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Iraq Country Handbook

1. This handbook provides basic reference information on Iraq, including its geography, history, government, military forces, and communications and transportation networks. This information is intended to familiarize military personnel with local customs and area knowledge to assist them during their assignment to Iraq. 2. This product is published under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Defense Intelligence Production Program (DoDIPP) with the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity designated as the community coordinator for the Country Handbook Program. This product reflects the coordinated U.S. Defense Intelligence Community position on Iraq. 3. Dissemination and use of this publication is restricted to official military and government personnel from the United States of America, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, NATO member countries, and other countries as required and designated for support of coalition operations. 4. The photos and text reproduced herein have been extracted solely for research, comment, and information reporting, and are intended for fair use by designated personnel in their official duties, including local reproduction for training. Further dissemination of copyrighted material contained in this document, to include excerpts and graphics, is strictly prohibited under Title 17, U.S. Code.

CONTENTS
KEY FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . U.S. MISSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . U.S. Embassy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Travel Advisories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Entry Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Passport and Visa Requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . GEOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Geography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Boundaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Topography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Provinces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Climate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hydrology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Roads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Maritime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Radio and Television. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Telephone and Telegraph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Newspapers and Magazines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii 1 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 5 6 7 17 17 20 27 27 27 29 30 30 31 31 32 32

Contents (Continued) Satellites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Internet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CULTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Arabs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cultural History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Husseins Tribal Policies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Religious Identity of Ethnic Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Language. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Islam and the Arab Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sunni Arabs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Shia Arabs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Role of Tribes in Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tribes and the Iraqi State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Religious Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Alliances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Arab Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Baath Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Customs and Courtesies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cultural Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marsh Arabs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kurds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ethnic Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Religious Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Role of Tribes in Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rule of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Customs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Attitudes Toward Others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv 33 33 33 34 34 37 38 38 39 40 41 43 44 46 56 57 59 59 69 75 78 78 81 81 81 82 83 88 89 90 96

Contents (Continued) Turkmen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ethnic Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cultural History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Religious Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Social Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Modern Nation State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . State And Tribal Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Customs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Attitudes Toward Others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cultural Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cultural Geography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chaldeans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ethnic Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cultural History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Christianity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Religious Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Role of Tribes in Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Significant Alliances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Modern Nation-state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . State and Tribal Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Other Centers of Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Attitudes Toward Others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cultural Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cultural Geography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Assyrians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ethnic Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cultural History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v 98 98 98 100 100 101 101 102 103 104 107 109 109 109 109 110 111 112 112 112 112 113 114 114 115 116 119 121 122 123 123 123

Contents (Continued) Language. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Role of Tribes in Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Significant Alliances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Customs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Attitudes Toward Others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cultural Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cultural Geography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Shia Muslims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Religious Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Differences Within Shia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Proselytizing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Religious Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Shia Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Attitude Toward Others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Religious-Ethnic Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Militant Subgroups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sunni Muslims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Differences between Sunni and Shia Islam . . . . . . . . . . . . . Proselytizing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Religious Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Significant Historical Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Islam and Arabs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Militant Subgroups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MEDICAL ASSESSMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Disease Risks to Deployed Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Food- or Water-borne Diseases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Vector-borne Diseases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sexually Transmitted Diseases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Water Contact Diseases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Animal Contact Diseases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi 124 124 125 126 127 130 132 133 134 137 140 141 141 143 144 146 147 149 149 152 152 153 154 155 157 157 157 158 158 158 159

Contents (Continued) Medical Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Key Medical Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . HISTORY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chronology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ECONOMY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Economic Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Resources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Minerals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Non-Oil Industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Utilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Foreign Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance . . . . The Coalition Provisional Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Political Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Iraqi Governing Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Iraqi Government Ministries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Role of Islam in the Political History of Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . Religious Justification for the Political Use of Violence . . . Religious/Ethnic Identity and Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii 159 160 161 173 175 176 176 176 176 177 178 180 180 182 182 183 183 184 185 185 185 186 186 187 194 200 200 202 204

Contents (Continued) ARMED FORCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . New Iraqi Army. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Recruiting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207 207 209 210 211

APPENDICES
A. Equipment Recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1 B. Improvised Explosive Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1 C. International Time Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-1 D. Conversion Charts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-1 E. Holidays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-1 F. Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F-1 G.International Road Signs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-1 H. Arabic Road Signs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . H-1 I. Deployed Personnels Guide to Health Maintenance . . . . . . . . . I-1 J. Individual Protective Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J-1 K. Dangerous Animals and Plants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . K-1 L. International Telephone Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L-1 M. Identification Card Guide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . M-1 N. Political Groups, Religious Groups, and Tribes . . . . . . . . . . . . N-1 O. Developing Effective Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . O-1

ILLUSTRATIONS
Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National Flag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Topography and Drainage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Provinces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii x 1 6 8

Contents (Continued) Population Density . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Swords at Baghdad Entrance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Urban Neighborhood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Baghdad and Al Basrah Weather . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mosul and As Sulaymaniyah Weather . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Water Catchment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Irrigation Pump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Barrage at Al Kut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bus Service in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Transportation Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Railroad Station Re-opening Ceremony at Umm Qasr, 2003 . . . . Baghdad Airport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Iraqi Arab . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Shepherds in Al Kut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tribes in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Street in Baghdad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Iraqi Marketplace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bedouin Family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Iraqi Farm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Shia Pilgrimage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mosque in Baghdad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Presidential Palace, Baghdad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Oil Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Natural Salt Bed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Major Industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Land Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Coalition Provisional Authority Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Coalition Provisional Authority Organization Directorship. . . . . . Coalition Provisional Authority Organization Directorship, Cont. Squad Tactics Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Officer Candidate Training. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix 11 13 15 18 19 21 23 25 27 28 29 30 40 44 45 47 52 58 74 139 150 164 177 178 179 181 188 189 190 207 208

TURKEY
Dahuk

IRAQ
International Boundary National Capital Major Roads Railroads

Mosul

Irbil

Karkuk

SYRIA
is Tigr
Euphrates

As Sulaymaniyah

Nahr

Diyala

r ve Ri

Samarra

IRAN
Ar Ramadi

BAGHDAD
Babil Karbala An Hillah Al Kut An Najaf Ad Diwaniyah Al Amarah

JORDAN

An Nasiriyah

Al Basrah

CANADA
Lansing Indianapolis Buffalo Pittsburgh WASHINGTON D.C. Raleigh

Lexington

SAUDI ARABIA
Boundary representations are not necessarily authoritative.

KUWAIT

KUWAIT Arabian Gulf

Iraq

KEY FACTS
Official Name. Conventional short form: Iraq Conventional long form: Republic of Iraq Local long form: Al Jumhuriyah al Iraqiyah Local short form: Al Iraq Flag. Three equal horizontal bands of red (top), white, and black with three green stars in a horizontal line centered in the white band; the phrase Allahu Akbar (God is Great) in green Arabic script was added in January 1991 during the 1990-91 Gulf War; similar to the flag of Syria that has two stars but no script and the flag of Yemen that has a plain white band; also similar to the flag of Egypt that has a symbolic eagle centered in the white band. Chief of State. No current chief of state Capital. Baghdad Time Zone. UTC (Formerly GMT) +3 hrs; EST+8 Population. 23,332,000 Language. Arabic (81 percent); also Kurdish, Assyrian, Armenian

National Flag

Currency. As of 15 October 2003 new bank notes are being used. Current bank notes will be accepted at full value until the exchange is complete. One former Iraqi dinar can be exchanged for one new Iraqi dinar; one former national dinar ("Swiss dinar" as used in some of the northern areas) can be exchanged for 150 new Iraqi dinars. Exchange rates. There is no current data for the exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and the Iraqi dinar.

U.S. MISSION
U.S. Embassy
The U.S. interest section at the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Baghdad is closed. No consular services are available for U.S. citizens in Iraq at this time. Because police and civil structures are in the process of being rebuilt, U.S. citizens may have little recourse to these entities in emergency situations. The Office of the Coalition Provisional Authority is responsible of the governance of Iraq and the overall administration of reconstruction efforts. They can be reached at the following address: Office of the Coalition Provisional Authority 2000 Defense Pentagon (Room 2C148) Washington D.C. 20301 Additional contact information for the reconstruction of Iraq may be obtained from the following points of contact: U.S. Department of Commerce, Iraq Business Outreach Hotline Tel: 1-866-352-4727; Fax: 1-202-482-0980 E-mail: Iraqinfo@mail.doc.gov Web: www.export.gov/iraq

U.S. Foreign Commercial Service, American Embassy, Kuwait Tel: 965-539-5307/8, ext. 2392 Fax: 965-538-0281 E-mail: Kuwait.City.Office.Box@mail.doc.gov Web: www.buyusa.gov/kuwait/en/ U.S. Foreign Commercial Service, American Embassy, Jordan Tel: 962-6-592-0101, ext. 2632 Fax: 962-6-592-0146 E-mail: ammanoffice.box@mail.doc.gov Web: www.buyusa.gov/jordan/en/ U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security Export Counseling Division Tel: 202-482-4811 Web: www.bis.doc.gov U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Department of Defense Iraq contract hotline Tel: 1-866-461-5171 Web: www.hq.usace.army.mil/cepa/iraq/contracts.htm

Travel Advisories
Iraq remains a dangerous place and the security conditions remain unstable. There is a new category of exemptions to restrictions on the use of U.S. passports for travel to Iraq. The U.S. government urges all U.S. citizens to avoid travel to Iraq. While Coalition forces are working with the Iraqi people to provide security and restore basic services, and conditions are stabilizing, some areas remain unsettled.

Entry Requirements Passport and Visa Requirements


U.S. passports are not valid for travel to, in or through Iraq, unless they are validated by the Department of State. There are limited exceptions 3

for American professional reporters and journalists on assignment in Iraq, certain persons providing humanitarian and other critical services in support of the Iraqi people, or U.S. Government personnel and contractors on official assignment in Iraq. There are also limited exceptions for U.S. citizens residing in Iraq since 1 February 1991. For further information, please contact: Deputy Assistant Secretary for Passport Services U.S. Department of State 2401 E St., NW, 9th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20522-0907 Attention: Office of Passport Policy and Advisory Services Telephone: (202) 663-2662 Fax: (202) 633-2654 Updated information on travel and security in Iraq may be obtained from the Department of State by calling 1-888-407-4747 within the United States, and, from overseas, 1-317-472-2328. U.S. citizens who plan to travel to or remain in Iraq despite this travel warning should contact the Department of States latest consular information sheet for Iraq and the Worldwide Caution Public Announcement, which are available on the Departments Internet site at http://travel.state.gov.

GEOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE


Geography
Iraqs 435,292 square kilometers (168,023 square miles), is slightly larger than California. It has 56 kilometers (36 miles) of coastline.

Boundaries
Iraq is bordered to the north by Turkey (331 kilometers), to the east by Iran (1,458 kilometers), the south by Kuwait (240 kilometers) and the Arabian Gulf (58 kilometers), and to the west by Saudi Arabia (686 kilometers), Jordan (134 kilometers), and Syria (605 kilometers). 4

Cities
The following is a list of Iraqs largest cities and their populations. The spellings of some cities may vary slightly in other publications due to different translations and dialects. City Al Basrah Umm Qasr Safwan Az Zubayr As Samawah An Nasiriyah Al Amarah An Najaf Al Kufah Al Hillah Karbala Al Kut Ad Diwaniyah Baqubah Al Qaim Ar Rutbah Ar Ramadi Fallujah Baghdad Samarra Tikrit Irbil Sulaymaniyah Kirkuk Dahuk Mosul Tallafar Region South East South East South East South East South East South East South East South Central South Central South Central South Central South Central South Central Central Central Central Central Central Central North North North North North North North North 5 Governate Al Basrah Al Basrah Al Basrah Al Basrah Al Muthanna Dhi Qar Maysan An Najaf An Najaf Babil Karbala Wassit Al Qadisuyah Diyala Al Anbar Al Anbar Al Anbar Al Anbar Baghdad Salah ad Din Salah ad Din Irbil Sulaymaniyah At Ta min Dahuk Ninawa Ninawa Population 1,337,000 45,000 40,000 174,200 128,000 560,200 351,100 585,600 119,100 548,000 572,300 400,300 443,500 295,600 80,000 18,000 445,800 269,500 5,772,000 207,700 28,000 864,900 662,600 755,700 48,800 1,739,800 161,400

Topography
The delta lowland region of the Nahr Dijlah (Tigris River) and Euphrates river basin extends southeasterly from north of Baghdad to the Arabian Gulf. The area is flat and encompasses 19,425 square kilometers (7,500 square miles) of marshland. There are lakes in southeastern Iraq. The southwest desert region is an extension of the Arabian Peninsula. It comprises half of Iraqs total area but is home to only 1 percent of the
TURKEY

IRAQ
ELEVATION IN METERS
Dahuk

Mosul

Irbil

Zab
As Sulaymaniyah

SYRIA
Eup hra tes

tle Lit

Kirkuk

3000+ 2000-3000 1000-2000 500-1000 200-500 0-200 Rivers Seasonal rivers

Gr ea tZ ab

Samarra

hr Na

Diy ala

is Tigr

IRAN

Ar Ramadi

JORDAN

SYRIAN DESERT

Karbala

BAGHDAD Riv er
An Hillah Ad Diwaniyah Al Kut Al Amarah

An Najaf

Eup hrat es

AL

HA

An Nasiriyah

SAUDI ARABIA

JAR

AH

Hawr al Hammar Al Basrah

KUWAIT
Boundary representations are not necessarily authoritative.

KUWAIT

Arabian Gulf

Topography and Drainage 6

population. This arid steppe region extends into Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Sparsely inhabited by nomads, the region consists of a wide, stony plain interspersed with a few sandy stretches. A wide pattern of wadis runs from the border to the Euphrates. Some wadis are more than 400 kilometers-long; they flood during the winter rains. The northeastern region borders Turkey to the north and elevation increases toward Iran. The region transitions from rolling plateaus nearest Turkey to irregular hills and then to mountain ridges (the Zagros Mountains), where summits average 2,440 meters (8,000 feet) elevation. Except for a few valleys, the mountain area is used only for livestock grazing in the foothills and steppes. The soil and rainfall, however, make cultivation possible. The oil fields near Mosul and Kirkuk are in the northeast region. An uplands region between the Tigris and the Euphrates Rivers is known as Al Jazirah. It extends westward into Syria, between the two rivers, and into Turkey. Water in the area flows in deep valleys, and irrigation is more difficult than in the lower plain. Much of this zone may be classified as desert.

Provinces
There are 18 Provinces in Iraq. The following briefly describes each. Al Anbar The capital of al-Anbar is Ar-Ramadi. The province lies on the Euphrates River just northwest of Hawr (Lake) al-Habbaniyah. Ancient settlements existed in the vicinity, but Ar-Ramadi was founded in 1869 to encourage settlement by the nomadic Dulaym tribes, a goal that has been partially fulfilled. The town prospered after becoming the departure point of a trade route. Population 818,000. Al Basrah With 1.3 million people, Basrah is the second largest city in Iraq. Located on the Shatt Al-Arab River and close to the Persian Gulf, Bas7

TURKEY DAHUK
Dahuk

Mosul

IRBIL
Irbil As Sulaymaniyah Kirkuk

NINAWA

SYRIA
Euphrates SALAH AD DIN

AT TA MIN
r ive is R Tigr

AS SULAYMANIYAH

Nahr

Diyala

IRAN
DIYALA

Samarra

Ar Ramadi

BAGHDAD

AL ANBAR
JORDAN

BAGHDAD WASIT
BABIL Karbala An KARBALA Hillah An Najaf Al Kut

Ad Diwaniyah AL QADISIYAH

MAYSAN
Al Amarah

AN NAJAF

DIN GAR
An Nasiriyah

AL BASRAH

IRAQ
International Boundary National Capital Province Boundary Province Capital

AL MUTHANA

Al Basrah

KUWAIT

SAUDI ARABIA
Boundary representations not necessarily authoritative.

KUWAIT

Arabian Gulf

Provinces rah is Iraqs primary port. It was founded on the site of a great military camp of the second Caliph Omar Bin al-Khatab and grew to be a center of maritime commerce and trade. The city prospered between the 9th and 13th centuries under the Abbasids, becoming a famous cultural center. Basrah continued to be an important trade center during the Ottoman period, and was one of the provincial capitals in Iraq. Because of its cosmopolitan nature, Basrah was home to significant Iraqi nationalist opposition to Ottoman rule in the early 20th century. Basrah Province is 8

predominantly Shia, and was the initial site of Shia rebellion immediately following the 1991 Gulf War. Al Muthana Samawah is the major city of Muthana Province (the smallest province in terms of population). Muthana is located in the Euphrates River valley between Baghdad and Nasiriyah. The people of this region are mostly Shiite Muslims. The major industry is agriculture, but there are also several cement factories in Samawah. Muthana is home to the ancient Sumerian city of Uruk (Warka) located 20 kilometers east of Samawah. The city has been inhabited since 4,000 B.C. and is said to have developed the first system of writing. The population of Samawah is approximately 125,000. Al Qadisiyah Diwaniyah, a city some 180 kilometers south of Baghdad, is the administrative center of Al-Qadisiyah governate. Located in central Iraq, on a branch of the Euphrates River and on the Baghdad-Basrah railroad, it is a marketplace for dates and grains. Nippur lies 35 kilometers to the northeast of Diwaniyah, Nippur has yielded antiquities that span the Sumerian and Babylonian periods, up to Abbasid times. It was a large city, neatly divided by the Euphrates. On the east side is the temple area, which held the ziggurat (palacial home of the gods) and the temple of Inlil, considered the God of the wind and creator of the universe. Population is 421,000. An Najaf An Najaf city and market center in southern Iraq is the capital of An Najaf governate, situated on the western branch of the Euphrates River. The caliph Harun al-Rashid founded the city in the 8th century. His tomb is now a principal shrine of Shia Muslims. An Islamic holy city, Najaf is home to the shrine of Imam Ali Ibn Abi Talib, the Prophet Mohammads cousin and son-in-law and fourth caliph. Najaf also contains one of the largest cemeteries in the world. According to Imam Ali, 9

any Muslim buried here will enter paradise; as a result, the tombs of several prophets are found in Najaf. Shia Muslims especially consider it a privilege to be buried here. Like Karbala, Najaf became an important center of Islamic scholarship and theology. During his exile from Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini lived here for 12 years prior to the 1979 revolution in Iran. In 1999, the Iraqi Shia leader Ayatollah Mohammad Sadiq alSadr was assassinated in Najaf, sparking clashes between Shia and the Iraqi government. Nearby is the city of Al Kfah (founded 638), formerly a great cultural center and a capital of the Abbasid caliphate. An Najaf governate was created in 1976 from parts of two others: Al Qadisiyah and Karbala. Population 563,000. Sulaymaniyah Located in northeastern Iraq, Sulaymaniyah is the capital of the governate with the same name, and is part of the Kurdish Autonomous Region. Sulaymaniyah is predominantly a Kurdish city, and has been a center for Kurdish nationalism. The economy of Sulaymaniyah is based on regional farming, for which Sulaymaniyah is the trade and administrative center. Produce includes tobacco, fruit, cereals and livestock. There is a tobacco-processing plant in town. Products are sold to other parts of Iraq, as well as to Iran. Sulaymaniyah has long been a popular tourist destination among Iraqis, because of the fresh and cool mountain air in the summer. Population 640,000 At Tamin Located in northern Iraq, the capital city of the At Tamin province is Kirkuk, the center of Iraq's oil industry, which is connected by pipelines to ports on the Mediterranean Sea. There is a small textile industry in the province. Kirkuk is built on the remains of a settlement from 3,000 B.C. The majority of the inhabitants are Turkmen with Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians and Armenians also represented. The At Tamin region, rich in oil fields and farmlands, has been one of the principal obstacles to finding a peaceful solution to Kurdish hopes for autonomy in Iraq. To ensure Arab control of the oil fields, successive governments in Bagh10

dad have implemented a policy of deliberate Arabization of the city. The Kurdish Democratic Party (KUP), the more powerful of the two Kurdish groups that control parts of northern Iraq, is determined to make Kirkuk the political capital of a Kurdish federal state in a post-Hussein Iraq. The KDP has drafted an Iraqi constitution outlining such a state, with Kirkuk as its most important city. Turkey opposes Kurdish control of Kirkuk, fearing it would strengthen regional moves toward Kurdish autonomy. Claiming to be the oldest site of continuous occupation in

Mosul

Gr ea tZ ab

Irbil Kirkuk As Sulaymaniyah

is Tigr

tes ra ph Eu
Ar Ramadi

BAGHDAD

r ve Ri

An Najaf

Al Amarah

POPULATED PLACES 4,649,000 250,000 - 650,000 125,000 - 250,000 0 0 25 50 75 175 5,238

An Nasiriyah Hawr al Hammar Al Basrah

65 129 194 453 13,566 Persons per square mile Based on 1987 census data, by first-level administrative division. For comparison, the population density for the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area is 920 persons per square mile.

Boundary representations are not necessarily authoritative.

Population Density 11

Iraq, Kirkuk sits on archaeological remains that are 5,000 years old. It reached great importance under the Assyrians in the 10th and 11th centuries B.C. Because Kirkuk is one of the centers of Kurdish national identity, both the KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) claim it as their regional capital. The area around Kirkuk and south to Khanaqin is the preserve of the Faili Kurds, who, unlike the majority of Kurds, are Shia. Many of the Faili Kurds belong to the PUK. Babil The Babil governate is located south of Baghdad with the city of Al Hillah as its capital. Al Hillah has about 520,000 inhabitants. Al Hillah is situated in the center of a large irrigated area in which dates, barley, rice, wheat, millet, sesame, and beans are grown. It lies on the Al Hillah stream, the eastern branch of the Euphrates River about 100 kilometers south of Baghdad. The economy of Al Hillah is based on its river port and grain market. Al Hillah lies in an area that has been most significant in Iraqi and Mesopotamian history. The city was built in 1101, partly from the bricks from the nearby ruins of Babylon. Kush and Borsippa are other cities of ancient ruins in the nearby area. Baghdad Iraqs capital, Baghdad, was founded in the 8th century following an Arab victory over a larger Persian army in 762 AD. Baghdad was the seat of the Abbasid caliphate from the 9th to the 13th centuries. During this era, it became the center of Islamic learning and international trade. Modern Iraqis proudly look back to this period as the golden age of Islamic civilization. Baghdad was one of the three seats of provincial Ottoman rule, and was maintained as a Sunni buffer against the Shia Safavid Empire in Iran. With more than 5 million people, Baghdad is the largest and most diverse city in Iraq. It is approximately 70 percent Shia. It is home to many significant religious and cultural sites dating to the Abbasid period, including shrines of Imams such as Sheikh al-Ghailani, who established the Sufi order al-Qadiriya, and Imam al-A'dham, who developed Islamic jurisprudence. As the leading manufacturing city of 12

Swords at Baghdad Entrance Iraq, the city has numerous oil refineries, food-processing plants, tanneries, and textile mills. The oil boom of the 1970s brought wealth to Baghdad, and the city was developed on an impressive scale. The city stretches along both banks of the Tigris, with the district of Rusafah on the east and the district of Karkh on the west. Eleven bridges connect the two halves of the city. There are many old mosques in the city, such as the Al Khulafa Mosque and Liberty Memorial Fountain Mosque. Dahuk The capital city of Dahuk province is Dahuk, also spelled Dohuk, or Dhok, town, northern Iraq, in the Kurdish Autonomous Region. The town lies near the northern end of the Tigris River Valley. The area in which the town is situated is unsuitable for cultivation but is good for fruit orchards and pasturage. Dahuk has a fruit-canning plant and a textile mill. There has been recent building of new tourist resorts and improvement to existing ones. 13

Dhi Qar Traditionally a farm market center, An Nasiriyah, the capital of Dhi Qar governate, is between Al Basrah and Al Kut and marks the western point of a 16,000-square-kilometer- (6,000-square-mile-) triangle of marshlands between the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. The population is 560,000. Diyala The capital city in the Diyala Province is Baquaba. Located in east-central Iraq, on the Diyala River and on a road and a rail line between Baghdad and Iran, it is a regional trade center for agricultural produce and livestock. The name comes from the Aramaic Baya quba, meaning Jacob's house. The town is located on the site of a settlement dating back to preIslamic times. Under the Abbasid caliphate, it was a prosperous town. Irbil The capital city of Irbil province is Irbil, also spelled as Erbil and Arbil. It is located in northern Iraq, 77 kilometers (48 miles) east of Mosul in the foothills of the mountains that rise to the east. It is a trade center for agricultural produce. A rail terminus, it is also linked by roads to Turkey, Syria, and Iran. It is one of the oldest continuously inhabited towns in the world. With a population of 743,000 people, Irbil encompasses a land area of 14,471 square kilometers. Karbala Karbala is a city in central Iraq and is the capital of the Karbala Province, on the edge of the Syrian Desert. It is connected to the Hindiyah branch of the Euphrates River by canal. The chief industries include the manufacture of religious goods, textiles, shoes, cement and food processing. Karbala is a holy city for Iraqi Shia because it holds the shrine of the martyred Imam Husayn ibn Ali, whose death here in 680 and the subsequent conflict over succession of the caliphate distinguished the Shia from the Sunni sects of Islam. Karbala is also the site of the holy shrine to Husayns brother, Abbas, who was martyred in the same battle. 14

Urban Neighborhood Shia make pilgrimages (called the Ashura) to Karbala twice a year to commemorate Husayns death on the 10th day of the Muslim month of Muharram and 40 days later in the month of Safar. Husseins regime attempted to prevent Shia pilgrims from entering the city, causing tension. Because of its shrines, Karbala became an significant center of Islamic learning and theology. Population 563,000. Maysan The capital of Maysan province is Al Amarah, the 14th largest city in Iraq. It is located in southeastern Iraq approximately 290 kilometers east-southeast of Baghdad and 155 kilometers north-northwest of Al Basrah. Al Amarah is bisected by the Tigris River and has developed along (and outward) from the riverbanks. Agriculture is the primary industry in the region. The estimated 1998 population within 10 kilometers of Al Amarah is 225,800. It is believed the majority (approximately 60 percent) of the population is Shia Arab. There also may be two minority groups who have lived in the study area: the Marsh Arabs (Maadan) and Mandeans. 15

Ninawa The capital city of Ninawa province is Mosul (Arabic, Al-mawsil) in northwestern Iraq. It lies on the right bank of the Tigris River across from the ruins of the ancient Assyrian city of Nineveh, 362 kilometers (225 miles) northwest of Baghdad. Mosul is Iraqs third largest city and constitutes the chief commercial center of the northwestern portion of the country. The largest city in the Iraqi Kurdish region, Mosul is predominantly Kurdish with a sizeable Turkmen minority. The Yazidi sect is most numerous in the surrounding mountainous area. Mosul also has the largest number of Iraqi Christians of any Iraqi city, including Nestorians, Jacobites, Catholics and Chaldeans. There are churches in Mosul that are historically and culturally significant for several of these Christian sects. With a rich ancient Assyrian history, Mosul is a historically important trade center linking Persia and the Mediterranean. In the 8th century, Mosul became the principal city of northern Mesopotamia under the early Muslim Abbasid dynasty. In the Ottoman period, it was one of the provincial seats of administration. Population 1,700,000. Salah Ad Din Tikrit is the capital city of this province, with about 100,000 inhabitants, about 160 kilometers northwest of Baghdad, on the Tigris River. Tikrit is the hometown of Saddam Hussein, and its significance in his regime has been substantial, as Hussein has recruited many of his closest allies and leaders of the national bureaucracy from the Tikriti clan. Moreover, the city contains many prominent schools and official buildings. This area is the site of concentrated anti-Coalition activity, given its close ties to Husseins regime. Wasit The capital city of Wasit province is Al Kut, located in southeastern Iraq, approximately 190 kilometers east-southeast of Baghdad and 240 kilometers northwest of Al Basrah. Al Kut is bisected by the Tigris, with the majority of the town on a bend on the north side of the river. Agri16

culture is the primary industry in the region. It is believed the majority (approximately 60 percent) of the population is Shia Arab. There also may be a minority of Sunni Arabs concentrated in the urban areas.

Climate
The extremely hot, dry, clear summer months last from May through October, and produce maximum daytime temperatures that reach 40 C (100 F), usually varying between 31 C (88 F) and 34 C (93 F). Temperatures are cooler in the northeast highlands. The summer months also feature strong winds and sandstorms. Baghdad averages five dust storms each month during July. During the winter, the mean daily maximum temperature is 17 C (64 F); however, temperatures are colder in the highlands. Ninety percent of Iraqs rain falls between November and April. Most of that falls between December and March. The remaining 6 months, particularly June through August, are dry. Precipitation is highest in the northeast highlands. The area receives 760 to 1,000 millimeters (30 to 40 inches) of rain annually and snow up to 3 months per year in some places. Mean annual rainfall ranges between 100 and 170 millimeters elsewhere in the country. The summer months also feature two types of wind. The southerly and southeasterly sharqi is a dry, dusty wind with occasional gusts of 80 kilometers per hour that occurs from April to early June and again from late September through November. From mid-June to mid-September, the prevailing wind is called the shamal; it is a steady wind that blows from the north and northeast. The arid air brought by the shamal allows the sun to heat the land surface, but the constant breeze has some cooling effect.

Environment
Iraq's infrastructure, greatly damaged during the 1990-91 Gulf War and to a lesser extent, during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) in 2003, fails to meet basic sanitation and environmental health needs. More than half the population obtains water from polluted sources. 17

TEMPERATURE

ELEVATION: 112 FT 15

BAGHDAD

PRECIPITATION
Snow Rain

150

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90

10 D A Y S 5

60

30

Extreme High Average High Average Low Extreme Low

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AL BASRAH
o

ELEVATION: 7 FT

TEMPERATURE
15

PRECIPITATION
Snow Rain

150

120

90

D 10 A Y S

60 5 30
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0 J F M A M J J A S O N D

Baghdad and Al Basrah Weather 18

TEMPERATURE

ELEVATION: 732 FT 15

MOSUL

PRECIPITATION
Snow Rain

150

120

90

10 D A Y S 5

60

30

Extreme High Average High Average Low Extreme Low

0 J F M A M J J A S O N D

0 J F M A M J J A S O N D

AS SULAYMANIYAH
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ELEVATION: 2,799 FT

TEMPERATURE
15

PRECIPITATION
Snow Rain

120

100

80 D 10 A Y S

60

40
Extreme High Average High Average Low Extreme Low

20

0 J F M A M J J A S O N D

0 J F M A M J J A S O N D

Mosul and As Sulaymaniyah Weather 19

Many people are displaced due to housing shortages in Baghdad, Basrah and Mosul. There is also a significant risk of exposure to extreme heat, intense sunlight, blowing dust, scarce water, and large quantities of unexploded ordnance in the desert. Summer temperatures exceeding 43 C (109 F) contribute to heat stress in unacclimated individuals. Dust storms occur in all but the mountainous regions in the northeast. Severe cold and low barometric pressures in the northeast mountains present risks of cold injuries and mountain sickness. Air, water, and soil pollution from industrial and domestic sources also present risk.

Hydrology
Iraqi hydrology, which examines how water is managed in the country, is a critical issue that received much attention during OIF. The Tigris and Euphrates Rivers are the life-blood of Iraq, providing the necessary water to sustain the urban population and support agriculture in a predominantly arid climate. During OIF, coalition leaders were concerned that Husseins regime might purposefully flood areas of the country to deny avenues of approach to Baghdad from the south. Though the regime did not pursue this course of action, the significance of the Iraqi hydrologic system was highlighted because of the potentially disastrous consequences of this course of action or the systems failure. A comprehensive engineering plan was initiated in the 1950s to better regulate spring floods and maximize the irrigated arable lands along both rivers. This successful effort (completed in 1984) provided a sophisticated hydrologic network of man-made structures and channels that stored and distributed water. Since that time, two major initiatives have had a dramatic impact on the hydrologic network in Iraq. First, a number of dams have been constructed in Turkey to store water for irrigation. This has significantly reduced the flow of water entering Iraq, especially from the Euphrates. 20

Water Catchment Second, following the Gulf War in 1991 and the ensuing civil unrest of the Shiites, Saddam Husseins regime implemented an aggressive plan to drain the Mesopotamian marshlands (an area larger than the Florida Everglades). As a result, 90 percent of the original wetlands were eliminated, leaving a barren salty crust. While an Iraqi inundation plan was never executed during OIF, the full understanding of Iraqs water system proved instrumental during all phases of the military operation and for post-war planning both short and long term. The following provides specific information on each river and potential hydrologic issues that may require further review and action in the future. Tigris River Of the twin rivers (the Tigris and Euphrates), Iraq exercises the greatest control over the Tigris. More than 1,500 of its 1,900 kilometers (80 percent) run through Iraq. Of even greater significance, nearly 60 percent of the fresh water inflow enters the Tigris through tributaries that collect runoff within Iraq from the Zagros Mountain range. 21

Crossing the Turkish border, the Tigris maintains a fairly constant slope (36 kilometers) and stable course through soft bedrock for approximately 500 kilometers. Mosul and Tikrit lie along this segment. At the city of Balad near the confluence with the Adhaim River, the slope decreases significantly (6-8 kilometers) and extends into a relatively flat terrain characterized by large meanders. The cities of Baghdad and Al Kut lie within this natural alluvial floodplain of the river. The average flow rate of the Tigris is approximately 1,500 cumecs. Beyond Al Kut, the Tigris joins the Euphrates at Al Qurnah. Beyond Al Qurnah, the combined flow of the twin rivers forms the Shatt al Arab that flows through Al Basrah and into the Persian Gulf at Al Faw. Rainfall from December through March, combined with the ensuing snowmelt from March through May, has resulted in significant flooding in the past. For example, from 1945 to 1954 the Tigris overflowed its banks near Baghdad 8 of the 10 years. In 1955, the completion of the Tharthar project allowed floodwaters to be diverted at Samarra, thus greatly reducing the flood vulnerability of Baghdad. The diverted flood waters are directed into the Tharthar Reservoir, built over a natural land depression, with an enormous total storage capacity of 85 billion cubic meters (BCM). Dams were added to further control and store water along the Tigris River and its tributaries. These dams are listed in order from the Turkish border downstream, and include the gross storage capacity:
I I I I I

The Mosul Dam, completed in 1986, storage of 11.1 BCM; Dokan, located along the Lesser Zab River tributary (completed in 1961; storage 6.8 BCM); The Al Azim, located along the Adhaim River (completed in 1998; storage 3.5 BCM); The Derbendikhan, located along the Diyala River tributary (completed in 1962; storage 3.0 BCM); and The Hamrin, also located along the Diyala River tributary (completed in 1980; storage 3.9 BCM). 22

The combined storage of 28 BCM from these dams, combined with the water diversion capability of Tharthar, has all but eliminated spring flooding along the Tigris. The controlled release of the spring water storage is used for irrigation during the dry season from June through mid-October. In addition, all these dams provide hydroelectric power. Euphrates River The Euphrates extends 2,700 kilometers from its headwaters in Turkey. Only 1,000 kilometers of the river lie within Iraqs borders. In stark contrast to the Tigris, there is no natural fresh water inflow into the Euphrates within Iraq. Approximately 85 percent of the inflow occurs within Turkey, and the remaining 15 percent within Syria. The Euphrates maintains a constant slope (30 cm/km) and course over 400 kilometers from the Syrian border to the City of Ramadi. There is a dramatic slope change (3-6 cm/km) into a flat alluvial plain for the

Irrigation Pump 23

remaining 600 kilometers. Downstream of this break, the slope is even smaller than the Tigris, and south of Al Hillah (elevation 32 meters MSL), the river is characterized by a braided structure of several channels that rejoin to form a main channel at Samawah. The construction of dams within Turkey has greatly reduced the threat of flooding along the Euphrates within Iraq. However, these upstream structures outside Iraqi control have also reduced the available water required to support agriculture. In fact, the flow of the Euphrates was reduced to a trickle in Iraq for 30 days in the early 1990s, in order for Turkey to accelerate the filling of a new high storage capacity reservoir (49 BCM) formed by the Ataturk Dam completed in 1990. Similar to the Tharthar diversion, water can be diverted if necessary from the Euphrates into two reservoirs, both constructed over natural land depressions. Through a control structure at Ramadi, water can be diverted into the Habbiniyah Reservoir. Upon reaching its fill capacity of 3.3 BCM, water can then be directed into the larger Milh Reservoir (capacity of 25 BCM) located just west of Karbala. Only one major dam exists along the Euphrates within Iraq. The Haditha Dam (completed in 1984) provides a storage capacity of 8.2 BCM in the Qadisiyah Reservoir. Located 120 kilometers from the Syrian border, this dam provides hydroelectric power to western Iraq. Other Hydrologic Control Features Two historic water control structures remain in place and are still functioning as designed. The Hindiya Barrage was constructed in 1911-1914 to raise the water level for irrigating upstream areas of land in the vicinity of Hillah and Greater Mussaiyab. Another major barrage was added in 1939 at Al Kut along the Tigris River. This structure continues to provide a means to regulate flow through the Shatt al Gharraf and Dujailah channels to support major agricultural areas south and east of Al Kut. Construction of a major drainage canal known as the Main Outfall Drain (MOD), between the Euphrates and Tigris, was started in 1953. This 24

Barrage at Al Kut project was initially designed to drain the high saline content from irrigated agricultural lands in the Mesopotamian valley. Finally completed in 1992 and renamed the Saddam River, the canal not only was used for irrigation drainage, but also as a means to divert the Euphrates River in order to drain the Central and Hammar Marshlands. In the early 1990s, The Fifth River, (Qadissiyah River) was also completed, which diverted water from the Euphrates River into the Sulaybiyat Depression. With a storage capacity of 2.7 BCM, this natural storage depression provided a means to reduce flow rates in the Euphrates during the required interconnection construction with the Saddam River east of An Nasiriyah. Furthermore, it provided a means to create a dry working environment for the construction of a levee system along the banks of the Euphrates, ultimately sealing the fate of the marshlands by completely halting any water exchange from the river. To accelerate the marsh drainage, a second canal, named the Mother of Battles (MOB) River, was completed in 1994. The marsh diversion 25

effort was completed in 1997 with the Loyality to the Leader canal, extending the MOB to Al Basrah. Future Hydrologic Issues The restoration of the drained marshlands represents a humanitarian act of goodwill to re-establish a major ecologic system and perhaps reestablish a lost homeland to thousands of Shiites. However, it is unclear whether the dried salty crust can be returned to the dense reed grasses. Simply diverting water back to the marsh by removing the lower Euphrates levee system and stopping the flow along the MOB is not sufficient. The Hussein regime also constructed numerous levees within the marsh itself to accelerate the evaporation process. A significant amount of earthwork will be required to re-establish the free flow of water through the original marshlands. Of more immediate concern is the state of the hydrologic infrastructure. Following the 1991 Gulf War and subsequent trade sanctions, equipment was difficult to maintain and repair due to the scarcity of spare parts. The freshwater and wastewater treatment facilities designed in the mid 1980s within Baghdad are incapable of supporting the growing population and must be updated. The dams must be maintained to ensure the safety, and to ensure sufficient water is available for irrigation. The structure of greatest concern is the Mosul Dam on the Tigris River, which requires daily grouting within the dam core to mitigate a documented leakage problem. Failure of this dam would result in significant flooding within hours at Mosul, with impacts extending as far downstream as Baghdad. The upstream water control by Turkey, and to a lesser degree, Syria, represents a potentially significant negative hydrologic impact on Iraq. The cumulative impact of the construction of more than 30 large dams, particularly those recently built in Turkey under the Southeast Anatolia Project, have been enormous. The storage capacity of dams on the Euphrates is five times greater than the rivers annual flow. The trend of 26

more human control is evident as at least 20 more dams are planned or under construction. Iraq and its neighbors must address water management and control issues to avoid potential conflicts.

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION


Transportation Roads
A major highway network consisting of 45,550 kilometers (38,400 kilometers paved and 7,150 kilometers unpaved) was constructed to allow troop and supply movement during the Iran-Iraq war. After the conclusion of the first Gulf War, the Hussein regime largely neglected maintenance of the network, resulting in slight degradation of the highway infrastructure. OIF did not inflict substantial damage on the overall road network. Some overpasses were damaged, but repairs are underway.

Bus Service in Iraq 27

TURKEY
Dahuk

Mosul

Irbil Kirkuk

SYRIA
Euphrates

As Sulaymaniyah

Nahr

Diyala

Samarra

r ive is R Tigr

IRAN

Ar Ramadi Karbala

BAGHDAD
An Hillah Ad Diwaniyah

JORDAN
An Najaf

Al Kut Al Amarah

An Nasiriyah

International Boundary National Capital Major roads Railroads Major airports Major ports

IRAQ

Al Basrah Khawr az Zubayr Umm Qasr

SAUDI ARABIA
Boundary representations not necessarily authoritative.

KUWAIT

KUWAIT

Arabian Gulf

Transportation Network Iraq has an extensive highway network is to link Baghdad with other major cities in Iraq and neighboring countries. The road from Baghdad extends 560 kilometers south to Al Basrah, near the Kuwaiti border. Iraqs primary international expressway (Highway 1) runs 1,264 kilometers from Safwan near the Kuwaiti border northwest to the Syrian and Turkish borders, with most sections being six-lanes-wide. All these roads pass through or near major towns. 28

Due to production shortfalls, gasoline (benzene) production cannot meet demand however, as a result of a fixed-price economy, prices are very low (the price of benzene ranges from 5 to10 U.S. cents per liter). Buses run less frequently and to fewer destinations than before OIF. Fares for buses and taxis have gone up in relation to the price of gas.

Rail
Maintenance and development of the railway system was severely disrupted by the 1980-88 and 1990-91 wars. Damage inflicted on the rail system during OIF was minimal. The rail routes originate in Baghdad and link to most main cities, including Mosul, Irbil, Husaibah, Akashat, in the north and An Nasiriyah, Al Basrah, and Umm Qasr in the south. There are also routes that serve major industrial centers. As of 1988 436 diesel-electric locomotives, 654 passenger cars, and 12,836 freight wagons ran on the network. The rail network was reactivated by the Coalition Provisional Authority with the reopening of the port of Umm Qasr.

Railroad Station Re-opening Ceremony at Umm Qasr, 2003 29

Air
Iraq has only two major international airports; they are at Baghdad and Al Basrah. OIF caused little damage to the major civilian airfields of Iraq and most are now operational in support of coalition rebuilding efforts. As of early August 2003, five airlines (Northwest Airlines, World Airways, Kalitta Air, North American Airlines and Continental Airlines) have been approved by the U.S. Department of Transportation for passenger and cargo air service. Five airlines (Air Transport International, Gemini Air Cargo, Evergreen International Airlines, Atlas Air and Polar Air Cargo) have been approved for air cargo operations only. Other than the two international airports, there are more than 100 other airports throughout the country. Of these, nearly 40 are related to the military; 74 are paved; and 61 have runways longer than 8,000 feet.

Maritime
The ports of Al Basrah and Umm Qasr are the most used commercial ports for Iraq. Umm Qasr was damaged by fighting early in the war, but has been largely repaired and began receiving cargo on 23 May 2003.

Baghdad Airport 30

Al Basrah can accommodate 12 vessels at the Maqal wharves and 7 vessels at buoys with a usual water depth of up to 10 meters. The port reportedly has a 40-ton gantry crane, 7 front loaders, and some tractors and trailers, all in a 30-acre area. Umm Qasr has space for eight vessels. Container and roll-on vessels can use three general cargo berths, which can accommodate vessels up to 183 meters-long. It is the primary port for coalition sealift to Iraq.

Communication
Iraqs communication infrastructure is gradually recovering from years of neglect from Husseins regime and more than a decade of United Nations sanctions. The system was further damaged during offensive operations against Husseins regime. However, the various media in Iraq are clearly taking advantage or their new-found freedom under the Coalition Provisional Authority.

Radio and Television


Radio is the most widespread and effective means of mass communication in Iraq. The current status of Iraqs radio communication infrastructure is unknown the U.S.-led coalition attempted to avoid targeting as much infrastructure as possible but, because Iraqi radio was state-controlled, it did not remain undamaged. Radio broadcasts are limited to regional broadcasts provided by coalition forces (CJTF V Corps/2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment broadcasts in Baghdad, 101st Air Assault Division broadcasts in Mosul and the 4th Infantry Division broadcasts in Tikrit). Additionally, Iran has been broadcasting at 3980 KHz (AM) the Voice of Teheran in Arabic across the border in effort to influence the Iraqi Shiite population. According to a 1998 estimate, there are 4.85 million radios in Iraq and while Saddam Hussein was in power, the government transmitted on 16 AM, 51 FM, and 4 shortwave radio stations. Prior to OIF, it was estimated that there were almost two million televisions in Iraq. Power is still an issue in Iraq, but some households have portable generators that can be used to keep televisions running. Iraqis 31

have access to several Arab-language satellite television stations that are generally transmitted from outside the country, including al-Jazeerah, al-Alam, al-Arabia, and the Arab News Network from Dubai, UAE. Iraqis also have access to Western media broadcasts including CNN, FOX news and BBC Arabic language programming.

Telephone and Telegraph


The fixed-line telephone service was so severely damaged during the war that the Coalition Provisional Authority has decided to switch telephone service to a cellular system. An American company, MCI/Worldcom, has setup a cellular network limited to the Baghdad area that is reserved for coalition forces and the agencies and organizations involved in the rebuilding of Iraq. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) announced 12 June 2003 that it planned to award a bid for the construction and operation of a nation-wide GSM system. Until then, U.S. military, development specialists, foreign journalists and those few Iraqis affluent enough to afford it must depend on satellite phones (Thuriya, IRIDIUM and Inmarsat) for telecommunications.

Newspapers and Magazines


Following a temporary printed media void after Baghdad fell to coalition troops, newspapers are back in circulation in Iraq. By July 2003, more than 100 newspapers and magazines were estimated to be in circulation in Baghdad and other major cities in Iraq. Many printed media are taking advantage of the new freedom of the press available since the fall of the Hussein regime. Some newspapers, such as Azzaman Arabic Daily, are actually printed in the United Kingdom and distributed throughout the Arab community. Various political factions sponsor other newspapers the Kurdish Democratic Party publishes al-Taakhi and the Shia Council sponsors the al-Tadamum newspaper. Several independent newspapers have also been established, such as the satirical weekly, Habez Bouz, one of the first Iraqi print journals founded and edited by a woman. 32

Satellites
Satellite dishes and receivers were banned under the Hussein regime. Now there is a booming business in satellite dishes including some hand-made with scrap metal. Generally, few Iraqis can afford satellite television but, in some cases, communities have pooled their finances and bought satellite dishes and receivers to gain access to information originating beyond Iraqs borders.

Internet
Internet service is primarily limited to the major cities of Iraq. As with other media, the internet was tightly controlled during the Hussein regime. Iraqi citizens are capitalizing on their new, online freedom and are expanding internet service. Recognizing this growing demand and capability, some Iraqi news publications, such as Azzaman Arabic Daily and al-Taakhi, publish online. Additionally, some coalition forces, such as the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, post news and information on their civil affairs websites.

CULTURE
Due to the ongoing unrest following the collapse of Saddam Husseins regime and the continued U.S./Coalition presence and efforts in nationbuilding, this section of the handbook has been expanded. Coalition forces need to understand as much as possible about the background of Iraq and its people to aid in attempts to rebuild their infrastructure and help them establish a new government. There are five major ethnic groups in the country: Arab, Kurd, Turkoman, Chaldean, and Assyrian. The cultural history, religious identity, language, tribal considerations, and customs of each group will be discussed in detail. Also, a section on the two major religions is included, in an attempt to explain the different beliefs and ways of Sunni and Shia Muslims. 33

Arabs Cultural History


Iraq occupies what was once known as Mesopotamia, the territory that historians and anthropologists consider the site of the earliest civilizations. The fertile lands of the Tigris and Euphrates river valleys attracted migrations of neighboring peoples and made possible, for the first time in history, the growing of surplus food. As food production increased, a process of urbanization evolved and Sumerian civilization (which produced writing, irrigation, the wheel, astronomy, religion, and literature) took root. Over the next 1,000 years, Babylonian rule encompassed a huge area covering most of the Tigris-Euphrates river valley from Sumer and the Arabian Gulf in the south to Assyria in the north. Mesopotamian culture left many legacies, including basic scientific principles, legal codes, and advances in warfighting technology, such as the wheeled chariot and the composite bow. It was also one of the first regions of the world to experience centralized authority with the rise of the Sumerian, Akkadian, Babylonian, and Assyrian empires. After the collapse of one empire or another, a multitude of small states emerged and survived a few decades or centuries before being absorbed into new empires. Iraqis take great pride in their ancestors and historical legacies. The Ottoman Period During the Ottoman period, nomadic tribes formed the bulk of Iraqs Arab population. Throughout most of Iraq, direct Ottoman control was weak. Loose tribal confederations prevailed, with each tribe acting as a sort of mobile mini-state. In the absence of a strong central authority, the tribal framework fulfilled the primary functions of resolving or engaging in conflict and managing resources. The history of Iraq through the 19th century is a chronicle of tribal migration and of conflict between 34

tribal groups, as the nomadic population swelled with the influx of Bedouins from Najd in the Arabian Peninsula. Beginning the mid-19th century, the Ottoman Empire increased its control over Iraqi Arab tribes through settlement policies and land reform measures. The result was an erosion of the sheikhs traditional source of power and a disintegration of the traditional tribal system. Following World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the British decided to unite the three Ottoman provinces of Baghdad, Mosul, and Basrah into one nation-state called Iraq (a name borrowed from the medieval past of the region) despite the significant religious, linguistic, ethnic, and tribal divisions running through Iraqi society. Under the mandate, British policies restored power to the tribal sheikhs, thereby helping to preserve and reinforce Iraqs tribal structure. The Iraqi monarchy tried to integrate the various fragments of its society through military conscription and national education. For the Sunnis, building a strong army compensated for weak social, political, and national bonds. These integrationist policies achieved some success during the last two decades of the monarchy. Substantial Shia immigration to Baghdad and improved education contributed to growing Sunni-Shia integration. Overall, however, the Sunnis remained dominant. Shia had almost no representation in the highest echelons of government and military, and remained the poor majority. Following the 1958 coup that toppled the monarchy, a decade of Sunni Arab republican rule brought mixed results for the Shia. Economically, Shia fared better than they had under the monarchy. Iraqi Arab tribes continued to lose power under both the modernizing monarchy and the republican regime. The republican regime enacted and began to implement agrarian reform. At the same time, a new wave of emigration from countryside to city weakened the remaining tribal units and ties. 35

The Baathist Period Following the 1968 Baathist coup, close family, clan, and tribal ties bound Iraqs ruling Sunni elite. Most notable in this regard was the emergence of Tikritis, Sunni Arabs from the town of Tikrit related to President Ahmad Hasan al Bakr. Saddam Hussein, a key leader behind the scenes, was a Tikriti and a relative of al Bakr. When the Baathists came to power, there were few Shia in the partys leadership. The Sunni Arab minority monopolized power. After early 1969, the regime embarked on a policy of intimidation and attraction to integrate and control the Shia community. Efforts to bring the Shia religious establishment under government control signaled the beginning of a long and violent clash between the regime and the activist Shia mujtahids and their followers. Because Shia Iran was nearby, larger and more powerful, it became convenient for the ruling Sunni elite to deny rights to the Shia majority, claiming that they were a Persian fifth column of Iran. Based on the large number of Persians in the Shia holy cities in southern Iraq and the ties between Arab and Persian Shia clergy, the regime accused the Shia (and those Shia clergy whom they failed to win over) of serving Iranian interests. Sunni-Shia tensions remained high during the Iran-Iraq War (19801988). During the war with Iran, the regimes rhetoric began to shift. The Islamic challenge posed by the Iranian revolution and the perceived need to assuage Iraqs Shia population helped inject a new religious element into the regimes discourse. Saddam Hussein regularly and conspicuously attended mosques, ordered the establishment of two Islamic universities and other schools for teaching Islamic subjects, and promoted Islamic values. In March 1991, following Iraqs defeat in the Gulf War, Arab Shia in southern Iraq (as well as the Kurds in northern Iraq) revolted against the Baathist regime. The first sparks of the rebellion were in the towns of Abul Khasib and Zubair, about 60-70 kilometers south of Basrah. The revolt gained momentum and spread to the major cities of southern Iraq, 36

including Basrah, Najaf, and Karbala. Masses including retreating soldiers and exiles infiltrated through Iran gathered in the streets and seized government and administrative offices. The Arab Shia who revolted mobilized around a longstanding sense of injustice regarding political and socio-economic deprivation. This spontaneous rebellion did not have a clear leadership, integrated organization, or political program, however. In addition, the Sunni-dominated central region of Iraq remained quiet. At the end of March, the government brutally crushed the uprisings. The rebels were captured, fled to Iran, or fled into the southern marshes. The government then drained the marshes, leading to the forcible relocation of the local Marsh Arab population.

Husseins Tribal Policies


During the 1980s and 1990s, Husseins regime also increased its control by relying on tribal loyalties among both Sunni and Shia Arabs. The majority of the former ruling elite came from Saddam Husseins Albu Nasir tribe and its allies in the Tikrit region. Sunni tribes that closely supported the regime included: the Dulaim, Jubbur, Ukaydat, Mulla, Saidat, and Shammar. Other supporting tribes residing in and around Tikrit include al-Hadithiyyun, al-Shayaisha, Albu Khishman, and Albu Bazun. The regimes rationale for increasingly relying on the tribes during this period was two-fold. First, tribal Arabs, although they had become settled, were still considered Bedouin, and thus the most genuinely Arab, and therefore the most trustworthy in the war against Iran. Second, they were believed to have retained tribal values such as loyalty, honor, courage, and manliness. The success of the regimes tribal policy was demonstrated when several Shia tribes remained on the sidelines or supported the regime during the 1991 uprising in the south. These tribes had been receiving benefits from Baghdad. Some of their members had become fairly prominent in the government and could distribute perks and advance the interests of the tribe. In addition, even tribes that stayed on the sidelines saw them37

selves as Arab, retaining their old Arab cultural traits. This Arab pedigree and culture was as important to them as their Shia affiliation. Tribal alliances are notoriously volatile and allegiances may differ even among groups within a particular tribe. Some of the major tribal partners that supported the regime the Jubbur, Ubaid, and Dulaim were no longer in full alliance with the regime before its collapse. There are other sources of tribal dissent. In 1994, for example, the al-Duri experienced several purges. (Duri is a city name not a tribal name.)

Religious Identity of Ethnic Groups


The Iraqi Arab population is predominantly Muslim. They are divided between Shia (55-60 percent) and Sunni (15-17 percent). Although the Shia are a minority among the worlds Muslim population, there are about four times as many Shia Arabs in Iraq as Sunni. Prior to the coming of Islam in the 7th century, there were thriving Jewish Arab settlements, Christian Arab tribes, and Arabs worshipping local and seasonal gods. Iraq still has a small Christian Arab community as well as a small Yazidi community.

Language
The Arabic language a Semitic tongue spoken by about 200 million people exists in three forms: the classical Arabic of the Quran; modern standard Arabic, used in books, newspapers, television, and radio; and the spoken language, which in Iraq is Iraqi Arabic. Educated Arabs tend to be bilingual in modern standard Arabic and in their own dialect of spoken Arabic. Even uneducated Arabic speakers can usually comprehend the meaning of something said in modern standard Arabic, although they are unable to speak it. Apart from Quranic texts, classical Arabic is known chiefly to scholarly specialists. Language is a major facet of Iraqi Arab identity. The Arabic language embodies an entire culture. Within a century of Islams revelation, Arabic replaced Aramaic as the language of the region. In many regions, populations were becoming Arabic faster than they were becoming Muslim. 38

Linguistic differences reflect different aspects of Iraqi identity. Historically, these linguistic differences were most pronounced among the Muslim, Christian, and Jewish communities. Linguistic differences in Iraq are also associated with factors such as gender, education, geography, nomadic lifestyles, and urbanization. The historical divide between the nomadic and settled populations in Iraq created distinct dialects that persist in Iraqi Arabic.

Islam and the Arab Culture


Islam, as it is practiced in Iraq, is closely tied to Arab culture. The two entities have functioned in Iraq as the preeminent political paradigms for more than 1,300 years. Despite Islams emphasis on community, an Arab versus non-Arab distinction insinuated itself soon after Islams founding. Arabs assert special rights and privileges in Islam for several reasons: the birthplace of Islam and its holiest sites are in the Arab countries; Arabic is the language in which Gods message was revealed and transmitted; and Arabs were the first to receive this message and were entrusted to carry it to other populations. There is a close association between Arab nationalism and Sunni Islam. Islamic heritage and achievement serve as an essential component of pan-Arabism. In addition, Arab Sunni Islams reliance on genealogy tends to affirm the Sunni communitys perception of primacy. Sunnis regard themselves as descendants of and heirs to the Arab Muslim rule of the 7th to 12th centuries. Shiism in Iraq is heavily influenced by Arab identity, and thus differs from the version followed in Persian Iran. Many of Iraqs tribes converted to Shiism in the 19th century, partly in response to Ottoman settlement policies that disrupted the tribal order. Shia rituals and laws helped tribesmen cope with their more complex daily life. The rapid conversion of the tribes of southern Iraq to Shiism did not permeate the former social and moral values of the tribesmen. The Shia have pointed to their Arab tribal attributes and values to distinguish themselves from 39

Iraqi Arab the Shia of Iran. During the Iran-Iraq War, Iraqi Shia, under significant pressure from the regime, for the most part chose their Arab identity over their religious one.

Sunni Arabs
The Sunni Arabs, historically acting as the ruling elite, have tried to balance and reconcile Iraqi-ness and a broader pan-Arabism. By its nature, however, a pan-Arab ideology precludes a separate Shia identity. In addition to benefiting from Husseins political hierarchy in Iraq, Sunni Arabs tended to support the regime because it represented a bulwark against possible Shia power and influence. Beyond the regimes Tikriti core was a broader system of Sunni support based on socioeconomic enticements, patronage, and cliental relationships. The Sunni network of 40

patronage and association numbers nearly 500,000 Iraqis (including dependents). With the decline of the Arab nationalist parties, Sunnis considered the military as their only potential protector against Shia domination. Today, Sunnis fear the loss of power and influence that is likely to accompany a more representative regime in the post-Hussein Iraq. Part of Husseins response to the 1991 uprising was to appeal to Sunni loyalty and solidarity, playing on their feelings of vulnerability. In particular, the government warned that the uprisings were a prelude to Shia revenge, which could potentially produce civil strife and mass killings. To date, there is little evidence of the Shia backlash that was expected by many experts once Husseins regime fell.

Shia Arabs
Iraq is the heartland of the global Shia community. Iraq served as the battleground for many of the seminal events defining the Sunni-Shia division. Eight of the 12 revered holy Imams are buried in Iraq. Millions of Shia pilgrims from throughout the world strive to visit the shrines of the Imams in Karbala, Najaf, Samara, and Kazimiyya. Theological schools and centers of learning have been established around many shrines. In Iraq, the Shia religious leadership and institutions were concentrated in the holy cities of Karbala and Najaf and Kazimiyya (a few miles up the Tigris, northwest of Baghdad). A small center of learning was also in Samarra, north of Baghdad, where the 12th Imam is believed to have disappeared. Until the 1980s, when the Iranian city of Qom rose to pre-eminence, Najaf was the most prominent Shia city. The establishment of modern Iraq posed a dilemma for the Shia and enhanced the issue of their identity. Unlike the Kurds, who constitute a distinct ethnic group, the Shia are Arab. In coping with their identity crisis, the Shia explicitly stressed their Arab culture as compared with their Iranian co-religionists. Shia Arabs have generally made attempts to accommodate their religious identity to the framework of the Iraqi state. Although Shia resented the ruling Sunni minoritys repeated questioning of their loyalty, the Shia community has never unified 41

behind a Shia cause. Many Shia have chosen not to participate in the governing of Iraq. In the last 75 years there have been only two serious initiatives by the Shia seeking political change: the Great Iraqi Revolution of 1920, and the uprisings following Desert Storm in 1991. Both attempts failed and further weakened Shia political status. In addition to religious differences, the rift between Sunni and Shia is rooted in a struggle for political and economic power and representation. Iraqi Shia have protested their inferior status in various ways to include: tribal uprisings in the 1930s, advocating communism in the 1950s, and the Islamic movement that appeared in the 1960s. There are several reasons for their failure to assert themselves as the political majority. The most serious drawback has been their inability to articulate a common goal that would unify and guide them as a group. They have been unwilling explicitly to identify themselves as Shia (as opposed to Arab or Iraqi) and to articulate their demands in Shia terms. The few Shia political groupings that did emerge failed to attract the support of either the secular or religious Shia. Moreover, these groupings were weak and fragmented. The Shia lacked a strong, leading personality, unified leadership, and a well-developed organization. Sunni-dominated regimes have systematically attacked the Shia religious establishment, a traditional source of leadership. In Najaf, Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq Al-Sadr, the highest-ranking Arab Shia Ayatollah, became a spokesman for Shia demands and a symbol of Shia frustration. His assassination in 1999 triggered significant demonstrations throughout the south. Although this incident demonstrates that there is a potential for Shia mobilization around central clerical figures, the Shia have never seriously challenged the Iraqi state (as opposed to the regime of Saddam Hussein) and have not considered secession an option. As the majority population of Iraq, Shia have a vested interest in its independence and statehood. Moreover, because they consider themselves the demographic, geographic, and historic heart of Iraq, Shia have sought to preserve an Iraqi identity distinct from other Arabs. 42

Many views about politics and religion contradict the image of Iraqi Shia as monolithic, radical, and pro-Iranian. The 1991 uprising against the regime illustrated the essentially diffused and decentralized character of Shia identity and the religious leaderships inability to control it. There are religious Shia, secular Shia, and Shia whose allegiance is to tribe, or in some instances, the regime. The political dispersion is further enhanced by the practice of allowing believers to choose the religious figure (a living mujtahid) whose teachings they want to follow. Finally, Shia loyalty to Iraq during the war with Iran provided strong evidence of independence from Tehran. Although there are strong cultural and familial links between Iraqi and Iranian Shia, Arab identity and national sentiment remain more powerful influences within the community. Iraqi Shia balance their religious and Arab identities, rejecting both Iranian-domination and pan-Arabism. Overall, the Shia blend Iraqi nationalism with Arab cultural content. They consider themselves indigenous Iraqis. They want a say in Iraqs politics and economy commensurate with their numbers.

Role of Tribes in Society


At least three-quarters of the Iraqi people belong to one of the countrys 150 tribes. Social relationships in Iraqi Arab culture require individuals to merge identity and personality within the framework of the communal group. Instead of asserting their separateness and privacy as individuals, Iraqi Arabs tend to interact as members of a group family, clan, village, neighborhood, tribe, etc. Iraqi Arabs display a high need for social approval and group norms. Shaming is the primary instrument with which Iraqi Arab society enforces conformity. The group often determines a persons identity, status, and prospects for success in life. Conformity is related to and reinforced by a reverence for tradition. Within Arab culture, therefore, the group takes precedence over the individual. Loyalty to the group is highly valued, and responsibility is generally considered to fall upon the group in its entirety rather than on any particular individual. Cousins, neighbors, and friends can develop bonds 43

Shepherds in Al Kut as strong as any between close family members. Kinship ties are fabricated, denied, and manipulated. Because of the primacy of the group, obligations of group members to one another are wide, varied, and powerfully compelling. The extended family is the fundamental unit of political and social action. Related kin groups may be allies or enemies, depending upon the existing economic and political conditions. Iraqi tribes are characterized by solidarity, hospitality, and independence. Tribal values also include loyalty, courage, gallantry, manliness, and mastery of arms. In general, the degree of hierarchy and centralization in a tribe correlates with the length of time it had been sedentary. Tribal membership did not impose a rigid structure on behavior. The tribe provided its members with an identity, a sense of security, and conflict resolution, but everyday behavior was pragmatic and adaptive to specific situations.

Tribes and the Iraqi State


When it came to power in 1968, the Baath party officially rejected tribalism, defining it as a remnant of colonialism and the epitome of backwardness. The party regarded tribalism as an obstacle to the socialist 44

transformation of Iraq. The regime also believed tribalism to be contrary to transnational-Arab unity and Iraqi patriotism. The government severely curtailed the sheikhs power over their tribesmen, and enacted agrarian reforms that further separated tribal peasants from their leaders. While reducing the influence of tribes, the regime implicitly promoted tribal values, relied on tribal loyalties to stay in power, and implemented policies that increased the individuals reliance on their tribes. Saddam Husseins rise was linked to the tribal factor. His leading role in the
Sih Sin or d Gu i li

TURKEY

SYRIA

Bar Dahuk Zibari zan rados a Mizun Surchi B Balik Rib Sinjar Herki Ako at Girdi Kushnao Mosul Sinjar Pizhdar Ch Irbil Aqaydat Shuan As ingini Dizai Sulaymaniyah Ham aw Kirkuk Jabbari and Jaf Ubayd Talabani Daudi Zangana Samirrai ah Albu Nasir rat ) ka riti h Euphrates Tikrit Ta (Tik fisa Na Samarra

Barwari Mizur

i
i

IRAQ
International Boundary National Capital

Sha m

me

Sh a

ikh

Duri
Akashat

dah Sumay Qarah

Kh az

raj

Dulaym
Ar Rutbah

Ar Ramadi

Jib

an

ur

Jib

Nahr

ur

Diyala

is Tigr

BAGHDAD Sathi Oaraghouh

Ri

ve

Atighi Jibur

IRAN

JORDAN An Nukhayb

Kurd Sunni Arab Sunni Arab/Kurd Mix Shia Arab Shia/Sunni Arab Mix Sunni Turkoman Sparsely Populated Tribe Name Hassan

Tribes in Iraq 45

Rawla h

Karbala

Zubaydi Janabi shimAl Kut bayd Saway id a Banu Haw Jabur U Bayat Laith Rai ah Albu An Najaf Fatla Banu Lam Tamim Yasir Khaza l Bani Rikab Albu Al Amarah Agra
Muhammad Uzayrij Bani Hijaymi

Majority Groups

Ghalal Hassan

Unizah
As Salman

Albu Salih Ribat An Muntafiq Nasiriyah Halluf Asdi

Al Basrah

Ba

ni

j ra az Kh alik M

Dufir

As Busayyah

Mutayrat Kindi
KUWAIT KUWAIT Arabian Gulf

SAUDI ARABIA
Boundary representations are not necessarily authoritative.

Baath Party stemmed from the relationship between President Ahamd Hasan al-Bakr and Khayr Allah Talfah, who was also Husseins maternal uncle and in whose home Hussein was raised. Bakr, Saddam Hussein, and most of the new Baathist elite that controlled the party after the 1968 coup came from provincial, semi-Bedouin small towns and villages, where tribal and family loyalties were and still are strongest. Tribalism re-emerged, along with Arab cultural identity and Islam, as major facets of Iraqi identity. Reverting to an old practice, many Iraqis (toward the end of Husseins reign) attached their tribal or regional affiliations to their names. (In 1976, the government had banned this practice, masking how many Tikritis and others close to Saddam Husseins clan and tribe held key positions.) Tribes have also played something of a unifying role in the past 10 years.

Religious Identity
The relatively late (19th century) conversion of many Iraqi tribes to Shiism resulted in a mixed religious identity for many of the larger tribes. This split usually follows a north-south pattern. For example, the northern Shammar Jarba are Sunni and the southern Shammar Toqa are Shia; the Dulaim on the Euphrates north of Baghdad are Sunni and the southern Fatla of the Dulaim are Shia; and the Jubbur are split between southern Shia and northern Sunni branches. The Albu Nasir (Saddam Husseins tribe) has a Shia branch in the Najaf area. Shia Tribes Generally speaking, the Diyala river and the area between Falluja and Baghdad mark the northern limit of the Shia population. The broad geographical divide between Shia and Sunni areas is by no means clear-cut, however, and there are mixed areas and enclaves throughout Iraq. Shia tribes tend to be organized into fewer confederations than their Sunni counterparts, and the tribal system in general is more complex. Government policies since the early 1900s had a significant bear46

Street in Baghdad ing on this, successfully breaking up many large confederations and aggravating existing tribal conflicts. Anti-regime activity just before OIF tended to not involve entire tribes; rather, it primarily involved disaffected individuals (occasionally tribal sheikhs) leading groups of tribesmen in small-scale guerrilla operations. However, the 1991 Shia uprising, although not encompassing all major Shia tribes, demonstrated the possibility of a significant pan-Shia collective action against Baghdad. The disaffection felt by most Shia toward Husseins Sunni-dominated regime represented a strong binding force across the population. This longstanding sentiment remains among Iraqs southern tribes. Despite living in the historical center of Shia culture, religious adherence among the Iraqi Shia is somewhat ambiguous. Most of the southern tribes are of Bedouin origin, an ethnic group not noted for religious observance, and most of the Shia are only relatively recent converts to Shiism. The forced transformation of many formerly nomadic tribes into sedentary agriculturalists led to a partial breakdown in tribal structures and autonomy (which was probably the regimes intention), and 47

prompted a re-evaluation of their identity in response to their changed political and economic circumstances. Interaction with urban Shia, most of whom had been converted in the 17th and 18th centuries was more likely a greater cause of conversion. Shiism provided the rural populace with a mechanism for improving their socio-economic status through increased opportunities for social inclusion and mobility in their dealings with city dwellers. Despite the rapid growth of Islam in the Middle East, conversion to Shiism among the southern Iraqi population took many decades, and some tribes remained secular until the early years of the 20th century. As a result the southern tribes retained important aspects of their Arab identity, and developed an ambiguous relationship between the tribal and religious elements of their social organization. Moreover, the conversion cut across the boundaries of some tribes and confederations, resulting in an imperfect correspondence between tribal and religious allegiances that prevails today. The constituent elements of Iraqi Shia identity are therefore more complex than those of the Sunni population. Although the Shia view themselves as Iraqis first and foremost, this does not translate into support for the state itself, at least in its Sunni-dominated guise. This is tempered, however, by the strong Arab traditions of Iraq Shia, that not only serve to blur boundaries between the two confessional groups, but also separate the Shia population from their counterparts in Iran. Shiism in Iraq and Iran differ in several significant respects.
I

Iranian Shia religious practices are far more integrated with social and political values of the society than the Iraqi Shia. In many ways, Shiism in Iran evolved from the socio-political system, rather than being imposed upon it, as was the case in Iraq. Iraqi Shiism incorporates many elements of Arab rituals and practices that pre-date conversion, a characteristic that is absent from the Iranian religion. 48

Conversion to Shiism in Iran was completed by the beginning of the 18th century, well before Iraq, and it encompassed a far greater proportion of the countrys population. Shiism has been the state religion in Iran since 1501. The rise of the modern Sunni state in Iraq, in contrast, restricted the development of Shiism in the country. During the 20th century, the decline of Shia religious and intellectual institutions in Iraq accelerated, further polarizing Iraqi Shia from their Iranian counterparts. Iraqi Shia identified with the Iraqi state from late Ottoman times onwards. This also slowed the development of Shia religious identity. The Shia formed the bulk of the Iraqi armed forces during the Iran-Iraq war, and the populations self-identification as Iraqis, first and foremost, is at least as strong as that of the Sunni population.

All this is not to suggest, however, that Iraqi Shia clerics do not have considerable influence within the population. The widespread unrest that followed the murder of Iraqs Shia religious leader Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr in 1999 demonstrated the significance of religious figures. Shia Tribes and Confederations Albu Muhammad. The Albu Muhammad confederation is one of Iraqs oldest Shia confederations, and is located mainly on the west bank of the Tigris south of Al Amarah. It broke off from the Zubayd confederation in the late 17th century, its constituent tribes settling around the marsh region from Qalat Salih to Al Qurnah and converting almost completely to Shiism by the late 18th century. The Albu Muhammad tribesman have traditionally been regarded as inferiors by neighboring tribes, due to their association with the Marsh Arabs, and is often described (incorrectly) as being made up of Marsh Arab tribes. A history of inter-marriage with Persian groups has also led to them being labeled derogatorily as Persians with mixed blood. Albu Muhammad customs particularly the practices of temporary marriage and wide49

spread polygamy among tribal sheikhs are also regarded as being of Persian origin and contrary to Quranic teachings. Albu Salih. This is a formerly nomadic tribe located on the north bank of the Euphrates in the Hawr Al-Hammar marshland near Fuhud. The Albu Salih is a member of the Bani Malik confederation, with its sheikh traditionally regarded as holding rights to the confederate leadership. The tribe was antagonistic toward Husseins regime, which had confiscated much of its land and killed many of its tribesmen. Bani-Hujaym. The Bani-Hajaym is a confederation of about 12 tribes located around the city of Al- Samawah, and is affiliated to the Muntafiq. It apparently has little internal coherency, and traditionally does not recognize a paramount sheikh. The confederation had a long history of anti-regime activity dating to before the British Mandate, and its constituent tribes were particularly active in the southern insurgency. Several members were executed by the regime. Bani Lam. Located in the Al Amarah region and in greater Baghdad, the Bani Lam is one of the largest and most influential Shia confederations. Most Bani Lam tribes were settled agriculturalists, and the confederation also has a reputation as cattle and horse-breeders. Although the Bani Lam has no clear political profile, a number of its tribes were involved in anti-regime activity. A branch of the confederation is located in Saudi Arabia. Bani Malik. Bani Malik tribes reside in Al Basrah city, the Al Azir and Al Qurnah areas to the north and in central Suq Ash Sukukh. Although the confederation was mostly anti-Hussein, it included some pro-regime elements and has little internal cohesion. It is affiliated to the Muntafiq. Bani Rikab. The Bani Rikab reside throughout southern Iraq. Although generally anti-regime, its tribes were not heavily involved in anti-regime activity. The confederation may also be a constituent section of another loose confederation, the Ajwad, which is part of the Muntafiq. 50

Halluf. Halluf is generally an anti-regime confederation located in and around Al Basrah City. The Halluf is one of the four largest confederations in the region, with an estimated 50,000 members. Janabi. Most of the Janabi tribes are concentrated on the western bank of the Euphrates between Falluja and Musaiyab, but others are distributed throughout the south, to include a small Sunni branch located near Tikrit, the Albu Qasr. The confederation maintained generally good relations with the regime, and held some high-ranking positions, although there are certain sections that are anti-Hussein. Khazail. The Khazail confederation was once the most dominant group in the Middle Euphrates valley. Its dominion was dissolved during the mid-19th century, and it now has little internal coherence, consisting of a number of largely autonomous tribes and tribal groupings. One of the most significant is the Al Aqra. Traditionally shepherds, some sections of the Khazail are linked with tribes in Iran. Muntafiq. Although the term Muntafiq means confederated, the Muntafiq is not strictly a confederation, but represents a loose collection of southern Iraqi confederations that includes the Bani Malik, the Bani Huajaym, the Bani Asad and the Bani Said. The Muntafiq formed from a group of tribes on the lower Euphrates by the Al Shabib-Sadun, a Sunni clan. The Sadun have lost all authority over the confederation and its constituent groups, but the clan remains one of the most significant Sunni components in the south and maintained close relations with the regime. The Muntafiq and its confederations have not acted collectively together for many generations. The extent to which southern tribes identify with the Muntafiq today is unclear, but, given the antiregime stance of most of its constituent confederations, it may form a symbolic axis for Shia collective action. Sunni Tribes Sunni tribal organization incorporates a stronger confederate element than the Shia. This has been attributed to a longer history of inter-con51

federate enmity in Sunni regions, resulting in a greater need for tribes to engage in collective political and, especially, military action in co-operation with neighboring tribes. Sunni tribes are unlikely to organize en bloc against a common enemy, tribal allegiance being a far greater motivational basis for collective action than shared ethnicity. Husseins regime had been effective at suppressing opposition by exploiting tribal divisions and manipulating the allegiances of tribal leaders. For these reasons, those Sunni tribes opposed to the regime have had difficulty organizing as a united front within the wider Iraqi opposition movement. Many Sunni tribal confederations are transnational, with branches in Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Kuwait. Only the Shammar and Zubayd confederations appear to have retained strong links with brethren in other countries.

Iraqi Marketplace 52

Albu Nasir. The Albu Nasir, located in and around Tikrit, has about 25,000 members, and is the confederation from which most of the regimes inner circle was drawn. Its status as a true tribal entity is in some doubt. A number of commentators speculate that it is actually an off-shoot of the Dulaym, while others have argued that it is not, in fact, a tribe at all, but an invented grouping that provided Hussein and select Tikritis with a tribal ancestry. Besides al-Nasiri and al-Tikriti, a number of other surnames denote membership in the confederation. These include Khattab, Haza, Najam, Qahir, Abbas, Abd al-Ghafur, Abd alQadir, Nadar and Faraj. Dulaym. Tribes belonging to the Dulaym confederation occupy a large area of western Iraq from the Jordanian border to the Euphrates. The Dulaym were nomadic shepherds, and there remain some isolated sections that have retained a semi-nomadic lifestyle. The confederation apparently lacks coherence probably as a result of assimilation by other groups that are not Dulaym by origin (most notably the Zuba). The Dulaym did not have close relations with Husseins regime, and included significant anti-Hussein sections within it. Of these, the most prominent is the Albu Nimr tribe from Anbar that attacked regime forces in 1995 and in August 1999. The incident also involved the Albu Alwan and the Albu Fahd tribes. Dulaymis were implicated in the assassination attempt on Husseins son Uday in 1996, in retaliation for the arrest and execution of the confederations paramount sheikh. The confederation has also been involved in several rebellions, most notably in 1995, when Dulaymis rioted throughout western Iraq in response to the execution of a senior Dulaymi air force officer, MajGen Muhammad Mazlum al-Dulaymi. Tribesmen reportedly attacked government offices and branches of the Baath party, and took control of the provincial capital, Ramadi. The confederation was also involved in less serious rioting in February 2002. Hussein had been careful to cultivate senior Dulaymis, however, probably because of the numerical and social importance of confederation in 53

the key governorate of Anbar. Among other strategies, this involved arranging marriages between Dulaymis and members of the Albu Nasir. Duri. Located between Baghdad and Tikrit, the Duri is one of the confederations closest to Husseins regime, with members holding many senior positions in the regime. These include the vice chairmanship of the Baath Partys Revolutionary Command Council, nominally the second most important political post in the country. Iraqs last permanent representative to the UN in New York, Dr. Muhammad al-Duri, is also a member of the confederation, as was the governor of Baghdad and a former intelligence chief, Saber Abdulaziz al-Duri. Jibur. The Jibur is Iraqs largest confederation, with more than 2 million members (representing almost 10 percent of the countrys population) and incorporating more than 50 tribes. It has both Sunni and Shia sections, the former located in the governorate of Salahuddin, in Ninawa governorate around Mosul and in Baghdad itself, and the latter residing south of Baghdad. Traditionally pro-regime, a number of tribes of the Jibur fell out of favor with Hussein toward the end of the regime. The confederation incorporated significant anti-regime elements and, although some Jiburis continued to hold prominent positions in the states military and security organs, many senior Jiburis had been dismissed from the Republican Guard leadership before the regime fell. In May 2002, clashes took places between Republican Guard and Jiburi tribesmen in the Salah Ad Din governorate, during which several Jiburis were killed and injured. These clashes were apparently sparked by the recent purges and the continued detention of a number of Jiburi women by the regime, and also involved fighting between members of Husseins own tribe and Jiburis around Tikrit. In response, Jibur leaders distributed leaflets among members of other tribes in the Samarra and Falluja areas denouncing the campaign against the confederation. Khazraj. The Khazraj is one of Iraqs oldest confederations, apparently pre-dating the Islamic period. The majority of tribal members are 54

located in the Diyala governorate and west of the Tigris between Baghdad and Samarra, with a minority Shia section to the south of Al Basrah. The tribe had close relations with the regime. Shammar. The Shammar is one of the largest transnational tribal groupings in the region, with branches in western Syria and north-central Saudi Arabia, as well as in Iraq. During the 19th century and until their defeat by Ibn Saud in 1921, the confederation controlled much of the Arabian Peninsula. The Iraqi Shammar has Sunni and Shia branches. The Sunni branches of the Iraqi Shammar, known as the Northern Shammar or Shammar Jarba, live along the Syrian border west of Mosul, mainly around Balad Sinjar, Tal Afar, Qala Sharqat and Mosul. The Shammar Jarba was thought to be close to Husseins regime. The traditional enemies of the Shammar are the Dulaym, whose territory is adjacent to the south, and the Dharfir. There is a history of violent conflict between Shammar tribes and tribes of these confederations. The Shammar traditionally consider themselves superior and of purer blood than the tribes around them, and have strict restrictions prohibiting marriage with members of other tribes, with execution the ultimate sanction for violators. The Shia branch of the Shammar, the Shammar Toqa, is on the east bank of the Tigris from Baghdad to Bughaila. Ubayd. The Ubayd inhabit lands east of the Tigris between Kirkuk and Samarra, and in the area north of Baghdad. Although the confederation supported Hussein, relations began waning in 1993, when a number of prominent tribesmen were dismissed from senior security positions for allegedly plotting an attempted coup. Unizah. A large confederation located around central and western Iraq. The Unizah also has a branch in Kuwait. The Unizah were thought to be generally pro-Hussein, but the confederation also contains a number of anti-regime sections. Zubayd. The Zubayd inhabit the area between the Euphrates and the Tigris northeast of Musaiyib. The confederation lost much of its coher55

ence in the first half of the last century, as pressure over resources in this region and the loss of its control of the west bank of the Tigris from Baghdad to Bughaila led to prolonged tribal-infighting. Most of its constituent tribes now operate independently. Zubayd members were reportedly involved in a plot to overthrow the regime during the 1990s.

Alliances
Tribal alliances are notoriously volatile, and allegiances differ even among groups within a particular tribe. The history of Iraqi tribes has been marked by shifts in allegiances, betrayals, and conditional alliances. Often tribes have looked out for their own interests, regardless of who controlled the state. Confederations warred with one another. The Dulaim, for example, are traditional enemies of the Shammar Jarba. Conflict has also occurred within several of the larger confederations. State versus Tribe The geographic shorthand used to describe Iraq Shia south, Sunni center masks more complex patterns of social and cultural identity. An Iraqi could simultaneously profess a strong Shia or Sunni loyalty, identify with a particular tribe, and have a sense of being an Arab. The existence of such overlapping loyalties has allowed past Iraqi ruling elites to define and redefine the countrys identity in accordance with their interests and the dictates of current policy. The Iraqi state has in the past created institutions that have effectively mixed communities and diluted their sense of separateness. The net result has been an ethnic and sectarian mixing that has created some sense of Iraqi-ness, particularly among a segment of the middle and upper classes. Since the late 1960s, moreover, voluntary and forced migration has altered the demographic balance. In urban areas, many Iraqis live in mixed communities, in which class and social status can have as much significance as ethnic and religious affiliation. However, Husseins tendency to rule along regional, tribal, and religious lines has created tensions. 56

The two main groups that make up Iraqs Arab population are torn between Iraqi and religious affiliations. Because the Iraqi state is a relatively recent creation, the Iraqi identity is the least rooted. The religious affiliation has deeper roots, greater historical weight, and a transnational character. Historically, an Arabs identity has been based primarily on language and a collective memory of his place and role in history. The religious differences between Sunnis and Shia have slowed the emergence of an Iraqi nationalism, created self-identification issues, and made relations between the two groups difficult.

Arab Identity
As an ethnic-cultural nationalist movement, Arab identity received much of its inspiration from 19th century European nationalism, especially from the German and Italian examples. Until the late 19th century, Iraqis lived within a variety of overlapping authority and political structures. The Ottoman Empire, Islam, and local tribal and village structures affected various factors of peoples lives and gave shape to their identities. Some Arab intellectuals argued that all those who spoke Arabic had a common identity and a shared past. However, most individuals identified themselves by religion, familial and tribal affiliations, and local residence. Arab nationalism first became part of the language of political protest and cultural renaissance in response to a series of reforms planned by the Ottoman Empire to promote Turkish culture. Elites called for instruction in the Arabic language, greater local autonomy, and the protection of Arab rights within the Ottoman Empire. Overall, the episode stimulated greater interest in Arab history and culture and a common identity based on language and ethnicity. The fall of the Ottoman Empire following World War I nurtured Arab identity and bolstered the Arab movement. Without the political structure in which Arabs had lived for centuries, they were forced to reconsider their identity. Arab culture was intertwined with Islam in many respects. Although many of its early champions were Christian, Arab symbols often drew from Islam and the cultures rapid rise can partially be attributed to its 57

Bedouin Family links with an Islamic identity. Over time, however, the religious content of Arab identity lost out to its secular and state tenets. Moreover, once the caliphate disappeared after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, no religious figure could claim allegiance outside his own countrys boundaries. Arab leaders who ignored the tenets of the Arab beliefs have their credentials and character questioned. In Iraq, the popularity of Arab nationalism was closely connected to the problems of governance in an ethnically and religiously divided society whose people had little identification with a British-imposed state. As residents of a country created by foreigners, they found it difficult to see themselves as Iraqis. Nationalists believed that it was necessary to have a state strongly committed to Arab unification and headed by a powerful leader. In the late 1970s Saddam Hussein took up the Arab cause in Iraqs name. The regime gradually abandoned the partys traditional approach that the Arab states 58

were all equally illegitimate entities arbitrarily created by Western imperialism and destined to disappear within an integrative pan-Arab union. Instead, it argued that by virtue of its illustrious history and centrality to the Arab cause, Iraq deserves to lead the Arabs.

The Baath Party


Established in 1940 in Syria, the Baath which means resurrection is the only party not confined to one Arab state. Its ideology conceives of only one Arab nation-state, regarding other existing ones as artificial creations of the old colonial powers. The party is explicitly secular. Its founder and chief ideologue, Syrian intellectual Michel Aflaq, was a Greek Orthodox Christian. The partys leading principle is that of Arab unity, which envisions the political unification of all Arab lands. It perceives Arab nationalism in terms of language, culture, and history. Baathists also support the struggle against Western imperialism and its influence upon the Arabs, and their idealology also incorporates a mild form of socialism. Baathists also support separating religion from politics. Baathist ideology accepts the moral and spiritual aspects of Islam but rejects it as a political and legal system. Baathists avoid rifts with the more traditional masses by paying lip service to religion while simultaneously striving to defuse Islam as a political and social force. The Baath Party seized power in Iraq in 1968. For the next 2 decades, the Iraqi leadership underwent gradual but significant change in terms of regional, ethnic, and denominational origin. In 1968 all the members of the highest political bodies came from the small Sunni Arab triangle lying between Baghdad, Mosul, and the Syrian border; by 1986, the leadership came from throughout Iraq. Although Sunni Arabs still dominated the senior positions, Shia Arabs gained a perceptible foothold. In 1968 Iraq was ruled by people from the urban lower-middle class; by 1988 it was ruled essentially by people from the rural lower classes.

Customs and Courtesies


Iraqi Arabs often greet each other with a number of ritual phrases and fixed responses. Elaborate greetings and inquiries about health and well59

being are often lengthy, but are important in establishing friendly relations. Inquiring about a female member of a persons family, however, is considered offensive. These elaborate greetings originate from Bedouin tradition, in which the nomadic lifestyle led to frequent encounters with strangers. The Bedouins, among the original inhabitants of Iraq, made their living as camel breeders and traders who roamed the deserts surrounding the Tigris and Euphrates. There were several groups of Bedouins, and they relied on other Bedouins hospitality and protection from enemy tribes. Iraqis generally shake hands every time they meet and every time they depart. Iraqi Arabs stand to shake hands, and when an esteemed person enters a room. Handshakes are lengthy and may involve grasping the elbow. Handshakes, though regarded as important, are usually not as firm as those of Americans. Upon entering a room full of people, greet those present especially the elderly before sitting down. When meeting a group, shake the hand of the person approaching you, or the most senior person, and expect to greet the entire party. Eye contact signals respect to the person greeted. If meeting a female, do not attempt to shake her hand unless she extends it. In addition, never greet a woman with an embrace or kiss. Arabs find public displays of affection between the opposite sexes offensive. Arabs typically stand close when greeting and talking. Arabs will stand close enough to breathe on and smell the other person. Stepping back and away from someone indicates a desire not to interact with them and may be offensive. Arabs are comfortable when surrounded by people in open spaces, but can feel uncomfortable or threatened when enclosed in small physical spaces. Hugging and embracing between men is common. A full-body embrace or hug should not be attempted until one has become close friends with another. Touching noses together three times when greeting is a Bedouin gesture of friendship and respect. Two men kissing quickly on the lips when greeting is also an expression of friendship. 60

Gestures It has been said that To tie an Arabs hands while he is speaking is tantamount to tying his tongue. However, Arab gestures differ a great deal from American ones. Iraqis/Arabs commonly make the following gestures and hand signs:
I

Placing the right hand or its forefinger on the tip of the nose, on the right lower eyelid, on top of the head, or on the mustache or beard means its in front of me, I see it, or its my obligation. Placing the palm of the right hand on the chest immediately after shaking hands with another man shows respect or thanks. Touching the tips of the right fingertips to the forehead while bowing the head slightly also connotes respect. Holding the fingers in a pear shaped configuration with the tips pointing up at about waist level and moving the hand slightly up and down signals be patient or be careful. Biting the right forefinger, which has been placed sideways in the mouth, is an expression of regret. The OK sign, if shaken at another person, symbolizes the evil eye. Hitting the right fist into the open the left palm is and expression of obscenity or contempt. Placing the palm of the right hand on the chest, bowing the head a little and closing ones eyes means thank you (in the name of Allah). A quick snap of the head upwards with an accompanying click of the tongue signals: No or perhaps. Flipping the hand near the mouth and simultaneously making a clicking sound with the tongue and teeth indicates, dont worry. Holding the right palm in front of the face and then flipping the hand so that the palm is up means that the person asked for is not present. Placing a half-closed hand in front of the stomach, and then turning it slightly connotes that the person to whom the gesture is made is a liar 61

I I I

I I I I I I I I

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Touching the tip of the right forefinger on the tongue and then placing it on the tip of the nose, means hurry up. Pointing a finger or writing utensil at anyone is considered threatening and is reserved for animals.

Visiting Iraqi Arabs are, in general, hospitable and generous. Their hospitality is often expressed with food. This practice stems from the culture of the desert, where traveling nomads depended on the graciousness and generosity of others to survive. Generosity and hospitality are considered expressions of personal honor. When Arabs visit, whether in homes or businesses, they expect the same level of generosity and attention. Privacy is important in Arab and Iraqi culture. It is considered rude to look into someones house and can be equated with trespassing. When visiting a house, it is customary to take a position next to the door to prevent being able to see inside the home. Do not enter the home unless invited by the host. It is expected that guests will remove their shoes before entering the home; this shows respect for the host. Arabs in villages or the countryside are less likely to have couches or chairs; instead they will have pillows on the floor or ground to sit against. When sitting, it is considered insulting to point the soles of ones feet in the direction of anyone; sit cross-legged if possible. It is also considered to be offensive to put ones feet on any furniture. In an Arab house, the typical gathering place is called a Dewaniah, which is for male visitors only. Females generally meet in separate rooms; meetings involving the opposite sex are generally forbidden. Arab culture stresses the importance of honoring and pampering guests. If a guest praises something that an Arab possesses, he may insist that the guest take it. It is assumed that the guest will refuse this offer. This pattern could manifest itself over and over, as at least one offer and refusal is typically expected. Arabs will expect the same offer of generosity if they praise something that belongs to another. As a general rule, praise is directed at items of personal belonging. Coffee or tea is typi62

cally offered upon entering a home or office. It is considered rude to refuse, but just as rude to drink more than three cups. The server will keep refilling the cup unless the guest shakes the cup from side to side to indicate that he is finished. The host is typically the last to begin eating, and will pretend to continue eating if he finishes first. Negotiations Politeness, socially correct behavior, and preserving honor are paramount. When faced with criticism, Arabs will try to protect their status and avoid incurring negative judgments. This concept can manifest itself in creative descriptions of facts or in the dismissal of conclusions, in order to protect ones reputation. This cultural trait will generally take precedence over the accurate transmission of information. The desire to avoid shame and maintain respect can also contribute to the tendency to compartmentalize information. One common manifestation of this behavior comes in the form of saying yes when one really means no. Arabs try to take the personalization out of contentious conversations, which can lead to vagueness and efforts to not speak in absolutes. Fear of shame also leads to secrecy and compartmentalization of knowledge. It is also considered disrespectful to contradict or disagree with a person of a superior rank or age. Conflict Resolution In Iraqi Arab society, community and tribal affiliation is given priority over individual rights. This emphasis on community helps explain the dominance of informal over contractual commitments and the use of mediation to solve conflicts. Many disputes are resolved informally. This has especially been the case in recent decades, as many Iraqis have reverted to tribal customs and traditions. There are several overarching principles that tend to guide conflict resolution. 63

First are the four Quranic influences that govern interaction between parties during conflict resolution.
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Civility and respect: most actions are condoned if they are civilized and show respect to others, especially those of a higher status. Tolerance: Be considerate of others, and tolerate differences. Humility: It is offensive to speak loudly or harshly to others or to contradict or disagree with superiors. Moderation: A high value is placed on moderation and deliberation. Avoid becoming angry, accusing or arrogant.

Second is protecting and recognizing the status of individuals. Disrespect toward elders or superiors can jeopardize negotiations. There are two accepted methods to resolve conflicts: mediation or deliberation in council. Both are typically time consuming. However, Arabs do not feel as pressed as Western cultures to finish tasks quickly. Unless the matter is urgent, there will be a casual approach to solving it. Arabs often convene a conference to study, deliberate and address problems of a grave or complex nature. Conferences are announced in advance and the issues are declared. When no resolution can be achieved, the mediators announce and convene another conference. Rituals play an important role in tribal conflict resolution. The sulh (settlement) ritual recognizes that injuries between individuals and groups will fester and grow if not acknowledged and repaired. Given the severity of life in the desert, competing tribes realized that sulh is a better alternative to endless cycles of vengeance. Following a conflict, tribes take stock of losses in human and material terms. The tribe with the fewest losses compensates the tribe that suffered most. Stringent conditions are set to settle the conflict definitively. The parties then pledge to forget everything that happened and initiate new and friendly relations. There are two types of sulh: total and partial. The former ends all conflict between the two parties; the latter ends conflict according to conditions agreed upon during the settlement process. The mediator of a sulh 64

is a Wasit, who is perceived as having all the answers and solutions. He therefore has a great deal of power and responsibility. In Southern Iraq the mediator is always from the Sada class, who derive their status from being the descendants of Fatima, daughter of the Prophet Muhammad. A sulh works as follows: after a murder or crime, the family of the victim, in an attempt to prevent blood revenge, calls on a delegation of mediators consisting of village elders or notables (usually called muslihs or jaha). As soon as mediators are called in, a hodna (truce) is declared. The mediators initiate a fact-finding process. The role of the mediators is not to punish the offending party bur to preserve the honor of both families involved. A blood price (diya) is then paid to the family of the victim. This diya, or an exchange of goods, substitutes for the exchange of death. The process ends with a public ceremony of reconciliation (musalaha) performed in the village square. The families of both the victim and the guilty party exchange greetings and accept apologies. The family of the offending party visits the home of the victim to drink a cup of bitter coffee and the ritual concludes with a meal hosted by the family of the offender. The ritual varies at times. In all cases it takes place within a communal, not a one-on-one, environment. Business Style A key to establishing good working relations with an Arab is to establish a good personal relationship. In professional business, Arabs are driven more by the personal relationship than time constraints, mission requirements, or professional skills. In business meetings formal, courtesies are expected. Cards which should be printed in both English and Arabic are regularly exchanged. Initial business meetings are usually social and rarely include objective analysis, pragmatic application, or frank exchange. Protocol is emphasized through polite conversation and refreshments. Business may be addressed at a subsequent meeting or at a dinner. Many topics may be discussed in order to assess the character of potential business partners. 65

Arab business moves at a slow pace. It is also common to avoid saying no outright to a proposed business deal. Frequently, Arab businessmen will indicate that they want to deliberate about the deal in order to allow the salesman to avoid the shame of a negative response. Criticism, even if offered constructively, can threaten or damage an Arabs honor and may be taken as a personal insult. To protect himself and his honor from criticism, an Arab may flatly deny facts or re-interpret them. Westerners should obscure corrective remarks and praise good points. In general, time is much less rigidly scheduled than in Western culture. However, it is considered rude to be late to an appointment, as is looking at ones watch or acting pressed for time. Arabs can be very offended by this. Additionally, Arabs believe that future plans may interfere with the will of God. Commitments a week or more into the future are less common than in Western culture. Friendship Friendship is defined differently by Arabs than by Americans. Arabs adhere to strict, formal rules of behavior and politeness. For an Arab, good manners require that one never flatly refuse a request from a friend. This does not mean that the favor must actually be done, but rather that the response must not be stated as a definitive no. If an Arab friend asks for a favor, it should be done if possible. If the favor is unreasonable, illegal, or too difficult, listening carefully, expressing doubt about the outcome, and promising to help is appropriate. Later, an expression of regret and an offer to do another favor is advisable. Many Arabs like to discuss money and may ask the cost of items or about salaries. As it is unusual in Arab society for an adult to be unmarried and for married couples to have no children, Arabs do not feel it improper to address such issues. Arabs consider questions about women in their families too personal. It is best to ask about the family, not specifically about an Arabs wife, sister, or grown daughter. 66

Hygiene Personal hygiene is extremely important to Iraqi Arabs for both spiritual and practical reasons. Because meals are frequently eaten by hand, it is typical to wash the hands before and after eating. Formal washing of the face, hands, and forearms, called wudhu, and general cleanliness of the body and clothing is required before daily prayers or fasting. A formal head-to-toe washing, called ghusi, is recommended following contact with substances considered unclean, including alcohol, pigs, dogs, or non-believers. Gifts Small gifts and candies are appropriate gifts for those invited to Iraqi homes. It is customary that gifts are not opened in front of people. Unlike Westerners, Arabs do not feel it necessary to bring gifts when visiting someones home; it is the responsibility of the host to provide for a guest in Arab culture. Other Cultural Considerations Often, an Arabs view of the world is based on one of five concepts: atomism, fatalism, wish-versus-reality, extremism, and paranoia. Atomism. Arabs tend to perceive events as isolated incidents. Emphasis on the part rather than the whole is a key psychological feature of Arab culture. Arabs do not generally subscribe to the Western concept of cause and effect; they often dismiss causal chains of events. These thought processes could cause Arabs and Arab rhetoric to seem illogical or irrational to Westerners who look for a unifying concept. Fatalism. Most Arabs believe human beings do not control life, but Gods will, or fate does. Contentment with the blessings of the day, tranquility, and acceptance in the face of hardship are part of the Islamic tradition. Fatalism complicates planning with Arabs to change what they consider to be a natural, unchangeable chain of events. Wish-versus-Reality. Arabs often use forceful and appealing rhetoric that tends toward exaggeration. In their hyperbole, wish blends 67

with reality; the ideal becomes more real than fact until the Arab is forced to accept reality. Even then, the reality is merely Gods will, unalterable by human beings. The tendency to blend ideals with reality makes Arab behavior seem illogical to Westerners. The ability to blend wish and reality into a psychologically acceptable concept explains how Arabs can live in an atmosphere of seeming contradiction; their desire for modernity is contradicted by a desire for Islamic tradition free of Western influence. Extremism. Many Arabs perceive the world in extremes, perhaps due to the harsh, desert environment that Arabs have lived in for thousands of years. Either there was water or no water; it was either hot or cold. Surrounded by an environment of extremes, Arabs perceive the world in those terms, and this attitude remains prevalent in Arabic society. As a result, Arabs do not address challenges the way Americans would; if a plan, project, or piece of equipment has a problem, then it means the entire plan, project, or piece of equipment is a problem. Paranoia. Arabs appear paranoid by Western standards. Many perceive problems as part of a plot to foil their attempts to make life more pleasant. Arab history of foreign domination and totalitarian governments may be the root of this concept. It often means that Middle Easterners view Americans living in the Middle East as secret operatives. Family members may be suspected of plotting against other family members for opportunities. The government is often viewed as plotting against the people for its own gain. Social etiquette The following are some actions that may offend an Arab.
I I I

Dont stare at women on the street or initiate conversation with them. Avoid pointing a finger at an Arab or beckoning with a finger. Use the right hand to eat, touch, and present gifts; the left is generally regarded as unclean. 68

I I I

Avoid putting feet on tables or furniture. Refrain from leaning against walls, slouching in chairs, and keeping hands in pockets. Do not show the soles of the feet, as they are the lowest and dirtiest part of the body.

Family
The family is the central unit of social organization in Iraqi society. It also is a relatively cohesive institution at the center of economic activities. The family provides protection, food, shelter, income, reputation, and honor. The Iraqi Arab family is not extended in the strict sense. It is rare for three or more generations to live together. However, relatives generally remain tied in a web of intimate relationships. They continue to live in the same neighborhood, to intermarry, and to group together on a kinship basis. Although the family is losing ground where social change is occurring most rapidly (such as in cities), family loyalty still dominates all aspects of Iraqi Arab life. Economic motivation and considerations of prestige and family strength all contribute to the high value Iraqis place on large families. Family members may be held responsible for the acts of every other member. Iraqi families are patriarchal and hierarchal. The father has authority and responsibility. He expects respect and unquestioning compliance, and shows little tolerance for dissent. Fathers generally distance themselves from their children while the children are young. The same patriarchal and hierarchical relations and values prevail at work and in religious, political, and social associations. Arab men and women continue to place a high value on their family affiliations in general and their roles as generators of new families in particular, and not on their own personal achievements. Young people in Arab society are not considered truly adult until they have completed the important rites of passage of marriage and parenthood. 69

Men Men are privileged in Iraqi Arab society, wielding almost all authority. Valued masculine attributes include personal bravery, a willingness to bear hardships and to come to the aid of family and friends regardless of the circumstances, and fathering children (preferably sons). Traditionally, a mans overarching responsibility has been to lead, protect, and provide for his family. Women Men and women have complementary and integrated roles, but are not equal in Iraqi Arab society. The majority of women occupy the private domain of the household, where their primary role is to make a comfortable home and bear and nurture children. Wives are expected to obey and serve their husbands and to defer to them, especially in public. Behind the scenes, women exercise more power than is immediately apparent. Supported by religious ideology and teachings, the prevailing standards of morality stress values and norms associated with traditional ideas of femininity, motherhood, and sexuality. A familys honor is tied to a womans modesty and faithfulness. In recent years, gender roles in Iraq have undergone some slight changes as a result of increased education, rapid urbanization, and the employment of women. In addition, the Baath Party supported more equality for women. For 30 years, Iraqi Arab women have participated in the government. Age and marital status determine a womans position. A young wife is at a disadvantage compared to an older one, especially a mother-in-law, and unmarried women generally have less authority than married ones. The number of children a woman bears, especially sons, also gives her status. In Arab-Islamic societies, a woman owes her allegiance to her father rather than to her husband. Dating and Marriage Traditionally, an Iraqi Arab marriage is more a family and communal affair than an individual one. It has been used to reinforce family ties 70

and interests. Iraqi Arabs still arrange marriages and permit endogamy (marriage within the same lineage, village, or community). Most common is the parallel cousin marriage marriage between a man and his fathers brothers daughter which serves to enhance and strengthen group solidarity. It is a strategy for retaining an individuals loyalty and commitment, and wealth within the family circle. Endogamy is more an ideological preference than an actual practice in modern Iraq. However, families still prefer their children marry individuals whose social and religious backgrounds and kinships networks are familiar. Traditionally, girls marry at a substantially earlier age than boys. Great emphasis is placed on premarital chastity. Polygamy in Iraq is conditional upon approval of a judge. It is relatively easy for a husband to divorce his wife, but difficult for a wife to divorce her husband against his will. The traditional codes governing marriage, divorce, custody, and inheritance differ in Iraqi Arab society according to religious sect. Children The hierarchical structure of the Arab family requires children to obey their elders and meet expectations. Reflecting nomadic tradition, sons are especially welcome in Arab families because they are the carriers of the family line, and because their economic contribution is usually greater than that of daughters. Sons are usually taught to be protectors of their sisters and to help the father with his duties inside and outside the house, while daughters are taught to defer to their brothers, and to help the mother with household chores. During adolescence, there is traditionally a separation of sexes. Boys have greater freedom than girls and are drawn into the social circles of their fathers during this time. The cornerstone of educating a child in Arab families is teaching complete obedience to authority. Arab families also teach their children to attach tremendous importance to blood ties and bonds of loyalty. They are taught that their identity comes from belonging to a particular primary group: their family, their friends, and perhaps their place of work. Group affiliation is important and acceptance is achieved by conforming 71

to accepted behavioral norms. Arab children are taught to feel shame as an excruciating punishment and to avoid it in any way possible. There is no real prohibition against distortion or fabrication to avoid shame. Dress Iraqi Arab men (especially tribal men) often wear a three-piece head cover. The bottom piece of this head covering is a white cap that is sometimes filled with holes. This cap, called keffiya, is used to hold the hair in place. On top of it is a square cloth called a ghutra. On top of it is the agal, which is a thick black cord woven into two rings surrounding the top of the head to hold everything else in place. For male children, wearing the head covering is a sign of entering manhood. Inside the house, the head covering is not needed, although when a man has guests in his house he often wears it as a sign of respect. When this headwear is forcibly removed, ones honor is tainted and blood has to be shed to remove the shame. But if the agal is removed voluntarily, the wearer is signifying allegiance. Iraqi women typically are less traditional than women in other Arab states, but there are still many Iraqi women who cover their hair in public. The hair covering can range from a gauzy veil draped around the head and neck to a thick kerchief folded so that the front lies low on the forehead and the rest of the head is securely swathed. Some women wear a scarf-like cover called Hejab that covers the hair but not the face. In urban areas, it is unusual to see women who cover their hair and wear a veil, but the Hejab has become more common in rural areas. The majority of Iraqis incorporate Western clothes into their daily attire. It is more common to see traditional Arab attire in less urbanized areas. Traditional attire consists of a long-sleeved, one piece dress called a Dishdashah or Thoub that covers the whole body. This garment allows the air to circulate, which helps cool the body. During summer, it is usually made of cotton; in winter, it is made from heavier fabric such as wool and comes in darker colors. 72

Most Iraqi women dress conservatively, although many dont cover their face or hair. In the rural areas, many women wear the abaya, a long-sleeved, coat-like over-garment that covers one from neck to ankles. Beneath a robe, a woman may be wearing a traditional dress or casual Western clothes. In urban environments, it is typical to see men and women wear contemporary Western clothes. Suits and sport coats are common for men, while women wear dresses. Most people will wear manufactured shoes and use contemporary accessories such as purses, briefcases and backpacks. However, very little skin is ever shown even when wearing Western fashions, which might expose their legs or arms. Frequently, progressive middle-class women still wear scarves to cover their necks. The quality and style of the clothes is directly related to the status one has within Iraqi society. In keeping with the values of appearance and prestige, it is common to see workers dress up to go to work and change when they get to their jobs. Also, within medical, scientific and technical fields lab coats often have insignias that delineate positions within the workplace. Diet The staple of the Arab Iraqi diet is bread called Aish, which is dark pita bread. Fava beans are also a staple. Lamb is the most popular meat, and is often combined with vegetables and rice. Because of religious restrictions, Arabs do not eat pork, rabbit, or shellfish. Lunch is the main meal. Popular Iraqi Arab dishes include kubba (cracked wheat mixed with minced meat, nuts, spices, parsley and onion); dolma (vine leaves or other vegetables stuffed with rice, meat and spices); tikka (shish-kebab); quozi (small lamb stuffed with rice, minced meat and spices and served on rice); and masuf (fish from the Tigris cooked on the river bank). Religious feasts and national celebrations have special significance in Iraq. They often include the extended family. During feasts, people greet 73

each other with the words Ayamak Saeeda (happy days). Since Islamic law prohibits alcohol, some Iraqis do not drink it. Alcohol consumption varies with the degree of an individuals religious faith. Dwellings Iraq has urbanized to a significant extent as approximately 60 percent of the population lives in an urban environment. Previously, Arabs were either nomads who lived in tent camps and moved their herds between summer and winter pasturage, or settled agriculturists who lived in villages or cities. In the cities there are several types of structures for dwelling, including houses, apartments and hotels. Usually, Arab houses are constructed to maximize privacy. Walls are thick and solid, while entrances and windows are positioned to prevent occupants from invading the privacy of their neighbors and vice-versa. In most major Iraqi cities there is some European influence, resulting from many years of British control. There is usually a correlation

Iraqi Farm 74

between the size and grandeur of a persons house and their social position within the community. Most Iraqi houses are single or two-story structures without basements. They typically have wood or tiled floors and fewer windows than Western houses. There is little emphasis on furniture, but most rooms have carpets and pillows. There is an aversion to partitions within the home. Although many Iraqis cannot afford spacious homes, they have large open spaces in the home to foster family togetherness. Iraqi houses are frequently built around shared courtyards lined with trees, which provide shade and privacy. Since the Gulf War, most Iraqi residences experience problems with basic utility services, and there are periods of time when electric power is shut off. Village and rural settlements tend to be spartan and plain, a subtle rejection of many of the corrupt values that cities tend to represent to some rural Arabs. Most rural settlements have only basic features that encompass the necessities in life. These settlements are organized around the markets that are the centers of trade and interaction. Some Iraqis who have not settled in villages or towns live in heavy woolen tents, which remain standing in winter pastures; they use lighter tents when traveling to and from summer pastures. Camps may consist of an entire clan or of a group of families who join to herd their flocks together. Southern Marsh Arabs live in villages built on swamps; Hussein destroyed most of these when he crushed the 1991 uprising. These Bedouins, although migratory, tend to appreciate technology and the Western influences of the cities. Their tents may be adorned with brighter colors and equipped with modern appliances or equipment.

Cultural Economy
The Iraqi Arab economy has always been diverse, including pastoral nomadism, settled agriculture, manufacturing, and commerce. Although communities of nomads, village farmers, and city dwelling merchants have always been distinct from one another, they were economically interdependent, and their respective interests were often in conflict. 75

The shift from agriculture to oil production during the 20th century transferred economic power from the big landowners to a small urban elite. More importantly, the influx of vast oil revenues strengthened the state. The state spent huge sums on social services to reinforce political compliance, providing education, supplying jobs, and subsidizing food. In addition, oil revenues were used to accommodate most of the displaced agricultural workers who had migrated from the countryside to the cities. By the 1970s, the majority of the workforce in the cities was employed by the government. The regime achieved a monopoly over sources of wealth. In the rural areas, goods continued to be produced largely under preindustrial conditions. Despite some commercial development, the economic base was still agriculture and, to a lesser extent, animal husbandry. The decade of economic sanctions that followed the Gulf War created new economic dynamics in Iraq. Unemployment and diminishing salaries deepened social divisions and inequalities. The sanctions had an uneven impact on different regions and groups because of the regimes long-established method of distributing benefits to favored individuals and groups. The increased competition for resources heightened ethnic and tribal rivalries. A substantial parallel economy based on smuggling developed. The networks controlling this parallel economy were closely linked to Saddam Husseins clan and extended family. Most of the population remains dependent on the state rationing system, which the government uses as a means to exert control. Crime, smuggling, and reliance on family and clan networks to get ahead have increased. Urban Versus Rural Culture The disappearance of the nomadic population and the division of Iraqi Arab society between urban and rural are relatively recent occurrences. Previously, Iraqi Arab society was divided into three interdependent, yet antagonistic groups: nomads, agriculturalists, and town-dwellers. Despite the decline of the nomadic population, the Bedouin tribal mode still profoundly influences the rural population and the newly settled sections of small and medium-sized towns, especially in western and 76

southern Iraq. Generally, the tribes of the west and the mid-Euphrates desert region have maintained (or recreated) their traditions more fully than those of eastern Iraq. Urban Arabs, particularly the educated ones, have been influenced by Turkish and Iranian cultures. Tribal Arabs have not. The Ottoman Empire championed the towns at the expense of the tribes. The British, in contrast, tried to balance the tribes against the towns, and excluded the countryside from national law. Until the fall of the monarchy in 1958, Iraq was legally subject to two norms: one for the city and one for the tribal areas. Until well into the 20th century, many urban residents were of relatively recent tribal origin. These tribal immigrants were therefore a link between the two disparate societies. Those who moved into Baghdad and other urban centers from the same village tended to relocate in clusters to ease the difficulties of transition and maintain traditional patterns of mutual assistance. Neighborhoods formed on the basis of rural or even tribal origin. Over the last 20 years, the divide between the rural and urban communities has deteriorated. Large areas of the rural south especially have been devastated by continuous fighting, triggering a massive migration to the cities. The Arabic word for city, medina, connotes the center of political or economic power. Iraqi cities and towns are a mosaic of neighborhoods based mainly on religious or ethnic composition. In general, Islamic cities are marked by a series of specific buildings and institutions such as the Friday mosque and public bath. There is a strict separation between markets and places of production and residential areas. Rural Iraq retains aspects of the largely traditional mode of social organization, particularly in the more isolated areas, such as the marshes in the south. Each household typically consists of one nuclear family, although some may include an extended family. The division of labor within the house is clear-cut and follows the traditional rural pattern of men working the fields and women tending to the household chores. 77

Marsh Arabs
The Madan or Marsh Arabs are a distinct group of rural Shia Arabs. A considerable number of them claim to be Sayyids, or descendants of the Prophet, and differentiate themselves from the other tribesmen by wearing green-and-black instead of black-and-white check headcloths. For 5,000 years, Marsh Arabs lived a very different life from other Iraqis. Inhabiting the wetland region at the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers in southern Iraq, they did very little farming, depending instead on fishing and raising water buffalo. The Marsh Arabs kept water buffalo primarily for milk, dung, and hides. Their quonset-hutshaped houses were built of reeds and could be moved if necessary. Craftsmen created ornate canoes and barges, which the Madan used to travel around the marshes. The mudhif, a grand arched structure built entirely of reeds by sheikhs, served as a guest house and dominated the settlement. The Madan comprise several different tribes and sections of surrounding tribes. The main tribes are the Faraijat, Shaghanba, Fartus, Shadda, Suaidiyin, Suaid, Kauliba, and Chab. Following the 1991 Shia uprising in the south, the regime drained the marshlands, dispersing the Marsh Arabs and largely destroying their way of life. Today the region is a massive network of man-made canals, parched earth, and sunken fields.

Warfare
Arab warfare stems directly from nomadic traditions and experiences. Historically, nomadic tribes alternated between accommodating central authority and defying it. In the first case, they were employed as frontier defense forces or as auxiliary light cavalry. In the second case, they posed a threat to settled populations by attacking small isolated garrisons and raiding poorly defended towns. Although the nomadic population of Iraq has greatly decreased in the 20th century, the image of the nomadic warrior has remained powerful. Because the extended family is the fundamental unit of political and social action, a kin group traditionally has looked first to its own fighting men, not to the states armed 78

forces, to ensure its protection and promotion of its interests. They resort to arms for the sake of tribe and clan first, which remains a higher ideal than military service to the state. Past Iraqi regimes constantly emphasized threats from ever-present and dangerous enemies, and simultaneously glorified force and violence. The defeat of the Kurdish insurgency in 1974-75 taught the Baathists that they could achieve policy goals with military force. Similarly, the humiliation of having to agree to the conditions of the March 1975 Algiers Accord in the face of Iranian military superiority convinced Baghdad that only the strong prosper in the Middle East. Government propaganda created an atmosphere of permanent crisis, enabling the regime to mobilize greater support. Overall, martial virtues imbue Iraqi Arab culture and society. During the Iran-Iraq War and the Persian Gulf War, the regime glorified and promoted ideals of honor and self-sacrifice. Husseins appeal to Arab rulers during the Gulf War resembled the old tribal competitions in which each tribe measured its strength, heroism, and honor against those of others and prided itself on its exalted qualities. The conduct of a struggle is considered just as important as its outcome. To show honor during a military operation is praised, regardless of the outcome. Conventional Warfare Cultural factors have made it difficult for Arab militaries to adopt Western war-fighting doctrine. Western warfare emphasizes offensive action and shock effect, whereas Arab warfare emphasizes standoff, attrition, deception, and surprise. Martial traditions also influence which military units are most prestigious. Fighter squadrons and commando units, for example, perform raid-like missions, which have a high profile in ArabIslamic history. Elite guard formations, such as the Republican Guard, also have historical precedent. Arab militaries, including the Iraqi military, have not been effective in the modern era. According to several observers, Arab culture encour79

ages patterns of behavior that are not conducive to modern military operations. Arab officers (especially junior officers) are hesitant to exercise independent judgment, frequently lack extensive technical training, and are prone to selectively transmit information in order to avoid the loss of face. These types of Arab cultural behavior patterns cause Arab militaries to have weak information flows. Arab military personnel often cannot take full advantage of their weaponry and equipment and have difficulty maintaining it. Arab armed forces training teaches that there is only one right answer to a military problem and only one right way to handle a situation. This approach is employed in battle regardless of other factors such as terrain, mission, forces available, or the enemys strength or disposition. Arab training exercises tend to be scripted and unrealistic. Training manuals are treated as cookbooks, and are followed to the letter. Unconventional/Tribal Warfare In the past, sedentary and nomadic units were skeptical of outside groups, fearing competition for scarce resources. Protection of territory and allegiance to the social unit were primary reactions against intrusion. It was common to engage in military forays to usurp and plunder resources belonging to a weaker tribe or neighbor. The glory of the raid, whether against another nomadic tribe, settled enemy, or caravan, is a key aspect of Bedouin tribal warfare. In many cases, the raids were carried out with minimal violence. However, they could become a flash point for a larger tribal conflict. Tribes commemorated their raids through poetry and song. Although it varied greatly as to numbers involved and distances traveled, raiding followed certain norms. Raiding tribes traveled light, avoided detection, moved quickly, minimized bloodshed, and took camels only no captives or other spoils. When raiding led to a larger conflict, the objective usually was not to force submission, but to restore the balance of honor or the balance of livestock. Tribal warfare tended to become more intense and bloody when central authorities tried to impose political control on a rural population. 80

Participation in a raid was considered a dramatic test of courage, skill, and dedication to the goals of the tribal group. Combat usually bestowed honor on both sides. For Iraqi Arab tribes, honor is the dominant value. In the collective sense, honor means defense of the tribe, the group, or the society as a whole against its challengers. Lost honor, according to tribal tradition, must be retrieved by violence.

Kurds Ethnic Description


The Kurds live in the mountainous region of the Middle East where the borders of Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran meet. There are an estimated 2025 million Kurds in the Middle East. The Kurds have always been a stateless people. Kurds in Iraq make up 15-20 percent of the Iraqi population of 24 million, or about 4-5 million people. Kurds are distinct from the Arabs, Turks and Iranians who live around them, but are ethnically and linguistically closest to Iranians.

Religious Identity
Most Kurds are Muslim, while the remainder follows heterodox (non traditional, unorthodox) religions. Within the Kurdish ethnic group, there are variations of Islamic practice. Nearly all Kurds in Iraq are Sunni adherents, with the exception of the Faili Kurds, who are Shia and live in and around Kirkuk and south to Khanaqin. Sunni Kurds follow the Shafii school, which sets them apart from most of the other Sunni adherents in Iraq who follow the Hanafi school. In addition to the followers of orthodox Islamic practice, there is a strong Islamic Sufi mystic following among the Kurds of Iraq. Small numbers of Kurds follow Alevism, Yazidism, or are members of the Ahl-e Haqq/Kakai religion, all of which are heterodox and non-Islamic. Religion has played a key role in the Kurdish national movement, because it granted key leaders an added authority that transcended the often-divisive boundaries of tribal loyalty. The most prominent leaders 81

of the Kurdish national movement Mahmud Barzinji, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, Massoud Barzani, and Jalal Talabani are from sheikh families, which gives them added influence as religious leaders in addition to their status as nationalist leaders. Unlike in cultures where the church and state are separate, in Islamic society there is not conflict between being both a secular and religious leader, but rather, holding both positions is seen as a benefit because it grants the individual greater authority and status.

Language
There are approximately 13 million Kurdish speakers spread over Iraq, Iran, Syria, Turkey, Armenia, and Georgia. Kurdish is an Indo-European language belonging to the Iranian branch and, hence, is completely unrelated to the Semitic language of Arabic spoken by the majority of the population in Iraq. Kurdish is a member of the Western subgroup of Iranian languages, which include Persian and Baluchi. In Iraq, the Kurdish speakers are divided into two main dialects: Kurmanji (Northern Kurdish) and Surani (Southern Kurdish, also referred to as Sorani or Kurdi). Kurmanji and Surania are sometimes categorized as separate languages because of difficulties with mutual intelligibility. There are approximately 2.8 million Kurmanji speakers in Iraq and 4 million Kurmanji-speaking Kurds in Turkey. Kurmanji is also spoken among Kurds in Armenia, Georgia, and Syria. There are approximately 2.8 million Surani-speaking Kurds in Iraq and 3 million Surani-speaking Kurds in Iran. The dialect of Surani Kurdish in the town of Sulaimaniya, Iraq is recognized by most Kurds as a standardized literary version of the Kurdish language. The Sulaimaniya version of Kurdish has attempted to exclude all borrowed Arabic words from its vocabulary. Other Kurdish dialects in Iraq include a heavily Persian version of Surani, found in the southeast of Iraq. Gurani is spoken in enclaves in southern Kurdistan and Zaza is spoken in northwestern Kurdistan. Gurani and Zaza 82

are related languages of the Indo-Iranian family of languages, but are only distantly related to Kurdish. The language uses a modified Arabic script in Iraq and Syria, however Kurds in Turkey use a Roman script.

Role of Tribes in Society


Kurdish identity is a series of levels of association that progress outward from the individual to household to lineage to tribe to dialect group. The bond that unites Kurdish tribesmen is a common tradition based on at least the claim to common origin and has resulted in the creation of a general body of tribal lore. This socially ascribed identity is reliant on it being recognized by others and is usually associated with a claim to a specific territory. Thus all the people who live in an area belong to the tribe by virtue of their presence in its territory. This belonging carries with it certain obligations, such as defense against external aggression. Every tribe encompasses one or more prominent agha lineages. These families historically wielded great power and in some cases still do. Aghas are those families who have maintained their claim to territory, to the extent of essentially owning their tribal villages. Aghas operate within tribally defined networks and also serve as brokers with the state. Aghas have shown great skill in forming alliances to play one neighboring power off another. During the nineteenth century, the term Kurd, which had previously meant simply nomad, came to be defined as tribal people who spoke the Kurdish language. Tribalism has declined as a principle of social organization in recent decades and most Kurds do not now consider themselves tribal. However, it remains a crucial component of Kurdish ethnicity. Furthermore, the importance of kin-based relationships as a means of social and political organization has also prevailed in both urban and rural areas. The rising influence of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) in northern Iraq during the past two decades has had a pronounced impact on the relative strength of Kur83

dish tribalism. Most commentators view the two political parties as now fulfilling the political roles that were formerly the preserve of the tribes. To an extent, this trend has resulted from the relative weakness of Kurdish tribal structures in comparison to those in the rest of Iraq. Kurdish tribes tend to be smaller, there are fewer Kurdish confederations, and in some areas, tribal organization has been abandoned altogether. Non-tribal Kurds, usually tenants, sharecroppers or landless laborers populate significant areas of the Kurdish region. One study has suggested that in 1960 approximately 60 percent of Kurds claimed a tribal affiliation; by the late 1980s, this figure had fallen to about 20 percent. Kurdish tribes retain significant social functions and there are close relationships between the tribes and political parties. Although the relationship is less intimate in the case of the PUK - the KDP essentially being a vehicle for the Barzani tribe and its leader Maasud Barzani - both parties rely on the tribes for support. In many ways, the parties themselves operate as neo-tribal entities. The relationships between the parties and Kurdish tribes - and the Kurdish population in general - is mediated via complex networks of patronage, through which tribal leaders are coopted into each partys sphere of influence. In this way, the parties act in the same way as tribal confederations. Kurdish tribal leaders, then, are essentially non-ideological, mostly secular, and are motivated primarily by the need to augment their support base against other tribes and non-tribal leaders. Many view themselves as Kurdish Iraqis and, with only a weakly articulated nationalist outlook, tend to be ambivalent at best with regards to Kurdish self-determination, borne out by their willingness to side with the regime during the 1980s. For these leaders, independent statehood is seen as less important than - and probably inimical to - tribal autonomy (particularly the ability to control trade routes passing through their areas). As far as Barzani and Talabani are concerned, a federal Iraq that provided the parties with the opportunity to retain control over their respective territories would probably come close to their ideal. 84

Kurdish tribes, therefore, are socio-political, economic, and territorial units that are the primary system of social organization within the Kurdish ethnic group. Kinship ties alone do not determine the membership of a tribe, as the Kurds do not hold to their genealogies to the same extent as Arabs. A tribe may have clients who, after several generations of cohabitation and cooperation, especially in military defense of the tribe, are accepted into the tribe as full members, regardless of their lack of kinship ties. There is often competition within and between Kurdish tribes; they do not consistently function as cohesive units, or as unified parts of a larger Kurdish ethnic group. The same flexibility that allows non-blood relations to become part of a tribe after a certain period of cooperation also allows for internal tribal divisions and transfers of loyalty based on pragmatic assessments of personal and or tribal advancement. Kurdish tribes are closely related to a particular territory. The name of a tribe is often the same as that of the town or region where the tribal members originate, for example the Barzani tribe is from Barzan. Tribal loyalties continue to dominate Kurdish society, and the allegiance of the majority of the Kurds has been to their extended families, clans, and tribes. Kurdish tribal leaders have played key roles in galvanizing and leading the Kurdish nationalist movement, but tribal ties undermined a more general and all-encompassing Kurdish nationalism. Aware of the power of tribal leaders, both the KDP and the PUK have attempted to gain their support. Kurdish Tribes Baradusti/Bardost/Baradost. The Bardost tribe lives near the intersection of the border of Iran, Iraq and Turkey. They speak the Northern Kurmanji dialect. The Bardost are followers of the Naqshbandi Sufi order. One of a number of independent tribes, opposed to both the PUK and KDP, the Baradost were traditionally the leaders of the opposition to Barzani hegemony over the Kurds, with whom they have been at war for several years. 85

Barzani. The Barzani tribe is from the area around the town of Barzan on the Greater Zab River. They speak the Northern Kurmanji dialect. The Barzani tribe was part of the Zibari tribe until the 19th century when it split into a separate tribal formation. Barzani tribal leaders have been the most prominent Kurdish resistance fighters and political leaders up to and during the post-1991 Gulf War period. The Barzani tribe has engaged in sporadic conflicts with many other Kurdish tribes. The network between the KDP and the Barzani tribe is of a similar order to that between Husseins regime and the Abu Nasir tribe. The KDP has, however, been careful to cultivate a broad support base among the tribes resident in its stronghold in the north of the Kurdish region, home to more than 2 million people. Daudi. Centered in the south of the Kurdish region between the towns of Tauq, Kifri and Tuz, Daudi tribesmen were heavily represented in the Peshmerga Kurdish militant forces during the 1980s. They are a Surani speaking tribe, and are affiliated with the PUK. A number of the tribes villages were destroyed in the Anfal campaigns in the late 1980s. Hamawand. The Hamawand tribe lives in the Sulaymaniyah area in the vicinity of Chamchamel and speaks Surani (southern) Kurdish. Historically, the tribe sustained itself by raiding, rather than as nomadic shepherds as were most other Kurdish tribes. Hamawand tribe members follow the Qadiri Sufi order. Harki/Herki. The Herki are one of the few Kurdish tribes in Iraq to maintain significant elements of their nomadic lifestyle as recently as the 1980s. They live near the Greater Zab River in the area east of Rawanduz. Another grouping of the Herki tribe lives at the intersection of the borders of Iran, Iraq and Turkey. The Harki in southern Iraqi Kurd region speak Sorani Kurdish; members of the Herki tribe in the northern Iraqi Kurd region, Iran and Turkey may speak either Sorani or Kumanji Kurdish dialects. The Harki tribe has historically been an adversary of the Barzani tribe, with a disagreement in 1994 sparking intertribal fighting between the PUK and KDP. 86

Jaf. Historically one of the most powerful Kurdish confederations, the Jaf claim a genealogical connection with Saladin, the great military leader from the Crusades. The Jaf is the largest Kurdish confederation, with 25 constituent tribes and more than a million members throughout northern Iraq and Iran, but concentrated in the Iraqi governorates of Sulaymaniyah, Diyala and At Tamin. The Jaf tribe is located on the IranIraq border close to the city of Halabja, west to Kirkuk and north to Sulaymaniyah. The confederation has strong ties with moderate elements and the opposition movement in Iran. They speak Sorani Kurdish. The Jaf and the Talabani tribes worked together during the 1988 Iraqi Anfal campaign and maintain good relations. Pizhdar. The Pizhdar tribe lives along the Iraq-Iran border near the Lesser Zab River in the vicinity of Qala Diza on the Iraqi side and Sardasht in Iran. Members of the Pizhdar tribe speak Sorani Kurdish and follow the Qadiri Sufi order. The social organization of the tribe is hierarchical and stratified with distinctions between the ruling class and their subjects, who are further subdivided into original tribal members and those who have attached themselves to the tribe voluntarily or through conquest. The Pizhdar tribe fought with the government against the Kurdish nationalists in the 1970s, placing themselves in opposition to the prominent Barzani tribe. More recently, however, the tribe was known to be very hostile toward Husseins regime, and suffered heavy losses during the Anfal campaigns. Some of the tribes land was confiscated by the regime under the Arabisation policies. Surchi. The Surchi are a large tribe along the middle course of the Greater Zab River, between the towns of Rawandiz and Akra. Its leaders are closely involved with the Kurdish Conservative Party (KCP), which the tribe founded. The Surchi collaborated with Hussein during the 1980s, and, because of this, the rest of the Kurdish population apparently does not respect Surchi leaders. The tribe is strongly opposed to the KDP, which is known to have attacked Surchi villages and is thought to have killed the tribes leader in 1996. The tribe is currently aligned with the PUK. The Surchi is one of the few Kurmanji-speaking tribes 87

affiliated with the PUK. The Surchi is also likely to be antagonistic toward Turkey, due to the destruction of a Surchi village by Turkish aircraft in summer 2000 that killed 32 tribesmen. Talabani. The Talabani is a large tribe located to the south and south east of Kirkuk and north of Khanaqin. The status of the Talabani as an authentic tribe is in doubt, as it essentially represents an extension of the land-owning Talabani family who dominated the eastern part of the Kurdish region until the early years of the 20th century. Talabani members live throughout Iraqi Kurdistan, and the tribe is now virtually synonymous with the PUK, through the influence of its leader, Jalal Talabani. The PUK controls an estimated 12,000 fighting personnel plus 6,000 support troops. The Talabani tribe is one of the southern-most of the Kurdish tribes in Iraq. The tribe members speak Sorani Kurdish. The Talabani tribe has been allied with the Jaf tribe. Relations between the Talabani tribe and the Barzani tribe, to which the leader of the KDP belongs, are strained by the divergent political goals and positions of the two Kurdish parties. Zibari. The Zibari tribe is a rival of the Barzani tribe because of their close proximity to each other in northern Iraqi Kurdistan, and the Zibaris have sided with the government against the Barzani tribe. However, the two tribes have also found common cause when the situation required. The Zibari-Barzani rivalry began in the 19th century when the Zibari tribe split and half supported the secular tribal leaders while the others supported the Sheikh of the village of Barzan, creating the Barzani tribe. Zibari tribe members speak Kurmanji Kurdish.

Rule of Law
Kurds value freedom/independence (azad). This independent spirit helps explain the success of Kurdish resistance to imperial and Iraqi attempts to rule them. Blood feuds occasionally occur throughout the Iraqi Kurd region. Kurdish blood feuding appears to differ little from that found in the surrounding Arab culture. An attack on an individual group member is considered an attack on collective honor and thus 88

involves the entire group. Even if blood feuds do not occur frequently, their potential is a powerful influence on behavior. The Kurdish concept of serim (loosely translated as shame) powerfully shapes Kurdish behavior. Under usual circumstances, it prevents overt, face-to-face challenges to hierarchy and authority. Kurdish culture to some extent valorizes wily or deceitful behavior. At the same time, people who display integrity are highly admired.

Family
The Kurdish term for household is mal, which usually includes the nuclear family plus the husbands parents. A Kurdish family is hierarchical. Status within the household is based mostly on age and gender. The head of the household is the oldest adult male, and he exercises a high degree of authority and responsibility. However, females wield more behind the scenes power than do Arab women. The oldest female in the household often has considerable say in what happens in the dayto-day operations within the household and how the children are reared. Marriage Marriages are significant events to Kurdish families. Traditionally, they are arranged. Potential brides are expected to display shyness and reticence to marry. To act otherwise would bring shame on the family. Kurds practice endogamy. Ideally, a man will marry his fathers brothers daughter, to whom he has first rights. Marriage celebrations can range from a day to a week. Gifts are exchanged between the wedding families. The bride brings with her a dowry equal to the ceremonial bride price and the agreed-upon alimony to be collected if the marriage ends in divorce. On the 7th day of the marriage, the couple visits close relatives, receiving more presents for their new lives. If the groom does not pay the agreed-upon bride-wealth or does not support his wife according to the standards of her own family, the bride has grounds for divorce. The only other way she may obtain divorce is by repayment in full of the bride-wealth, unless otherwise stipulated in the marriage settlement. A man may divorce his wife by renouncing her three times. 89

Customs
Greetings When most Kurds meet they ask, where are your people from? The answer may be general, naming a tribe or area, or it may be more specific noting the village, name of presiding agha and lineage. However, urban Kurds may define themselves by their millet, or their religious community. Kurds respect formality, and believe that only using first names is a sign of disrespect. One must use titles and first and last names when speaking to Kurds. Kurds typically adopt the name of the father for the middle name and the tribal name for the last name and will introduce themselves as such when greeting someone. In some cases, Kurds will use a first name if it is preceded by a term of formality. The most common terms are Kak, which is similar to mister and Mam, which is similar to uncle. These terms are used among Kurds with a strong level of familiarity. Adhere to strict protocol when greeting Kurds; a break in formality is seen as disrespectful unless you are good friends with the Kurd in question. Initially Kurds are suspicious of strangers and strange things due to the betrayals that the Kurds have endured throughout their history. Gestures Most Kurds will extend their hand and when it is grasped, will grasp with their second hand and shake vigorously. Kurds, like Arabs, will look people in the eye when shaking hands. Kurds will use some of the same hand signals as Arabs, but they do not place the same significance on them. Two of the most important hand signals to avoid are, beckoning to or pointing at someone with a finger and shaking the ok sign at someone. In Iraq and parts of Iran these signs are seen as offensive. Visiting In rural parts of the Kurdish homeland, it is customary to offer strangers food and shelter. Shelter is usually provided by the agha, the highest90

ranking member of the community. Agha means landlord, and it is considered his duty to maintain the guest house. Since the guest house is the dwelling for visitors to the village or town, it is often the focal point for that community. When visiting the aghas shelter, women remain out of sight, except to make or serve food. Because Kurds take pride in being good hosts, they will be disappointed by somber or uncooperative guests who do not go along with the entertainment aspect of visiting, be it conversation or games. Kurds will refuse offers of food two or three times before accepting, and similar behavior is expected of a visitor. Negotiation Kurds are wary of laws, regulations, and authority. Independence and autonomy are influential in negotiation. Across the Kurdish homeland, tribal confederacies are the highest form of social organization and will usually govern the political processes. In rural settings, most negotiations and discussions take place in a Diwan setting. This is a community meeting place for discussion, storytelling and negotiation. It is typically formal, with men only in attendance. Despite their minority status and relatively small military forces, the Kurds have always tried to negotiate from a position of equality. However, this strategy has rarely worked in their favor. Conflict Resolution Because of their history of being betrayed and their strong tribal inclinations, independence and autonomy are essential to any binding resolution. It is in the Kurdish nature to try to skirt regulations or laws that they see as not in their best interest, which can hamper resolution efforts. Kurds tend to hold local political concerns above religion insofar as religion does not counter the interests of the tribe or confederation. Unlike Arabs, who attach many of their struggles and efforts to Islam, the Kurds are predominantly concerned with political and tribal matters. Tribal confederations and affiliations can be changed to accommodate present interests. An example of this was demonstrated by the Kurdish 91

side-switching after the Gulf War when the Iraqi army attempted to stamp out the KDP uprising. In resolving conflict, the manner in which the Kurds or the opposition conducts themselves is significant. Kurds consider valor to be the most valuable character trait of the individual; it is the prerequisite of honor. Kurds believe that the result of a struggle is not always as significant as the way in which it was conducted. Business Style Kurds are forthright to a fault, from the Western perspective. Kurds will voice their opinion positive or negative, which can at times be interpreted as being aggressive or rude. In business this can make people uncomfortable and hesitant to embrace Kurds as partners. In addition, the relationship between the Kurds and the countries that they occupy has hampered outside investment in traditional Kurdish areas. However, Kurds pride themselves on precision and attention to detail. They are also more inclined to individual enterprise and a means of self-reliance. Wealth and success are not seen as being excessive and are things to celebrate. Many Kurds feel that their business approach sets them apart from their Arab neighbors. Time and Space Kurds see the concept of borders as restrictive and running counter to their concept of homeland. Kurds associate their homeland with the mountains. Kurds believe that they are the descendants of all who ever came to settle in the Kurdish region and do not owe particular homage to the Turks, Arabs or Iranians. Like Arabs, Kurds do not mind being in crowds, but do not like to be confined indoors. Kurds also do not have the same concept of personal space that westerners have. They do not mind being close enough to smell someone and it is not considered a personal privacy invasion. The Kurdish year is 365 days and based on the Georgian calendar. Like westerners, they have 12 months, 24-hour days and a leap year every fourth year. 92

Hygiene Kurds believe that one must wash hands before and after eating. Like other Muslims, Kurds believe in a formal washing of the face, hands, and forearms, before daily prayers or fasting. Washing is also recommended following contact with other substances considered unclean, including alcohol, pigs, dogs, or non-believers. Gifts Unlike Arabs, Kurds do not believe that they have to offer their possessions as gifts to visitors. However, when visiting a Kurd in their home, it is customary to bring a small gift; this practice is especially prevalent when in rural areas. Acceptable gifts are sugar, tea, coffee, cloth, matches, soap, tobacco or cigarette paper. Social Etiquette
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Women are not to be stared at or given personal attention. Though Kurdish women enjoy a much more progressive life than Arab women, it is still an insult to the husband or father to have a woman in his household commented on or approached. Do not extend a hand to shake that of a females unless she approaches first. The household and family are private matters and not for discussion with others. Western women should not assert their views (equality, sexuality or opinion) to Kurdish women or men. Kurdish men will take this as an insult and an attack on their privacy. Kurds are shy about undressing in front of other people; doctors should be of the same sex. Kurds find public displays of affection between members of the opposite sexes offensive. Same sex affection is acceptable.

Dress The traditional male headdress is a turban worn over a skullcap or a fez, wrapped so that the fez can be seen from the top. The headdress is sym93

bolic of tribal or political affiliation. The skullcap is typically white or tan, while the turban can vary in color, pattern and style of wearing. In the northern Kurdish areas the turban is typically anchored to the skullcap and wound tightly. In the southern Kurdish areas the turban is worn loosely with a tail hanging to a side or covering an eyebrow. The turban color usually represents tribal affiliations: Red and White check or Red represents the Barzani tribe; Green represents Sayyaids who are descendants of Muhammad; White is typically representative of sheikhs or mullahs; Grey, black, grey checked with white and burgundy are standards of the smaller tribes. Women seldom cover their faces, but frequently wear scarves on their hair. Womens scarves, sashes and headdresses are also colored according to tribal and regional affiliations. It is typical in the larger cities to see men in suits or sport jackets and button down shirt with ties. Women have also adopted Western fashion and will wear conservative dresses, but more frequently pantsuits. Children in urban areas can be seen in baseball hats, T-shirts and jeans. It is not uncommon for teenagers to mimic some conservative Western styles such as athletic wear, sneakers, jeans and garments with western logos. The move from traditional Kurdish dress is seen as an embrace of modernity and a sign of progressiveness and education. However, traditional male Kurdish dress has not been completely abandoned, and is not just used in festivities or for special occasions. Traditional costume varies by region and marks regional origins. Increased contact with other ethnic groups and exposure to mass media has further stimulated ideas for costume variations. Kurdish men differ from Arabs in that they wear trousers. The traditional dress of a Kurdish man is loose trousers and matching jacket, long sleeve shirt, cummerbund, skullcap and turban. This combination can vary slightly from region to region and tribe to tribe. The southern Iraqi and Iranian dress is similar to that of the Kurdish soldiers. Traditionally, Kurdish soldiers (peshmergas) wore a loose shirt under a tight jacket with matching baggy pants and colored cummer94

bund, turban or balaclava signifying their tribe. However recently, they have begun to dress in camouflage or tan uniforms accented with a sash, turban or balaclava and Western-style military boots. Urban Kurdish women will wear Western clothing, but not styles that are revealing. Kurdish women will also wear Western shoes that would be considered conservative, such as sandals, low heels and boots. Younger Kurdish women mimic the styles of their elders; modern Western female styles are not considered acceptable. In rural areas middleaged to elderly women wear the traditional two-part Kurdish dress or the dishdash, an all-purpose housedress. Women traditionally wear two or three long dresses over trousers with jackets. The trousers are similar to pantaloons and the dresses are long sleeve and made of a woven fabric that varies with the season. Kurdish women frequently mix a variety of colors in their clothing. Diet The daily diet of most Kurds includes bread, dairy products (especially curdled milk), dates, tea, and meat. Popular vegetables include eggplant, tomatoes, red beets, green beans, cucumbers and olives. Most of the traditional dishes incorporate mutton, beef or chicken. Dwelling Historically, Kurds were either nomads who lived in tent camps and moved their herds between summer and winter pasturage, or settled agriculturists who lived in villages on the plains or in mountain valleys. Now most have settled. Those who have not live in heavy, black woolen tents that remain standing at the winter pastures; they use lighter tents when traveling to and from summer pastures higher in the mountains. Camps may consist of an entire clan or of a group of families who join to herd their flocks together. The houses in most Kurdish villages are built from clay, mud or sunbaked brick. They are often built on the sides of a slope so that the roof of one house serves as a terrace for the house above it. Some villages 95

correspond to tribal lineages, but many are not organized along any kind of kinship lines. Villages often own communal pastureland, and, in some villages, private property may be sold only to fellow villagers. In larger urban areas the streets are twisted and narrow while most houses connect with each other to give them the look of a citadel. Where stone is available, the richer Kurds will build their houses from it. In cities, the more affluent Kurds live higher in the hills away from the offices and markets. Typically the richest furnishings in a Kurdish home are the carpets and storage chests. In some urban areas, there may be modern appliances that are decorated.

Attitudes Toward Others


Kurds are distrustful by nature. The Kurds experiences, both on an interpersonal level and on an ethnic/national one, have taught them that trust leads to victimization. As a nation, the Kurds have been betrayed by all of the powers surrounding them. U.S. Military. U.S. military personnel may be met with wariness and suspicion on the part of Kurds. It is the role and conduct of military personnel that determines the reception they will receive from local inhabitants. However, there are significant divisions within the Kurdish ethnic group that prevent a precise assessment of Kurdish attitudes toward the U.S. military. Arabs. Violent conflict between Arabs and Kurds has been a feature of Iraqi society since the early 1920s. Over the decades, the Arab majority succeeded in asserting its dominance and limiting Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights. Kurdish frustration with this situation remains a source of resentment and instability. Despite an initial improvement in relations after the 1968 Baathist coup, a pattern developed of negotiations over Kurdish autonomy followed by armed clashes. For the past 30 years, Kurdish nationalism has been at odds with Iraqi Arab nationalism disseminated from Baghdad. The 1991 uprisings in the Kurdish north 96

revealed the extent of their dissatisfaction with the regime. Significant distrust continues between Iraqi Arabs and Kurds. Turkmen. Kurdish-Turkmen relations have been tense and even violent at times in the area of Kirkuk. In 1959, Iraqi President Qasim used the Kurds to suppress the Turkmen in Kirkuk. It is a point of debate whether the city of Kirkuk had a majority of Turkmen, or was always dominated by a Kurdish population. The Kurdish claim to Kirkuk strains the Turkmen-Kurdish relationship. Assyrians. Assyrians from Turkey settled on lands belonging to the Barzani family during the British mandate period and precipitated an armed conflict between the Barzani tribe and the government. Since the 1991 Gulf War, AssyrianKurdish relations have been peaceful. Iran: Iranian support was vital to Barzanis resistance against Husseins government. The resistance advanced the cause of a portion of Iraqi Kurds, but had negative consequences for Iranian Kurds and damaged trans-border relations between the Kurdish populations in the two countries. Iran was seen as a potential source of financial and military support for the Iraqi Kurds against Husseins government, but was not considered a consistent and loyal friend of the Kurdish cause. The Kurdish view of Iran is pragmatic, in that relations with Iran may be a useful asset, but carry the risk of making the Iraqi Kurds the victim of changes in Iranian policy. The Kurds recognize that Iranian support has always been more anti-Hussein than pro-Kurd, and that the Iranians are just as adamantly against the concept of a greater Kurdistan as the Turks. Turkey. The Kurds perceive Turkey as an obstacle to Iraqi and international recognition of Kurdish autonomy within a federal Iraq or an independent Kurdish state. The Kurds also regard Turkey with a measure of fear because of its treatment of its own Kurdish population, and for the tactics Turkey has employed in pursuit of PKK members in northern Iraq. Iraqi Kurds are wary of Turkey, as they believe Turkey is intent on repressing their collective identity. 97

Turkmen Ethnic Description


The Turkmen claim to be the third largest ethnic group in Iraq after the Kurds and Arabs. Turkmen (also Turkmen, Turcoman) are of Turkic ethnic descent, primarily from the Oghuz group, which is most closely related to modern Turks, Azeris, and Turkmen of Turkmenistan. The term Turkmen is used broadly, however, to designate any Iraqi with some Turkish origins. Turkmen began arriving in Iraq from Central Asia around the 7th century A.D. The Ottoman Empire ruled Iraq from the 15th to the early 20th centuries, during which time many Turkic people migrated into Iraq. These Ottoman Turks were separated from Turkey after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the Treaty of Sevres, which created the British Mandate that led to the modern nation-state of Iraq. Most Turkmen living in Iraq are concentrated in the north and central parts of the country in the provinces of Mosul, Irbil, Kirkuk, and Deyalah. There are 2-3 million Turkmen in Iraq, most of whom are Sunni Muslims. There are some small Shia Turkmen groups, and up to 30,000 Christian Turkmen, known as kale gavuru.

Cultural History
Turkmen in Iraq are part of the broader group of Oghuz Turkic people who migrated from Central Asia in successive waves, beginning in the 7th century A.D. These Turkic people were nomadic, but began to settle as they encountered the agricultural-based societies of the Byzantium and Abbasid empires. Many arrived during the Ottoman Empire, settling with the Turkmen people who had already been living in the country. Under the original Iraqi Constitution, Turkmen were permitted to use their own languages in schools, government offices, and newspapers. However, in 1972, the Iraqi Baathist government prohibited the study of the Turkish language, banned Turkish media in Iraq, changed the 98

Turkish names of towns to Arabic names, and instituted an assimilation policy designed to force Turkmen to adopt Arab culture and language. Beginning during this period, Turkmen were targeted (because of their ethnicity) for persecution, arrest, and imprisonment. Turkmen leaders were tortured or assassinated. In 1974, administrative boundaries were redrawn in a way that divided Turkmen concentrations, and a new policy was launched to encourage Arabs living in the south to move into Turkmen areas, especially the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. The Iraqi government destroyed numerous Turkmen villages and created new housing that was increasingly populated with Arabs. In the 1980s, the Baath party prohibited any public use of the Turkish language and banned Turkmen political parties. The 1990 Constitution eliminated any reference to Turkmen, mentioning only Kurds and Arabs. In recent years, Turkmen leaders have taken advantage of the relative autonomy in northern Iraq to develop representative political bodies that can both advocate on behalf of the group and provide organizational infrastructure for political activity in a post-Hussein Iraq. In 1995, the Iraqi Turkmen Front was established, incorporating a number of parties under an umbrella organization capable of speaking with one Turkmen voice to both domestic and foreign audiences. In October 1997, Turkmen organizations arranged the Turkmen Assembly in northern Iraq. The assembly has secured unanimity among the Turkmen organizations, and determined the cultural, educational, information and social policies for the Turkmen people. The development of these organizations reflects an understanding on the part of Turkmen that their interests can only be articulated through political action, and such action will take place within the state and in international venues that can bring pressure on domestic actors. Thus, to a great degree, the Turkmen have adopted a statist or national political approach, reflecting their commitment to Iraq over any vestigial tribal commitments or cultural affinities that may have been more prevalent in the past. 99

The Turkmen desire a strong and effective state, but one that protects their cultural rights and freedoms and is restrained from arbitrary uses of state power or extrajudicial violence by other groups (such as the Kurds). In this way, the Turkmen position has evolved into a very Western concept of the role and necessary institutionalized limitations upon the state in a modern society.

Religious Identity
Most Turkmen, more than two-thirds of the population, are Sunni Muslims, predominantly of the Hanafi sect, which is known for its liberal religious orientation that elevates belief over practice and is tolerant of differences within Muslim communities. Nearly a third of the Turkmen are Shia Muslims, and up to 30,000 are Christian. Sufism is also prevalent among the Turkmen of Iraq. Generally, the Turkmen are not considered devout religious worshippers. Given their history of adapting and assimilating, religion seems less critical to their individual identities than as an indicator or symbol of their collective identity as a (predominantly) Sunni, Turkic people. To most Turkmen, Islam represents a folk religion, reflecting Arabic nomadic heritages, emphasizing sacred forces, the symbolic interpretation of texts, and worship at shrines. This type of folk religion has flourished in the region of northern Iraq for centuries.

Language
Turkmen language is a dialect of Turkish that is a part of the Western Turkish language group spoken in Turkey, Cyprus, the Balkans, Azerbaijan (North and South), Northern Syria, Iran, Turkmenistan, and Northern Afghanistan. The Turkmen language, with its 5 major accents, is closer to the Turkish spoken in Azerbaijan and Urfa in southeastern Turkey than that spoken in Turkmenistan. Many Turkmen also speak Arabic. However, they believe maintaining and perpetuating their language is an important component of their culture. This created problems under the regime of Hussein and is also a 100

problem in the Kurd-dominated north. For instance, the Turkmen insist on being taught in Turkish, using the Latin script, whereas the KDP wants them to learn Kurdish and Arabic. The Turkmen will only support a long-term political resolution of the political configuration of Iraq if it includes state-guaranteed rights to teach their language.

Social Hierarchy
The Turkmen, while generally considered egalitarian, distinguish two social categories within each lineage. Individuals are either regarded as descendants of ig or qul, free or slave. The distinction is made from those who descended from non-Turkmen ancestors. While there is a general reluctance to intermarry, it does happen. The most observable outcome of this separational view is in the distribution of land and resources, the ig tend to be better off than the qul. Class divisions are observable in differences between dress, living, education and jobs. However, modernization and the changing landscape in Iraq is breaking down many of these traditional divisions. In many Turkmen communities, the basic unit of society is the albeit. This term encompasses all of the inhabitants living in their dwelling and those closely related persons living in the same compound who are dependent on one another. Within the albeit, each person is assigned a task and a set of responsibilities. To overcome the feelings of second-class status and disenfranchisement, the Turkmen have established social institutions within the family unit to replace those not found in Iraqi society. Within each community, there are individuals appointed to positions of decision and authority. In many cases, these people replace teachers, counselors, religious figures, lawyers and other advisors.

Family
Turkmen define their circle of kin as those to whom the blood reaches. This is usually traced through patrilineal relationships, and defined as 101

those sharing a common patrilineal ancestor in seven or fewer generations. The traditional Turkmen household consists of a male, his wife, their sons and their wives and their children. Typically, a man leaves his fathers household between the ages of 30-40, usually after he is married and has his own children. Usually by the age of 40, the sons children will be old enough to be economically productive, and therefore able to help support his household. After establishing his own household, the father will marry off his daughters, and prepare his sons to establish their households. The exception is the youngest, who traditionally has remained in the fathers household to care for his father and mother. Turkmen society places a great amount of respect and loyalty on age and care for the elderly. Once a girl has been married, she is expected to identify herself with her new family. While not as secluded as women in other Islamic countries, Turkmen women typically raise the children, cook, serve meals and work in the fields or another manual labor positions. Marriage In most Turkmen social groups, freedom of courtship and choosing mates is accepted. The most formalized part of the process is the meeting and agreement of the families. Traditionally, the families meet to discuss the Mahr, or the bridal package. The Mahr is an agreed upon sum of money that is transferred from the bridegrooms family to the brides family. The Mahr, although more a tradition, is accepted as part of Islamic law. In some more rural areas in Iraq, there are instances where marriages are arranged according to tribal affiliations.

Modern Nation State


Since World War I, and particularly during the regime of Saddam Hussein, the Turkmen suffered at the hands of the Kurds and other ethnic groups, as well as the state itself. Part of the reason for the vast difference in Turkmen population estimates is because during the 1970s and 1980s the government expelled Turkmen from their traditional lands in 102

Iraq. They were resettled in other areas and encouraged to register officially as Arabs. Arabs were then resettled onto lands once belonging to Turkmen and Kurds after the latter two groups were forced out. While it is clear that the Turkmen have been victimized and impoverished under Iraqi state, it also seems clear that they identify themselves as Iraqi albeit of Turkish lineage and they nonetheless remain committed to the idea of a unified, multiethnic sovereign Iraqi state. In the context of the modern Iraqi nation state, the Turkmen have predominantly supported the central authority of the state provided that it guaranteed security. The regime of Saddam Hussein implemented assimilation policies aimed at eradicating the cultural diversity of Iraq, by banning the teaching of languages and other cultural rituals, and persecuting cultural leaders. Nonetheless, unlike their Kurdish, neighbors, the Turkmen have not engaged in violent opposition. The Turkmen found themselves in the familiar position of being alone against other unfriendly, if not openly hostile ethnic groups, and a regime that despised their cultural commitments. While they have strong desires to maintain their cultural heritage and practice and perpetuate their language, they nonetheless understand the importance of a strong state that can effectively safeguard their rights against infringement by other groups. They are also well aware of the dangers of an autocratic, totalitarian regime and thus desire the development of representative and legal institutions that are capable of removing the dangers of arbitrary state power from society.

State and Tribal Roles


Turkmen generally desire autonomy, particularly in relation to the Kurds. Turkmen resented the authority of the Hussein regime because of its brutal and arbitrary use of state power against them. At the same time, they want a strong and effective government that can provide them protections against other groups. Turkmen served in Iraqi government administrative positions during the early Republican period and generally supported the development of a strong, but responsive state. 103

Given the impact of the assimilation policies and their relative numerical weakness, the Turkmen have attempted to support their cause by developing political apparatuses such as the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF) and various political parties. The ITF, established 24 April 1995, has managed to create an umbrella for all the Turkmen political parties and organizations around the world to work together for the unity of Iraq. Turkmen have also taken part in the broad-based Iraqi National Congress, though at times they have been excluded from active participation due to Kurdish efforts. In doing so, they effectively acknowledge the centrality of the state to their own future and thus can be seen as moving away from a tribal response to the injustices imposed upon them. Though it represents only part of the Turkmen community, the ITF has been active in mobilizing public support and increasing international attention to the plight of Turkmen in rump Iraq and in the Kurdish-controlled northern region. Officially, it has never recognized the Kurdish Regional Government and refused to take part in the 1992 elections held in the autonomous region. There are reportedly 22 other Turkmen groups outside Iraq that participate in ITF work.

Customs
In the past 2,000 years, two forces have shaped Turkmen culture. The first major influence was that of the Turks, particularly the Ottomans. The second was the Arabs and introduction of Islam. Most of the common Turkmen practices and customs evolved from these two cultures. Turkmen have close cultural and linguistic ties with Anatolian Turkey, but nonetheless identify themselves broadly as Iraqis. Most Turkmen are characterized by their hospitality, trustworthiness and sincerity. Conversely, Turkmen are also renowned for being hot-tempered and vengeful. Their diverse history and character traits distinguish the Turkmen from their Arab and Kurdish neighbors. 104

Visiting Turkmen tend to be very hospitable, offering food and tea to visitors. When entertaining with a meal, Turkmen will spread food in bowls over a tablecloth on the floor. Traditionally, the quantity of food reflects the amount of respect the visitor commands. Turkmen are gracious to their hosts and expect that visitors will pay particular homage to the male head of the household. It is essential that visitors recognize the male primacy within the household. In more formal, Islamic households the women remain separate from the men during visitations and meals. Social Etiquette
I I

Show respect to the male figure in charge; he will lead other males in conversation and negotiation. Women should not be engaged unless they speak first. Like many Muslims, the Turkmen believe that it is improper to direct attention to a female in public. Refrain from discussing the dispute between the Kurds and the Turks. Because of their connection to both groups, disagreement over the Turk-Kurd situation can cause significant tension.

Dress In most urban areas Turkmen men tend to wear Western fashions, with men frequently dressing in suits, or pants matched with shirts and jackets. Women tend to wear long colorful dresses. Western influences can be seen particularly among the youth with t-shirts, jeans/pants and sneakers. Young girls still wear dresses, but they are less traditional than those of previous generations. In rural areas the dress is somewhat more traditional. Men wear baggy trousers, coarse shirts, boots and wool hats. Women wear long dresses and have an affinity for jewelry. 105

The Turkmen were once known as the qizilbash, or Red Heads, for their red felt caps. In rural areas and during formal engagements, such as weddings, men still don the red caps. Women tend to wear fine cotton scarves, wound to resemble turbans. Diet The diet of most Turkmen is similar to that of the Kurds, but retains some specific delicacies. The main staples are vegetables, bread, dairy products, and meat, particularly chicken and mutton. Popular vegetables include peppers, onions, eggplant, tomatoes, red beets, green beans, cucumbers, chickpeas and olives. The most common drinks are tea and coffee, both of which are made strong. Dwelling The Turkmen were once nomadic herders who lived in tents and moved around as the seasons changed. Over time, many Turkmen settled and became farmers or took administrative positions in the towns and cities. Those Turkmen who still herd live in the same type of dwellings as the Kurds. They often live in heavy, black woolen tents, which they use throughout the winter. In the summer or when traveling, they use lighter tents. Camps may consist of an entire clan or of a group of families who herd their flocks together. Turkmen villages and communities have a history of poverty, overpopulation, illiteracy, poor health, and in rural areas, isolation. This is partly the result of forced resettlement campaigns directed by the Baath regime. Urban Turkmen dwellings are similar to lower class Arab and Kurd dwellings. Kurd, Arab and Turkmen communities are generally segregated. The main Turkmen settlements in Iraq are in the following cities: Tall Afar, Mosul, Irbil, Tuz, Kifri, Karaghan, Kizlarbat, Khanaquin, Mendeli, Bedre and Kirkuk (the largest Turkmen city in Iraq). The Turkmen view the areas around Mosul and Kirkuk as their cultural and historical base. Turkmen carpets are famous throughout the Middle East, but most outsiders incorrectly call these rugs Afghan or Bukhran. Carpets are used 106

for seating, sleeping, dining, prayers, storage bags and doors and are the primary furnishing in the Turkmen dwelling. The carpets were traditionally made on horizontal looms in patterns that represent particular tribal designs. Today, the tribal designs are still used, but the rugs are made in factories and are a great source of Turkmen pride.

Attitudes Toward Others


United States. With a new regime in Baghdad, the Turkmen are expected to work with the United States and other international actors to secure protections and liberties for their people, ideally within the framework of an effective state with strong representative institutions. The Turkmen are guardedly optimistic. However, they will be suspicious of measures that do not provide concrete guarantees, for fear that they may be subjected to Kurdish violence or political domination. As representatives of the United States, U.S. military personnel will be welcomed by the Turkmen, but with a certain level of wariness. Turkmen will attempt to discern the position of the U.S. military toward the Kurds, and will be quick to interpret U.S. responses to potential Kurd transgressions. If the United States is assessed as dealing fairly and equally with the various groups then they are likely to receive strong Turkmen support. However, if the United States is seen as merely reinforcing Kurd control of northern Iraq, the Turkmen will question their motives and grow frustrated with the situation. It is unlikely that such frustrations would be manifested through violence, but cooperation with U.S. missions is likely to decline. Iraqi Arabs. While the Turkmen had legitimate reasons to fear the Baathist regime, there is no evidence that this has translated into a general distrust of Iraqi Arabs. They are likely to reciprocate positively to any attempts by Iraqi Arabs to develop new governmental institutions in a post-Hussein environment. In the north, the mutual distrust of the Kurds (shared by the Turkmen and the Iraqi Arabs) makes a political alliance likely, particularly if Kurd groups are perceived as attempting to assert control over the region. 107

Iraqi Kurds. The Turkmen fear the Kurds. From the memory of mass Kurd violence against Turkmen in Kirkuk in July 1959 to more recent Turkmen suffering as a result of intra-Kurd fighting after the first Gulf War, there is a legitimate basis for those fears. Yet the Turkmen have not responded violently, instead seeking protection from the state against Kurdish transgressions. As long as a relative level of order is maintained, this is likely to continue. However, if Kurd violence toward Turkmen escalates, Turkmen (or certain elements within the Turkmen population) may feel that they must take measures to defend themselves. Within the Iraqi Turkmen region, there are two main political parties. One typically works with Kurdish authorities and the other is backed by the Turkish state and vehemently opposes the creation of a Kurdish state. This division plays itself out in political and social debates. Some Turkmen feel that they have been punished in order to placate Kurdish desires and aspirations. Because of these divisions, there are Turkmen who will oppose most positions supported by the Kurds. Iraqi Shia. Given their commitment to cultural freedoms, Turkmen are likely to support Iraqi Shia initiatives for greater freedom and religious rights. However, they are also likely to be wary of any initiatives by Shia leaders to impose their own positions upon other groups within the Iraq, or any attempts to break up the state. Turkey. Turkey is the Turkmens only ally. Though the Turkmen share a rich cultural history with their Anatolian relatives, this relationship does not drive Turkmen behavior or policy. The Turkmen have been in Iraq for hundreds of years, and they consider the cities like Kirkuk and Mosul, and their surrounding areas, their home. At the same time, the Turkmen population strongly opposes a Kurdish state in the north, as does Turkey. Iran. Insofar as Iran supports the concept the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Iraq, the Turkmen will see them as an ally in the context of post-war regional negotiations on the future of the state. However, if Iran is perceived as supporting secession of the south, the Turkmen are likely to strongly oppose such interference. 108

Cultural Economy
The Turkmen of Iraq are mainly merchants and manual laborers. Most are very poor, barely living at subsistence levels. Literacy rates are also low, though precise information is difficult to obtain. During the Ottoman era, they held positions of respect in the urban areas of northern Iraq, particularly Mosul and Kirkuk. For much of Iraqs history, they have served as a middle class in these urban areas, which to some extent inspired envy and ill feelings on the part of Kurds in the 1950s. Like many Iraqis, they have seen their fortunes erode under the leadership of Saddam Hussein.

Cultural Geography
The Turkmen have lost much of their rural tribal nature over time. The majority of Turkmen are concentrated in the north and central parts of Iraq in the provinces of Mosul, Irbil, and Kirkuk. There is also a sizable Turkmen population in Baghdad. In fact, the cultural ownership of Iraqs major northern cities shows that, in many ways, Turkmen have moved beyond simple tribal notions of culture to attach themselves to urban areas and the cultural and historical significance of those areas. For example, the Turkmen and the Kurds passionately argue over the cultural origins of Kirkuk, a city both claim as their own. However, Kirkuk is an exception in Turkmen-Kurdish relations, as the two groups long ago set a precedent of living in segregated villages, or neighborhoods within cities that were either exclusively Turkmen or Kurdish. Most villages remain fairly close to urban area, rather than being dispersed across a wide landscape.

Chaldeans Ethnic Description


Chaldeans are a Syriac-speaking people of Roman Catholic faith and of mixed Semitic, Aramaean, Assyrian, Persian, Arab, and Kurdish descent. There are an estimated 800,000 Chaldeans in Iraq. Most Chaldeans live in and around Baghdad, in central Iraq. Others live in northern Iraq, especially the Mosul area, and another smaller group lives in southern Iraq. 109

Chaldeans acknowledge a common ethnic ancestry with Assyrians, with whom they share the culture, language, and heritage of ancient Mesopotamia. They consider themselves and the Assyrians descendants of the ancient Babylonians (also called neo-Babylonians). Despite this common ancestry, Chaldeans have considered themselves a separate community from the Assyrians since their split with the Nestorian Church of the East in the 16th century. Their communities are distinct from each other, based on ecclesiastical differences and variations in cultural and social patterns. Chaldeans see themselves as a distinct nation and ethnic group encompassing the Assyrians. Chaldeans believe the name Chaldean reflects a more comprehensive, inclusive and generic name for the two groups of people considered together. They consider themselves united by the Syriac language, the Christian faith, the legacy of the Church of the East, and a common ancestry. Conversely, many Assyrians believe the name Assyrian includes the Chaldean community.

Cultural History
Compared to other Iraqi Christian communities, Chaldeans feel relatively secure in Iraq, largely because they have kept a low profile and not played a prominent political role. Today, Chaldeans claim to be the largest group of Christians in Iraq, and they are most numerous in and around Baghdad and other large cities. Although Chaldea, the last ancient Mesopotamian state, collapsed more than 2,500 years ago, Chaldeans have remained a cohesive group. They have maintained linguistic and geographical continuity for as much as four millennia, and religious continuity since at least the 5th century when they widely accepted Christianity. Despite this cohesiveness and the association with ancient Mesopotamia, the Chaldean group in Iraq consists of people from many different ethnic groups, largely assimilated through the religious missionary work of the Church of the East, and the settling of many different peoples in the region over time. 110

Christianity
In the first few centuries after Jesus death, Chaldeans and Assyrians considered themselves the same people, unified by their language, Syriac, and their common heritage as the descendants of the ancient Mesopotamian civilizations. They were among the first groups of people to adopt Christianity, and established the early Church of the East. Chaldeans began migrating from rural villages in northern Iraq to larger cities, including Mosul, Baghdad, Irbil, and Basrah in the 1880s. As Chaldeans migrated to the larger urban centers in Iraq, differences between Chaldeans and other Iraqis, as with other Christians, became less prevalent. Though they continued to use Syriac, mostly in their liturgies, many also learned Arabic, and patterns of speech and dress became less differentiated. The 1880s also ushered in the beginning of Chaldean emigration from Iraq, mostly to the United States Though Chaldeans were wary of the pan-Arab movement of the Baath regime, they generally fared well and supported its secular ideology. Support for the regime continued after Saddam Hussein came to power in 1979 because Chaldeans fared better than other Iraqi groups, including the Shia, Kurds, and Assyrians, under his persecutions. While Saddam Hussein destroyed Assyrian churches, he spared Chaldean churches and schools. Chaldeans saw this preferential treatment as an acknowledgement of their small and unthreatening numbers, their usefulness as a buffer between the Kurds and the government, and the loyal service of some Chaldeans in his government. In the late 1990s, support for the government declined among Chaldeans, as Saddam Hussein adopted more Islamic political rhetoric, publicly elevated Islam over Christianity, and closed Chaldean schools. Though many Chaldeans didnt like the regime of Saddam Hussein, they feared the chaos and anarchy, and the possible rise of more extreme Islamic or Arabic ideologies that could develop in his absence. 111

Religious Identity
From a doctrinal perspective, the Chaldean Church is indistinguishable from other Catholic churches. In practice, their penitential customs, pattern of prayers offered in Mass, sacraments and other ecclesiastical rituals are virtually identical to those of the Nestorian Church of the East.

Language
Chaldeans and Assyrians speak Syriac, a modern form of the ancient Aramaic language. Aramaic and Syriac are Semitic languages related to Hebrew and Arabic, but distinct from both. Aramaic was the language spoken by Jesus Christ and his disciples, and it was adopted as the official language of the Church of the East in the 5th century A.D. The fact that modern Syriac is still based on 75 percent pure Aramaic is a measure of the cohesion of the Chaldean and Assyrian communities over the last 1,500 years. Among Chaldeans, Syriac is also called Old Chaldean, Chaldean, SyroChaldaic, Neo-Aramaic, Aramaic, or Jesus language.

Role of Tribes in Society


Tribal affiliations do not play a significant role among Chaldeans. In ancient Mesopotamia and in the early Christian era, Chaldeans were organized as tribes. Beginning in the 16th century, however, religion rather than tribal affiliations determined ones identity as a Chaldean.

Significant Alliances
The Vatican. Chaldeans have nurtured a close alliance with the Vatican since the 16th century, and they guard this connection jealously. This alliance helped secure Chaldean communities within the hostile environment of Muslim rule. In the 20th century, Roman Catholic clergy were influential in persuading their congregations to avoid becoming involved in the political and military struggles between Arabs, Kurds, and the British. This action protected Chaldeans from some of the 112

enmity that was focused on the Assyrians, who were associated with British imperial power. In the 1990s, the Chaldeans alliance with the Vatican again helped to secure their position in the Iraqi state when Chaldeans joined the Vatican in condemning the sanctions placed against Iraq by the international community. Assyrians. Chaldeans are wary of attempts by Assyrian nationalists to speak for them and subsume their identity within an Assyrian ethnonational group. Nevertheless, nationalist Chaldeans have attempted to present a common front with Assyrians at conferences regarding the future of Iraq. This common front is made in an effort to ensure that the international community does not ignore the needs and desires of Assyro-Chaldeans. Chaldeans and Assyrians fear a post-Hussein government will leave them under the authority of Kurds in a federalist state, or worse, an extreme Muslim or Arabic regime. Yezidis. Chaldeans have had a friendly relationship with Yezidis in northern Iraq, occasionally living among them in mixed villages. Chaldeans fleeing massacres by the Turks from 1914 to the 1920s found shelter and aid among Yezidis in the Sinjar Mountains.

Modern Nation-state
Since its independence, every Iraqi government has sought to forge a common identity in a land that lacked a common religion, language, or ethnicity. While the Kurds and Turkmen felt excluded ethnically and linguistically from a pan-Arab identity, they could share appeals to Muslim solidarity. Shia Arabs might disagree with the Sunni dominance of the state, but they shared Islam, Arab ethnicity, and the Arabic language with the Sunnis. As non-Arab, Syriac-speaking Christians, Chaldeans are minorities in every respect within Iraq. Nevertheless, Iraqi citizenship provided Chaldeans with an opportunity to take advantage of economic and political opportunities broader than those that were available within the Ottoman millet system. However, the rise of the pan-Arab movement renewed Chaldean fears of persecu113

tion and led to the largest wave of Chaldean emigration from Iraq between the 1960s and the 1980s.

State and Tribal Roles


Chaldeans fared better than other ethnic and religious groups, such as the Shia Arabs, Kurds, and Assyrians, under the persecutions of Saddam Hussein and the Baathist regime. Hussein spared Chaldean churches while he destroyed Assyrian ones, and he interfered only minimally in the Chaldeans right to practice their faith. This relatively better treatment was due to the small size of the Chaldean community, rendering it less threatening to Hussein than the Kurds or Shia. The Chaldeans loyalty to Iraq and the Baathist regime also helped to protect them. Nevertheless, in the later 1990s, many Chaldeans turned against the regime as Hussein increasingly emphasized Islamic and tribal identity. Chaldean fears of religious persecution increased as the government showed greater support for Islamic identity, whipping up anti-Christian sentiment in the process. To shore up this new-found Islamic support, Hussein began closing Chaldean schools and publicly elevated Islam over Christianity. The governments efforts to augment tribal identity and associate the regime with tribal authority also alienated Chaldeans, who are excluded from Arab tribes and tribal customs. Now, many Chaldeans wish to rebuild a prosperous, democratic Iraq without Hussein, though they fear his replacement by a radical Muslim regime.

Other Centers of Authority


The religious leader of the Chaldean community is called the Patriarch of the Chaldeans, and he resides in Baghdad. Though Roman Catholic clergy vow celibacy and cannot marry, the Chaldean Patriarch, under the Chaldean Rite, was traditionally allowed to marry. The use of married clergy among Chaldean communities have been declining in recent years due to an increasing Western influence. 114

Family
The family plays a central role in the Chaldean community. Until the 20th century, Chaldean families largely mirrored the traditional family structure throughout much of the Middle East. Families were patrilineal, and extended families were the norm. A family consisted of a husband and wife, their sons, their sons wives and children, and their unmarried daughters, as well as other kin who needed support. The father was the unchallenged head of the family, holding an almost royal position. Among Chaldeans, the patrilineal, extended family remains an ideal widely held and valued, even among diaspora communities. Though Chaldean families are usually nuclear, consisting of a husband, wife, and their unmarried children, the extended family still occupies a central role in their daily activities and social lives. Families are often expanded for indefinite periods, as a nuclear household takes on the support of a relative in need, or newly married couples live with the husbands parents until they set up their own household. Assuming the support of other kin is a matter of great prestige in the village. The extended family occupies a significant economic role for Chaldeans, as family members help each other obtain jobs and form business partnerships, as well as loan each other money. Men are expected to exhibit strong, masculine characteristics in Chaldean families, while women are expected to be feminine, nurturing, and understanding. Though men enjoy greater social freedom than women, both men and women are held responsible for putting the family ahead of their personal needs, goals, and desires. Children are taught early not to bring shame upon the family through their behavior. Children are also taught to show deference and respect toward their elders. Marriage Chaldean girls are not permitted to date. Boys are taught to look after their sisters and prevent other boys from courting them. The parents of both the young man and the young woman must give their blessings 115

before a couple can get engaged. Couples are usually engaged for at least 6 months, a period during which they attend marriage classes at a Chaldean church. Couples marry in a Chaldean church, and generally the grooms family pays all wedding expenses. As a rule, rural Chaldeans marry people from the same village and religious community (in the case of mixed villages). Frequently, they marry within the same family, as cousin marriages are common and preferred. Women marry early, often between the ages of 17 and 22. Men usually marry in their mid-20s. Marriages are usually arranged. Weddings are exuberant community events that include singing, folk dancing, and drinking. All relatives are invited, which in some villages, such as Telkaif, includes nearly everybody in the village. Thus, wedding celebrations can be as large as 1,000 people. Divorce is virtually nonexistent. Chaldean widows almost never remarry, and they wear black mourning clothes for the rest of their lives. Widowers, on the other hand, frequently remarry.

Culture
Greetings Chaldean men and women usually greet each other with a handshake. Close female friends usually kiss each other once on each cheek. Good male friends may also kiss each other once on each cheek if they have not seen each other in a long time. Children are expected to approach and greet their elders. Elders will then kiss the children on each cheek and wish them well. To pay special respect, children refer to their elders, whether friends or relatives, as uncle or aunt followed by their first names. Adults address each other informally by their first names. Men may refer to each other as the father of their first-born son using the name Abbo followed by the sons first name. Visiting Social visits among close friends and relatives are welcomed and important to Chaldeans. Chaldeans often visit each other without invitation or 116

notice. If a person is invited to a Chaldean home, it is a sign of the trust and regard of that family. Food is always offered. Daytime visits are expected to last 1-2 hours. Evening guests are expected to stay at least 3 hours. They will be offered tea, desserts, drinks, and a large dinner. Negotiation Strongly influenced by Christian values and the Catholic Church, Chaldeans emphasize honesty and trust in negotiations. These qualities tend to help them succeed in business. Conflict Resolution Strongly influenced by Christian values and the Catholic Church, Chaldeans value peace and prefer to deal with conflicts in private, when possible. Chaldeans emphasize humility and forgiveness in their attempts to resolve conflicts. Thus, they tend to be forgiving of insults and discrimination against them. As a group, Chaldeans prefer avoiding conflicts, such as that between Iraqi Arabs and Kurds, rather than becoming involved in them. Catholicism supports a general emphasis on community and family over individuals among Chaldeans. Thus, the cohesion of the family or community is a significant consideration in the process and outcomes when resolving conflicts. Clergy may be consulted for advice or to act as mediators. Since Chaldeans are no longer influenced by tribal identities, tribal councils have no place in negotiations or conflict resolution. Business Style Chaldeans value entrepreneurial skills and quickly became an economic force in their urban communities after they migrated to Iraqs large cities in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Valuing education and known for their honesty and strong work ethic, many Chaldeans have become successful businessmen and professionals in Iraq. Hygiene As Christians, Chaldeans do not share the strict hygienic customs of Muslims, such as ritual washing before prayer, or prohibitions against certain acts considered unclean, such as eating pork. 117

Gifts On special occasions, guests bring gifts to be opened after dinner in the presence of the host. Social Etiquette
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Hands are kept above the table at all times during a meal. Elbows are not placed on the table. After a meal, it is polite for a guest to bless the house and the host family, asking that God continue to provide. If one enters a room while others are eating, the host family will usually extend an invitation to join the meal. It is polite to refuse the invitation nicely, saying alla yazeeda, or May God provide you more. If the host insists on the person joining the meal, the invitation may be accepted. Compliments on the meal are welcomed. Rice and stew are eaten with a spoon in the right hand. A fork or knife in the left hand can be used to push food onto the spoon. A knife in the right hand can be used to cut food. Utensils are placed on the plate after the meal. It is polite to accept refreshments, sweets, or baked goods.

Funerals Paying respect to the dead is a significant ritual in Chaldean families and communities. Hundreds or thousands of relatives and friends may attend a Chaldean funeral. The deceased is viewed for 2-3 days, and men and women pray and pay their respects on separate sides of the casket. Expressions of grief may be overt; demonstrations of sorrow may include family members hitting themselves in the head and face. A special prayer and offering of food to the mourners is held on the seventh, usually the Sunday following a persons death. Another offering of food and prayers is made on the 40th day after someone has died. Dress Chaldean women wear colorful dresses with waistbands and scarves typical of their villages. Men wear cloaks and head coverings similar to 118

Iraqi Arabs, or jackets with baggy pants and head wraps. Older women wear black lace head scarves with flowery dresses typical of rural Chaldeans. Older men wear black and white head wraps and dress conservatively. In urban areas, most Chaldeans dress like other Iraqis. Style and quality of clothing are considered important indications of a persons status in social situations. However, civic and religious leaders criticize a focus on style as too materialistic. Diet The most traditional Chaldean dish is bushalla, a meat and vegetable stew served with white steamed rice. Lamb, pork, or fish may be served as a complement to bushalla. This dish is usually eaten as a late lunch (1400), along with fresh fruit and tea, or as dinner. Breakfast consists of a large meal of tea with milk, and bread with jam and gamer, a food similar to cream cheese. A large dinner is eaten late (2100-2200) and includes foods such as soup and salad, lamb stew, roasted vegetables, bushalla, stuffed grape leaves, fish, and chicken. Dinner is informal in Chaldean households, and guests, friends, and relatives are welcomed. Rice and vegetable stew are eaten with a spoon in the right hand, and a knife or fork in the left hand is used to push food onto the spoon. A knife in the right hand can be used to cut food. Chaldeans also commonly use their fingers to eat. Flatware is laid on the plate when the meal is finished. Dwelling Most Chaldeans live in apartments or houses in Iraqs large cities. In the rural villages of northern Iraq, Chaldeans live in small stone houses.

Attitudes Toward Others


Assyrians. Relations between Chaldeans and Assyrians are multi-faceted. On one hand, both communities believe they share a common ethnic heritage and language. They acknowledge a long period of shared history under the Church of the East, and their religious rites and litur119

gies remain nearly identical. On the other hand, Chaldeans, as the largest Christian community in Iraq, resent attempts by Assyrians to fold Chaldeans into an Assyrian ethno-national identity. Chaldeans conversely believe their own ethno-national identity includes Assyrians because it was the ancient Chaldeans who ruled the last independent Mesopotamian empire. Kurds and Arabs. The Chaldeans Christianity has made them a visibly distinct community, with traditions and practices in stark contrast to those of their Muslim Kurdish and Arab neighbors. Awareness of their minority status, religious persecution and feelings of uncertainty regarding religious freedom in Iraq, therefore, have led many Iraqi Chaldeans to distrust their Kurdish and Arab neighbors and migrate to the West. Shia Arabs. Chaldeans are occasionally at odds with Shia Arabs. Since Shia Arabs participated in the uprisings of 1991 that were brutally suppressed, many express frustration toward Chaldeans, whom they perceive as having supported the Hussein regime. Turkmen. Relations between Chaldeans and Turkmen tend to be quiet. The Turkmen share a similar position with the Chaldeans and Assyrians in northern Iraq with respect to the Kurds. As minorities among the Kurds in northern Iraq, Turkmen, Chaldeans and Assyrians are all interested in greater political representation in a democratic, pluralistic government. Each group also seeks to secure greater cultural, linguistic, and educational rights. The Turkmen, Chaldeans, and Assyrians, therefore, would like to see northern Iraq, where they are all numerous, less dominated by the Kurds. Attitudes Toward Neighboring States Turkey. Chaldeans have a strongly negative attitude toward Turks and the Turkish government because they believe they suffered attempted genocide at the hands of the Turks in 1914, along with Assyrians and other Christians in Turkey. Chaldeans and Assyrians call the period 1914-15 the Year of the Sword, or Sayfo, to remember the 2.5 million 120

Christians who were killed, and the 2 million who subsequently fled from Turkey, many of them into Iraq. Syria. With a much higher population of Christians, Syria was considered a place of refuge for Chaldeans and Assyrians fleeing violence and repression in Turkey and Iraq from 1915-1940s. This was particularly true during the French Mandate period in Syria, from 1920-1932, since the French had a history of protecting Christians under Ottoman rule. Iran. Chaldeans fear Muslim fundamentalism even more than they feared the persecution of the Hussein regime. As a result, they are wary of the Shia fundamentalist Iranian state, which they perceive as strongly encouraging fanatical Islam in the Middle East.

Cultural Economy
In urban areas, Chaldeans and Assyrians have long been associated with entrepreneurship, commerce and business, including money lending, money changing, importing and exporting activities thought unsuitable for Muslims. In the large cities of Iraq, many shops, hotels and restaurants are run and staffed by contemporary Chaldeans and Assyrians, a merchant and innkeeper tradition that extends back for centuries. Vocation Chaldeans and Assyrians value education. Though they were considered inferior under Muslim rule, Chaldeans and Assyrians have always been considered skilled at building, navigation, agriculture, medicine, science, and art. In the early centuries of Muslim rule, the Arab tribes who assumed political leadership were careful to use learned Chaldeans and Assyrians (both known as Suraya in that period) to perform these tasks. Peasants The Chaldeans and Assyrians in the Mosul district of northern Iraq were settled agriculturalists on lowland plains, most often in subordinate serf-like economic relationships to other Kurdish and Arab tribes. Though they lived in a rich, agricultural area, they lived in 121

relatively poor peasant villages due to the taxes and social discriminations levied on Christians. Nevertheless, compared to non-Muslims in other Arab regions, the Chaldeans and Assyrians who lived and worked on Mosuls fertile plains were healthier and economically better off. They were also better educated, due to the presence of church-run, Syriac-speaking schools.

Cultural Geography
Chaldeans have lived mainly in rural villages in the Mosul district of northern Iraq, including Tel Kaif (Tel Keppe in Syriac), Alkosh, Araden, and Batnaya. Most Chaldeans in the United States are emigrants from these villages or their direct descendants. Chaldean villages stretched across the Sapna Valley north of Mosul in a rich agricultural zone. Some villages were mixed communities of Chaldeans, Assyrians, and sometimes Kurds and Arab Bedouins. Today, most Chaldeans have migrated to the large urban centers of Iraq, especially Baghdad, Mosul, Basrah, Irbil, and Kirkuk. There are more than 75,000 Chaldeans in the United States, with more than 60,000 in the Detroit area, approximately 15,000 in California, and many in other areas of the United States, such as Washington D.C., Illinois, Arizona, and Tennessee. Other Chaldean emigrant communities can be found in Canada, Mexico, Britain, and Germany. Chaldeans also live in Turkey, Syria and Lebanon. The Chaldean community in Detroit has become the largest in the world. Most can trace their roots to Tel Kaif (Tel Keppe in Syriac), a small town outside of Mosul in northern Iraq. These Chaldeans also refer to themselves as Tel Keppians. They are active in preserving and promoting the Chaldean identity, through cultural activities, community groups, Syriac language classes, and support of Chaldean churches. There are four Chaldean churches in Detroit, and Syriac remains the primary language among Detroit Chaldeans. 122

Assyrians Ethnic Description


Assyrians are a Syriac-speaking people of Eastern Christian faith and of mixed Semitic, Aramaean, Assyrian, Persian, Arab and Kurdish descent. There are an estimated 200,000 Assyrians in Iraq. Most live in and around Baghdad, in central Iraq. Another sizeable community lives in northern Iraq, particularly around Mosul, and a third, smaller group lives in Basrah. Assyrians acknowledge a common ethnic ancestry with Chaldeans, with whom they share the culture, language, and heritage of ancient Mesopotamia. Despite this, Assyrians acknowledge that their communities are distinct from each other based on ecclesiastical differences and variations in cultural and social patterns since the Chaldeans split with the Nestorian Church of the East in the 16th century. Assyrians see themselves as a distinct nation and ethnic group encompassing Chaldeans and other Syriac-speakers. Assyrians believe the name Assyrian reflects a more comprehensive, inclusive and generic name for the two groups of people considered together. They consider themselves united by the Syriac language, the Christian faith, the legacy of the Church of the East, and common ancestry. Conversely, many Chaldeans believe the name Chaldean includes the Assyrian community.

Cultural History
Assyrians believe they are the descendants of the ancient civilization of Assyria, with its principal capital in Ninevah, a city located in northern Iraq mentioned in the biblical story of Jonah. Although the ancient Assyrian empire collapsed more than 2,500 years ago, Assyrians have remained a remarkably cohesive group. They have maintained linguistic and geographical continuity for as much as four millennia, and religious continuity since at least the 5th century when they accepted Christianity. 123

Christianity Compared to other Iraqi Christian communities, Assyrians have been far more politically insecure in Iraq. The connection to Iraq for many Assyrians has existed only since the end of World War I. This led to a much greater movement to emigrate west, and the tendency to stay abroad permanently. Today, Assyrians are only 17 percent of the Christian population in Iraq, and they are most numerous in and around Baghdad. Assyrian emigrants communities settled primarily in Chicago, but also in New York, California, Canada, Europe, Australia and Brazil.

Language
Assyrians and Chaldeans speak Syriac, a modern form of the ancient Aramaic language. Aramaic and Syriac are Semitic languages related to Hebrew and Arabic, but distinct from both. Among Assyrians, Syriac is also called modern Assyrian, Neo-Aramaic, and Aramaic.

Role of Tribes in Society


Before World War I, the semi-nomadic Assyrians of the Hakkari Mountains in southeast Turkey were notably more tribal than the rural Assyrians of the Mosul and Urumiyan plains. These distinctions began to disappear once the pastoral Assyrians joined their rural brethren to flee massacres at the hands of Turks and Kurds during Ottoman rule. Thus, while tribalism declined much earlier among Chaldeans, who first moved to rural and urban settings nearly 400 years ago, some Assyrians can still recall the tribal affiliations of their families. Assyrian Tribes The autonomous Assyrian tribes of Hakkari were called ashiras (ashirets in Turkish). Some of these were the Tiyari, Tkhuma, Jilu and Baz tribes. Tribal affiliations have all but lost their significance in the urban and rural communities in which contemporary Assyrians live. 124

Significant Alliances
British. Assyrians had a close alliance with the British during World War I and the British Mandate period. Although this gave them temporary protection of the British, it ultimately led to recriminations from the Arabs and Kurds, as well as abandonment by the British to the Arabdominated nation-state of Iraq. The British encouraged national aspirations among the Assyrians, leading to Assyrian demands for autonomy or a national homeland. Despite promises made in the Treaty of Sevres, these demands were never met. Thus, Assyrians cynically remember their alliance with the British as a time of betrayal. Chaldeans. Though contemporary Assyrians and Chaldeans acknowledge a common ethnic heritage, similar cultural traditions, and shared history, there is tension between the two communities. Assyrians are frustrated by Chaldeans insistence on a separate identity and their own political representation, as well as Chaldean support of the Iraqi state and Saddam Husseins regime throughout much of the 1980s and 1990s. Chaldeans, on the other hand, are wary of attempts by Assyrian nationalists to speak for them. Nevertheless, nationalist Assyrians have attempted to present a common front with Chaldeans at conferences regarding the future of Iraq. This common front is an effort to ensure that the international community does not ignore the needs and desires of Assyro-Chaldeans. Assyrians and Chaldeans together fear that a post-Hussein government will leave them under the authority of Kurds in a federalist state, or worse, an extreme Muslim or Arabic regime. Kurds. Though there is much tension between Assyrians and Kurds, both groups share a history of conflict with the Iraqi state. When the Kurdish nationalist struggle grew stronger in the 1960s, some Assyrians (including Assyrian women) fought with the Kurdish peshmergas against the Iraqi state. In the 1990-1991 Gulf War, Kurdish domination of northern Iraq led Assyrians to fear Kurdish attempts to assimilate them into Kurdish culture, language and political parties. 125

State versus Tribe Assyrians, like Chaldeans, originally identified with state power, and this cultural memory remains a part of Assyrian identity. However, since the decline of the Assyrian Empire, Assyrians have been a minority within other empires. The Assyrians suffered persecution under the regime of Saddam Hussein, having their churches and schools closed. Assyrians resist attempts by the Iraqi government to label them as ancient Iraqis and Iraqi Christians. They also oppose government policies that attempt to force Arabic and Arab culture upon them. Likewise, the Assyrians in northern Iraq resisted Kurdish attempts to assimilate them into Kurdish culture. In the later 1990s, Husseins campaign to emphasize Islamic and tribal identity increased Assyrian fears of religious persecution, as the government showed greater support for Islamic identity, whipping up antiChristian sentiment in the process. The governments efforts to augment tribal identity and associate the regime with tribal authority further alienated Assyrians, who are excluded from Arab tribes and tribal customs. Despite a fear of, and strong dislike for the Iraqi government and Saddam Hussein, contemporary Assyrians nevertheless fear the installment of a radical Muslim regime.

Family
Similar to Chaldeans, the extended family is of major significance to Assyrians. Mirroring the traditional family structure common in the Middle East, a family usually consists of a husband, a wife, and their unmarried children. Multigenerational and extended families living together are quite common, especially relatives who need economic support. The concept of family includes the nuclear family, and aunts, uncles, and cousins, as well as relatives of aunts and uncles in-laws. The patrilineal, extended family remains an ideal widely held and valued, even among diaspora communities. Assuming the support of other kin is traditionally a matter of great prestige in the village. 126

The extended family still occupies an important economic role for Assyrians and Chaldeans, as family members help each other obtain jobs and form business partnerships, as well as loan each other money. Men are expected to exhibit strong, masculine characteristics in Assyrian and Chaldean families, while women are expected to be feminine, nurturing, and understanding. Though menhave greater social freedom than women, both are held responsible for putting the family ahead of their personal needs, goals, and desires. Children are taught early not to bring shame upon the family through their behavior. Children are also taught to show deference and respect toward their elders. Marriage Traditionally, marriage is considered a permanent union between families, and not simply a partnership based on the personal affection of the man and woman involved. Thus, marriage is viewed seriously, and divorce, considered a disgrace, is rare. Assyrians favor early marriages, with men marrying as early as 17, and young women marrying even younger. The age at which couples marry has been steadily rising. Marriage ceremonies are elaborate, community-based affairs lasting a full week. Activities include a religious ceremony preceded and followed by feasts, drinking, singing, dancing, giftgiving, firing of shots into the air, and ceremonial processions. Pagan rituals to ward off evil and other mischief-making, and to promote fertility, are also part of the festivities.

Customs
Greetings Assyrians greet each other warmly, kissing each other on both cheeks. They may also shake hands, particularly if they recognize someone as being a Westerner. 127

Visiting Hospitality is very important to Assyrians. Showing hospitality and giving attention to guests is a mark of respect. Assyrians tend to be gregarious and gracious hosts, and they will always offer their guests food. Assyrians play music, dance to folk songs, drink tea, share sweets, and eat meals together to celebrate festive occasions. Time spent with friends and family is deeply valued. Negotiation Strongly influenced by Christian values and the Church of the East, Assyrians emphasize honesty and trust in negotiations. These qualities tend to help them succeed in business. Conflict Resolution With a history more closely linked to the martial traditions of the Hakkari tribes, and a tradition of fiercely defending their communitys autonomy and independence, Assyrians are more likely to defend themselves than Chaldeans when it comes to conflict. Business Style Assyrians are industrious and known for their entrepreneurial skills. As small business owners, many Assyrians quickly became an economic force in their urban communities after they migrated to Iraqs large cities in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Assyrians, like Chaldeans, also value education, and many Assyrians have become successful businessmen and college-educated professionals in Iraq. Hygiene As Christians, Assyrians and Chaldeans do not share the strict hygienic customs of Muslims, such as ritual washing before prayer, or prohibitions against certain acts considered unclean, such as eating pork. However, cleanliness is valued among Assyrians and Chaldeans. 128

Gifts On special occasions, guests bring gifts to be opened after dinner in the presence of the host. Dress Assyrian women wear colorful blouses and skirts or dresses with head scarves typical of their villages. Men wear shirts or jackets with baggy trousers. Colorful scarves and feathered caps are worn for celebrations. In large urban areas, most Assyrians dress like other Iraqis. Assyrians value neatness and cleanliness, and a persons appearance may not reflect economic hardship even when the family is struggling to make ends meet. Diet Assyrians avoid meat and/or dairy products on Wednesdays and Fridays throughout the year, and when observing Lent and certain other religious holidays. All animal products are avoided during the 3-day observance of the Fast of the Ninevites, commemorating the Assyrians repentance at the behest of Jonahs warning. Assyrian diet consists of many chicken, lamb, beef, pork, white rice, cracked wheat, and yogurt dishes. The most traditional Assyrian dish is bushalla, a rich, creamy, meat and vegetable stew served with white steamed rice. Lamb, pork, or fish may be served as a complement to bushalla. Breakfast consists of a large meal of tea with milk, and bread with jam and gamer, a food similar to cream cheese. A large dinner is eaten late (9-10 pm) and includes foods such as soup and salad, lamb stew, roasted vegetables, bushalla, stuffed grape leaves, fish, and chicken. Kurush, a rich stew made with a tomato-based broth over rice, is another popular dish. At weddings, a traditional feast of rice is given called khalta-d rizza. Girdu is another meal prepared on special occasions that consists of rice and yogurt topped with melted butter. On 129

saints days, a lamb is sacrificed, and the meal, called dukhrana, is distributed to all present. Dwelling Most Assyrians live in urban apartments or houses. In the rural villages of northern Iraq, Assyrians live in small stone houses.

Attitudes Toward Others


Kurds and Arabs. Assyrian relations with their Kurdish and Arab neighbors were largely hostile and violent throughout the 20th century. This hostility was exacerbated during the British Mandate period in the early years of Iraqs independence, and is responsible for continuing Assyrian insecurity in Iraq with regard to these ethnic groups. Christianity has made the Assyrians a visibly distinct community, with traditions and practices in stark contrast to those of their Muslim Kurdish and Arab neighbors. Awareness of their many differences has led Iraqi Assyrians to generally distrust their Kurdish and Arab neighbors. Kurdish attempts to exercise hegemony in northern Iraq, as well as violence between Kurds and the Iraqi government near traditional Assyrian villages, have driven most Assyrians to migrate to larger cities or emigrate to the West in search of physical safety. Assyrians in northern Iraq resist attempts by Kurds to assimilate them into Kurdish culture, language, and political parties. Assyrians, like Chaldeans, feel Arabs and Kurds do not treat them as equal citizens. They claim that the Iraqi government has never prosecuted Kurdish violence against them. Assyrians are particularly wary of a situation in which they might be left, in the future, under the authority of Kurds in northern Iraq. Though most Assyrians did not support Hussein, many fear that Kurdish peshmergas will overrun Assyrian villages and towns near Mosul without a strong central government in Iraq. Chaldeans. The Chaldean break with the Nestorian Church of the East arose out of, and exacerbated, a long history of factionalism within the 130

Suraya community. The struggles over the Catholic unity movement were heated and at times violent up through the 19th century. As a result, Nestorian Assyrians scornfully labeled Chaldeans Maghlobeen, or the conquered, that is, those conquered by Rome. Relations between Assyrians and Chaldeans are multi-faceted. Both communities share a common ethnic heritage and language. They acknowledge a long period of shared history under the Church of the East, and their religious rites and liturgies remain nearly identical. Assyrians, though a much smaller group than Chaldeans in Iraq, have a more organized political representation and appear to receive more attention and recognition from the international community. As a result, Assyrians tend to be vocal in their belief that the term Assyrian encompasses Chaldeans and other Syriac speakers, a position many Chaldeans resent. Furthermore, Assyrians, who are more opposed to the Iraqi regime and the Kurdish parties that dominate northern Iraq, resent Chaldeans cooperation with these institutions. Turkmen. Relations between Assyrians and Turkmen tend to be quiet. The Turkmen share a similar position with the Assyrians and Chaldeans in northern Iraq with respect to the Kurds. Turkmen, Assyrians and Chaldeans are all interested in greater political representation in a democratic, pluralistic government. Each group also seeks to secure greater cultural, linguistic, and educational rights. The Turkmen, Assyrians, and Chaldeans would like to see northern Iraq less dominated by the Kurds. Attitudes Toward Neighboring States Turkey. Assyrian attitudes toward Turkey are particularly negative, as Assyrians suffered their heaviest losses at the hands of Kurds and Turks under the Ottoman government. In addition to the 2.5 million Christians who were killed, and the 2 million who subsequently fled from Turkey in 1914-1915 (the Year of the Sword), in 1924 more than 10,000 Christians were executed in the Hakkari region and its surrounding Christian villages. Turkey also violently rebuffed all attempts by Assyrians to return to their traditional villages in the Hakkari region of south131

eastern Turkey in period after World War I. Assyrians and Chaldeans believe it is Turkeys goal to completely eliminate the Assyrian and Chaldean people, culture, history, and language from its territory. Iran. Assyrian attitudes toward Iran improved after they were allowed to enter Iran in the interwar period following World War I. Syria. Syria, with its higher Christian population, was considered a place of refuge for Assyrians and Chaldeans fleeing violence and repression in Turkey and Iraq from 1915 through the 1940s. This was particularly true during the French Mandate period in Syria, from 19201932, since the French had a history of protecting Christians under Ottoman rule. Many Assyrians and Chaldeans settled in the Syrian Jazira region permanently, or on their way to North America and Europe. Attitudes Toward Other States Britain. Although the British favored Assyrians during the early part of the 20th century, Assyrians feel they were abandoned by Britain to the Iraqi Arab nation state. Assyrians, therefore, have a bitter attitude toward Britain due to the massacres that followed this action. United States. Assyrian Iraqis in the United States appear to have enthusiastically supported the United States in its drive to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Assyrian attitudes toward the United States will depend on how the United States deals with the formation of a new multi-ethnic state in Iraq, and protection of Assyrian interests among the Arabs and Kurds.

Cultural Economy
In urban areas, Assyrians and Chaldeans have long been associated with entrepreneurship, commerce and business, including money lending, money changing, importing and exporting activities that were thought unsuitable for Muslims. Trading relationships with Europeans and greater contact with Westerners during the Ottoman period facilitated this role. In the large cities of Iraq, many shops, hotels and restaurants are run and staffed by Assyrians and Chaldeans, a merchant and innkeeper tradition that extends back for centuries. 132

Vocation Assyrians and Chaldeans value education. Though they lived with severe discrimination and were considered inferior under Muslim rule, Assyrians and Chaldeans have been considered skilled at building, navigation, agriculture, medicine, science, and art. In the early centuries of Muslim rule, the Arab tribes who assumed political leadership were careful to use learned Assyrians and Chaldeans (both known as Suraya in that period) to perform these tasks. Peasants The Assyrians and Chaldeans in the Mosul district of northern Iraq were settled agriculturalists on lowland plains, most often in subordinate, serflike economic relationships to other Kurdish and Arab tribes. Though they lived in a rich agricultural area, they lived in relatively poor, peasant villages due to the taxes and social discriminations levied upon them as Christians. Nevertheless, compared to non-Muslims in other Arab regions, the Assyrians and Chaldeans who lived and worked on Mosuls fertile plains were healthier and economically better off. They were also better educated, due to the presence of church-run schools. These farmers raised cattle, grew food, and the area was known for the quality of their fine tobacco. Some Assyrians still live and farm on the Mosul plains.

Cultural Geography
There are an estimated 200,000 Assyrians in Iraq. Most live in and around Baghdad. Another group of Assyrians live in northern Iraq, and a smaller group of a few thousand live in southern Iraq. There are approximately 80,000 Assyrians living in Chicago, the largest population of Assyrians in the United States. Other Assyrian immigrant communities were established in New York, California, Arizona, Canada, Europe, Australia and Brazil. Assyrians began emigrating to the West in the 1880s, particularly to the United States, in search of jobs and higher education. Since Assyrians 133

place a great value on education, many Assyrians in the United States have college degrees and pursue professional careers in medicine, law, computer science, education, and the sciences. Many Assyrian immigrants in the United States also own small businesses. Assyrians throughout the world continue to visit and financially support relatives in Iraq. They are active, moreover, in contributing financial assistance to Assyrian refugees through registered charities such as the Assyrian Aid Society, which also provides food, medicine, and school buildings, as well as help in rehabilitating Assyrian villages in northern Iraq. The Assyrian diaspora actively promotes human rights for relatives in Iraq. Political advocacy for Iraqi Assyrians is organized primarily in the diaspora, as are efforts at bringing the Assyrian, Chaldean and other Syriac Christian churches together. In general, Assyrians in the United States supported measures to end the regime of Saddam Hussein, keeping in mind the persecutions their relatives suffered in Iraq.

Shia Muslims
The Sunni-Shia division of Islam originated shortly after the death of the founder of Islam, the prophet Muhammad, in 632 A.D. The differences between the Shia and the Sunni did not become a formal religious distinction until the traditions and doctrine of Shia Islam were set out by Jafar al-Sadiq, the sixth Shia Imam, around 750 A.D. The word Shia means partisan (or faction) of Ali, and was first used to designate those who believed that Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of the prophet, should have been designated the Imam (the political and religious leaders of the Muslim community) after the death of Muhammad. After Muhammads death, there was disagreement as to who would have authority over the Muslim community. Those who would later become known as Sunnis believed that, based on specific provisions of the Quran (Koran), Muslims are to be governed by an elected head of state called the khalifa (caliph). Supporters of Ali, the early Shia, believed that the Muslim leader, whom they designated as Imam, must be a direct descendant of the prophet Muhammad and that Muhammad 134

had designated Ali as his successor. The title Imam in the Shia community has come to mean more than the spiritual and political leader of Islam, as the Shia believe that the Imam is infallible and possesses holiness beyond that of a caliph. At Muhammads death, three of his companions agreed among themselves that one of them, Abu Bakr, would take on the leadership of the Muslim community in Medina. The townspeople swore allegiance to Abu Bakr, and he took on the title of caliph. Umar, who was then succeeded by Uthman, succeeded Abu Bakr. Ali was ultimately elected to be the fourth caliph, but was later overthrown and assassinated. Shia Muslims believe that the first three caliphs Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman were usurpers, and that Ali was the first true Imam. Shia Muslims are divided into two groups, Ithna Asharia or Twelvers and Ismailis or Seveners. Twelvers constitute the majority of Shia adherents. Their name derives from their recognition of twelve Imams beginning with Ali and ending with Muhammad al-Mahdi, who will one day return. Seveners believe in only the first seven of the 12 Shia Imams, because they disagree with the process of succession after the death of the sixth Imam Jafar al-Sadiq, and believe that Ismail should have inherited the Imamate. The Shia have several practices and beliefs that distinguish them from Sunni Muslims. First is the belief that they must follow a supreme leader, or Imam who is descended from the prophet Muhammad and who has spiritual and temporal authority over all Shia Muslims. Shia Muslims believe that the Imam must possess ismah, or infallibility so that he will always lead the umma (global Muslim community) on the right path. The Imam must also have immunity from sin. God bestows these critical characteristics upon the Imam; the Imam is not divine himself, but is infused with divine elements because of his piety and selfdiscipline. This differs from the Sunni principle, which does not require a singular supreme leader, nor require that he be a descendant of Muhammad, but rather a member of Muhammads tribe. Shia Muslims also hold the Imam Ali in as high regard as the prophet Muhammad. 135

The Shia practice of Islam is generally similar to that of the Sunnis. However, there are several specific practices outlined in the Twelver Jafari school of law that are distinct from, and rejected by the Sunnis. Taqiyya is the practice of dissimulation or quietism, through which Shia Muslims may deny their Shia identity to avoid threats to their life or property by persecutors. Imam Ali is said to have performed taqiyya by outwardly pledging his allegiance to the first three successors of Muhammad, but inwardly rejecting their authority, seeking to protect himself from those who opposed him. Shia also refer to the Quranic verse that states: if anyone is compelled and professes unbelief with his tongue while his heart contradicts him to escape his enemies, no blame falls on him because God takes his servants as their hearts believe. Sunnis see the concealment of faith as cowardly and degrading to a true believer and look down on the Shia as willing to lie about their faith. The second practice is temporary marriage, called muta. In muta, a man and a woman, who would be permitted to marry in permanent marriage, may agree on a dowry and a specific period of time and enter into marriage with the knowledge that their union will end on a specified date. Temporary marriage is an alternative if one does not have adequate financial means for permanent marriage, and is a way to avoid immoral sexual behavior. Muta was permitted in early Islam, but was prohibited by the second caliph Umar. The Shia, however, reject Umar, and consider muta an acceptable practice. A third practice rooted in the Jafari school of law is the payment of khums. In addition to the practice of zakat (almsgiving), which is one of the five pillars of Islam shared by Sunni and Shia, the Shia are also expected to pay khums, equaling one fifth of ones surplus income after necessary expenses are paid. A portion of the khums is called the share of the Imam and is paid directly to the Shia mujtahid or cleric in the locality where the individual lives. This portion of the khums is used to support the mujtahid and is distributed to other needy clerics, and for the maintenance of Shia shrines. The money paid by the Shia to the mujta136

hids, many of whom are concentrated in the shrine cities, provides a substantial economic base that the Shia clerics can use to maintain their influence by distributing funds within the religious community. The Shia further believe that the hadiths (traditional sayings and acts) of the Twelve Imams and Fatima, Muhammads daughter and Alis wife, are as authoritative as the hadith of Muhammad. They also reject Muhammads hadiths regarding the authority of Umar, Aisha (Muhammads wife and Abu Bakrs daughter) and Uthman within the Islamic community.

Religious Practice
Prayer Like other Muslims, Shia say five prayers a day, but they have adapted their practice to combine the recitation of two prayers and often pray only three times a day. While it is considered preferable to pray the five daily prayers separately, it is acceptable to pray the two prayers said between noon and sunset together. The two prayers between noon and sunset must be prayed in the appropriate order, and may be said at any time during the prescribed period before the sun sets. The Shia add the phrase hasten to the best of works in the call to prayer. Ablution Muslims are directed to perform a ritual ablution or washing, before prayer. Shia interpret the Quran as directing believers to wash their faces and hands up to the elbows, but wipe the head and feet with water rather than fully washing them. During prayer, the Shia prostrate themselves on the ground. They believe that they should only prostate on the bare earth or on any other non-edible or non-wearable substance. Bare earth and stone are preferable. The Shia do not pray on cloth or woven prayer rugs, but may use mats woven of reeds or straw. Shia may place a piece of stone or clay on the ground and touch their foreheads to the stone when they pray. The clay, disc-shaped turbas are 137

made from the sacred soil of Najaf where Imam Ali is buried. The possession of such a disc is a sign of Shia identity. Holy Cities (Atabat) The shrines of Shia Imams are significant in Shia Islam. They are seen as extensions of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, and pilgrimage to a Shia shrine may substitute for going on the hajj when travel to Mecca is prohibitive, but a trip to Najaf, Karbala, or another shrine city is possible. Unlike the hajj to Mecca, which is a requirement for Muslims, visits to shrines are voluntary. Many Shia visit shrines to petition for the help of the saint or Imam buried there, for personal spiritual fulfillment, or to commemorate a day of martyrdom. The shrine cities of Karbala and Najaf are of particular significance for the Shia of Iraq. The founding events of Shiism took place in Iraq in these cities. Both cities draw Shia pilgrims from all over the world. Karbala and Najaf emerged as strongholds of Shia Islam in Iraq during the late Ottoman period because they were dominated by Iranian clerics who were protected by the Iranian government. Ashura Commemoration The Shia commemorate the martyrdom of Imam Husayn in the Muslim month of Muharram. Ashura marks the death of the third Shia Imam in 680 A.D. in battle along with 72 of his followers. After a 40-day period of mourning, the Shia travel on foot from Najaf to Karbala where the shrine of Imam Husayn is located, carrying banners and pictures of the martyred Imam. Male participants in the Ashura rituals beat their chests and chant in an action called lahtom. Some use swords to lacerate their heads to symbolize the beheading of Husayn, or use chains to beat their backs to evoke the suffering of Husayn. The commemoration of Ashura is a very vocal and frenetic event, with some participants reaching a frenzied state as they mourn Husayn. Most pilgrims to the shrine of Husayn at Ashura are dressed in white robes and wear a black band around their heads in a sign of mourning. Women wear the traditional long black robes to com138

pletely cover their hair and body and do not participate in the frenzied activities of the chanting crowd, but pray quietly by themselves. The martyrdom of Husayn and its reenactment every year has parallels to the Christian commemoration of the crucifixion of Christ. The Shia believe Husayn knew that death at the hands of his enemies was his fate, and chose to accept the suffering. In doing so, he could stand up to the political enemy that sought to destroy the family of the Prophet, as well as to sacrifice himself on behalf of his followers. Husayns death is believed to have redemptive power for the Shia, so that those who follow Husayn will experience redemption when the 12th Imam returns on the Last Day. Husayns death has taken on additional meaning as a symbol of the persecution and dispossession that the Shia community has endured in Iraq and other countries. The Baath Party banned the Ashura celebration, not only because the ruling group was Sunni and disagreed with principles of Shiism, but also to preempt the mass expression of Shia politi-

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cal dissent in the context of a Shia religious ritual. While the Shia could visit the shrine of Husayn, they could not have a procession from Najaf to Karbala, and could not show any outward symbols of the celebration, such as beating ones chest, displaying the ceremonial sword, or flying banners with Imam Husayns name. The fall of the Hussein regime has permitted a mass revival of the Ashura commemoration among the Iraqi Shia. As it has been more than 3 decades since the last open celebration, this means many younger Iraqi Shia are participating in the remembrance for the first time.

Differences Within Shia


The Shia population of Iraq includes Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, and Iranians. Different cultural identities and practices serve to distinguish each group from the others and prevent the development of a strong Shia bond between them. The Iraqi Arab Shia group is the largest of the four Shia subgroups in Iraq. Shia followers did not make up the majority of the population in Iraq until the 19th century when nomadic Arab tribesman living in Ottoman-controlled Iraq converted to Shiism at the same time that they adopted a settled lifestyle. The Shia of the 21st century are religiously united by their Shia identity but are politically diverse, including secularists, religious groups, urban and rural dwellers, each group having its own perspective on government and the role of religion. A sub-group of the Iraqi Arab Shia are the Madan, also called Marsh Dwellers or Marsh Arabs. The tribes of the Madan live in southeastern Iraq, where they have been fishermen and buffalo herders in the marshlands for centuries. The Madan are Shia Muslims, but their lifestyle as marsh dwellers sets them apart from the Shia who live in towns and cities. As a result, the religious practice of the Marsh Arabs is different, specifically in their more lenient adherence to Islamic practices as prayer and diet, in comparison to town dwellers. Other Arabs, both Shia and Sunni, see the Madan as inferior because of their variations in 140

Islamic practice and their allegedly mixed Arab and Iranian heritage. Some Iraqi Arabs believe that the Madan maintain close ties to Iran. The Kurdish and Turkmen (Turkoman) Shia form a small portion of their respective ethnic groups. They have been marginalized within their own ethnic groups, in which the majority are Sunni adherents. The Faili Kurds have been Muslims since Islam came to the territories of Iraq and Iran. They converted to Shiism during the period of the Safavid Empire in Iran because of their geographical proximity to the Persian Empire. Faili Kurds constitute about ten percent of all Kurds in Iraq.

Proselytizing
Since the 1950s, the Shia of Iraq have been unable to openly practice all aspects of their faith. They have been forced to refrain from or hide the most distinctive Shia practices, including the Ashura commemoration of the death of Imam Husayn, and the display of clay disks used during prayer. The repressive policy of the Iraqi state toward the Shia population has prevented the Shia from proselytizing or otherwise publicly displaying their religious practice.

Religious Hierarchy
Shia Muslims have a more structured religious hierarchy than the Sunnis. The Shia clergy is referred to collectively as ulema (a single cleric is an alim). At the pinnacle of the Shia religious hierarchy is the Imam, who is a direct descendant of the family of the prophet Muhammad. The Shia believe in twelve Imams, each of whom were spiritual and political leaders of the Shia community. The twelfth Shia Imam, Muhammad, is known as the Mahdi, who is presently in hiding, waiting for the Last Day, when he will return and restore Islam and justice throughout the world. Although the Twelfth Imam is presently absent from sight, he nevertheless remains the Imam, and retains his infallibility and immunity from sin. Unlike among the Sunni, who use the term Imam to designate the prayer leader in a mosque, Shia reserve the title of Imam for Muhammads twelve successors. 141

Until the Imams return, Shia clerics act as deputies and interpret the Islamic law and provide guidance to Shia followers. The ulema have several levels of authority and status: marja al-taqlid, ayatollah, greater and lesser mujtahids, and mullah. A member of the ulema attains a particular status in the Shia hierarchy by achieving both a certain level of scholarly knowledge and a following among the public who acknowledge his piety and learning and follow his legal rulings. Mumins are itinerant preachers who may or may not have received formal religious training and instruction. Some mumins have attended religious schools and are legitimate representatives of Shia religious leaders, while others appeal to the folk superstitions of rural peasants. A village mullah cannot interpret religion for others and must defer to a more learned religious scholar. A mullah holds the lowest place in the clerical hierarchy and functions as a low level preacher. Mutadayyins are pious men who are addressed as Thiqat al-Islam (the Trust of Islam) and may receive charity (khums payments made by the faithful to support the clergy) and settle minor Sharia cases. The title of mujtahid designates a certain level of learning and position in the hierarchy rather than the clerics actual function. All levels of clerics from mujtahid and above may issue fatwas or binding legal opinions. The fatwas of a greater mujtahid are given greater consideration than those of a lesser mujtahid because of their greater prominence and larger number of followers. A marja al-taqlid serves as a preeminent interpreter of divine law whose learning and wisdom is considered superior to that of other Shia clerics, and to whom other clerics look for guidance. A marja is supposed to exhibit extreme piety and devotion combined with advanced learning and superior reason. There are no fixed criteria for being a marja, and there is no formal recognition or ceremony to mark that he has achieved the position. A marja gains the title by being acknowledged as such by some of his fellow ulema (clerics) and by being the recipient of khums, 142

which indicates his standing as an important cleric in one of the Shia shrine cities. There may be more than one marja during the same time period. For example, Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran was recognized as a marja although he did not fulfill all of the traditional criteria, but his high profile led to his recognition as a marja. At the same time that Khomeini was considered a marja, there was another ayatollah in Iraq (Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Sidiq al-Sadr), who was also recognized as a marja. Shia may chose which marja they will follow if there is more than one simultaneously, but he must be a living marja. The status of ayatollah is just below the marja al-taqlid. The use of the title is a recent phenomenon, with a sharp increase in its use following the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Ayatollah means the sign of God, and is bestowed on a cleric through the recognition of his knowledge by other ayatollahs. An ayatollah may be elevated to marja taqlid status, if his peers consider him exemplary.

Shia Politics
The Shia population rebelled against the regime after the 1991 Gulf War in a spontaneous uprising that spread across southern Iraq. Shia of all political affiliations participated in the uprising, but the majority were Shia without links to political parties, who rose up out of anger and resentment against the regime and were not motivated by a particular ideology. The uprising lacked a clear religious leadership that could coordinate the insurrection and was limited to the countryside and the cities of Najaf and Karbala. Hussein managed to prevent the spread of the rebellion to the Shia residents of the Baghdad slum neighborhoods. Shia rebels and opposition members repeatedly affirmed that the rebellion was aimed at the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and was not directed against the Iraqi state. The Shia did not seek to divide the state but sought to fulfill their long-standing demand for political power and representation in the government in proportion to their population. The regime used military force to put down the rebellion, killing as many as 300,000 citizens in a 3-week operation. The regime denounced 143

the dissidents as Iranian agents and forced the leading Shia cleric, Ayatollah al-Khoei, to denounce the uprising on television and appeal for obedience to the regime. The brutal methods used by the government to put down the resistance caused a mass flight of refugees, 33,000 of whom sought protection from the Allied forces in Saudi Arabia, and an equal number who fled to Iran. Since the uprising there has been a continuing exodus to Iran, Syria, Britain, and the United States. The regime divided the religious and secular centers of authority by empowering the tribal sheikhs with weapons and government support to enforce security in the south of the country, while it continued to persecute prominent Shia clergy. Many religious leaders, regardless of their level of political participation, have been arrested and many were executed. With the collapse of the secular government, the Shia are turning to their clerics for political as well as spiritual leadership because they have been the only authority figures for 30 years. Clerics were the primary source of trusted leadership under the anti-Shia regime. Since the removal of Hussein, the people have turned to the clergy to expand the leadership role that they have always held within the Shia community. The Iraqi Shia are acutely aware of their status as a politically marginalized section of the population. The Iraqi Shia have been, since the creation of the modern state of Iraq, under-represented relative to their proportion of the population. In addition to the active discrimination against the Shia by the Baath government, there are other barriers to Shia political participation that come from within the group: the Shia rejection of Sunni political leaders, and reluctance on the part of the Shia to participate in such a government.

Attitudes Toward Others


Despite the treatment the Shia experienced at the hands of the Iraqi regime, relations between the Sunni and Shia populations in Iraq are generally positive. This is particularly true in larger cities, where the urban population is better educated and has a higher standard of living 144

than in the rural areas. The culture of the cities leads to greater integration and cooperation between the Sunni and Shia. Ties with Foreign Believers The issue of foreign ties is particularly sensitive in the case of the Iraqi Shia. The Shia population of Iraq, regardless of ethnic identity, has perennially faced allegations of having ties with Iran. From the perspective of Sunni Arabs, who are the ruling group in Iraq and the majority of Muslims worldwide, Shiism is linked to the Iranians. The reality is more nuanced and is based on a range of factors including domestic politics, the regional situation and the policies of Iran itself. The formative events of Shia Islam occurred in Iraq, in particular the martyrdom of Husayn at Karbala and the burial of the first Shia Imam Ali in Najaf. Iran is the center of Shiism because Shiism was declared the state religion of the Persian Safavid Empire. The Sunni-dominated leadership have gradually marginalized the influence of Shia clerics in Iraq since the 1970s, when the most prominent Shia clerics were expelled to Iran. The Iraqi Shia are caught in the middle of the tension between Iran and Iraq by virtue of their religious and ethnic identity. For the majority whose ethnic identity is Arab, they feel a deep connection to the Arab identity of Iraq that outweighs any feelings toward Iran. Before the large scale conversion to Shiism in the 1800s, most Iraqi Arab Shia were nomadic tribesmen, and they have retained many of their pre-Shiism Arab and tribal values. The Madan identify themselves as Arabs, but feel a second level of group cohesiveness based on their unique lifestyle as marsh dwellers. Kurdish and Turkmen Shia feel connected to their respective ethnic groups first and foremost, before any identification on the basis of religion. The Iraqi Arab Shia feel particularly caught between Iraq and Iran because, unlike Kurdish or Turkmen Shia, or even the culturally distinct Madan, the main difference between them and the rest of the Arab population of Iraq is their religious identity. To agitate for rights solely on the basis of religion only serves to highlight the sectarian division 145

between them and the Sunni Arabs, which is the primary division between the two groups in the first place. Several prominent Iraq Arab Shia political organizations have received assistance from Iran. There are allegations that al-Dawa al-Islamiyah, the first major Shia political organization (which became active in the 1960s), had ties to the Iranian Shah. The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), an Iranian-based Iraqi exile group that aimed to overthrow Saddam Hussein and the Baath regime, has received substantial Iranian assistance since its creation in the 1980s. The militia branch of SCIRI, called the Badr Brigade (now Badr Corps), took part in the Shia uprising against Hussein after the Gulf War in 1991. The head of SCIRI, Ayatollah Muhammad Bakr al-Hakim, is the son of an early antiBaath dissident, who was Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadrs mentor. Although ties between the preeminent Iraqi Shia political leaders and Iran can be discerned, it is unclear to what extent these relationships are based on genuine affinities or pragmatic calculations; these interests do diverge. Iranian and Arab Shia Muslims have a very distinct sense of identity, and the Iraqi Shia attachment to Arab identity generally appears to be stronger than to Shiism.

Religious-Ethnic Interaction
Islam and Arabs Islam, as it is practiced in Iraq, is closely tied to Arab culture. Arabs and Muslims have functioned in Iraq as the preeminent political paradigms for more than 1,300 years. Just as the two groups have become synonymous, so has the notion of equating Arabs with Sunnis, with the resulting implication that Arab governments must necessarily be Sunni. Equating Arab with Sunni presents a dilemma for the Shia, who, while Arab, are designated as outsiders because of their religious identity. Because of historical developments, which have resulted in Iran playing the role of spiritual and political home of Shiism, the Arab Shia are associated with Iran despite the contrasts in Arab and Iranian culture. 146

Ethnic versus Religious Identity The Iraq Arab Shia dedication to their Arab identity is generally stronger than to Shiism and Iraqi Shia generally feel that they are Arabs first and foremost. Most of the Iraqi Shia converted to Shiism when the Ottomans instituted a policy of tribal settlement in the 1830s. The newly settled and recently converted Shia tribesmen retained their Arab identity. The Shia in Iraq, who have been ruled by a succession of Sunni governments since the 1920s, have developed a political consciousness based on their religious identity. The consolidation of their identity as Shia Arabs is the result of having been treated by the successive rulings groups as outsiders because of their religious affiliation. The development of a distinct identity as a Shia does not override the deeper Arab identity they have maintained since conversion. Religion and Society Shia clerics are the primary authorities for the Shia in Iraq. The Baath government of Iraq has been seen as illegitimate since the party took power in 1968, and the Shia turned to the clerics to provide guidance and leadership. The status of the Shia clerics has revived after the collapse of the Hussein regime in 2003. In the vacuum of law and order, numerous clerics have sought to establish themselves in positions of political authority. The Shia population is turning to the clerics as political as well as religious leaders because they were the trusted authorities during the decades of Baath oppression. A younger generation of clerics has emerged, many of whom are the sons or younger relatives of clerics killed by the Hussein regime. The clerics of 2003 are competing for the support of the Shia population in an uncertain environment that lacks the structure that shaped the society of their predecessors.

Militant Subgroups
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) is based in Iran with its main offices located in London and cells operating 147

in Iraq. The military wing of SCIRI is the Badr Corps. The Badr Corps consists of Iraqi refugees in Iran as well as Iraqi military officers and soldiers from the Iraqi army who defected and fled to Iran during the Iran-Iraq war. The ranks of the Badr Corps increased after many Iraqi Shia fled to Iran following the popular uprising of 1991. The Badr Corps is named after the first battle fought in the name of Islam in 624 A.D., when Ali, Muhammads son-in-law and the first Shia Imam, defeated a band of infidels at Badr, south of Medina. SCIRI was created in 1982 after Ayatollah Muhammad Bakr al-Hakim fled Iraq and settled in Iran. Al-Hakim is part of a prominent Iraqi religious family. He is the son of the late Grand Ayatollah Muhsin alHakim, who was the spiritual leader of the Shia in the world from 1955 to 1970 and a co-founder of the Islamic political movement in Iraq (along with Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr, who was executed by the Iraqi regime in 1980). Al-Hakim moved his activities to Iran when the regime increased its persecution of Shia political figures following the Iranian Revolution. Although some Iraqis look on SCIRI with distrust because they reportedly received weapons and funding from Iran, many admire the leader of the organization, al-Hakim, and look favorably on his credentials as an Iraqi with longstanding ties to the Shia political movement in Iraq. Al-Dawa al-Islamiyah (Islamic Call) The al-Dawa party was formed in the late 1960s and was based on the philosophy of Ayatollah Sayyid Baqir al-Sadr. The party launched guerilla attacks against police stations, the Baath party and the Peoples Army posts in the 1970s. The armed wing of the party- the Revolutionary Army for the Liberation of Iraq- almost succeeded in killing President Husseins son Uday in 1996. The party is presently split into factions, some in Iran. Al-Dawa had been repressed under Baath rule, but is reappearing in post-Hussein Iraq. Al-Dawa is said to seek the formation of an Islamic government with similarities to that in Iran; this goal is not simply a replication of Iranian ideas but reflects a long-standing aim of the indigenous Iraqi Shia political movement. 148

Sunni Muslims
The Arabic word Sunnah means path or example, and refers particularly to the example of the Prophet Muhammad as found in the Hadith, a collection of the Prophets sayings, and to the Quran, a collection of writings that Muslims believe were divinely revealed to Prophet Muhammad. Sunnis are literally those who follow the example of the prophet. Sunni Islam does not encourage a single over-arching interpretation of Islam by a ruler, but is predicated on unity through recognition of differences of opinion on how specific Islamic principles should govern life and be applied to society. There are four orthodox schools of law interpretations of Islamic principles within Sunni Islam: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii and Hanbali. Sunni Arabs in Iraq follow the Hanafi school of Islamic Law. Founded by Abu Hanifa, one of the earliest Muslim scholars to seek new ways of applying Islamic tenets to everyday life, it is the oldest school (Hanifa died in Iraq in 767). Hanifas interpretation of Muslim law was tolerant of differences within Muslim communities and elevated belief over practice. As a result, this school is known for its liberal religious orientation. It is the least conservative and dogmatic of the four schools. The Abbasid caliphate based in Baghdad from the mid-8th to the mid-13th centuries favored the Hanafi school. Under the Ottomans, the Hanafi school became the only authoritative code of law in the public life and official administration of justice in all the provinces of the empire.

Differences between Sunni and Shia Islam


In the mid-7th century, soon after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, Sunni Muslims and Shia Muslims split over his rightful spiritual and secular successor (known as the caliph). In terms of doctrine and belief Shia and Sunni Muslims are similar. Both follow the Five Pillars of Islam: profession of faith; praying five times a day; almsgiving to the poor and the mosque (house of worship); fasting during daylight hours in the month of Ramadan; and pilgrimage to Mecca (the hajj). However, there are significant differences between Sunni and Shia Muslims. 149

Mosque in Baghdad Of the several areas of controversy between Sunnis and Shia beliefs, the two most significant are historical memory and political theory. In terms of historical memory, Shia and Sunni view Islams formative period very differently. The source of the Sunni-Shia breach is the struggle for power between the followers of Ali (Muhammads cousin and son-in-law) and the supporters of the first three caliphs. At first political, the struggle gradually became religious. The events in the years between Muhammads death in 632 A.D. and the death of Alis son Husayn in 680 A.D. have developed into a foundational myth of the Shia. The central feeling of Shia since then has been that they suffered a historic injustice when Alis right to the caliphate was usurped. In particular, Shia see the 3rd caliph, Uthman, a member of 150

the Umayyad clan, as a mortal enemy of Ali. In addition to the AliUthman struggle, the martyrdom of Alis son Husayn in 680 A.D. forms the core of the Shia historical vision. The anniversary of this event has become a central Shia holiday. During the nine days preceding it, the story of the assassination is related at public and private gatherings. On the anniversary itself, (Ashura) performances re-enacting the events are followed by mournful marches. Ashura provides annual reinforcement for the Shia feeling of injustice. It heightens their sense of being the oppressed, persecuted, and stigmatized part of the Muslim community. It has also become a symbol of the right to rise up against tyrannical rule. The interpretation of this decisive half-century is much less central to the historic vision of Sunni Islam. According to Sunnis, the first three caliphs, along with Ali, are the rightly guided caliphs who form the golden age of Islam. In the Sunni world, Ashura is merely a voluntary fast day. Because of its symbolism, the Sunni Ottomans completely banned Ashura gatherings in Shia communities. Sunni and Shia also differ significantly in terms of political theory. According to Shia teachings, a state not ruled by the descendants of Ali is illegitimate. In contrast, Sunnis believe that not only members of the Prophet Muhammads family, but all descendants of the Arabian Quraysh tribe, have the right to be chosen as caliphs. Sunni tradition views a Muslim regime as legitimate as long as it does not publicly reject Islam. To Sunnis, even a bad Muslim ruler is preferable to chaos and anarchy. Sunnis, therefore, in contrast to Shia, have a very limited right to rebel within their religious tradition. In addition, Sunni religious leaders (ulema) who have never enjoyed the spiritual status of their Shia counterparts have generally been subservient to the state government. Piety Historically, piety (or lack thereof) has had political significance in Sunni Islam. The degree of ones piety was associated with the degree of ones 151

opposition to or support for the government. Antagonists tended to define one another as unbelievers or corrupters of true Islam to justify armed opposition. The opposition often insisted that the ruling authorities failed to live according to the Sharia and therefore were insincere in their belief. However, since its founding as a state, Iraq has been a secular society. The Baathist party was originally a secular socialist party. Muslim secularism does not involve a separation of mosque and state on the pattern of the American separation of church and state. Instead, Muslim secularism is characterized by state domination or appropriation of religion. The government in Iraq has largely controlled religious teaching and institutions in order to further political goals, while expressing an appreciation of Islams cultural heritage and of the role of this Islamic heritage in Iraqi national identity. Over the past decade, there has been no sign of a return to secularism. Rather, the Iraqi regime has continued to expand Islamic law within the Iraq legal system and has introduced compulsory study of the Quran at all educational levels. It is not clear to what extent these steps helped legitimize the government or strengthen its popularity. However, the regime remains essentially secular in many respects. Although the Iraqi society is also secular, it is not irreligious. Individual Sunnis in Iraq may follow Islamic rituals and live an Islamic lifestyle. There are indications that many people have turned to religion over the past decade in response to hardship. Overall, however, Islam remains subordinate to other identities, primarily ethnicity, for the majority of Iraqi Sunnis.

Proselytizing
Central to Islam is the belief that Islam constitutes one single community (umma) and that it is the duty of the umma to invite more people to Islam and to expand its abode.

Religious Hierarchy
Sunni Islam is a faith largely without clerical hierarchies and centralized institutions. The different classifications for Sunni clerics are the qadi, 152

the mufti, and the mullah. The qadis develop the law; the muftis apply and enforce it by issuing fatwas. During the Ottoman period, the supreme mufti of the empire normally issued fatwas of political import. The authority of both the qadi and the mufti was heavily dependent on the Ottoman state apparatus or powerful local rulers. Moreover, although fatwas are in theory binding on all Sunni Muslims, the force of any individual edict is related to the stature of the cleric who issued it. The mullah leads religious ceremonies at the communal level. The absence of a hierarchy in Sunni Islam has been a source of strength that has permitted the faith to adapt to local conditions. However, it also has been a weakness that makes it difficult for Sunni Muslims to achieve any significant degree of solidarity.

Significant Historical Events


Sunni-Shia Division In the mid-7th century, soon after the death of Muhammad, Shia and Sunni Muslims split over his rightful spiritual and secular successor (known as the caliph). The Shia favored Muhammads cousin and sonin-law Ali, advancing his candidacy on the basis of heredity. The Sunnis, believing that the Muslim people should be governed by consensus, elected Abu Bakr as caliph. Ali ultimately became the fourth caliph, but was overthrown by the rebellion of Yazid bin Muawiya, the governor of Syria. Muawiya established the Umayyad caliphate. During the Battle of Karbala (680), between Alis son Husayn and his followers and the Umayyad army, Husayn was killed. This 50-year period, from 632 to 680, marks the beginning of Shia Islam. Between the mid-10th and mid-11th centuries, Shia scholars put Shia hadith, law, and theology into written form, and new, uniquely Shia communal rituals were established. These included the annual public mourning for Husayn at Karbala (the ashura), the public cursing of the first two caliphs, and pilgrimages to the tombs of Ali's family. These acts cemented the Sunni perception of themselves as a distinct community. 153

The Sunnis and the Baath Party Following the 1968 Baathist coup, close family, clan, and tribal ties bound Iraqs ruling Sunni elite. Most notable in this regard was the emergence of Tikritis Sunni Arabs from the town of Tikrit related to President Ahmad Hasan al Bakr. Saddam Hussein, a key leader behind the scenes, was a Tikriti and a relative of al Bakr. The Baathist regime was strongly secular, and efforts to bring the Shia religious establishment under government control signaled the beginning of a long and violent clash between the regime and the activist Shia mujtahids and their followers. Because Shia Iran was nearby, larger and more powerful, it became convenient for the ruling Sunni elite to disenfranchise the Shia majority, repeating the long-standing charge that they were an Iranian fifth column. Pointing to the large number of Iranians in the Shia shrine cities in southern Iraq and the ties between Arab and Iranian Shia clergy, the regime accused the Shia whom they failed to win over, of serving Iranian interests. The 1979 Iranian Revolution brought religious and ethnic identity to the center of regional politics. The Islamic challenge posed by the war and the perceived need to assuage Iraqs Shia population caused a new religious element to enter the Iraqi regimes discourse. Islam became a significant part of the regimes identity and propaganda against Iran. Specifically, the rhetoric of the Sunni Arab elite began to emphasize Arab and Sunni identity as synonymous with Iraqi national identity. Saddam Hussein regularly and conspicuously attended mosques, ordered the establishment of two Islamic universities and other schools for teaching Islamic subjects, and generally promoted Islamic values.

Islam and Arabs


Islam, as it is practiced in Iraq, is closely tied to Arab culture. For Sunni Arabs especially, Arab values and Islam are often synonymous. Islam and Arab values have functioned in Iraq as the preeminent political paradigms for more than 1,300 years. Despite Islams emphasis on commu154

nity, an Arab versus non-Arab distinction insinuated itself within the early Islamic community. Arabs assert special rights and privileges in Islam for several reasons: the birthplace of Islam and its holiest sites are in the Arab region; Arabic is the language in which Gods message was revealed and transmitted; an Arab prophet was the first to receive this message; and its initial spread resulted from conquest by Arab armies. There is an especially close association between Sunni Islam and Arab nationalism. Islamic heritage and achievement serve as an essential component of transnational Arab unity. In addition, Arab Sunni Islams reliance on genealogy has tended to affirm the Sunni communitys perception of primacy. Sunnis regard themselves as descendants of and heirs to the Arab Muslim rule of the 7th to 12th centuries.

Militant Subgroups
Sunni Arab Islamist Groups in Iraq There are no prominent or influential Sunni Arab Islamist groups in Iraq. The regime severely persecuted groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. Wahhabism from neighboring Saudi Arabia has not managed to establish a foothold, although there is recent evidence of it being promoted within Iraq. However, militant Sunni Islamists in other Arab regions have forced the Iraqi regime to make rhetorical and material concessions to its demands. For example, this was partially responsible for the regime making Islamic law more prominent in Iraqs legal system and for introducing Islamic teachings to the schools curriculum. Sunni Kurdish Islamist Groups For the most part, militant Islam has failed to insinuate itself in the Iraqi Kurdish population. In general, the KDP and PUK forces have kept in check or suppressed the radical groups. The origins of Kurdish followers of Islam date to the 19th century, when the Kurdish national movement came to be led by Kurdish sheikhs. Modern Kurdish Islamic fundamentalism began in the 1950s with the spread of Egyptian-based Muslim Brotherhood. However, Kurds soon became disen155

chanted with the Muslim Brotherhood because it was not concerned with Kurdish nationalist aspirations. During the 1980s, the Iraqi government encouraged the emergence of Sunni religious movements among Kurds as a barrier to the penetration of Iranian Shia influence. It also viewed these movements as useful counterweights to the Kurdish nationalist movement, which it accused of cooperating with Tehran. However, the Kurdish Islamists soon directed their energies against the regime. The Iraqi regimes intensifying repression of Kurds spurred the growth of militant Islam. The radicals exploited the chemical attacks and the economic difficulties that followed the Gulf War. The town of Halabje which suffered a chemical weapons attack had been a center of Kurdish Islamic cadres. This region is home to the Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK), founded in 1986 by Mullah Uthman Abd al-Aziz. The IMIK inherited some the organizational structures of the Muslim Brotherhood existing in among Kurds since the 1950s. Although this group commands little popular support, its social and charitable work has increased its appeal. As Sunni Islamists, it represents a new trend in Iraq, one that may attract Sunni Arabs as well as Kurds. Among the Iraqi Kurds there are some relatively weak and organizationally disparate Islamic groups. The Islamist Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan is among the largest Kurdish-Islamic organizations. It has been able to form alliances with groups in both Saudi Arabia and Iran. In addition, it maintains close links with Arab Islamists. Jihad for this group does not imply action against Western interests, but was focused on overthrowing the Baathist regime. Other Kurds Islamic groups include: the Kurdish Islamic Association (concentrated outside of Iraq, it forms a Kurdish arm of the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood); the Kurdistan Hizbullah (composed primarily of Barzanis who took refuge in Iran in the 1970s, it has limited influence among Iraqs Kurds); and the Association of Muslim Students in Kurdistan (concentrated outside of Iraq, it lacks an effective presence among the Kurds). 156

Ansar al-Islam Ansar al-Islam (Supporters of Islam), a group of 400-700 Islamic militants of various ethnicities, controls several villages in the Kurdish region of Iraq beneath the Shinerwe Mountains near the Iranian border. In each village it has established fundamentalist Islamic rule, banning music, alcohol, photographs, etc. The group prevents girls from studying, requires men to grow beards, and enforces prayer five times daily. Ansar al-Islam formed in 2001 when several splintered parties in the region merged into one. It is suspected to have collaborated with Al Qaida and to provide refuge to Al Qaida members who have fled Afghanistan. The group is believed to be responsible for the recent assassinations of officials in the Kurdish regional government, and is suspected of inciting anti-Coalition activities since the fall of Baghdad.

MEDICAL ASSESSMENT
Disease Risks to Deployed Personnel
Iraq is assessed as high risk for infectious diseases. Without force health protection measures, mission effectiveness will be seriously jeopardized.

Food- or Water-borne Diseases


Sanitation is poor throughout the country, including major urban areas. Local food and water sources (including ice) are contaminated with pathogenic bacteria, parasites, and viruses to which most U.S. service members have little or no natural immunity. If local food, water, or ice from unapproved sources is consumed, diarrheal diseases can be expected to temporarily incapacitate a very high percentage of personnel within days. Hepatitis A and typhoid fever can cause prolonged illness in a smaller percentage. In addition, viral gastro157

enteritis (Norovirus) and food poisoning (Bacillus cereus, Clostridium perfringens, Staphylococcus) may cause significant outbreaks.

Vector-borne Diseases
During warmer months (April through November), the climate and ecological habitat support large populations of arthropod vectors, including mosquitoes, ticks, and sand flies. Significant disease transmission is sustained countrywide, included urban areas. Up to one percent of personnel exposed to sand flies could develop cutaneous leishmaniasis, and sporadic cases of visceral leishmaniasis could occur. Personnel exposed to mosquitoes in northern southern and eastern arease could develop malaria in the absence of countermeasures.

Sexually Transmitted Diseases


Gonorrhea, chlamydia and other infections are common among highrisk populations, and may affect a high percentage of personnel who have sexual contact, particularly amoung prostitutes and intervenous drug users. HIV/AIDS and hepatitis B also occur. Though the immediate impact of HIV/AIDS and hepatitis B on an operation is limited, the long-term health impact on individuals is substantial.

Water Contact Diseases


Lakes, rivers, streams, or other surface water may be contaminated with organisms that cause schistosomiasis and leptospirosis. Operations or activities that involve extensive fresh water contact may result in personnel being temporarily debilitated. Bodies of surface water are likely to be contaminated with human and animal waste. Activities such as wading or swimming may result in exposures to enteric diseases such as diarrhea and hepatitus through incindental ingestion of water. Prolonged water contact may also lead to the development of a variety of potentially debilitating skin conditions such as bacterial or fungal dermatitis. 158

Animal Contact Diseases


Rabies is a major public health problem primarily in rural areas of Iraq. Rabies-infected dogs and wildlife are common.

Medical Capabilities
Iraqs inadequate health care system is slowly recovering from more than a decade of neglect and from the looting that followed Operation Iraqi Freedom. Local medical care is limited and available only in major urban areas. Although inadequate, the Iraqi health care system can provide basic health care services. Limited amounts of medical materiel and the generally poor quality of the medical infrastructure greatly limit Iraqs ability to handle mass casualty incidents effectively. Ambulance services are extremely limited, lack coordination, and are restricted to large cities; patient care is not provided during transit. Most city hospitals use small vans or conscripted private vechicles for patient transport. Some private hospitals in Baghdad offer better medical care than their government counterparts, but care is still below U.S. standards. All Iraqi medical facilities experience frequent and extreme supply shortages. The quality of all Iraqi-made medical products is substandard. Blood banks are understaffed, lack sufficient supplies, and are unable to provide an adequate supply of safe blood products. Arabic and Kurdish are the main languages spoken in most of Iraq. Some medical personnel, especially physicians, can communicate in English. The Ministry of Health-Coalition Provisional Authority (MOH-CPA) is overseeing the reconstruction of the Iraqi government medical infrastructure and is an excellent point of contact for infrastructure information. The MOH-CPA is in the 12-story, S-shaped Ministry of Health building on the northeast corner of Baghdad Medical City in Baghdad (33-20-50N/044-22-53E). The MOH-CPA is headed by a U.S. senior general officer-equivalent civilian medical advisor, who is assisting the Iraqi Minister of Health. U.S. and Coalition medical assets are the best source of quality medical care in Iraq. 159

Key Medical Facilities


Saddam Husayn Cardiac Center Coordinates 33-19-37N 044-23-17E Location Adjacent to Baghdads central radio/television broadcasting station City Baghdad Type Private, 200 beds. Capabilities Medical: general, cardiology; surgery: general, plastic, ear/nose/throat, urology, renal lithotripsy; ancillary: wellequipped emergency room, ICU, 6 operating rooms. Comments Second best surgical facility in Iraq. Referral facility for Iraqi and foreign diplomats. Emergency generator. Ibn Sina Hospital Coordinates 33-18-42N 044-24-23E Location Haifa Street, 500 meters before palace gates City Baghdad Type Private, 100 beds. Capabilities Medical: general, cardiology; surgical: general, cardiac, plastic, ENT, renal lithotripsy; ancillary: well-equipped emergency room, ICU, MRI, operating room. Comments Best private surgical care facility in Iraq, but its use is limited to Saddam Husseins family and high-ranking military and political officials. Emergency generator. Rashid Military Hospital Coordinates 33-16-53N 044-27-27E Location Mu'askar ar-Rashid (Rashid Military Camp) City Baghdad Type Military, 800 beds. Capabilities Medical: general; surgery: general. Comments Primary military medical facility.

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Baghdad Medical City Complex Coordinates 33-20-50N 044-22-45E Location Ar Razi and Al Asharit Streets (North Gate) City Baghdad Telephone 4168611, 4169004 Type Civilian, 1,270 beds. Capabilities Medical: general, pediatrics; surgery: general; ancillary: 2 CT scanners. Comments Approximately 1,000 employees. Compound includes 650-bed surgical hospital; 220-bed pediatric hospital; Baghdad Medical College; and 11-story, 400-bed subspecialty hospital with 6 operating rooms. Nurses residence, physicians residence, nursing home, and conference center. Underground parking garage 220 meters south of main hospital building. Probably used to treat military casualties. Several emergency generators.

HISTORY
Many believe that Iraqs history began with the Garden of Eden, which was situated near Al Basrah, where the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers converge. Known for centuries as Mesopotamia, Sumerians, Babylonians, Assyrians, and then later, Arabs lived in Iraq. Iraq became part of the Turkish Ottoman empire in the 16th century until that empire disintegrated after World War I. In the peace settlement following the war, the Allies divided the Ottoman lands among them. Britain gained control of the territory that became Iraq. Britain retained control of the country until 1958, when a group of army officers killed the British-imposed king and proclaimed a republic. In 1961, Kuwait, another British protectorate, gained its independence from Britain. Iraq immediately claimed sovereignty over it, largely because of Kuwaits oil wealth. However, Britain reacted very strongly to the threat to its ex-protectorate and dispatched a brigade to deter the 161

Iraqi aggression. Iraq was forced to back down and, in 1963, officially recognized the sovereignty and borders of Kuwait. The Baath Party came to power during a coup in 1968, and Prime Minister Hasan al-Bakr became president and prime minister. The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) was put in place as the center of governmental power. Saddam Hussein was the key deputy to President al-Bakr. Hussein officially assumed power from al-Bakr in 1979. Hussein asserted his authority by personally executing key members of the RCC opposed to his assuming power. The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran threatened Iraq. The rise of a strong Shia government in Iran concerned Hussein; he was afraid a Shia opposition movement might gain momentum in southeast Iraq. In early 1980, Iranian Ayatollah Khomeini called for Iraqi Shia to overthrow the secular Iraqi government. Hussein invaded Iran in September 1980, using as pretext a historic dispute over the Shatt al-Arab waterway. Hussein underestimated the will of the Iranian people, and may have overestimated the power of his armed forces. After the Iranian governments purging of those in the Iranian military perceived to retain loyalty to the Shah, Hussein may have believed an opportunity existed to challenge a weakened Iranian force. Iran, however, remained strong enough to halt the Iraqi invasion. By 1982, Iran had reestablished its border and began advancing into Iraqi territory. In 1986, the war reached a stalemate. From the beginning of the war, the West and the conservative monarchies in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia supported Iraq in its effort to quell fundamentalist Islamic movement in Iran. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia loaned vast sums of money to Iraq. The Gulf Cooperation Council increased production of oil to force the price down, thus damaging Irans oil-dependent economy. The economic hardship became too great; financing a war was impossible. The war ended in July 1988 when the Iranian leadership accepted the UN ceasefire resolution. 162

The cost of the war to Iraq and Iran was staggering; several hundred thousand Iraqis had been killed or wounded. The war had also cost Iraq US$450 billion. Hussein purposely delayed progress on negotiations after the war to avoid any admission that hed been the aggressor. He also wanted to claim victory. Despite the accumulated debts and continued negotiations after the 8year war, Hussein began a large military expansion. Many believe that demobilizing his huge army at a time of economic crises might have jeopardized the regimes stability. Hussein lodged a series of complaints against Kuwait over oil reserves on the countries border to justify his attempts at expansion. He also accused Kuwait of leading an oil-pricing conspiracy designed to limit Iraqi oil revenues. He also demanded that Kuwait reclassify US$12 billion in war loans as gifts, becoming irate when they did not comply. Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 to acquire oil, gain access to Arabian Gulf ports, and perhaps to divert Iraqis attention from their domestic hardship. To ensure that Iran would not oppose Iraqs offensive, Hussein afforded Iran a generous peace settlement. In late July 1990, 100,000 Iraqi troops massed on the Kuwaiti border. On 2 August 1990, 350 Iraqi Republican Guard tanks rolled into Kuwait, secured the country in 3 days, and provoked international economic and military reprisals. To consolidate its gains, Iraq formally annexed Kuwait on 8 August 1990, incorporating it as the 19th province, and ordered all foreign ministries and government functions to relocate to Baghdad. UN condemnation was swift. Plans were laid to assemble a multinational force to isolate and ultimately remove Iraq from Kuwait. The UN leveled economic sanctions and a trade embargo on Iraq. On 29 August 1990, the UN Security Council set 15 January 1991 as the deadline for Iraq to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait or face retaliation. 163

Presidential Palace, Baghdad American, British, and French naval forces assembled in the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea as part of the first contingent of an international force that would eventually total nearly 750,000 personnel drawn from 31 countries. Following Iraqs refusal to meet the 15 January 1991 deadline, a massive air assault was launched. After seriously diminishing Iraqs army, navy, and air force capabilities, multinational forces launched a ground offensive to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait and destroy Iraqi army assets in southern Iraq. After 100 hours of ground warfare, a temporary cease-fire was declared on 28 February 1991. Iraq disavowed the annexation of Kuwait and formally accepted all UN resolutions. The United States presented Iraq with several conditions under which the cease-fire would remain permanent, including the swift and complete return of all coalition prisoners of war and full compliance with UN resolutions. On 11 April 1991, an official cease-fire was signed, effectively ending hostilities. On 24 April 1991, UN observation forces began to replace U.S. troops on the Iraq-Kuwait border. Domestic unrest characterized post-Gulf War Iraq. Regular Iraqi army troops, disgruntled by the inhumane conditions under which they were sent to the front in stark comparison to the well-equipped Republican Guard units rebelled upon their return to 164

Iraq. Dissident army troops, backed by other Iraqi opposition groups such as the Shia of the marsh areas and Al Basrah, mounted a strong but short attack on Republican Guard, local Baath Party headquarters, and other loyalist positions in southern Iraq. Intense fighting continued for several weeks but, by the middle of March 1991, most armed opposition ceased. A southern no-fly zone was initiated by the coalition to protect Shia Muslim rebels from air attacks. The zone initially extended from the 32d parallel to the border of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In northern Iraq, Kurdish rebels (peshmerga) consolidated control over the region by capturing several prominent towns. However, these advances ended quickly as Hussein brought the air and ground assets that were not destroyed in the Gulf War, most notably helicopter gunships, to bear in the north. One million Kurds and other Iraqis fled to the more remote, mountainous northern region on the Iraq-Turkey border. By April 1991, Kurdish and Iraqi leaders reached an agreement allowing Kurds to return to their towns without Iraqi interference. The UN further ensured the safety of Kurds by establishing a no-fly zone in northern Iraq, and a security zone for Kurdish refugees that was patrolled by Allied forces. Hussein sought to consolidate his control over the military by executing, purging, or reassigning several corps and divisional commanders, as well as many senior and mid-level officers. Husseins relatives, family members, and other Sunni Arabs from Tikrit, Husseins hometown, were featured prominently as replacements. The two Coalition-enforced no-fly zones highlighted Iraqs weakened defenses. Hussein rejected the no-fly zones in late 1992 and continued to stage air attacks against Shia rebels in the south. On 27 December 1992, a U.S. F-16 shot down an Iraqi MiG-25; in January 1993, Coalition forces shot down a MiG-29. In January 1993, Iraq moved surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) into the no-fly zones and rejected the U.S./Allied ultimatum to remove them, prompting a Coalition response. In January, the United States, Britain, and France staged air strikes against four missile/radar sites and two concentrations of mobile antiaircraft missile batteries inside 165

the southern no-fly zone, rendering Iraqi air defenses there inoperable. In June 1993, in response to an Iraqi attempt to assassinate former U.S. President George Bush while on a visit to Kuwait, 23 U.S. cruise missiles destroyed Iraqs principal intelligence facility in downtown Baghdad. The U.N. economic embargo had its intended effect. As domestic conditions worsened, Hussein complied nominally with the conditions of the cease-fire. In October 1994, however, Hussein moved two divisions of the Republican Guard Force Command to the Kuwaiti border to pressure the Coalition into removing sanctions. The United States deployed a carrier battle group, more than 28,000 troops, and 200 additional aircraft into the region. The Iraqi regime backed down. As a result of Iraqs confrontational stance, the UN imposed a no-drive zone in southern Iraq. The imposition prohibited the reinforcement of Iraqi troops and armor south of the 32d parallel. In November and December 1994, Iraq gave the appearance of conciliation by formally recognizing the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of Kuwait, and the international border demarcated by the UN in 1993. In March 1995, the Iraqi National Congress, an umbrella Iraqi opposition group, planned an attack on the northern Iraqi cities of Kirkuk and Mosul, hoping to instigate a rebellion among Iraqi troops. However, without international support, the action quickly fell apart. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) was the only opposition group to actually engage the Iraqi forces in combat. Also in May 1995, several military officers of the al-Dulaymi tribe from western Iraq staged a coup attempt. Hussein tortured and executed the participants, then returned their mutilated bodies to their kinsmen. In response, a Republican Guard battalion, led by angry al-Dulaymi military officers, attacked the Iraqi prison at Abu Gharayb. Two Republican Guard brigades defeated the rebels, but Hussein was irate that elements of his loyal Republican Guards had turned against him. A purge of the Republican Guards followed in July. 166

In August 1995, Hussein Kamil Hassan al-Majid, Husseins brother Saddam Kamil, and their families fled Baghdad to Jordan. The significance of this defection was acute; the wives of the men were Husseins daughters, and both men held significant posts in Husseins power structure. Hussein Kamil had been Minister of Industry and Military Industrialization and in charge of Iraqs weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. Saddam Kamil was an officer in Husseins Presidential Guard. The defection resulted less from disloyalty than fear; Saddam Husseins son, Uday, had threatened the lives of the men. Once in Jordan, however, Hussein Kamil denounced the Iraqi regime and divulged numerous secrets about Iraqs WMD programs, forcing the Iraqis to attempt damage control and release thousands of documents pertaining to WMD to UNSCOM. Hussein Kamil expected to be accepted by the West as a viable leader to replace Saddam Hussein; when such assistance was not forthcoming, Hussein Kamil began to chafe under his exile in Jordan. In February 1996, the Kamil brothers and their families eagerly returned to Baghdad, accepting Saddam Husseins offer of amnesty and expecting to return to their positions of power. Once back in Iraq, the brothers were promptly executed by Hussein, who announced to the world that vengeful kinsmen had killed them for their betrayal of Iraq. Despite these troubles, Hussein was able to maintain control throughout the mid 1990s. He bought the loyalty of supporters and security forces, and maintained his military forces to the extent possible. The Iraqi people, however, continued to suffer. Living standards further deteriorated in 1995. Prices more than doubled, and necessities such as infant formula and medicines became unavailable. In January 1996, Hussein decreed economic austerity measures to counter soaring inflation and widespread shortages caused by UN sanctions. To alleviate some of the Iraqi peoples hardship, the UN allowed Iraq to sell US$2 billion worth of oil every 6 months. All the proceeds of this limited oil sale had to be deposited in a UN escrow account and used to purchase food, medicine, and other essential materials and supplies for Iraqi citizens. 167

This plan was nearly derailed in August 1996 when Iraqi forces, assisted by Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) fighters, assaulted the PUK-held northern city of Irbil, the headquarters of the Iraqi opposition. The seizure of Irbil severely damaged Kurdish and Iraqi opposition unity, and strengthened Husseins power. U.S. cruise missile strikes in retaliation for the attack, and the extension of the no-fly zone from the 32nd to the 33rd parallel, had the unintended consequene of strengthening Husseins image abroad as an unjustly persecuted Arab leader. The UN oilfor-food (OFF) plan was implemented in January 1997, and large sums of money from the program were used by Hussein to support his loyalists and military. The situation for Iraqi citizens nominally improved as a result of the OFF program, although not to the extent possible if Hussein had provided more of the available support to his people. Iraqi smuggling of petroleum products to Turkey and through Iranian waters in the Arabian Gulf, in violation of UN sanctions, also brought in US$300-$400 million a year for Hussein. However, proceeds supported the Iraqi regime at the expense of the Iraqis. In October 1997, as UNSCOM weapons inspectors closed in on key information regarding Iraqs chemical and biological weapons programs, Hussein again became confrontational. He expelled the U.S. members of the UNSCOM team from the country, hoping to achieve concessions from the UN in return for renewed cooperation. UNSCOM chairman Richard Butler suspended all UNSCOM activities in Iraq, and the UNSC unanimously condemned Iraq for its actions. Baghdad again balked at cooperating with UN inspections in February 1998, again raising the likelihood of U.S. military strikes against Iraq. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan secured a last-minute accord with the Iraqi regime that allowed UN inspectors to continue their efforts and forestalled a U.S. attack on 23 February 1998. This agreement proved ineffective when Iraq demanded relief from sanctions, suspended cooperation with UNSCOM, and expelled the weapons inspectors in August 1998. This Iraqi intransigence helped fuel the passage of the Iraq Liber168

ation Act in October 1998, which allocated U.S. government funding to Iraqi opposition organizations dedicated to replacing Husseins regime. The UN responded to Iraqs actions by suspending regular sanction reviews, thereby ensuring sanctions would continue indefinitely unless Iraq renewed cooperation with the UN. On 15 December 1998, Butler delivered his annual report to the UNSC on the status of UN inspections. In this report, Butler accused Iraq of implementing a campaign to obstruct UNSCOM access to WMD-related records and sites. On 16 December, the United States and the United Kingdom began a 3-day air campaign named Operation DESERT FOX against key WMD and military targets in Iraq. The air strikes heavily damaged a number of military and suspected WMD production facilities. However, the air strikes did not cause Hussein to renew cooperation with the UN. Instead, the Iraqi regime claimed itself a victim, told the U.S. press that UNSCOM inspectors had turned over information to U.S. intelligence agencies, and asked the UN to remove American and British personnel from further UN missions in Iraq. In February 1999 Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammed Sadiq al Sadr, a Shia spiritual leader, and his two sons were assassinated in southern Iraq. Various anti-regime groups blamed Hussein for these murders, triggering 3 days of unrest and protests against Husseins tactics by Shia in Baghdad and southern Iraq. The regime responded by suppressing the protests and killing many protestors. Discontent continued through 1999, but Hussein eventually strengthened his hold on power through effective security operations. In December 1999, the UN attempted to restart its inspection effort. On 17 December, the UN Security Council passed a resolution creating the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) to replace UNSCOM. Iraq, however, rejected this resolution and announced its refusal to cooperate with further inspections. UN appointed Hans Blix, former head of IAEA inspections in Iraq, to lead UNMOVIC. Despite the setbacks, the IAEA conducted an inspection of 169

Iraqs nuclear material in January 2000. The IAEA report indicated Iraq complied with the inspection team and had not disturbed the uranium locked away by the IAEA years earlier. In 2000, Iraq attempted to reduce its political and economic isolation. Its increased diplomatic effort was rewarded during August 2000 when Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez became the first elected head of state to visit Iraq in a decade. Relations between Syria and Iraq also improved when Iraq began pumping crude oil to Syria, despite UN sanctions, through a pipeline that had been closed since 1982. In 2002, Izzat Ibrahim, vice-chairman of the Iraqi RCC, visited Syria and held talks with Syrias President Bashar al-Assad on 9 November. The renewed conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians in September 2000 provided Hussein with a propaganda opportunity. Hussein deployed a number of Republican Guard and Army units to western Iraq, claiming that he was prepared to support the Palestinians militarily in their struggle against Israel and encouraging other Arab leaders to do the same. Hussein then held Baghdads largest military parade since 1990, showcasing Iraqs military might and support for the Palestinians. The Iraqi regime also provided free medical care to Palestinians wounded in the intifadah and paid money to the families of those killed. These efforts appealed to Arabs angered by Israeli actions, but they directly challenged the moderate Middle Eastern leaders who argued for diplomacy and peace. After the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, U.S. intelligence determined that the Al Qaida terrorist network, led by Usama bin Ladin was responsible. Some speculated that Iraq assisted in the effort. When anthrax was found in the U.S. mail system in autumn 2001, more speculation focused on Iraq as a possible culprit. Hussein went to great lengths to not provoke the U.S. during this time, and hoped to avoid being included in the War on Terrorism. Challenges to no-fly zone enforcement abated, and Hussein even offered some sympathetic statements to the people of the United States. However, in January 2002, President Bush stated in his State of the Union address that 170

Iraq was a member of an axis of evil (which included Iran and North Korea) that threatened the world with its weapons of mass destruction. In frequent public appearances over the following months, top presidential administration officials repeated the theme of regime change and threatened military action if Iraq did not comply with weapons inspections and the mandated destruction of all weapons of mass destruction and development programs. In September 2002, President Bush urged the UN to encourage Hussein to comply with appropriate UN resolutions to avoid military action. In November, the U.N Security Council passed another resolution that gave Husseins regime 30 days to provide the security Council an accurate declaration of all aspects of its military programs, and demanded that Iraq allow U.N. arms inspectors unhindered access to any site suspected of WMD. The resolution further warned that Iraq would face serious consequences if it continued to violate UN resolutions. Iraq allowed inspectors to return on 26 November. However, the Iraqi government continued to deny having weapons of mass destruction, and issued statements saying the UN resolution was a result of the U.S and British governments desire to launch attacks against Iraq. On 17 March 2003, President Bush gave Hussein and his sons 48 hours to depart Iraq, threatening that his refusal to do so would result in military action. Hussein responded with a statement released through his Revolutionary Command Council saying that the Iraqi people denounced the reckless ultimatum, and that Iraq was ready to confront any U.S.-led attack. On the morning of 20 March 2003, 40 guided Tomahawk cruise missiles were launched at Baghdad from U.S warships in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. This launch was later characterized as a target of opportunity (many believe the United States acted on information regarding Husseins whereabouts). Later that evening President Bush announced that he had ordered the coalition to attack Iraq. 171

On the first full day of the war, U.S and British ground forces advanced into southern Iraq, entering the port city of Umm Qasr, near the Basrah, while a second wave of air attacks hit Baghdad. By March 23, Coalition forces had seized the H-2 and H-3 airfields in western Iraq, and controlled parts of Umm Qasr, Basrah, and Nasiriyah. Armored and mechanized forces had advanced to within 100 miles of Baghdad and forced a crossing of the Euphrates River at Nasiriyah. In northern Iraq, the United States launched an attack with 40 to 50 cruise missiles on elements Ansar al Islam (AI), a terrorist group believed to be associated with Usama Bin Ladins al-Qaida. Also on 23 March, U.S. forces began airlifting into Kurdish controlled northern Iraq, which signaled the opening move of the so-called second front. Within days, Kurdish Peshmerga troops of the PUK and with U.S. Special Forces units assaulted another stronghold along the Iranian border. In the last week of March, difficult fighting erupted in the city of Samawah, where U.S forces faced up to 1500 Iraqi irregulars at a critical bridge over the Euphrates River. U.S forces would eventually overcome the Iraqi irregulars, take control of the bridge, and advance to Baghdad. U.S forces had also advanced as far north as Karbala, where large battles with Iraqi forces had taken place. Major combat actions were ongoing in the cities of Najaf, Nasiriyah, Basrah and other locations as Iraqi guerrilla forces proved to be formidable for the coalition to overcome. Bombing raids continued on Baghdad, as did the Iraqi attempts to hit Kuwait-based targets. With the exception of one surface-to-surface missile hitting a shopping mall, these attacks were unsuccessful. By the first week of April, U.S forces had reached the Saddam International Airport on the southern side of Baghdad. On 5 April, U.S. armored forces entered Baghdad. They secured the city quickly, but increasing vandalism and looting adversely affected the mission. In mid-April, Kurdish fighters seized Kirkuk and Mosul and U.S. Marines seized Husseins home town of Tikrit, effectively ending major combat operations. 172

Chronology
1899 Britain signs treaty with the al-Sabah family putting Kuwait under British protection. 1920 Mandate for Iraq awarded to UK by the League of Nations. 1921 Britain installs Emir Faisal as King of Iraq. 1932 Saudi Arabia proclaimed by Abd al Aziz; Iraq declares independence. 1958 Iraqi monarchy overthrown in coup by General Abdul Karim Qasim. 1961 Kuwait established as independent nation. 1963 Coup overthrows Qasim; Gen. Abdul Salam Aref installed in power. 1966 Abdul Rahman Aref succeeds his brother as leader of Iraq. 1968 Baath party coup; Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr installed, Saddam Hussein becomes chief deputy. 1979 Saddam Hussein succeeds Bakr as president of Iraq. 22 Sep 80 Iraq invades Iran, starting 8-year war. 7 Jun 81 Israel launches air attack against Iraqi nuclear facilities. Apr 84 Attacks begin on tankers in the Arabian Gulf. 17 May 87 Iraq attacks USS Stark, killing 37 U.S. sailors. 1988 Saddam Hussein orders use of chemical weapons on Kurds. Aug 88 Iran-Iraq War ends. 2 Aug 90 Iraq invades Kuwait; President Bush freezes Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets; UN calls on Saddam Hussein to withdraw. 16 Jan 91 U.S. attacks Baghdad, Kuwait, and military targets in Iraq. 23 Feb 91 Ground war begins. 27 Feb 91 President Bush orders a cease-fire. 2 Mar 91 Shia Muslims in southern Iraq and Kurds in north, rebel against Husseins rule. Iraqi army crushes both revolts. 3 Mar 91 Iraqi military leaders formally accept cease-fire terms. 23 Sep 91 UN inspectors find documents detailing Iraqs nuclear weapons program; say Iraq was close to building a bomb. 173

27 Aug 92 No-fly zone imposed over southern Iraq to stop air attacks on Shia Muslim rebels. Allies begin air patrols. 13 Apr 93 One day before President George Bush was to arrive in Kuwait, 14 arrests made for plotting to assassinate him; Washington says plot organized by Iraqi intelligence. 27 Jun 93 U.S. warships fire 24 Tomahawk cruise missiles at intelligence headquarters in Baghdad in retaliation for Iraqi assassination plot. Oct 94 Two Iraqi Republican Guard armor divisions deploy south to the Kuwait border. President Clinton dispatches carrier group, 28,000 troops, and more than 200 warplanes to Gulf. The Iraqis pull back. Dec 94 Iraq formally recognizes Kuwaits sovereignty and borders. Mar 95 An attempted coalition offensive of Iraqi opposition groups falls apart due to lack of international support. The PUK conducts offensive operations against the Iraqi army in the vicinity of Irbil, but no gains are made. May-Jun Twenty Iraq military officers are tortured and killed for 95 plotting a coup. A Republican Guard battalion, led by alDulaymi officers, rebel at Abu Gharayb. 8 Aug 95 Hussein Kamil al-Majid and his brother Hussein Kamil defect. 6 Jan 96 Saddam Hussein decrees economic austerity measures for Iraq to cope with soaring inflation and widespread shortages caused by UN sanctions. 20 Feb 96 Hussein Kamil and his brother return to Iraq, accepting Husseins pledge of amnesty; both are executed. 31 Aug 96 Hussein sends forces to capture Irbil, a key Kurdish safehaven protected by U.S.-led forces. 2 Sep 96 U.S. ships and planes fire missiles at military targets in Iraq. Jan-Jun 97 Food-for-oil program implemented. 29 Oct 97 U.S. weapons inspectors banned from Iraq; UNSCOM suspends operations. 31 Oct 98 President Clinton signs the Iraqi Liberation Act to provide U.S. aid to the Iraqi opposition. 174

16-19 The U.S. and UK conduct airstrikes (Operation DESERT Dec 98 FOX) to force Baghdad to cooperate with the UN. 19 Feb 99 The assassination of a Shia spiritual leader results in Shia unrest in Baghdad and in southern Iraq. 17 Dec 99 UNMOVIC replaces UNSCOM to carry out inspections. Oct 00 Iraq deploys military forces to western Iraq to show support for the Palestinian intifadah. 20 Mar 03 U.S. launches initial salvo in Operation Iraqi Freedom. 15 April 03 Baghdad Falls. 1 May 03 President Bush declares end of major combat operations.

ECONOMY
The Iraqi economy and its infrastructure are under transition, and will require a significant international commitment to rebuild. Under Husseins regime, the middle class virtually disappeared, and the countrys 24 million people are now struggling to subsist in an economy based largely on cash, barter, and international handouts. The country is plagued by high unemployment, poverty, spiraling inflation and rampant corruption. The economy depends almost wholly on revenues from oil exports that in the past have come from primarily the southern oil fields. In July 2003 Iraq exported approximately 258,000 barrels a day, compared to 2 million barrels a day in March 2003. According to the Iraqi Oil ministry, the country must boost export production to at least 400,000 barrels a day to start securing long-term contracts for selling fixed quantities of oil, a measure that would produce the necessary income to start reviving the Iraqi economy. One of the key missions of the CPA is to gather basic information about Iraqs full economic condition. Immediate tasks include paying government salaries, including the armed forces, establishing oversight of Iraqs Central Bank, the Finance Ministry, and the other government agencies necessary for public health and safety. 175

Economic Statistics
GDP Growth Rate Per Capita Exports Imports External Debt US$4.4 billion (2002) NA US$170 (2002) US$1.2 billion US$1.3 billion US$100 billion (2000 est.)

Resources Oil
Iraq has an estimated 112 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, the worlds second largest endowment. The U.S. Department of Energy indicates that Iraqs reserves may be as high as 220 billion barrels. Provided this is an accurate estimate, Iraq would possess more than 20 percent of the world's proven reserves. Greater reserves could result from re-evaluation of known oil fields, and there is a possibility of further new discoveries in the unexplored Western desert region.

Natural Gas
Iraq is believed to have approximately 110 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of proven natural gas reserves, with probable reserves estimated at 150 Tcf. Most of its natural gas production is liquid propane gas (LPG) for household use. About 70 percent of Iraqs natural gas reserves are associated gas (produced in conjunction with oil). Main sources of natural gas are the Kirkuk, Al Zalah, Butma and Bai Hassan oil fields in northern Iraq, as well as the North and South Rumaylah and Zubayr fields in southern Iraq. Iraqs only non-associated natural gas reserves are from the al-Anfal field in northern Iraq. In the past, Iraq has used its natural gas production primarily for domestic energy needs. 176

IT-2A
Gusair Sasan Ibrahim Adalyah

Mushorah Ayn Zalah Butmah Alan Atshan Qalian Qasab

Mosul Demir Dagh


Kirkuk Taqtaq Bay Hasan Chamchamal Qara Chauq Khubbuz Saddam

Jawan Najmah Al Qayyarah Iraq-Turkey Pipeline

IT-2

Supergiant Oilfield Other Oilfield Oil Pipeline Pump Station Operational Refinery Tanker Terminal

Kirkuk Al Kifl

Kirkuk

IT-1A Bayji K-2

T-1
Akkas

Hadithah
Iraq-Syria-Lebanon Pipeline (Closed)

K-3

Kar Mor Jambur Hamrin Palkhanah Chia Surlh Gilabat Ajil Qamarm Judaida Nau West Injana Duman Khanaqin Tikrit Kashm Jaria Pika al Ahmar Mansuriya Naft Khaneh Balad Falluja BAGHDAD East Baghdad

PS-4

Ad Dawrah

Badra Dhafiriya Ahdab Amara Kumait Ad Dujaylah Abu Ghurab Buzurgan Jabal Fauqi Huwaiza

Marjan

Al Kifl West Kifl

PS-3

0 0

100 100

200 Kilometers 200 Miles

Rafidain Halfaya Noor Gharraf Rifae An Nasiriyah Majnun As Samawah PS-2 West Qurnah Rumaylah Nahr Umar Iraq Strategic Diwan Subba North Pipeline Al Basrah Ar Ratawi Salman Al Luhays Tubah Az Zubayr Ar Raki Satwari Iraq-Saudi Arabia Jerishan Rumaylah Pipeline (PSA) South (Closed) Mina al

As Samawah

Abu Khalma

IPSA-2

Bakr Khawr al Amaya (Closed)

Boundary representations are not necessarily authoritative.

Oil Fields

Minerals
Mineral deposits in Iraq are limited to phosphates, sulfur, salt and gypsum. Phosphate deposits are found at Akashat (near the Syrian border) and it is primarily used in the production of fertilizer. Phosphate reserves are estimated at 10 billion tons. The Mishraq sulfur deposits attracted several Western European companies in the 1970s, but subsequent development was hampered by the Iran-Iraq war. The Mishraq 177

complex has a design capacity of 1.25 million tons a year. Sulfur is also produced as a by-product of refining oil, especially Kirkuk crude.

Industry
Oil is the mainstay of the Iraqi economy. Despite its importance, the oil industry and its infrastructure has been subject to chronic under funding for more than 30 years. The oil industry is only capable of producing about 50 percent of Iraqs domestic consumption requirements. Prior to the liberation of Iraq, oil wells were pumping more than 2.5 million barrels a day under the auspices of the UN-Oil for Food Program. In June 2003, the Iraqi Oil Ministry predicted output would be restored to prewar levels by mid-2004. Equipment looting at oil facilities, compounded by sabotage of pipelines, has contributed to reconstruction efforts. Iraqs oil deposits lie in two general regions the north, in and around Kirkuk, and in the south, in around Basrah and Umm Qasr, near the Persian Gulf Port of Mina al-Bakr. Iraq has over 75 discovered oil fields. The two largest producing fields are Kirkuk and Rumaylah, which have combined reserves of some 22 billion barrels. Other major fields are

Natural Salt Bed 178

TURKEY

Mosul Irbil

SYRIA
Baiji

Kirkuk Tuz Khurmatu

Nahr

Diyala

r ive is R Tigr

Euphrates

IRAN

Khanaqin

BAGHDAD

JORDAN

Karbala

Al Kufah

IRAQ
Cement Food processing Iron and steel Oil refining Petrochemicals/ fertilizers Salt mining Textiles

An Nasiriyah Az Zubayr

Al Basrah

KUWAIT

SAUDI ARABIA
Boundary representations not necessarily authoritative.

KUWAIT

Arabian Gulf

Major Industries East Baghdad (11 billion barrels), Zubayr (4.5 billion barrels), Bai Hassan (2 billion barrels), Buzurgan (2 billion barrels) and Abu Ghirab (1.5 billion barrels). Iraq has three main oil refineries, located in Bayji, Baghdad and Al Basrah. The port facilities in southern Iraq were severely damaged during the first Persian Gulf War but were sufficiently repaired to handle the 1 million barrels a day under the UN-sponsored Oil for Food Program. Oil from Kirkuk and nearby fields can be exported via the 600-mile 179

pipeline to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. The 40-inch pipeline which appears operable has a capacity of 1.1 million barrels a day. A second, parallel pipeline with 500,000 million barrels a day capacity exists but is currently inoperable.

Non-Oil Industries
The non-oil industry sector includes such industries as petrochemicals, phosphate, sulfur, fertilizers, minerals, cement, paper, consumer goods, light manufacturing, electronics, machinery and transport equipment, textiles, leather and shoes, and food processing. Specific details about these industries are unknown, and the Coalition Provisional Authority is conducting a country assessment in these areas.

Agriculture
Under the Hussein regime, all farming was subsidized and all products purchased by the central government. Coalition Provisional Authorities and representatives of the Iraqi Agriculture Ministry are supporting less government subsistence and a greater dependency on market forces. The U.S. Department of Agriculture predicts Iraqs agricultural output could double over the next several years with market reform and agronomic training and assistance. Agriculture comprises approximately 30 percent of the Iraqi economy. Despite the importance of agriculture in Iraqs economy, approximately 60 percent of the Iraqi population is receiving foodstuff assistance through reconstruction efforts. Barley and wheat are the chief cereal grains, and rice is grown in the south where water for irrigation is abundant. Iraq is the largest producer of dates, its chief export crop. Cotton, sugarcane and sugar beets also have significant commercial value. Livestock is a significant contributor to Iraqs agricultural economy. Camels, sheep, goats and chickens are raised in most parts of the country. Cattle graze in irrigated areas, particularity in the south. Wool and animal hides are exported, and milk and meat are produced for local consumption. About one-fifth of Iraq consists of farmland; about half of 180

this is in the northeastern plains and mountain valleys. The remainder of the cultivated land is in the valleys of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. Current agriculture problems include overcoming the cultural mindset of government subsistence farming, and the lack of instructions from a central government on when to harvest and where to bring the crops. Without instructions from the Coalition Provisional Authority, many Iraqi farmers are reluctant to begin their harvest.

Dahuk

Mosul

Gr ea tZ ab

Irbil Kirkuk As Sulaymaniyah

is Tigr

tes ra ph Eu
Ar Ramadi

BAGHDAD
An Hillah Ad Diwaniyah

Karbala An Najaf

Al Kut

r ve Ri

Al Amarah

Woodland/forest Meadows and pastures (sheep and cattle) Arable land Irrigated farming Rough grazing/ nomadic herding Wasteland Barley Cotton Rice Vegetables Dates Wheat

An Nasiriyah Hawr al Hammar Al Basrah

Land Use 181

Utilities
The most critical infrastructures in Iraq are fuel, electricity, and water; the infrastructure baselines vary widely across the country. In the southern and central part of the country, there is sporadic electricity, a condition that directly affects the operability of the water and sewage systems. The pumps necessary to transport the water supply and operate the water sanitation equipment and wastewater treatment plants are all run by electricity. As of June 2003, military reverse osmosis water purification units and wells were being used to supply Iraq with approximately 300,000 liters of potable water daily.

Electricity
Almost all of Iraqs power production uses fossil fuels (97.89 percent), with the remainder provided by hydroelectric power. In early 2003, electricity output was roughly 4.5-giga watts and was derived from the Bayji and Mosul thermal plants and the Saddam hydroelectric dam on the Tigris River. Demand for electricity is approximately 6.6 giga watts, and the resulting 2.1-giga watt power deficit has caused power outages. Most of the electrical problems reside in the central and southern part of the country, as the infrastructure in previously Kurdish controlled northern Iraq remains largely intact. While some of the disruption is due to allied bombing during OIF, most are the result of sabotage, and post war looting. Along the Al BasrahBaghdad network, saboteurs destroyed many power line towers by cutting the towers with torches. To supplement the power grid system, the Coalition Provisional Authority has imported generators that provide some relief to the situation. Most of the electricity is going to the commercial and residential communities, with very little electricity going toward the industrial sector. In addition, there is a serious lack of spare parts for the water systems and substations. As of June 2003, electricity in Baghdad was being provided 3-hours-on and 3-hours-off. 182

Water
Half of Iraqs population obtains water directly from surface sources such as rivers, reservoirs, irrigation canals, drainage ditches, and open wells. The remaining half depends on piped and bottled water. Although OIF severely disrupted the supply of fresh water, especially in the south, there now appears to be adequate drinking water throughout the country. The Tigris and the Euphrates Rivers provide Iraq with most of its water. However, both Turkey and Syria have built dams that reduce the river flow, and in the past water rights from the two rivers has been a source of cross-border tension. In the south, Iraq has diverted many streams that feed into the southern marshes for agriculture purposes. In addition, it is believed that some of the projects were undertaken to deny dissidents in the south refuge in the marshes, as well as make the southern oil fields more attractive to international oil companies. Both irrigation and agricultural infrastructure projects have been a major feature of past Iraqi development spending. Due to irrigation drainage and dam construction, the marshes have shrunk from 20,000 square kilometers of fertile waterway to less than 2,000 square kilometers.The flow from these marshes previously provided nutrients to fish-spawning grounds in the northern Gulf.

Foreign Investment
Under Hussein, Iraqi law prohibited non-Arab foreign investment in Iraqi companies, and the Iraqi constitution prohibited private ownership of natural resources and the basic means of production, as well as foreign ownership of real estate. In June 2003, Iraqi Industry Ministry officials met with the Coalition Provisional Authority to discuss the eventual privatization of the countrys 48 state-owned companies (excluding oil companies). The Coalition Provisional Authority has indicated that it would like to begin the process of privatizing stateowned countries in 2004 to spur foreign investment. 183

All money coming into the country is being applied to humanitarian and reconstruction needs. In June 2003, the Coalition Provision Authority announced a US$100 million construction fund - US$45 million for urgent construction projects, US$20 million to refurbish government ministries damaged by bombs and looting, and US$25 million to complete public works projects. In the future, money flowing into Iraq for reconstruction will be bankrolled by US$1.7 billion in previously frozen Iraqi assets in the United States as well as US$1.2 billion seized in other countries, US$900 million in cash discovered by U.S. forces, and US$350 million in currency and gold located at Iraqs central bank. Other sources of funding will include US$1 billion from the oil-for-food program, US$2 billion pledged by other countries and US$2.5 billion earmarked for relief and construction by the United States.

Outlook
Many key issues will need to be addressed to stabilize the Iraqi economy. The security situation will remain at the forefront of improving all aspects of the economy. It will also be necessary to establish a legitimate Iraqi government and the necessary governmental institutions to regulate economic activity and commerce. As part of this process, reconstruction efforts will focus on reviving the non-oil economy, establishing a new monetary system, rebuilding the financial infrastructure to facilitate transactions, and transitioning the country from a staterun to a market-based economy. Another international legal hurdle contributing to the economic uncertainty is the disposition of its foreign debts and war claims against the country. It is unclear whether Iraq will be able to honor its foreign debt. Further, the exact nature of Iraqs indebtedness is unknown estimates range from US$60 to US$110 billion. Western sources provided Iraq with approximately US$35 billion in military assistance during the 1980s, and the former Soviet Union and other eastern European states provided approximately US$8 billion in assistance. Approximately 184

US$30-40 billion in assistance came from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates during the 8-year Iran-Iraq War. War damage claims and reparations for Kuwait are not included in these estimates, and could increase Iraqs debt by another US$43 billion for individual and family compensations connected with its 1991 invasion of Kuwait. In addition, Iran is still seeking US$97 billion for war damage from the Iran-Iraq war. For the remainder of 2003, it is expected that Iraqs GDP will contract by 7.5 percent as a result of declining oil production caused by OIF. Continued international humanitarian and financial aid and money from Iraqi oil exports will be the principal source of income for the country.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS


Government Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
With major combat operations drawing to a close by late April 2003, focus shifted to establishing a democratic government within Iraq. Retired U.S. Lieutenant General Jay Garner was selected to lead the effort as head of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). Instability prohibited LtGen. Garner and his staff from moving easily through the country; their efforts to evaluate what resources would be required to commence reconstruction were therefore hindered greatly by security concerns. Adding to the countrys state of disarray was the Iraqi populations distrust of the United States (and authority in general) after enduring Husseins regime for more than 2 decades. Many formerly exiled Iraqis returned to the country seeking positions in a new government, thus exacerbating the populations uncertainty regarding who would determine their future. 185

The Coalition Provisional Authority


Concerns about a lack of progress prompted the appointment of Paul Bremer to head the reconstruction effort, replacing LtGen. Garner. ORHA was renamed the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). As his first task, Bremer initiated the slow process of gaining the populaces trust while working to reconstruct Iraqs infrastructure. Gradually, public services are being restored, citizens are beginning to return to work, government and military personnel are being paid, and shops and stores have opened.

Political Dynamics
Shiite Muslims, long oppressed by Hussein's Sunni-dominated government, will likely have significant influence on any new governing authority. A governing council of 25 was formed in July 2003 as the first step in a 12-to-15 month governing process. The process will likely involve a constitutional referendum, followed by the first free Iraqi elections in decades. The governing council will gradually return control to Iraqis as elections at all levels occur. While the Shiite majority seeks prominence, Sunni leaders as well as other groups fear that a Shiite theocracy, like that in Iran, could take hold. A Shiite-dominated government would cause an enormous shift in Iraq, which has been ruled by Sunni minority since the days of Ottoman Turkish rule. Shiites comprise at least 60 percent of Iraq's population of 24 million; they also have a history of rebelling against Sunni rulers. Based on the transition plan, Iraqis who left the country during Husseins reign will be represented in the new government, but the majority of the council will be composed of those who remained during Husseins reign. Shiite leaders have been among the most vocal critics of the proposed governing council; some state that a council made up of privileged people, apparently hand-picked by the United States, would have no more legitimacy than the current provisional administration. Of more concern is the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, one of Iraq's most influen186

tial Shiite leaders, who issued a fatwa, or religious edict, denouncing plans for any council picked by the Americans.

Iraqi Governing Council


The Coalition Provisional Authority installed a governing council of 25 Iraqis from a variety of religious, political, and ethnic backgrounds on 13 July 2003. The membership includes an array of backgrounds, including physicians, former exiles, lawyers, tribal leaders, social activists, Muslim clerics, and politicians. The Council will serve with the CPA to administer the nation until elections are held, and be responsible for the appointment of diplomats, the operation of ministries, the approval of an annual budget and the establishment of a commission to draft a constitution. Membership includes: 13 Shiites, 11 Sunnis and an Assyrian Christian (who could, with their assent, represent Chaldean Christians as well). Among the Sunnis, five are ethnic Kurds, five are Arab, and one is an ethnic Turkoman. Three of the council members are women. A separate committee is set to begin forming a 200-to-250-strong constitutional convention. This group will decide what form of government Iraq should have. With little infrastructure and no accurate Iraqi voter records, a popular vote for the convention would be a challenge. One option being studied is to establish an electoral college that would allow regions and groups to nominate representatives. The council has the authority to appoint and supervise the cabinet and to manage sovereign affairs, such as the diplomatic corps abroad, issuing new currency, and putting in place a financial budget. It also has a significant role in developing and managing national security affairs. The Council will undertake the countrys affairs until an interim government can be elected. The new constitution will also be implemented. The council includes the following representatives: Iyad Allawi is a Shiite, former Iraqi intelligence officer from the Iraqi National Accord Movement. He is a surgeon, whose uncle was health minister under the ousted monarchy. He was a member of the Bath 187

Counselors

JTF-7 Military LNOs Deputy CIC

Administrator

Chairman, Council for International Cooperation (CIC)

COS Intel Executive Secretariat General Counsel Financial Oversight

Director Humanitarian Affairs

Contributing Countries NGOs UN Specialized Agencies

Military Aides/ Personal Staff

Operational Support Group

188
Steering Group Director of Operations and Infrastructure Director Office of Management & Budget Director Civil Affairs Director Interior Affairs

Office of Policy Planning

Director Oil Policy

Director Governance

Director of Economic Development

Director of Private Sector Development

Director AID

Director Security Affairs

Director Strategic Communications

Coalition Provisional Authority Organization

Administrator

Director Oil Policy Director of Operations and Infrastructure Electricity Comptroller Program Review Board Planning & Budgeting Infrastructure & Utility Policy Public Works Tiger Team Management Transport & Communication Regional Advisors Senior Advisors (Governor Level) Economic Policy Finance Debt Restructuring Financial Institutions Agriculture Housing Irrigation Central Bank Director of Economic Development

Director Governance

Director Office of Management & Budget

Director of Private Sector Development Industry & Minerals SOEs Trade Private Sector Initiatives Commercial Attache/Business Center Privatization Policy Corporate Sponsorship

Marketing

Oil Operations

Oil Pipeline Security

189

Production

Sales

Policy Guidance

Coalition Provisional Authority Directorship

Administrator

Director AID Director Civil Affairs Culture Education Immigration Police Foreign Affairs Health Higher Education Justice Labor and Social Affairs Religious Affairs Youth Customs Enforcement NIA Director Interior Affairs Director Security Affairs

Director Strategic Communications Spokesman Civil Affairs Press Office Information Operations Spokesman Military Affairs

DART

Reconstruction

190

Coalition Provisional Authority Directorship, Continued

party from 1961 until 1971 before fleeing the country. He helped to set up the National Accord Movement in 1991. Ahmad Chalabi is a secular Shiite who is the leading figure in the Pentagon-backed Iraqi National Congress (INC). A doctor in mathematics from the University of Chicago, he comes from a wealthy family and founded the INC in 1992. Considered close to U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, he fled Iraq in 1958. He was found guilty of embezzlement in a Jordanian court in the 1990s -- a conviction he says was politically motivated under pressure from Husseins regime. Akila Hashemi was a Shiite member of the committee advising the interim foreign ministry under the U.S.-led coalition. She held a doctorate in French literature and advised on international relations under the former regime. Hashemi was assassinated in August 2003; her replacement has not been selected. Sheikh Abdul Aziz al-Hakim is a high-ranking member of the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI), the main Shiite Muslim group. He lived in exile in Iran for 23 years until May 2003. He heads the armed Badr brigades. Ibrahim Jafari is a spokesman for the fundamentalist Shiite Dawa party. A medic, he joined the Dawa movement in 1966. The group, the oldest Islamist movement in Iraq, was founded in 1957 and is based on the ideology of reforming Islamic thought and modernizing religious institutions. When the party was banned in 1980, Jafari fled the country. Wahel Abdul Latif is governor of the southern city of Basrah. He served as a judge beginning in1982 and is currently deputy head of the Basrah court. He was imprisoned for a year by the secret police under Husseins regime. Karim Mahud Hattab al-Mahamadawi, also known as Abu Hatem, was born in 1958 and is a tribal chief from the southern marshlands near Amarah. He spent most of his life leading guerrilla resistance against Husseins regime from secret hideouts across the southern 191

marshlands. He spent 7 years in jail before 1986, when he disappeared into the marshlands and began launching sporadic and spectacular resistance attacks. He is a member of one of the regions largest Arab Shiite Muslim tribes. Hamid Majid Mussa is a Shiite head of the Iraqi communist party and trained as an economist. Originally from Babylon, south of Baghdad, he lived for several years in Iraqi Kurdistan, largely free of Husseins control since the 1991 Gulf War. Wasfat al-Rubai is a doctor previously exiled in London who recently returned to Iraq. His political allegiance is unknown. Ezzedine Salim is head of the Islamic Dawa movement in the southern city of Basrah. Samir Mahmud is a businessman. His political allegiance is unknown. Sheikh Barak Abu Sultan is head of union of lawyers and human rights league in the central city of Babylon. His political allegiance is unknown. Mohammed Barhul Uloom is a liberal ayatollah who ran the Islamic Ahl ul-Bayt center in London. He fled Iraq in 1991 after some of his family were killed by Husseins regime and returned to Iraq with the fall of the Bath Party. Rajiha Habib Kurzai is a Shiite, a maternity doctor who lived in London in the 1960s. Her political allegiance unknown. Adnan Pachachi is a Sunni who served as foreign minister from 1965 to 1967, before the Bath Party came into power. A liberal, he heads a group called Independent Iraqis for Democracy (IID) and lived for 23 years in the United Arab Emirates and in London. Nasseer al-Shadershi is a Sunni Muslim lawyer who heads the Iraqi Democratic Current. He became a lawyer in 1959 after studying in Cairo and Baghdad, and lived in Iraq throughout Hussein's regime. 192

Mohsen Abdul Hamid is a Sunni secretary general of the Islamic Party, the Iraqi branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in 1960 and banned the following year. Ghazi al-Yawar is a businessman originally from Mosul. He is the nephew of Sheikh Mohsen Adil al-Yawar, head of the powerful Shamar tribe, unusual in that is encompasses both Sunnis and Shiites. He lived for 15 years in Saudi Arabia where he worked in business, returning to Iraq in June 2003. Salahedin Bahaeddin is an Islamist close to the Muslim Brotherhood. He was born into a religious family in the Kurdish north and studied religion. He founded the Islamist Union Party after 1991 when the region shook off Baghdads control and became its secretary general in 1994. The party is the third Kurdish grouping after the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party. Massud Barzani is the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), established by his father. He became a Peshmerga fighter in 1963, taking over the party helm after his fathers death in 1979. He is fiercely opposed to Hussein, who had three of his brothers killed and repeatedly had his village razed. He has shared power in the autonomous Kurdish region of Iraq since 1991 along with rival Jalal Talabani. Jalal Talabani is a lawyer by training and heads the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). He was born near Irbil and during the 1960s was a member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party under Barzanis control. He split from the party in 1975 to form the PUK, which controls the southeast Kurdish region, while the KDP controls the northwest. Mahmud Ali Osman is a medic originally from Sulaymaniyah. He held various posts in the Kurdistan Democratic Party before leaving the group and moving to London, where he founded the Kurdish Socialist Party in 1975. He later moved to Irbil. Dahran Nurredin was a Kurdish judge in his 50s, originally from Kirkuk. He served 3 years in jail under Hussein for criticizing a decision 193

of the Revolutionary Command Council, the highest authority in the Bath party regime. He was granted amnesty after a year. He served as head of one of Baghdad's courts. Yonnadam Yussef Kanna is a Christian engineer who heads the Assyrian Democratic Movement. He served as a transport minister in the first Kurdish regional assembly then as trade minister in the Kurdish regional government set up in Irbil. Shangul Shapuk is a teacher and grass roots activist. She is an artist who teaches at the academy of fine arts in the northern city of Mosul. The council membership reflects the population structure of each Iraqi group, with 13 Shia, 5 Kurds, 5 Sunni, a Turkoman and a Christian. The Communist Party will have a representative but it isnt known who will be the general secretary of the party or who will represent it in the Ruling Council. The Ruling Council is the first step forward to sovereignty and independence. After long negotiations between the leadership of the Islamic National Party and the occupation authority, the first decision issued by the council was the cancellation of all official days and all official celebrations that belong to the old regime. The day Husseins regime was defeated, 9 April 2003, was declared an official Iraqi national day. The council announced that the most important task of the council is security and stability in Iraq and all of its efforts should be directed toward this goal. They also must refresh the national economy and reactivate the state and civilian societal foundations and seek to end the interim period by drafting a permanent constitution.

Iraqi Government Ministries


The following is a list of the various ministries of the government and their responsibilities. Ministry of Agriculture This ministry provides agricultural inputs and services to farmers. According to The Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN, there 194

are more than 600,000 farmers in Iraq. There are both individual and family farms (located mostly in the south), as well as large plantations (located mostly in the north). Ministry of Atomic Energy The Ministry of Atomic Energy is being transferred to a Science and Technology Commission. This is an organization with much broader objectives that includes transforming the Weapons of Mass Destruction group into a technology infrastructure group that will help rebuild Iraq and transfer technology to its various sectors. Ministry of Culture The Ministry of Culture oversees many areas concerning entertainment and the heritage of the Iraqi people. Along with archeological sites and museums, the ministry oversees cinema, theater, fine arts, fashion, publishing and dance. An interim steering committee is overseeing the ministry. The committee is made up of a six-person board of respected academics and cultural experts. This interim body is working with a number of sub-committees to address the areas of rebuilding, personnel, finance, legal issues, and tasking. Ministry of Education The Ministry of Education oversees primary and secondary education, as well as educational reform, to include setting curricula, assessing and auditing schools, opening schools and revising textbooks. Its goal is to create a modern education system that will provide quality education for all Iraqi children. Many of the Ministry of Education concerns are focused on attendance and school infrastructure. Prior to the war, only 75 percent of all school-age children attended school, and only 33 percent attended secondary school. School buildings were in a state of disrepair due to regime neglect, and numerous schools were used as arsenals. There are 16,000 primary and secondary schools in Iraq serving 8 million students; it is estimated that only 30 percent of students are attending school. 195

Ministry of Electricity The Ministry is being reestablished under the authority of CPA. The nations electric grid suffered damage both during the war and, more recently, by sabotage. CPA expects to have electricity supplies back to pre-war conditions soon. Ministry of Finance and Banking The banking system centers around two large banks, Al Rasheed and Rafadine and the Central Bank. Other smaller banks are the Industry and Real Estate Banks. Rasheed Street in Baghdad is considered the Iraqi equivalent of Wall Street. The Ministry of Finance establishes budgets, manages debt, and establishes economic policy. It pays Iraqs 1.8 million pensioners and 1.4 million state employees, and collects taxes and customs revenues. The U.S. has announced that all assets frozen in the U.S. during the first Gulf War will be returned to the Iraqi people. These funds will partially be used to pay salaries, emergency payments, and basic costs of the Iraqi government. Ministry of Foreign Affairs The Ministry is working to create policies to build a new Iraqi relationship with the U.S. and its allies, and will inform host nations how to treat the new Iraqi embassies. They plan to open embassies in Jordan, Syria and Iran first. Ministry of Health The Ministry of Health (MOH) is headquartered in Baghdad. The MOH is staffed with industry leaders in health care from the United States and other countries representing the civilian and military coalitions supporting the effort to rebuild the Iraqi health care system. The MOH works closely with its Iraqi MOH counterparts in the MOH Baghdad offices and other non-governmental and international organizations. 196

The Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research The Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (MHESR) oversees the administration of 15 major public universities in Iraq, two post-graduate commissions, and 37 technical institutes and colleges. The MHESR has assumed basic administrative oversight of some higher educational institutions previously tied to the office of the president and other dissolved organizations (e.g., Al Nahrain University). At the start of the 2002-2003 academic year, these institutions had more than 210,000 undergraduates attending classes taught by roughly 14,700 fulltime faculty members. Approximately 500 staff members serve in the MHESR headquarters in Baghdad. Ministry of Housing and Construction The ministry is responsible for many of the construction projects in Iraq, to include the national housing program, roads and bridges, and construction of public buildings. It has three main components: engineering and design, research and development related to construction of infrastructure, and construction. The ministry has 12 state-owned general construction companies with offices across the nation. The construction program is carried out by the state-owned companies, as well as many private Iraqi and international companies. Ministry of Industry and Minerals The Ministry of Industry and Minerals oversees 52 enterprises, which are categorized by six sectors to include: food, pharmaceuticals, chemicals for water purification and oil refining. The headquarters for the ministry has 550 employees, and the state run enterprise employs approximately 96,000 people. Ministry of Information This ministry is now referred to as Iraqi Media Network, due to the wartime reputation of the past ministry. A network has been formed from professional journalists who envision carrying the information to the public in the same manner as broadcasting stations in the United States. 197

Ministry of the Interior The Ministry of Interior consists of two government institutions: the police and the municipal branches. The Ministry is vital to reestablishing order in the postwar period, and is working to reemploy Iraqis who worked there before the war. Law enforcement in Iraq has been one of the CPA priorities since the initial looting following the collapse of the government. In regard to fire protection, the interim supervisor reported more than 900 fire brigade staff workers in Baghdad, where 23 out of 25 fire stations are staffed and 12 stations are operational. Ministry of Irrigation The Ministry of irrigation is responsible for water resources development and management in Iraq. It is the bulk water supplier for irrigation and municipal and industrial water uses. Water intake and distribution are the responsibility of other ministries and individual farmers. The new Public Works ministry, for example, treats and delivers water to homes and businesses. Ministry of Justice This ministrys mission is to institute the rule of law in Iraq and restore non-judicial Ministry functions. It oversees courts, prosecutors, judicial and prosecutorial training, publishing the Legal Gazette (all laws and CPA proclamations), notaries, public deeds, records, and prisons. It has 12,000 employees, 130 courthouses (approximately 48 in operation), and 400 courts (100 in operation). Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs provides services and benefits to Iraqs most vulnerable citizens. The Ministrys 3,800 career professionals administer the private social security pension fund and welfare program giving the nations children, elderly, widows and disabled the financial means to survive. Services and benefits in the Kurdish regions mirror those offered by the national Ministry in Baghdad. 198

Ministry of Oil The Ministry of Oil oversees exploration, production, distribution and marketing of crude oil, as well as the refining and distribution of petroleum products. Iraqi oil management, engineers and workers have been working with U.S. advisors to assess damage and make repairs to critical nodes in the system. Ministry of Planning The Ministry of Planning oversees central data collection and analysis for the Iraqi government and its various ministries. The Planning Ministry is also responsible for the census, telecommunications, economic and agriculture measurements, international standards, contract bid proposals and project planning. Ministry Public Works The reestablishment of a functional public works program is key to rebuilding Iraqs dilapidated public infrastructure. The CPA is considering employing former members of the Iraqi military as a pool of talent to staff the rebuilding effort. Ministry of Religious Affairs The vision of the ministry is to enable the people of Iraq to realize the benefits of tolerant, moderate, ecumenical religious practices by supporting respected religious and political leaders in the establishment of religious institutions and processes that reinforce these practices. Ministry of Trade The Ministry of Trade oversees national and international distribution of Iraqi goods. The headquarters for the ministry employs 1,400 Iraqi citizens and has eight satellite offices. The ministry is partially responsible for the distribution of food, personal hygiene products and other basic necessities to the 24 million people of Iraq. 199

Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications The Ministrys main responsibilities include constructing, maintaining and improving Iraqs surface transport infrastructure (including waterways), and restoring its civil aviation and telecommunications branches. Ministry of Youth When the Hussein regime was in power, the Ministry of Youth was used as a tool to oppress the youth of Iraq. The former Olympic Village was the site of an underground prison, and it housed the offices of Uday Hussein. Now that the war is over, almost nothing remains of the Ministry. Unlike some of the other ministries, none of the former members will be asked to return.

Politics Role of Islam in the Political History of Iraq


The idea of the nation-state has no historical antecedents in the political culture of Islam. The traditional term for a state in Muslim political culture is Dawla. Not a political concept, the term is best described as a wielding of power. Other terms used by Muslims to denote a state are Saltana and Mamlaka. Like Dawla, neither term has a territorial connotation. Since Muslims believe that sovereignty is the exclusive preserve of God, the Islamic notions of the caliphate have no territorial limits. Rather, they adhere to a concept of rule by person or dynasty. Since World War II, the religious bond among members of the Islamic community the Umma has been often overshadowed by nationalist affiliation, but it has not been completely abandoned or replaced. Groups of fundamentalist Muslims still seek the fusion of religion and state to attain the Islamic ideal of a just and righteous society where the word of God is law. Islam therefore has the potential to serve as a source of legitimacy for Iraqi rulers. However, from 1920 to the late 1970s, Iraqi governments, dominated by the Sunni Arab minority, were more or less secular. From 200

the mid-1940s to the mid-1950s, some Islamic movements began to form in Iraq. The Iraqi branch of the Muslim Brotherhood was organized in 1945 in Baghdad and Mosul. Similarly, Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (HT) appeared in 1952 in Baghdad. The members of both groups were predominantly Sunni Arabs from Sunni areas and towns in central Iraq. However, HT included many Shia in its ranks. For a decade after it took power in 1968, the ruling Baath Party avoided rifts with the more traditional masses by making a pretense of supporting religion, while simultaneously striving to defuse Islam as a political and social force. The 1979 Iranian Revolution brought religious and ethnic identity to the center of regional politics. The surge in Islamic radicalism among Iraqi Shia during this period was less a result of Shia radicalism in Iran and more a response to the martyrdom of Shia clerical leader Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. It also reflected the changing rhetoric of the Sunni Arab elite, which began to emphasize Arab and Sunni identity as synonymous with Iraqi national identity. Finally, as the Iraqi regime increasingly controlled all aspects of Iraqi life, a growing number of Shia began to look to Islamic ideology as a vehicle for political change. However, the Iraqi Shia never became genuinely revolutionary like their Iranian counterparts. Saddam Hussein took great pains to be viewed as religiously correct, and therefore legitimate. While always emphasizing the Arab character of Iraq rather than the regimes Islamic zeal, the regime nevertheless increasingly alluded to the religious nature of the state (especially after the eruption of hostilities between Iran and Iraq). By the end of the 1980s, largely in response to the pressures generated by the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi government infused much of its rhetoric with Islamic terms and values, and introduced Islamic principles into its legal system. In January 1991, just before the Gulf War, Iraqs flag was changed to include the Islamic slogan Allahu Akbar (God is Great). During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the regime initially appealed to trans-national Arab unity to generate support for Iraq. However, Iraqs 201

invasion of an Arab country, and the hostile response of a substantial segment of the Arab populations, undermined the effectiveness of Arab unity against the West as a motivational symbol. The American presence in Saudi Arabia the home of Islams holiest cities and shrines afforded the regime the opportunity also to invoke Islamic symbolism in its effort to enlist popular support. As the crisis deepened, Iraqi rhetoric relied heavily on Islam to enlist support, and resorted to unabashedly Islamic appeals and symbols. References to the United States as infidels replaced old epithets such as imperialists and colonialists. In the decade after the Gulf War there was no sign of a return to secularism. Rather, the Iraqi regime continued to expand Islamic law within the Iraqi legal system, and introduced compulsory study of the Quran at all educational levels. In an apparent appeal to Muslim sensibilities, Hussein cultivated his image as a pious Muslim ruler. It was not clear to what extent these steps helped legitimize the government or strengthen its popularity. However, the regime remained secular in many respects. As for the population, there were indications that many people turned to religion in response to hardship.

Religious Justification for the Political Use of Violence


According to prevailing Islamic doctrine, Muslims reside either in the House of Peace (territory under Islamic leadership) or the House of War (its converse). The Prophet Muhammad fought offensive and defensive battles as the early Muslim community left Mecca and sought to establish itself in the neighboring city of Medina. After his death, emerging Islamic tradition began to formally sanction the use of force to achieve what they termed a righteous society. Islam possesses an elaborate body of rules about the collective duty of the Muslim believers to wage holy war (jihad) for the sake of Allah against infidels, or, in the words of the Prophet Muhammad, until all men say There is no god but God. The ultimate aim of jihad is to establish an Islamic state, for unless an Islamic government rules Muslims, they will remain oppressed by infidel leadership. 202

By the 11th century, Muslim jurists had developed the principle of jihad into concepts of defensive and offensive war, conduct of diplomatic relations, conditions of and parameters for peace, division of spoils, treatment of prisoners, political violence, and martyrdom. Islamic scholars have differentiated three situations: war against non-Muslims (jihad), war between Muslims (fitna), and war as a condition of the human experience (harb). Jihad was permissible, if not obligatory; fitna was objectionable. Nevertheless, Muslim Arabs often engage in conflict with one another. In these cases one side usually declares the other to be apostates from true Islam. Muslim jurists have historically disagreed on the legal causes that justify fighting non-Muslims. Some contend that all non-Muslims should be fought because they are infidels; others argue that non-Muslims should be fought only if they pose a danger to Muslims. Generally accepted interpretations of jihad include principles of proportionality, redress, limitations on combat, and the need to exhaust other methods before resorting to violence. Early Muslim jurists based these rules on Muhammads conduct in battle, defined by 1) non-combatant immunity; 2) no destruction of religious buildings; 3) no destruction of crops or trees; 4) humane treatment of prisoners; 5) no acts of reprisal, retribution, or victimization. In this sense, Islam has concepts similar to the Western concept of just war. Injunctions regarding jihad and the House of War have been tempered over the centuries, since it is impractical to be constantly waging war. Nevertheless, the concept of jihad remains a potent force, whether in gathering political support to fight other Muslims or to fight against foreign powers. It assures Muslims that God stands by them in armed conflict and that sometimes God even requires them to engage in armed conflict. However, in most instances, jihad has been a tool for secular governments attempting to validate politically expedient warfare. The Quran also deals with the concept of shahadat (martyrdom). Some verses imply that those who become shahid do not really die, and that they receive rewards in the afterlife. Husayn provided a prominent 203

example of shahadat. He was killed when he refused to accept the authority of the Umayyad dynasty. Husayns example, which only involved injury and death to combatants, has been used to legitimize martyrdom that has inflicted death and injury on noncombatants. His example especially resonates with Shia. Saddam Husseins regime used Islam to motivate its soldiers during the Iran-Iraq War. The prolonged fighting against religiously motivated Iranian Shia made it necessary to address the Iraqi soldiers, who were mostly Shia, in the same terms. Units and weapons were given Islamic names, as were military operations and offensives. The regime also labeled the war a jihad. This characterization served several purposes: it deprived the opposite side of the conflict any moral legitimacy, it augmented the fighters motivation, and it made it easier to win Muslim states as allies, since joining a jihad was acting in defense of the faith. To generate both internal and external support, Iraq similarly presented the Gulf War as a jihad against the infidel Christian. One of Iraqs war aims was the liberation of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia, which Hussein claimed had fallen into the hands of Christians with the help of Muslim collaborators, the Saudi government.

Religious/Ethnic Identity and Politics


Sunnis Iraqs Sunni Arabs inhabit the valleys of the Euphrates above Baghdad, and of the Tigris between Baghdad and Mosul. This region forms a triangle between Baghdad, Mosul, and the Syrian and Jordanian borders. Sunni Arabs in Iraq comprised the countrys ruling elite under the Hussein regime. It is difficult, however, to speak of a strict or cohesive Sunni political identity. Sunnis subscribe to a broad spectrum of ideologies and affiliations, many of which have little to do with religion. Historically, Sunni Arabs have supported the Hussein regime because it represented a bulwark against possible Shia and Kurdish power. Beyond the regimes Tikriti core, there was a broader system of Sunni 204

support based on socioeconomic enticements, patronage, and cliental relationships. Sunni networks of patronage and association numbered nearly 500,000 Iraqis if dependents were included. The military was particularly vital to Sunni cohesiveness because, with the decline of the Arab nationalist parties, many Sunnis considered the military their only potential protector against Shia domination. In short, many Sunnis were bound together by their desire to avoid the loss of power and influence that would accompany a more representative regime in Iraq. Part of the regimes response to the 1991 uprising was to appeal to this Sunni solidarity, playing on their feelings of vulnerability. In particular, it warned that the uprisings were a prelude to Shia revenge, producing civil strife and mass killings. As with the Shia, evidence is appearing that outsiders are taking an interest in the Iraqi Sunnis, to include the introduction of Wahabism, a conservative sect of Islam most prevalent in Saudi Arabia. Shia In the decade following the Gulf War, Iraqs Sunni rulers succeeded in eradicating much of the power traditionally held by the Shia religious establishment based in Najaf and Karbala. There was some religiously motivated Shia opposition, although it had to contend with a strong apolitical tradition among Shia clergy. The prominent mujtahids in the two Iraqi cities distanced themselves from preaching, an activity that they considered detrimental to a mujtahids academic standing. As a result, Shiism in Iraq lost much of its potential influence over the population, as well as its power within the state. As a group, the Iraqi Shia were acutely aware of their status as a politically marginalized section of the population. Since the creation of the modern state of Iraq, the Iraqi Shia have been under-represented relative to their proportion of the population. In addition to the active discrimination against the Shia by the Baath government, there was another barrier to Shia political participation that came from within the 205

group: the Shia rejection of Sunni political leaders as illegitimate, and reluctance on the part of the Shia to participate in such a government. With the toppling of the Hussein regime, the Shia are becoming more active in political matters, encouraged in some cases by outside parties such as Iran. However, the Shia are not monolithic in their outlook; there are differences in terms of the degree of religious devotion that may be affected by ones socioeconomic status or even location (for example, proximity to the holy cities of An Nejaf or Karbala). There are various Islamist movements within the Shia, including the Supreme Council of the Islamic Movement in Iraq (SCIRI), the Dawa Party, and others (see the Shia portion of the Cultural Section of this handbook for more detail). Many of these movements have armed militias associated with them. It expected, however, that, given the majority status and the history of abuses of the Shia, they intend to play a large role in any future government in Iraq. In fact, the 25-person membership of the Iraq Governing Council contains 13 Shia members. This will not necessarily satisfy the more conservative members of the Shia religious leadership, many of whom believe that a non-secular government is the correct path for Iraq. Kurds After decades of fighting against various Iraqi regimes, Sunni Kurds are extremely political. However, Sunni Kurds are not cohesive. In particular, the split between the two major Kurdish groups- the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)- has severely undermined Kurdish solidarity. Conflict between the PUK and the KDP led to violence between the two groups in 1994. The Kurdish area in northern Iraq is divided into two zones of influence; the KDP controls the northwestern section and the PUK administers in the southeast. Christians In the past, the Christian groups (Chaldeans, Assyrians, and others) have experienced repression by the government, although they were at times viewed as useful societal buffers by various regimes. They have not nec206

essarily been politically active (although former Minister of Foreign Affairs Tariq Aziz was a Chaldean Christian with strong ties to Hussein). They are accustomed to living under the dominance of those adhering to the Islamic faith, and will not likely be seen as a threat by their Islamic countrymen. However, their role in Iraqi society and their importance to any new government is recognized by the appointment of a Christian to Iraqs Governing Council.

ARMED FORCES
New Iraqi Army
Paul Bremer, Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) administrator, announced in May 2003 the dissolution of the defense forces and other security structures of the ousted regime. The order also did away with the Ministry of Defense and Hussein's elite Republican Guard corps. The CPA plans to create a new Iraqi corps, the first step in forming a national self-defense capability for a free Iraq. The goal is for the new

Squad Tactics Training

207

force to be under civilian control; the corps will be professional, nonpolitical, militarily effective, and representative of all Iraqis. The first battalion of 700 soldiers graduated from Kirkush Military Training Base in early October 2003, following a 2-month basic training course. The new battalion is another step toward Iraqi self-rule, and will form the core of an army ultimately to be commanded by Iraqis. As the force grows, they will assume some of the security details from Coalition forces, putting an Iraqi face on the postwar administration of the country. CPA goals are for the force to grow to between 35,000-40,000 troops by October 2004, organized into 27 battalions. It will then be up to the new Iraqi government to see how it will build on that foundation. The New Iraqi Army (NIA) will be established in four stages. Stage one will focus on infrastructure repair/preparation and recruitment. The second stage will highlight the organizing, training and equipping of the new recruits. The third phase will concentrate on progressive training to initial operations. The final phase will be the transition to the Iraqi National Army. The NIA will initially be attached to the Commander,

Officer Candidate Training 208

Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7). The end result will be three motorized infantry divisions located near Mosul (Northern), Baghdad (Central), and Basrah (Southern). As respective battalions are formed and trained, they will be employed for the following missions: providing point security (to include sensitive sites); convoy security; route security; patrolling; border security; and de-mining. An immediate priority for standing up a modern Iraqi military will be to overhaul and update the present infrastructure. Following decades of conflict, the military bases and the equipment associated with Saddams army are in failing condition, unable to support a modern armed force. Much of the military equipment purchased in the 1980s to support the war effort against Iran has been destroyed; maintenance shortfalls have rendered much of the remaining equipment unusable, and much of what is left is obsolete. United Nations-imposed sanctions in the post-Gulf War era forced Iraq to neglect improvements upon most of their infrastructure, and severely restricted major end item improvements for their equipment inventories. The U.S.-led coalition is helping Iraq rebuild bases, fix logistics shortfalls, and rebuild command/ control/communications sites. The CPA did not include a defense ministry when it reconstituted the interim Cabinet. However, a defense support agency, the beginning of a department of the army, is being created to deal with the daily bureaucratic demands of an emerging army. This work will focus on establishing a Personnel Command, Doctrine and Training Command, and a Logistics Support Command. The Bush administration has proposed spending US$2 billion in 2004 to rebuild the army. Initially, most of the equipment used to rebuild the NIA will be salvaged Iraqi equipment.

Recruiting
Recruiting is being conducted at centers in Mosul, Baghdad, and Basrah. Satellite recruiting stations will eventually be established, and will feed the larger recruiting sites. Initially, the recruiting is to be a joint operation between the coalition and the Iraqis. The goal is to construct a 209

military that is representative of the Iraqi population, regarding both ethnicity and religious factors. A fair and proportionate distribution of all ranks, both officer and enlisted, will be made available to Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, Chaldeans, and Assyrians, as well as Shia and Sunni Muslims and Christians. A memorandum made available to all applicants reiterates that leadership assignments and promotions will be based on capabilities and merit, not tribal affiliations, ethnicity, or religion. All potential recruits will be screened. The process will evaluate various criteria, some of which may be waiverable, and some will disqualify individuals from joining the military. There will also be special consideration for individuals with desired or special skills. Former military members with prior affiliation with regime security organizations, such as the Special Republican Guard, will be automatically disqualified. Past senior Baath party members, anyone affiliated with terrorist organizations, or those with a known history of human rights violations will also be disqualified. The names of recruits will be compared to a manifest of the former military to ensure unwanted elements are screened out. People with criminal history, close relationships to former regime officials, and extremist organizational contacts are all waiverable. NonIraqi citizenship is also waiverable. Candidates will be measured using a whole man approach, taking into account criteria such as intellectual ability, education, physical fitness, prior military service, and more.

Training
About two-thirds of the first training class had prior military experience in the old army. For the Second Battalion, all non-commissioned officers and officer candidates will have different tracts of training for approximately the first 5 weeks. They will then be placed in to their respective training company for collective training. An opportunity for a delayed entry program is available if the volume of acceptable candidates outnumbers the billets available. 210

Organization
Recruiting, training and equipping the three motorized infantry divisions will be conducted over a period of 30 months. All enlistment terms of service will be for 26 months- basic training plus 2 years of service. The goal is for all NIA soldiers to qualify with their weapons, to understand their individual jobs, and to work as a team member upon graduation from basic training. The model for a battalion calls for 41 officers and 649 enlisted. This includes a headquarters company with 17 officers and 201 enlisted, and four line companies, each with 6 officers and 112 enlisted. The first battalion will be used in the central region. As more battalions complete training, they will be placed in one of the three regions, until each region has three battalions forming one brigade. The goal is to have a brigade in each region by the summer of 2004. After the 4th battalion graduates (late February 2004) the Kirkush training base will stand up as an NCO Academy. At that point, 400-500 NCOs will receive a 4-week training package. The officer candidates will be trained by and in Jordan. When the NCOs are finished with their training in Kirkush, and the officers have completed their training, they will combine and be responsible for training the new enlisted soldiers. Sites around the country (much like Kirkush) are being improved and made ready for the training of the enlisted troops of the NIA. The first brigade to become a division will be in the central region, and it is projected to be operational in January 2005. The increase in strength from brigade to division for the North and South regions should be complete in January 2006. The plan is to create a professional, capable military that can ensure the integrity of Iraq and add stability to the nation and region. One priority is to demonstrate that the new army is not a continuation of the old regime, that it is not a militia to be used as a political enforcement apparatus, but is instead a component of a new security strategy for Iraq. A close association with the defense support agency and the NIA will help to make the eventual succession of military authority to civilian authority over the NIA seamless. 211

The average salary of an Iraqi private under Husseins rule was US$11 per month, while an officer candidate made about US$44. Today, OCS candidates receive $100 a month, while an E-1 will receive $60 a month. There are seven enlisted pay grades, with Jundi being the lowest, to Sergeant Major. There are two warrant officer ranks. The officer ranks range from the second lieutenant to the lieutenant general, who receives $240 a month. There will likely be a stipend provided to anyone involved in the Delayed Entry Program. Other recommendations for compensation include enlistment bonuses, completion of training bonuses, transportation allowances, and equipment buy-back.

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APPENDIX I: Deployed Personnels Guide to Health Maintenance


DoD-prescribed immunizations and medications, including birth control pills, should be brought in sufficient quantity for deployments duration. Only food, water, and ice from approved U.S. military sources should be consumed. Consuming food or water from unapproved sources may cause illness. Food should be thoroughly cooked and served hot. Thorough hand-washing before eating and after using the latrine is highly recommended, as is regular bathing. Feet should be kept dry and treated with antifungal powder. Socks and underwear should be changed daily; underwear should fit loosely and be made of cotton fiber. Excessive heat and sunlight exposure should be minimized. Maintaining hydration is important, as are following work-rest cycles and wearing uniforms properly. Sunglasses, sunscreen (SPF 15 or higher), and lip balm are recommended. Drinking alcohol should be avoided. Personnel with previous heat injuries should be closely monitored. Uniforms should be worn properly (blouse boots). DEET should be applied to exposed skin and uniforms treated with permethrin; permethrin is not intended for use on skin. Proper treatment and wear of uniform, plus application of DEET to exposed skin, decreases the risk of diseases transmitted by biting insects. Overcrowded living areas should be avoided. Ventilated living areas and avoiding coughing or sneezing toward others will reduce colds and other respiratory infections. Cots or sleeping bags should be arranged head to toe to avoid the face-to-face contact that spreads germs. Contact with animals is not recommended. Animals should not be kept as mascots. Cats, dogs, and other animals can transmit disease. Food should not be kept in living areas as it attracts rodents and insects, and trash should be disposed of properly. I-1

Hazardous snakes, plants, spiders, and other insects and arthropods such as scorpions, centipedes, ants, bees, wasps, and flies should be avoided. Those bitten or stung should contact U.S. medical personnel. All sexual contact should be avoided. Properly used condoms offer some protection from sexually transmitted diseases but not full protection. Stress and fatigue can be minimized by maintaining physical fitness, staying informed, and sleeping when the mission and safety permits. Alcohol should be avoided as it causes dehydration, contributes to jet lag, can lead to depression, and decreases physical and mental readiness. Separation anxiety, continuous operations, changing conditions, and the observation of human suffering will intensify stress. Assistance from medical personnel or chaplains is available.

Additional Information Water


If unapproved water, as found in many lakes, rivers, streams, and city water supplies must be used in an emergency, the water may be disinfected by:
I I I I

Adding calcium hypochlorite at 5.0 ppm for 30 minutes; Adding Chlor-Floc or iodine tablets according to label instructions; Heating water to a rolling boil for 5 to 10 minutes; or Adding 2 to 4 drops of ordinary chlorine bleach per quart of water and waiting 30 minutes before using it.

Either U.S. military preventive medicine or veterinary personnel should inspect bottled water supplies. Bottled water does not guarantee purity; direct sunlight on bottled water supplies may promote bacterial growth. Water in canals, lakes, rivers, and streams is likely contaminated; unnecessary bathing, swimming, and wading should be avoided. If the tactical situation requires entering bodies of water, all exposed skin should be covered to protect from parasites. Following exposure, it is important to dry vigorously and change clothing. I-2

Rodents
Rodents should not be tolerated in the unit area; they can spread serious illness. Diseases may be contracted through rodent bites or scratches, transmitted by insects carried on rodents (such as fleas, ticks, or mites), or by contamination of food from rodent nesting or feeding. Personnel can minimize the risk of disease caused by rodents by:
I I I

Maintaining a high state of sanitation throughout the unit area; Sealing openings 1/4 inch or greater to prevent rodents from entering unit areas; Avoiding inhalation of dust when cleaning previously unoccupied areas (mist these areas with water prior to sweeping; when possible, disinfect area using 3 ounces of liquid bleach per 1 gallon of water). Promptly removing dead rodents. Personnel should use disposable gloves or plastic bags over the hands when handling any dead animal and place the dead rodent/animal into a plastic bag prior to disposal. Seeking immediate attention if bitten or scratched by a rodent or if experiencing difficulty breathing or flu-like symptoms.

Insects
Exposure to harmful insects, ticks, and other pests is a year-round, worldwide risk. The following protective measures reduce the risk of insect and tick bites:
I I I I I I I I

Use DoD-approved insect repellents properly; Apply DEET on all exposed skin; Apply permethrin on clothing and bed nets; Tuck bed net under bedding; use bed net pole; Avoid exposure to living or dead animals; Regularly check for ticks; Discourage pests by disposing of trash properly; eliminate food storage in living areas; and Cover exposed skin by keeping sleeves rolled down when possible, especially during peak periods of mosquito biting (dusk and dawn); keep undershirts tucked into pants; tuck pant legs into boots. I-3

Uniforms correctly treated with permethrin, using either the aerosol spraycan method (reapply after sixth laundering) or with the Individual Dynamic Absorption (IDA) impregnation kit (good for 6 months or the life of the uniform) will help minimize risks posed by insects. The date of treatment should be labeled on the uniform. Bed nets should be treated with permethrin for protection against biting insects using either the single aerosol spray can method (treating two bed nets) or the units 2-gallon sprayer. All personnel should sleep under mosquito nets, regardless of time of day, ensure netting is tucked under bedding, and use poles to prevent bed nets from draping on the skin. DoD-approved insect repellents are: IDA KIT: NSN 6840-01-345-0237 Permethrin Aerosol Spray: NSN 6840-01-278-1336 DEET Insect Repellent: NSN 6840-01-284-3982

Hot Weather
If heat is a threat in the area, personnel should:
I I I I I I I I

Stay hydrated by drinking water frequently; Follow work-rest cycles; Monitor others who may have heat-related problems; Wear uniforms properly; Use a sun block (SPF 15 or higher), sunglasses, and lip balm; During hot weather, wear natural fiber clothing (such as cotton) next to the skin for increased ventilation; Seek immediate medical attention for heat injuries such as cramps, exhaustion, or stroke. Heat injuries can also occur in cold weather; Avoid standing in direct sunlight for long periods; be prepared for sudden drops in temperature at night, and construct wind screens if necessary to avoid blowing dust or sand.

Sunscreens: Sunscreen lotion: NSN 6505-01-121-2336 Non-alcohol lotion base sunscreen: NSN 6505-01-267-1486 I-4

WORK/REST TABLE EASY WORK Water Work / Intake Rest (Qt/Hr) NL 1/2 NL 1/2 NL 3/4 NL 3/4 50/10 min 1 MODERATE WORK Water Work / Intake Rest (Qt/Hr) NL 3/4 50/10 min 3/4 40/20 min 3/4 30/30 min 3/4 20/40 min 1 HARD WORK Water Work / Intake Rest (Qt/Hr) 40/20 min 3/4 30/30 min 1 30/30 min 1 20/40 min 1 10/50 min 1

Heat Cat 1 2 3 4 5

WBGT Index (o F) 78 81.9 82 84.9 85 87.9 88 89.9 > 90

The work/rest times and fluid replacement volumes will sustain performance and hydration for at least 4 hours of work in the specific heat category. Individual water needs will vary +/- (plus/minus) 1/4 qt/hr. NL = no limit to work time per hour. Rest means minimal physical activity (sitting or standing) and should be done in shade if possible. Caution: Hourly fluid intake should not exceed 1 quarts. Daily intake should not exceed 12 quarts. Note: MOPP gear adds 10o to WBGT Index.

Food
High risk food items such as fresh eggs, unpasteurized dairy products, lettuce or other uncooked vegetables, and raw or undercooked meats should be avoided unless they are from U.S. military approved sources. Those who must consume unapproved foods should choose low risk foods such as bread and other baked goods, fruits that have thick peels (washed with safe water), and boiled foods such as rice and vegetables.

Human Waste
Military-approved latrines should be used when possible. If no latrines are available, personnel should bury all human waste in pits or trenches.

I-5

Cold Weather
If cold weather injuries are a threat in the area, personnel should:
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Drink plenty of fluids, preferably water or other decaffeinated beverages; Closely monitor others who have had previous cold injuries; Use well-ventilated warming tents and hot liquids for relief from the cold. Watch for shivering and increase rations to the equivalent of four MREs per day; Not rest or sleep in tents or vehicles unless well ventilated; temperatures can drop drastically at night; Dress in layers, wear polypropylene long underwear, and use sunglasses, scarf, unscented lip balm, sunscreen, and skin moisturizers; Insulate themselves from the ground with tree boughs or sleeping mats and construct windscreens to avoid unnecessary heat loss; and Remember that loss of sensitivity in any body part requires immediate medical attention.

I I I I

I-6

First Aid Basic Lifesaving


Those caring for injured persons should immediately:
I I I I I I I I

Establish an open airway, Ensure the victim is breathing, Stop bleeding to support circulation, Prevent further disability, Place dressing over open wounds, Immobilize neck injuries, Splint obvious limb deformities, and Minimize further exposure to adverse weather.

Injuries and Care Shock


I

Symptoms:

Confusion Cold, clammy skin Sweating Shallow, labored, and rapid breathing Rapid pulse An open airway should be maintained. Unconscious victims should be placed on their side. Victims should be kept calm, warm, and comfortable. Lower extremities should be elevated. Medical attention should be sought as soon as possible. I-7

Treatment:

Abdominal Wound
I

Treatment: Exposed organs should be covered with moist, clean dressing. Wound should be secured with bandages. Displaced organs should never be reintroduced to the body. Treatment: Direct pressure with hand should be applied; a dressing should be used if available. Injured extremity should be elevated if no fractures are suspected. Pressure points may be used to control bleeding. Dressings should not be removed; additional dressings may be applied over old dressings. Tourniquet: NOTE: Tourniquets should only be used when an injury is life threatening. A 1-inch band should be tied between the injury and the heart, 2 to 4 inches from the injury, to stop severe bleeding; wire or shoe strings should not be used. Band should be tight enough to stop bleeding and no tighter. Once the tourniquet is tied, it should not be loosened. The tourniquet should be left exposed for quick visual reference. The time that the tourniquet is tied and the letter T should be written on the casualtys forehead.

Bleeding
I

Eye Injury
Treatment: I Embedded objects should not be removed; dressings should secure objects to prohibit movement. I Bandages should be applied lightly to both eyes. I Patients should be continuously attended. I-8

Chest Wound
Symptoms:
I I

Sucking noise from chest Frothy red blood from wound

Treatment:
I I I

Entry and exit wounds should be identified; wounds should be covered (aluminum foil, ID card). Three sides of the material covering the wound should be taped, leaving the bottom untaped. Victim should be positioned to facilitate easiest breathing.

Fractures
Symptoms:
I I I

Deformity, bruising Tenderness Swelling and discoloration Fractured limb should not be straightened. Injury should be splinted with minimal movement of injured person. Joints above and below the injury should be splinted. If not in a chemical environment, remove clothing from injured area. Rings should be removed from fingers. Check pulse below injury to determine blood flow restrictions.

Treatment:
I I I I I I

Spinal, Neck, Head Injury


Symptoms: I Lack of feeling and/or control below neck Treatment: I Conscious victims should be cautioned to remain still. I Airway should be checked without moving injured persons head. I-9

Victims who must be moved should be placed, without bending or rotating victims head and neck, on a hard surface that would act as a litter (door, cut lumber). Head and neck should be immobilized.

Heat Injuries
Heat Cramps Symptoms:
I I I I

Spasms, usually in muscles or arms Results from strenuous work or exercise Loss of salt in the body Normal body temperature

Heat Exhaustion Symptoms:


I I I I I I I

Cramps in abdomen or limbs Pale skin Dizziness, faintness, weakness Nausea or vomiting Profuse sweating or moist, cool skin Weak pulse Normal body temperature

Heat Stroke Symptoms:


I I I I I

Headache, dizziness Red face/skin Hot, dry skin (no sweating) Strong, rapid pulse High body temperature (hot to touch) I-10

Treatment: I Victim should be treated for shock. I Victim should be laid in a cool area with clothing loosened.
I I I

Victim can be cooled by sprinkling with cool water or fanning (though not to the point of shivering). If conscious, victim may drink cool water (2 teaspoons of salt to one canteen may be added). Seek medical attention immediately; heat stroke can result in death.

Burns
Burns may be caused by heat (thermal), electricity, chemicals, or radiation. Treatment is based on depth, size, and severity (degree of burn). All burn victims should be treated for shock and seen by medical personnel. Thermal/First Degree Symptoms:
I I

Skin reddens Painful Source of burn should be removed. Cool water should be applied to the affected area.

Treatment:
I I

Thermal/Second Degree Symptoms: I Skin reddens and blisters I Very painful Treatment: I Source of burn should be removed.
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Cool water should be applied to the affected area. Blisters should not be broken. A dry dressing should cover the affected area. I-11

Thermal/Third Degree Symptoms:


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Charred or whitish looking skin May burn to the bone Burned area not painful; surrounding area very painful

Treatment:
I I I

Source of burn should be removed. Clothing that adheres to burned area should not be removed. A dry dressing should cover the affected area.

Electrical Burns Treatment:


I I I

Power source must be off. Entry and exit wounds should be identified. Burned area should be treated in accordance with its severity.

Chemical Burns Treatment:


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Skin should be flushed with a large amount of water; eyes should be flushed for at least 20 minutes. Visible contaminants should be removed. Phosphorus burns should be covered with a wet dressing (prevents air from activating the phosphorous)

Cold Injuries
Hypothermia Symptoms:
I I

Body is cold under clothing Victim may appear confused or dead I-12

Treatment: I Victim should be moved to a warm place. I Wet clothing should be removed; victim should be dressed in warm clothing or wrapped in a dry blanket. I Body parts should not be rubbed. I Victims must not consume alcoholic beverages. Frostbite Symptoms: I Skin appears white or waxy I Skin is hard to the touch Treatment: I Victim should be moved to a warm place. I Affected area should be warmed in 104 to 108 F (40 C) water for 15 to 30 minutes (NOT hot water). I Affected area should be covered with several layers of clothing. I Affected area must not be rubbed.
I

Victim must seek medical attention.

Emergency Life-Saving Equipment


Equipment may be improvised when necessary. Following is a list of possible uses for commonly found items. Shirts = Dressings/Bandages Belts, Ties = Tourniquets, Bandages Towels, Sheets = Dressings/Bandages Socks, Panty Hose, Flight cap = Dressings/Bandages Sticks or Tree Limbs = Splints Blankets = Litters, Splints Field Jackets = Litters BDU Shirts = Litters/Splints Ponchos = Litters/Bandages Rifle Sling = Bandages M-16 Heat Guards = Splints I-13

APPENDIX: B IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES


Threat
Terrorist use of explosives to attack U.S. and coalition forces worldwide remains a primary concern based on successful employment and increased sophistication of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Several terrorist groups have demonstrated technological advances in bomb-making, combining high-tech firing systems, timers, and antitampering devices with low-cost explosives (for example, TNT, ammonium nitrate/fuel oil, and military-grade high explosives) to produce increasingly larger and more devastating bombs. IED deployment often involves using people, aircraft, boats, and vehicles as delivery platforms. The term improvised explosive device describes devices that have been creatively constructed from available material, and incorporate explosives, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals in their design. IEDs are generally handmade, and consist of an energetic material and an initiation fuse or initiation system. IEDs may be placed or delivered with the intent to destroy, disfigure, distract, harass personnel, or to disperse a toxic material to expose a target population. They range in design from crude to sophisticated, depending on the ingenuity of the designer and the availability of tools and materials. IEDs are extremely diverse and may contain any type of firing device or initiator, plus various military, commercial, or handmade fillers.

IED Components
The word improvised is the key to IED design. Most IEDs are unique because the builder must use whatever materials are at hand. Most IEDs are designed to defeat a specific target or type of target. They generally become more difficult to detect and protect against as they become more sophisticated. The diversity of IED designs, electronic components, methods of concealment, and standoff initiation technologies all contribute to the difficulty in detection and protection. Generally, each of B-1

Typical IED Components the following component classes can be found in military/commercial systems, or in handmade systems:
I

Initiation Systems. Also known as fuzes, triggers, or switches, initiation systems can take on many forms. These can be electrical, mechanical, or pyrotechnic systems, ranging from simple burning time (safety) fuzes to advanced electronic integrated circuits. Filler Materials. Filler materials can include explosives, incendiary materials, chemicals or chemical agents, biological materials, or radioactive materials. Filler varies with the intended target and available materials. Detonators. Detonators can be electric or non-electric, depending on the firing system used. Electric detonators, or blasting caps, are most commonly used because they are more widely available, and are easier to control. Power Sources. Power sources are commonly batteries (normally standard 9-volt batteries) that have sufficient power to initiate an B-2

electric detonator. In rare cases, IEDs have been powered by wall current or solar-powered cells.
I

Containers. Containers are the most widely differing components of IEDs. Almost any type of container can be used to conceal an IED. Generally, the container is chosen to blend with the target environment. Some containers may have an additional fragmentation hazard (such as propane tanks), or may simply be a concealment device with no added hazard (for example, a backpack).

Commonly Used Explosives


Terrorists obtain explosive material from many sources. Some are manufactured for commercial and military use; however, when military and commercial explosives are unavailable, explosive material can be made from common substances. Examples of commonly used explosives that terrorists worldwide have effectively used in IEDs are as follows: Handmade Alulminized fomulations ANFO Chlorate mixtures Flammable gases Gasoline Hydrogen peroxide/cellulose Nitrate mixtures Paint mixtures Perchlorate mixtures Sugar mixtures Sulfuric acid mixtures Triacetone-triperoxide (TATP) Military Grade Alulminized formulations Black powder C-4 Comb B Metal azide salts Nitrolycerine, Nitrocellulose PETN Picric acid RDX Semtex Tetryl TNT

Blast and Fragmentation Threat from IEDs


Threat posted to personnel, structures, and vehicles by IEDs is generated by blast overpressure, and fragmentation. The threat distances from fragments and debris are almost always much greater than those posted B-3

by blast overpressure. The threat severity is heavily dependent on the type and amount of explosive used, and the nature of the container. IEDs encased in heavy (usually metal) containers are designed to fracture the container and throw the fragments of the container for long distances. Metal objects such as nuts, bolts, ball bearings, screws, and nails can also be imbedded into the explosive to increase fragmentation effects. For heavily cased IEDs, up to half of the detonation energy is consumed fracturing the container. IEDs with heavy cases are ideal for attacking unprotected personnel and thin-skinned vehicles. Lightly cased IEDs generally pose a low fragmentation threat, but a high threat due to blast overpressure. The human body has pressure-sensitive organs (e.g., ears, lungs), but overpressures of an atmosphere ore greater are required to cause serious injuries to these tissues. The greatest threat posed by lightly cased IEDs is to non-reinforced structures, where overpressures of about half an atmosphere (7.3 psi) or less can damage common structural materials such as glass, concrete, wood, and brick. The

IED concealed in a Cocoa Can B-4

threat to personnel from these types of IEDs is therefore generated by the partial or total collapse of buildings, dwellings, or other structures. Blast Overpressure Effects on Personnel and Structure Peak overpressure (psi) 0.4-1.0 1.5-5.5 2.9-8.7 13.0-18.9 30.0-40.0 100-120 130-180 200-250 Effect Window glass breaks Concrete shatters; wood splinters Bricks shear 50 percent ear drum rupture Lung damage 1 percent lethality 50 percent lethality 99 percent lethality

Example Blast/Fragmentation Threats from IEDs. Explosive Explosive mass Device (TNT equivalent, kg) Pipe bomb 2.5 Briefcase bomb 25.0 Car bomb 400.0 Truck bomb 4,000.0 Frag threat distance (meters) 250 500 500 1,000 Blast threat distance (meters) 8.5 23.0 58.0 125.0

IED Threat to Armored Vehicles


Common IED threats to armored vehicles are stationary mines (buried for belly attacks or mounted for side attacks), and small, portable IEDs used for close attack, or attached to the vehicle. As military forces often use armored assets in counter-terrorist operations, these vehicles have become prime targets for terrorist operatives. The most notable of such attacks is the destruction of Israeli Merkava Mark III main battle tanks by Palestinian operatives on at least two occasions in 2002. The IEDs used in these operations were exceptionally large charges at 50-100 kilograms (110-220 pounds) of handmade explosives buried in the roadway. Charges of this magnitude can generate blast overpressures B-5

of up to 200 atmospheres, which is the equivalent of 10 large anti-tank mines. There is virtually no defense against IEDs of this size. Terrorist operatives have been known to construct and employ shaped and hollow-charge IEDs in various levels of sophistication against armored vehicles. The IEDs typically achieve armor penetration of less than 300 millimeters, which is the minimum a military-class highexplosive antitank (HEAT) warhead is capable of achieving.

Flammable Gas Explosives


Over the past century, thousands of people have been killed by explosions of flammable gases. Most incidents are accidental, or the result of negligence, but deliberately set explosives are not uncommon. Occasionally, an explosion causes hundreds of deaths. In 1992, a sewer explosion in Guadalajara, Mexico killed more than 200 people, and the 1989 explosion of gases leaking from a pipeline in Russia killed nearly 600 people. The highest profile terrorist use of flammable gases may have been the April 2002 attack on a Tunisian synagogue that killed more than 20 people and injured dozens. Most organic liquid and gaseous materials cannot burn or detonate until they are mixed with air in the proper concentrations. When a mixture is initiated, there are four possible outcomes: ignition failure, flash fire, deflagration, or detonation. Flammable Gas Acetylene Butane Ethylene Oxide Gasoline Methane Propane Propylene Oxide n-Propyl Nitrate Standard Transport Method Non-liquefied/ compressed Liquefied Liquefied Liquefied Nonliquefied/ compressed Liquefied Liquid Liquid B-6 Flammability limits in air (vol. %) Upper Lower 2.5 100.0 1.8 3.0 1.3 5.0 2.1 2.8 2.0 8.4 100.0 6.0 15.0 9.5 37.0 100.0

Vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) have killed more than 300 and injured more than 1,000 U.S. citizens in the past 20 years. VBIEDs may be fabricated from any type of vehicle, are simple to construct, and are capable of causing massive amounts of damage. VBIEDs are effective for several reasons. They are built into or based on vehicles, making them inherently mobile and difficult to locate or track. Vehicles are also easy to conceal, and therefore easy to place near the intended target. VBIEDs are usually large and are therefore capable of concealing large amounts of explosives. Likewise, VBIEDs carry such a large payload, they may not need to penetrate perimeter security obstacles to be effective. The addition of a suicide driver significantly increases the probability that a VBIED attack will be successful. Historically, most VBIEDs have used ammonium nitrate/fuel oil (ANFO) as the main explosive charge. However, VBIED charges could use almost any explosive, as long as large quantities are available.

Vehicles used in VBIED Operations B-7

ANFO, TNT, C-4, and urea nitrate, as well as flammable gases, are just a few of the many explosives that have been used in VBIED attacks. As with all terrorist activities, the terrorist organizations are likely to use the material that is most readily available. VBIEDs may contain anywhere from 500 to 60,000 pounds of high explosive. VBIEDs tend to be simple in construction. All that is required is a vehicle, a large amount of explosive material, and an initiation system. Remotely controlled vehicles have been used on occasion. Another innovative technique is the use of directed-blast VBIEDs. These devices make use of sand or other dense filler materials placed on the side of the main charge, facing away from the intended target. This dense material serves to concentrate the blast wave toward the direction of the target, which in turn pushes more explosive energy toward structures, and causes more damage. Explosives capacity (TNT equivalent) Pipe bomb 2.3 kg / 5 lb Briefcase/ 23 kg / Suitcase bomb 50 lb Compact sedan 227 kg / 500 lb Sedan 454 kg / 1,000 lb Passenger/ 1,814 kg / cargo van 4,000 lb Small moving van/ 4,536 kg / Delivery truck 10,000 lb Moving van/ 13,608 kg / Water truck 30,000 lb Semi-trailer 2,7216 kg / 60,000 lb Threat description B-8 Building evacuation distance 21 m / 71 ft 46 m / 150 ft 98 m / 320 ft 122 m / 400 ft 195 m / 640 ft 262 m / 860 ft 375 m / 1,240 ft 475 m / 1570 ft Outdoor evacuation distance 259 m / 850 ft 564 m / 1,850 ft 457 m / 1,500 ft 534 m / 1,750 ft 838 m / 2,750 ft 1,143 m / 3,750 ft 1,143 m / 6,500 ft 2,134 m / 7,000 ft

Suicide Bombers
Suicide attacks constitute an escalation of terrorist activity, and the intent of these attacks is to cause maximum casualties and damage, and to strike a blow to public morale. Over the past two decades, several countries have been forced to contend with suicide attacks. Radical activists from Turkey, Sri Lanka, Lebanon, and Palestine have used suicide tactics as a weapon in terrorist attacks, with the goal of producing a negative psychological effect on an entire population rather than just the victims of the attack. Historically viewed as a problem affecting the Middle East and South Asia, the threat posed by suicide terrorism is spreading around the globe. A suicide attack is an operational tactic whereby the act of violence results in the voluntary death of the attacker. The attacker is fully aware that if he does not kill himself, the planned attack will not be successful.Such attacks are carried out by activating explosive material concealed on the body or carried by a vehicle, usually a car, truck, or boat.

Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia, 1996 VBIED Damage B-9

The individual suicide bomber attack is one of the easiest and cheapest terrorist operations to execute. It is the ultimate precision-smart bomb. Not only does the bomber decide exactly when and where to attack for optimum results, he can spontaneously move to a secondary target or target of opportunity if necessary. Recent trends show the suicide body suit or belt has evolved to improve concealment, and is becoming increasingly small. Initially, the device was a square block of explo- Suicide Belt sives worn in the chest and belly area. Gradually, it evolved into a small block of explosives placed just above the navel. With the exception of the malleable plastic explosives and detonator, all the other components can be purchased from fabric and auto shops (ball bearings, wires, batteries, and switches). Because they contain few or no electronic components, it is difficult for security agencies to develop counter technologies to detect these devices. To increase lethality, fragmentation devices are used, incorporating small objects such as screws, nails, or ball bearings. There is no consistent characterization of a suicide bomber. The keys to a successful suicide bombing operation are pre-operational surveillance and the attackers ability to blend into the target environment. As countries adopt countermeasures, terrorist groups will adopt new methods of attack that contradict known profiles that security forces are following to uncover potential bombers.

B-10

Simplicity, cost-effectiveness, and relatively high success all contribute to the high threat posed by suicide bombing attacks. Suicide terrorism will continue to spread. New tactics, delivery methods, and explosive combinations are evolving and becoming more effective. Terrorist groups are setting a dangerous trend of using suicide bombers to destroy targets far removed from their theaters of war. The 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon underscore how terrorists imagination, ingenuity, and will to succeed can expand the options for conducting such attacks.

Non-detectable Explosives Non-Nitrogen Compounds


Explosives detection in airports typically relies on dogs trained to sniff out nitrogen-based explosives, or chemical swipe tests designed to detect the same compounds. Explosive materials that contain no nitrogen have been developed commercially and by terrorist groups. Although detectable by other means, these non-nitrogen-based explosives are much less likely to trigger alarms at most airports.

Terrorist Use of TATP


Terrorist groups have been making extensive use of triacetone triperoxide (TATP), which is unstable, but is relatively easy to make from readily available materials. It has been a popular main-charge explosive material among Palestinian terrorists. TATP has less than 90 percent of the power of TNT and is extremely sensitive to friction and impact. However, it is easily prepared from acetone, battery acid, and commercial-grade (30 percent concentration) hydrogen peroxide. In addition to being used in main charges, it can also be used as an initiator for more powerful explosives.

Hydrogen Peroxide
A number of known explosive compositions contain hydrogen peroxide (H202). Concentrated H2O2, when combined with many common organic materials, will form an explosive mixture with performance properties only slightly less than that of TNT. H2O2 will form an explosive mixture B-11

when combined with a specific ratio of cellulose/starch materials, such as cotton, flour, ground spices, or coffee grounds, none of which would trigger an alarm in an explosives inspection. Shelf life of the explosive is 48 hours, and it has 80 percent explosive equivalent to TNT.

Future Trends for IEDs


As security measures continue to evolve, terrorist organizations will seek to improve techniques for IED fabrication and use. Several trends are emerging. For example, IEDs are being made smaller and bombers are leaning toward the more stable military-grade explosives and means of initiation. New techniques are also being developed to deliver the explosive to the target more reliably, as in the use of tandem charges, directed-energy IEDs, and the use of third parties to unwittingly deliver explosive devices. The commercial explosives industry continues to improve detonation devices, making them safer, more reliable, and smaller. As this technology becomes available to terrorists, they will be able to make more effective IEDs. The latest microdetonators may lead to smaller firing circuits, which are more likely to pass through security checkpoints. Shock Tube is an increasingly common device used in commercial and military demolition and disposal operations. It has a plastic tube 1/8 inch in outer diameter, and the inner surface of the tube is layered with a thin film of HMX dust (10 grams per 100 feet). An igniter is placed on one end of the tube, and a non-electric detonator is placed on the other. Shock Tube contains considerably less explosive than is found in typical detonating cord, and therefore storage and handling requirements are less restrictive. Also, when combined with a non-electric detonator, the chance of detection is further reduced. Several new techniques have been developed by terrorist organizations in order to more effectively deliver the device to the target. Because suicide bombers may be unreliable, or may exhibit external signs that would alert security forces, terrorist groups are beginning to use third parties who are unaware that they are carrying explosives. This technique was demonstrated most recently by the FARC. FARC members forced kidnapped civilians to drive large VBIEDs to predetermined B-12

locations; the civilians were unaware that they were transporting explosives. When the VBIED arrived at the target location, FARC operatives detonated the explosives, killing the driver and damaging the target. Unless prior knowledge is available, these operations are nearly impossible to stop. The use of remote-controlled vehicles is becoming increasingly popular among terrorist organizations. These devices provide a reliable means of getting the ordnance to the target as long as the target is within range of the remote-control device. However, this type of operation does require a more sophisticated knowledge of electronic devices, as well as a significant amount of practice.

B-13

Franz Josef Land Severnaya Zemlya Spitsbergen New Siberian Islands

Arctic Ocean

M o u ld B ay Arctic Ocean
S tandard tim e is advanced one hour, the year round, in R ussia

R e so lu te M u rm a n sk Ta a siila q R eykjavik N o vyy Po rt Iga rka T iksi A m b a rch ik

N o rd vik D ickso n

APPENDIX C: International Time Zones


Ve rkh o ya n sk A n a d yr

Nom e Fa irb a n ks

A n ch o ra ge

W h ite h o rse Ju n e a u Ed m o n to n

C h u rch ill

H e lsin ki Ya ku tsk M a ga d a n Oslo N o vo sib irsk S to ckh o lmLe n in gra d S ve rd lo vsk Aloutian M o sco w Irku tsk D u blin Islands B e rlin W a rsaw Aloutian W in n ip e g Lo n d o n -3h30m Islands K iyev M o n tre a l S t. Jo h n s B u d a p e st Pa ris S eattle B e lgra d e D e tro it M a d rid B o ise C hicago B e ijin g R o m e Ista n bu l B a ku N ew Yo rk San Francisco D e nveS t. Lo u is W ashington D.C. Azores Lisb o n r Seoul Tu n is Te h ra n K a bu l La n zh o u To kyo B a gh d a d +3h30m A lgie rs +4h Lo s A n ge le s Bermuda N ew Trip o li C a iro H o u sto n 30m D e lh i Pacific Ocean M ia m i Atlantic Taiwan C a lcu tta H o n o lu lu Midway M e cca Ocean H ava n a H o n g Ko n g M exico Wake K h a rto u m Hanoi B om bay Hawaii Pacific D a ka r Guam B a n gko k M a n illa +5h30m Sanaa M a n a gu a C a ra ca s Ocean +6h30m A d d is Pa n a m a Marshall La go s -3h30m Caroline Ababa C o lo m b o M o n ro via A ccra Islands B o go ta Islands K am pala N a iro b i S in ga p o re Galapagos Q u ito K in sh a sa Marquesas Islands M anaus Indian Dar es Islands S a lva d o r Ja ka rta Lu a n d a Ocean -9h30m S a la a m Lim a D a rw in Fiji Samoa Lu sa ka La Pa z B ra silia H a ra re A n ta n a n a rlvo New Cook W in d h o e k R io d e Caledonia +9h Islands A su n cio n M a p u to Janeiro B risb a n e Pe rth 30m S antiago S yd n ey C ape Tow n Buenos M e lb o u rn e A ire s W e llin gto n S an Julian Falkland Islands B ro w n a n d Ye llo w : H o u rly Z o n e s G re e n : Irre gu la r T im e Z o n e s
International Date Line

C-1
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6

Boundary representations are not necessarily authoritative.

-11 -10

-9

-8

-7

-6

-5

+7

+8

+9

+10 +11 +12-

Coordinated Universal Time (UTC)


To use the table, go to the country you are interested in, and add the number of hours corresponding to the United States time zone to the current time. The UTC is also known as Greenwich Mean Time (GMT).
Country Afghanistan Albania Algeria American Samoa Andorra Angola Antarctica Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Armenia Aruba Ascension Australia North Australia South Australia West Australia East Austria Azerbaijan Bahamas Bahrain Bangladesh Barbados Belarus Belgium Belize Benin Bermuda Bhutan Bolivia Bosnia Herzegovina Botswana UTC +4.5 H +1.0 H +1.0 H -11.0 H +1.0 H +1.0 H -2.0 H -4.0 H -3.0 H +4.0 H -4.0 H +0.0 H +9.5 H +10.0 H +8.0 H +10.0 H +1.0 H +3.0 H -5.0 H +3.0 H +6.0 H -4.0 H +2.0 H +1.0 H -6.0 H +1.0 H -4.0 H +6.0 H -4.0 H +1.0 H +2.0 H Eastern +9.5 H +6.0 H +6.0 H -6.0 H +6.0 H +6.0 H +3.0 H +1.0 H +2.0 H +9.0 H +1.0 H +5.0 H +14.5 H +15.0 H +13.0 H +15.0 H +6.0 H +8.0 H +0.0 H +8.0 H +11.0 H +1.0 H +7.0 H +6.0 H -1.0 H +6.0 H +1.0 H +11.0 H +1.0 H +6.0 H +7.0 H Central +10.5 H +7.0 H +7.0 H -5.0 H +7.0 H +7.0 H +4.0 H +2.0 H +3.0 H +10.0 H +2.0 H +6.0 H +15.5 H +16.0 H +14.0 H +16.0 H +7.0 H +9.0 H +1.0 H +9.0 H +12.0 H +2.0 H +8.0 H +7.0 H +0.0 H +7.0 H +2.0 H +12.0 H +2.0 H +7.0 H +8.0 H Mountain +11.5 H +8.0 H +8.0 H -4.0 H +8.0 H +8.0 H +5.0 H +3.0 H +4.0 H +11.0 H +3.0 H +7.0 H +16.5 H +17.0 H +15.0 H +17.0 H +8.0 H +10.0 H +2.0 H +10.0 H +13.0 H +3.0 H +9.0 H +8.0 H +1.0 H +8.0 H +3.0 H +13.0 H +3.0 H +8.0 H +9.0 H Pacific +12.5 H +9.0 H +9.0 H -3.0 H +9.0 H +9.0 H +6.0 H +4.0 H +5.0 H +12.0 H +4.0 H +8.0 H +17.5 H +18.0 H +16.0 H +18.0 H +9.0 H +11.0 H +3.0 H +11.0 H +14.0 H +4.0 H +10.0 H +9.0 H +2.0 H +9.0 H +4.0 H +14.0 H +4.0 H +9.0 H +10.0 H

C-2

Country Brazil East Brazil West British Virgin Islands Brunei Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Canada East Canada Central Canada Mountain Canada West Cape Verde Cayman Islands Central African Rep. Chad Republic Chile China Christmas Island Colombia Congo Cook Island Costa Rica Croatia Cuba Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Djibouti Dominica Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt El Salvador Equatorial Guinea

UTC -3.0 H -4.0 H -4.0 H +8.0 H +2.0 H +0.0 H +2.0 H +7.0 H +1.0 H -5.0 H -6.0 H -7.0 H -8.0 H -1.0 H -5.0 H +1.0 H +1.0 H -4.0 H +8.0 H -10.0 H -5.0 H +1.0 H -10.0 H -6.0 H +1.0 H -5.0 H +2.0 H +1.0 H +1.0 H +3.0 H -4.0 H -4.0 H -5.0 H +2.0 H -6.0 H +1.0 H

Eastern +2.0 H +1.0 H +1.0 H +13.0 H +7.0 H +5.0 H +7.0 H +12.0 H +6.0 H +0.0 H -1.0 H -2.0 H -3.0 H +4.0 H +0.0 H +6.0 H +6.0 H +1.0 H +13.0 H -5.0 H +0.0 H +6.0 H -5.0 H -1.0 H +6.0 H +0.0 H +7.0 H +6.0 H +6.0 H +8.0 H +1.0 H +1.0 H +0.0 H +7.0 H -1.0 H +6.0 H

Central +3.0 H +2.0 H +2.0 H +14.0 H +8.0 H +6.0 H +8.0 H +13.0 H +7.0 H +1.0 H +0.0 H -1.0 H -2.0 H +5.0 H +1.0 H +7.0 H +7.0 H +2.0 H +14.0 H -4.0 H +1.0 H +7.0 H -4.0 H +0.0 H +7.0 H +1.0 H +8.0 H +7.0 H +7.0 H +9.0 H +2.0 H +2.0 H +1.0 H +8.0 H +0.0 H +7.0 H

Mountain +4.0 H +3.0 H +3.0 H +15.0 H +9.0 H +7.0 H +9.0 H +14.0 H +8.0 H +2.0 H +1.0 H +0.0 H -1.0 H +6.0 H +2.0 H +8.0 H +8.0 H +3.0 H +15.0 H -3.0 H +2.0 H +8.0 H -3.0 H +1.0 H +8.0 H +2.0 H +9.0 H +8.0 H +8.0 H +10.0 H +3.0 H +3.0 H +2.0 H +9.0 H +1.0 H +8.0 H

Pacific +5.0 H +4.0 H +4.0 H +16.0 H +10.0 H +8.0 H +10.0 H +15.0 H +9.0 H +3.0 H +2.0 H +1.0 H +0.0 H +7.0 H +3.0 H +9.0 H +9.0 H +4.0 H +16.0 H -2.0 H +3.0 H +9.0 H -2.0 H +2.0 H +9.0 H +3.0 H +10.0 H +9.0 H +9.0 H +11.0 H +4.0 H +4.0 H +3.0 H +10.0 H +2.0 H +9.0 H

C-3

Country Eritrea Estonia Ethiopia Falkland Islands Fiji Islands Finland France French Antilles French Guinea French Polynesia Gabon Republic Gambia Georgia Germany Ghana Gibraltar Greece Greenland Grenada Guadeloupe Guam Guatemala Guinea-Bissau Guinea Guyana Haiti Honduras Hong Kong Hungary Iceland India Indonesia East Indonesia Central Indonesia West Iran Iraq

UTC +3.0 H +2.0 H +3.0 H -4.0 H +12.0 H +2.0 H +1.0 H -3.0 H -3.0 H -10.0 H +1.0 H +0.0 H +4.0 H +1.0 H +0.0 H +1.0 H +2.0 H -3.0 H -4.0 H -4.0 H +10.0 H -6.0 H +0.0 H +0.0 H -3.0 H -5.0 H -6.0 H +8.0 H +1.0 H +0.0 H +5.5 H +9.0 H +8.0 H +7.0 H +3.5 H +3.0 H

Eastern +8.0 H +7.0 H +8.0 H +1.0 H +17.0 H +7.0 H +6.0 H +2.0 H +2.0 H -5.0 H +6.0 H +5.0 H +9.0 H +6.0 H +5.0 H +6.0 H +7.0 H +2.0 H +1.0 H +1.0 H +15.0 H -1.0 H +5.0 H +5.0 H +2.0 H +0.0 H -1.0 H +13.0 H +6.0 H +5.0 H +10.5 H +14.0 H +13.0 H +12.0 H +8.5 H +8.0 H

Central +9.0 H +8.0 H +9.0 H +2.0 H +18.0 H +8.0 H +7.0 H +3.0 H +3.0 H -4.0 H +7.0 H +6.0 H +10.0 H +7.0 H +6.0 H +7.0 H +8.0 H +3.0 H +2.0 H +2.0 H +16.0 H +0.0 H +6.0 H +6.0 H +3.0 H +1.0 H +0.0 H +14.0 H +7.0 H +6.0 H +11.5 H +15.0 H +14.0 H +13.0 H +9.5 H +9.0 H

Mountain +10.0 H +9.0 H +10.0 H +3.0 H +19.0 H +9.0 H +8.0 H +4.0 H +4.0 H -3.0 H +8.0 H +7.0 H +11.0 H +8.0 H +7.0 H +8.0 H +9.0 H +4.0 H +3.0 H +3.0 H +17.0 H +1.0 H +7.0 H +7.0 H +4.0 H +2.0 H +1.0 H +15.0 H +8.0 H +7.0 H +12.5 H +16.0 H +15.0 H +14.0 H +10.5 H +10.0 H

Pacific +11.0 H +10.0 H +11.0 H +4.0 H +20.0 H +10.0 H +9.0 H +5.0 H +5.0 H -2.0 H +9.0 H +8.0 H +12.0 H +9.0 H +8.0 H +9.0 H +10.0 H +5.0 H +4.0 H +4.0 H +18.0 H +2.0 H +8.0 H +8.0 H +5.0 H +3.0 H +2.0 H +16.0 H +9.0 H +8.0 H +13.5 H +17.0 H +16.0 H +15.0 H +11.5 H +11.0 H

C-4

Country Ireland Israel Italy Jamaica Japan Kazakhstan Kenya Kiribati Korea, North Korea, South Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Laos Latvia Lebanon Lesotho Liberia Libya Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Macedonia Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Maldives Mali Republic Malta Marshall Islands Mauritania Mauritius Mayotte Mexico East Mexico Central Mexico West Moldova

UTC +0.0 H +2.0 H +1.0 H -5.0 H +9.0 H +6.0 H +3.0 H +12.0 H +9.0 H +9.0 H +3.0 H +5.0 H +7.0 H +2.0 H +2.0 H +2.0 H +0.0 H +2.0 H +1.0 H +2.0 H +1.0 H +1.0 H +3.0 H +2.0 H +8.0 H +5.0 H +0.0 H +1.0 H +12.0 H +0.0 H +4.0 H +3.0 H -5.0 H -6.0 H -7.0 H +2.0 H

Eastern +5.0 H +7.0 H +6.0 H +0.0 H +14.0 H +11.0 H +8.0 H +17.0 H +14.0 H +14.0 H +8.0 H +10.0 H +12.0 H +7.0 H +7.0 H +7.0 H +5.0 H +7.0 H +6.0 H +7.0 H +6.0 H +6.0 H +8.0 H +7.0 H +13.0 H +10.0 H +5.0 H +6.0 H +17.0 H +5.0 H +9.0 H +8.0 H +0.0 H -1.0 H -2.0 H +7.0 H

Central +6.0 H +8.0 H +7.0 H +1.0 H +15.0 H +12.0 H +9.0 H +18.0 H +15.0 H +15.0 H +9.0 H +11.0 H +13.0 H +8.0 H +8.0 H +8.0 H +6.0 H +8.0 H +7.0 H +8.0 H +7.0 H +7.0 H +9.0 H +8.0 H +14.0 H +11.0 H +6.0 H +7.0 H +18.0 H +6.0 H +10.0 H +9.0 H +1.0 H +0.0 H -1.0 H +8.0 H

Mountain +7.0 H +9.0 H +8.0 H +2.0 H +16.0 H +13.0 H +10.0 H +19.0 H +16.0 H +16.0 H +10.0 H +12.0 H +14.0 H +9.0 H +9.0 H +9.0 H +7.0 H +9.0 H +8.0 H +9.0 H +8.0 H +8.0 H +10.0 H +9.0 H +15.0 H +12.0 H +7.0 H +8.0 H +19.0 H +7.0 H +11.0 H +10.0 H +2.0 H +1.0 H +0.0 H +9.0 H

Pacific +8.0 H +10.0 H +9.0 H +3.0 H +17.0 H +14.0 H +11.0 H +20.0 H +17.0 H +17.0 H +11.0 H +13.0 H +15.0 H +10.0 H +10.0 H +10.0 H +8.0 H +10.0 H +9.0 H +10.0 H +9.0 H +9.0 H +11.0 H +10.0 H +16.0 H +13.0 H +8.0 H +9.0 H +20.0 H +8.0 H +12.0 H +11.0 H +3.0 H +2.0 H +1.0 H +10.0 H

C-5

Country Monaco Mongolia Morocco Mozambique Myanmar (Burma) Namibia Nauru Nepal Netherlands Netherlands Antilles New Caledonia New Zealand Newfoundland Nicaragua Nigeria Niger Republic Norfolk Island Norway Oman Pakistan Palau Panama, Rep. of Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Puerto Rico Qatar Reunion Island Romania Russia West Russia Central 1 Russia Central 2 Russia East

UTC +1.0 H +8.0 H +0.0 H +2.0 H +6.5 H +1.0 H +12.0 H +5.5 H +1.0 H -4.0 H +11.0 H +12.0 H -3.5 H -6.0 H +1.0 H +1.0 H +11.5 H +1.0 H +4.0 H +5.0 H +9.0 H -5.0 H +10.0 H -4.0 H -5.0 H +8.0 H +1.0 H +1.0 H -4.0 H +3.0 H +4.0 H +2.0 H +2.0 H +4.0 H +7.0 H +11.0 H

Eastern +6.0 H +13.0 H +5.0 H +7.0 H +11.5 H +6.0 H +17.0 H +10.5 H +6.0 H +1.0 H +16.0 H +17.0 H +1.5 H -1.0 H +6.0 H +6.0 H +16.5 H +6.0 H +9.0 H +10.0 H +14.0 H +0.0 H +15.0 H +1.0 H +0.0 H +13.0 H +6.0 H +6.0 H +1.0 H +8.0 H +9.0 H +7.0 H +7.0 H +9.0 H +12.0 H +16.0 H

Central +7.0 H +14.0 H +6.0 H +8.0 H +12.5 H +7.0 H +18.0 H +11.5 H +7.0 H +2.0 H +17.0 H +18.0 H +2.5 H +0.0 H +7.0 H +7.0 H +17.5 H +7.0 H +10.0 H +11.0 H +15.0 H +1.0 H +16.0 H +2.0 H +1.0 H +14.0 H +7.0 H +7.0 H +2.0 H +9.0 H +10.0 H +8.0 H +8.0 H +10.0 H +13.0 H +17.0 H

Mountain +8.0 H +15.0 H +7.0 H +9.0 H +13.5 H +8.0 H +19.0 H +12.5 H +8.0 H +3.0 H +18.0 H +19.0 H +3.5 H +1.0 H +8.0 H +8.0 H +18.5 H +8.0 H +11.0 H +12.0 H +16.0 H +2.0 H +17.0 H +3.0 H +2.0 H +15.0 H +8.0 H +8.0 H +3.0 H +10.0 H +11.0 H +9.0 H +9.0 H +11.0 H +14.0 H +18.0 H

Pacific +9.0 H +16.0 H +8.0 H +10.0 H +14.5 H +9.0 H +20.0 H +13.5 H +9.0 H +4.0 H +19.0 H +20.0 H +4.5 H +2.0 H +9.0 H +9.0 H +19.5 H +9.0 H +12.0 H +13.0 H +17.0 H +3.0 H +18.0 H +4.0 H +3.0 H +16.0 H +9.0 H +9.0 H +4.0 H +11.0 H +12.0 H +10.0 H +10.0 H +12.0 H +15.0 H +19.0 H

C-6

Country Rwanda Saba Samoa San Marino Sao Tome Saudi Arabia Senegal Seychelles Islands Sierra Leone Singapore Slovakia Slovenia Solomon Islands Somalia South Africa Spain Sri Lanka St. Lucia St. Maarteen St. Pierre & Miquelon St. Thomas St. Vincent Sudan Suriname Swaziland Sweden Switzerland Syria Taiwan Tajikistan Tanzania Thailand Togo Tonga Islands Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia

UTC +2.0 H -4.0 H -11.0 H +1.0 H +0.0 H +3.0 H +0.0 H +4.0 H +0.0 H +8.0 H +1.0 H +1.0 H +11.0 H +3.0 H +2.0 H +1.0 H +5.5 H -4.0 H -4.0 H -3.0 H -4.0 H -4.0 H +2.0 H -3.0 H +2.0 H +1.0 H +1.0 H +2.0 H +8.0 H +6.0 H +3.0 H +7.0 H +0.0 H +13.0 H -4.0 H +1.0 H

Eastern +7.0 H +1.0 H -6.0 H +6.0 H +5.0 H +8.0 H +5.0 H +9.0 H +5.0 H +13.0 H +6.0 H +6.0 H +16.0 H +8.0 H +7.0 H +6.0 H +10.5 H +1.0 H +1.0 H +2.0 H +1.0 H +1.0 H +7.0 H +2.0 H +7.0 H +6.0 H +6.0 H +7.0 H +13.0 H +11.0 H +8.0 H +12.0 H +5.0 H +18.0 H +1.0 H +6.0 H

Central +8.0 H +2.0 H -5.0 H +7.0 H +6.0 H +9.0 H +6.0 H +10.0 H +6.0 H +14.0 H +7.0 H +7.0 H +17.0 H +9.0 H +8.0 H +7.0 H +11.5 H +2.0 H +2.0 H +3.0 H +2.0 H +2.0 H +8.0 H +3.0 H +8.0 H +7.0 H +7.0 H +8.0 H +14.0 H +12.0 H +9.0 H +13.0 H +6.0 H +19.0 H +2.0 H +7.0 H

Mountain +9.0 H +3.0 H -4.0 H +8.0 H +7.0 H +10.0 H +7.0 H +11.0 H +7.0 H +15.0 H +8.0 H +8.0 H +18.0 H +10.0 H +9.0 H +8.0 H +12.5 H +3.0 H +3.0 H +4.0 H +3.0 H +3.0 H +9.0 H +4.0 H +9.0 H +8.0 H +8.0 H +9.0 H +15.0 H +13.0 H +10.0 H +14.0 H +7.0 H +20.0 H +3.0 H +8.0 H

Pacific +10.0 H +4.0 H -3.0 H +9.0 H +8.0 H +11.0 H +8.0 H +12.0 H +8.0 H +16.0 H +9.0 H +9.0 H +19.0 H +11.0 H +10.0 H +9.0 H +13.5 H +4.0 H +4.0 H +5.0 H +4.0 H +4.0 H +10.0 H +5.0 H +10.0 H +9.0 H +9.0 H +10.0 H +16.0 H +14.0 H +11.0 H +15.0 H +8.0 H +21.0 H +4.0 H +9.0 H

C-7

Country Turkey Turkmenistan Turks and Caicos Tuvalu Uganda Ukraine United Arab Emirates United Kingdom Uruguay USA Eastern USA Central USA Mountain USA Western USA Alaska USA Hawaii Uzbekistan Vanuatu Vatican City Venezuela Vietnam Wallis & Futuna Islands Yemen Yugoslavia Zaire Zambia Zimbabwe

UTC +2.0 H +5.0 H -5.0 H +12.0 H +3.0 H +2.0 H +4.0 H +0.0 H -3.0 H -5.0 H -6.0 H -7.0 H -8.0 H -9.0 H -10.0 H +5.0 H +11.0 H +1.0 H -4.0 H +7.0 H +12.0 H +3.0 H +1.0 H +2.0 H +2.0 H +2.0 H

Eastern +7.0 H +10.0 H +0.0 H +17.0 H +8.0 H +7.0 H +9.0 H +5.0 H +2.0 H +0.0 H -1.0 H -2.0 H -3.0 H -4.0 H -5.0 H +10.0 H +16.0 H +6.0 H +1.0 H +12.0 H +17.0 H +8.0 H +6.0 H +7.0 H +7.0 H +7.0 H

Central +8.0 H +11.0 H +1.0 H +18.0 H +9.0 H +8.0 H +10.0 H +6.0 H +3.0 H +1.0 H +0.0 H -1.0 H -2.0 H -3.0 H -4.0 H +11.0 H +17.0 H +7.0 H +2.0 H +13.0 H +18.0 H +9.0 H +7.0 H +8.0 H +8.0 H +8.0 H

Mountain +9.0 H +12.0 H +2.0 H +19.0 H +10.0 H +9.0 H +11.0 H +7.0 H +4.0 H +2.0 H +1.0 H +0.0 H -1.0 H -2.0 H -3.0 H +12.0 H +18.0 H +8.0 H +3.0 H +14.0 H +19.0 H +10.0 H +8.0 H +9.0 H +9.0 H +9.0 H

Pacific +10.0 H +13.0 H +3.0 H +20.0 H +11.0 H +10.0 H +12.0 H +8.0 H +5.0 H +3.0 H +2.0 H +1.0 H +0.0 H -1.0 H -2.0 H +13.0 H +19.0 H +9.0 H +4.0 H +15.0 H +20.0 H +11.0 H +9.0 H +10.0 H +10.0 H +10.0 H

C-8

APPENDIX D: Conversion Charts


When You Know Units of Length Millimeters Centimeters Meters Meters Kilometers Inches Inches Feet Yards Miles Units of Area Sq. Centimeters Sq. Meters Sq. Kilometers Hectares Sq. Inches Sq. Feet Sq. Yards Sq. Miles Acres Units of Mass and Weight Grams Kilograms Tons (100kg) Ounces Pounds Short Tons 0.035 2.21 1.10 28.35 0.45 2.12 D-1 Ounces Pounds Short Tons Grams Kilograms Tons 0.16 1.20 0.39 2.47 6.45 0.09 0.84 2.60 0.40 Sq. Inches Sq. Yards Sq. Miles Acres Sq. Cm Sq. Meters Sq. Meters Sq. Km Hectares

Multiply by 0.04 0.39 3.28 1.09 0.62 25.40 2.54 30.48 0.91 1.61

To find Inches Inches Feet Yards Miles Millimeters Centimeters Centimeters Meters Kilometers

Units of Volume Milliliters Milliliters Milliliters Liters Liters Liters Liters Cubic Meters Cubic Meters Teaspoons Tablespoons Fluid Ounces Cups Pints Quarts Gallons Cubic Feet Cubic Yards Units of Speed Miles per Hour Km per Hour

Multiply by 0.20 0.06 0.03 4.23 2.12 1.06 0.26 35.32 1.35 4.93 14.78 29.57 0.24 0.47 0.95 3.79 0.03 0.76

To find Teaspoons Tablespoons Fluid Ounces Cups Pints Quarts Gallons Cubic Feet Cubic Yards Milliliters Milliliters Milliliters Liters Liters Liters Liters Cubic Meters Cubic Meters

1.61 0.62

Km per Hour Miles per Hour

D-2

Temperature To convert Celsius into degrees Fahrenheit, multiply Celsius by 1.8 and add 32. To convert degrees Fahrenheit to Celsius, subtract 32 and divide by 1.8.
Celsius
oC 100

Fahrenheit
oF 212 105 98.6 90

Heat Wave

Boiling Point of Water


Normal Body Temperature

40 36.9 35

A Hot Summer Day

30 80 25 70 20 60 15

A Mild Spring Day

A Warm Winter Day

10 5 0 5 10

50 40 32 30 20 10

Freezing Point of Water

15 20 0

Temperature Chart D-3

Currency Conversion Chart


Rate 1 I R 2 A Q 3 4 D 5 I 6 N A 7 R 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Rate U $1 S $2 D $3 O $4 L $5 L $6 A R $7 $8 $9 $10 $11 $12 $13 $14 $15 $16 $17 $18 3.217 $0.31 $0.62 $0.93 $1.24 $1.55 $1.87 $2.18 $2.49 $2.80 $3.11 $3.42 $3.73 $4.04 $4.35 $4.66 $4.97 $5.28 $5.60 Currency Conversion: MIDDLE EAST CURRENCY to U.S. DOLLAR Rate 3.745 Rate Rate 3.745 Rate 0.299 3.217 Rate $5.91 S 19 $5.07 K 19 S 1 $0.27 K 1 $3.34 I 19 A 2 $0.53 U 2 $6.69 R 20 $6.22 A 20 $5.34 U 20 A U W U W $7.77 D 25 $6.68 A 25 D 3 $0.80 A 3 $10.03 Q 25 4 $1.07 I 4 $13.38 $9.33 I 30 $8.01 I 30 30 I 35 $9.35 T 35 5 $1.34 T 5 $16.72 D 35 $10.88 I 40 $12.43 A 40 $10.68 A 6 $1.60 6 $20.07 40 N R D R D A 7 $1.87 I 7 $23.41 A 45 $13.99 A 45 $12.02 I 45 B 8 $2.14 N 8 $26.76 R 50 $15.54 B 50 $13.35 N 50 I 9 $2.40 A 9 $30.10 60 $18.65 I 60 $16.02 A 60 A R A R 70 $18.69 10 $2.67 10 $33.44 70 70 $21.76 11 $2.94 11 $36.79 80 80 $24.87 R 80 $21.36 R I 12 $3.20 12 $40.13 90 90 $27.98 I 90 $24.03 Y 13 $3.47 13 $43.48 100 $31.09 Y 100 $26.70 100 A A 14 $46.82 200 $62.17 L 200 $53.40 200 L 14 $3.74 300 $80.11 300 15 $4.01 15 $50.17 300 $93.26 400 $106.81 400 16 $4.27 16 $53.51 400 $124.34 500 $133.51 500 17 $4.54 17 $56.86 500 $155.43 18 $4.81 18 $60.20 1000 $310.86 1000 $267.02 1000 Currency Conversion: U.S. DOLLAR to MIDDLE EAST CURRENCY Rate 3.217 3.745 3.217 3.745 0.299 71.15 K 61.12 S 0.30 3.74 K 3.22 S U $19 I S $20 R 74.90 U 64.34 A 0.60 7.49 U 6.43 A U W A U W 93.62 A 80.42 D 0.90 9.65 D 11.23 A $25 Q D 112.35 I 96.51 I 1.20 O $30 14.98 12.87 I I L $35 D 112.59 A 131.07 T 1.49 18.72 T 16.08 A 22.47 I R 149.80 L $40 128.68 1.79 19.30 R D N A D A 2.09 22.52 A 26.22 I R $45 A 144.76 B 168.52 I 187.25 N 2.39 25.74 B 29.96 N $50 R 160.85 I I 193.01 A 224.70 A 2.69 33.70 A 28.95 $60 A R R R 262.15 225.18 I 2.99 37.45 32.17 $70 257.35 Y 299.60 3.29 35.39 R 41.19 $80 I 289.52 A 337.05 3.59 44.94 38.60 $90 321.69 L 374.50 3.89 41.82 Y 48.68 $100 A 749.00 643.38 4.19 45.04 L 52.43 $200 1123.50 965.07 4.48 56.17 48.25 $300 1498.00 1286.76 4.78 59.92 51.47 $400 1872.50 1608.45 5.08 63.66 54.69 $500 3745.00 3216.90 5.38 67.41 57.90 $1000 0.299 $63.55 $66.89 $83.61 $100.33 $117.06 $133.78 $150.50 $167.22 $200.67 $234.11 $267.56 $301.00 $334.45 $668.90 $1003.34 $1337.79 $1672.24 $3344.48 0.299 5.68 5.98 7.47 8.97 10.46 11.96 13.45 14.95 17.94 20.93 23.92 26.91 29.90 59.80 89.70 119.60 149.50 299.00

I R A Q D I N A R

D-4

Travel Distances in Middle East


J E R U S A L E M

Distances in Miles

A M M A N

B A G H D A D

C A I R O

D A M A S C U S

D H A H R A N

J I D D A H

J U B A I L

M A N A M A

M E C C A

M E D I N A

N A J R A N

R I Y A D H

S A N A A

T A B U K

T E H R A N

AMMAN, Jordan BAGHDAD, Iraq CAIRO, Egypt DAMASCUS, Syria


500

500 307 110 943

46 744 894 966 760 558 1121 839 1256 251 929

807 469 596 545 876 541 614 865 677 1092 627 1239 577 439 384 1179 263 763 1134 1203 792 639 1185 1022 1300 338 1240 968 138 844 916 993 857 653 1207 888 1343 355 878 981 769 59 26 734 673 714 243 846 847 658

307 807 110 469 384

DHAHRAN, Saudi Arabia 943 596 1179 968 JERUSALEM, Israel JIDDAH, Saudi Arabia JUBAIL, Saudi Arabia MANAMA, Bahrain MECCA, Saudi Arabia MEDINA, Saudi Arabia NAJRAN, Saudi Arabia RIYADH, Saudi Arabia SANAA, Yemen TABUK, Saudi Arabia TEHRAN, Iran
46 545 263 138 981

746 932 1003 763 570 1133 866 1265 250 973 763 793 43 208 428 532 537 500 1234

744 876 763 844 769 746 894 541 1134 916 966 614 1203 993 59 932 763 26 1003 793

76 731 649 742 247 877 809 613 76 756 696 728 261 853 875 655 208 395 492 508 520 1214 561 451 694 330 1056 512 149 892 1333 653 689 821 1022 1472 1012

760 865 792 857 734 763

43 731 756

558 677 639 653 673 570 208 649 696 208 1121 1092 1185 1207 714 1133 428 742 728 395 561

839 627 1022 888 243 866 532 247 261 492 451 512 1256 1239 1300 1343 846 1265 537 877 853 508 694 149 653

251 577 338 355 847 250 500 809 875 520 330 892 689 1022 929 439 1240 878 658 973 1234 613 655 1214 1056 1333 821 1472 1012

D-5

Travel Distances in Iraq


A S S U L A Y M A N I Y A H

Distances in Miles

A L B A S R A H

A L H I L L A H A L K U T

A L R A M A D I A M A R A

B A G H D A D

I R B I L

K A R B A L A

K I R K U K

M O S U L

N A J A F

N A S I R I Y A H

S A M A R R A H

AL BASRAH, Iraq ALHILLAH, Iraq AL KUT, Iraq AL RAMADI, Iraq AMARA, Iraq
243 182 334

243 182 334 102 376 282 451 371 397 486 231 100 345 82 82 92 161 91 251 92 167 220 161 59 257 142 205 276 35 148 123 95 104 163 63

91 212 103 275 224 221 307 251 191 64 195

99 154 202 117 241

102 167

275 193 350 307 297 388 168 165 91 289

78 252

AS SULAYMANIYAH, Iraq 376 220 212 191 275 BAGHDAD, Iraq IRBIL, Iraq KARBALA, Iraq KIRKUK, Iraq MOSUL, Iraq NAJAF, Iraq NASIRIYAH, Iraq SAMARRAH, Iraq
282 59 103 64 193 165

60 141 255 316 130 94 194 67

198 150 147 220 279 54

451 257 275 195 350 371 142 224

91 198

51 291 379 137

99 307 289 150 279 60 147 54 247 51 272

247 272 141 271 160 94 241 325 94 93

397 205 221 154 297

486 276 307 202 388 141 220 231 35 95 117 168 255

309 409 154 132 156 260

94 291 141 241 309

100 148 104 241 345 123 163

78 316 194 379 271 325 409 132 67 137 160 93 154 156 260

63 252 130

D-6

APPENDIX E: Holidays
Public/National Holidays
1 6 8 21 17 1 14 17 8 January January February March April May July July August New Years Day Army Day (1921) 8th of February Revolution Spring Day Liberation Day Labor Day July Revolution National Day Victory Day

Religious Holidays
There are several religious holidays celebrated by Muslims. These holidays are based on the lunar calendar, so the actual day of celebration may vary. They includethe following:

Muharram
The first of this month marks the Islamic new year. It is the anniversary of Mohammeds Hajra from Mecca to Medina.

Yom Ashoora
The tenth of Muharram began a fast that lasted 24 hours. Called ashoora, meaning tenth, this holy day at the beginning of the Prophets mission coincided with Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement in Judaism. For Shiites, ashoora is much more significant. It is the anniversary of the martyrdom of Hussein, the son of Ali, and Mohammeds grandson. This is the most important Shia holiday and is commemorated by the E-1

passion plays reenacting Husseins betrayal and murder, as well as by processions of Shia men who engage in self-flagellation as atonement for sin. These festivities are viewed with great suspicion by the ruling Sunni families in the Gulf; however, they are permitted in Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE. While not necessarily dangerous, non-Muslims would do well to avoid Shia celebrations of ashoors.

Leilat al-Meiraj
This day occurs in the month of Rajab and commemorates the Ascension of the Prophet Mohammed to heaven and his return to Medina.

Eid al-Fitr
The feast occurs at the end of the fast of Ramadan or the 1st day of the month of Shawwal and lasts 3 days. This holiday is also known as Eid al-Sagheer (the small eid).

Eid al-Adha
Also known as Eid al-Kabeer (the big eid) or the Day of the Sacrifice, this feast begins on the 10th of Dhu al-Hijjah and lasts 3 days. It commemorates Abrahams attempt to sacrifice his son.

Mouloud
This day celebrates the birth of the Prophet Mohammed on the 12th of Rabi I. The year of his birth is disputed, but was about 50 years before the Hijra, approximately A.D. 570. The birth of Mohammeds son, Hussein, is also celebrated during the month of Rabi II.

Islamic Calendar
The Islamic calendar is computed from the Hajra (or the flight of Mohammed from Mecca to Medina) and often designated with the letters A.H. (for Anno Hegirae). The calendar is lunar and consists of 354 days-11 days shorter than the solar year of 365 days. Leap years occur E-2

every 2 or 3 years. The following Western dates indicate the beginning of contemporary Islamic years:
Islamic Date 1422 1423 1424 1425 1426 Western Date 26 March 2001 15 March 2002 4 March 2003 22 February 2004 10 February 2005 Islamic Date 1427 1428 1429 1430 Western Date 31 January 2006 21January 2007 10 January 2008 29 December 2008

The calendar months begin with the first crescent of the new moon and alternately contain 30 or 29 days and are named as follows:
I I I I

Muharram Safar Rabi I Rabi II

I I I I

Jumada I Jumada II Rajab Shaban

I I I I

Ramadan Shawwal Dhu al-Qada Dhu al-Hijjah

The Islamic calendar has 7-day weeks; begining with Sunday, Yowm alAhed, which means the first day. Yowm al-Sabt means the seventh day. Yowm al-Jumah, or the day of gathering, is the day Muslims gather for the larger prayer sessions. The name originated through Arabic tradition when Fridays were days people would bring their goods to the local market and catch up on local gossip and politics. It is equivalent to the Jewish Sabbath or Christian Sunday. The workweek runs from Saturday through Wednesday. Thursday and Friday are the weekend. The Islamic day lasts from sundown to sundown.
Islamic Day Yowm al-Ahed Yowm al-Ithnayn Yowm al-Thulaatha Yowm al-Arbaa Western Day Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Islamic Day Yowm al-Khamiys Yowm al-Jumaa Yowm as-Sabt Western Day Thursday Friday Saturday

E-3

APPENDIX F: Language
Arabic Language Guide
Arabic is considered to be the language of Allah. The Koran is written in Arabic, as is some of the worlds finest poetry. It is the official language of Iraq and Kuwait, and is spoken by over 197 million persons worldwide. English is widely spoken in official and business circles in Kuwait, less so in Iraq. Kurdish, Assyrian, and Armenian are also spoken in Iraq. The Arabic alphabet is written from right to left, but numerals are written from left to right. There are 28 characters, all of which are consonants, and 10 numerals. Vowels are unwritten, although three markers are used to ensure proper pronunciation. While there is no capitalization in Arabic, each letter has a different form depending on where it falls in the word at the beginning, the middle, the end, or standing alone. Arabic is a semitic language; its structure and grammar are different from English. Words are formed from roots by changing the vowels between the consonants that usually begin and end the word. For example, the word for book is Ketab and the word for library is Maktabah.

F-1

Arabic Alphabet/Numerals
theh teh beh alif

dal

kha

ha

jeem

seen

zain

ra

thai

tah

dhad

sad

sheen

feh

ghain

ain

zah

meem

lam

kaf

qaf

yeh

waw

heh

noon

F-2

Key Phrases
(Capital letters indicate stress and apostrophe indicates a stop.) English Hello. Please? Thank you. Yes. No. What? When? Where? Which? Who? Why? How much/many? How are you? I am fine, thank you. Good morning. Good morning. (reply) Good evening. Good evening. (reply) Good night. Welcome. Praise God. Excuse me. What is this? This is mine. This is not mine. What does this mean? Do you speak English? I am an American. I understand. I dont understand. Arabic MARhaban men FADlek SHUKran naam la maa mata AYNa aiya man liMAZa kaam Kayfu HALukum? Anna KWAIsa, SHUKran soBAH alKHAIR soBAH alNOOR meSAH alKHAIR meSAH alNOOR layla SAIDa AHlen wa SAHlen alHUMDallah AFwaan Ma HAZa HAZa li HAZa LAISa li Ma MANa HAZa hal tetaKALum enGLIzi anna amRIKi anna AFhaam anna la AFhaam F-3

English Can you help me? Im hungry. Im tired. Im lost. No smoking.

Arabic MOOMkin tiSAADni anna gaANna anna taaBAAN anna toht memNOOR aTADkhin

Key Words
English American Embassy arm (body) bandage beach big blanket book boots bridge building coat cold correct early exit far fast first aid kit flashlight gloves gulf harbor hat head heavy Arabic siFAARa amriKIya ziRAA aasaaBI SHAti kaBIR bataNIya kiTAB boot KOObri MAABnaa MItaf barid saHIa moBAKir khaROOJ baaid saRI ALba tisaFAAT awaLIya bataRIya GAeb gowWANti khaLIJ miNA koBAa raas taGIL F-4

English highway hospital hot how hurry I insect repellent knife late leg light map market matches medicine mosque near new old open passport police radio river sea seacoast shoes shut slow small soap taxi the

Arabic taRIQ mosTASHfa harr kayf biSOORa anna daHAN dud alhashaRAT saKHIna mitAKHer saq khaFIF khaRITa sooq kaBRIT daWAA MASjed kaRIB jaDID kaDIM MOOFtah joWAZ aSAfar boLIZ RADio nahr BAhr shaTI alBAhr hiza maqFOOL bati saGIR saBOON takZI al F-5

English toilet tower watch we wrong you

Arabic TWAAlit borg saah NAHnu Galat anta

Military Vocabulary
English aircraft aircraft carrier air defense airfield ammunition amphibious antiair artillery antilanding defense antitank artillery army artillery aviation battalion battleship bomb camouflage cruise (ship) chemical weapon coastal defense corps destroyer (ship) division engineer garrison Arabic taaREH hamLEH ataaRAT deFA ataaRET maTAR zakhiREH bahrMAi madeFAIya dud ataaRET deFA alABrar madeFAIya dud alDABabat jaish madeFAIya tiRAN katiBEH baraaGEH KOONbaLEH tamooYEH toRAD saLAH kemeWIya deFA saHELi filg moDEMorah farqh moHANDis hamiEH F-6

English gun handgrenade headquarters helicopter howitzer infantry latitude longitude machine gun map military mine minefield mortar nuclear weapon platoon radar reconnaissance rifle submachine gun tactics tank topography torpedo weapon weather

Arabic maadFA KOONbaleh alyedeWIya kiYADH heliKOPter HOWwitzer moSHAat khat alARad khat aTOOL reSHASHa khaRITa oskeRIya allaGHAM haql allaGHAM haWEN saLAH atomiKIya fasiLEH raDAR estatLAH BOONdook raSHASHa kaSIRa takTIK daBABa toboograFIa toorBID saLAH aTUKS

Military Ranks
English Private First Class Corporal Sergeant Sergeant Major Arabic joondee awwal areef rakeeb rakeebawwal F-7

English Second Lieutenant First Lieutenant Captain Major Lieutenant Colonel Colonel Brigadier General

Arabic moolazim moolazim awwal nakeeb raaid mookaddam mookaddam ameed

Numbers
English One Two Three Four Five Six Seven Eight Nine Ten Arabic wahid thnayn thalatha arbaa khamsa sitta sabaa thmanya tisaa ashara English Eleven Twelve Thirteen Fourteen Fifteen Sixteen Seventeen Eighteen Nineteen Twenty Arabic ihdash thnash thalattash arbaatash khamastash sittash sabaatash thamantash tisaatash ishreen

F-8

APPENDIX G: International Road Signs

40
Crossroads Maximum speed No through road Road narrows

S TO P
Fallen/falling rock No entry for vehicular traffic Motorway Stop and give way

ON E W AY Low flying aircraft or sudden aircraft noise One way street

Tourist information

No left turn

Tourist information point

Traffic signals

No u-turn

Cable height 16 - 6

Overhead cables, Maximum height

Failure of traffic light signals

Sharp deviation

G-1

APPENDIX H: Arabic Road Signs

N o U turn

N o left turn

N o entry

N o right turn

M a xim u m load 10 tons

M a xim u m speed 60 kph.

M a xim u m height 4 m .

M a xim u m w idth 2 m .

P
N o stopping R oad closed Pa rkin g

P
N o parking

H ospital

N o honking

A nim a l-draw n vehicles prohibited

H andcarts p ro h ib ite d

H-1

First-aid post

Petrol

G arage

One w ay

level (railroad) crossing M axim um w ithout barrier w idth 3 m .

M axim um height 4 m .

Opening or sw ing bridge

D ip

U neven road

W inding road

S teep hill

S top at m ajor road ahead

S ide road

Location of level (railroad) crossing w ithou gate or barrier

H-2

APPENDIX A: Equipment Recognition


SMALL ARMS 7.62-mm Tokarev TT-33/Type 51

Effective Range Caliber System of Operation Overall Length Feed Device Weight

40 m 7.62 x 25-mm Recoil, semiautomatic 7.68 in. 8-round, in-line detachable magazine 1.88 lbs

NOTE: This weapon HAS NO SAFETY.

A-1

9-mm Makarov

Maximum Effective Range Caliber System of Operation Overall Length Feed Device Weight

40 m 9 x 18-mm Recoil, semiautomatic 6.34 in. 8-round, in-line detachable magazine 1.56 lbs

A-2

9-mm Beretta M1951 (TARIQ)

Maximum Effective Range Caliber System of Operation Overall Length Feed Device Weight

40 m 9 x 19-mm Recoil, semiautomatic 203 mm 8-rd detachable box magazine 870 g

A-3

9-mm FN 35 (Browning Hi Power)

Maximum Effective Range Caliber System of Operation Overall Length Magazine Capacity Weight (Loaded)

40m 9 x 19-mm Recoil, semiautomatic 200 mm 13-round, detachable box magazine 882 g

A-4

7.62-mm SKS/M-59

Maximum Effective Range Caliber System of Operation Overall Length Magazine Capacity Weight (Loaded)

400 m 7.62 x 39-mm Gas, semiautomatic 40.16 in. 10-round, staggered row, non-detachable box magazine 8.7 lbs

Using the SKS: (1) Set weapon on SAFE by turning the safety lever up as far as it will go. (2) Pull the operating handle, located on the right side of the receiver, to the rear [The bolt will lock in place]. (3) Insert one end of the 10-rd charger clip into the charger guide at the forward end of the bolt carrier. (4) Strip the rounds down into the magazine and remove empty charger clip. (5) Pull back on operating handle, the bolt will unlock and run forward chambering the first round. (6) Turn Safety down as far as it will go to FIRE. (7) WEAPON IS READY TO FIRE.

A-5

Field Stripping the SKS/M59

A-6

7.62-mm AK-47/AKM/Tabuk
TABUK FAZ with the grenade sight raised (sight folds back over gas tube when not in use). An AKM (Iraqi AK-47/AKMs can be converted to FAZ with the installation of a spigot grenade launcher); TABUK short version.

Maximum Effective Range Caliber System of Operation Overall Length Magazine Capacity Weight (Loaded)

400 m 7.62 x 39-mm Gas, selective-fire 34.25 in. 30-rd, staggered row detachable box magazine 8.7 lbs

Using the AK-47/AKM: (1) Insert the 30-rd magazine into the underside of the receiver, forward end first, then draw up the rear end of the magazine until a click is heard or until the magazine catch is felt to engage. (2) Pull the operating handle, located on the right side of the receiver, smartly to the rear and release it [the bolt will run home and chamber a round]. (3) Push the safety lever from the uppermost position: SAFE, to the middle position: AUTO or all the way down to SEMI. (4) WEAPON IS READY TO FIRE. NOTE: While the AK is a heavy weapon it climbs rapidly during automatic fire.

A-7

Field Stripping the AK-47/AKM/TABUK

A-8

Iraqi Rifle Grenades

M 60 AT HEAT

M 60 AP P1

M 62 Smoke/Illumination Each 10-man regular infantry section (equivalent to a US squad) is authorized one FAZ rifle. Mechanized infantry units are authorized two FAZ rifles per 8-man section. Commando units are authorized two FAZ rifles per 10-man section. These rifle grenades provide a multitude of capabilities to the individual rifleman similar to those of US forces provided by the 40-mm grenade family of ordnance. Filling the short-range void left by mortar systems, these grenades allow the engagement of armored targets, fortifications, transport vechicles and personnel.

A-9

Rifle Grenade Firing

Because of the tremendous recoil, the Iraqis are trained to fire rifle grenades with the butt of the weapon tucked under the arm rather than on the shoulder. This makes for an inherently less accurate system than the U.S. M203 grenade launcher. Iraqi grenadiers generally carry four grenades of various types plus the screw-on launcher and special blank cartridges with adapters in a specially-designed pouch. A-10

7.62-mm Dragunov SVD/Al-Kadissiya

Maximum Effective Range Caliber System of Operation Overall Length Magazine Capacity Weight (Loaded)

1300 m 7.62 x 54-mm Gas, semiautomatic 48.2 in. 10-rd, staggered row detachable box magazine 9.5 lbs

7.62-mm Tabuk Sniper Rifle

Maximum Effective Range Caliber System of Operation Overall Length Magazine Capacity Weight (Loaded)

800 m 7.62 x 39-mm Gas, semiautomatic 48.2 in. 10-rd, staggered row detachable box magazine 9.5 lbs

Using the Dragunov SVD/Al-Kadissiya or Tabuk Sniper Rifle: (1) Insert the 10-rd magazine into the underside of the receiver, forward end first, then draw up the rear end of the magazine until a click is heard or until the magazine cathc is felt to engage. (2) Pull the operating handle, located on the right side of the receiver, smartly to the rear and release it [the bolt will run home and chamber a round]. (3) Push the safety lever from the uppermost position: SAFE, or all the way down to SEMI. (4) WEAPON IS READY TO FIRE.

A-11

7.62-mm RPK/Al-Quds

Maximum Effective Range Caliber System of Operation Overall Length Magazine Capacity Weight (Loaded)

800 m 7.62 x 39-mm Gas, selective fire 48.2 in. 40-rd, staggered row detachable box magazine or 75rd drum magazine. Can also use 30-rd AK magazine. 1.13 kg (40-rd box) 2.1 kg (75-rd drum)

Using the RPK: (1) Insert the 30-, 40-, or 75-rd magazine or drum into the underside of the receiver, forward end first, then draw up the rear end of the magazine until a click is heard or until the magazine catch is felt to engage. (2) Pull the operating handle, located on the right side of the receiver, smartly to the rear and release it [the bolt will run home and chamber a round]. (3) Push the safety lever from the uppermost position: SAFE, to the middle position: AUTO or all the way down to SEMI. (4) WEAPON IS READY TO FIRE. Bottom image is al-Quds LMG.

A-12

7.62-mm RPD

Maximum Effective Range Caliber System of Operation Overall Length Magazine Capacity Weight

800 m 7.62 x 39-mm Gas, automatic 40.8 in. 100-rd metallic link belt in drum 15.6 lbs

Using the RPD: (1) Fit the drum by sliding its top dovetail to mating surfaces under receiver. (2) Pull operating handle to the rear [Older models will remain in place, on newer models the handle should be pushed forward after cocking]. (3) Open cover by pushing forward on cover latch and lifiting cover. (4) Lay belt on feedway so lead round lies beside cartridge stop. WEAPON IS READY TO FIRE Note: Safety is on the right side of the pistol grip: Forward SAFE...Rear FIRE

A-13

7.62-mm PK

Maximum Effective Range Caliber System of Operation Overall Length Magazine Capacity Weight

800 m 7.62 x 54-mm Gas, automatic 47.2 in. 100, 200, or 250-rd metallic link belt 19.8 lbs

Using the PK: (1) Open cover by pressing catch at top rear of cover. (2) Lay Belt in feedway, first round flush against cartridge stop. (3) Close cover, pull operating handle to rear. WEAPON IS NOW READY TO FIRE. Note: Safety located on receiver at rear of trigger.

A-14

12.7-mm DShK-38/Model 38/46

Maximum Effective Range System of Operation Overall Length Magazine Capacity Weight w/Mount

1,000 m Gas, automatic 62.5 in 50-rd metallic link belt 259 lbs

Using the DShK: (1) Push forward feed latch located at top rear of feed cover and lift cover. (2) Place belt on revolving block so first round can be put in the upper recess of feed block. (3) Hold free end of belt w/right hand and press feed belt against revolving block. (3) Rapidly rotate block w/belt as far to the right as possible. (4) Close cover, Pull operating handle to rear until slide is engaged. WEAPON IS READY TO FIRE. (5) Hold both spade grips and depress trigger.

A-15

GRENADES, MORTARS, AND MINES RPG-7

Maximum Effective Range Caliber Overall Length

330 m (moving targets) 500 m (stationary targets) 40-mm (launcher diameter) 85-mm (grenade) 1.1 m

Using the RPG: (1) Insert grenade tail first into the muzzle of the launcher [Ensure that the small projection mates with the muzzle to line up the percussion cap with the hammer] (2) Remove nosecap, pull safety pin. RPG IS READY TO FIRE (3) Place launcher over shoulder, sight target, squeeze trigger. WARNING: ENSURE BACKBLAST AREA CLEAR.

A-16

Al-Jaleel (M70) 60-mm Commando Mortar

Maximum Range Rate of Fire Combat Weight

2,540 m. 20-25 rds/min. 7.6 kg.

A-17

Iraqi Hand Grenades

RG-42 Fragmentation Grenade

F-1 Fragmentation Grenade

RGD-5 Fragmentation Grenade

RGO-78 Fragmentation Grenade

RKG-3 Antitank Grenade A-18

No. 2 Offensive Grenade

Iraqi Mines
Iraq is known to have a vast arsenal of mines. Many of these have delay, anti-handling or otherwise sensitives fuses. IF MINES ARE ENCOUNTERED; MARK THE AREA, MOVE AROUND AND CONTACT EOD OR COMBAT ENGINEERS. DO NOT ATTEMPT TO DISARM OR REMOVE!

Type 72 AP Mine

Valmara 69 AP Mine

TM-62M AT Mine

TMN-46M AT Mine VS-50 AP Mine

A-19

Other Explosive Ordinance Hazards


There is a possibility for personnel to encounter live, unexploded ordinance while in the Iraq area of operations. THIS ORDNANCE IS LIVE AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS! UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD PERSONNEL TAMPER WITH OR DISTURB IT. MARK THE ITEM, MOVE AROUND IT, AND CONTACT EOD OR COMBAT ENGINEERS.

Mark 118 Bomblet BLU-91/B Landmine

BLU-97/B Bomblet

BLU-43/B Dragons Tooth Mine

A-20

AT-4 SPIGOT

Type Maximum Range Launch Weight Armor Penetration

Wire-guided SACLOS 70 - 2,000 m (9M111) 70 - 2,500 m (9M111-2) 12.5 kg 400 mm (9M111) 460 mm (9M111-2)

A-21

120-mm Al-Jaleel Mortar

Maximum Range Rate of Fire Combat Weight

5,400 m 5-8 rds/min 148 kg (firing position)

A-22

82-mm Al-Jaleel Mortar

Maximum Range Rate of Fire Combat Weight

4,900 m 20-25 rds/min 63 kg (firing position)

A-23

AIR DEFENSE 14.5-mm ZPU-4 (Quad)

Crew Maximum Range Tactical AA Range Rate of Fire (Per Barrel) Combat Weight Length Width Height

5 8,000 m (horizontal) 5,000 m (vertical) 1,400 m 550 - 600 rds/min 1,810 kg 4.53 m 1.72 m 2.13 m

A-24

23-mm ZU-23

Crew Maximum Range Tactical AA Range Rate of Fire (Per Barrel) Combat Weight Length Width Height

5 8,000 m (horizontal) 5,000 m (vertical) 2,500 m 800-1,000 rds/min 950 kg 4.57 m 1.83 m 1.87 m

A-25

SA-7 GRAIL

Crew Maximum Range Combat Weight Length

1 3,200 m 9.15 kg 1.49 m

SA-14 GREMLIN

Guidance Maximum Range Combat Weight Length

Passive IR homing FM tracking logic seeker 2,000 m (approaching jet) 4,500 m (approaching prop A/C or Helicopter) 16 kg 1.5 m

A-26

SA-16

Guidance Maximum Range Combat Weight Length

Passive IR homing Fm tracking logic seeker 4,500 m (approaching target) 5,200 m (receding target) 16.65 kg 1.7 m

A-27

APPENDIX J: Individual Protective Measures


Security Threats
Individual protective measures are the conscious actions which people take to guard themselves against physical harm. These measures can involve simple acts such as locking your car and avoiding areas where crime is rampant. When physical protection measures are combined they form a personal security program, the object of which is to make yourself a harder target. The following checklists contain basic individual protective measures that, if understood and followed, may significantly reduce your vulnerability to the security threats overseas (foreign intelligence, security services, and terrorist organizations). If you are detained or taken hostage, following the measures listed in these checklists may influence or improve your treatment.

Foreign Intelligence and Security Services


I I I

Avoid any actions or activities that are illegal, improper, or indiscreet. Guard your conversation and keep sensitive papers in your custody at all times. Take it for granted that you are under surveillance by both technical and physical means, including: Communications monitoring (telephone, telex, mail, and radio) Photography Search Eavesdropping in hotels, offices, and apartments Do not discuss sensitive matters: On the telephone In your room In a car, particularly in front of an assigned driver

J-1

Do not leave sensitive personal or business papers:


In your room In the hotel safe In a locked suitcase or briefcase In unattended cars, offices, trains, or planes Open to photography from the ceiling In wastebaskets as drafts or doodles

Do not try to defeat surveillance by trying to slip away from followers or by trying to locate bugs in your room. These actions will only generate more interest in you. If you feel you are under surveillance, act as naturally as possible, go to a safe location (your office, hotel, U.S. Embassy), and contact your superior. Avoid offers of sexual companionship. They may lead to a room raid, photography, and blackmail. Prostitutes in many countries report to the police, work for a criminal organization, or are sympathetic to insurgent or terrorist organizations; in other words, are anti-U.S. Others may be employed by an intelligence service. Be suspicious of casual acquaintances and quick friendships with local citizens in intelligence/terrorist threat countries. In many countries, people tend to stay away from foreigners and do not readily or easily make contact. Many who actively seek out friendships with Americans may do so as a result of government orders or for personal gain.

In your personal contacts, follow these guidelines:


I I I I I

Do not attempt to keep up with your hosts in social drinking. Do not engage in black market activity for money or goods. Do not sell your possessions. Do not bring in or purchase illegal drugs. Do not bring in pornography.

J-2

I I I I I I I

Do not bring in religious literature for distribution. (You may bring one Bible, Koran, or other religious material for your own personal use.) Do not seek out religious or political dissidents. Do not take ashtrays, towels, menus, glasses, or other mementos from hotels or restaurants. Do not accept packages, letters, etc., from local citizens for delivery to the U.S. Do not make political comments or engage in political activity. Do not be lured into clandestine meetings with would-be informants or defectors. Be careful about taking pictures. In some countries it is unwise to take photographs of scenes that could be used to make unfavorable comparisons between U.S. and local standards of living or other cultural differences. Avoid taking any photographs from moving buses, trains, or aircraft. The following picture subjects are clearly prohibited in most countries where an intelligence or terrorist/insurgent threat is evident:

Police or military installations and personnel Bridges Fortifications Railroad facilities Tunnels Elevated trains Border areas Industrial complexes Port complexes Airports

J-3

Detention
Most intelligence and security services in threat countries detain persons for a wide range of real or imagined wrongs. The best advice, of course, is to do nothing that would give a foreign service the least reason to pick you up. If you are arrested or detained by host nation intelligence or security, however, remember the following:
I

Always ask to contact the U.S. Embassy. You are entitled to do so under international diplomatic and consular agreements, to which most countries are signatories. Phrase your request appropriately. In Third World countries, however, making demands could lead to physical abuse. Do not admit to wrongdoing or sign anything. Part of the detention ritual in some threat countries is a written report you will be asked or told to sign. Decline to do so, and continue demanding to contact the Embassy or consulate. Do not agree to help your detainer. The foreign intelligence or security service may offer you the opportunity to help them in return for releasing you, foregoing prosecution, or not informing your employer or spouse of your indiscretion. If they will not take a simple no, delay a firm commitment by saying that you have to think it over. Report to your supervisor immediately. Once your supervisor is informed, the Embassy or consulate security officer needs to be informed. Depending on the circumstances and your status, the Embassy or consulate may have to provide you assistance in departing the country expeditiously. Report to your units security officer and your services criminal investigative branch upon returning to the U.S. This is especially important if you were unable to report to the Embassy or consulate in country. Remember, you will not be able to outwit a foreign intelligence organization. Do not compound your error by betraying your country.

I I

J-4

Foreign Terrorist Threat


Terrorism may seem like mindless violence committed without logic or purpose, but it is not. Terrorists attack soft and undefended targets, both people and facilities, to gain political objectives they see as out of reach by less violent means. Many of todays terrorists view no one as innocent. Thus, injury and loss of life are justified as acceptable means to gain the notoriety generated by a violent act in order to support their cause. Because of their distinctive dress, speech patterns, and outgoing personalities, Americans are often highly visible and easily recognized when they are abroad. The obvious association of U.S. military personnel with their government enhances their potential media and political worth as casualties or hostages. Other U.S. citizens are also at risk, including political figures, police, intelligence personnel, and VIPs (such as businessmen and celebrities). Therefore, you must develop a comprehensive personal security program to safeguard yourself while traveling abroad. An awareness of the threat and the practice of security procedures like those advocated in crime prevention programs are adequate precautions for the majority of people. While total protection is impossible, basic common sense precautions such as an awareness of any local threat, elimination of predictable travel and lifestyle routines, and security consciousness at your quarters or work locations significantly reduce the probability of success of terrorist attacks. To realistically evaluate your individual security program, you must understand how terrorists select and identify their victims. Terrorists generally classify targets in terms of accessibility, vulnerability, and political worth (symbolic nature). These perceptions may not be based on the persons actual position, but rather the image of wealth or importance they represent to the public. For each potential target, a risk versus gain assessment is conducted to determine if a terrorist can victimize a target without ramifications to the terrorist organization. It is during this

J-5

phase that the terrorist determines if a target is hard or soft. A hard target is someone who is aware of the threat of terrorism and adjusts his personal habits accordingly. Soft targets are oblivious to the threat and their surroundings, making an easy target. Identification by name is another targeting method gathered from aircraft manifests, unit/duty rosters, public documents (Whos Who or the Social Register), personnel files, discarded mail, or personal papers in trash. Many targets are selected based upon their easily identifiable symbols or trademarks, such as uniforms, luggage (seabags or duffle bags), blatant national symbols (currency, tatoos, and clothing), and decals and bumper stickers.

Travel Security
Travel on temporary duty (TAD/TDY) abroad may require you to stay in commercial hotels. Being away from your home duty station requires increasing your security planning and awareness; this is especially important when choosing and checking into a hotel and during your residence there. The recent experiences with airport bombings and airplane hijacking suggest some simple precautions:
I I

You should not travel on commercial aircraft outside the continental U.S. in uniform. Prior to traveling by commercial aircraft, you should screen your wallet and other personal items, removing any documents (that is, credit cards, club membership cards, etc.) which would reveal your military affiliation. NOTE: Current USMC policy requires service members to wear two I.D. tags with metal necklaces when on official business. Also, the current I.D. card must be in possession at all times. These requirements include travel to or through terrorist areas. In view of these requirements, the service member must be prepared to remove and

J-6

conceal these and any other items which would identify them as military personnel in the event of a skyjacking. You should stay alert to any suspicious activity when traveling. Keep in mind that the less time spent in waiting areas and lobbies, the better. This means adjusting your schedule to reduce your wait at these locations. You should not discuss your military affiliation with anyone during your travels because it increases your chances of being singled out as a symbolic victim. In case of an incident, you should not confront a terrorist or present a threatening image. The lower profile you present, the less likely you will become a victim or bargaining chip for the terrorists, and your survivability increases.

Hostage Situation
The probability of anyone becoming a hostage is very remote. However, as a member of the Armed Forces, you should always consider yourself a potential hostage or terrorist victim and reflect this in planning your affairs, both personal and professional. You should have an up-to-date will, provide next of kin with an appropriate power-of-attorney, and take measures to ensure your dependents financial security if necessary. Experience has shown that concern for the welfare of family members is a source of great stress to kidnap victims. Do not be depressed if negotiation efforts appear to be taking a long time. Remember, chance of survival actually increases with time. The physical and psychological stress while a hostage could seem overpowering, but the key to your well-being is to approach captivity as a mission. Maintaining emotional control, alertness, and introducing order into each day of captivity will ensure your success and survival with honor. During interaction with captors, maintaining self respect and dignity can be keys to retaining status as a human being in the captors eyes. Complying with instructions, avoiding provocative conversations (political,

J-7

religious, etc.), and establishing a positive relationship will increase survivability. Being polite and freely discussing insignificant and nonessential matters can reinforce this relationship. Under no circumstance should classified information be divulged. If forced to present terrorist demands to the media, make it clear that the demands are those of the captor and that the plea is not made on your behalf. You must remember that you are an American service member; conduct yourself with dignity and honor while maintaining your bearing. Hostages sometimes are killed during rescue attempts; consequently, you should take measures to protect yourself during such an action. Drop to the floor immediately, remain still and avoiding any sudden movement; select a safe corner if it offers more security than the floor. Do not attempt to assist the rescuing forces but wait for instructions. After the rescue, do not make any comment to the media until you have been debriefed by appropriate U.S. authorities.

J-8

APPENDIX K: Dangerous Animals and Plants


Desert black snake
Description: Adult length usually 0.9 to 1.2 meters; moderately stout snake. Background generally glossy black sometimes with brownish tinge; belly more pale. Habitat: Found in various habitats, including open desert, cultivated fields, gardens, oases, irrigated areas, and around buildings. Also barren, rocky mountain hillsides and sandy desert with sparse bushes. Activity and Behavioral Patterns: Nocturnal; spends much time underground. Can be very aggressive. When molested, threatened, or provoked, will hiss violently and strike. Venoms effects: Venom strongly neurotoxic.

Gasperettis horned desert viper


No photograph available Description: Adult length usually 0.3 to 06 meter, maximum of 0.85 meter. Background generally yellowish, yellowish brown, pale gray, pinkish, or pale brown with rows of dark spots along the back. Belly whitish. Tip of tail may be black. May have a long spine-like horn above each eye. K-1

Habitat: Found in deserts with rock outcroppings and fine sand. Often in very arid places, however, may be found near oases. Activity and Behavioral Patterns: Nocturnal. Can make itself almost invisible by wriggling down into loose sand. Hides in rodent holes and under stones. When angered, rubs inflated loops of body together to make rasping hiss. Can strike quickly if disturbed. Venoms effects: Venom primarily hemotoxic. Local symptoms include pain, edema, redness, possible hematoma at site of bite. No fatalities reported.

Sochureks Saw-scaled Viper


No photograph available Description: Maximum length of 0.8 meter. Background color gray-beige; belly whitish, usually with dark gray spots. Series of pale, dark-edged dorsal spots, which may connect in zig-zag line. Incomplete undulating pale line along sides. Distinctive gray cross pattern on top of head. Habitat: Found in variety of habitats in sandy, rocky, and cultivated areas. Avoids wet terrain, but may enter water if necessary. Activity and behavioral patterns: Primarily nocturnal and terrestrial; but climbs low bushes and trees. Venoms effects: Potent hemotoxin. Pain and swelling start soon after bite. Systemic bleeding may start within 6 hours after bite. Other symptoms may include vomiting, abdominal pain, regional lymph node enlargement, hematuria, and shock. Deaths recorded. K-2

False-horned Viper
Description: Adult length usually 0.5 to 0.7 meter, maximum of 0.9 meter. Background generally pale or bluish gray to khaki; gray or brown-gray crossbands on back. Alternating faint spots on throat and body sides. Ventral side white; tail black. Head very broad; distinct from neck. Horn, composed of several overlapping scales, above each eye. Habitat: Most often found in desert bush. Also found in sandy, rocky terrain, as well as burrows and crevices in elevations of up to 2,000 meters. Activity and behavioral patterns: Nocturnal. Sluggish, placid, less likely to bite during the day. Dangerously active and aggressive at night. When disturbed, hisses loudly but not particularly vicious. Locomotion characteristically sidewinding. Frequently hides in rodent tunnels and beneath rocks. Venoms effects: Primarily neurotoxic. May produce local symptoms such as minor pain, tingling, and stiffness; more serious bite causes weakness followed by ptosis. Victim may be conscious, but unable to respond due to paralysis.

Blunt-nosed or Levantine Viper.


No Photograph Available Description: Adult length usually 0.7 to 1 meter; maximum of 1.5 meter. Background color generally light gray, khaki, or buff, with double row of opposing or alternating spots from head to tail along back. Belly light gray to yellow, with small dark brown spots; tail pinkish brown.

K-3

Habitat: Wide variety of habitats from marshes and plains at sea level to mountainous areas at elevations up to 2,000 meters. also semi-desert areas and rocky, hilly country at moderate elevations, with scattered bushes and adequate water supply. Often near farms and grazing areas. Activity and behavioral patterns: Primarily nocturnal. Sluggish. Most active and alert at night, usually very slow-moving and almost oblivious to stimuli when encountered during day. However, temperament is unpredictable; may strike quickly and savagely at any time. Venoms effects: Primarily hemotoxic. Bite causes sharp pain at site, followed by local swelling and necrosis. Deaths reported.

Arthropods Scorpions
Although many scorpions in the region are capable of inflicting a painful sting, some, such as the Fat-tailed scorpion, are known to be life-threatening. Habitat: Found in dry and desert areas, usually in stony soils, cactus hedges and arid mountainous regions and high plateaux. Also found on steep slopes of drifting sand dunes. Avoids humidity. Often found hear human habitations (such as in cracks in walls). Venoms effects: One of the most potent scorpion venoms in the world. Species causes several deaths each year.

K-4

Spiders
Although there are several spider species found in the region that are capable of inflicting a painful bite, only the widow spider is considered life-threatening.

Insects
There is little specific information of medical importance regarding insects. However, nearly all countries have at least one species of moth or caterpillar with venomous spines. Some are very hairy (such as puss moths and flannel moths) and almost unrecognizable as caterpillars. Others bear prominent clumps of still, venomous spines. Contact with these caterpillars can be very painful. Some are brightly colored. Paederus are small (usually 4 to 7 millimeters), slender rove beetles that do not look like typical beetles and have very short wing covers that expose most of their flexible abdomens. When crushed, their body fluid contains an agent that blister skin on contact. The lesions take a week to heal and the area remains painful for two weeks. The substance is extremely irritating to the eyes; temporary blindness has been reported.

Centipedes
Although area centipedes can inflict a painful bite, none are known to be life-threatening.

Millipedes
Millipedes do not bite and in general are harmless to humans. However, when handled, some larger millipedes (may be more than 50 millimeters long) secrete a very noxious fluid that can cause severe blistering upon contact; some can squirt this fluid at least 2 feet. K-5

Plants Croton
Other names: Ciega-vista, purging croton. Mechanisms of toxicity: Long-lasting vesicular dermatitis results from contact with the toxic resin. The cathartic and purgative properties of the toxins (croton oil, a "phorbol," in leaves, stems, and seeds) causes severe gastroenteritis, even death; 20 drops potentially lethal (the oil applied externally will blister the skin). Many types covered with hundreds of sticky hairs that cling to skin on contact. Contact with the eyes can be serious. Comments: Croton is a wooly-haired annual herb, evergreen bush, or small tree with smooth ash-colored bark, yellow-green leaves, small flowers, and fruit.

Jimsonweed
Other names: Thorn-apple, stinkweed, Devils trumpet. Mechanisms of toxicity: The entire plant is toxic because of tropane alkaloids. Fragrance from the flowers may cause respiratory irritation, and the sap can cause contact dermatitis. People have been poisoned through consumption of crushed seeds accidentally included in flour; also through attempting to experience the hallucinogenic high. Can kill. Jimsonweed has a quickly fatal potential. K-6

Comments: Originally called Jamestown weed after mass poisoning of soldiers sent to quell "Bacons Rebellion" in 1666 ate the seeds during a severe food shortage. Jimsonweed is often confused with Angels Trumpet.

Mole Plant
Other names: Caper spurge, Mexican fire plant, milkweed, red spurge, poison spurge, cypress spurge, cat's milk, mala mujer, sun spurge, candelabra cactus, Indian spurge tree, pencil tree, pencil cactus, rubber euphorbia. Mechanisms of toxicity: Herbs, often with colored or milky sap, containing complex terpenes; irritate the eyes, mouth, and gastrointestinal tract, and many cause dermatitis on contact. Rain water dripping from the plant can contain enough toxic principle to produce dermatitis and keratoconjunctivitis; can blind. Some contain urticating hairs (skin contact breaks off ends and toxic chemicals are injected). The caper spurge has killed those who mistook the fruit for capers. The Mexican fire plant was known for medicinal properties in the first century and has killed children. Red spurge causes dermatitis. The pencil cactus has an abundant, white, acrid sap extremely irritating to the skin; has caused temporary blindness when accidentally splashed in the eyes, and has killed as a result of severe gastroenteritis after ingestion. Comments: Approximately 2,000 species of extremely variable form; may appear as herbs, shrubs or trees many are cactus-like. Fruit is usually a capsule opening in three parts, each one seeded; sometimes a drupe.

K-7

Belladonna
Other Name: Nightshade Mechanisms of toxicity: Berries, leaves, and roots contain tropane alkaloids that can cause death from anticholinergic poisoning. Comments: Perennial plants to 3 feet high. Native to Eurasia and North Africa.

Black Bryony
No Photograph Available Mechanism of toxicity: Primary injurious agents are calcium oxalate crystals, which cause severe irritation of oral mucosa, nausea, and diarrhea if ingested and are irritating to the skin. The attractive bright red berries are the part most likely to be eaten by children. Fresh rootstock contains a histamine like substance that has caused severe burning of the skin with erythema, painful swellings, and sometimes allergic reactions. Alkaloids, saponins and photosensitizing phenanthrene derivatives are also present in the leaves and tubers, but only in trace amounts; therefore, there is little or no effect on plant toxicity. Comments: Perennial herb with a twining stem found at edges of woods and hedgerows, and in thickets on rich calcareous soils. Young shoots lack calcium oxalate crystals, and are eaten in Dalmatia as a vegetable. Also used to treat rheumatic conditions in Hungary by rubbing the freshly cut, sticky, shiny surface of roots on the skin.

K-8

Castor Oil Plant


Other Name: Castorbean Mechanisms of toxicity: Used to make a feed supplement; a lecithin, which is a highly toxic chemical, and some low-molecular weight glycoproteins with allerenic activity have resulted in serious poisoning. Factors making this a high-risk plant threat are its attractive nuts with a hazelnut-like taste; the highly toxic ricin present in high concentration (2-6 seeds can be fatal); and stability of ricin in the presence of gastric enzymes. The seeds are used to make necklaces, requiring boring a hole through the seed, and breaking the otherwise impermeable coat, allowing the possibility of toxin to reach the skin and enter the body through minor abrasions. Poisoning becomes evident after several hours. Comments: The seeds of this ancient plant have been found in Egyptian graves dating as far back as 4,000 B.C. Cultivated worldwide for 6,000 years for producing castor oil.

Yellow Heads
No Photograph Available Other names: Woolly-headed gnidia

K-9

Mechanisms of toxicity: Shrubs or small trees with extremely irritating resin. The root and flower of many species are strongly purgative is the source of the drug radjo. Some species have been shown to contain mezereine (irritant resin) and daphnine (an alkaloid). Comments: More than 140 species found from tropical and southern Africa to the Arabian peninsula, and from Madagascar to western India and Sri Lanka.

Heliotrope
Other names: Cherry pie, scorpions Indian heliotrope. tail,

Mechanisms of toxicity: Contains pyrrolizidine alkaloids. Cause of large epidemics (Afghanistan, India) of illness following ingestion of bread made with flour contaminated with members of this genus. The pathologic effects (Budd-Chiari syndrome) take weeks to months, and death comes slowly over years. Chronic copper poisoning has occurred associated with this plant. Comments: Large genus, found worldwide (250 tropical, temperate trees and shrubs).

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Strychnine
Other names: Nuxvomica tree, Snakewood tree Mechanisms of toxicity: The entire plant, including the seeds, contains the powerfully acting indole alkaloid strychnine, which can kill. Comments: Genus of 190 different species of trees, shrubs and vines with berry-like fruits, found in most tropical regions. Some have the reputation of having edible fruit despite dangerous seeds. It is a source of curare obtained by stripping and macerating its bark. Curare, now used as a muscle relaxant, was formerly used as an arrow poison by South American Indians.

English Yew
Other names: Ground hemlock, American yew, Japanese yew. Mechanisms of toxicity: Taxine A and B, classed as steroid alkaloids, are present in all plant parts except the aril. A single chewed seed is deadly. An hour after ingestion, nausea, dizziness, and abdominal pain begin. This is followed by reddening of the lips, dilatation of the pupils, shallow breathing, tachycardia, and coma. Then the pulse slows, blood pressure drops, and death occurs through respiratory paralysis. No proven treatment exists. Emptying the stomach hours after ingestion may be helpful as leaves may not pass through the GI tract expediK-11

tiously. Various clinical measures (circulatory stimulants, artificial respiration, cardiac pacemaker) have not prevented death in suicide cases. Comments: An evergreen shrub or small tree bearing a characteristic fleshy, red, sweet-tasting aril with a single green to black, partly exposed, hardshelled seed within. In North America, the Japanese yew, the toxicity of which may exceed that of the English yew, has repeatedly caused fatal animal poisonings. Was once known as the tree of death.

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APPENDIX L: International Telephone Codes


International Telephone Codes
Algeria Australia Austria Bahrain Belgium Brazil Canada China Cyprus Denmark Djibouti Egypt Ethiopia Finland France Gabon Germany Greece Hawaii Hong Kong Indonesia Iran Iraq Ireland Israel Ivory Coast Japan Jordan Kenya Kuwait Libya Madagascar Malaysia AT&T (public phones) 213 61 43 973 32 55 1 86 357 45 253 20 251 358 33 241 49 30 1 852 62 98 964 353 972 225 81 962 254 965 218 261 60 0072-911 or 0030-911 Malta Mexico Morocco Netherlands Nigeria New Zealand Norway Oman Philippines Portugal Qatar Republic of Korea Saudi Arabia Senegal Seychelles Singapore Somalia South Africa Spain Sweden Switzerland Syria Taiwan Tanzania Thailand Tunisia Turkey UAE United Kingdom United States Yemen Zambia Zimbabwe On-base 356 52 212 31 234 64 47 968 63 351 974 82 966 221 248 65 252 27 34 46 41 963 886 255 66 216 90 971 44 1 967 260 263 550-HOME or 550-2USA

L-1

APPENDIX M: Identification Guide


The following is a guide to the various identification documents used in Iraq. This is by no means an exhaustive listing of all forms of identification.

Military Service Document - Front and Back Cover, circa 1996 1 2 3 4 5 Republic of Iraq Minister of Defense Public Recruitment Directorate Military Service Book Number

M-1

Personal Identification Card, circa 2000; Ministry of Interior Identification Card, circa 1992; Ministry of Oil Identification Card, circa 2000 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Ministry of Interior Identification number General Civil Affairs and Citizenship Directorates Issued in accordance with the legal statute number 60; 1979 Republic of Iraq Agency Serial Age Identification number Name Fathers and Grandfathers name Family name Mother and grandfathers name Gender Approving officials signature Preparation date Preparers signature

18 Full name 19 Witnessing officers signature 20 Left thumb print 21 Occupation 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34


Religion Date of birth, date in long form Place of birth Distinguishing marks Marital status Husbands name Place of registry Description Eye color Complexion Hair color Height Blood type

M-2

Military Service Document - Pages 1 and 2, circa 1996

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Unified military number Military service ID series Primary registration series Place and date of birth Full name and title Mothers full name Civilian registration number Iraqi citizenship certificate number

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

Occupation Level of education Enlistment officer Date Ministry of Defense General Enlistment Directorate Area enlistment office Enlistee

M-3

Military Service Document - pages 3 and 4, circa 1996

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Photo of military service book holder Military service number Full name and title Place and date of birth Rank and name Enlistment officer Date issued Description

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

Height Weight Eye color Hair color Distinguishing marks Blood type Full address Thumb print

M-4

Military Service Document - pages 5 and 6, circa 1996

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Continuation - examination Medical examination result X-ray Examination number Examination date Findings Examination board decision

8 9 10 11 12 13

Board director Member Attended Date Findings Member

M-5

Military Service Document - pages 7 and8, circa 1996

1 2 3

Educational Postponement Enlistment officer Personal oath

4 5 6

No prior service verification Bearers signature Date

M-6

Military Service Document - pages 9 and 10, circa 1996

1 2

Educational postponement 3 Enlistment officer 4

Educational postponement Enlistment officer

M-7

Military Service Card, circa 1995

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Ministry of Defense General enlistment directorate Service discharge doctorate Number Name Date of birth Place of enlistment Occupation or branch

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

Military service status Identification number Civilian identification number Assigned unit name Name of unit released from Release date Card serial number Issue date

M-8

Ministry of Defense Friends of Saddam Hussein Card, circa 1992

1 Officers administration director 2 Ministry of Defense 3 Officers administration directorate 4 Rank 5 Name

6 Identification number 7 Issue date 8 Friends of President Saddam Hussein Identification card 9 Benefits

M-9

Republican Guard Identification Card, circa 1994

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Unclear Cdr. Republican Guard Forces Republican Guard Forces HQ Administration Statistic number Rank Name

8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Blood type Identification number Issue date Citizenship certificate serial number Date issued Date of birth Republican Guard Forces HQ Officer on duty identification

M-10

Army Officer Identification Card, circa 1995

1 2 3 4 5 6

Officers administration directorate Ministry of defense Officers administration directorate Rank Name Blood type

7 8 9 10 11

Identification number Issue date Issue date Identificaton number Citizenship certificate serial number 12 Army officers identification

M-11

Army Enlisted Identification Card, circa 1988

1 Division Admin. Director 2 Number 3 4 5 6


Rank Name Date of birth Blood type

8 9 10 11 12 13 14

7 Unit number

Brigade commander Iraqi military non-commissioned officer and enlisted soldier ID card Army sample numbered 431 A Identification number Issue date Citizenship certificate serial number Issue date

M-12

Fighters of Bin Firas Al-Hamadani Companies ID Card, circa 2000 1 Unit commander 7 2 ABI Firas Al Hamdani Companies 8 Fighter Identification 3 Full name 9 4 Occupation 10 5 Fighter number 11 6 Company number Date of birth Address Identification number Issue date Expiration date

M-13

Office of the Presidency Special Service Organization Identification Card, circa 1994

1 2 3 4

Republic of Iraq Presidency of the Republic Special Security Organization Position

5 6 7 8

Identification number Issue date Name Blood type

M-14

Office of the Presidency Identification Card, circa 1987

1 2 3 4 5 6

Head of the office of the presidency 7 Republic of Iraq 8 Office of the presidency Full name Position Identification number

Dated Citizenship certificate serial number 9 Dated 10 Blood type 11 Signature of identification card holder

M-15

Office of the Presidency Identification Card, circa 1995

1 2 3 4 5

Head of the office of the 6 presidency Republic of Iraq 7 Office of the presidency 8 Name Position 9

Identification number Issue date Citizenship certificate serial number Blood type

M-16

Ninawa Governorate Police Identification Card, circa 1995

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Republic of Iraq Ministry of Interior Ninawa Governate Police Department Department of Information Information office Head of household name Address and house number

8 Document number 9 Signature 10 Rank 11 12 13 14 Document controllers name Date Remarks Information office use

M-17

Baghdad University Identification Card, circa 1993 1 Name 5 Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research - Baghdad University Night studies Number Issue date

2 Class 6 3 Citizenship certificate 7 serial number 4 Date issued 8

M-18

Basrah University Identification Card - circa 1995

1 2 3 4

Blood type Name College dean Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research 5 Basrah University 6 For use only with university

7 8 9 10

Full name and title Place and date of birth Department Issue date

11 Expiration date 12 Identification number

M-19

Al-Rafidain University Identification Card, circa 1997 1 2 3 4 5 6 Dean 7 Al-Rafidain University 8 College Student ID 9 Full name Department ID number Place and date of birth For use within the university

Iraqi citizenship certificate number and date 10 Issue year 11 Expiration date 12 Permanent address M-20

Mosul University Identification Card - circa 1993

1 Ministry of Higher Education and 6 Scientific Research 2 Mosul University Bureau/ 7 College of Engineering 3 Name 8 4 Occupation 9 5 Citizenship certificate number

Date of birth Issue date

Republic of Iraq Identification of country membership 10 Identification number

M-21

APPENDIX N: Political Groups, Religious Groups, and Tribes


Political Groups (and common acronyms)
Assyrian Democratic Movement Al-Hawza al-Ilmiya Movement & Popularity Movement Ansar Al Islam Arab Socialist Movement Coalition for Iraqi National Unity Collective Iraqi Revolutionaries Movement Constitutional Monarchy Movement Communist Party of Iraq (may be same as ICP) Democratic Communist Party Destorial Kingdom Movement Democratic Nationalist Party Democratic National Union of Kurdistan Democratic Party Democratic Popular Movement Democratic Solution Party Kurdistan Political front for Hawza AKA The Mighty One Free Iraq Fighting Forces Free Iraqi Officers and Civilian Movement Formation of the Mighty One Hizb al-Awda (Party of Return) High Council for Iraqi Liberation Higher Council National Salvation (Prob SCNS) Islamic Ashia Islamic Accord Movement Islamic Al Dawa Party Islamic Amal Organization of Iraq Iraqi Communist Party (may be same as CPI) Islamic Democratic Party of Iraq Iraqi Education Party Islamic Group of Kurdistan Iraqi Hizballah (Shia based opposition party) Iraqi Harmony Movement ADM AHAIMPM AI ASM CINU CIRM CMM CPI DCP DKM DNP DNUK DP DPM DSPK Fadilah FIFF FIOCM FMO HAA HCIL HCNS IA IAM IADP IAOI ICP IDPI IEP IGK IH IHM

N-1

Iraqi Homeland Party Islamic Higher Union Independent Iraqis for Democracy Iraqi Islamic Forces Union Islamic Iraqi Party Islamic Justice Party Iraqi Liberation Army Islamic Loyalty Movement Islamic Movement Iraqi Military Council Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan Iraqi National Accord Iraqi National Congress Iraqi National Front Islamic National Front of Iraq Iraqi National Gathering Iraqi National Movement Iraqi Turkomen Front Iraqi Turkomen Peoples Party Iraqi Turkomen Union Movement Islamic Union Party for Turkomen Islamic Work Organization Iraqi Youth Society Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress Kurdistan Democratic Party Kurdistan Freedom Congress Kurdish Democratic Workers Party Kurdistan Freedom & Democracy Party (Prob KADEK) Kurdistan National Congress Kurdish Revolutionary Hizbollah Party Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party Liberal Democratic Movement Liberty Democratic Party Muslim Brotherhood Iraq Movement for Iraqi Unity National Congress to Free Iraq National Congress Party National Democratic Party

IHP IHU IID IIFU IIP IJP ILA ILM IM IMC IMIK INA INC INF INFI ING INM ITF ITPP ITUM IUPT IWO IYS KADEK KDP KFC KDWP KFDP KNK KRHP KSDP LDM LDP MBI MIU NCFI NCP NDP

N-2

National Front for Democratic Kurdistan National Front for Salvation of Iraq National Harmony Movement National Liberation Movement National Unity Coalition National Unity Party Party for Unity of Iraq Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Revolutionary Islamic Vanguard Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq Supreme Council National Salvation Syrians Social Progressive Turan Party Turkomen Peasant Group Union for Democratic Free Movement United Islamic Party Worker Communist Party of Iraq

NFDK NFSI NHM NLM NUC NUP PUI PUK RSV SCIRI SCNS SSP TP TPG UDFM UIP WCPI

Neo Baath Party Groups (and common acronyms)


Iraqi National Party Iraqi Vanguard Organization Islamic Youth Organization Iraqi Patriotic Party TalaI Organization of Iraq Freedom of Iraq Party The National Party The Gathering of Warriors Al-Tanthim Al -Talaa Party Liberation of Iraq Al-Rafidin Party Harikat Al-Afha The Party of the Return Hizb Al-Awda Al Quad The National Peoples Democratic Party National Peoples Party Free Officers Coalition Group INP IVO IYO IPP TOI FIP NP GW LOI POR NPDP NPP FOCG

N-3

Tribes
Jibur Confederation Dulaym Confederation Al -Shammar Al Abed Al Badur Al Ghizi Al Hassan Al Hatim Al Joubir Al Juwamil Ubayd Yasir Zaibari Al Feidaliya Beni Tamim Albu Aluwan Albu Husayn Albu Mohammed Al Sudan Bani Sulayyim Fatla Ti Al Rahhal Albu Salih Zubayd Confederation Muntafiq Confederation Ubayd Al Amara Al Ghiza Al Gubor Al Hussein Al Juaber Tikrit Um Zara WItWit Yezidi Zuba'a Bani Said Bani Lam Albu Ghayat Albu Julaybib Al Dikhaynat Bani Malik Bani Asad Al Rumayth Al Halu Albu Kashman A'Abid

N-4

Key Leaders
Ahmed Chalabi Ayed Alawi Jalal Talabani Ibrahim Jafari Kazem al-Haeri Sayyed Ali Sistani Abu Hatem Ahmad Qubaysi Mishan Jibburri Muzhir al Dulaymi Iskandir WitWit Hazen al-Shalan Abd al Karim Burjis Najim abd Mahdi Muhammad Bakr al-Hakim Massoud Barzani Naseer al-Chadirchi Adnan Pachachi Maqtadah al-Sadr Bahr al-Ulum Muhammad al-Fartusi Sharif Ali Bin al-Husayn Abdul Munem Mustafa Sheibani Ghanim al-Basso Ali Abdul Hasan Tamimi Taha Bedaiwi al Alwan Ali Abdul Hasan Kammouna

Religious Groups (and their membership)


Sunni Shia or Shiite Al-Hawza Ai-Ilmiya or Al-Hawza or Hawza Wahabi Shafii Twelver or Ithna-Ashari Faili Kurds Sufi or Sufism Yazidi Mandaean Alevism

Shi'a Sunni Sunni Shi'a Shi'a Muslim Group Non Muslim, Non Christian Group Non Muslim, Non Christian Group Non Muslim, Non Christian Group

N-5

APPENDIX O: Developing Effective Relationships


Effective relationships are the building blocks of power in the Middle East. Professional dealings with Iraqis can be politically and personally rewarding. However, the relationships must be developed and nurtured, a task that can be both challenging and risky. Cultural and personal misunderstandings have a strong potential to strain relationships and complicate critical discussions between Coalition leaders and their Arab counterparts in Iraq. The attitudes, perceptions, and emotional and behavioral responses of Iraqi leaders are shaped by their culture. Already complex interaction between Iraqi and Coalition leaders of different cultures can be further complicated because Coalition leaders generally have too many priorities and too limited time to invest in any one relationship.

Building Trust
One of the qualities most prized by Iraqis in a relationship is trustworthiness. From the Arab point of view, a person is trustworthy if he keeps a confidence and follows through on his word, ensuring that the relationship remains healthy. Iraqis value frank discussions with Coalition leaders. Such discussions are necessary for the sake of the relationship, and should be conducted in a respectful manner, usually in private. Leaders must allow time for treating the issue in depth. To an Iraqi, what is said is often as important as what is left unsaid. Iraqis often assume that an unsatisfactory, high-level decision can be modified or even reversed with the right amount of persuasion, and that a special relationship with a Coalition leader grants them the right to ask for such consideration. Coalition leaders can respond to a difficult O-1

request by stating that they will look into the matter, and by providing feedback, even if the results are negative. There are different ways an Iraqi might treat a Coalition leader to indicate displeasure with a personal or political action; Some ways include:
I

Maintaining silence. Iraqis signify their disapproval by refraining from speaking directly to an individual or refusing to take telephone calls. Iraqis have been known to isolate themselves when they are upset with the way they have been treated. Delaying a reply or action. Iraqis may even refrain from attending significant events to avoid action. Providing irrelevant excuses. It is common for regional leaders to tell Coalition officials planning trips to the region that travel is unsafe rather than admit that they do not wish to meet with them. Responding to a Coalition request with a non-substantive phrase such as inshallah (God willing). This is a common response to hardship or disappointment. Iraqis tend to understand and respect when foreigners use these phrases to couch commitments that are less than solid.

Presence
Some gestures that require a small investment from Coalition perspective often carry more weight in cementing a relationship with an Iraqi than significant movement on substantive issues. Individuals who engage in non-political activities when visiting a country in the Middle East are usually welcomed in the Arab culture. A Coalition leaders visit to a mosque, church, school, or hospital, or his eating a meal in a local restaurant, is often taken as a sign of respect. Most Iraqis are not comfortable talking with Coalition leaders about sensitive matters over the telephone and prefer to discuss such issues in one-on-one meetings or through a trusted personal emissary. Iraqis look O-2

for emissaries who have a well-known connection to their Coalition counterparts and a good reputation for keeping a confidence. Rushing through talking points in an effort to convince Iraqis to expedite their response to a Coalition request is often taken as a lack of interest in building the relationship. If the time needed to respond to a Coalition request is truly limited, it is often helpful to take longer to explain the logic behind the urgency. Without investing the time to make a case for swift action, delay is more likely to be the result.

Displays of emotion
Iraqis are partial to presentations with strong emotional content. Public speeches are deeply rooted in emotion-laden language, as are the electronic and print media. Al Jazirah reports often appeal to the emotions of its audience, repeatedly showing images of severed limbs, bloody corpses, and physical abuse that would shock most non-Arab viewers. Emotion is culturally linked to a sense of what is morally just and religiously right and is especially evident in Arab reactions to Israeli attacks against Palestinians. Displays of emotion also allow leaders to assess relationships. Iraqis value the expression of strong feelings even anger because such manifestations connote deep and sincere concern. Some Iraqis have been known to be long-winded in meetings, even with the most senior policymakers. Others have tried to intimidate Coalition contacts. This approach is often employed to test officials to see if they are willing to engage. It may be helpful to capitalize on the strong emotional sense of history Iraqis share, suggesting that leaders take inspiration from the glories of the past to create a better future for their people. In southern Iraq, great respect is shown to Americans who are willing to constructively discuss the U.S. actions and shortfalls during the Shia uprising of of 1991. O-3

Physical Gestures
Iraqis view physical gestures, such as hand holding, extended handshakes, double handshakes, kissing on each cheek (first to the right, then to the left and back to the right) and hugs as signs of special closeness. Placing ones right hand on the shoulder of an Iraqi indicates a sense of closeness and a sense of power. Understanding cultural and personal expectations and knowing how to identify indicators of effective communication can help to establish and deepen relationships with Iraqis. It is also helpful to clarify differences of substance from those of interpretation. Critical issues that have a strong potential for creating misunderstandings that will strain relations with Arab counterparts are:
I

Establishing credibility with and obtaining backing from moderate Iraqis for the U.S. sponsored Roadmap for reenergizing Israel-Palestinian peace negotiations. Gaining support from regional leaders for Coalition policies in Iraq that will allow these leaders to engage in reconstruction efforts. Supporting Iraqis in risk taking, a capacity essential for them to make changes in their societies that are deep enough to allow political and economic reform to take hold.

Language as a Cultural Key


By carefully reviewing talking points and other comments for cultural appropriateness, Coalition leaders are less likely to offend an Arab with a remark perceived as insulting or uninformed. Sports and other metaphors, jokes, quotations from American songs or movies, and references from U.S. history do not carry well across cultures. At a minimum, Iraqis may misunderstand or only partially comprehend the meaning of an American metaphor. In a worse case scenario, an Iraqi may become confused, embarrassed at his confusion, and then feel angry. O-4

Some tribal, religious and political leaders in Iraq have a strong command of English and familiarity with American culture. Speaking Arabic can help to establish and develop a relationship with an Iraqi even if it is a minimal command of the language. A careful selection of Arabic metaphors and proverbs translated into English, Polish, Spanish, etc., or delivered by an interpreter can help to drive home a particularly difficult point with little chance that the Iraqi will misunderstand. Appealing to cultural wisdom also shows respect, giving the message additional weight. Using Arabic terms when delivering a speech in English directed toward Arabs can increase its appeal; however, it is important to pronounce the Arabic words correctly. Using Quranic Arabic phrases to greet a leader can be awkward, because several formulations are specifically Islamic, and their use by U.S. leaders might be considered offensive by Christian Arabs.

Venues of Distinction
Iraqis especially appreciate being publicly received in venues that combine a sense of power and personal favor (for example, at President Bushs ranch in Crawford, Texas; aboard Air Force One; at Camp David and in the Oval Office). They might lobby to be invited to these types of places. Iraqis with regular access to these venues may be asked by other regional leaders to deliver messages. In the case of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, Iraqis prefer to be received or invited to U.S. military controlled facilities like the CPA or CJTF-VII headquarters in Baghdad or the Polish Multinational Division Headquarters at Babylon. Iraqis carefully assess treatment accorded sons of regional rulers by Coalition leaders, especially when these young men visit the United States. Special treatment, even if unintended, can be interpreted in the region as Coalition endorsement of a leaders son as his heir apparent. When a high-level Coalition official stays overnight in Iraq, especially in response to an invitation, the gesture is treasured; refusing an invitaO-5

tion to overnight without a strong reason to do so is taken to indicate a lack of interest in deepening the relationship. Gestures toward an Iraqi or official, even when positive, can affect relations with another leader without Coalition officials necessarily becoming aware of the complication. Certain Iraqi officials have been known to take advantage of meetings with Coalition officials to badmouth other Iraqi officials to make themselves appear closer to the Coalition or more deserving of support.

What to Avoid
Many actions that would complicate relations with an Iraqi are personal and specific to Iraq, but behavior by Coalition officials that have negative cultural connotations includes:
I

Publicly committing to an action without giving a clear statement of necessary additional conditions. For example, brief statements by U.S. officials committing to moving the peace process forward are often interpreted in the region to mean that U.S. policymakers are now prepared to push Israel to make major concessions. Referring to the Quran in causal conversation. Regardless of whether a particular Iraqi is a practicing Muslim, his public statements are usually imbued with Islamic symbolism and references; however, the same consideration does not extend to non-Muslims in leadership positions. CPA made this mistake in its Baath Party Denunciation forms, which ended with the phrase, as God is my witness. Using Israeli achievements as a yardstick for gauging the behavior of Iraq or another Arab state. Calling a leader by his first name. Political, religious, and scholarly titles (i.e. President, Minister, Imam, Sheik, Said, etc.) are a source of pride and status to Arabs and a host would react positively to them. This caveat does not hold in private meetings, but it is advisable to wait until a leader has asked to be addressed by his first name before doing so. O-6

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