Subject: Oral Defamation or Slander

Crimes Against Honor: 1. A persons name, honor and reputation, is as sacred to him as his very life. Title 13 seeks to give protection thereto by defining certain acts injurious to a persons name and reputation as crimes and prescribing penalties therefore.

2. These crimes, which are in the nature of character assassination, are classified according to the manner of their commission into the following: a) Libel which is by making use of the mass media and literary forms or literary outlets b) Oral Defamation which is by the use of oral utterances c) Slander by Deed which is by performing an act intended to cast dishonor, disrespect or contempt upon a person d) Incriminatory machinations which may either be: (i) Incriminating an innocent person in the commission of a crime by planting evidence (ii) Intriguing against honor by resorting to any scheme, plot, design, but not by direct spoken words, to destroy the reputation of another

3. Elements common to crimes against honor a) That there be a matter, oral written or in whatever form, or of an act, which is defamatory to another b) That there is publicity of the defamatory matter c) That there be malice on the part of the accused d) That the person defamed is identifiable

4. The foregoing crimes cannot be committed by negligence because all require the element of malice.

5. Title 13, especially the article on libel constitutes another limitation to the freedom of speech and of the press as these two freedoms can not be allowed to be used to destroy the good name of an innocent person.

Kinds and Definition of Slander or Oral Defamation: Definition: Speaking of base and defamatory words that tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood.

Two kinds of oral or verbal defamation: (1) Grave Slander

(2) Simple Slander

A. Factors to consider: 1. The expression used including their sense, grammatical significance and accepted ordinary meaning 2. The personal relations of the accused and the offended party, as when both are bitter enemies 3. The special circumstances of the case and its antecedents, such as the time, place and occasion of the utterances, persons present 4. The social standing and position of the offended party

B. Words uttered in the heat of anger or in a quarrel, with some provocation on the part of the victim, is simple slander. > The victim may not have heard the words, it is enough that a third person heard them. > Words uttered in one occasion and place and directed at several persons not mentioned individually constitute only one offense. > Words used as expletives (to express anger, displeasure, are not defamatory)

Articles:

Art. 358. Slander. Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period if it is of a serious and insulting nature; otherwise, the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos.

Article 90. Prescription of crime. - Crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal shall prescribe in twenty years. Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years. Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the exception of those punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in five years. The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year. The crime of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months. Light offenses prescribe in two months. When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest penalty shall be made the basis of the application of the rules contained in the first, second and third paragraphs of this article. (As amended by Republic Act No. 4661, approved June 19, 1966.)

Cases: As cited in the case of Daniel Victorio and Exequiel Victorio v. The Hon. Court of Appeals and The People of the Philippines: To determine whether the offense committed is serious or slight oral defamation, the Court adopted the following guidelines:

. . . We are to be guided by a doctrine of ancient respectability that defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending upon, as Viada puts it, '...upon their sense and grammatical meaning judging them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time: ... Balite v. People, Ibid., quoting Viada, Codigo Penal, Quinta edicion, page 494).

Thus, in the same case cited where scurrilous words imputed to the offended party the crime of estafa, the Court ruled: The scurrilous words imputed to the offended party the crime estafa. The language of the indictment strikes deep into the character of the victim; He 'has sold the union; he 'has swindled the money of the vendees; he 'received bribe money in the amount of P10,000.00 ... and another P6,000.00'; He 'is engaged in racketeering and enriching himself with the capitalists'; He 'has spent the funds of the union for his personal use.' No amount of sophistry will take these statements out of the compass of grave oral defamation. They are serious and insulting. No circumstances need to be shown to upgrade the slander. . . .

In another case where a woman of violent temper hurled offensive and scurrilous epithets including words imputing unchastity against a respectable married lady and tending to injure the character of her young daughters, the Court ruled that the crime committed was grave slander: The language used by the defendant was deliberately applied by her to the complainant. The words were uttered with evident intent to injure complainant, to ruin her reputation, and to hold her in public contempt, for the sake of revenge. One who will thus seek to impute vice or immorality to another, the consequences of which might gravely prejudice the reputation of the person insulted, in this instance apparently an honorable and respectable lady and her young daughters, all prominent in social circles, deserves little judicial sympathy. Certainly, it is time for the courts to put the stamp of their disapproval on this practice of vile and loud slander. (U.S. v. Tolosa, 37 Phil. 166 [1917]).

In a case where the accused, a priest, called the offended party a gangster, in the middle of a sermon, the court affirmed the conviction of the accused for slight slander (People v. Arcand 68 Phil. 601 [1939]). There was no imputation of a crime nor a vice or immorality in said case.

In the instant case, appellant-petitioner admitted having uttered the defamatory words against Atty. Vivencio Ruiz. Among others he called Atty. Ruiz, "estapador", which attributes to the latter the crime of estafa, a serious and insulting imputation. As stated by the Court in Balite v. People, supra, "no amount of sophistry will take these statements out of the compass of grave oral defamation . . . No circumstances

need to be shown to upgrade the slander."

Defamatory words uttered specifically against a lawyer when touching on his profession are libelous per se. Thus, in Kleeberg v. Sipser (191 NY 845 [1934]), it was held that "where statements concerning plaintiff in his professional capacity as attorney are susceptible, in their ordinary meaning, of such construction as would tend to injure him in that capacity, they are libelous per se and (the) complaint, even in the absence of allegation of special damage, states cause of action." Oral statements that a certain lawyer is 'unethical,' or a false charge, dealing with office, trade, occupation, business or profession of a person charged, are slanderous per se (Kraushaar v. LaVin, 42 N.Y.S. 2d 857 [1943]; Mains v. Whiting 49 NW 559 [1891]; Greenburg v. De Salvo, 216 So. 2d 638 [1968]).

In Pollard v. Lyon (91 US 225 [1876]), the court there had occasion to divide oral slander, as a cause of action, into several classes, as follows: (1) Words falsely spoken of a person which impute to the party the commission of some criminal offense involving moral turpitude for which the party, if the charge is true, may be indicted and punished; (2) Words falsely spoken of a person which impute that the party is infected with some contagious disease, where, if the charge is true, it would exclude the party from society; (3) Defamatory words falsely spoken of a person which impute to the party unfitness to perform the duties of an office or employment, or the want of integrity in the discharge of the duties of such office or employment; (4) Defamatory words falsely spoken of a party which prejudice such party in his or her profession or trade; and (5) Defamatory words falsely spoken of a person, which, though not in themselves actionable, occasion the party special damage."

In the instant case, appellant-petitioner imputed the crime of estafa against a prominent lawyer one-time Justice of the Peace and member of the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, a professor of law and for sometime a president of the Nueva Ecija Bar Association. As the scurrilous imputation strikes deep into the character of the victim, no special circumstance need be shown for the defamatory words uttered to be considered grave oral defamation Balite v. People, supra. In addition, the fact that the offended party is a lawyer, the totality of such words as "kayabang", "tunaw ang utak", "swapang at estapador", imputed against him has the import of charging him with dishonesty or improper practice in the performance of his duties, hence, actionable per se. Petitioner argues that this Court in People v. Doronila (40 O.G. No. 15, Supp. 11, p. 231 [1941]) and People v. Modesto (40 O.G. No. 15, Supp. 11, p. 128 [1941]) ruled that defamatory words uttered in the heat of anger could only give rise to slight oral defamation (Rono, p. 13).

In Reyes vs. People, 14 we ruled that the expression "putang ina mo" is a common enough utterance in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slender but rather to express anger or displeasure. In fact, more often, it is just an expletive that punctuates one's expression of profanity. We do not find it seriously insulting that after a previous incident involving his father, a drunk Rogelio Pader on seeing Atty. Escolango would utter words expressing anger. Obviously, the intention was to show his feelings of resentment and not necessarily to insult the latter. Being a candidate running for vice mayor, occasional gestures and words of disapproval or dislike of his person are not uncommon.1wphi1.nt

In Cruz v. Court of Appeals,[30] petitioner and complainant, a Municipal Judge, were next door neighbors. Animosity grew between their two families because of some disputes. Petitioner resented the practice of complainant of throwing garbage and animal excrement into her premises. There was also a boundary dispute between petitioner's mother and complainant, which was the subject of a civil suit for "Recovery of Possession, Ownership, Enforcement of Legal Easement and Abatement of Nuisance" filed by the mother before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo against complainant. Additionally, petitioner's mother had previously instituted an administrative complaint against the complainant before the Supreme Court, but the same was dismissed. There was a pent-up feeling of being aggrieved, resentment, anger, and vexation on petitioner's part, culminating in her outburst against complainants. For having called the complainant judge "land grabber," "shameless" and "hypocrite," petitioner was charged and subsequently convicted by the Court of First Instance of three separate offenses of Grave Oral Defamation committed on 5, 6 and 8 August 1976. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the verdicts of conviction. On review, however, we held that although the abusive remarks may ordinarily be considered as serious defamation, under the environmental circumstances of the case, there having been provocation on complainant's part, and the utterances complained of having been made in the heat of unrestrained anger and obfuscation, petitioner is liable only for the crime of Slight Oral Defamation. Petitioner was sentenced to pay a fine of P200.00 in each of the criminal cases, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.