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International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work? Author(s): Robert O. Keohane Source: Foreign Policy, No. 110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge (Spring, 1998), pp. 8296+194 Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1149278 Accessed: 12/08/2010 01:40
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International Can Institutions: Work?

byRobert Keohane O.

Interdepen

Council ShouldNATO How can the UnitedNationsSecurity expand? assure inspectors UN accessto siteswhereIraqmightbe conducting Under what conditionsshouldChina be bannedweaponsactivity? admitted the World to Trade (wTo)?Howmanybillions Organization of dollars doesthe International Fund(IMF) needat its disMonetary an "lender lastresort" countries as of for such posalto remain effective in Indonesia, Korea,and Thailandthat werethreatened 1997 with financialcollapse? Will the tentativeKyoto Protocolon Climate and Can ratified, implemented Changebe renegotiated, effectively? future UnitedNationspeacekeeping to contrast the UN practices-in fiascoes Bosnia Somalia-be mademoreeffective? in and Thesequestions illustrate growing the of help importance international institutions maintaining for worldorder. Twelveyearsago in these for pages, Nye Joseph andI gave"twocheers multilateralism," pointing
ROBERT O. KEOHANE isJames Dukeprofessor political B. at science DukeUniversity. of
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- o analyze world politics in the 1990s is to discuss internationalinstitutions: the rules that govern elements of world politics and the organizationsthat help implement those rules.

Keohane

of RonaldReagan,whichtook out that even the administration President office ill-disposed towardinternational had come institutions, grudgingly to accepttheirvalue in achievingAmericanpurposes. need Superpowers rules becausethey seek to influence events aroundthe world. general Even an unchallengedsuperpower such as the United States would be unableto achieve its goalsthroughthe bilateral exerciseof influence: the costsof such massive"arm-twisting" wouldbe too great. Internationalinstitutions are increasinglyimportant,but they are not always successful. Ineffective institutions such as the United Nations IndustrialDevelopment Organizationor the Organization of AfricanUnity exist alongsideeffectualones such as the MontrealProtocol on Substancesthat Deplete the Ozone Layerand the European Union. In recent years,we have gained insight into what makessome institutionsmore capablethan others-how such institutionsbest promote cooperationamongstatesand what mechanicsof bargaining they use. But our knowledgeis incomplete,and as the worldmoves toward new formsof global regulationand governance,the increasingimpact of internationalinstitutionshas raisednew questionsabouthow these institutionsthemselvesare governed.

THEORY AND REALITY,

1919-89

Academic "scribblers" not alwayshave to pay much attention to did internationalinstitutions.The 1919 VersaillesTreatyconstituted an attempt to construct an institution for multilateraldiplomacy-the Leagueof Nations. But the rejection of the LeagueCovenant by the U.S. Senate ensuredthat until WorldWarII the most importantnegotiations in worldpolitics-from the secretGerman-Russian dealsof the 1920s to the 1938 Munich conference-took place on an ad hoc basis. Only afterthe United Nations was founded in 1945, with strongsupport from the United States and a multiplicityof specializedagencies differenttasks,did internationalinstitutionsbegin to comperforming mand substantialinternationalattention. Until the late 1960s, American studentsof internationalrelations equated internationalinstitutionswith formal internationalorganizations, especially the United Nations. International Organization, the academicjournalon the subject,carriedlong summaries UN of leading meetings until 1971. However,most observersrecognizedlong before 1972 that the United Nations did not play a centralrole in worldpoliSPRING

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missions-of whichthe First tics. Exceptforoccasional peacekeeping UN Emergency Forcein the Middle Eastbetween1956and 1967was was the mostsuccessful-itsabilityto resolvehostilities paralyzed by of that in conflicts interest resulted frequent vetoesin the superpower the states SecurityCouncil. Moreover, influx of new postcolonial for into conhelpedturnthe General Assembly an arena North-South flict after1960andensured the major that Western powers, especially the UnitedStates,wouldviewmanyGeneral as resolutions Assembly hostileto theirinterests values-for example, New Internaand the tionalEconomic Orderand the Zionism Racism is resolutions the of in North America,and 1970s.Analystsand policymakers Europe, muchof Asia concluded international that institutions weremarginal to a gameof world still exercise state of politics driven the traditional by The UN-called "adangerous former U.S. represenpower. place" by tativeto the UN DanielPatrick morea forum for Moynihan-seemed or conflicts thananinstruscoring pointsin theColdWar North-South mentforproblem-solving cooperation. Inreality, even states increashowever, themost powerful were relying institutions-notso muchon the UN as other inglyon international and that and to organizations regimes setrules standards govern specific setsof activities. From late1960s the theTreaty theNon-Proon onward, of liferation Nuclear was for to Weapons thechiefvehicle efforts prevent the dangerous of NATOwasnot onlythe most spread nuclear weapons. successful multilateral in alliance history alsothemosthighly but instituwitha secretary-general, a permanent andelaborate rules tionalized, staff, relations members. itsfounding 1947through From in governing among the Uruguay Round concluded 1993,theGeneral that in on Agreement Tariffs Trade and overa series trade of rounds have that (GArr)presided reduced tariffs industrialized countries upto 90 percent, import among by international trade. Aftera shaky startin the 1940s,the IMF boosting of had-by the 1960s-becomethecenterpiece efforts themajor by capitalist democracies regulate monetary to their affairs. Whenthatfunction with the onset of flexibleexchangeratesin the 1970s,it atrophied became theirleading for and economic develagent financing promoting in America. sheer The number interof Asia,andLatin opment Africa,
also rose dramatically-from about 30 in governmentalorganizations 1910 to 70 in 1940 to morethan 1,000 by 1981. The exchangerate and oil crisesof the early1970shelped bringperand ceptions in line with reality.Suddenly,both top policymakers aca84
FOREIGN POLICY

Keohane

Ford administration to a sought construct new international monetary based flexiblerather on thanpegged rates. Confrontregime exchange ed with complexinterdependence the efforts statesto manage and of scientistsbegan to redefinethe studyof international it, political it what they called"intemrnainstitutions, broadening to encompass tional regimes"-structures of rules and norms that could be moreor less informal. The inter- Whyshould international nationaltraderegime,for examinstitutions exist at allin a ple, did not have strongformal world dominated by rules or integrated,centralized it a rather, provided management; sovereign states? set of interlockinginstitutions, including regular meetingsof the GATT formal settlement and contracting parties, dispute arrangements, of whichgradually develdelegation technicaltasksto a secretariat, Someinternational opeda bodyof caselawandpractice. lawyers grumbled that the politicalscientistswere merelyusing other termsto discuss international Nevertheless, law. wereonce politicalscientists how rules affectstatebehavagaindiscussing international andnorms the ior,even if theyavoided "L-word." In the 1980s, research international on from moved regimes attempts to describethe phenomenaof interdependence international and to of under whichcountries regimes closer analysis the conditions cooperate.Howdoescooperation occuramong statesandhowdo sovereign international institutions affect From standpoint political it? the of realism, both the relianceplaced by states on certain international institutions the explosionin theirnumbers and werepuzzling. Why shouldinternational institutions exist at all in a worlddominated by states?This questionseemedunanswerable institutions if sovereign wereseenasopposed orabove,the statebutnot if theywereviewed to, as devicesto helpstatesaccomplish objectives. their
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demic observers in the United States realized that global issues requiredsystematic policy coordination and that such coordination of requiredinstitutions.In 1974, then secretary state Henry Kissinger, who had paid little attention to international institutions, helped establishthe International Energy Agency to enableWesterncountries to deal cooperativelywith the threat of futureoil embargoeslike the of and 1973 OPEC embargo the Netherlands UnitedStates.And the

Institutions International

The new research international on institutions brokedecisively of with legalism-the view that lawcan be effective regardless politiassociated the field's with cal conditions-as well as withthe idealism of scholars the Instead, adopted assumptions realism, accepting origins. interests werekey factors that relativestatepowerand competing in world new but about the politics, at the sametimedrawing conclusions influence institutions the process. of on Institutions createthe capafor statesto cooperate mutually in beneficial bility waysby reducing the costsof making enforcing and refer economists agreements-what to as "transaction costs." enforceThey rarely engagein centralized ment of agreements, they do reinforce but of practices reciprocity, whichprovide incentives governments keeptheirown commitfor to mentsto ensure others so aswell.Evenpowerful that do states havean interest,most of the time, in followingthe rulesof well-established international sincegeneral to the institutions, conformity rulesmakes of behavior otherstatesmorepredictable. This scholarship heavilyon the twin concepts uncertainty drew of andcredibility. Theorists thatthepreferences of increasingly recognized statesamount "private to information"-that absentfulltransparency, states are uncertainabout what their partners rivalsvalue at and time. They naturally By reducing the any given to respond uncertainty beingless by uncertainty of enforcing willing to enter into agreements, agreements,international since they are unsurehow their institutions help states partnerswill later interpretthe termsof suchagreements. Internaachieve collectivegains. tional institutions reducethis can uncertainty promoting by negotiations in whichtransparency encouraged; dealingwith a seriesof is by issues overmanyyears undersimilar and honrules,thusencouraging in order preserve to future andbysystematically moniesty reputation; the of with toring compliance governments theircommitments. Even if a government genuinelydesiresan international agreeits that it will, in the ment, it may be unableto persuade partners be it. international future, willingand able to implement Successful therefore in domesticinstitutions. negotiations may require changes For instance,without "fast-track" authorityon trade,the United States'negotiatingpartners have no assurance that Congresswill
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Keohane

refrainfromaddingnew provisionsto tradeagreementsas a condition for their ratification. Hence, other states are reluctant to enter into trade negotiations with the United States since they may be confronted, at the end of tortuousnegotiations, with a redesignedagreement less favorableto them than the draftthey initialed. By the same token, without fast-trackauthority,no promise by the U.S. government to abide by negotiated terms has much credibility,due to the president'slack of control over Congress. In short, this new school of thought arguedthat, ratherthan imposinstitutionsshould respondto ing themselves on states, intemrnational the demandby statesfor cooperativewaysto fulfilltheir own purposes. By reducinguncertaintyand the costs of makingand enforcingagreeinstitutionshelp statesachieve collective gains. ments, intemrnational

YESTERDAY'S

CONTROVERSIES:

1989-95

This new institutionalism not withoutits critics,who focused was theirattacks threeperceived on that First, shortcomings: theyclaimed international are institutions fundamentally sincestates insignificant wield the only real powerin worldpolitics.They emphasized the of weakness efforts the UN or League Nationsto achievecolof by lectivesecurity and againstaggression greatpowers, they pointed by to the dominant of major role in contributors international economic organizations. institutions Hence,anyeffectsof theseinternational wereattributed moreto the efforts theirgreatpowerbackers of than to the institutions themselves. This argument overstated. course, was Of suchas the greatpowers United States exercise enormousinfluence within international institutions. the policies emerge But that from theseinstitutions difare ferentfromthosethatthe UnitedStateswouldhaveadopted unilatertoward orrecipients IMFloans, of for ally.Whether Iraq policies specific situations cannotbe entirelyad hoc but mustconformto generally applicablerules and principles to be endorsedby multilateral institutions. Whereagreement manystatesis necessary policyto for by be effective, even the UnitedStatesfindsit usefulto compromise on
substanceto obtain the institutionalseal of approval.Therefore,the decision-making procedures and general rules of international institutionsmatter.They affect both the substanceof policy and the degreeto which other states accept it.
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cles to achievingjoint gains.Forinstance,whetherthe KyotoProtocol will lead to a globalagreementis questionablein partbecausedeveloping countriesrefusedto acceptbindinglimitson theiremissionsand the U.S. Senate declaredits unwillingnessto ratifyany agreementnot con88 FOREIGN POLICY

The secondcounterargument focused "anarchy": absence a on the of world or international system whichvicto government effective legal timsof injustice appeal. a result anarchy, can As of critics states argued, relativegains(i.e., doingbetterthan otherstates)to absolute prefer and even gains.Theyseekto protecttheirpowerandstatus will resist beneficial if are mutually cooperation theirpartners likelyto benefit more than they are. For instance,throughout American-Soviet the armsrace, both sidesfocusedon their relativepositions-who was or ahead threatening gaina decisive to than advantage-rather on their ownlevelsof armaments. Similar on economdynamics appear certain ic issues,such as the fierceEuro-American (i.e., Airbus competition Industrie versus of Boeing)in the production large passenger jets. aboutthe "relative wereintense Scholarly disputes gainsquestion" butshort-lived. turned thatthe question It out neededto be reframed: "dostatesseekrelative absolute or but"under whatcondinot, gains?" tionsdo they forego even mutually beneficial to cooperation preserve theirrelative and Whenthereareonlytwomajor power status?" players, andone side's relative gainsmaydecisively change power relationships, in for or races, example, monopolistic gainsloomlarge: arms competition (asbetween Airbus Boeing). and Mostissues potential of cooperato tion, however,fromtradeliberalization climatechange,involve multilateral that and negotiations makerelative gainshardto calculate entaillittlerisk decisive of shifts one sideoveranother. for Therepower mostof the timeto seekto enhancetheir fore,statescan be expected ownwelfare without worried others alsomakeadvances. that will being So the relative the of gains argument merely highlights difficulties cooperation wherethereis toughbilateral it competition; doesnot by any means undermine for in prospects cooperation general. The thirdobjection theories cooperation lessradical to of was but moreenduring. Theorists cooperation recognized cooperaof had that tion is not harmonious: emergesout of discordand takesplace it that the potenthrough toughbargaining. Nevertheless, claimed they tialjointgainsfromsuchcooperation the increases explained dramatic in the number scopeof cooperative and multilateral institutions. Criticspointed however, bargaining that could obstaout, problems produce

Keohane

Bothsidesstaked countries. by tainingsuchcommitments developing efforts credible at out toughbargaining hindering compropositions, the mise.As a resultof thesebargaining problems, fact that possible that soludealscouldproduce joint gainsdoesnot assure cooperative The of actors the information and tionswillbe reached. tactics political of are about another bothkeyaspects a process one theyhaveavailable Institutions helpprothatdoesnot necessarily to cooperation. lead may on actorsmay agree,but new vide "focalpoints," which competing In oftenlacksuchinstitutions. this case,both the paceandthe issues becomemoreproblematic. extentof cooperation TODAY'S DEBATES

The generalproblem bargaining of raisesspecificissuesabouthow which always involvea affectinternational institutions negotiations, mixture discord potential of and aboutbargaincooperation. Thinking since bargaining so aboutsubjectivity, ing leadsto concerns depends on the beliefs the parties of involved. And the mostfundamenheavily talquestion scholars to answer wish concerns effectiveness: Whatstrucand makeinternational moreor institutions tures, processes, practices of lesscapable affecting outcomes-in desired policies-and ways? The impact institutional of on remains arrangements bargaining puzfromobservation, fromgametheory, from and zling.We understand of in explorations bargaining a varietyof contexts that outcomes on morethanthe resources available the actors the payto or depend offstheyreceive. Institutions affect in complex and bargaining patterns nuanced has over In Who,forexample, authority the agenda? the ways. Delors usedhis authority headof the European as Com1980s, Jacques mission structure agenda the European to the of thusleadCommunity, Act Whatvoting ingto the SingleEuropean andthe Maastricht Treaty. orconsensus are At arrangements usedandwhointerprets ambiguities? the Kyoto on a ruleof "consensus" not predid Conference, agreement vent the conferencechair from ignoringobjectionsas he gaveled afterprovision the finalsession. in Can disgruntled through provision blockimplementation formally of ratified In participants agreements?
the GATT,until 1993, loserscould prevent the findingsof disputeresolution panels frombeing implemented;but in the WTO, panel recommendationstake effect unless there is a consensusnot to implement them. Asking such questions systematically about international
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Institutions International

Street and are then unreachable,I have to choose between skipping lunch with you or showing up at your preferred location. Asymmetrical informationand our mutual belief that I know where you will be the waiting for me have structured situation.
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new in institutions wellyieldsignificant insights future may years. Institutional maneuvers placewithina larger take context ideological that helpsdefinewhichpurposes and which such institutions pursue The of of they practices findacceptable. Mandates System the League in Nationsdepended parton specificinstitutional but arrangements, morefundamental the shared was that Eurounderstanding continued was No of peanruleovernon-European peoples acceptable. system rule over could after byEuropeans non-Europeans remain legitimate thecolthe World II. War lapseof thatconsensus during 15years following The endof the ColdWarshattered wholesetof beliefs a about world Theoriesof international the Cold Warwere politics. politicsduring a materialistic, overwhelmingly reflecting view of the worldin which states "national interests" and pursued shaped geopolitical economic by realities. Stalinoncefamously As aboutthe pope:"How quipped many divisions doeshe have?" only did an unarmed Not PopeJohnPaulII in of prevail the contestforthe allegiance the Polishpeople,butafter the failed1991coupagainst the Gorbachev, SovietUnion brokeinto its constituent on the basisof the normof "self-determination," parts rather thanalonglinesof military or resources. State power economic interests depend parton howpeopledefinetheiridentities-as now in or Serbs Croats, Russians Chechens. or on Theyalsodepend the politicalandreligious valuesto whichtheirpublics committed. are aware Hence,the end of the ColdWarmadescholars increasingly of the importance ideas,norms, information-topics some of and that of themhadalready Someyears such earlier, a reoribegunto explore. entationmighthavefacedfiercecriticism fromadherents gametheof which had traditionally ory and other economics-based approaches, focused material on interests. sincethe mid-1980s, However, bargainhas are ing theory shownmoreandmorethatthe beliefsof actors crufor To economist Thomas ciallyimportant outcomes. adapt Schelling's famous that example, suppose youandI wantto meetforlunchin New York on West City,butyouwork WallStreetandI workon the Upper Side.Wherewillwe get together? havea mutual We in interest meetnot If ing,buteachof uswould prefer to wastetimetraveling. youleave a message my answering on machinesuggesting restaurant Wall a on

Keohane

createinforand institutions The procedures rulesof international are as whatprinciples acceptable mational structures. Theydetermine and actionsare the basisforreducing conflicts whether governmental or they expeclegitimate illegitimate. Consequently, helpshapeactors' in ritualized a tations.For instance,tradeconflictsare increasingly in of of toughactionon behalf process protesting the WTO-promising one'sown industries, in quasi-judicial resolution engaging prodispute if or about defeat when cedures, victory possible, complaining claiming but Thereis muchsoundandfury, regularly institutionalized necessary. conflictto the realmof dramatic usually relegate expression. processes Institutions information. "Insiders" can therebycreatedifferentiated the directed toward "outsiders" use theirown and interpret language to or others' beliefs. understandings interpret, manipulate, of students international continue tryto underto institutions Finally, stand someinstitutions somuchmore are effective others. than Variwhy ation in the coherence institutional of policyor members' conformity withinstitutional ispartially rules accounted bythedegree common for of interests the distribution poweramongmembers. and of Institutions whosemembers share socialvalues havesimilar and political systemssuch as NATO or the European Union-are likely to be strongerthan

thosesuchastheOrganization Security Cooperation Europe for and in or the Association SouthEast of AsianNations, whosemore diverse memdoes have interbership not necessarily the samekindof deepcommon ests.Additionally, character domestic the of discussed elsewhere politics, in this issueby HelenMilner, wellas by Margaret as Hermann Joe and hasa substantial on international The institutions. distriHagan, impact bution power alsoimportant. of is Institutions dominated a small numby ber of members-forexample,the IMF, with its weightedvoting take actionthanthosewhereinflusystem-cantypically moredecisive ence is more such diffused, asthe UN General widely Assembly. OVERCOMING THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT

Even as scholars these areasof inquiry, pursue they are in dangerof a deficit"that overlooking majornormativeissue:the "democratic
exists in many of the world's most important international institutions.As illustratedmost recently by the far-reaching interventions of the IMFin EastAsia, the globalizationof the world economy and the expanding role of international institutions are creating a
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Institutions International

institutions formof globalregulation. Majorinternational powerful that areincreasingly downrulesandguidelines governments, if laying investment generate and mustfoltheywishto attract foreign growth, low.But these international institutions managed technocrats are by andsupervised highgovernmental officials. Thatis, theyarerunby by senseis democratic 6lites.Only in the mostattenuated controlexercisedovermajorinternational in Key organizations. negotiations the are madein closedsessions. The IMFnegotiates secretwith in WTO and potentialborrowers, it has only begunin the lastfew monthsto on the it provide conditions imposes recipients. The EUprovides another in point.Itsmostimportant case decisionis its Councilof Ministers, whichis composed governof making body mentrepresentatives perform who moreimportant functions legislative than the members the European of Parliament. councilmeets The behindcloseddoorsand does not its votes. It also appoints Onlyin the most attenuatedpublish to theEuropean members Commissense is democraticcontrol sion, whichactsas the EU executive, whose ties to the publicare exercisedovermajor thus very indirect indeed. The internationalorganizations.European Parliament narrowly has defined powersand little status; most nationalparliaments not closelyscrutinize do European-level actions.How much genuineinfluencedo Germanor Italianvoters therefore haveoverthe council's decisions? little. Very The issuehere is not one of statesovereignty. Economic interdehave altered notionsof sovereignty: Few pendenceand its regulation states can still demandto be completelyindependent external of over legalpractices withintheir territories. best most The authority states hopeforis to be ableto usetheirsovereign can as authority a barthat rules gainingtool to assure othersalsohave to abideby common andpractices. Giventhesechanges, issue the hereis whohasinfluence overthe sorts bargains arestruck? of that Democratic theory givespride of placeto the publicrolein deciding the distributional value on and tradeoffs inherentin legislation regulation. the practices and But of international institutions in placethatprivilege the handsof the 6lites of national and governments of international organizations. does work well.American Admittedly, democracy not always politicians regularly institutions, engagein diatribes againstinternational
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of at playingon the dismay a vocal segmentof theirelectorates the in number foreigners the UnitedNations.Moreseriously, of excessive like can an argument be madethatthe IMF, central can banks, onlybe fromdirectdemocratic control.Eversince effectiveif it is insulated andtheorists haveexplored authorihow 1787,however, practitioners canbe combined accountability publics with to tativedecision making control.The U.S. Constitution basedon is and indirectdemocratic sucha theory-the ideathat popular is thoughessential, sovereignty, bestexercised An rather elaborate institutions. issue indirectly, through that scholarsshould now explore is how to devise international institutions arenot onlycompetent effective alsoaccountthat and but to able,at leastultimately, democratic publics. One possible is response to say that all is well, since international institutions responsible governments-which, turn, accountare to in are ablein democracies theirownpeople. to International regulation simply adds another to thechainofdelegation. longchains delegation, link But of in whichthe public actiononlyat several affects reduce actual removes, If of are the authority. the terms multilateral public cooperation to reflect interests broader of democratic rather thanjustthoseof narrow publics traditional of will 6lites, patterns delegation haveto be supplemented by othermeans ensuring of to greater accountabilitypublic opinion. One promising would to seekto invigorate be transnationapproach al societyin the formof networks individuals nongovernand among mental organizations. growthof such networks---of The scientists, in fields,and humanrightsand environmental professionals various activists-hasbeen aidedgreatly the fax machine the Intemrnet and by andby institutional thatincorporate networks these into arrangements decisionmaking. example, For natural socialscientists and developed the scientificconsensus the underlying KyotoProtocolthroughthe Panel whosescientific Intergovernmental on ClimateChange(IPCC) work organized scientists didnot haveto answer anygovwas who to by ernments.The Kyoto Protocolwas negotiated,but governments to actionon climate opposed effective changecouldnot hopeto renethe scientific set by the IPCC. gotiate guidelines The dramatic in the cost of long-distance fall communication will
facilitatethe developmentof many more such transnational networks. As a result,wealthyhierarchical organizations-multinationalcorporations as well as states-are likely to have more difficultydominating transnational communications. Thirtyyearsago, engagingin prolonged
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Institutions International

considerable resources. Now communication intercontinental required free. do individuals so on the Intemrnet, virtually institutions to of the Therefore, future accountability international formal on demotheirpublics restonlypartly delegation through may under Its craticinstitutions. otherpillarmaybe voluntary pluralism International conditionsof maximumtransparency. policies may of or be monitored loosegroupings scientists otherproby increasingly networks such as AmnestyInternaor by issueadvocacy fessionals, the whosemembers, scattered around world, tionalandGreenpeace, will be linkedeven morecloselyby modeminformation technology. will not Accountability be enhanced onlybychainsof official responbut of Official actions, sibility, by the requirement transparency. negoin will tiatedamongstaterepresentatives international organizations, be subjected scrutiny transnational to networks. by Such transparency, however, represents nongovernmental organizationsandnetworks morethanordinary whomaybe asexcluded people, frome-litenetworks they are fromgovernment as circles.That is, transnational society be a necessary insufficient civil but condition may fordemocratic Democracies should insistthat,wherever accountability. international maintain sufficient for feasible, organizations transparency transnational networks advocacy of domesticlegislators, and groups, democratic to theiractions. proponents democBut of publics evaluate raticaccountability should seekcounterparts the mechanisms also to of control embedded national in democratic institutions. Governors the of Reserve Federal Board after nominated thepresident conand are, all, by firmed the Senate,even if theyexercise their by great authority during termsof office.If Madison, and Hamilton, Jaycouldinvent indirect of mechanisms popular in control theFederalist twocenturies Papers ago, it should be beyond competence devisecomparable not our to mechanismsat the global levelin the twenty-first century. As we continue thinkabout normative to the of implications globalwe shouldfocussimultaneously the maintenance robust on of ization, democratic institutions home,the establishmentformal at of structures of international and networks. be To delegation, the roleof transnational in effective the twenty-first modem century, democracy requires internationalinstitutions. to be consistent And with democratic these values,
institutionsmust be accountableto domestic civil society.Combining with effectivedemocratic will globalgovernance accountability be a major and alikein the yearsahead. challengeforscholars policymakers
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Keohane

WANT

TO KNOW

MORE?

on institutions The bestsinglesourceforacademic writings international is the quarterly Organization, published MIT Press. by journalInternational for A forthcoming issue,scheduled Autumn 1998,will reviewthe special in last 30 yearsof scholarship the field. The sophisticatedrealismof the 1970s, which largelyignoredinternational institutions,is best represented Kenneth Waltz's Theory of by World Politics (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1979). For data on numbers of international organizations,see Cheryl Shanks, Harold

in "Inertia Change the Constellation and & Jacobson, Jeffrey Kaplan's

of InternationalGovernmentalOrganizations,1981-1992" (InternationalOrganization, Autumn 1996). For statements of institutionalist After Hegemony:Cooperationand Distheory,see RobertKeohane's cord in the WorldPolitical Economy (Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniunderAnarchy versityPress,1984) and KennethOye, ed., Cooperation PrincetonUniversityPress,1986). For a reflectionon (Princeton,NJ: this literatureby an internationallawyer,see Anne-Marie Slaughter "InternationalLaw and InternationalRelations Theory: A [Burley], Dual Agenda" (American Journal International April 1993). Law, of On the United Nations and multilateralism,see Daniel Patrick Moynihan'sA Dangerous Place (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and "Two Cheers for MulCompany,1978); Keohane& JosephNye, Jr.'s tilateralism" (FOREIGNPOLICY, Fall 1985); and John Ruggie'sWinning the Peace (New York,NY: Columbia University Pressfor the TwentiethCenturyFund, 1996). The "relative gainsdebate"is thoroughly reportedin David Baldwin, Debate (New ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism:the Contemporary York,NY: ColumbiaUniversityPress,1993). On bargaining and distributional issues, see Stephen Krasner's "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier" (World Politics, April 1991); JamesMorrow's "Modelingthe Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution versus Information" (International Summer 1994); and James Fearon's Organization, Enforcement and InternationalCooperation"(Interna"Bargaining, tionalOrganization, forthcoming). Work on the legalizationof internationalinstitutions is just beginning; my comments in this article reflect an ongoing project on this
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that with MilesKahler, and Goldstein, subject I amcodirecting Judith Anne-Marie Burley. On the roleof ideas, Goldstein Keohane, IdeasandForsee & eds., and PoliticalChange(Ithaca, NY: eign Policy:Beliefs,Institutions, CornellUniversityPress,1993) and MarthaFinnemore's National Interestsin International Society (Ithaca,NY: CornellUniversity issue networks, Burley's see Press,1996). Finally,on transnational "The Real New WorldOrder"(Foreign Affairs, September/October Keck& Kathryn Sikkink's ActivistsBeyond Bor1997)andMargaret ders:Advocacy Networks International in Politics(Ithaca, CorNY: nell University Press, 1997). Forlinksto relevant Websites,as wellas a comprehensive indexof related access articles, www.foreignpolicy.com.

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Letters

CORRECTION
On page 96 of this issue, we incorrectly identifiedAnne-Marie as Anne-Marie to We apologize Dr.Slaughter to and Slaughter Burley. ourreaders.

CREDITS
Front Cover: 1923.A Manat the Derby, Hulton Dayat theRaces, Surrey, Epsom, England, Getty BackCover: Detail from illustration VintLawrence, 28 by page Zairean soldiers Goma, near Ricardo WORLD PHOTOS Zaire; Mazalan, AP/WIDE Young UN General Bert Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis Assembly; Hardy, Detailfrom chart, page100 In Text: p. 28, Illustration VintLawrence by withTroop ToySoldiers, of Genevive Corbis p. 50, Young Plays Boy Naylor, Session International of Tribunal War on Crimes Former in in p. 70,First Yugoslavia Opens the UN 184689 Hague, PHOTO in WORLD PHOTOS Gulf, AP/WIDE p. 117,Shipsreflagging Persian L. National Khan, p. 127,Genghis James Stanfield, Collection; Image Geographic Napoleon, of H. David, Jacques-Louis National DC, Collection; Gallery Art,Washington, Samuel Kress Stalin, UPI/Corbis-Bettman of of Inc. p. 156,Volkswagen, compliments Volkswagen America,

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