The Enrolled Bill Doctrine Arroyo v. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268, Aug.

14, 1997 [Mendoza]

Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. Bill No. 7189 by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment.

Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair. On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House

Held: Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved. In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.

Arroyo v De Venecia G.R. No. 127255 August 14, 1997

Facts: Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against respondents charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did. On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.

Issue: Whether R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House; Whether the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious; Whether the Chair, in the process of submitting and certifying the law violated House Rules; and Whether a certiorari/prohibition will be granted.

Held: That after considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240 This case is therefore dismissed.

Ratio: To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our government. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skulduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body. In view of what is essential: Merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 26-27 are VIOLATED. First, in Osmea v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.'" Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite numbers of members have agreed to a particular measure.

In view of the Courts jurisdiction This Court's function is merely to check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing . . . of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error. If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a situation in which a branch of the government has "gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction". In view of House Rules: No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in cases such as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in this House that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then the voting comes in. Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings of a bill, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, and in re-passing a bill over the veto of the President. In view of grave abuse Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power. In view of the enrolled bill doctrine Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies good, if old-fashioned democratic theory: Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government. (In view of justifiability according to PUNO, J) With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-justifiable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over the case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.

The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just.

Tolentino versus Secretary of Finance

Facts: Petitioner seeks re consideration on the on the decision of the Supreme Court dismissing the cases for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value-added Tax Law. Petitioner claimed that the law did not originate exclusively from the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI Sec. 24 of the Constitution. Though its original version House Bill No. 11197 was filed in the House of Representatives then sent to the Senate where only first reading was conducted and then the senate passed another version of the bill (Senate Bill No. 1630). Tolentino contended that the Senate should have amended the House Bill No. 11197 by replacing it with the text of S. No. 1630. In this way, the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version becomes only the text of the House Bill. Issues: 1. Whether the Senates action renders R.A. No. 7716 constitutionally invalid. 2. Whether the Senate committed grave abuse of its discretion by passing its own version of the Bill.

Held: No, R.A. No. 7716 is not unconstitutional. It is not the only instance in which the senate proposed an amendment to a House revenue bill by enacting its own version. This has happened twice during the eight Congress in R.A. No. 7369 and R.A. No. 7549. Petitioners contention concerns only a matter of form and did not establish any substantial difference on both Bills. There was no grave abuse of discretion though Art. VI sec. 24 provides that all appropriation and revenue bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives; it further provides that the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. It is an accepted practice for the Senate to introduce what is known as an amendment by substitution, which may entirely replace the bill initiated in the House of Representatives.

ABAKADA v. Executive Secretary ABAKADA v. Ermita G.R. 168056 September 1, 2005 FACTS Republic Act No. 9337 was enacted for reasons of fixing budget, generation of revenue, inadequacy in fiscal allocation for education, compensation for health workers, and a wider range of coverage for full value-added tax benefits. The petitioners, however, questioned, not only the wisdom of the law, but also the perceived flaws in its passage. RA 9337 is a consolidation of three legislative bills namely, House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705, and Senate Bill No. 1950. Because of its provisions being in conflict with each other, the Senate agreed to request the House of Representatives for a committee conference, in which the Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill recommended the approval of its report. In due to that, the Senate and the House of Representatives did. On May 24, 2005, the President signed in to law the consolidated House and Senate versions as Republic Act 9337. Before its effectivity on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining government from implementing the law, in response to a series of petitions for certiorari and prohibition, questioning the constitutionality of the said Republic Act. ISSUES 1) Can amendment proposals to revenue bills originate from the Senate without violating Section 24, Art. VI of the Constitution? 2) Did the EVAT law violate the "no-amendment rule" under Section 26(2), Art. VI of the Constitution?

3) What are the powers and extent of authority of the Bicameral Conference Committee? 4) Did the EVAT law, RA 9337, violate the constitutional mandate on uniformity of taxation? 5) Is the EVAT law, RA 9337, regressive? HELD 1) Yes. Section 24, Art. VI of the Constitution states, "All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills, shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments." Thus, Section 24, Art. VI of the Constitution does not contain any prohibition or limitation on the extent of the amendments that may be introduced by the Senate to the House revenue bill. 2) No. The "no-amendment rule" refers only to the procedure to be followed by each house of Congress with regard to bills initiated in each of the aforementioned respective houses, regarding its transmission to the other house for its concurrence or amendment. Section 26(2), Art. VI of the Constitution does not mean that the introduction by the Bicameral Conference Committee of amendments and modifications to disagreeing provisions in bills is prohibited. 3) The power of the Bicameral Conference Committee is to reconcile or settle the differences in the two Houses respective bills, but it is not limited to the conflicting provisions of the bills. It may include matters not found in the original bills but germane to the purpose thereof. If both Houses viewed the pronouncement made by this Court in such cases as extreme or beyond what they intended, they had the power to amend their respective Rules to clarify or limit even further the scope of the authority which they grant to the Bicameral Conference Committee. Petitioners grievance that, unfortunately, they cannot bring about such an amendment of the Rules on the Bicameral Conference Committee because they are members of the minority, deserves scant consideration. That the majority of the members of both Houses refuses to amend the Rules on the Bicameral Conference Committee is an indication that it is still satisfied therewith. At any rate, this is how democracy works the will of the majority shall be controlling. 4) No. Article VI, Section 28(1) of the Constitution reads: "The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation." Uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. Different articles may be taxed at different amounts provided that the rate is uniform on the same class everywhere with all people at all times. The EVAT law is uniform as it provides a standard rate of 0% or 10% (or 12%) on all goods and services. Uniform taxation does not deprive Congress of the power to classify subjects of taxation, and only demands uniformity within the particular class. 5) Yes, by its nature it is regressive. But the principle of progressive taxation has no relation with the VAT system inasmuch as the VAT paid by the consumer or business for every goods bought or services enjoyed is the same regardless of income. In other words, the VAT paid eats the same portion of an income, whether big or small. Hence, the petitions were DISMISSED and the temporary restraining order issued by the Court was lifted upon finality of the decision.

BARA LIDASAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (21 SCRA 496, l-28089D 25 OCTOBER 1967 FACTS: RA 4790 creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao Del Sur was enacted into law. Section 1 of the act reads: XxxSECTION 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga,Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao,Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamawakan, Kapatagan, Bongabong,Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and Magolatung, in the Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan,Province of Lanao del Sur, are separated from said municipalities and constituted into a distinct and independent

municipality of the same province to be known as the Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The seat of government of the municipality shall be in Tagalogxxx Bara Lidasan, petitioner in this instant case, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Commission on Elections citing that the said law included two barrios from the Municipality of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and, ten barrios that are parts and parcel of the Municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato, not Lanao del Sur thereby changing the boundaries of the two provinces. Since elections are forth coming, the COMELEC issued a resolution on August 15, 1967 which still puts the twelve barrios from Cotabato Province under the new Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The Office of the President thereafter recommended to COMELEC that the operation of the statute be suspended be suspended until clarified by correcting legislation but the COMELEC declared that the statute must be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Does the title of RA 4790 conform to the constitutional requirement that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill and whether RA 4790 is null and void.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled, to wit: 1. No, the title of RA 4790 does not conform with the constitutional requirement regarding to title of statute since it is misleading and deceptive as the legislation combines two purposes in one statute, namely, creates the Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur from twenty barrios from the Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, both of Lanao del Sur, and dismembers two municipalities of the Province of Cotabato. 2. Yes, RA 4790 is null and void

LIDASAN v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS GR NO. L-280892 Petioner: BARA LIDASAN Respondent: COMELEC

FACTS On June 18, 1966, Chief Executive signed into law House Bill (HB) 1247, now known as Republic Act (RA) 4790An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur The new

municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur includes: Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang,Dagowan,Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos, and Magolatung. It also includes: barrios of Togaig and Madalum (both situated in Buldon, Cotabato) and barrios of Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo,Tangabao,Tiongko, Colodan, and Kabamawakan (all situated in Parang, Cotabato) Bara Lidasan, resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato affected by the implementation of RA 4790, questions the constitutionality of RA 4790.

ISSUE Whether or not RA 4790 is valid?

RULING RA 4790 declared as NULL and VOID Constitutional requirement foretasted that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill Constitutional provision contains DUAL LIMITATIONS upon legislative power: 1. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, less than one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. 2. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. It violates the constitutional requirement that the subject of the bill be expressed in its title. It did not inform the Congress the full impact of the Law. Moreover, It did not inform the citizens of Buldon and Parangin Cotabato that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and municipalities and that such will be added to the Province of Lanao del Sur. The subject was the creation of the municipality of Dianaton. Hence, it makes the title misleading and deceptive Even upon removing the barrios of Cotabato included in the municipality of Dianaton, it is still unconstitutional because the valid part is not independent of the invalid portion. Thus, it is indivisible, and it is accordingly null and void in its totality.

People of the R.P. vs. Purisima GR Nos. L-42050-66 20November1978 FACTS OF THE CASE: There are twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question of law. Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of

deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed before them the details of which will be recounted below an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element of the crime. ISSUES OF THE CASE: Are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9? There are two elements to the the offense: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder. The petitioner by having one particular stand of the carrying of any dangerous weapon outside of the residence w/o regard to motive or intent makes this a case of statutory construction. HELD: COURT DISMISSED ALL MOTIONS MADE BY THE PETITIONER AND AFFIRMS ALL DECISIONS MADE BY THE RESPONDENT JUDGES. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON: The problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of a statute, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein. It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequence