Professional Documents
Culture Documents
The situation is very "interesting" in the sphere of night sights for sniper
weapons.
The question arises: at that time, where were the widely advertised
Russian automated systems for sniper detection and blinding their optics
• However, the reason for that ratio - is tactical errors. One could say that
the Georgians repeated all of the Russian Army's errors, which were made
during the storming of Groznyy in the First Chechen Campaign. The tanks
were cut off from the infantry and destroyed by RPG attacks from the side
and rear axes. There was no coordination of the operations between the
tank crews of the Georgian tanks and the infantry subunits.
In contrast to the Georgians, the 58 th Army tank grouping operated
correctly in a tactical context and took into account the experience of the
two Chechen campaigns, so there were insignificant armored vehicle
losses.
But it is too early to be happy: if we compare the technical level of the
tanks, which were employed in the operation with the Georgian tanks, we
see that the Georgian tanks either correspond or substantially surpass the
Russian tanks based upon their technical level. At a time when obsolete T-
72B and T-62 tanks constitute the primary portion of the 58 th Army's tank
fleet, the modernization of the T-72 SIM1, which was supplied to Georgia
by Ukraine, is substantially more "advanced". These tanks have state-of-
the-art thermal imaging sights, in all likelihood with the use of the French
second-generation camera, which permits the gunner to identify targets,
both during the day and at night, but then again, behind a smoke screen.
What is even more unpleasant is that the Georgian T-72 SIM1 tanks
possess a gun stabilizing system, that is, they can fire on the move. The
Ukrainian specialists have adapted their Kombat guided weapon system-
antitank missiles to these tanks, which are launched directly from the tank
gun's tube. That system is newer than the similar Svir System of the 58 th
Army's T-72B tanks.
At the same time, we must point out the fact that the Georgian tank's
level of armor protection does not surpass the armor of the Russian tanks
• We must point out that as before the 58 th Army's armored vehicles are
primarily for the conduct of a counterterrorist war. Although tandem
antitank grenades and missiles are now being actively employed even in
that war, against which the old tanks are absolutely defenseless from any
axis of attack.
No one has attempted to improve that situation even in light of the
unconcealed Georgian military preparations of recent years.
Despite a significant increase of qualitatively new threats, as before we
present the upgrade of the Russian 58 th Army with "modernized" 40-year-
old T-62 tanks, with anti-shaped charge screens along the sides, as a
gigantic "leap forward". Now we were able to behold all of these "tin cans"
in South Ossetia. This is the kind of junk that the Russian military budget
is being spent on now!
It remains only to guess why the latest generation Russian tanks, which
are being manufactured by Uralvagonzavod, are not coming to the
constantly fighting North Caucasus Military District, but only to the
"ceremonial" Moscow divisions.
The same thing concerns light armored vehicles : All of the Russian
armored infantry and airborne assault vehicles that were noted in South
Ossetia completely turned out to be old Soviet-generation vehicles with
updated service lives.
Where are the BMP-3s? Where are the BMD-4s? They all remained at their
permanent deployment locations.
The generals' depraved psychology is present here: we will save the latest
weapons for a parade and for now the Army is fighting with old
equipment. We still need to decommission
• Ground Troops artillery has always been the Russian Army's strong
suit. Here contemporary Russian arms makers have preserved the
developments, of which as before our Western competitors are
incapable.
However, the enemy is not dozing: the foreign advisors managed
to teach the Georgians the contemporary tactics of artillery
employment. After an artillery raid, the Georgian artillery batteries
rapidly left their location and changed position.
It turned out to be an extraordinarily complex matter to combat
this tactic. Georgian self-propelled artillery consists of dozens of
multiple rocket launcher systems and self-propelled guns on a
wheeled chassis that were purchased in the NATO countries.
After five days of engagements, it remained undestroyed, having
ceased its operations against Tskhinvali only after Saakashvili's
panicked order about a general retreat was received.
The Russian Army will have to master this lesson, having saturated
ground troops' units with unmanned aerial vehicles, artillery fire
localization and detection radars and other operational target
designation systems for its own artillery and aircraft. Otherwise,
counterbattery combat is one more headache for our military
personnel in the next conflict.
But then again, that urgently needs to be done, having taken as an
example of efficiency - the rearming program of that same
• The active employment of unmanned aerial vehicles - is one more
"anticipated surprise", to which the Russian Army also failed to
react for some reason, although the degree of predictability of this
type of threat was approximately the same in this case as the
degree of predictability of the arrival of Tuesday after Monday. In
general, we don't understand what the generals are thinking about
on this score!
It is impossible to explain the delay with the introduction of
unmanned aerial systems in the troops either by the expense (they
are an order of magnitude cheaper than manned aircraft) or by a
technological lag (there are adequately many firms in Russia,
which offer their product at the highest level).
It remains to deduce that only tunnel vision and shortsightedness
is impeding the introduction of these extremely effective and
economical reconnaissance and strike systems in the troops.
The operation's aviation component turned out to be significant.
The famous Grach - Su-25 armored ground attack aircraft, which
distinguished themselves already in the first and second Chechen
wars, bore the primary load. It is precisely they that conducted
precision strikes against the reconnoitered positions of the
Georgian infantry and artillery. In Georgia, they also conducted
"free hunt" against enemy troop columns, while sowing panic
among the Georgian soldiers. This class of aircraft is ideal for
operations under mountain conditions: the Su-25's speed is higher
• On the other hand - the speed of this aircraft is not too high, and it is
capable of actively maneuvering between the mountain peaks, while
inflicting precision strikes with a diving trajectory.
But then again, we don't understand what is arriving to replace this
aircraft. New aircraft are already not being manufactured in Russia and
right now the question has been raised about in general not eliminating
the mothballed Su-25 production capacity.
The Georgian side also employed these aircraft, which were allegedly
modernized with Israel's participation. It turns out that Russia did not
possess technical supremacy in this class of weapons during the course of
the conflict.
Judging by everything, Tu-22M3 high-altitude, supersonic, Long Range
Aviation bombers were also employed, however the nature of the
operations with their participation has not been explained. We can assume
that the mission to suppress the Georgian air defense system and aircraft
was assigned to this class of aircraft.
The air force handled this mission with a 3+. Why Russian aircraft and
tactical missiles did not tear apart all of the Georgian takeoff and landing
strips in the very first days of the conflict remains incomprehensible.
One of the Tu-22M3 aircraft, which was involved with reconnaissance
based upon the Russian military leaders' assertion, was even shot down.
We must acknowledge the total level of losses - four aircraft - to be
satisfactory for this type and scale of operations, and also while taking
into account the powerful air defense, which was developed based upon
the Soviet medium-range Buk and long-range S-200 systems, which were
supplied by Ukraine.
• The truth is that we expected the more active employment of
helicopters by the Russian peacekeepers.
Exclusively Georgian Mi-24s, which flattened the Ossetian positions
and the peacekeepers' positions, were visible over the battlefield
in the first two days, at least if you believe the footage that was
taken and the numerous eyewitnesses.
At that time, where were the modernized Russian Mi-24s, and the
Ka-50 and Mi-28N helicopters that have been extensively
advertised and have already entered the inventory in small
quantities? It is incomprehensible...
It seems that there weren't even attempts to employ attack
helicopters, to which the zero or close to zero loss level attests. It
is possible that this turned out to be the best decision, while taking
into account the presence on the Georgian side of portable air
defense missiles and small caliber artillery. However, the question
remains: what are the generals planning to do in the future?
A program to supply hundreds of the latest helicopters to the
Russian Army inventory was quite recently made public. If now we
have ascertained that the helicopters for these operations are
inadequately armored, isn't it better to resume the construction of
modernized Su-25 ground attack aircraft in their place?
Otherwise, it turns out to be something absurd: the production of
the latest models is being increased, but when it comes down to it,
• On the other hand, it would be even more ridiculous in the 21 st century to
continue to fight using Soviet models, without attempting to completely
renew the arsenal.
In general, we must adhere to the golden rule: THE ARMY OF THE
VICTORIOUS COUNTRY ALSO MUST LOOK LIKE A VICTOR.
Otherwise, the deterrence factor is subjected to erosion. The enemy once
again can erroneously think that Russia is weak. And really it has already
occurred: in 1812, 1941, and now with Georgia...
However, we are not learning: our soldiers frequently seem to be ground-
down "weaklings", although they move mountains on the battlefield, and
the tanks and aircraft look like a heap of rusty iron, which has been lightly
covered with peeling paint.
"Obsolete weapons" can be adequately effective if you judge from the
purely utilitarian point of view. However, in the process, its external
appearance and age do not at all promote the formation of the deterrence
factor. And really, as it was pointed out long ago: the ideal weapon - that
is the weapon, which will do it in such a way that you will not have to
employ it.
The latest events have shown that Russia's deterrence factor has
experienced significant corrosion in the last two decades and its needs
"urgent resuscitation". If such a country as Georgia dared to attack the
Russian Armed Forces and Russian citizens, the situation, as they say, "has
reached the breaking point". Some sort of Latvia, while fulfilling the
American pre-election order and relying on NATO's protection, will begin a
military operation at some time for the "return" of Pytalovkskiy Rayon,
• The Russian leadership must seriously think about how it can restore the
deterrence factor. Having never been used even once, Russian nuclear
weapons are devaluing their deterrence potential with time and are
becoming an ineffective investment of resources.
The Georgian swagger is one of the examples, which confirms that
assertion.
And here it is impossible to get by with words or with military maneuvers.
Russia will have to unambiguously demonstrate in deeds at some point
that its leadership is adequately strong in order to employ all of the
weapons that it has in its arsenal, also not excluding nuclear weapons.
What's the sense of possessing these destructive weapons, if the
readiness to employ them has not been demonstrated in 60 years?!
If Russia's leadership is actually concerned about a fundamental increase
of the return from its growing military expenditures in the context of the
effective deterrence of aggression and ensuring a stable peace, it must
find the capability to demonstrate its resolve through the employment of
nuclear weapons.
We will consider this task to be the next "test" for the new president.
Otherwise, stronger states than Georgia will attempt to repeat aggression
against Russia sooner or later, while relying on their more state-of-the-art
and more numerous conventional armed forces.
Source:Ocnus.net 2008