict the full use of
sophisticated weapons and equipment. These Section I — Movement and Mobility
limitations enable a well-trained and determined Mounted Movement
enemy to have a military effect disproportionate Dismounted Movement
to his numbers and equipment. As such, Mobility
mountain campaigns are normally characterized Special Purpose Teams
by a series of separately fought battles for the Section II — Offensive Operations
control of dominating ridges and heights that
overlook roads, trails, and other potential
Preparation
avenues of approach. Operations generally focus
on smaller-unit tactics of squad, platoon, Forms of Maneuver
company, and battalion size. Because access to Movement to Contact
positions is normally difficult, adjacent units Attack
often cannot provide mutual support and Exploitation and Pursuit
reserves cannot rapidly deploy. Attacks in Motti Tactics
extremely rugged terrain are often dismounted, Section III — Defensive Operations
with airborne and air assaults employed to seize

high ground or key terrain and to encircle or Planning Considerations

block the enemy's retreat. While the Preparation
mountainous terrain is usually thought to offer Organization of the Defense
the greatest advantage to the defender, the Reverse Slope Defense
attacker can often gain success with smaller Retrograde Operations
forces by effectively using deception, bold
Stay-Behind Operations
surprise actions, and key terrain.
Although mountains often increase the need to employ light forces, commanders should not be misled into
believing that this environment is the sole domain of dismounted units. On the contrary, the integrated use
of mounted and dismounted forces in a mountainous environment, as elsewhere, increases a commander’s
capabilities while reducing his limitations. However, the employment of mixed forces must be based on
sound mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil
considerations (METT-TC) analysis of the specific mountain area of operations (AO). The infantry, armor,
and combined arms series of field manuals, at both battalion and brigade level, provide the capabilities and
limitations for each type force, planning and safety considerations, as well as, various concepts for
employment. In all cases, commanders should assign complementary missions to each type force that
capitalizes on their strengths and reduces their weaknesses, and takes into consideration the differential in
operations tempo. Working together on the mountain battlefield, armored and dismounted forces can offset
each other’s weaknesses and provide much greater lethality than any one alone.
SECTION I — MOVEMENT AND MOBILITY
4-1. To move decisively in all directions without losing momentum in a mountain area of
operations requires meticulous planning and careful preparation. In a mountainous
environment, numerous conditions exist that affect mobility. The force that can maintain its
momentum and agility under these conditions has the best chance of winning. Reduced
mobility is a primary limitation to be considered during all phases of planning for mountain
operations. Rugged terrain, the time of year, the weather, and the enemy have a decisive
influence on movement in the mountains. Commanders must ensure that they have sufficient
time and space to deploy their forces for battle by maintaining constant security and
selecting proper routes and movement techniques. Additionally, they must closely manage
limited off-road areas. Tactical operations centers, artillery units, aid stations, air defense
artillery, battalion trains, and other supporting units will compete for limited space in
restrictive mountainous terrain.
4-2. At any elevation level, movement is generally considered to be either movement across
or along terrain compartments. When moving across terrain compartments from one ridge to
another, elements should use bounding overwatch. Lead elements should secure the high
ground and provide overwatching fires as the rest of the element crosses the low ground.
When moving along a terrain compartment, forces should move on the high ground without
silhouetting themselves or, at a minimum, place an element there to secure their flanks.

4-3. Maneuver forces should move by stealth and exploit the cover and concealment of
terrain. Using rough, unlikely routes and movement during limited visibility helps avoid
enemy detection. All movements must exploit known weaknesses in enemy detection
capabilities. Whenever possible, movement should be planned to coincide with other
operations that divert the enemy's attention.
4-4. Because of the narrow routes sometimes encountered, especially in the higher
elevations, formations may be compressed to columns or files. To reduce vulnerability to the
enemy, forces should move separated from each other on multiple and unlikely routes.
When moving dismounted along unlikely routes, special teams construct fixed ropes,
hauling systems, traverse systems, and other mountaineering installations to provide access
to higher elevation levels and increased mobility.
4-5. The danger of surprise attack is most acute in terrain that makes deployment from the
march impossible. Even with well-thought-out movement plans, maneuver elements must
take both active and passive security measures at all times. Restrictive terrain facilitates
templating and determining the movement of forces, making the actions of an armored force
more predictable. Elements may avoid detection by using planned fires to destroy known
enemy sensors and observation posts or by placing fires to divert the enemy's attention away
from an exposed area through which the element must move. However, the placement of
fires in a particular area or along a route may compromise operational security.
4-6. When the danger of rockslides or avalanches exists, the distance between elements
should be increased as much as four to six times more than required on flat terrain. The
more the conditions vary for each unit, the more thorough the planning must be, especially if
units must reach the objective simultaneously. Often, a reserve of time must be programmed
if units move on multiple routes, over unfamiliar terrain, or during limited visibility, or if
they face an uncertain enemy situation.
MOUNTED MOVEMENT
WHEELED AND TRACKED VEHICLES
4-7. Generally, the mountain terrain above the valley floor severely limits movement of
wheeled vehicles and is too restricted for tracked vehicles. Trafficable terrain tends to run
along features with steep slopes on either side, making mounted movement vulnerable to
vehicular ambushes and attack aircraft. Recovery vehicles must always accompany mounted
forces in mountainous terrain to rapidly remove disabled vehicles from the limited and
narrow trail network.
4-8. Tanks and other armored vehicles, such as infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), are
generally limited to movement in valleys and existing trail networks at lower elevations.

Even at these levels, the trails may require extensive engineer work to allow tracked
vehicles to pass over them. Tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles (BFVs), and cavalry fighting
vehicles (CFVs) can support by fire if accessible firing positions are available; however, it
will rarely be possible for them to accompany dismounted infantry in the assault. In such
cases, commanders may seek to use their increased firepower to isolate the objective for the
dismounted assault. If employed above Level I, armored vehicles are forced to fight in
smaller numbers, yet a single tank at a critical point may have a decisive effect. Although
antitank weapons employed from higher elevations can easily penetrate the top of armored
vehicles, in many situations, the inability to elevate the weapon system’s main gun
sufficiently to return fire may further increase its vulnerability.
4-9. Low atmospheric pressure considerably increases the evaporation of water in storage
batteries and vehicle cooling systems, and impairs cylinder breathing. Consequently,
vehicles expend more fuel and lubricant, and engine power is reduced by four to six percent
for every 1,000-meter (3,300-foot) increase in elevation above sea level. This translates to a
fuel and oil increase of approximately 30 to 40 percent or more.
4-10. Figure 4-1 contains

questions that are part of any ● How fast can the march be conducted?
mounted movement plan. Limited ● Will there be other traffic on the route?
road networks and restricted off- ● Are there potential areas that offer
road mobility significantly covered, off-road positions?
increase their importance. In the ● Are there any locations along the route
mountains, failure to address that could be used for resupply?
these questions in detail may ● Are there alternate routes?
seriously jeopardize the overall
mission.
Figure 4-1. Mounted Movement Planning
HELICOPTERS
4-11. Utility and cargo helicopters are key to the rapid movement of soldiers and equipment
in the mountains. However, any operation that depends primarily on continuous aviation
support to succeed is extremely risky. High elevations and rapidly changing and severe
weather common to mountainous regions is very restrictive to aviation operations and
makes availability of aviation support very unpredictable. At high altitudes, weather that
appears to be stable to the ground observer may significantly affect helicopters. The effects
of fog, frontal systems, winds, and storms are readily discernible. Additionally, higher
altitudes may restrict aircraft lift capabilities and decrease aircraft allowable gross weight in
mission profile. Aircraft icing is common at high altitude and may occur suddenly. De-
ice/anti-ice capabilities exist for rotor blades, however, icing may still decrease lift and, in
severe cases, prevent flight altogether. Therefore, commanders must become intimately
familiar with the conditions that may limit the full effectiveness of Army aviation when
operating in a mountain environment (see FM 3-04.203).

4-12. Additionally, commanders must consider the effect of altitude on soldiers when
planning air assault operations (see Chapter 1). If possible, commanders should use soldiers
acclimatized at or above the elevation level planned for the air assault. Depending on the
situation, it may be better to have troops walk in rather than fly them to the necessary
elevation level.
4-13. Rugged, mountainous terrain complicates flight route selection and places an
additional navigational load and strain on the entire crew, as they have little margin for
error. Direct routes can seldom be flown without exposing aircraft to an unacceptable risk of
detection and destruction by the enemy. Tactical flight routes follow valley corridors, where
it is possible to obtain cover and concealment while maintaining the highest possible terrain
flight altitude. Terrain flight in the mountains may preclude using closed formations. Multi-
helicopter operations are normally flown in "loose" or "staggered trail" formations with
increased spacing between aircraft.
4-14. Terrain suitable for multiple

helicopter landing zones (LZs) in
mountainous regions is limited. Level
areas that are suitable for mountain LZs
frequently require little preparation
beyond the clearance of loose material,
since the ground is usually firm enough
to support helicopters. Conversely, if
LZs must be developed, clearing may
be difficult due to the rocky ground.
Stand-off space from rock wall faces
must be cleared and a level landing
surface must be created. Demolitions
may be required to clear large rocks but care must be used to prevent rockslides or
avalanches started by the explosive shock. During the winter, snow must be packed to
prevent whiteouts. Similarly, sandy or dusty LZs should be dampened with water to prevent
brownouts.
4-15. When only single aircraft landing zones are available, in-flight spacing between
helicopters must be significantly increased. Although helicopter LZs should be located on
the windward side of ridges or peaks to take advantage of the more stable winds,
concealment from enemy observation and the mission are the most important factors in site
selection in forward areas. When it is impossible for helicopters to land, personnel may
rappel and light equipment may be sling-loaded into a LZ or, in some situations, lowered by
rope while the helicopter hovers. However, this may increase turnaround time and aircraft
vulnerability. Since available landing sites are often limited, the enemy can be expected to
target all likely locations. Personnel should secure terrain that dominates a landing site

before using it. They must extensively suppress enemy air defense weapons during air
assault or supply operations.
4-16. Attack helicopters can be well suited for a mountain environment; however,
commanders must be continuously mindful of weather and elevation effects on their
employment. They can be the commander's most mobile maneuver forces in mountain
warfare, enabling him to concentrate combat power quickly and exploit enemy weaknesses.
During stable weather conditions, attack helicopters equipped with a variety of ordnance can
rapidly engage targets beyond the range of other weapons or those masked by intervening
crests. As discussed earlier, higher altitudes and icing conditions affect lift and subsequently
armament loads. Ice can also prevent attack helicopters from firing their weapons altogether.
4-17. Employment time and fuel consumption increases because of the few direct routes.
Terrain compartments provide excellent terrain masking and radar and visual acquisition
avoidance, and allow for rapid movements to the flanks and rear of an isolated enemy force.
However, these same compartments may limit aircraft maneuverability and necessitate
smaller flight formations, which, in turn, may affect target engagement techniques. The
compartmented terrain, combined with extended distances, may require engagement without
the support of other combined arms. If terrain precludes placement of fuel and arming points
in the forward area, turnaround time increases and on-station time decreases. Since ground-
to-air communication is often degraded by intervening terrain, in-flight operational control
over extended ranges may be difficult.
4-18. Enemy motorized and mechanized forces may be slowed and canalized as they move
up steep grades, down narrow valleys, and along mountain trails. These types of conditions
allow attack helicopters to engage slower moving targets that have little room to maneuver
or hide. However, these same conditions also make it difficult for pilots to select positions
that allow line-of-sight to the target, sufficient tracking distance, acceptable standoff range,
and adequate cover and concealment. Positions located high on a ridgeline may support
successful target acquisition, tracking, and standoff, but create dangerous silhouettes and
look-down angles (the angle from the aircraft to the target) that exceed aircraft weapon
constraints. Lower positions, possibly in draws or saddles, may provide concealment to the
flanks and an extensive backdrop to help conceal positions, but can decrease a pilot’s ability
to locate and track targets. Intervisibility lines may mask targets, and extreme terrain relief
within the aircraft’s optics field of view may inhibit tracking.
4-19. Remote Hellfire engagements avoid most of these problems (see Figure 4-2), but they
may increase the time of flight of the missile. A remote engagement limits the number of
aircraft exposed for tracking and lasing targets. When engaging with remote fires, a
designating team is placed in a position overwatching the enemy’s route of march. The
remaining aircraft position themselves in covered and concealed battle positions oriented on
the engagement area. If possible, these battle positions should be located below the reverse
military crest or the counterslope of the ridgeline paralleling the engagement area. Aircraft

in these battle positions

will act as remote
platforms by providing
missiles to the
designators without
unmasking. This tactic
prevents the enemy
from achieving line of
sight on the firing
aircraft.
4-20. The AH-64D

Longbow Apache will
provide an even greater
killing capability for the
mountain commander. It
is able to detect, Figure 4-2. Remote Hellfire Engagements
classify, prioritize, and engage targets with Longbow Hellfire missiles without visually
acquiring the target. The commander of the AH-64D Longbow Apache utilizes the its fire
control radar and mast-mounted site to target all of the vehicles in the enemy’s march
formation. A data transfer handover is then executed to all other AH-64D Longbow
Apaches within the company. After the data transfer has been completed, the company can
then engage the enemy march column without exposing the remote platforms. When
employing the AH-64D Longbow Apache with radar guided Hellfire missiles, engagement
times are greatly reduced and aircraft exposure to the enemy is limited. Regardless of the
type of helicopter, a thorough terrain analysis and early involvement of aviation operational
planners are key to successful application of Army aviation assets in mountainous terrain.
DISMOUNTED MOVEMENT
4-21. Dismounted movement is often extremely slow and arduous, and may require the
skills of technical mountaineering teams to secure the advance. For example, movement in
Level II may dictate that elements secure the high ground in Level III. As with any type of
movement, proper movement techniques and formations and constant security to avoid
unplanned enemy contact are some of the keys to successful dismounted movement.
4-22. Foot marches in the mountains are measured in time rather than distance. When
making a map reconnaissance, map distance plus one-third is a good estimate of actual
ground distance. One hour is added for each 300 meters of ascent or 600 meters of descent
to the time required for marching a map distance. Figure 4-3 shows dismounted movement
calculations for an estimated 16-kilometer march on flat and mountainous terrain. Although
not included in this example, commanders must also consider acclimatization, fatigue,
soldiers’ loads, limited visibility, and other factors that affect movement times (see FM 3-

25.18 for additional factors influencing dismounted march rates).
Flat Terrain Mountain Terrain
Normal Time
16 kilometers / 4 kilometer per hour
= 4 hours
Ascent
600 meters / 300 meters per hour
Total = 2 hours
16 kilometers / 4 kilometer per hour
= 4 hours Descent
600 meters / 600 meters per hour
= 1 hour
Total
4+2+1
= 7 hours
Figure 4-3. Example Dismounted Movement Calculations
4-23. Commanders cannot permit straggling or deviations from the selected route. Every
aspect of march discipline must be rigorously enforced to keep a column closed with the
knowledge that the interval between individuals depends on terrain and visibility.
4-24. To prevent an accordion effect, soldiers must allow enough distance between
themselves to climb without causing the following individual to change pace. In
mountainous terrain, a slow, steady pace is preferred to more rapid movement with frequent
halts. Commanders must incorporate scheduled rest halts into their movement plans based
on distance, availability of covered and concealed positions, and other factors described
above. If possible, commanders should not conduct rest halts during steep ascents or
descents. At the start of a march, soldiers should dress lightly so that they begin slightly
chilly. However, a short halt should be taken to adjust clothing and equipment after the first
15 minutes of movement. In addition, soldiers must put on special mountaineering
equipment before reaching steep terrain.
4-25. In glacial areas, the principal dangers and obstacles to movement are crevices, snow
and ice avalanches. Exposure to the hazards of glaciated mountains is increased at company-
level and above, and movement should be limited to separate platoon and lower levels.
When moving on glaciers, an advance element should be used. This group identifies the best
routes of advance, marks the trail, and provides directions and distances to follow-on units.
A marked trail is especially important during inclement weather and low visibility, and

provides a route for retrograde. Commanders must carefully weigh the advantages of a
marked route against the possibility of ambush and the loss of surprise.
MOBILITY
4-26. During mountain operations where limited mobility exists, it is critical that units
maintain security and control of available road/transportation networks. This includes
securing key bridges, fords, crossing sites, intersections, and other vulnerable choke points.
These locations must be protected against enemy air, obstacle, and ground threats. However,
commanders must carefully balance their available combat power between protecting their
freedom of mobility/maneuver and allocating forces to critical close combat operations.
Effective risk analysis and decisions are essential. Route clearance operations, patrols,
traffic control points (TCPs), and other security operations aid commanders in securing
routes. During offensive operations, commanders may need to commit forces to seize key
terrain and routes that afford their forces greater mobility and tactical options against the
enemy.
4-27. Engineer support in front of convoys and combat formations is often necessary to clear
and reduce obstacles, such as washouts, craters, mines, landslides, and avalanches, as well
as, snow and ice in colder regions. Reducing obstacles is more difficult in mountainous
areas because of reduced maneuver space, lack of heavy equipment, and an increased
competition for engineer support. Minefields should normally be breached, since bypassing
properly sited obstacles is often impossible. In the mountains, using mechanical mine plows
and rollers is frequently impossible due to the lack of roads and trails, and removal of mines
by hand or through demolitions is often required. Commanders must exercise extreme
caution when employing demolitions in the vicinity of snow and rock covered slopes
because they can cause dangerous rockslides, avalanches, and secondary fragmentation. FM
3-34.2 has information on breaching operations and synchronization required.
4-28. Creating new road systems in mountainous regions is usually impractical because of
the large amount of rock excavation required. Therefore, roadwork is generally limited to
the existing roads and trails often requiring extensive construction, improvement,
maintenance, and repair to withstand the increased military traffic and severe weather
conditions. In certain mountainous areas, materials may be difficult to obtain locally and
impossible to make full use of conventional heavy engineer equipment for road and bridge
construction or repair. In such cases, large numbers of engineers are required and units must
rely heavily on hand labor, light equipment, and demolitions.
4-29. Secondary roads and trails should be steadily improved to accommodate trucks and
infantry fighting vehicles, and, eventually, heavier vehicles. Their selection depends on
necessity and the speed with which the routes can be put into service. Abnormal gradients
on roads may be necessary to ensure that construction keeps pace with tactical operations.
Sidehill cuts are the rule, and the same contour line is followed to avoid excessive fills or

bridging. Turnouts should be installed approximately every 500 meters to reduce traffic
congestion on single-lane roads or trails. Drainage requirements must be considered in detail
because of the effects of abnormally steep slopes, damaging thaws, and heavy rains.
4-30. Stream and river crossing operations are difficult and must usually be accomplished
by expedient means. Bridging operations in mountainous terrain are normally limited to
spanning short gaps and reinforcing existing bridges by using prefabricated materials and
fixed spans from floating bridge equipment. However, standard design or improvised
suspension bridges may still be needed for longer spans. Because existing bridges may have
low vehicle load classifications, standard fixed tactical bridges and bridging materials
should be on hand to quickly reinforce or replace them. In extremely rough terrain,
cableways and tramways may be constructed to move light loads and personnel across
gorges, and up and down steep slopes.
COUNTERMOBILITY
4-31. Obstacles become more important because of the compartmented terrain and already
limited road and trail networks. It is easy to create effective obstructions in mountains by
cratering roads, fully or partially destroying bridges, or inducing rockslides and avalanches.
Units can use antitank minefields effectively to canalize the enemy, deny terrain, or support
defensive positions. Commanders should remember that clearing or reducing these same
obstacles may be extremely difficult and a hindrance to future operations. Using reserve and
situational obstacles, lanes and gaps, and plans to rapidly reduce friendly obstacles must be
an integral part of all defensive operations. Commanders must also consider the enemy's
ability to create similar obstacles and minefields when developing courses of action that
hinge on speed of movement or a particular avenue of approach.
4-32. Reinforcing obstacles can be used effectively with the natural ruggedness of
mountains to deny the enemy terrain and to delay and impede his movement. As in all
environments, the engineer and maneuver force commander must site obstacles based on
terrain and the availability of weapon systems.
4-33. Antitank mines are laid along the comparatively narrow approaches suitable for
mounted attacks. Flash floods and excessive runoff may dislodge mines from their original
location; however, they normally remain armed. Family of scatterable mines (FASCAM),
particularly artillery-delivered and helicopter-delivered mines, increases the flexibility of the
maneuver unit commander, reduces the engineer effort, and is a valuable resource in
protecting rear areas from enemy envelopment and breakthroughs. Using FASCAM should
be weighed against the time in delivery, displacement of the artillery, and the additional
logistics burden that may be involved.
ENGINEER AUGMENTATION AND EMPLOYMENT

4-34. Because mountain terrain requires small-unit decentralized operations, an engineer

platoon or company should be allocated to each maneuver battalion, light or heavy.
Allocation in this manner may leave division and brigade rear areas short of engineer
support.
4-35. An additional corps engineer battalion (wheeled) and an engineer light equipment
company may be needed to augment an infantry division. Platoons from the engineer light
equipment company may be tasked to assist divisional platoons with the engineer effort in
each maneuver battalion area. The corps combat engineer battalion (wheeled) provides
heavy equipment and dump trucks required to support road improvement and maintenance
in division and brigade rear areas. Also, this corps combat engineer battalion (wheeled) can
accomplish such tasks as constructing or reinforcing bridges. To operate efficiently,
additional items, such as compressors, jackhammers, power drills, chain saws, and
bulldozers, may be necessary, as well as large amounts of explosives and obstacle materials.
SPECIAL PURPOSE TEAMS
4-36. On steep, exposed, or technically difficult terrain, soldiers with advanced

mountaineering skills may be required to maintain or improve mobility. Advanced climbers
may deploy ahead of maneuver forces during limited visibility or inclement weather to erect
aids that will help maneuver elements move in difficult terrain. They may also be committed
to lead forces or to operate independently to strike the enemy suddenly over unlikely routes
and to occupy certain key heights that can be defended easily because of their position. The
specific employment of special purpose teams is based on the mission, tasks, and
requirements of the commander.
4-37. Commanders must analyze operational terrain levels and identify the mobility
requirements necessary to obtain and maintain freedom of both tactical maneuver and
operational movement (see Figure 4-4). It is critical that special purpose teams are properly
organized before a mission begins. Once movement is underway, unplanned deviations have
little chance of success. Bypassing obstacles in mountainous terrain is almost always
difficult or impossible. In many instances, the best available bypass will channel friendly
forces into enemy kill zones or ambushes.

Figure 4-4. Relationship of Terrain to Skills and Special Purpose Teams
4-38. To enable a force to move personnel, equipment, and supplies on the mountain
battlefield with limited delays due to terrain, visibility, or obstacles, commanders should
organize soldiers with advanced mountaineering training as guides, lead climbing teams,
installation teams, and evacuation teams (evacuation teams are covered in the combat health
support portion of Chapter 5).

The 10th Mountain Division and Riva Ridge (February 1945)
After attempts to capture Bologna in Italy's Po Valley during the winter of 1944-1945 failed, Allied
commanders focused on the possibility of wide sweeping movements aimed at encircling Bologna
and all the German armies in the region. The plan called for using the 10th Mountain Division to
capture a series of mountain peaks and ridges dominating a 10-mile section of Highway 64, one of
two main routes leading from Pistoia through the northern Apennines to Bologna. This would
provide the Allies with a better position before starting the spring offensive, since seizure of this
terrain would result not only in the Germans' being unable to protect their vital lines of
communications, but also in the Americans' being able to observe German activity almost all the way
to the Po Valley, approximately 40 miles away. The Division's baptism-by-fire was to be in a region
dominated by two ridges whose highest peaks rose 3,000 to 5,000 feet. One of these ridges, Pizzo di
Campiano-Monte Mancinello, became known as Riva Ridge (see Figure 4-5).
These heights appeared to be

impregnable, as it was doubtful
that any force large enough to
overwhelm the Germans could be
massed unobserved for an assault.
The Germans had all the
advantages of the commanding
heights, and there was little cover
for troops crossing the barren,
snow-covered ground. It was clear
that Riva Ridge would have to be
cleared before the decisive attack
could advance up Mount
Belvedere and along the ridge
towards Monte della Torraccia.
Therefore, the plan was for the
mountain troops to climb the 1500-
foot cliff and surprise the
Germans, who would not be
expecting the attack up the face of
the cliff.
The 86th Mountain Infantry

Regiment's 1st Battalion and one
company from its 2nd Battalion

were assigned to negotiate the cliff

and capture Riva Ridge, thereby
setting the conditions for other
assault elements to achieve their
objectives. Select teams of
climbers assembled their ropes,
pitons, and other gear. The teams
climbed in the dead of night,
hammering pitons into the rock,
attaching links to them, and
fastening ropes to the links. These
served as fixed lines to assist those
who followed in their ascent of the
vertical face of the ridge. The lead
climbing teams reached the top
around midnight, and battalion
units began their ascent in force.
By 0400 on 20 February, all three
of 1st Battalion's companies and
the company from the 2nd
Battalion had reached their
individual objectives on top of the
ridge without being seen. They
attacked the defending Germans
and completely surprised them.
German daylight counterattacks
were repulsed and the division's
left flank was secured on Riva
Ridge - opening the way for the
rest of the division to accomplish
its mission.
The capture of Riva Ridge was the

only significant action in which the
division put to use its specialized
stateside training. Nevertheless, no
one would deny that this single
mountain operation justified all the Figure 4-5. Riva Ridge
demanding training the 10th Mountain Division had undergone.
Adapted from See Naples and Die, Robert B. Ellis.

GUIDES
4-39. Mountain guides are useful for any operation, particularly on terrain above Class 3,
which requires accurate judgment and extensive technical knowledge. They act primarily as
advisors to unit commanders and assist with planning when technical mountaineering
problems affect the tactical scheme of maneuver. They must be experienced in all aspects of
mountaineering (usually a Level 3 mountaineer) and capable of ensuring that the force is
never beyond the margin of its operational capabilities while operating on mountainous
terrain. Mountain guides must possess the skills, knowledge, and experience necessary to
develop a true perspective of the obstacles and conditions that must be overcome.
4-40. Mountain guides should perform the following functions for the commander:
1. Conduct a terrain analysis of the assigned area.

2. Select the best march routes.
3. Identify danger areas, obstacles, and hazards.
4. Estimate the effects of elevation on force capabilities.
5. Determine the technical means necessary to employ the force.
6. Estimate the time of unit movements.
7. Develop a movement sketch indicating the azimuth, time, and mountaineering
requirements.
8. Lead units, usually company-level and above, on difficult terrain.
9. Supervise all aspects of mountaineering safety.
LEAD CLIMBING TEAMS
4-41. As with all special purpose teams, lead climbing teams have highly skilled soldiers
qualified in advanced mountaineering techniques (normally Level 2 mountaineers). To a
lesser degree, lead climbing teams perform many of the same functions as guides. They also
accompany a unit over unprepared routes and assist with actually conducting its mission by
maintaining and improving mobility. In some instances, lead climbing teams may operate
independently of other forces to accomplish specific missions.
4-42. These teams are capable of climbing at night with the aid of night-vision goggles and
can conduct operations over any type of terrain. Lead climbing teams should be utilized to
install fixed ropes to assist personnel over exposed terrain. They make the most difficult
climbs and act as rope leaders. Members of the lead climbing teams must be extremely
proficient in the technical aspects of mountaineering, since they select the specific routes to
be climbed. This responsibility emphasizes the importance of accurate judgment, since a
single mistake could jeopardize the success of the unit's mission. Commanders should
consider assigning lead climbing teams to, or developing an organic capability within:

● Ground reconnaissance elements.

● Forward observer parties.
● Air defense sections.
● Communications sections.
● Security elements.
● Assault elements.
● Sniper sections.
4-43. The number of lead climbing teams required is dependent on the mission and
difficulty of the elevation level or dismounted mobility classification. If more than one point
of attack is to be used or a more mobile patrol is needed, it may be necessary to employ
additional lead climbing teams. Lead climbing teams may also assist in the attack of very
steep objectives by negotiating the most unlikely avenues of approach. They can be
dispatched ahead of the attacking elements to secure the advance at night and during periods
of inclement weather. The commander’s imagination and their limited availability are the
only restraints toward using lead climbing teams.
4-44. In precipitous terrain, lead climbing teams can be used alone to conduct small
reconnaissance patrols or to form the nucleus of larger patrols. They may also be used to
expedite movement of flank security elements over difficult terrain and during poor
visibility. At least one team should be attached to each element, depending on the size of
flank security and the operational terrain level in which operations take place. When the AO
dictates a rate of march on the flanks that is slower than that of the main body, flank security
elements should be located adjacent to the advance echelon. Lead climbing teams are
detached as necessary to reconnoiter and hold dominant terrain features on the flanks of the
line of march. As the trail element passes and the security position is no longer required, the
lead climbing team’s flank outposts join the main body or proceed forward to another
security location.
INSTALLATION TEAMS
4-45. Installation team members are qualified in the construction and maintenance of
technical mountaineering systems, referred to as installations, which facilitate unit
movement. These teams deploy throughout the AO, in any weather or visibility conditions,
to erect mountaineering installations that overcome obstacles to the movement of friendly
forces and supplies.
4-46. In most situations, installation teams should consist of six qualified members, enough
to build most installations. Installation teams deploy early and prepare the AO for safe, rapid
movement by constructing various types of mountaineering installations (see Figure 4-6).
Following construction of an installation, the team, or part of it, remains on site to monitor
the system, assist with the control of forces across it, and make adjustments or repairs during
its use. After passage of the unit, the installation team may then disassemble the system and

deploy to another area as needed.
4-47. Although installation teams can

assist, commanders remain
responsible for establishing a traffic
control system and the rate of
negotiation to expedite tactical
movement and prevent unnecessary
massing of personnel and equipment
on either side of the obstacle. Plans
for the traffic control system include
arrangements for staging and holding
● Fixed ropes
areas, as well as movement. A
● Pulley systems
prearranged order of movement,
● Hauling lines
disseminated to all elements of the
● Rope ladders
force, facilitates rapid movement. The
● Rope bridges
traffic control plan also includes
● Handrails
instructions for dispersing forces on
● Traverse systems
the far side once they negotiate the
obstacle. The successful negotiation
of systems depends on how quickly a
force can consolidate on the far side Figure 4-6. Types of Installations
and continue its mission.
4-48. Commanders must carefully consider the proportion of installation team assets
allocated to maneuver with those assigned to sustain essential logistics activities. When
considering a unit's scheme of maneuver, the number and types of installations depend on
METT-TC, emphasizing factors listed in Figure 4-7.
4-49. Once operations stabilize,

installation teams can direct and assist
engineers in the construction of fixed
alpine paths. Fixed alpine paths
consist of permanent or semi-
permanent mountain aids that assist
troops in traversing rugged mountain
terrain and facilitate the movement of
equipment and supplies to and from
forward areas.

● Number of routes required by the

SECTION II — OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS maneuver force
● Size of the maneuver force
4-50. Offensive operations in the ● Amount and type of maneuver force
mountains vary depending on the equipment
degree of restrictions dictated by ● Number of installations required to
mountains of different heights and extend logistics support
character, but are normally planned ● Weather and visibility conditions
and conducted utilizing the movement ● Number of installation teams
to contact and the attack. Exploitation available
and pursuit are conducted, but less
frequently than in other environments.
Figure 4-7. Factors Influencing Mountain
4-51. Mountain operations will most
Installations
likely be fought to gain control of key
or decisive terrain. The goal is to seize
objectives that are important for continuing the battle, such as lines of communication,
passes, ridges, and choke points. Every attempt must be made to fight from the heights
down. Frontal attacks against defended heights have little chance of success and attacks are
usually made along the flanks and to the rear of the enemy. Consequently, envelopment
becomes the preferred form of maneuver.
4-52. The missions assigned to units operating in a mountainous region remain the same as
those in lowland regions. Commanders should place an increased emphasis on:
● Limited-visibility operations.
● Mobility and survivability.
● Securing friendly lines of communications while severing those of the enemy.
● Reconnaissance and security.
● Centralized planning and decentralized small-unit actions.
● Environmental factors favoring operations of short duration and violent execution.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
4-53. When conducting offensive operations in the mountains, surprise is often a dominant
consideration, rather than a supporting one. Units achieve surprise by achieving superior
situational understanding, especially of the terrain, and by using that knowledge to do the
unexpected. Friendly forces should conduct bold and imaginative operations to exploit
enemy weaknesses or inability to operate in a mountainous environment. A well-trained
force can achieve surprise by infiltrating and attacking the enemy’s rear or attacking during
periods of limited visibility, such as night, rain, or snow. They can use helicopters and their
technical mountaineering skills to conduct decisive operations anywhere in the AO. The

effects of surprise can be dramatically increased if commanders select objectives in

restrictive terrain that decrease the enemy’s mobility and ability to react effectively.
4-54. The mountainous terrain increases the threat to concentrated formations. Usually, it is
difficult to coordinate all forces by time and location so that they can rapidly support each
other and achieve massed effects. The compartmented terrain separates adjacent units,
precluding mutual support, and may adversely affect supporting distances. Therefore, it is
critical to anticipate the concentration of forces and fires before the battle begins to achieve
effective synchronization.
4-55. Commanders usually select decisive points for the attack based, in part, on their ability
to seize and control key terrain. Each of these objectives often necessitates the seizure of
one or more intermediate objectives. The compartmented terrain and resulting dispersion
make it difficult for commanders to visualize the entire AO and complicates command and
control, while the terrain often affords the defender excellent observation and decreases the
attacker’s ability to concentrate forces undetected.
4-56. Once a battle is joined, helicopters are the only rapid means for massing forces on
terrain higher than Level I. When weather conditions permit, attack helicopters and tactical
air assets are essential because they can move and strike over a large AO in a short time.
Therefore, the suppression of enemy air defense may become a high priority during
offensive operations.
4-57. Commanders must personally acquaint themselves with the terrain to the fullest extent
possible. They combine this knowledge with other factors of METT-TC to develop simple,
yet precise plans and orders. As previously discussed, compartmented terrain tends to divide
the battle into many isolated engagements that are difficult to control. A complex and
inflexible plan will not withstand the changing situations associated with this type of
decentralized combat. An uncomplicated plan with a well-thought-out intent that is clearly
communicated ensures understanding at the lowest level and allows subordinates to exploit
battlefield opportunities even if communications fail.
PREPARATION
4-58. The length of the preparatory phase is typically longer in a mountainous environment.
An offensive action against an enemy defensive position must be based on thorough
reconnaissance and orderly preparation. The primary factor in determining the technique to
be used in destroying the enemy position is the strength of the enemy’s defenses. The
stronger the defenses, the more deliberate the attack must be. In mountainous terrain,
evaluation and exploitation of the ground are essential. Commanders must prepare plans of
attack that take advantage of the weaknesses found in the enemy's defensive system. In the
mountains, a larger number of reconnaissance assets and additional time may be needed to
determine the strength of enemy positions on the objective and all surrounding heights, and

favorable routes to and past the objective.
4-59. Difficult approach routes should be marked and prepared for safe passage. Easily
traversed slopes, broad hills, plateaus, and valley floors, as well as mountainous terrain with
well-developed road and transportation nets, permit deployment in breadth. High ranges
with ridges and crests leading to the objective require organization in depth with extended
lines of communications.
4-60. In trackless mountain terrain, company-sized teams usually conduct attacks. If the area
assigned to a battalion permits, companies should approach the objective separately on
multiple routes. In restrictive terrain, adequate maneuver space may not always be available
and several units may be required to move along the same avenue of approach. It may even
be necessary to conduct shaping operations to seize sections of terrain from which the
enemy can dominate the forces' movement and approach.
4-61. The preparatory phase may also include feints and demonstrations to shape the
battlefield. In mountainous terrain, the defending force has a number of advantages that
allow it to defeat an attacking force much larger than its own, such as long-range
observation, rugged natural cover, concealment, advance siting of weapons, and operations
on familiar terrain. Feints and demonstrations mask friendly operations, expose enemy
vulnerabilities, disorganize the defense, and allow the attacking force to engage the enemy
discriminately. In a mountain area of operations, the benefits achieved from a successful
deception effort may well outweigh the difficulties involved in mounting it.
FORMS OF MANEUVER
4-62. The forms of offensive maneuver are common to all environments, to include
mountainous terrain. While frequently used in combination, each form of maneuver attacks
the enemy in a different way, and some pose different challenges to the commander
attacking in the mountains.
INFILTRATION
4-63. Infiltration is frequently used in the mountains. The difficult terrain and recurring
periods of limited visibility allow for undetected movement. Infiltration in a mountainous
environment is used to shape the battlefield by attacking enemy positions from the flank or
the rear, securing key terrain in support of the decisive operations, or disrupting enemy
sustaining operations. Infiltration is normally conducted using one of three techniques:
movement in small groups along one axis, movement in one group, or movement in small
groups along several routes at the same time. Regardless of the technique used, units must
move in a covert manner to reduce the chance of enemy contact.

4-64. With movement in small groups along one axis, all members of the force use the best
route. Small groups are harder to detect and easier to control, and do not compromise the
total force if detected. This technique may require an excessive amount of time and an
increased number of guides and lead climbing teams, and does require an assembly area or
linkup point prior to conduct of the decisive action. If the lead group is detected, other
groups may be ambushed.
4-65. The enemy can more easily detect movement in one group. If the force is detected, the
overall mission may be endangered. However, this technique has no reassembly problems,
since reassembly is not required. Everyone uses the same route, easing navigation and
reducing the number of guides and lead climbing teams required. A large force can fight out
of a dangerous situation more easily than a small one. This technique minimizes
coordination problems with other infiltrating units.
4-66. Movement in small groups along several routes at the same time has several
advantages. It avoids putting the total force in danger and is less likely to be seen. It forces
the enemy to react in many locations and makes it harder for him to determine the size of
the force or its mission. Groups travelling over severely restrictive terrain may have
significant assembly, control, and sustainment difficulties, and may require more guides,
lead climbing teams, and installation teams.
ENVELOPMENT AND TURNING MOVEMENT
4-67. The envelopment and its variant, the turning movement, are used extensively in
mountain operations. Both forms of maneuver seek to avoid the enemy’s strength and attack
the enemy at a decisive point or points where the enemy is weakest or unprepared, and both
rely on superior agility. In the mountains, the ability to react faster than the enemy may be
achieved through greater mountaineering skills, using airborne and air assaults, and,
depending on the specific AO, amphibious assaults.
PENETRATION
4-68. Mountainous terrain normally makes penetration extremely dangerous or impossible

because of the difficulty in concentrating overwhelming combat power in the area of
penetration. Due to mobility restrictions, it is also difficult to develop and maintain the
momentum necessary to move quickly through a gap and on toward the objective. The area
of penetration is always vulnerable to flank attack, and this vulnerability significantly
increases in mountainous terrain. A penetration may be useful when attacking an enemy that
is widely dispersed or overextended in his defense. If a penetration must be conducted, flank
defensive positions must be eliminated before the initial breach of enemy positions.
Successful penetration of a defensive position in restrictive mountainous terrain requires
using limited visibility, stealth, and covered and concealed terrain at selected breach points.

FRONTAL ATTACK
4-69. Frontal attacks in hilly or mountainous areas, even when supported by heavy direct
and indirect fires, have a limited chance of success. Mountain terrain adds to the relative
combat power of the defender. The frontal attack exposes the attacker to the concentrated
fire of the defender while simultaneously limiting the effectiveness of the attacker's own
fires. In the mountains, the frontal attack is an appropriate form of maneuver to conduct as a
shaping operation designed to fix a force, while the decisive operation uses another form,
such as the envelopment, to defeat the enemy.
MOVEMENT TO CONTACT
4-70. The fundamentals regarding movement to contact also apply in a mountainous

environment with the added likelihood of surprise attack and ambush. Limited mobility and
dependence on restrictive terrain make it difficult to rapidly deploy from the movement
formation. Plans and movement formations and techniques should be based on maintaining
flexibility and providing continuous security.
4-71. During a movement to contact, the advance guard normally advances in column,
moving continuously or by bounds, until it makes contact. While requiring less physical
exertion, movement along the topographical crest of a ridgeline increases the possibility of
enemy observation and should normally be avoided. Given adequate concealment, this
exposure may be reduced by moving along the military crest. Ridgelines and crests can
often provide a tactical advantage to the force that controls them. Their control may allow
rapid movement from one terrain compartment to another and afford excellent observation
into lower terrain levels. In all cases, commanders must address the control or clearance of
ridgelines that dominate their planned avenues of approach.
4-72. The main body should never be committed to canalizing terrain before forward
elements have advanced far enough to ensure that the main body will not become encircled.
This is a critical factor when employing mixed heavy and light forces that have sharp
differences in operational tempo. Combat service support must be decentralized and readily
available to sustain the combat elements. Major terrain compartments may physically
separate maneuver units moving as part of a larger force. Continuous reconnaissance to the
front and flank security is essential to prevent the enemy from infiltrating the gaps between
units.
4-73. As the enemy situation becomes better known, commanders may shorten the distance
between elements to decrease reaction time, or they may begin to deploy in preparation for
the attack. Lateral movement between adjacent columns is frequently difficult or impossible.
However, every attempt should be made to maintain at least visual contact. Commanders
must emphasize the use of checkpoint reporting, contact patrols, and phased operations to
coordinate and control the movement of the overall force. Control measures should not be so

numerous as to impede operations and stifle initiative. Proper control ensures that units and
fires are mutually supporting, objectives are correctly identified, and units are in position to
attack.
ATTACK
4-74. Speed, flexibility, and surprise, normally advantages enjoyed by the attacker, are
limited by restrictive terrain and the defender’s increased ability to see and acquire targets at
greater distances. These limitations make it difficult for units above the company team level
to conduct a hasty attack against prepared positions. In the mountains, commanders usually
need more time to coordinate fire support, pick routes to prevent enemy observation and
detection, and select control measures to coordinate and control the operation. Therefore,
deliberate attacks requiring a detailed scheme of maneuver and well-developed fire support
plan become the norm at battalion-level and above. Since daylight contributes to the
defender’s ability to see and, thereby, reduces the attacker’s chances of success,
commanders should seek opportunities to exploit the advantages of limited visibility.
Although these conditions slow movement even more and make coordinating forces more
difficult, they decrease the enemy’s ability to accurately sense what is happening and react
effectively.
4-75. In planning and conducting the attack, commanders should recognize that the enemy
will generally seek to control the valleys and trail networks, including adjacent slopes and
high ground. Defenses normally be anchored around obstacles, and long-range, direct fire
weapons employed in poorly trafficable terrain, often on slopes and protruding high ground.
The enemy will attempt to engage the attacker in the valleys and low ground with flanking
fires and artillery, often in a direct fire mode. Commanders must analyze the terrain to
determine not only how the enemy will organize his defensive positions, but also how the
terrain might contribute to the enemy’s ability to counterattack. As friendly forces attempt to
deploy for the attack, the enemy, using his advance knowledge of the terrain and prepared
routes, may maneuver forces to counterattack from the flank or rear.
4-76. All terrain features that can be occupied by even a small enemy force should be
secured. In many instances, overwatch positions may not be readily available within the
range capability of organic weapons. Infiltration, technical climbing, and extensive
breaching may be required to position weapons to support the assault. On many occasions
artillery support, especially in high mountains, may not be available. In other instances,
commanders may need to identify intermediate objectives for maneuver forces based on the
need to ensure that artillery units have suitable, secure firing positions to range the enemy
and support the attack. As in all environments, commanders must identify fire support
requirements and allocate fires based on the ability to support and available ammunition.
Because resupply may be limited and extremely difficult, they may need to place restrictions
on the amount of ammunition expended on specific targets.

4-77. Fire and movement during the assault are extremely difficult. In situations where
machine guns can be positioned effectively, a rifle platoon can provide itself with support
from a flank or from a height. However, during an assault up a slope, supporting fire cannot
come from an overwatch position and must originate from the flanks or through gaps
between the assaulting soldiers. Control is difficult to maintain when the assault is in steeply
rising terrain. Commanders must pay special attention to the dangers of fratricide.
4-78. Fire and movement are easier in an assault over a downward slope. Down-slope
assaults often have the advantage of good observation, but dead spaces and intervening
terrain may reduce the effectiveness of supporting fires. Defensive positions laid out by a
skillful enemy on a reverse slope significantly increase the effect of unfavorable down-slope
conditions. This type of defense compels the attacking force to position its supporting
weapons and observation posts on exposed crests. In this situation, support elements must be
positioned to avoid terrain masking and crest clearance problems.
4-79. Breaching obstacles and preparing bypass routes that allow the assault force to move
into the defensive position must be an integral part of the commander's plan. In rugged
terrain, man-made obstacles that are covered by fire create a particularly dangerous and
formidable barrier. Command and control of a covert, in-stride, deliberate, or assault
breaches is more difficult than in open terrain, and mobility support is extensive if the
obstacle cannot be reduced. Assaults in mountainous terrain almost always involve
preparing routes that allow the assault force to rapidly move over difficult natural obstacles
and into the objectives.
4-80. Commanders should maintain a strong reserve, if possible. In the mountains, as

elsewhere, commanders can use their reserves to restore the momentum of a stalled attack,
defeat enemy counterattacks, and exploit success. Reserves must be carefully positioned and
organized so difficult terrain, limited road networks, or unpredictable weather does not
delay their arrival. Once committed, commanders make every effort to reconstitute another
reserve from available units.
4-81. An attack should not be halted on a summit or on a ridgeline objective, which enemy
artillery and mortar fire will likely target. Reorganization is generally best conducted well
forward of a crest line on the next suitable slope. Commanders must ensure that the enemy
is not allowed the opportunity to counterattack to recapture key terrain. Rapid adjustment of
positions and coordination with flanking units are essential. Support weapons, especially
mortars, should be brought forward as quickly as possible. Helicopters are useful for this
purpose and may be used for backhaul of casualties.
COUNTERATTACK
4-82. Counterattacks in the mountains must exploit the aspects of terrain that impair enemy
momentum and make it difficult for him to mass and maneuver. Obstructing terrain that

canalizes movement and restricts mobility significantly increases the potential for
counterattacks. In planning a counterattack, the commander must carefully consider the
enemy's weaknesses or inability to operate in a mountainous environment. A counterattack,
even on a very small scale, can have a decisive impact in mountainous terrain.
RAID AND AMBUSH
4-83. The restrictive terrain also affords increased opportunities to conduct raids and
ambushes. These operations should take advantage of limited visibility and terrain that the
enemy may consider impassable. In steep terrain, movement time increases significantly,
and only light equipment can be taken. The force should use special climbing techniques to
negotiate the difficult routes during limited visibility. Commanders must carefully consider
the routes and methods used for extraction to ensure that the combat force does not become
isolated after executing the mission. They can ensure a successful operation by avoiding
detection through proper movement techniques and by skillfully using natural cover and
concealment. It may be necessary to reposition some indirect fire support assets to cover
dead space or use attack helicopters and close air support. The ambush or raid commander
must know in advance if supporting fires cannot cover his routes to and from the objective.
DEMONSTRATIONS AND FEINTS
4-84. Because maneuver space is usually limited or confined and restricts the number of
avenues of approach for heavier forces, deception plays an important part in the mountain
battle. To mislead the enemy regarding friendly intentions, capabilities, and objectives,
commanders should plan systematic measures of deception.
EXPLOITATION AND PURSUIT
4-85. In a mountainous environment, exploitation and pursuit operations must be conducted

discriminately and the mountain commander must always prepare for success. A battalion
may exploit its own success to a limited extent, but it normally participates in the
exploitation as part of a larger force. Air assault and attack helicopter units can be used to
augment exploitation and pursuit operations. The exploiting commander must compensate
for the ground mobility restrictions imposed by terrain and weather. Speed can best be
achieved by isolating enemy positions with the smallest force possible. Engineer support
should be well forward with the necessary equipment to allow combat troops to maintain
momentum and avoid delay by enemy obstacles. The commander must be careful to prevent
overextending either the exploiting force or its sustaining logistics. A withdrawing force is
capable of establishing numerous strong points and firing positions on heights that allow it
to quickly dissipate the combat power of the exploiting force.
MOTTI TACTICS

4-86. Motti tactics are presented here to demonstrate how forces can exploit superior
mobility skills and knowledge of the mountainous terrain and environment to defeat the
enemy. The Finns developed these tactics during the Finnish-Russian War in 1939-1940.
They are characterized by attacks on rear areas, bivouac sites, and command posts.
4-87. The Finnish word "motti" means a pile of logs ready to be sawed into lumber — in
effect, setting the conditions so that a larger force can be defeated in detail. These tactics
were most successful in the forested areas of Finland during the arctic winters. During the
Finnish-Russian War, the Soviets were neither prepared for, nor trained for, warfare under
such conditions. They were almost totally trail-bound, with few ski troops. In the 1980s, the
Soviet Union experienced similar difficulties in the mountains of Afghanistan. In both
instances, the road and trail-bound nature of their forces and their basic tactics left them
vulnerable to motti tactics in mountainous terrain.
4-88. Generally, the force utilizing

motti tactics never becomes decisively FORCES CAN USE MOTTI TACTICS
engaged. It disrupts the enemy’s WHEN THEY:
supply lines, denies him warmth and
shelter, infiltrates his bivouacs, and ● Have superior technical mobility
destroys his rear areas to the point skills necessary to negotiate Class 4
where he must remain in a high state and 5 terrain
of alert. These attacks, in combination ● Are able to operate effectively in a
with the environment, help to destroy noncontiguous area of operations
the enemy’s will to fight. with limited support, and despite
Commanders should not only develop temperature extremes and inclement
a thorough understanding of how to mountain weather
apply these tactics, but also ● Are able to navigate in high
understand the conditions that may mountainous terrain, dense
leave their own forces vulnerable to vegetation, darkness, storms, and fog
its use (see Figure 4-8). while making good use of available
cover and concealment
Motti tactics generally follow the ● Maintain the element of surprise
sequence of:
FORCES ARE VULNERABLE TO
1. Locating and fixing the enemy. MOTTI TACTICS WHEN THEY:
2. Isolating the enemy.
3. Attacking to defeat or destroy ● Operate within noncontiguous areas
the enemy. of operations
● Have limited mobility skills
4-89. Reconnaissance is conducted to restricting their movements to roads,
locate an enemy force moving in or trails, and Class 1 and 2 terrain
toward an area that will restrict his ● Have inadequate reconnaissance and

movements to roads, trails, or linear security

terrain. Once identified, the force
must be fixed so that it presents a
linear target along the axis of advance Figure 4-8. Conditions Affecting the Use of
to which it is bound. This is Motti Tactics
accomplished using obstacles and a
series of squad and platoon sized ambushes and raids. Obstacles may be natural, such as
snow, crevices, deep mud, steep terrain, and water obstacles, or man-made, for example
mines, landslides, avalanches, or destroyed bridges.
4-90. The ambushes and raids not only fix the enemy, they also disturb his composure,
create an air of uncertainty, and prevent uninterrupted sleep and rest. Friendly units attack
the enemy from the high ground. They make maximum use of night vision devices, as well
as the difficult restrictive terrain. They avoid enemy security and interdict his operations. As
a further result of these actions, the enemy is compelled to use more forces on security tasks.
Unless the enemy can be easily defeated or destroyed, the attacking force rapidly withdraws
after forcing the enemy to deploy. In general, this series of attacks confuses the enemy as to
the friendly unit’s exact location and intent, and slows his decision-making cycle so that he
reacts ineffectively to subsequent operations.
4-91. The attacking force then isolates the enemy into smaller groups. Once isolated, the
friendly force maneuvers to envelop and attacks to defeat or destroy the isolated elements.
As the enemy exhausts himself in an effort to break out, the attacking force may regroup and
repeat the sequence. It is imperative that the attacking force seal off the enemy and keep
avenues of approach closed, and not ignore the threat to its flanks, which may increase as
the attack progresses.
4-92. Overall, motti tactics wear the enemy down to a point where he is vulnerable to more
direct attacks or to the point where it is no longer beneficial or feasible to continue
operations in the area. Motti tactics employed alone only prove decisive over a long period
of time, depending on the enemy’s capabilities, strength, and resolve. Based on METT-TC,
friendly forces normally must increase the operation’s tempo to gain a quick, decisive
outcome. Still, these type tactics may complement other more direct offensive operations in
support of the overall plan.
SECTION III — DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
4-93. In the mountains, more so than in the lowlands, the strength of the defense depends on
its selection and use of key and decisive terrain. Key and decisive terrain provides the
defender—and usually denies the attacker—excellent observation and fighting positions.
Reinforcing obstacles significantly enhance the natural obstacles of rugged mountainous
terrain.

4-94. The immediate objective of a mountainous defense is to deny the enemy access to key
terrain that helps him conduct further operations. Therefore, it is necessary to defend in
terrain that restricts and contains the enemy, as well as control the high ground that
dominates this terrain. The effects of rapidly changing weather, visibility, and mountain
hazards must be continually assessed. The terrain provides the defender with cover,
concealment, and camouflage that can deceive the enemy regarding the strength and
dispositions of friendly forces. The advantages of knowing the terrain, having fortified
positions, siting weapons in advance, stockpiling supplies, and identifying or preparing
lateral trail networks favor the defense. They allow the defender to shift forces on the
ground more rapidly than the attacker. Delaying operations are particularly effective in the
mountains and can be accomplished by a smaller force. These advantages combine to make
the mountains an ideal place for defensive operations. Regardless of the scale of defensive
operations, key factors in achieving success in the mountains are having good observation
and aggressive reconnaissance, while denying the same to the enemy.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
4-95. Defending commanders must develop flexible plans for control of fire, maneuver,
communications, and logistics. Initially, the attacker has the initiative and decides where and
when combat will take place. The defender must be agile enough to maintain control of the
heights, strike effectively, and shift his effort quickly without losing momentum and
flexibility. Tactical flexibility depends on planning in detail, organizing in depth, and
retaining an adequate, mobile reserve.
4-96. Although the mountains generally allow observation at greater distances, intervening
terrain features and weather often prevent commanders from seeing the area of operations
beyond the area to their immediate front and flanks. Consequently, commanders normally
allocate more assets for reconnaissance and security, echeloned in depth and in height, to
ensure that they are able to sense all aspects of the AO and gain the time needed to
decisively apply combat power.
4-97. Commanders must prevent the enemy from concentrating overwhelming combat
power against isolated sections of their defense. The restrictive terrain is one of the primary
advantages of the mountain defender, as it interferes with the attacker's synchronization,
canalizes his movement, and impedes his ability to maneuver. However, unless commanders
carefully analyze the terrain from both the friendly and enemy viewpoints, to include the
horizontal and vertical perspectives, they leave themselves vulnerable to infiltration and
possible attack from the flanks and rear along difficult and unexpected routes.
4-98. In the mountains, commanders usually organize for a perimeter defense to be prepared
to defeat the enemy from any approach, to include those that may appear impassable.
Although preparing for an all-around defense, they should weight a portion of the perimeter

to cover the most probable direction of enemy attack. Rocky terrain may make it more
difficult to prepare defensive positions and rapidly changing weather may halt preparations
altogether. If sufficient forces are not available, the commander must economize in some
areas and rely more heavily on prepared positions, to include alternate and supplementary
positions, obstacles, and well-planned indirect fires to cover gaps and dead space.
4-99. The width of an area to be defended depends mainly on the degree to which terrain is
an obstacle. Terrain that significantly restricts enemy movement tends to favor a larger AO.
Normally, an area should be approximately as deep as it is wide, and may include the entire
length and surrounding heights of a valley. Ridges that run at right angles to the enemy's
direction of attack also permit increased width with less depth. A defense in depth is
required in valleys that run in the direction of the enemy's attack. In either case, it is
essential to have forces deploy on the dominating heights that control approach routes.
4-100. Ideally, reserves should be mobile enough to react to enemy action in any portion of
the perimeter. Less mobile reserves are positioned to block the most dangerous avenues of
approach and assigned on-order positions on other critical avenues. Sharply compartmented
terrain may require the creation of more than one reserve. Helicopters may be used to
deploy reserves, but their use depends on the availability of suitable, secure LZs and
favorable weather conditions.
PREPARATION
4-101. The process of preparing the defense must begin with a thorough reconnaissance.
Preparations for a mountain defense require more time than in other terrain, and as units
arrive they must begin immediate preparation of their defensive positions. In some
instances, technical mountaineering skills may be needed to establish effective security and
to emplace crew-served weapons properly. However, commanders must weigh the
advantages gained from these inaccessible positions against difficulties in repositioning and
resupply. Preparations for the defense must also include installing communications, stocking
forward supply points with particular attention to Class IV, emplacing medical elements,
adjusting air defense coverage, and arranging for security of installations in the rear area.
Commanders must ensure that time is available to develop alternate routes and positions,
rehearse and time movements between positions and along routes, and rehearse
counterattacks.
4-102. Commanders must seek every opportunity to recapture the initiative from the attacker
and transition to offensive operations. Preparations for a counterattack in the mountains
must include caching ammunition, preparing counterattack positions and routes to attack
downhill, identifying crew-served weapon positions, and establishing rally points that are
usually on the reverse slope.

ORGANIZATION OF THE DEFENSE
4-103. Defensive operations in the mountains derive their strength, balance, and freedom of
action from the effective use of terrain. The mobility restrictions found in mountainous
areas, combined with the necessity to hold dominating ground, dictates that an area defense
be used. Mountain defenses use security forces, continuous reconnaissance and combat
patrols, as well as numerous observation posts. The mountain AO is usually organized into a
security area, main battle area (MBA), and rear area.
SECURITY OPERATIONS
4-104. While a screening force is often thought to be the most preferable form of security in
extremely rugged mountainous terrain, all forms of security operations, to include guard,
cover, and area, may be employed effectively in a mountain AO based on the factors of
METT-TC with particular emphasis on:
● Forces available for security operations.

● Ability to maintain a mobility advantage.
● Size of the security area and the number of avenues of approach.
● Likelihood of enemy action.
● Size of the expected enemy force.
● Amount of early warning and reaction time needed.
4-105. A screen primarily provides early warning to the protected force and is usually an
economy-of-force measure. The compartmented nature of mountainous terrain often serves
to create multiple gaps and exposed flanks. The rugged terrain may also serve to restrict the
movement of not only advancing enemy forces, but also the movement and mobility of
larger friendly security forces. In these instances, commanders may choose to use minimum
combat power to observe, identify, and report enemy actions at these locations, and engage
and destroy enemy reconnaissance within the screening force’s capability. The screening
force may be able to avoid decisive contact by withdrawing into restrictive terrain that
forces the enemy to utilize difficult climbing techniques if he continues the pursuit.
4-106. In the mountains as elsewhere, the screening force should adjust to the enemy
advance and continue to screen as far forward as possible, even though elements of the force
may have to withdraw. Retention of selected forward positions may allow surveillance and
targeting forward of the MBA, upsetting the enemy's coordination. By allowing the enemy
to bypass advance positions, the screening force can facilitate counterattack to the front of
the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) by providing observation of, and access to, the
flanks and rear of attacking forces.
4-107. If a significant enemy force is expected or a significant amount of time and space is
required to provide the required degree of protection, commanders usually resource a guard

or cover mission instead of a screen. As long as the security force can maintain a mobility
advantage over the enemy, it can effectively delay and attack the enemy force by using
obstacles and the restrictive terrain to its advantage. Although utilizing a greater proportion
of his combat power, the appropriate use of a guard or cover force should provide the
mountain commander greater depth in his security area and the ability to defeat, repel, or fix
lead elements of an enemy ground force before they can engage the main body with direct
and indirect fires.
4-108. No matter the type of security used, defending forces must prevent enemy infiltration
by carefully positioning observation posts (OPs) and conducting continuous patrols and
ambushes. Combat reconnaissance patrols and other intelligence gathering assets observe
the enemy as far ahead of friendly positions as possible and report his strength and
composition, as well as his route of movement. To accomplish this, reconnaissance patrols
may need to rely heavily on technical climbing skills. Ground surveillance radar and
unattended ground sensors can be used effectively, but the defender must be sure to cover
all gaps and dead spaces. The defender must make best use of his time to study the ground
and determine all possible infiltration routes.
MAIN BATTLE AREA
4-109. In rugged mountainous terrain, it may be difficult to maintain mutual support and
overlapping observation. Elements should be employed to man observation posts, assist the
passage of security forces into the MBA, cover obstacles and avenues of approach by fire,
screen gaps between defensive positions, and ambush enemy infiltrators.
4-110. Defensive positions along ridges or dominating heights should include as much of
the forward and reverse slopes as possible to add depth and all-around security. The actual
size of unit positions is terrain-dependent. At a minimum, fighting positions and observation
posts should be echeloned vertically, as well as in depth. When defending a mountain
valley, forces should establish fighting positions that are located on adjacent heights and in
depth to permit covering the valley with interlocking fire. These positions must also be
anchored to restrictive terrain or adjacent defensive forces to prevent enemy envelopment.
In wooded terrain, defensive positions may be organized on the forward edge of the woods,
as well as on commanding heights. Obstacles should be widely employed to slow or stop
enemy movement throughout.
4-111. Mountain warfare demands that forces conduct an aggressive defense. Defending
units must infiltrate enemy units and attack headquarters, supply lines, and rear areas.
Smaller patrols and OPs should be deployed well forward to direct artillery fire and attack
aircraft on targets of opportunity, and to conduct personnel and antiarmor ambushes.
Disruption operations should be conducted to force the enemy to deploy additional assets to
protect lines of communication and delay and upset preparations for the attack. In the
mountains, enemy forces can frequently be isolated if they are discovered in time and

reserves are effectively placed and highly mobile.
4-112. In the defense, the reserves’ primary purpose must preserve the commander's
flexibility. In mountainous terrain, the commander may need to rely on the reserves as his
principal means of restoring his defense’s integrity or exploiting opportunities through
offensive action. Because of the difficulties of movement, small reserves may be located
near primary defensive positions, ready for immediate counterattack. This type of small,
responsive counterattack may be much more effective than a large-scale, major
counterattack. It can catch the enemy exhausted after an uphill assault and before position
consolidation. Large, centrally placed counterattack forces are normally unable to intervene
in time unless the terrain permits mounted movement, or sufficient helicopter lift assets are
committed to the reserve force or made rapidly available.
REAR AREA
4-113. To minimize the vulnerability of sustaining operations and extended lines of

communication, command and control, as well as support operations, in the rear area must
be dispersed, redundant, and as far from potential enemy approaches as possible. Because of
limited space available in the rear area, the commander must be careful in selecting and
locating positions for combat service support activities. These positions are likely to be
confined to small valleys. Therefore, they are high-priority targets for enemy artillery and
air attack or raids by small combat patrols, particularly at night or in bad weather. When
possible, combat service support elements must avoid the most obvious positions and
occupy atypical sites. However, they should be in the vicinity of a defined road network and
an air loading area, even if the network or area is within Level II. Locating base defenses at
Level II elevations may allow more access to supply bases for air resupply during inclement
weather, such as the heavy fog often encountered in valleys and at lower elevations.
4-114. A perimeter defense is planned for each combat service support unit within the
defensive area. Defensive positions should be selected on the dominating high ground.
Sensors, OPs, and radars are used to cover avenues of approach and gaps between positions.
Rear area forces must routinely conduct patrols and ambushes around the perimeter,
especially at night and during other periods of limited visibility. Air defense assets should be
located to protect rear area facilities. Tactical combat forces (TCF) must be prepared to
respond rapidly to rear area threats and should be prepared to move to any of their
objectives by multiple routes. However, units within the rear area must not fall into the trap
of relying solely on a TCF for their security. No matter how well-organized or mobile the
TCF, rear area units must provide their own well thought-out and active security measures,
even at the cost of a reduced ability to sustain the force.
REVERSE SLOPE DEFENSE
4-115. Reverse slope defenses apply particularly well to mountain operations and pursue

offensive opportunities through surprise and deceptive operations by defending in a manner

for which the enemy is unprepared. This defense seeks to reduce the effects of massed
indirect fire from mortar, artillery, and close air support, and draws the battle into the small
arms range of infantry weapons. The overall goal is to make the enemy commit his forces
against the forward slope of the defense, causing his forces to attack in an uncoordinated
fashion across the exposed topographical crest. Once this type of defense is employed,
subsequent use may be of limited value, due to the loss of the key element of surprise.
4-116. All or parts of the defending force may use reverse slope techniques. In many
instances, mountainous terrain favors a defense that employs combined forward and reverse
slope positions to permit fires on enemy approaches around and over the crest and on the
forward slope of adjacent terrain features. Key factors to this type of defense are mutually
supporting covered and concealed positions, numerous natural and man-made obstacles, the
ability to bring fire from all available weapons onto the crest, and a strong and mobile
counterattack force.
4-117. The reverse slope

defense is organized so
that the main defensive
positions are masked
from enemy observation
and direct fire by the
topographical crest (see
Figure 4-9). It extends
rearward from the crest
only to the maximum
effective range of small
arms fire. Observation
and fires are maintained Figure 4-9. Reverse Slope Defense
over the entire forward slope as long as possible to continue to destroy advancing enemy
forces and prevent him from effectively massing for a final assault. A successful reverse
slope defense is based on denying the topographical crest to the enemy, either by fire or by
physical occupation. Although the crest may not be occupied in strength, control of the crest
by fire is essential for success. For more detailed discussions of the reverse slope defense,
see FM 3-100.40 and FM 3-21.30.
RETROGRADE OPERATIONS
4-118. Retrograde operations of delay and withdrawal can be conducted in mountainous

terrain with fewer assets because of the mobility difficulties of an advancing enemy.
Delaying operations are particularly effective in the mountains. Numerous positions may
exist where elements as small as a machine-gun or sniper team can significantly delay a
large force. When conducting retrograde operations in mountainous terrain, the friendly

force must accomplish several tasks.
● It must make maximum use of existing obstacles. However, the addition of relatively
few reinforcing obstacles, such as the antitank mining of a route with very steep
sides, often increases the value of existing obstacles.
● The force must conduct detailed reconnaissance of routes to rearward positions.
Routes of withdrawal are not as numerous in mountainous terrain and often do not
intersect as they do on flat terrain. These factors complicate subsequent link-up
operations and necessitate meticulous planning.
● It must protect the flanks and rear to prevent encirclement, particularly by air assault.
There are only a few LZs and they can significantly influence the outcome of a
battle. At a minimum, they must be covered by fire.
STAY-BEHIND OPERATIONS
4-119. The compartmented terrain

in the mountains lends itself to the ● Attack the enemy throughout the depth
employment of stay-behind forces of his formations
as a tool for offensive action. Stay- ● Disrupt the cohesion of the enemy
behind operations involve the offense by interrupting lines of
positioning of friendly elements communication and logistics
within operational areas before ● Detract from the enemy's main effort by
the enemy advances through the forcing him to allocate combat forces to
area. Stay-behind forces conceal rear areas
their location and allow ● Provide immediate intelligence
themselves to be bypassed as the ● Call for and control indirect fire and
enemy advances. (Figure 4-10 close air support
outlines the important tasks that
stay-behind forces can
accomplish for the mountain Figure 4-10. Tasks for Mountain Stay-Behind
commander.) Forces
4-120. Stay-behind forces may be positioned forward of the FEBA, in the MBA, and not
participate in the initial fight, or, under certain conditions, in the MBA after the fighting has
started. When planning for stay-behind operations in the mountains, commanders must
consider the following:
● Stay-behind forces should be a combined arms force that includes engineers.

● Indirect fire support or close air support should be available throughout their
operations.
● Return routes must be well planned and reconnoitered in advance. Exfiltration,
regardless of element size, should follow covered and concealed routes, and rally
points should be designated forward of and behind the lines of friendly forces.

Reentry must be carefully coordinated to prevent fratricide.

● After an attack, stay-behind forces may be unable to reach a hide position to
subsequently return to friendly lines by exfiltration. If this occurs, they must be
prepared to conduct a breakout.
● The tactical situation and logistics supplies that were stockpiled or cached in the AO
have an impact on the length of time stay-behind forces remain in enemy territory.

FM 3-97.6 Chptr 5 Logistics and Combat Service Support

Chapter 5
Logistics and Combat Service Support
Mountainous terrain poses great challenges to

combat service support (CSS) forces and
complicates sustaining operations. Existing
Contents
roads and trails are normally few and primitive,
and cross-country movement is particularly Section I — Planning Considerations
demanding. Highways usually run along Section II — Supply
features that have steep slopes on either side, Supply Routes
making them vulnerable to disruption and Classes of Supply
attack. Rivers become major obstacles because Section III: Transportation and Maintenance
of rapid currents, broken banks, rocky bottoms, Section IV — Personnel Support
and the lack of bridges. Landslides and
Section V — Combat Health Support
avalanches, natural as well as man-made, may
Planning
also pose serious obstacles to CSS operations.
Mountainous areas have wide variations in Evacuation
climate and are subject to frequent and sudden Mountain Evacuation Teams
changes of weather that may preclude reliance Treatment
on continuous aviation support. Together, these
conditions compound the obstacle-producing
effects of mountainous terrain and create major challenges for the CSS planner. Therefore, the forward
distribution of supplies may depend upon the knowledge, skill, and proficiency of CSS personnel in both

basic mountaineering and aerial resupply operations.
The Importance of Lines of Communications: The Satukandav Pass (Soviet-Afghan War,

November-December 1987)
One of the characteristics of the Soviet-Afghan War (December 1979 - February 1989) was the
attempt by both sides to control the other's lines of communications (LOCs). In an effort to deprive
the guerrillas of their source of sustainment, the Soviets used various methods to drive the rural
population into exile or into cities. For their part, the Mujahideen regularly interdicted supply routes
through the establishment of blocking positions and vehicular ambushes. In some regions, they were
able to effectively interdict supply routes for weeks, months, and even years at a time. The Soviet
main supply route was a double-lane highway network winding through the rugged and inhospitable
Hindu Kush Mountains. The continued Soviet presence in Afghanistan depended, in large part, on
their ability to keep the roads open. Therefore, much of heavy Soviet combat was a fight for control
of this road network, with this control often changing hands during the course of the war.
In the fall of 1987, the Mujahideen had established a series of blocking positions that severely limited
the supply of weapons, ammunition, and food to Soviet forces in the Khost district. In response, the
Soviets planned and conducted Operation Magistral, "main highway," to open the LOCs (see Figure
5-1). The guerrilla forces had established strong positions in the Satukandav Pass, virtually the only
way through the mountains between Gardez and Khost. For the operation, the Soviets massed a
motorized rifle division, airborne division, separate motorized rifle regiment (MRR), separate
airborne regiment, various 40th Army regiments, special forces, and other subordinate units, and
regiments from the Afghan Armed Forces. On 28 November, in order to determine the location of
Mujahideen positions, particularly air defense systems, the Soviets conducted a ruse in the form of an
airborne assault using dummy paratroopers. When the Mujahideen fired at the dummies, Soviet
artillery reconnaissance was able to pinpoint enemy strong points and firing positions. The Soviets
hit these positions with air strikes and a four-hour artillery barrage. The next day, however, an MRR
failed to make its way up the foothills to seize the dominant terrain along the crest, and suffered
heavy casualties. The 40th Army Commander, General Gromov, nevertheless, decided to continue to
press his advance using the 1st Airborne Battalion and a battalion of Afghan commandos. On 1
December, two airborne companies captured key terrain and used this to support the decisive
operation against the dominant peak to the south. This flanking attack took the Mujahideen by

surprise and they began to withdraw. While calling in artillery fire on the retreating guerrilla forces,
primarily on the reverse slope and along the probable avenue of approach for the commitment of
enemy reserves, the Soviet battalion commander used this hard-won, key terrain to support a
simultaneous, two-prong attack to the south toward the Satukandav Pass. Now it was the Soviets who
were in a position to cut off supplies, especially fresh drinking water, from the Mujahideen. The
latter were forced to withdraw, and the two battalions captured the pass. However, while the
operation itself was a success, Soviet and Afghan Army forces could keep the road open for only 12
days, after which the Mujahideen once again cut off the supply route to Khost.
Figure 5-1. Satukandav Pass
Both sides recognized the vital importance of LOCs, and this shift of LOC control was a constant
feature throughout the entire duration of the Soviet-Afghan War. The Mujahideen's ability to
interdict the LOCs prevented the Soviets from maintaining a larger occupation force there, a key
factor in the eventual Soviet defeat.

Compiled from The Other Side of the Mountain and The Bear Went Over the Mountain.
SECTION I — PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
5-1. Mountainous areas of operations dictate that commanders foresee needs before
demands are placed upon CSS personnel. The main logistical differences between mountain
operations and operations in other terrain are a result of the problems of transporting and
securing material along difficult and extended lines of support. Logistics support must
emphasize a continuous flow of supplies to specific locations, rather than the build-up of
stocks at supply points along the main supply routes. Supply point operations alone are
insufficient; the proposed support structure must plan for redundancy in the ability to
distribute supplies directly to units operating from predetermined supply routes. If possible,
commanders should plan to use multiple supply routes designed to support maneuver
elements moving on separate axis.
5-2. Commanders must be concerned not only with the sustainment of current operations but
also with the support of future operations. A detailed logistics preparation of the theater
(LPT) to identify the potential lines of communication plays a major part in determining the
conduct of CSS operations. A detailed reconnaissance should be conducted to determine:
● The type and maximum number of vehicles that the road network can support in the
area. New roads may need to be constructed or improvements made to existing ones
to support protracted operations in isolated areas.
● Classification of bridges.
● Suitable sites for drop zones (DZs), loading zones (LZs), and short, tactical airstrips.
● Availability of water sources.
● Availability of local resources, facilities, and service and support activities.
5-3. Because of terrain constraints, it may be necessary to disperse support units over a
wider area and ensure that supplies are positioned closer to supported units. Dispersion
reduces vulnerability of CSS assets, which also creates problems with command, control,
and security. CSS units are often high-priority targets, and must ensure adequate protection
against ground and air attacks.
5-4. In mountainous terrain, battalion CSS elements are normally echeloned into combat and
field trains to increase responsiveness, provide adequate space, and decrease the logistics
footprint. Combat trains are routinely located in ravines or valleys on the rear slope of the
terrain occupied by the unit. This permits the personnel officer (S1) and logistics officer

(S4) to operate in close proximity to the tactical operations center (TOC), and allows them
to keep abreast of unit requirements.
5-5. In the mountains, unresolved logistical problems can quickly lead to mission failure.
Ground operations may increase fuel consumption rates of individual vehicles by 30 to 40
percent, requiring more frequent resupply operations. The operation of equipment in
mountainous terrain has proven that maintenance failures far exceed losses due to combat,
and most breakdowns can be attributed to operator training. Air operations are characterized
by a significant increase in lift requirements; however, increased elevations decrease aircraft
lift capabilities.
5-6. Commanders must carefully

consider combat loads in the ● Limit supplies to essentials.
mountains, based upon a thorough ● Lighten the individual soldier's
mission analysis. Excess equipment combat load.

and supplies reduce the efficiency of ● Improvise methods and supply
the individual soldier and seriously sources, to include utilizing captured

impede operations. In steep terrain enemy supplies and equipment.
above 1,500 meters (5,000 feet), ● Use aviation assets to increase
soldier loads may need to be reduced responsiveness.

by nearly 50 percent. Commanders ● Anticipate maintenance
must develop priorities, accept risk, requirements.

and require the combat force to carry ● Develop plans that place realistic
only the bare essentials needed for its demands on the CSS system.
own support. Nonessential equipment
should be identified, collected, and
stored until it is needed. In situations Figure 5-2. Mountain Supply Imperatives
where there are conflicts between the
weight of ammunition and weapons, experience has shown that it is better to carry more
ammunition and fewer weapons. In the mountains, commanders should strive to achieve the
imperatives indicated in Figure 5-2.
SECTION II — SUPPLY
5-7. Units operating in mountainous terrain transport supplies by a combination of wheeled

vehicles, oversnow vehicles, indigenous pack animals and personnel (see FM 3-05.27),
assisted by Army and Air Force lift assets. These combinations depend on equipment
availability, location of combat units, type of terrain, and weather. However, any

combination of resupply usually includes combat soldiers man-packing supplies to their

positions.
5-8. Since combat operations in the mountains are decentralized, CSS operations are
correspondingly decentralized. This decentralization serves to create heavier man-loads,
while rough, steep terrain decreases the amount soldiers are able to carry. Although most
soldiers are eventually able to acclimate themselves to higher elevations, their pace and
subsequently the overall pace of the entire operation slows down as elevation increases.
5-9. Mountain warfare is highly dependent on accurate logistical planning if supply

operations are to function smoothly. To win in any area of operations (AO), commanders
normally seek to move and strike as rapidly as possible. Rapidly changing tactical situations
may cause long supply lines, resulting in delay or complete disruption of supply operations.
To mitigate these risks, situational understanding, rapid decisions, and continuous
coordination between tactical and logistical planners are essential. Stockpiling and caching
supplies may also help to decrease the risks to resuppply.
5-10. The total tonnage of supplies required by the force may also decrease. For example,
while individual vehicle petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) consumption may increase,
overall consumption may decrease because of lower vehicle movement. The quantity of
supplies needed by the individual soldier normally increases. Soldiers consume more food
because of increased energy expenditure, and need many additional items of equipment,
such as extra clothing, sleeping bags, climbing equipment, tents, and stoves, all of which
must be stored and transported.
SUPPLY ROUTES
5-11. Main supply routes are generally limited to the roads located along major valleys and,
through necessity, to the smaller, more restrictive trails that follow or parallel the ridgelines.
The limited number of routes increases the volume of traffic and places heavy demands on
engineer units to maintain them. In most cases, engineer units require assistance in clearing
and developing, as well as in securing, these routes. Travel times for ground transportation
assets are significantly increased due the generally poor quality of mountain roads and trails,
frequent switchbacks, and steep grades that require lower vehicle speeds. Traffic control
assumes increased importance due to the limited number of routes in the mountains, and
may require an increased number of military police dedicated to the task of battlefield
circulation control. In particular—
● Existing roads should be rapidly analyzed for bottlenecks, deployment areas, passing
places, and turnarounds for various vehicles.
● Routes should be classified as one- or two-way, and schedules developed for the use
of one-way routes.
● Signs should be placed for both day and night moves on difficult and dangerous

routes.
● Whenever possible, separate routes should be designated for vehicular and
dismounted movement. Additionally, separate routes should be designated for
wheeled and tracked vehicles, particularly if the latter are likely to damage road
surfaces.
5-12. The enemy will emphasize destroying logistical units and interdicting supply
activities. Enemy units will infiltrate and seize key terrain that dominates supply routes in an
effort to disrupt and isolate units from their logistics support. Using mountain trails and
roads without securing the high ground on both sides invites ambush. Patrols must be
continually conducted at irregular intervals to verify the status of roads and prevent enemy
infiltration. Patrols must be continuously alert for ambush and they must be skilled at
locating and identifying mines. However, a combination of patrols and aerial reconnaissance
is the best means of providing route security. Observation posts on dominant terrain along
supply routes are also essential for early warning of enemy infiltration into rear areas.
5-13. Most often, units have to use the narrrow ridge trails as alternate supply routes, in
some instances as main supply routes, to reduce the volume of traffic on the main supply
routes located along valley floors. This involves movements in much more restrictive terrain
and exposure to excellent observation and fire by the enemy. Supply columns moving along
separate routes face the same problems as combat units; they face the difficulties of being
able to provide mutual support due to compartmented terrain, should one column come
under attack. Movement of supplies at night may reduce vulnerability to enemy attack, but
night marches present other hazards due to the difficult terrain, and require daylight
reconnaissance, careful route preparations, and using guides.
CLASSES OF SUPPLY
CLASS I: RATIONS AND WATER
5-14. The strenuous activities required during mountain operations increase caloric
requirement to 4,500 calories or more per day. Improper or too little food means soldiers
will lack the stamina to accomplish the mission. Although combat rations are normally used,
unitized group rations (UGRs) should be provided once a day if the situation permits.
Individual packages of oatmeal and dehydrated soup mixes should be issued if the UGR
cycle cannot be maintained.
5-15. In abrupt ascents to high altitude, soldiers do not have time to acclimate themselves,
so their entire circulatory system labors to supply oxygen to the body. In this situation,
standard rations are hard to digest and special rations, such as the ration, cold weather
(RCW), that allow soldiers to eat light and often should be procured. The totally self-
contained operational ration consists of one full day’s feeding in a flexible, white-
camouflaged meal bag. It contains cooked, freeze-dried, or other low moisture entrees, as

well as a variety of items such as oatmeal, a nut-raisin mix, and fruit-cookie bars. The RCW
provides sufficient calories (approximately 4,500 kilocalories) to meet the increased energy
expenditure during heavy exertion, while limiting sodium and protein content to reduce the
risk of dehydration. Because of rapidly changing weather conditions and the difficulty of
resupply, each soldier may need to carry two to three days’ supply of rations. However, this
increases the soldier’s load by approximately 10 to 15 pounds.
5-16. Proper water production, resupply, and consumption are essential and a constant
challenge during mountain operations. In low mountains, planners should count on at least
four quarts of water per soldier per day when static and up to eight quarts per day when
active. In high mountains, planner should increase those requirements by about two quarts
per soldier. In the mountain environment, medical care often requires an increased water
supply and must be considered as part of the original planning and contingency factors.
5-17. Units should always be prepared to use natural water sources to help reduce the
logistics burden. However, far above the timberline, water is extremely difficult to find.
Special measures must be taken to protect it from freezing in cold weather, such as placing
canteens in the chest pockets of the extended cold weather clothing system (ECWCS) coat,
hanging a two-quart canteen on a strap under the coat, or utilizing a camel-back type,
commercially available, canteen under overgarments. Purification and chemical sterilization
are always necessary no matter how clean mountain water may appear. Micro-organisms
present in mountain water may cause serious illness and rapidly degrade the strength of a
unit. If above ground water sources cannot be located or are not reasonably available,
drilling for underground sources may become a critical engineer task. Once engineer units
access the water, quartermaster units have responsibility for completing the water points and
purifying the water.
CLASS II: GENERAL SUPPLIES
5-18. General supplies include expendable administrative items, individual clothing and
equipment, tentage, and other items authorized by common tables of allowance. All units
must deploy with enough Class II items to last until routine resupply can be established.
Special items, such as extended cold weather clothing, gloves, climbing equipment,
extended cold-weather sleep systems, batteries, and one-burner cook stoves, will be in great
demand. Due to the rugged nature of the terrain, mountain operations also increase
requirements for replacement items of individual clothing and equipment. Combat boots, for
example, may be expected to last approximately two weeks in harsh rocky terrain.
CLASS III: FUEL AND PACKAGED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS
5-19. Individual vehicles need much more fuel in mountainous terrain. However, limited
road nets and steep slopes reduce the volume of vehicle traffic and overall fuel consumption.
The heavy reliance on aviation assets for resupply and movement increases aviation fuel

requirements. A commander must routinely plan for the emplacement of a forward arming
and refueling point (FARP) within their AO to support intensive aviation operations.
Battalions should establish a fuel point in the field trains using collapsible fuel drums. These
drums should be operational as soon as the field trains are established and prepared to
receive fuel from the forward supply company as soon as it arrives. When terrain makes
refueling operations vulnerable to attack, units should conduct forward refueling using
supply point distribution, and dispense fuel to unit vehicles using the tailgate technique. The
lack of suitable terrain normally increases the percentage of forward refueling done by this
method.
5-20. At 600 meters (2,000 feet), multi-fuel cook stoves operate at about 75 percent
efficiency. When soldiers refuel cook stoves, they must avoid using automotive fuel. Fuel
points must supply units with refined or white gasoline that is specifically produced for
pressurized stoves. Relatively large quantities of this fuel will be used when procuring water
and preparing food. Adequate quantities of five-gallon cans, nozzles, and one-quart fuel
bottles must be on-hand before deployment.
CLASS IV: CONSTRUCTION, BARRIER, AND FORTIFICATION MATERIALS
5-21. Soldiers should make maximum use of local materials to reduce Class IV
requirements and demands on the transportation system. Gabion-type material is especially
versatile during mountain operations. Gabions are widely used in the mountains for
constructing obstacles, fighting positions, anchors, mountain installations, traverse
platforms, and helicopter LZs; for creating landslides or rockfalls; and for repairing roads.
Units should stock adequate quantities of easily transportable sizes of reinforcing mesh and
other suitable materials for constructing gabions.
CLASS V: AMMUNITION
5-22. Because of terrain, ammunition resupply is difficult, making strict fire control and
discipline an absolute necessity. Ammunition transfer points need to be as far forward as
possible without revealing friendly unit locations or placing ammunition stocks at risk of
capture or destruction. Direct delivery to the user may be required using aerial resupply.
Innovation and flexibility are critical. In the mountains, the traditional mixes of tank
ammunition may be less effective. Depending upon the specific threat, more rounds may be
needed to attack light vehicles and fortified positions and less may be needed to engage
tanks. Ammunition consumption for direct fire weapons may be low, however, consumption
of indirect fire munitions, such as grenades, mortars, and artillery, may be high because of
the dead space common to mountainous terrain. Planners must ensure that increased
consumption of indirect fire munitions is included in computating required supply rates.
CLASS VII AND IX: MAJOR END ITEMS AND REPAIR PARTS

5-23. Rugged terrain and climate extremes cause an increase in repair parts consumption.
However, overall vehicle utilization decreases in many situations. Because it is difficult to
transport large end items to forward units, the commander must place additional emphasis
on preventive maintenance and repair.
CLASS VIII: MEDICAL SUPPLIES
5-24. The medical platoon obtains medical supplies for the battalion from the supporting
forward support medical company (FSMC) or similar task organized medical element.
Medical supply organizations may distribute supply by various means: supply point
distribution, unit distribution, or a combination of both. Mountainous terrain necessitates
using supply point distribution to a great extent. Medical supply activities must maximize
use of empty evacuation assets moving forward to execute unit distribution of supplies as
often as possible. The terrain will severely constrain ground movement operations. Pre-
planned unit distribution via air assets is a must for emergent situations, such as mass
casualty scenarios. Medical supplies must have a high priority for movement. Distribution
of Class VIII via air lines of communications (LOCs) should occur as often as tactically
feasible.
SECTION III — TRANSPORTATION AND MAINTENANCE
5-25. Transportation assets for mountain operations are often limited, and their use requires
sound planning. Although vehicles are used to move supplies as far forward as possible,
they may not be able to reach deployed units. Using smaller cargo vehicles with improved
cross-country mobility and dedicated aircraft is paramount to sustaining units in the
mountains. Locally obtained animals, indigenous personnel, or combat soldiers must often
move supplies from roads and trails to unit positions. The poor quality of road networks
requires increased engineer effort. The rugged mountain terrain aids in infiltration
increasing security requirements along the route.
5-26. Air resupply should always be considered to reduce the transportation burden on
ground assets. Therefore, support personnel should be well-trained in aerial resupply and
sling-load operations. Aerial resupply, either by parachute drop, free drop, or cargo
helicopter, may be available for a variety of tactical situations. However, unpredictable
weather and air currents, cloud cover, and lack of suitable landing zones make aerial
delivery unreliable, and higher elevations decrease overall aircraft lift capabilities. The
integrated use of available helicopter transport should be used for forward transport of mail,
replacements, returnees, and personnel service support providers, such as chaplains and
finance support teams.
5-27. Fixing equipment as far forward as possible takes on added importance during
mountain operations. In low mountains, equipment recovery and maintenance teams are

critical in keeping limited routes clear

and returning damaged vehicles to the ● Tires
battle in the shortest possible time. In ● Tracks
high mountains, these teams are ● NVG Batteries
generally less critical to units ● Communications Equipment
operating there because terrain often ● Cooling Systems
limits vehicle use. Helicopter repair

teams are critical in all mountainous
environments due to helicopters flying Figure 5-3. Key Repair Parts
at or near the maximum limits of their
operational capabilities to meet increased needs for helicopter support. In all cases,
maintenance turn-around time increases to compensate for fatigue and the other effects of
the environment on maintenance personnel. Figure 5-3 lists some of the critical repair parts
that often fail or require frequent replacement during mountain operations.
5-28. Drivers well trained in proper maintenance and driving techniques eliminate a great
deal of unnecessary maintenance and reduce maintenance requirements and vulnerable
bottlenecks. All soldiers must devote increased attention to applicable FMs and TMs for
their weapons and equipment and must conduct preventative maintenance, to include the
availability and use of suitable cleaning solvents and lubricants, appropriate for the weather
and terrain conditions.
SECTION IV — PERSONNEL SUPPORT
5-29. Personnel support in the mountains is not unlike that provided to other types of
operations except for the limitations on soldiers and equipment posed by the environment.
Key personnel support missions are to provide manning and personnel service support to
unit commanders, soldiers, and Army civilians.
5-30. Personnel units normally depend on large quantities of automation equipment to

successfully accomplish their mission. Adverse weather and rugged terrain may decrease
their reliability and commanders should take extra precautions to protect this equipment.
Additionally, the difficulty in establishing and maintaining communications may require an
increased reliance on manual strength reporting until communications and automated
systems are firmly established.
5-31. Postal services establish the link between soldiers and their family and friends and
assist in defeating the isolation caused by the compartmented terrain and the resulting
dispersion of units. However, the limited lines of communications in mountainous terrain
may adversely affect mail distribution. Inefficient distribution of mail can quickly
undermine morale, regardless of the AO. The timely delivery of mail is especially important
in countering the shock of entering a new environment. Commanders should consider

devoting a high priority to the distribution of mail on arrival in the theater of operations. FM
1-0 describes in detail the critical personnel systems and functions essential to providing
manning and personnel service support.
SECTION V — COMBAT HEALTH SUPPORT
PLANNING
5-32. Combat health support (CHS) in the mountains is characterized by—
● Difficulty in accessing casualties in rugged terrain.

● Increased need for technical mountaineering skills for casualty evacuation.
● Longer periods of time needed for casualties to be stabilized.
5-33. When planning CHS, commanders must consider the tactical situation, the nature of
the terrain, and speed of movement along the chain of evacuation. Aid stations should be
centrally located in relation to supported units. The exact location should be based on the
ability to provide shelter from the elements, cover and concealment from the enemy, ease of
evacuation, and expected casualty rates.
5-34. The decentralization in the mountain area of operations also forces the decentralization
of CHS. Commanders may need to establish casualty collection points, operated by aidmen
from the evacuation section, to support isolated elements. These points are designated at
intermediate points along the routes of evacuation where casualties may be gathered.
Additionally, multiple ambulance exchange points may be required to transfer casualties
from one type of transportation to another.
EVACUATION
5-35. Aeromedical evacuation remains the preferred form of casualty evacuation in

mountain operations. Aircraft provide the best capability of evacuating casualties from
isolated locations and transporting them to treatment centers. However, in many instances,
even lightly wounded personnel may not be able to move unassisted over rough terrain and
LZs may not be available.
5-36. Medical evacuation teams must complete reconnaissance and install necessary
evacuation systems along each evacuation route before the onset of casualties. Litter relay
stations may be required at predetermined points to conserve the stamina of litter bearers
and accelerate evacuation. The evacuation plan must include measures to care for wounded
soldiers at points along the route of evacuation where delays are possible. The plan must
also depict all evacuation routes and provide for proper disposition of medical personnel

along the lines of evacuation (see FM

4-02.2). Evacuating the wounded from ● The patient's condition
mountain combat zones normally ● Anticipated casualty rate
requires a larger number of medical ● Importance of rapid movement
personnel and litter bearers than on ● Number of available evacuation
flat terrain. The number and type of teams
evacuation systems depend on ● Number of evacuation routes
mission, enemy, terrain and weather, available
troops and support available, time ● Transportation assets and
available, civil considerations (METT- equipment available
TC) and the factors listed in Figure 5- ● Availability of suitable and secure
4. LZs
MOUTAIN EVACUATION TEAMS Figure 5-4. Factors Affecting Evacuation

Systems
5-37. As the battle to control the
heights evolves, combatants attempt to exploit technical aspects of terrain. Consequently,
commanders must anticipate the need for evacuation teams, normally Level 2 mountaineers,
that have the capability to reach, stabilize, and evacuate casualties in rugged terrain. Ground
evacuations are generally classified as steep slope (non-technical) or high angle (technical).
The mission of trained mountain evacuation teams is to move casualties over cliffs,
obstacles, and other technical terrain that would significantly impede the mobility of
standard litter bearers. Using evacuation systems to negotiate obstacles shortens routes and
increases the speed of evacuation.
5-38. Because units normally deploy over a wide area and the availability of qualified
technical evacuation teams is likely to be limited, all soldiers should be trained to conduct
less technical, steep-slope evacuations. Two of the most qualified evacuation teams should
be identified in each battalion-sized unit prior to planned operations. They should be
designated as the battalion's technical evacuation assets and should undergo more advanced
mountaineering training and rigorous evacuation training. These soldiers can also develop
and teach a program of instruction that will increase the proficiency of the company
evacuation teams.
5-39. Mountain evacuation teams must install the necessary evacuation systems before
casualties occur. They must man the systems, move casualties over the obstacle until the
evacuation route is no longer required, disassemble the system, and redeploy as necessary.
Depending on the specific terrain, evacuation teams may demand extensive additional
training in some of the areas listed in Figure 5-5.
TREATMENT

5-40. Treatment of the wounded in

forward areas by medical personnel is
extremely difficult in restrictive
terrain, since even a single company is
often deployed over a wide area.
Combat in the mountains demands a
greater reliance on self-aid, buddy-aid,
and unit combat lifesaver techniques.
Emphasis must be placed on
lifesaving and life-preserving
measures to be performed before
medical personnel arrive. Unit combat
lifesavers must be identified and
trained to perform in the absence of
medics. Units operating in
mountainous areas should strive to
meet or exceed Army standards for ● High-angle ascending and
the number of combat lifesavers descending techniques.
required for their specific unit. See ● Anchor points and systems.
FM 4-02.92 for more information on ● Litter rigging.
combat lifesavers. ● Lowering and raising systems.
● Avalanche search and rescue.
5-41. Soldiers in mountain regions are
exposed to many and varied types of
illnesses and injuries. Appendix A
Figure 5-5. Mountain Evacuation Team
describes the cause, prevention, Tasks
symptoms, and treatment of common
mountain illnesses and injuries.

FM 3-97.6 Appendix A Mountain Illnesses and Injuries

Appendix A
Mountain Illnesses and Injuries
Table A-1. Chronic Fatigue and Its Effects
CHRONIC FATIGUE (ENERGY DEPLETION)
CAUSE PREVENTION SYMPTOMS TREATMENT
Low blood sugar. Provide adequate food Difficulty sleeping. Proper diet and rest.
(type and quantities).
Sources of energy are Fatigue, irritability, and Treat synergistic effects
depleted. Monitor food intake and headache. if required.
ensure soldiers eat
Insufficient caloric 4,500 calories or more Difficulty thinking and
intake. per day. acting coherently --
impaired judgement.
Eat small, frequent
meals rather than large, Victims begin to
infrequent meals. stumble and become
clumsy and careless.
Snack lightly and often.
Energy depletion
Increase amounts of fat resembles and
in diet. aggravates
hypothermia. The body
does not have enough
fuel to maintain proper
body temperature. As a
result inadequate
sources of energy,
coupled with cold,
create a compound or
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synergistic effect.
Table A-2. Dehydration and Its Effects
DEHYDRATION
Loss of too much fluid, Drink 3 to 4 quarts of Generally tired and Sufficient hydration to
salt, and minerals due to water per day when weak. offset water loss.
poor hydration. static and up to 8 quarts
during increased Mouth, tongue, and Rest.
Contributing Factors: activity. throat become parched
and dry, and Severe cases may
Water loss occurs Adequate rest. swallowing becomes require an IV.
through sweating, difficult.
breathing, and urine Avoid caffeine (coffee, Insulate as required and
output. In cold climates, tea, soda) and alcohol, Darkening of urine. evacuate.
sweat evaporates so as they compound
rapidly or is absorbed dehydration. Constipation and
so thoroughly by painful urination.
clothing layers that it is Increase command
not readily apparent. supervision. Loss of appetite.
In cold weather, Keep canteens full. Rapid heartbeat.

drinking is
inconvenient. Water is Use flavored powdered Headache, dizziness,
hard to resupply, heavy drink mixes to and nausea with or
to carry, and freezes in encourage water without vomiting.
colder climates. consumption.
Difficulty focusing
Lack of humidity in the eyes.
dry mountain air.
Dehydration
Diminished thirst compounds the effects
sensation induced by of cold and altitude.
hypoxia.

Table A-3. Giardiasis and Its Effects
GIARDIASIS (PARASITICAL ILLNESS)
Parasitical illness Drink only potable Abdominal pain. Proper hydration with
contracted from water. potable water.
drinking unpurified Weakness and nausea.
water. Boil water for 3 to 5 Evacuation and
minutes. Frequent diarrhea and prescribed medications.
intestinal gas.
Use approved water
purification tablets or Loss of appetite.
filters.
Keep water containers

clean.
Table A-4. Hypoxia and Its Effects
HYPOXIA
Rapid ascent to high Acclimatization. Impaired judgment, Evacuation to lower

altitudes (above 3,000 perception, and higher altitude.
to 4,000 meters or Slow ascent. mental functions
10,000 to 13,000 feet). increasing with altitude.
Limited activities.
Long rest periods.

Table A-5. Acute Mountain Sickness (AMS) and Its Effects
ACUTE MOUNTAIN SICKNESS (AMS)
Rapid ascent to high Acclimatization. Headache and fatigue. Stop and rest.
altitudes (2,400 meters Symptoms will
or 8,000 feet). Staged and/or graded Insomnia, irritability, normally subside in 3-7
ascent. and depression. days if soldiers do not
continue to ascend.
During stops, no Coughing and shortness
strenuous activity and of breath. Observe for the
only mild activity with development of HAPE
frequent rest periods. Loss of appetite, or HACE.
nausea, and vomiting.
Increased carbohydrate If symptoms do not
intake (whole grains, Dizziness. disappear, a rapid
vegetables, peas and descent of 150 to 300
beans, potatoes, fruits, Swelling of the eyes meters (500 to 1,000
honey, and refined and face. feet) or greater is
sugar). necessary.
Acetazolamide Re-ascent should take

prescribed by a place only after
physician. symptoms are resolved.
Table A-6. High Altitude Pulmonary Edema (HAPE) and Its Effects
HIGH ALTITUDE PULMONARY EDEMA (HAPE)

Unacclimatized soldiers Acclimatization. Wheezing and coughing Rapid evacuation

rapidly ascending to (possibly with pink recommended.
high altitudes (2,400 Staged and/or graded sputum).
meters or 8,000 feet)*. ascent. Observe for the
Gurgling sound in development of HACE.
Acclimatized soldiers Sleeping at the lowest chest.
ascending rapidly from altitude possible. Seek qualified medical
a high to a higher Difficulty breathing. assistance.
altitude. Slow assumption of
physical activity. Coma.
Usually begins within
the first 2-4 days after Protection from the Death may occur if
rapid ascent and cold. rapid descent is not
generally appears initiated.
during the second night
of sleep at high or
higher altitudes.
Fluid accumulation in
the lungs.
*HAPE most often does not occur until above 3,500 meters (12,000 feet).
Table A-7. High Altitude Cerebral Edema (HACE) and Its Effects
HIGH ALTITUDE CEREBRAL EDEMA (HACE)

Unacclimatized soldiers Acclimatization. Most severe high Immediate evacuation;

rapidly ascending to altitude illness. preferably by air
high altitudes (2,400 Staged and/or graded evacuation.
meters or 8,000 feet)*. ascent. Severe headache,
nausea, and vomiting. Seek qualified medical
Acclimatized soldiers Slow assumption of assistance.
ascending rapidly from physical activity. Staggering walk/sway.
a high to a higher
altitude. Protection from the Confusion,
cold. disorientation, and
Excessive accumulation drowsiness.
of fluid in the brain.
Coma, usually followed
by death.
*HACE, like HAPE, most often does not occur until above 3,500 meters (12,000 feet).

FM 3-97.6 Appendix B Forecasting Weather in the Mountains

Appendix B
Forecasting Weather in the Mountains

The Air Force provides the bulk of the weather support required by the Army; however, reports from
other branches of the military service, our own National Weather Bureau, or a foreign country’s weather
service can also aid in developing accurate forecasts (see FM 2-33.2). Weather at different elevations and
areas, even within the same general region, may differ significantly due to variations in cloud height,
temperature, winds, and barometric pressure. Therefore, general reports and forecasts must be used in
conjunction with the locally observed weather conditions to produce reliable weather forecasts for a
particular mountain area of operations.
INDICATORS OF CHANGING WEATHER
MEASURABLE INDICATORS
B-1. In the mountains, a

portable aneroid barometer, ● Barometric Pressure
thermometer, wind meter, ● Wind Velocity
and hygrometer are useful ● Wind Direction
to obtain measurements that ● Temperature
will assist in forecasting the ● Moisture Content of the Air
weather. Marked or
abnormal changes within a
12-hour period in the Figure B-1. Measurable Weather
indicators listed in Figure B- Indicators
1 may suggest a potential
change in the weather.
CLOUDS
B-2. Clouds are good indicators of approaching weather conditions. By reading cloud
shapes and patterns, observers can forecast weather even without additional equipment.
B-3. Shape and height are used to identify clouds. Shape provides information about the
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stability of the atmosphere, and height above ground level provides an indication of the
distance of an approaching storm. Taken together, both indicate the likelihood of
precipitation (see Figure B-2). The heights shown in the figure are an estimate and may
vary, based on geographical location.
Figure B-2. Types of Clouds
Clouds by Shape
B-4. Clouds may be classified by shape as cumulus or stratus.
● Cumulus clouds are often called "puffy" clouds, looking like tufts of cotton. Their
thickness (bottom to top) is usually equal to or greater than their width. Cumulus
clouds are primarily composed of water droplets that cause them to have sharp,
distinct edges. These clouds usually indicate instability at the altitude of the
atmosphere where they are found. The stormy weather associated with cumulus

clouds is usually violent with heavy rains or snow and strong, gusty winds.
Precipitating cumulus clouds are called cumulonimbus.
● Stratus clouds are layered, often appearing flattened, with greater horizontal than
vertical dimensions. They usually indicate a stable atmosphere, but can indicate the
approach of a storm. Stormy weather associated with stratus clouds usually does not
normally include violent winds, and precipitation is usually light but steady, lasting
up to 36 hours. Lightning is rarely associated with stratus clouds, however, sleet
may occur. Fog is also associated with the appearance of stratus clouds.
Precipitating stratus clouds are called nimbostratus, and clouds that cannot be
determined as stratus or cumulus are referred to as stratocumulus. These latter types
may be evolving from one type to another, indicating a change in atmospheric
stability.
Clouds by Height
B-5. Clouds are also classified by the height of their base above ground level into three
categories – low, middle, and high.
● Low clouds, below 2,000 meters (6,500 feet), are either cumulus or stratus, or their
precipitating counterparts. Low clouds may be identified by their height above
nearby surrounding relief of known elevation. Most precipitation originates from
low clouds because rain and snow from higher clouds usually evaporates before
reaching the ground. As such, low clouds usually indicate precipitation, especially
if they are more than 1,000 meters (3,000 feet) thick (clouds that appear dark at the
base usually are at least that thick).
● Middle clouds, between 2,000 and 6,000 meters (6,500 and 19,500 feet) above
ground, have a prefix of "alto", and are called either altostratus or altocumulus.
Middle clouds appear less distinct than low clouds because of their height. Warm
"alto" clouds have sharper edges and are composed mainly of water droplets.
Colder clouds, composed mainly of ice crystals, have distinct edges that grade
gradually into the surrounding sky. Middle clouds indicate potential storms, though
usually hours away. Altocumulus clouds that are scattered in a blue sky are called
"fair weather" cumulus and suggest the arrival of high pressure and clear skies.
Lowering altostratus clouds with winds from the south indicate warm front
conditions, decreasing air pressure, and an approaching storm system within 12 to
24 hours.
● High clouds, higher than 6,000 meters (19,500 feet), are cirrus, cirrostratus, and
cirrocumulus. They are usually frozen clouds with a fibrous structure and blurred
outlines. The sky is often covered with a thin veil of cirrus that partly obscures the
sun or, at night, produces a ring of light around the moon. The arrival of cirrus
indicates moisture aloft and the approach of a storm system. Precipitation is often
24 to 36 hours away. As the storm approaches, the cirrus thickens and lowers
becoming altostratus and eventually stratus. Temperatures warm, humidity rises,

and winds approach from the south or southeast.
Other Clouds
B-6. Some clouds indicate serious weather ahead.
● Towering cumulus clouds have bases below 2,000 meters (6,500 feet) and tops
often over 6,000 meters (19,500 feet). They are the most dangerous of all types and
usually do not occur when temperatures at the surface are below 32-degrees
Fahrenheit. They indicate extreme instability in the atmosphere, with rapidly rising
air currents caused by solar heating of the surface or air rising over a mountain
barrier. Mature towering cumulus clouds often exhibit frozen stratus clouds at their
tops, producing an "anvil head" appearance. Towering cumulus clouds may be local
in nature, or they may be associated with the cold front of an approaching storm.
The latter appears as an approaching line of thunderstorms or towering cumulus
clouds. Towering cumulus clouds usually produce high, gusty winds, lightning,
heavy showers, and occasionally hail and tornadoes (although tornadoes are rare in
mountainous terrain). Such thunderstorms are usually short-lived and bring clear
weather.
● Cloud caps often form above pinnacle and peaks, and usually indicate higher winds
aloft. Cloud caps with a lens shape (similar to a "flying saucer") are called
lenticular and indicate very high winds (over 40 knots). Cloud caps should always
be watched for changes. If they grow and descend, bad weather can be expected.
APPLYING THE INDICATORS
B-7. Weather forecasts are simply educated estimations or deductions based on general
scientific weather principles and meteorological evidence. Forecasts based on past results
may or may not be accurate. However, even limited experience in a particular mountainous
region and season may provide local indications of impending weather patterns and
increased accuracy. Native weather lore, although sometimes greatly colored and
surrounded in mystique, should not be discounted when developing forecasts, as it is
normally based on the local inhabitants’ long-term experience in the region.
BAD WEATHER
B-8. Signs of approaching bad weather (within 24 to 48 hours) may include—
● A gradual lowering of the clouds. This may be the arrival or formation of new
lower strata of clouds. It can also indicate the formation of a thunderhead.
● An increasing halo around the sun or the moon.
● An increase in humidity and temperature.

● Cirrus clouds.
● A decrease in barometric pressure (registered as a gain in elevation on an altimeter).
STORM SYSTEMS
B-9. The approach of a storm system is indicated when—
● A thin veil of cirrus clouds spreads over the sky, thickening and lowering until
altostratus clouds are formed. The same trend is shown at night when a halo forms
around the moon and then darkens until only the glow of the moon is visible. When
there is no moon, cirrus clouds only dim the stars, but altostratus clouds completely
hide them.
● Low clouds, which have been persistent on lower slopes, begin to rise at the time
upper clouds appear.
● Various layers of clouds move in at different heights and become abundant.
● Lenticular clouds accompanying strong winds lose their streamlined shape, and
other cloud types appear in increasing amounts.
● A change in the direction of the wind is accompanied by a rapid rise in temperature
not caused by solar radiation. This may also indicate a warm, damp period.
● A light green haze is observed shortly after sunrise in mountain regions above the
timberline.
THUNDERSTORMS
B-10. Indications of local thunderstorms or squally weather are—
● An increase in size and rapid thickening of scattered cumulus clouds during the
afternoon.
● The approach of a line of large cumulus or cumulonimbus clouds with an "advance
guard" of altocumulus clouds. At night, increasing lightning windward of the
prevailing wind gives the same warning.
● Massive cumulus clouds hanging over a ridge or summit (day or night).
STRONG WINDS
B-11. Indications of approaching strong winds may be—
● Plumes of blowing snow from the crests of ridges and peaks or ragged shreds of
cloud moving rapidly.
● Persistent lenticular clouds, a band of clouds over high peaks and ridges, or
downwind from them.
● A turbulent and ragged banner cloud that hangs to the lee of a peak.

PRECIPITATION
B-12. When there is precipitation and the sky cannot be seen—
● Small snowflakes or ice crystals indicate that the clouds above are thin, and fair
weather exists at high elevations.
● A steady fall of snowflakes or raindrops indicates that the precipitation has begun at
high levels, and bad weather is likely to be encountered on ridges and peaks.
FAIR WEATHER
B-13. Continued fair weather may be associated with—
● A cloudless sky and shallow fog, or layers of haze at valley bottoms in early
morning.
● A cloudless sky that is blue down to the horizon or down to where a haze layer
forms a secondary horizon.
● Conditions under which small cumulus clouds appearing before noon do not
increase, but instead decrease or vanish during the day.
● Clear skies except for a low cloud deck that does not rise or thicken during the day.
B-14. Signs of approaching fair weather include—
● A gradual rising and diminishing of clouds.

● A decreasing halo around the sun or moon.
● Dew on the ground in the morning.
● Small snowflakes, ice crystals, or drizzle, which indicate that the clouds are thin
and fair weather may exist at higher elevations.
● An increase in barometric pressure (registered as a loss in elevation on an
altimeter).

FM 3-97.6 GLOSSARY

GLOSSARY
ABN airborne
acclimatization the physiological changes that allow the body to adapt or get used to
the effects of a new environment, especially low oxygen saturation at
higher elevations
ACE armored combat earthmover
acetazolamide a pharmaceutical drug used to accelerate acclimatization
ADA air defense artillery
ADAM area denial artillery munitions
AH-64 attack helicopter also called the Apache
aid in mountaineering, a climbing device, such as pitons, bolts, chocks,

and stirrups, used for body support and upward progress; also used for
artificial height in the absence of handholds and footholds
ALOC air lines of communications
AM amplitude modulation
ambient temperature encompassing atmosphere
AMS acute mountain sickness
anchor a secure point (natural or artificial) to which a person or rope can be

safely attached
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FM 3-97.6 GLOSSARY
aneroid using no liquid
ANZAC Australia and New Zealand Corps
AO area of operations
apnea temporary suspension of respiration
ARSOF Army special operations forces
ART Army tactical task
ARTEP Army training and evaluation program
assault climber military mountaineer possessing advanced (Level 2) skills, capable of

leading small teams over class 4 and 5 terrain and supervising
rigging/operation of all basic rope systems
AT4 a man-portable, lightweight, self-contained, antiarmor weapon
ATGM anti-tank guided missile
basic mountaineer a military mountaineer trained in fundamental (Level 1)

travel/climbing skills necessary to move safely and efficiently in
mountainous terrain
belay a rope management technique used to ensure that a fall taken by a

climber can be quickly arrested; belay techniques are also used for
additional safety/control in rappelling, raising and lowering systems,
and for mountain stream crossings
BFV Bradley fighting vehicle
BSFV Bradley Stinger fighting vehicle
BN battalion

FM 3-97.6 GLOSSARY
C2 command and control
CAFAD combined arms for air defense
CFV cavalry fighting vehicle
CHS combat health support
CNR combat net radio
continental climate bitterly cold winters, extremely hot summers; annual rain and
snowfall is minimal and often quite scarce for long periods
cordillera principal mountain ranges of the world, named after the Spanish word
for rope
crampons climbing irons, attached to the bottom of boots, used on ice or snow in
mountaineering
crevice a narrow opening resulting from a split or crack as in a cliff
CS combat support
CSS combat service support
DA Department of the Army
defile a narrow passage or gorge
DPICM dual-purpose improved conventional munition
DZ drop zone
ECWCS extended cold weather clothing system
edema a local or general condition in which the body tissues contain an

excessive amount of tissue fluid

FM 3-97.6 GLOSSARY
evacuation team a team trained to move casualties over steep slopes, cliffs, and other
obstacles that would significantly impede the mobility of standard
litter bearers
EW electronic warfare
F Fahrenheit
FARP forward arming and refueling point
FASCAM family of scatterable mines
FEBA forward edge of the battle area
fixed alpine path a mountain path created by any combination of aids, to include steps,
stanchions, standoff ladders, suspended walkways, cableways, or
other improvements made of materials available; normally an
engineering task.
fixed rope a rope, or series of ropes, anchored to the mountain at one or more
points to aid soldiers over steep, exposed terrain; usually installed by
lead climbing teams (normally Level 2 qualification)
flash defilade to arrange fortifications to protect from fire
FM field manual; frequency modulation
FSMC forward support medical company
FOX system a lightly-armored, wheeled laboratory that takes air, water, and ground
samples and immediately analyzes them for signs of weapons of mass
destruction
gabion a wicker basket filled with earth and stones often use in building
fortifications; can also be created out of similar materials, such as
wire mesh/fence, lumber, plywood, or any suitable material that forms
a stackable container for rocks, gravel, and soil

FM 3-97.6 GLOSSARY
giardiasis parasitical illness
glaciated covered with glacial ice
GPS global positioning system
GTA graphic training aid
guide a soldier experienced in all aspects of mountaineering who has the

skills and knowledge to identify obstacles and ways to overcome
them; commander's advisor on technical mountaineering matters that
could affect the tactical scheme of maneuver; primary function of
mountain leaders (Level 3 qualification)
HACE high altitude cerebral edema
HAPE high altitude pulmonary edema
HE high explosives
Hellfire tank-killing missile carried by the Apache attack helicopter
high mountains mountains that have a local relief usually exceeding 900 meters (3,000
feet)
HUMINT human intelligence
HWY highway
hygrometer an instrument used to measure humidity or moisture content in the air
hypoxia a deficiency of oxygen reaching the tissues of the body
ice fog trails steam/smoke trails created by firing weapons
ID infantry division

FM 3-97.6 GLOSSARY
IFV infantry fighting vehicle
IHFR improved high frequency radio
IMINT imagery intelligence
installation team a team organized to construct and maintain rope installations used to
facilitate unit movement; usually comprised of Level 1 and 2
mountaineers
interdiction to stop or hamper
ionospheric a part of the earth’s atmosphere of which ionization of atmospheric

gases affects the propagation of radio waves; starts at about 30 miles
above ground
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IV intravenous
JSTARS joint surveillance, target attack radar system
km kilometer
lead climbing team a roped climbing team (usually Level 2 qualification) trained to lead
on class 4 and 5 terrain; establishes/prepares the entire route for the
remainder of the unit
leeward the side sheltered from the wind
lenticular having the shape of a double-convex lens
LOC line of communication
local relief the difference in elevation between valley floors and the surrounding
summits
look-down angles the angle from the aircraft to the target

FM 3-97.6 GLOSSARY
low mountains mountains that have a local relief of 300 to 900 meters (1,000 to 3,000
feet)
LPT logistics preparation of the theater
LRS long-range surveillance
LRSU long-range surveillance unit
LSDIS light and special division interim sensor
LTC lieutenant colonel
LZ landing zone
MANPADS man-portable air defense system
maritime climate mild temperatures with large amounts of rain or snow
MBA main battle area
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available,
time available, civil considerations
MK-19 40-mm grenade machine gun, MOD 3
MOPP mission-oriented protective posture
motti Finnish word meaning "a pile of logs ready to be sawed into lumber";
used in military terms to describe setting the conditions so a larger
force can be defeated in detail
mountain leader a military mountaineer possessing the highest level (Level 3) of

mountaineering skills with extensive experience in a variety of
mountain environments in both winter and summer months
MSE mobile subscriber equipment

FM 3-97.6 GLOSSARY
MSRT mobile subscriber radio terminal
MTF manual terrain following
NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical
OCOKA observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key
terrain, and avenues of approach
OH-58D a scout and attack helicopter known as the Kiowa Warrior
OP observation post
OPORD operation order
OPSEC operations security
OR operational readiness
orographic pertaining to the physical geography of mountains and mountain

ranges
PADS Position Azimuth Determining System
POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants
protection in mountaineering, special anchor points established during a roped

party climb to limit potential fall distances, protecting climbers from
severe fall/ground-fall consequences
PSYOP psychological operations
RAAMS remote antiarmor mine system
rappel method of controlled frictional descent down a rope
RCW ration, cold weather

FM 3-97.6 GLOSSARY
rockfall rockfall occurs on all steep slopes. It is caused by other climbers or by

the continual erosion of the rock on a mountainside resulting from
freezing, thawing, and heavy rain; grazing animals; or enemy action.
SATCOM satellite communications
scree small unconsolidated rocks or gravel, fist-size or smaller, located

mostly below rock ridges and cliffs
screening crest a hill or ridge located in front of a radar set to mask it from unwanted
returns (clutter) at close range, and to provide security against
electronic detection or jamming; screening crest also prevents visual
observation and attack by direct fires
SEE small emplacement excavator
SHELREP shelling report
SHORAD short-range air defense
SINCGARS Single-channel Ground and Airborne Radio System
SOF special operations forces
squall a sudden, violent wind
SR special reconnaissance
talus accumulated rock debris that is much larger than scree, usually
basketball-size or larger
TBP to be published
TC training circular
TCF tactical combat force
TCP traffic control point

FM 3-97.6 GLOSSARY
temperature inversion when the temperature is warmer at higher elevations than lower
elevations
TM technical manual
TOC tactical operations center
TOW tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided, heavy antitank missile

system
TRADOC United States Army Training and Doctrine Command
tundra treeless, black, mucky soil with permanently frozen subsoil; located in
mountainous regions above the timberline
tussocks grassy clumps
UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
UGR unitized group ration
UHF ultrahigh frequency
Venturi effect as a fluid (such as air) flows through a constriction (like a mountain
pass), the speed increases and the pressure drops
VFR visual flight rules
VT variable time
wind chill the rate at which a man or object cools to the ambient temperature;
wind increases the rate of cooling and adds to the risk of frostbite,
hypothermia, and other cold-weather injuries
windward being in or facing the direction from which the wind is blowing

FM 3-97.6 GLOSSARY
WP white phosphorous

FM 3-97.6 Bibliography

Bibliography
The bibliography lists field manuals by new number followed by old number.
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
Most Army doctrinal publications are available online: http://155.217.58.58/atdls.htm
AR 385-10. The Army Safety Program. 23 May 1988.
FM 1-0 (12-6). Personnel Doctrine. 09 September 1994.
FM 2-01.3 (34-130). Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. 08 July 1994.
FM 2-33.2 (34-81). Weather Support for Army Tactical Operations. 31 August 1989.
FM 2-33.201 (34-81-1). Battlefield Weather Effects. 23 December 1992.
FM 3-0 (100-5). Operations. 14 June 1993.
FM 3-01.8 (44-8). Combined Arms for Air Defense. 01 June 1999.
FM 3-01.43 (44-43). Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle Platoon and Squad Operations. 03October 1995.
FM 3-01.44 (44-44). Avenger Platoon, Section, and Squad Operations. 03 October 1995.
FM 3-04.100 (1-100). Army Aviation Operations. 21 February 1997.
FM 3-04.203 (1-203). Fundamentals of Flight. 03 October 1988.
FM 3-05.27 (31-27). Pack Animals in Support of Army Special Operations Forces. 15February 2000.
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FM 3-09.4 (6-20-40). Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Brigade Operations
(Heavy). 05 January 1990.
FM 3-09.12 (6-121). Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Field Artillery Target Acquisition.
25September 1990.
FM 3-09.40 (6-40). Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Field Artillery Manual Cannon Gunnery. 23
April 1996.
FM 3-09.42 (6-20-50). Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Brigade Operations
(Light). 05 January 1990.
FM 3-11.4 (3-4). NBC Protection. 29 May 1992.
FM 3-11.5 (3-5). NBC Decontamination. 28 July 2000.
FM 3-11.6 (3-6). Field Behavior of NBC Agents (Including Smoke and Incendiaries). 03November 1986.
FM 3-11.19 (3-19). NBC Reconnaissance. 19 November 1993.
FM 3-21.7 (7-7). The Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad (APC). 15 March 1985.
FM 3-21.20 (7-20). The Infantry Battalion. 06 April 1992.
FM 3-21.30 (7-30). The Infantry Brigade. 03 October 1995.
FM 3-21.38 (57-38). Pathfinder Operations. 09 April 1993.
FM 3-23.10 (23-10). Sniper Training. 17 August 1994.
FM 3-23.30 (23-30). Grenades and Pyrotechnic Signals. 27 December 1988.
FM 3-24.3 (20-3). Camouflage, Concealment, and Decoys. 30 August 1999.
FM 3-24.32 (20-32). Mine/Countermine Operations. 29 May 1998.
FM 3-25.9 (23-9). M16A1 and M16A2 Rifle Marksmanship. 03 July 1989.
FM 3-25.18 (21-18). Foot Marches. 01 June 1990.
FM 3-25.26 (21-26). Map Reading and Land Navigation. 07 May 1993.

FM 3-25.60 (21-60). Visual Signals. 30 September 1987.
FM 3-25.76 (21-76). Survival. 05 June 1992.
FM 3-34.1 (90-7). Combined Arms Obstacle Integration. 29 September 1994.
FM 3-34.2 (90-13-1). Combined Arms Breaching Operations. 28 February 1991.
FM 3-34.102 (5-102). Countermobility. 14 March 1985.
FM 3-34.112 (5-103). Survivability. 10 June 1985.
FM 3-34.214 (5-250). Explosives and Demolitions. 30 July 1998.
FM 3-34.223 (5-7-30). Brigade Engineer and Engineer Company Combat Operations (Airborne, Air
Assault, Light). 28 December 1994.
FM 3-34.330 (5-33). Terrain Analysis. 11 July 1990.
FM 3-60 (6-20-10). Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process. 08 May 1996.
FM 3-90.21 (6-20-1). Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery Cannon Battalion. 29
November 1990.
FM 3-91.2 (71-2). The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force. 27September1988.
FM 3-91.3 (71-3). The Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade. 08 January 1996.
FM 3-91.123 (71-123). Tactics and Techniques for Combined Arms Heavy Forces: Armored Brigade,
Battalion Task Force, and Company Team. 30 September 1992.
FM 3-97.3 (90-3). Desert Operations. 24 August 1993.
FM 3-97.11 (90-11). Cold Weather Operations. TBP.
FM 3-97.22 (90-22). (Night) Multi-Service Night and Adverse Weather Combat Operations. 31January
1991.
FM 3-97.50 (3-50). Smoke Operations. 04 December 1990.

FM 3-100.14 (100-14). Risk Management. 23 April 1998.
FM 3-100.15 (100-15). Corps Operations. 29 October 1996.
FM 3-100.40 (100-40). Tactics. TBP.
FM 3-100.55 (100-55). Reconnaissance and Surveillance. TBP.
FM 3-100.71 (71-100). Division Operations. 28 August 1996.
FM 4-02.2 (8-10-6). Medical Evacuation in a Theater of Operations Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures. 14 April 2000.
FM 4-02.22 (22-51). Leaders’ Manual for Combat Stress Control. 29 September 1994.
FM 4-02.92 (8-10-4). Medical Platoon Leaders’ Handbook Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.
16November 1990.
FM 4-20.1 (10-27). General Supply in Theaters of Operations. 20 April 1993.
FM 4-20.2 (10-23). Basic Doctrine for Army Field Feeding and Class I Operations Management. 18
April 1996.
FM 4-25.10 (21-10). Field Hygiene and Sanitation. 21 June 2000.
FM 4-25.11 (21-11). First Aid for Soldiers. 27 October 1988.
FM 4-30.32 (9-207). Operations and Maintenance of Ordnance Materiel in Cold Weather. 20March
1998.
FM 5-0 (101-5). Staff Organization and Operations. 31 May 1997.
FM 6-0 (100-34). Command and Control. TBP.
FM 6-02.11 (24-11). Tactical Satellite Communications. 20 September 1990.
FM 6-02.18 (24-18). Tactical Single-Channel Radio Communications Techniques. 30September 1987.
FM 6-02.32 (11-32). Combat Net Radio Operations. 15 October 1990.

FM 6-02.43 (11-43). The Signal Leader’s Guide. 12 June 1995.
FM 6-02.55 (11-55). Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) Operations. 22 June 1999.
FM 6-22 (22-100). Army Leadership Be, Know, Do. 31 August 1999.
FM 7-0 (25-100). Training the Force. 15 November 1988.
FM 7-10 (25-101). Battle Focused Training. 30 September 1990.
FM 7-15 (25-XX). Army Universal Task List. TBP.
FM 21-305. Manual for the Wheeled Vehicle Driver. 27 August 1993.
GTA 8-5-60. A Soldier’s Guide to Staying Healthy at High Elevations. 02 September 1996.
GTA 8-6-12. Adverse Effects of Cold. 01 August 1985.
TC 3-10. Commander’s Tactical NBC Handbook. 29 September 1994.
TC 24-20. Tactical Wire and Cable Techniques. 03 October 1988.
TC 24-21. Tactical Multichannel Radio Communications Techniques. 03 October 1988.
TC 90-6-1. Military Mountaineering. 26 April 1989.
NONMILITARY PUBLICATIONS
Jalali, Ali Ahmad and Lester W. Grau. The Other Side of the Mountain. Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps
Combat Development Command, USMC Studies and Analysis Division, 1999.
Ellis, Robert B. See Naples and Die. London: McFarland & Co, 1996.
Gawrych, George W. "The Rock of Gallipoli" in Studies in Battle Command. Fort Leavenworth, Kans.:
US Army Command and General Staff College, Combat Studies Institute, 1995.
Grau, Lester W. The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan. Washington,
D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996.

DOCUMENTS NEEDED
These documents should be available to the intended users of this manual.
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms. 1 February 1974.
FM 7-0 (25-100). Training the Force. 15 November 1988.
FM 7-10 (25-101). Battle Focused Training. 30 September 1990.
FM 3-0 (100-5). Operations. 14 June 1993.
FM 3-40 (100-40). Tactics. TBP.
TC 90-6-1. Military Mountaineering. 26 April 1989.

FM 3-97.6 Authentication

FM 3-97.6 (FM 90-6)

28 NOVEMBER 2000
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
ERIC K. SHINSEKI
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
Administrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army
0031803
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and US Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with the
initial distribution number 110315, requirements for FM 3-97.6.
http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/3-97.6/auth.htm [1/7/2002 4:55:11 PM]

Mountain Operations 3 - FM 3-19.6

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FM3-97.

6 TABLE OF CONTENTS Mountain Operations

Section II — Effects on Personnel

Section III — Effects on Equipment

Section IV — Reconnaissance and Surveillance

Chapter 2 COMMAND AND CONTROL

Section I — Assessment of the Situation

Terrain and Weather

Troops and Support Available

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Section III — Communications

Combat Net Radio

Mobile Subscriber Equipment

Wire and Field Phones

Audio, Visual, and Physical Signals

Initial Training Assessment

Weapons and Equipment

Camouflage and Concealment

Reconnaissance and Surveillance

Chapter 3 FIREPOWER AND PROTECTION OF THE FORCE

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Section II — Protection of the Force

Air Defense Artillery

Section I — Movement and Mobility

Special Purpose Teams

Section II — Offensive Operations

Exploitation and Pursuit

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Section III — Defensive Operations

Organization of the Defense

Reverse Slope Defense

Chapter 5 LOGISTICS AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Section I — Planning Considerations

Section III — Transportation and Maintenance

Section IV — Personnel Support

Section V — Combat Health Support

Mountain Evacuation Teams

Chronic Fatigue (Energy Depletion)

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Giardiasis (Parasitical Illness)

Acute Mountain Sickness (AMS)

High Altitude Pulmonary Edema (HAPE)

High Altitude Cerebral Edema (HACE)

Indicators of Changing Weather

Applying the Indicators

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release: distribution is unlimited.

* This publication supersedes FM 90-6, 30 June 1980.

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RDL Table of Document Download

The proponent of this publication is Headquarters TRADOC. Send comments and

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RDL Table of Document Download

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of ground mobility in mountainous terrain.

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RDL Table of Document Download

SECTION I — THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

1-1. The requirement to conduct

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movement times, limits the General Effects

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Figure 1-1. Mountain Regions of the World

1-4. A broad mountainous region approximately 1,600 kilometers wide dominates