Statutory

construction

B. Statutory construction
or judicial legislation

Statutory Construction,
whose job is it?
It belongs to the judiciary branch.
"To declare what the law shall be is a legislative
power, but to declare what the law is or has been
is judicial."

Definition
MERRIAM WEBSTER : laws held to
be created by the
pronouncements
of a judge who departs from a
strict interpretation of a law
according
to the manifest intention of the
legislature

Judicial Legislation and

and the separation of
powers
Branches of the government
1. Executive branch it has the power to
enforce law
2. legislative branch-The legislative branch,
which has the authority to make, alter or repeal
laws
3. Judicial branch- has the power to interpret
laws
Based on separation of powers judicial
legislation is illegal and superseding the
power given to judiciary.

Judicial Legislation and

and the separation of
powers
Judicial legislation sometimes called
judicial tyranny unfortunately, has
no clear distinction between judicial
interpretation.
As the judiciary is called upon to
regulate its actions and in a sense
establish its own boundaries.

When is it Construction
and When it is Judicial
Legislation?
It is when the judiciary go beyond
ruling of the law and deviated
from the legislative intent of the
statute or law. It is illegal and a
mere violation of the powers
vested in the different branches of
the government

Floresca vs Philex Mining

Corporation
" Copper Mining Worker's
Death benefit under
Workmen's Compensation Act
versus Damages"

 G.R. No. L-30642

April 30, 1985
PERFECTO S. FLORESCA, in his own behalf and on behalf of the minors
ROMULO and NESTOR S.
FLORESCA; and ERLINDA FLORESCA-GABUYO, PEDRO S. FLORESCA, JR., CELSO
S. FLORESCA,
MELBA S. FLORESCA, JUDITH S. FLORESCA and CARMEN S. FLORESCA;
LYDIA CARAMAT VDA. DE MARTINEZ in her own behalf and on behalf of her
minor children
LINDA, ROMEO, ANTONIO JEAN and ELY, all surnamed Martinez; and DANIEL
MARTINEZ and
TOMAS MARTINEZ;
SALUSTIANA ASPIRAS VDA. DE OBRA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her
minor children JOSE,
ESTELA, JULITA SALUD and DANILO, all surnamed OBRA;
LYDIA CULBENGAN VDA. DE VILLAR, in her own behalf and on behalf of her
minor children EDNA,
GEORGE and LARRY III, all surnamed VILLAR;
DOLORES LOLITA ADER VDA. DE LANUZA, in her own behalf and on behalf of
her minor children
EDITHA, ELIZABETH, DIVINA, RAYMUNDO, NESTOR and AURELIO, JR. all
surnamed LANUZA;

Summary
This is a case for petition done by relatives of miners that
died as a result of the cave in that buried them in tunnels
while working at the copper mines underground operation
in Tuba, benguet. They claim that they have the right of
selection between availing benefits from Workmen's
Compensation Act and suing for damages as a result of
negligence of philex mining corporation in protecting their
employees, or whether they may avail themselves
cumulatively of both action.
The Supreme Court Ruled in favor of the relatives and
stated that Even though they claimed the benefits from
Workmen's Compensation Act, such may not preclude them
on filing claims for damages as a result of negligence of the
corporation, though benefits claimed under the Workmen's
Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages
that may be decreed in their favor.

Facts:
On june 28, 1967 a copper mine site managed by Philex Mining
Corporation collapsed, leaving some mining workers, dead.
Petitioners which are relatives of the affected parties alleged
that the accident happened because of gross and reckless
negligence and imprudence and deliberate failure of Philex
Mining Corp to take the required precautions for the protection
of the lives of its men working underground that time. That they
(Philex Corp) allowed great amount of water and mud to
accumulate in an open pit area at the mine above certain block,
which leads to collapse of the underground support burying
the victims. Philex Mining Corporation insisted that the accident
was covered by the provision of the Workmen's Compensation
Act (Act 3428 as amended by RA 772) section 4 A which
imposes a 50 percent additional compensation in the event that
the employer was negligent and the Court of first instance of
manila has no jurisdiction on such matter for it is falls under the
job Workmen's Compensation Commissioner

Facts:
The petitioners filed an opposition, stating that
causes of
action were not based on the
provision of Workmen's Compensation Act, but
on the provision of Civil code
allowing the
award of actual, moral and exemplary damages,
hereby making the case fall under CFI's
jurisdiction.
The Court of First Instance held in favor of Philex
Mining
Corporation, dismissing the peetition for
lack of
jurisdiction hence the petitioner filed a
petition for review.

Issues:
Whether or not the relatives of the victims hence
the petitioners, have the right of selection
between availing themselves of the worker's right
under the Workmen's Compensation act and suing
in he regular courts under the Civil Code for
damages (actual, moral and exemplary) on the
basis of negligence by Philex Corporation or
whether they may avail themselves cumulatively
of both actions.
Does the CFI have jurisdiction over thee
complaint?

Held
Supreme Court held in favor of the petitioner. It was
held that claim of damages is different from benefit
under the workmen's compeensation act, because
such claim is based on negligence and protected
under the provision of the civil code. Hence, making it
also a jurisdiction of Court of first Instance. The legal
basis of this is based on the fact that employee and
employer has a contractual relationship and any
breach of contract may held liable, the party in bad
faith.
The rationale in awarding compnsation under the WCA
is based on thory of compensation distinct from the
eexisting theories of damages, payments under the
acts being made as a compensation not as damages.

Held:
The recovery under the act is not based on thee
actionable wrong done by the employer. In Murillo
vs Mendoza, it was held that the employer is
liable to pay under compensation acts, any
benefits for loss of income, as long as the death,
sickness or injury is work connected or work
aggravated, even if the death is not due to the
fault of the employer. Damages on th other hand
are given as an award to one as a vindication on
the wrongful invasion of his rights. The Provision
in Workmen's Compensation act under Workmen's
compensation commission now Employees
Compensation Commission did not contain any
award of actual, morla or exemplary damages.

Held:
The petitioner also has the right to chose between availing the
the fixed amounts set by WCA or to prosecute an ordinary civil
action for higher damage but he cannot pursue both (Pacana
vs Cebu Autobus Company, 32 SCRA 443). Though some of th
claimants already received The compensation from WCA, it
would not preclude them from bringing action before the
regular court because they became aware of the fact that
philex has been remiss in its contractual obligation with the
deceased miners only after receiving compensation under the
act.
If they were aware, they would not have sought it because of
lesser amount of compensation. It was an ignorance or a
mistake of fact and the law nullifies the choice because it
wasnt mad intelligently.
However, should the petitioner bee successful in their bid
before the lower court, the payments made under WCA should
be deducted from the damages in their favor.

Does the court commit

judicial legislation?
No its not, The court merely applies and give
effect to the constitutional guarantees of social
justice then secured by Section 6, 7 and 9 of
Article 14 of the 1935 constitution and now
Section 6,7 and 99 of article 11 of the
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STAT
POLICIEES OF THE 1973 CONSTITUTION as
amended, and as implemented by Articles 2176,
2177, 2178, 1173, 2201, 2216, 2231 and 2232 of
the New Civil Code of 1950.

 To emphasize, the 1935 Constitution declares

that:
Sec. 5. The promotion of social justice to insure
the well- being and economic security of all the
people should be the concern of the State (Art. II).
Sec. 6. The State shall afford protection to labor,
especially to
working women, and minors, and
shall regulate the relations between landowner
and tenant, and between labor and capital in
industry and in agriculture. The State may
provide for compulsory arbitration (Art. XIV).

 The foregoing constitutional guarantees in favor of

labor institutionalized in Section 9 of Article 11 of
the 1973 Constitution and re-stated as a
declaration of basic policy in Article 3 of the New
Labor Code, thus:
Art. 3. Declaration of basic policy.The State shall
afford protection to labor, promote full
employment, ensure equal work opportunities
regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the
relations between workers and employers. The
State shall assure the rights of workers to selforganization, collective bargaining, security of
tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.
(emphasis supplied).

 These constitutional principles cannot be impliedly repealed by the

restrictive provisions of Article 173 of th new Labor Code section 5
of workmen's Compensation Act (took effect june 10, 1928),
predecessor of article 173 of the new labor code, has been
supersede by the new civil code a subsequent law which took
effect August 30 1950. Article 173 of the New Labor Code seems to
diminish the rights of the workers and therefore collides with the
social justice guarantee of the Constitution and the liberal
provisions of the New Civil Code. Any doubts which may be
engendered by Art 173 of the new labor code should be resolved in
favor of the workers and employees. Article 1702 of the new civil
code directs that in case of doubt, all labor legislation must be
construed in favor of the safety and decent living of the laborer.
Article 173 didnt expressly or impliedly repeal the applicable
provision of the new civil code. It only expressly repeal section 699
of the revised administrative code, RA 1161 as amended, CA no
186 as amended, RA 4864 as amended and all other laws whose
benefit are administered by the system (GSIS or SSS)

 There is no ordinary statute can override

constitutional provision.It is therefore patent that
giving effct to social justic guarantees of the
Constitution, as implemented by the provisions of
the New Civil Code, is not an exercise of the
power of law making but is rendering obedience
to the mandates of fundamental law.

Dissenting Opinions
Melencio-Herrera

Compensation and damages are synonymous

The WCA remedy is exclusive
The WCA proceedings are a finished transaction
Even assuming that the remedies are selective, the
heirs made
their choice and have accepted th benefits thereof. If
they want to make a second eleection on the argument
that the first one is misinformed choic, they should
return the amounts they receive from WCA.
When the court givs effect not in accordance with the
intent of the lawmaker, the court is unjustifiably
legislating

Dissenting Opinions
Gutierrez jr.
It should be the legislature not the court, which
should remove the exclusionary provision of the
WCA
The WCA is a compromise.
The schedule of compensation, the rates of
payment, the compensable injuries and diseases,
the premiums paid by employers to the present
system, the actual stability of the trust and many
other inter related parts have all been carefully
studied before the integrated scheme was
enacted into law.

COURT OF APPEALS AND

MOLINA
"PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY"

REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and
RORIDEL OLAVIANO
MOLINA, respondents.

 Summary

The case at bar challlenges the decision made by

the Court of Appeals granting the marriage
between Reynaldo and Roridel Molina, Void on the
ground of psychological incapacity under article
36 of the Family Code. The Supreme court
reversed the decision and held that mere
irreconcilable differences and conflict in the
personality between the parties are not ground for
psychological incapacity. With such difficulties by
different court and lawyers in asserting
psychological incapacity, the Supreme Court laid
down guidelines.

Facts:
Roridel and Reynaldo Molina were marris on April 14, 1985
at San Agustin Church, Manila. They had 1 son named Andre
Molina. A year fter their marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of
immaturity and irreesponsibility, spending more tme with his
peers, was never honest with regards to finances and
depends to his parents for money. He was later relieved of
his job in manila since then, Roridel became the solee
breadwinner. There were frequent quarrels between them.
Roridel resigned eventually from her job and went to live
with her pareents in Baguio City. Reynaldo then leave her
and his son. On August 16 1990 Roridel filed a declaration
of nullity of their marriage on the grounds of psychological
incapacity. On Reynaldo's reply, he stated admitted that
they could not livee together. However,, he stated that their
misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to

Facts:
Roridel strange behavior on insisting to maintain
her group of friends even after they were married
2. Roridel's refusal to perform marital duties such
as cooking meals. 3. Roridel's failure to run the
household and handle their finances.

The RTC rendered the judgement declaring their

marriage null and void. The Office of solicitor
General, the petitioner filed an appeal in the CA
but denied hence raising it to Supreme court

Issue:

Whether or not the mariage between Reynaldo

and Roridel Molina, void on the grounds of
psychological incapacity.

Held:
The Supreme Court reverses the decision made by
RTC and CA making the marriage between
Reynaldo and Roridel subsists and remain valid.
Irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personality do not constitute psychological
incapacity. In Leouel vs CA, it stated that
psychological incapacity confined too the most
serious cases of personality disorders,
demonstrating insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated nd characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability

Held:
In this case, it is clearly showed that the
psychological defect is not an incapacity but
rather clinging towards difficulty, refusal and or
neglect.
The expert testimony made by their expert
witness Dr Sison Showed no incurable psychiatric
disorder but a mere incompatibility.
Facing with so many difficulties by trial courts in
the application of Article 36 of the family code,
The Supreme Court laid down specific guidelines
in the interpretation and application of the article

Held:
1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.
2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficientlyproven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological not physical. although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
not have given valid assumption thereof.

Held:
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at
"the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
4.Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in
regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.

Held:
6. The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should
be given great respect by our courts.

Held
8. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed
down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney,
shall submit to the court such certification within
fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the
defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

C. Legislative Intent, how

ascertained

How must Legislative Intent be ascertained

Legislative intent must be ascertained from the statute as
a whole.
The object of all interpretation and construction of
statutes is to ascertain the meaning and intention of the
legislature, to the end that the same may be enforced.
This legislative intent is primarily determined from the
language of the statute.
OPTIMA STATULI INTERPRETATIX EST IPSUM
STATUTUM The best interpreter of the statute is the
statute itself.
What is of prevailing importance is to discover the
legislative intent why the law is enacted.

 The courts honest belief that the legislature intended to

enact a law different to what it actually enacted is of no
moment. Neither can the courts determine whether the
statute is wise for that is not its duty. Its duty is to find out
the legislative intent, and this can be done by construing
the statute as a whole, by considering one part of the
statute in relation to other parts, and by harmonizing all the
provisions of the statute whenever possible.
It is to be presumed that the purpose of the legislature is to
make every part of the statute effective.
UT RES MAGIS QUAM PEREAT It is not enough that a
statute should be given effect as a whole but that effect
should be given to each of the provisions in the statute.
This rule applies to amendments because it is presumed
that the legislature, in making changes in the law, finds that
there is a necessity for said amendments. This is a
legislative function which is beyond the domain of the
courts.

Aisporna vs. CA (GR L-39419)

April 12, 1982
113 SCRA 459
Facts:
On 7 March and on 21 June 1969, a Personal Accident Policy was issued by Perla Compania de Seguros,
through its authorized agent Rodolfo Aisporna, for a period of 12 months with the beneficiary designated
as Ana M. Isidro. The insured died by violence during lifetime of policy. Mapalad Aisporna participated
actively with the aforementioned policy. For reason unexplained, an information was filed against
Mapalad Aisporna, Rodolfos wife, with the City Court of Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189 of the
Insurance Act on 21 November 1970, or acting as an agent in the soliciting insurance without securing
the certificate of authority from the office of the Insurance Commissioner. Mapalad contends that being
the wife of true agent, Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, as clerk, and that policy was merely
a renewal and was issued because Isidro had called by telephone to renew, and at that time, her
husband, Rodolfo, was absent and so she left a note on top of her husbands desk to renew. On 2 August
1971, the trial court found Mapalad guilty and sentenced here to pay a fine of P500.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. On appeal and on 14 August 1974, the trial
courts decision was affirmed by the appellate court (CA-GR 13243-CR). Hence, the present recourse was
filed on 22 October 1974. On 20 December 1974, the Office of the Solicitor General, representing the
Court of Appeals, submitted that Aisporna may not be considered as having violated Section 189 of the
Insurance Act.
Issue:
Whether Mapalad Aisporna is an insurance agent within the scope or intent of the Insurance Act
Held:
The appellate courts ruling that the petitioner is prosecuted not under the second paragraph of Section
189 but under its first paragraph is a reversible error, as the definition of insurance agent in paragraph 2
applies to the paragraph 1 and 2 of Section 189, which is any person who for compensation shall be an
insurance agent within the intent of this section. Without proof of compensation, directly or indirectly,
received from the insurance policy or contract, Mapalad Aisporna may not be held to have violated
Section 189 of the Insurance Act. The Supreme Court reversed the appealed judgment and acquitted the
accused of the crime charged, with costs de oficio.

ACT No. 2427

AN ACT REVISING THE INSURANCE LAWS
AND REGULATING INSURANCE BUSINESS IN THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS

Agents

SECTION 189.
No insurance company doing business within the Philippine Islands, nor any agent
thereof, shall pay any commission or other compensation to any person for services
in obtaining new insurance unless such person shall have first procured from the
Insurance Commissioner a certificate of authority to act as an agent of such company
hereinafter provided.

No person shall act as agent, subagent, or broker, in the solicitation or procurement

of applications for insurance, or receive for services in obtaining new insurance any
commission or other compensation from any insurance company doing business in
the Philippine Islands, or agent thereof, without first procuring a certificate of
authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner, which must be renewed
annually on the first day of January, or within six months thereafter. Such certificate
shall be issued by the Insurance Commissioner only upon the written application of
persons desiring such authority such application being approved and countersigned
by the company such person desires to represent, and shall be upon a form approved
by the Insurance Commissioner, giving such information as he many require. The
Insurance Commissioner shall have the right to refuse to issue or renew and to revoke
any such certificate in his discretion. No such certificate shall be valid, however, in
any event after the first day of July of the year following the issuing of such
certificate. Renewal certificates may be issued upon the application of the company.

Any person or company violating the provisions of this section shall be fined in the
sum of five hundred pesos. On the conviction of any person acting as agent,
subagent, or broker, of the commission of any offense connected with the business of
insurance, the Insurance Commissioner shall immediately revoke the certificate of

 China Banking Corporation and Tan Kim Liong vs. Hon. Wenceslao
Ortega and Vicente Acaban G.R. No. L-34964 Jan. 31, 1973
A petition for certiorari to review the orders dated Mar. 4 and Mar. 27, 1972
of the court of the first instance of Manila in civil case no. 75138.
FACTS
On Dec. 17, 1968, Vicente Acaban filed a complaint in court against
Bautista Logging Co., Inc. and B and B Forest Development Corporation and
Mariano Bautista for the collection of a sum of money. Since Mr. Bautista and
the two companies failed to answer within the reglementary period, the court
agrees to receive Mr. Acabans evidence. With the order of the court, B and B
Forest Development Corporation would have to garnish its bank deposit with
China Banking Corporation in which, Mr. Tan Kim Liong is the cashier. Mr.
Liong refused to garnish such document citing the provisions of RA 1405 that
it prohibits the disclosure of any information relative to bank deposits. Mr.
Acaban filed a motion to cite Mr. Liong in contempt in court, however, the
court denied such motion on Mar. 4, 1972, instead, he was ordered by the
court to inform/confirm if B and B Forest Development Corporation was a
deposit with China Banking Corporation, to hold it intact and not allow any
withdrawal until further order from the court.
On Mar. 27, 1972, the court again ordered Mr. Liong to comply with the
courts order on Mar. 4, 1972 otherwise; he will be arrested by the court. Thus
this case was filed by herein petitioners.
It is the petitioners argument that the disclosure ordered by the court does
not fall under the exceptions stated under Sec. 2 of RA 1405 and that if, Mr.
Liong garnish such bank deposit, he may be criminally liable under Sec. 5 of
the same RA and that B and B Forest Development Corporation may press

 ISSUE
Whether a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a
court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor by
invoking the provisions of RA 1405.
RULING/HELD
The lower court did not order an examination or inquiry into the
deposit of B and B Forest Development Corporation, it merely required
Mr. Liong to give light whether defendant B and B Forest Development
Corporation has a deposit with China Banking Corporation only for the
purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold
the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further notice by
court.
The prohibition against examination or inquiry into a bank deposit
under RA 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to insure
satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed, there is no real inquiry in such a
case, and if the existence of the deposit is disclosed, the disclosure is
purely incidental to the execution process.
The court stands with the judgment of the lower court and thus
affirms its order dated Mar. 4 and Mar. 27, 1972 with cost against the
petitioners.

REPUBLIC ACT NO.1405

AN ACT PROHIBITING DISCLOSURE OF OR INQUIRY
INTO, DEPOSITS WITH ANY BANKING INSTITUTION
AND PROVIDING PENALTY THEREFOR
SECTION 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government to give
encouragement to the people to deposit their money in banking institutions
and to discourage private hoarding so that the same may be properly utilized
by banks in authorized loans to assist in the economic development of the
country.
SECTION 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking
institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued
by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its
instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely
confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into
by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon
written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or
upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of
duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or
invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
SECTION 3. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of a banking
institution to disclose to any person other than those mentioned in Section two
hereof any information concerning said deposits.
SECTION 4. All Acts or parts of Acts, Special Charters, Executive Orders, Rules
and Regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
hereby repealed.
SECTION 5. Any violation of this law will subject offender upon conviction, to
an imprisonment of not more than five years or a fine of not more than twenty
thousand pesos or both, in the discretion of the court.

Board of Administrators, Philippine Veterans Administration vs. Hon. Jose G.

Bautista and Calixto V. Gasilao G.R. No. L-37867 Feb. 22, 1982

Present case is a petition to review on certiorari the 27 Oct. 1973 civil case no. 90450.

FACTS
Mr. Gasilao is a veteran in good standing during World War II. Due to his service, he was
rendered disabled. The Philippine Veterans Administration (PVA), formerly the Philippine
Veterans Board, now Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO), is an agency of the
government charged with the administration of different laws giving various benefits in
favor of veterans and their orphans or widows and parents. It is PVAs job to implement the
rules and regulations governing veterans affairs.
On July 23, 1955, Mr. Gasilao filed a claim for disability pension under sec. 9 of RA 65.
Alleging he was suffering from PTB which he incurred in the line of duty. Due to failure to
complete his supporting papers to back his claim, petition was denied on Dec. 18, 1955.
On Aug. 8, 1968, he was able to complete his supporting documents and after due
investigation and processing, PVA found out that his disability is 100%, thus he was awarded
the full benefits of section 9 of RA 65 and was given a pension of Php.100/month and with
an additional Php.10/month for each of his unmarried minor children pursuant to RA 1920,
amending section 9 of RA 65.
RA 5753 was approved on June 22, 1969, providing for an increase in the basic pension to
Php.200/month and the additional pension of Php.30/month for the wife and each of the
unmarried minor children. Petitioners pension was only increase on Jan. 15, 1971, and by
25% of the increase provided by law, due to the fact that it was only on the said date that
the funds were released for the purpose, and the amount so released was only sufficient to
pay only 25% of the increase. On Jan. 15, 1972, more funds were released to implement
fully RA 5753 and pay in full the benefits of Veterans.
The court ruled in favor of Mr. Gasilao and that PVA is ordered to make the pension of
petitioner effective in Dec. 18, 1955 at the rate of Php50/month; and the increase of rate to
Php100/month plus Php10/month each of his ten (10) unmarried minor children from June
22, 1957 up to Aug. 7, 1968; to pay the difference of Php100/month plus Php30/month and
Php20/month each for his ten (10) unmarried children below 18 years of age from June 22,
1969 up to Jan. 15, 1971; the difference of Php.75/month plus Php.22.50/month for his wife
and Php20/month each for his unmarried minor children below 18 years of age from Jan. 16,
1971 up to Dec. 31, 1971.

Issue:
1. The lower Court erred in ordering the petitioners to retroact the
effectivity of their award to respondent Calixto V. Gasilao of full
benefits under section 9 of RA 65 to December 18, 1955, the date
when his application was disapproved due to his failure to complete
his supporting papers and submit evidence to establish his service
connected illness, and not August 8, 1968, the date when he was
able to complete his papers and allow processing and approval of
his application.
2. The lower Court erred in ordering payment of claims which had
prescribed.
3. The lower Court erred in allowing payment of claims under a law
for which no funds had been released.
RULING/HELD
1. The court ruled that Gasilaos pension benefits should retroact to
the date of the disapproval of his claim on Dec. 18, 1955 and not
commence from the approval on Aug. 8 1968. Mr. Gasilaos claim
was merely suspended due to lack of supporting papers and
evidence to establish his service related illness.

 2. Republic Act 65 is a veteran pension law which must be accorded a liberal construction and
interpretation in order to favor those entitled to the rights, privileges and benefits granted
thereunder, among which are the right to resume old positions in the government, educational
benefits, the privilege to take promotional examinations, a life pension for the incapacitated,
pensions for widow and children, hospitalization and medical care benefits.
The purpose of the law in granting veteran pensions is to compensate, as far as may be, a class
of men who suffered in the service for the hardships they endured and the dangers they
encountered,and more particularly, those who have become incapacitated for work owing to
sickness, disease or injuries sustained while in line of duty.A veteran pension law is, therefore, a
governmental expression of gratitude to and recognition of those who rendered service for the
country, especially during times of war or revolution, by extending to them regular monetary aid.
For this reason, it is the general rule that a liberal construction is given to pension statutes in
favor of those entitled to pension. Courts tend to favor the pensioner, but such constructional
preference is to be considered with other guides to interpretation, and a construction of pension
laws must depend on its own particular language.
3. The third ground relied upon in support of this Petition involves the issue as to whether or not
the payment of increased pension provided in the amendatory Act, R.A. 5753, could be ordered,
even where there was no actual release of funds for the purpose, although the law itself
expressly provided for an appropriation.
We refrain from ordering the petitioner to pay the amountof P120.00 per month from January 1,
1972 that isdue to the respondent by virtue ofthe mandate of section 9 of Republic Act 65, as
amended by Republic Act 5753,because the Government has thus far not provided the
necessary fundsto pay all valid claims duly approved under the authority of said statute.
Thus the court ordered PVA to make Mr. Gasilaos pension effective Dec. 18, 1955 at the rate of
Php.50/month plus Php.10/month for each of his then unmarried minor children below 18, and
the amount increased to Php.100/month from June 22, 1957 to Aug. 7, 1968.
The differentials in pension to which said Gasilao, his wife and his unmarried minor children
below 18 are entitled for the period from June 22, 1969 to January 14, 1972 by virtue of Republic
Act No. 5753 are hereby declared subject to the availability of Government funds appropriated
for the purpose.

D. Power to construe

Construction is a
judicial function.
It is the court that has the final word as to what the
law means.
It construes laws, as to decide what the cases based
on the fact and the law involved.

Power to Construe
Legislature cannot overrule
the judicial construction.
It cannot preclude the courts from the statutes from
different interpretations.
Legislative they enact laws.
Executive to execute laws.
Judicial interpretation and application.
If the legislature may declare what the law means it will
cause confusion. It will be violative of the fundamental
principles of what the constitution of separation of powers.
Legislative construction is called the resolution of
declaratory act.

Power to Construe
When Judicial
interpretation may be
set aside.
Interpretations may be set aside, the interpretation
of statute or a constitutional provision by the courts
is not so sacrosanct as to be beyond modification
and nullification.
The supreme court itself may, in appropriate case
may change and overrule its previous construction.

Power to Construe

When courts may

construe statute.
The court may construe statute where there is
Doubt and Ambiguity.
Ambiguity a condition where the word that has 2 or
more meanings
Only when the law is ambiguous or doubtful.

Power to Construe
Courts may not construe
where the statute is clear.
A statute that is clear and unambiguous is not
susceptible of interpretations.
First and fundamental duty of court Apply the law
Construction very Last function which the court
should exercise.
Courts cannot enlarge or limit the law if it is clear
and free from ambiguity.
A meaning that does not appear not is intended or
reflected in the very language of the statute cannot
be placed therein by construction.

Power to Construe
Rulings of the supreme
court part of the legal
system.
Art. 8. cc judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the constitution shall form part of the
legal system of the Philippines.
Legis interpratato legis vim obtinet authoritative
interpretation of the supreme court of the statutes
acquires the force of the law by becoming a part
thereof as of the date of its enactment, since the
courts interpretation merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the statute
thus construed intends to effectuate.

Power to construe
Rulings of the Supreme Court
part of the legal system.
Stare decisis et non quieta novere - when the Supreme
court once laid down a principle of law as applicable to
a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that the
principle and apply it to all future cases, where the facts
are substantially the same.
For the stability and certainty.

Supreme court becomes, to the extent applicable, the

criteria that must control the actuations not only of
those called upon to abide thereby but also those dutybound to enforce obedience
Supreme court rulings are binding on inferior courts.

Power to Construe
Judicial rulings have not
retroactive effect.
Lex prospicit not repicit - the law looks forward, not
backward.
Rationale retroactive application of the law usually
divest rights that have already become vested or
impairs the obligations of contract and hence its
unconstitutional.

Power to Construe
Only Supreme court en banc
can modify or abandon the
principle of law, not any
division of the court.
no division of the court has the power to modify or
reverse a doctrine or principle of law enunciated by
either another division of the court of the court en
banc, except the court itself.

Power to construe
Courts may issue guidelines in
construing statute.
In Construing a statute, the enforcement of which
may tread on sensitive areas of constitutional rights,
the court may issue guidelines in applying the
statute, not to enlarge or restrict it but clearly
delineate what the law is.

E. Limitations on power to construe

Courts may not enlarge nor

restrict statutes.
Courts are not authorized to insert into the law what they
think should be in it or to supply what they the legislature
would have supplied if its intention had been called to the
ommision.
They should not by construction, revise even the most
arbitrary or unfair action of the legislature, nor rewrite the
law to conform to what they think should be in the law.
Neither should the courts construe statutes which are
perfectly vague for its violation.
Failure to accord persons fair notice of the conduct to avoid.
Leave law enforces unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions.

Limitation on power to construe

Courts may not enlarge nor
restricts statutes.
Two leading starts on judicial construction.
Good faith
Commonsense

An utterly vague act on its face cannot be clarified

by either a saving clause or by connection.

Limitations on power to construe

Courts not to be influence

by question of wisdom.
Courts do not sit to resolve the merit of conflicting
theories.
Courts do not pass upon question of wisdom, justice
or expediency of legislation, for its not within their
province to supervise legislation and keep within the
bounds of commonsense.
The court merely interpret regardless of whether or
not the wise or salutary.

 Aids in determining the intention of the legislature:

1. Intrinsic Aids elements found in the law itself.
Title expresses the subject matter of the law
Preamble state the reasons or the objectives of the enactment
Words, Phrases and Sentences, Context intention of the legislature
must primarily be determined from the language of the statue
Punctuation
Headings and Marginal Notes
Legislative definition and interpretation

2. Extrinsic Aids Facts or matters not found in the law

Contemporaneous Circumstances the conditions existing at the
time the law was enacted, the reason why the law was enacted
Policy
Legislative History of the Statute
Contemporaneous or practical construction
Executive construction
Legislative construction
Judicial Construction
Construction by the bar and legal commentators

Presumptions Based on logic or established

provision of law

3.

Validity
Constitutionality
Good Faith

Against Injustice
Against Inconsistency
Against Absurdity
Against In effectiveness
Against Irrepealable Laws
Against Implied Repeals
Against Violation of Public Policy
Knowledge of Existing Law
Acquiescence to Judicial Construction
Jurisdiction
Acting Within the Scope of Authority
Against Violation of International Law

Sample cases:
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Social Security Commission
(GR L-15045, 20 January 1961)
Facts:
The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila filed with the Social Security
Commission a request that the all religious and charitable institutions and
organization operated by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila be exempted
from the compulsory coverage of the Social Security Law of 1954. The request
was based on the claim that the said Act is a labor law and does not cover
religious and charitable institutions but is limited to businesses and activities
organized for profit. The request was denied by the Social Security Commission.
Issue:
Whether the charitable institution and organization operated by the Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila be exempted from the monthly contributions to
the System.
Decision:
The decision of the Social Security Commission are hereby affirmed.

 Section 9 of the Social Security Law, as amended, provides that

coverage "in the System shall be compulsory upon all members
between the age of sixteen and sixty rears inclusive, if they have been
for at least six months a the service of an employer who is a member
of the System, Provided, that the Commission may not compel any
employer to become member of the System unless he shall have been
in operation for at least two years and has at the time of admission, if
admitted for membership during the first year of the System's
operation at least fifty employees, and if admitted for membership the
following year of operation and thereafter, at least six employees x x
x."
The term employer as used in the law is defined as any person,
natural or juridical, domestic or foreign, who carries in the Philippines
any trade, business, industry, undertaking, or activity of any kind and
uses the services of another person who is under his orders as regards
the employment, except the Government and any of its political
subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities, including corporations
owned or controlled by the Government" (par. [c], see. 8),
while an "employee" refers to "any person who performs services for
an 'employer' in which either or both mental and physical efforts are
used and who receives compensation for such services" (par. [d], see.
8).

 "Employment", according to paragraph [i] of said

section 8, covers any service performed by an
employer except those expressly enumerated
thereunder,
like
employment
under
the
Government, or any of its political subdivisions,
branches or instrumentalities including corporations
owned and controlled by the Government, domestic
service in a private home, employment purely
casual, etc.
the Social Security Law was enacted pursuant to the
"policy of the Republic of the Philippines to develop,
establish gradually and perfect a social security
system which shall be suitable to the needs of the
people throughout the Philippines and shall provide
protection to employees against the hazards of
disability, sickness, old age and death." (See. 2,
Republic Act No. 1161, as amended.)

 David vs. Commission on Election 271 SCRA 90 (GR 127116 April 8, 1997)
Facts:

Petitioner Alex L. David, who is elected as a barangay chairman on the

second Monday of May 1994 , filed a petition to prohibit the holding of the
barangay election scheduled on the second Monday of May 1997.
Petitioners6contend that under Sec. 2 of Republic Act No. 6653, approved
on May 6, 1988, "(t)he term of office of barangay officials shall be for five
(5) years . . ." This is reiterated in Republic Act No. 6679, approved on
November 4, 1988, which reset the barangay elections from "the second
Monday of November 1988" to March 28, 1989 and provided that such
five-year term shall begin on the "first day of May 1989 and ending on the
thirty-first day of May 1994."
Petitioners averts that although Sec. 43 of RA 7160 reduced the term of
office of all local elective officials to three years, such reduction does not
apply to barangay officials because

(1) RA 6679 is a special law applicable only to barangays while RA 7160

is a general law which applies to all other local government units;

(2) RA 7160 does not expressly or impliedly repeal RA 6679 insofar as

the term of barangay officials is concerned;

(3) while Sec. 8 of Article X of the 1987 constitution fixes the term of
elective local officials at three years, the same provision states that the
term of barangay officials "shall be determined by law";

 and (4) thus, it follows that the constitutional

intention is to grant barangay officials any term,
except three years; otherwise, "there would be no
rhyme or reason for the framers of the Constitution
to except barangay officials from the three year term
found in Sec. 8 (of) Article X of the Constitution.
Issue:

1. Which law governs the term of office of

barangay official: RA 7160 or RA 6679?

2. Is RA 7160 insofar as it shortened such term to

only three years constitutional?

3. Are petitioners estopped from claiming a term

other than that provided under RA 7160?.
Decision:

The petitions are devoid of merit.

 First Issue:

RA 7160, the Local Government Code, was enacted later than RA

6679. It is basic that in case of an irreconciliable conflict between two
laws of different vintages, the later enactment prevails. The rationale is
simple: a later law repeals an earlier one because it is the later legislative
will. It is to be presumed that the lawmakers knew the older law and
intended to change it. In enacting the older law, the legislators could not
have known the newer one and hence could not have intended to change
what they did not know. Under the Civil Code, laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones and not the other way around.
Second Issue:
Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution states:

The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,

which shall be determined by law, shall be three years, and no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which
he was elected.

To the question at issue here on how long the term of barangay

officials is, the answer of the Commission was simple, clear and quick:
"As may be determined by law"; more precisely, "(a)s provided for in the
Local Autonomy Code." And the Local Autonomy Code, in its Sec. 43-c,
limits their term to three years.

 Third Issue:

BARANGAY 77
CERTIFIED LIST OF CANDIDATES
VOTES OBTAINED
May 9, 1994 BARANGAY ELECTIONS
PUNONG BARANGAY VOTES OBTAINED

1.

DAVID, ALEX L. 112

.

1.

KAGAWAD
Magalona, Ruben 150
2. Quinto, Nelson L. 130
3. Ramon, Dolores Z. 120
4. Dela Pena, Roberto T. 115
5. Castillo, Luciana 114
6. Lorico, Amy A. 107
7. Valencia, Arnold 102
8. Ang, Jose 97
9. Dequilla, Teresita D. 58
10. Primavera, Marcelina 52

If, as claimed by petitioners, the applicable law is RA 6679, then (1) Petitioner David
should not have run and could not have been elected chairman of his barangay because
under RA 6679, there was to be no direct election for the punong barangay; the kagawad
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes was to be automatically elected
barangay chairman; (2) thus, applying said law, the punong barangay should have been
Ruben Magalona, who obtained the highest number of votes among the kagawads 150,
which was much more than David's 112; (3) the electorate should have elected only seven
kagawads and not one punong barangay plus seven kagawads.

IV.
Interpretation
of Statutes

A. Literal Construction
General Rule
The intent of the legislature is found in the
language of the statute.
Presumption
The words employed by the legislature in a
statute correctly express its intention or will and
preclude the court from construing it differently.

A. Literal Construction
Verba Legis (Plain Meaning Rule)
Where the statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without interpretation.
Where the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no room for interpretation.
There is only room for application.
Law cannot be changed under the guise of
interpretation.

A. Literal Construction
Reasons
A statute, being the will of the legislature, should
be applied in exactly the way the legislature has
expressed itself clearly in the law.
The duty of the court is limited to inquiring into
the legislative intent and, once this is determined,
to making said intent effective.

SALVATIERRA v. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS
Facts

Enrique Salvatierra died intestate and without

any issue. He was survived by his legitimate
brothers Tomas, Bartolome, Venancio and
Macario, and sister Marcela, all surnamed
Salvatierra. His estate consisted of three (3)
parcels of land Lot Numbers 25 (containing an
area of 1,116 sq. m. more or less), 26
(containing an area of 749 sq. m. more or less)
and 27 (containing an area of 670 sq. m. more
or less).

SALVATIERRA v. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS

On May 4, 1966, Macario Salvatierra

sold Lot No. 26 to his son, Anselmo
Salvatierra by means of a deed of sale.
Meanwhile, Marcela, prior to her death
sold her 1/5 undivided share to her
brother, Venancio.

SALVATIERRA v. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS
On September 24, 1968, an "Extrajudicial Partition with
Confirmation of Sale" was executed by and among the
surviving legal heirs and descendants of Enrique
Salvatierra, which consisted of Lot Numbers 25, 26 and
27. By virtue of the sale executed by Marcela in favor
of Venancio, the latter now owns 2/5 shares of the
estate. Anselmo Salvatierra represented his father
Macario, who had already died. Therefore, by virtue of
the said extrajudicial partition, Venancio and Anselmo,
got the following undivided shares:
VENANCIO SALVATIERRA Whole of Lot No. 27 and
344 sq. m. of LotNo. 26
Macario Salvatierra now ANSELMO SALVATIERRA

SALVATIERRA v. THE
HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS

Thereafter, Venancio sold the whole of Lot No. 27 and a

149 sq. m. portion of Lot 26 to respondent spouses Lino
Longalong and Paciencia Mariano Longalong. The
Longalongs took possession of the said lots. It was
discovered in 1982 (through a relocation survey) that
the 149 sq. m. portion of Lot No. 26 was outside their
fence. It turned out that Anselmo Salvatierra was able to
obtain an original certificate of title in his name, the title
covering the whole of Lot No. 26.
Efforts to settle the matter at the barangay level proved
futile because Purita Salvatierra (widow of Anselmo)
refused to yield to the demand of Lino Longalong to
return to the latter the 149 sq. m. portion of Lot No. 26.

SALVATIERRA v. THE
HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS
Issue

Whether Lino Longalong and Paciencia Mariano

Longalong are entitled to the reconveyance of 149
sq. m. of Lot No. 26. Yes!

SALVATIERRA v. THE
HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS
Ruling

The Supreme Court found no ambiguity in the terms and stipulations of the
extrajudicial partition. The terms of the agreement are clear and
unequivocal, hence the literal and plain meaning thereof should be
observed. The applicable provision of law in the case at bar is Article 1370
of the New Civil Code which states:
Art. 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon
the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulation shall control.
Contracts which are the private laws of the contracting parties, should be
fulfilled according to the literal sense of their stipulations, if their terms are
clear and leave no room for doubt as to the intention of the contracting
parties, for contracts are obligatory, no matter what their forms maybe,
whenever the essential requisites for their validity are present.

KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MANILA

RAILROAD COMPANY CREDIT UNION, INC. v. MANILA
RAILROAD COMPANY
Facts
In this mandamus petition dismissed by the lower court,
petitioner-appellant would seek a reversal of such decision
relying on what it considered to be a right granted by Section
62 of the Republic Act (RA) No. 2023, more specifically the
first two paragraphs thereof: "... (1) A member of a
cooperative may, notwithstanding the provisions of existing
laws, execute an agreement in favor of the co-operative
authorizing his employer to deduct from the salary or wages
payable to him by the employer such amount as may be
specified in the agreement and to pay the amount so
deducted to the co-operative in satisfaction of any debt or
other demand owing from the member to the co-operative.
(2) Upon the exemption of such agreement the employer
shall if so required by the co-operative by a request in writing
and so long as such debt or other demand or any part of it
remains unpaid, make the claimant and remit forth with the
amount so deducted to the co-operative.

KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MANILA

RAILROAD COMPANY CREDIT UNION, INC. v. MANILA
RAILROAD COMPANY
Issue
Whether Republic Act (RA) No. 2023, indeed, gives
first priority in the matter of payment to the
obligations of employees in favor of their credit
unions. No!

KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MANILA

RAILROAD COMPANY CREDIT UNION, INC. v. MANILA
RAILROAD COMPANY
Ruling
As can be clearly seen, there is nothing in the provision of RA 2023 which
provides that obligation of laborers and employees payable to credit unions
shall enjoy first priority in the deduction from the employees' wages and
salaries. The only effect of RA No. 2023 is to compel the employer to deduct
from the salaries or wages payable to members of the employees' cooperative
credit unions the employees' debts to the union and to pay the same to the
credit union. In other words, if RA No. 2023 had been enacted, the employer
could not be compelled to act as the collecting agent of the employees' credit
union for the employees' debt to his credit union but to contend that the debt
of a member of the employees cooperative credit union as having first priority
in the matter of deduction, is to write something into the law which does not
appear. In other words, the mandatory character of RA 2023 is only to compel
the employer to make the deduction of the employees' debt from the latter's
salary and turn this over to the employees' credit union but this mandatory
character does not convert the credit union's credit into a first priority credit. If
the legislative intent in enacting pars. 1 and 2 of Sec. 62 of RA No. 2023 were
to give first priority in the matter of payments to the obligations of employees
in favor of their credit unions, then, the law would have so expressly declared.
Thus, the express provisions of the New Civil Code, Articles 2241, 2242 and
2244 show the legislative intent on preference of credits.

a. DEPARTURE FROM LITERAL

INTERPRETATION
ABELLANA vs. MARAVE G.R. No. L-27760, 29 May 1974
FACTS:
The petitioner, Francisco Abellana was prosecuted for the crime of
physical injuries through reckless imprudence. The criminal case was
filed at the City Court of Ozamis City, which found the accused guilty
as charged, damages in favor of the offended parties. Francisco
Abellana appealed such decision to the CFI.
The private respondents as the offended parties filed a separate and
independent civil action for damages at the CFI of Misamis
Occidental. The petitioner, then, sought for the dismissal of such
action principally on the ground that there was no reservation for
the filing thereof in the City Court of Ozamis City. It was argued by
the petitioner that filing of a separate and independent civil action is
not allowable at the stage where the criminal case is already on
appeal (Sec 1, Rule 111, Rules of Court).
The respondent judge, Honorable Geronimo Marave denied the
petition.

ABELLANA vs. MARAVE G.R. No. L27760, 29 May 1974

ISSUE:
Whether the offended parties may file a separate and
independent civil action for damages while the criminal
case is already on appeal.
RULING:
The petitioner's literal reading of Section 1, Rule 111: ?
That a separate civil action can be legally filed and
allowed by the Court only at the institution, or the right
to file such separate civil action reserved or waived, at
such institution of the criminal action, and never appeal
to the next higher court,? had failed them to take into
account the rule as to a trial de novo found in Section
7, Rule 123: ?An appealed case shall be tried in all
respects anew in the CFI as if it had been originally
instituted in that Court.?

PARAS vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 123169, 4 November 1996
FACTS:
The petitioner, Danilo Paras was the incumbent Punong
Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won the last regular
local election in 1994. A petition for his recall was filed by the
registered voters of the barangay. The recall election was set
on 1996 but was opposed by the petitioner invoking Section
74(b) of R.A. No. 7160: ?No recall shall take place within one
year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one
year immediately preceding a regular election.? Petitioner
insists that the scheduled recall election was barred as the
SK election was set on the first Monday of May 1996.
ISSUE:
Whether the SK election may be considered as a regular
election.

PARAS vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 123169, 4 November
1996
RULING:

The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an

elective official to recall election once during his
term of office. Thus, subscribing to petitioner's
interpretation of the phrase regular local election
to include SK election will unduly circumscribe the
provision of the Local Government Code on recall
for there will never be as such.

B. Executive Construction
Types of Executive Interpretation
1. Construction by an executive or
administrative
officer directly called to interpret the
law
May be expressed interpretation embodied in a
circular, directive, or regulation
May be implied practice or mode of
enforcement of not applying the statute to certain
situations or of applying it in a particular manner

B. Executive Construction
2. Construction by the Secretary of
Justice in his capacity as the chief
legal adviser of the government
3. Interpretation handed down in
an adversary proceeding in the
form of a ruling by anexecutive
officer exercising quasi-judicial
power.

B. Executive Construction
Basic rule on Executive Construction
Rules and regulations issued by executive
or administrative officers pursuant to, and
as authorized by, law have the force and
effect of laws
Thus, interpretation by those charged with
their enforcement is entitled to great
weight by the Court in the latters rules
and regulations
An administrative agency has the power to
interpret its own rules and such
interpretation becomes part of the rules

PAFLU vs. Bureau of Labor

Relations
The court still and should respect
the contemporaneous
construction placed upon a
statute by the executive officers
whose duty is to enforce it, and
unless such interpretation is
clearly erroneous will ordinarily be
controlled thereby.

When Executive Construction is

not given weight
Where there is no ambiguity in the law
Where the construction is clearly
erroneous
Where strong reason to the contrary
exists
Where the court has previously given
the statute a different interpretation

Phil. Apparel Workers Union vs

NLRC
There was no grant of said increases yet,
despite thecontrary opinion expressed in the
letter of the Undersecretary of Labor. It must
be noted that the letter was based on a
wrong premise or representation on the part
of the company. The construction or
explanation of Labor Undersecretary is not
only wrong as it was purely based on a
misapprehension of facts, but also unlawful
because it goes beyond the scope of the law.
The Supreme Court set aside the decision of
the commission, and ordered the company to
pay, in addition to the increased allowance
provided for in PD 1123.

IBAA Employees Union v. Inciong

GR L52415, 23 October 1984 (132 SCRA 663)
Facts: On June 20, 1975, the Union filed a complaint against the
bank for the payment of holiday pay before the then Department of
Labor, National Labor Relations Commission, Regional Office IV in
Manila. Conciliation having failed, and upon the request of both
parties, the case was certified for arbitration on 7 July 1975. On 25
August 1975, Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano rendered a decision in
the above-entitled case, granting petitioners complaint for payment
of holiday pay. Respondent bank did not appeal from the said
decision. Instead, it complied with the order of the Labor Arbiter by
paying their holiday pay up to and including January 1976.
On 16 December 1975, Presidential Decree 850 was promulgated
amending, among others, the provisions of the Labor Code on the
right to holiday pay. Accordingly, on 16 February 1976, by authority
of Article 5 of the same Code, the Department of Labor (now Ministry
of Labor) promulgated the rules and regulations for the
implementation of holidays with pay. The controversial section
thereof reads as Status of employees paid by the month.
Employees who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the
number of working days therein, with a salary of not less than the
statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid
for all days in the month whether worked or not. On 23 April 1976,
Policy Instruction 9 was issued by the then Secretary of Labor (now
Minister) interpreting the above-quoted rule.The bank, by reason of
the ruling laid down by the rule implementing Article 94 of the Labor

Facts:
On 30 August 1976, the Union filed a motion for a writ of execution to
enforce the arbiters decision of 25 August 1975, which the bank
opposed. On 18 October 1976, the Labor Arbiter, instead of issuing a
writ of execution, issued an order enjoining the bank to continue paying
its employees their regular holiday pay. On 17 November 1976, the bank
appealed from the order of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC. On 20 June
1978, the NLRC promulgated its resolution en banc dismissing the
banks appeal, and ordering the issuance of the proper writ of
execution. On 21 February 1979, the bank filed with the Office of the
Minister of Labor a motion for reconsideration/appeal with urgent prayer
to stay execution. On 13 August 1979,s the NLRC issued an order
directing the Chief of Research and Information of the Commission to
compute the holiday pay of the IBAA employees from April 1976 to the
present in accordance with the Labor Arbiter dated 25 August 1975. On
10 November 1979, the Office of the Minister of Labor, through Deputy
Minister Amado G. Inciong, issued an order setting aside the resolution
en banc of the NLRC dated 20 June 1978, and dismissing the case for
lack of merit. Hence, the petition for certiorari charging Inciong with
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether the Ministry of Labor is correct in determining that monthly paid employees are
excluded from the benefits of holiday pay.
Held: From Article 92 of the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree 850, and
Article 82 of the same Code, it is clear that monthly paid employees are not excluded from
the benefits of holiday pay. However, the implementing rules on holiday pay promulgated
by the then Secretary of Labor excludes monthly paid employees from the said benefits by
inserting, under Rule IV, Book Ill of the implementing rules, Section 2, which provides that:
employees who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working
days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established minimum wage
shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or not. Even if
contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by executive officers whose duty is
to enforce it is given great weight by the courts, still if such construction is so erroneous,
the same must be declared as null and void. So long, as the regulations relate solely to
carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they are valid. Where an administrative order
betrays inconsistency or repugnancy to the provisions of the Act, the mandate of the Act
must prevail and must be followed. A rule is binding on the Courts so long as the
procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory
authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the
policy stated therein or its innate wisdom. Further, administrative interpretation of the law
is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the order of the Deputy Minister of
Labor, and reinstated the 25 August 1975 decision of the Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano

Chartered Bank Employees Association

v. Ople
GR L-44717, 28 August 1985 (138 SCRA
273)
FACTS:
On 20 May 1975, the Chartered Bank Employees Association, in representation of its
monthly paid employees/members, instituted a complaint with the Regional Office IV,
Department of Labor, now Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) against Chartered
Bank, for the payment of 10 unworked legal holidays, as well as for premium and
overtime differentials for worked legal holidays from 1 November 1974.
Both the arbitrator and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ruled in favor
of the petitioners ordering the bank to pay its monthly paid employees the holiday pay
and the premium or overtime pay differentials to all employees who rendered work
during said legal holidays.
On appeal, the Minister of Labor set aside the decision of the NLRC and dismissed the
petitioners claim for lack of merit basing its decision on Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of
the Integrated Rules and Policy Instruction 9, claiming the rule that If the monthly paid
employee is receiving not less than P240, the maximum monthly minimum wage, and
his monthly pay is uniform from January to December, he is presumed to be already
paid the 10 paid legal holidays. However, if deductions are made from his monthly
salary on account of holidays in months where they occur, then he is still entitled to the
10 paid legal holidays.
Issue:
Whether the Ministry of Labor is correct in maintaining that monthly paid employees
are not entitled to the holiday pay nor all employees who rendered work during said
legal holidays are entitled to the premium or overtime pay differentials

Held:
In the present case, the provisions of the Labor Code on the entitlement to the
benefits of holiday pay are clear and explicit, it provides for both the coverage of
and exclusion from the benefit. In Policy Instruction 9, the Secretary of Labor went
as far as to categorically state that the benefit is principally intended for daily
paid employees, when the law clearly states that every worker shall be paid their
regular holiday pay.
It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and, when necessary, correct constitutional
(and/or statutory) interpretation, in the context of the interactions of the three
branches of the government, almost always in situations where some agency of
the State has engaged in action that stems ultimately from some legitimate area
of governmental power. Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Rules to implement the
Labor Code and Policy Instruction was declared null and void in IBAAEU v. Inciong,
and thus applies in the case at bar. Since the private respondent premises its
action on the invalidated rule and policy instruction, it is clear that the employees
belonging to the petitioner association are entitled to the payment of 10 legal
holidays under Articles 82 and 94 of the Labor Code, aside from their monthly
salary. They are not among those excluded by law from the benefits of such
holiday pay
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the Labor Ministers 7 September
1976 order, and reinstated with modification (deleting the interest payments) the
24 March 1976 decision of the NLRC affirming the 30 October 1975 resolution of
the Labor Arbiter.

C. Rule vs. Opinion

What is the difference between
a rule and an opinion?

Victorias Milling vs Social Security

Commission
Facts: On October 15, 1958, the Social Security Commission issued its
Circular No. 22 which states:
Effective Nov 1, 1958, all employees in computing the premiums due the
System, will take into consideration and include in the Employees
remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of
other media of remuneration. All these will comprise the Employees
remuneration or earnings, upon which the 3 % and 2 %
contributions will be based, up to a maximum of P500 for any one month.
Upon receipt of a copy thereof, Victorias Milling Company wrote the Social
Security Commission in effect protesting against the circular as
contradictory to a previous Circular 7, and further questioned the validity
of the circular for lack of authority on the part of the SSC to promulgate it
without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in the
Official Gazette.
Overruling these objections, the Social Security Commission ruled that
Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation that needed the approval of
the President and publication in the Official Gazette to be effective but a
mere administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere opinion as to
how the law should be construed.

 Issue: Whether Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation

Held: There is a distinction between an administrative rule and an
administrative interpretation. When an administrative agency
promulgates rules and regulation, it makes a new law with the
force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion, or
gives a statement of policy; it merely interprets a pre-existing law.
Circular 22 in question was issued by the Social Security
Commission in view of the amendment of the provisions of the
Social Security Law defining the term compensation. In Sec (8) of
RA 1161 before amendment, it states that bonuses, allowances,
overtime pay are exempted or excluded from the definition of
compensation and such exemption was deleted by amendatory law
(RA 1792)
It became necessary for the Social Security Commission to
interpret the effect of such deletion. Circular 22 was issued to
apprise those concerned by the interpretation of the Commission. It
did not add any detail that was not in the law as amended. It
merely stated the opinion of the Commission as to how the law
should be construed. Circular 22 purports merely to advise
employers-members of the system of what, in the light of the
amendment of the law should include in determining the monthly
compensation of their employees upon which the social security
contributions should be based.