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INTRODUCTION
John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in
1950 Designed to evaluate situations where individuals and organizations can have conflicting objectives Example: 1. wage negotiations between unions and firms 2. peace talks between two nations at war
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FIRM 2
no price change price change no price change 10,10 -20,30 100,-30 140,35
FIRM 1
price change
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from another participant's equivalent losses. The net change in total wealth among participants is zero; the wealth is just shifted from one to another.
10,10 -20,30 100,-30 140,35
games (excluding costs). For every person who gains on a contract, there is a counter-party who loses. Gambling is also an example of a zero-sum game.
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NASH EQUILIBRIUM
DEFINITION: set of strategies such that none of the participants in the game can improve their payoff, given the strategies of the other participants FIRM 2
no price change change 10,10 No price change -20,30 100,-30 140,35 price
FIRM 1
5
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Dominant strategies
When one firms best strategy may not depend on
the choice made by other participants in the game, that firm has a dominant strategy When one player has a dominant strategy, the game will always have a Nash equilibrium
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Dominated strategies
an alternative that yields a lower payoff than
some other strategy, no matter what the other players in the game do
defensive strategy
defense against run blitz linebackers back
14
10
pass
7 Game theory and Oligopoly 8/15/2013
Maximin strategies
it specifies that each player in the game will select
FIRM 1 no new
product new product
6,3
2,2
2
Firm 2 min
8 Game theory and Oligopoly
2
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Mixed strategies
when in a game the participants have more than
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participants and enter into some form of binding agreement The Prisoners dilemma
suspect 2
person 1 max 0,0 5,15
confess
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15
5
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agreements that binds the participants in the game to a particular strategy Can avoid the Prisoners Dilemma
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firms may escape if the game is played many times The optimal strategy for a repeated game may be different from the optimal strategy for a game that is played only once A tit-for-tat strategy of mimicking the last choice of the other player may be effective in repeated games
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new product
no new product
10,-5
13
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Reference
Managerial economics
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THANK YOU
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