Chapter10:CipherTechniques

SomeProblems
TypesofCiphers
Networks
Examples

November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#101

Overview
Problems
Whatcangowrongifyounaivelyuseciphers

Ciphertypes
Streamorblockciphers?

Networks
Linkvsendtoenduse

Examples
PrivacyEnhancedElectronicMail(PEM)
SecurityattheNetworkLayer(IPsec)
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#102

Problems
Usingcipherrequiresknowledgeof
environment,andthreatsinthe
environment,inwhichcipherwillbeused
Isthesetofpossiblemessagessmall?
Dothemessagesexhibitregularitiesthatremain
afterencipherment?
Cananactivewiretapperrearrangeorchange
partsofthemessage?
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#103

Attack#1:Precomputation
SetofpossiblemessagesMsmall
Publickeycipherfused
Idea:precomputesetofpossibleciphertexts
f(M),buildtable(m,f(m))
Whenciphertextf(m)appears,usetableto
findm
Alsocalledforwardsearches
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#104

Example
CathyknowsAlicewillsendBoboneof
twomessages:encipheredBUY,or
encipheredSELL
UsingpublickeyeBob,Cathyprecomputes
m1={BUY}eBob,m2={SELL}eBob
CathyseesAlicesendBobm2
CathyknowsAlicesentSELL
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#105

MayNotBeObvious
Digitizedsound
Seemslikefartoomanypossibleplaintexts
Initialcalculationssuggest232suchplaintexts

Analysisofredundancyinhumanspeech
reducedthistoabout100,000(217)
Thisissmallenoughtoworryaboutprecomputation
attacks

November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#106

MisorderedBlocks
AlicesendsBobmessage
nBob=77,eBob=17,dBob=53
MessageisLIVE(11082104)
Encipheredmessageis44572116

Eveinterceptsit,rearrangesblocks
Nowencipheredmessageis16215744

Bobgetsencipheredmessage,deciphersit
HeseesEVIL
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#107

Notes
Digitallysigningeachblockwontstopthis
attack
Twoapproaches:
Cryptographicallyhashtheentiremessageand
signit
Placesequencenumbersineachblockof
message,sorecipientcantellintendedorder
Thenyousigneachblock
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#108

StatisticalRegularities
Ifplaintextrepeats,ciphertextmaytoo
ExampleusingDES:
input(inhex):
32313433363538373231343336353837

correspondingoutput(inhex):
ef7c4bb2b4ce6f3bef7c4bb2b4ce6f3b

Fix:cascadeblockstogether(chaining)
Moredetailslater
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#109

WhatTheseMean
Useofstrongcryptosystems,wellchosen
(orrandom)keysnotenoughtobesecure
Otherfactors:

Protocolsdirectinguseofcryptosystems
Ancillaryinformationaddedbyprotocols
Implementation(notdiscussedhere)
Maintenanceandoperation(notdiscussedhere)

November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1010

Stream,BlockCiphers
Eenciphermentfunction
Ek(b)enciphermentofmessagebwithkeyk
Inwhatfollows,m=b1b2,eachbioffixedlength

Blockcipher
Ek(m)=Ek(b1)Ek(b2)

Streamcipher
k=k1k2
Ek(m)=Ek1(b1)Ek2(b2)
Ifk1k2repeatsitself,cipherisperiodicandthekengthof
itsperiodisonecycleofk1k2

November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1011

Examples
Vigenrecipher
bi=1character,k=k1k2whereki=1character
Eachbiencipheredusingkimodlength(k)
Streamcipher

DES
bi=64bits,k=56bits
Eachbiencipheredseparatelyusingk
Blockcipher
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1012

StreamCiphers
Often(tryto)implementonetimepadby
xoringeachbitofkeywithonebitof
message
Example:
m=00101
k=10010
c=10111

Buthowtogenerateagoodkey?
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1013

SynchronousStreamCiphers
nstageLinearFeedbackShiftRegister:
consistsof
nbitregisterr=r0rn1
nbittapsequencet=t0tn1
Use:
Usern1askeybit
Computex=r0t0rn1tn1
Shiftronebittoright,droppingrn1,xbecomesr0
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1014

Operation

r0

rn1

bi

ci

r0

rn1

ri=ri1,
0<in

r0t0++rn1tn1
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1015

Example

4stageLFSR;t=1001
r ki
newbitcomputation
newr
0010
0
01001001=0
0001
0001
1
01000011=1
1000
1000
0
11000001=1
1100
1100
0
11100001=1
1110
1110
0
11101001=1
1111
1111
1
11101011=0
0111
0
0
11101011=1
1011
Keysequencehasperiodof15(010001111010110)

November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1016

NLFSR
nstageNonLinearFeedbackShift
Register:consistsof
nbitregisterr=r0rn1
Use:
Usern1askeybit
Computex=f(r0,,rn1);fisanyfunction
Shiftronebittoright,droppingrn1,xbecomesr0

NotesameoperationasLFSRbutmoregeneral
bitreplacementfunction
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1017

Example
4stageNLFSR;f(r0,r1,r2,r3)=(r0&r2)|r3
r

ki

newbitcomputation

newr

1100
0110
0011
1001
1100
0110
0011

0
0
1
1
0
0
1

(1&0)|0=0
(0&1)|0=0
(0&1)|1=1
(1&0)|1=1
(1&0)|0=0
(0&1)|0=0
(0&1)|1=1

0110
0011
1001
1100
0110
0011
1001

Keysequencehasperiodof4(0011)
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1018

EliminatingLinearity
NLFSRsnotcommon
Nobodyoftheoryabouthowtodesignthemtohave
longperiod

Alternateapproach:outputfeedbackmode
ForEenciphermentfunction,kkey,rregister:
Computer=Ek(r);keybitisrightmostbitofr
Setrtoranditerate,repeatedlyencipheringregisterand
extractingkeybits,untilmessageenciphered

Variant:useacounterthatisincrementedforeach
enciphermentratherthanaregister
TakerightmostbitofEk(i),whereiisnumberofencipherment

November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1019

SelfSynchronousStreamCipher
Takekeyfrommessageitself(autokey)
Example:Vigenre,keydrawnfromplaintext
key
XTHEBOYHASTHEBA
plaintextTHEBOYHASTHEBAG
ciphertext
QALFPNFHSLALFCT

Problem:
Statisticalregularitiesinplaintextshowinkey
Onceyougetanypartofthemessage,youcandecipher
more

November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1020

AnotherExample
Takekeyfromciphertext(autokey)
Example:Vigenre,keydrawnfromciphertext
key
plaintext
ciphertext

XQXBCQOVVNGNRTT
THEBOYHASTHEBAG
QXBCQOVVNGNRTTM

Problem:
Attackergetskeyalongwithciphertext,sodeciphering
istrivial
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1021

Variant
Cipherfeedbackmode:1bitofciphertextfedintonbit
register
Selfhealingproperty:ifciphertextbitreceivedincorrectly,itand
nextnbitsdecipherincorrectly;butafterthat,theciphertextbits
deciphercorrectly
Needtoknowk,Etodecipherciphertext

k
E

Ek(r)

mi

ci

November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1022

BlockCiphers
Encipher,deciphermultiplebitsatonce
Eachblockencipheredindependently
Problem:identicalplaintextblocksproduce
identicalciphertextblocks
Example:twodatabaserecords
MEMBER:HOLLYINCOME$100,000
MEMBER:HEIDIINCOME$100,000

Encipherment:
ABCQZRMEGHQMRSIBCTXUVYSSRMGRPFQN
ABCQZRMEORMPABRZCTXUVYSSRMGRPFQN

November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1023

Solutions
Insertinformationaboutblocksposition
intotheplaintextblock,thenencipher
Cipherblockchaining:
Exclusiveorcurrentplaintextblockwith
previousciphertextblock:
c0=Ek(m0I)
ci=Ek(mici1)fori>0

whereIistheinitializationvector
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1024

MultipleEncryption
Doubleencipherment:c=Ek(Ek(m))
Effectivekeylengthis2n,ifk,karelengthn
Problem:breakingitrequires2n+1encryptions,not22n
encryptions

Tripleencipherment:
EDEmode:c=Ek(Dk(Ek(m))
Problem:chosenplaintextattacktakesO(2 n)timeusing2n
ciphertexts

Tripleencryptionmode:c=Ek(Ek(Ek(m))
BestattackrequiresO(22n)time,O(2n)memory

November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1025

NetworksandCryptography
ISO/OSImodel
Conceptually,eachhosthaspeerateachlayer
Peerscommunicatewithpeersatsamelayer
Applicationlayer

Applicationlayer

Presentationlayer

Presentationlayer

Sessionlayer

Sessionlayer

Transportlayer

Transportlayer

Netw orklayer

Networklayer

Networklayer

Datalinklayer

Datalinklayer

Datalinklayer

Physicallayer

Physicallayer

Physicallayer

November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1026

LinkandEndtoEndProtocols
LinkProtocol

EndtoEnd(orE2E)Protocol

November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1027

Encryption
Linkencryption
Eachhostenciphersmessagesohostatnext
hopcanreadit
Messagecanbereadatintermediatehosts

Endtoendencryption
Hostenciphersmessagesohostatotherendof
communicationcanreadit
Messagecannotbereadatintermediatehosts
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1028

Examples
TELNETprotocol
Messagesbetweenclient,serverenciphered,and
encipherment,deciphermentoccuronlyatthesehosts
Endtoendprotocol

PPPEncryptionControlProtocol
Hostgetsmessage,deciphersit
Figuresoutwheretoforwardit
Enciphersitinappropriatekeyandforwardsit

Linkprotocol
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1029

CryptographicConsiderations
Linkencryption
Eachhostshareskeywithneighbor
Canbesetonperhostorperhostpairbasis
Windsor,stripe,seavieweachhaveownkeys
Onekeyfor(windsor,stripe);onefor(stripe,seaview);one
for(windsor,seaview)

Endtoend
Eachhostshareskeywithdestination
Canbesetonperhostorperhostpairbasis
Messagecannotbereadatintermediatenodes
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1030

TrafficAnalysis
Linkencryption
Canprotectheadersofpackets
Possibletohidesourceanddestination
Note:maybeabletodeducethisfromtrafficflows

Endtoendencryption
Cannothidepacketheaders
Intermediatenodesneedtoroutepacket

Attackercanreadsource,destination
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1031

ExampleProtocols
PrivacyEnhancedElectronicMail(PEM)
Applicationslayerprotocol

IPSecurity(IPSec)
Networklayerprotocol

November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1032

GoalsofPEM
1. Confidentiality

Onlysenderandrecipient(s)canreadmessage

2. Originauthentication

Identifythesenderprecisely

3. Dataintegrity

Anychangesinmessageareeasytodetect

4. Nonrepudiationoforigin

Wheneverpossible

November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1033

MessageHandlingSystem
UA

MTA

November1,

UA

UA

MTA

MTA

IntroductiontoCompu

User
Agents

Message
Transfer
Agents

Slide#1034

DesignPrinciples
Donotchangerelatedexistingprotocols
CannotalterSMTP

Donotchangeexistingsoftware
Needcompatibilitywithexistingsoftware

MakeuseofPEMoptional
Availableifdesired,butemailstillworkswithoutthem
Somerecipientsmayuseit,othersnot

Enablecommunicationwithoutprearrangement
Outofbandsauthentication,keyexchangeproblematic
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1035

BasicDesign:Keys
Twokeys
Interchangekeystiedtosender,recipientsand
isstatic(forsomesetofmessages)
Likeapublic/privatekeypair
Mustbeavailablebeforemessagessent

Dataexchangekeysgeneratedforeachmessage
Likeasessionkey,sessionbeingthemessage

November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1036

BasicDesign:Sending
Confidentiality

mmessage
ksdataexchangekey
kBBobsinterchangekey

Alice

November1,

{m}ks||{ks}kB

IntroductiontoCompu

Bob

Slide#1037

BasicDesign:Integrity
Integrityandauthentication:

mmessage
h(m)hashofmessagemMessageIntegrityCheck(MIC)
kAAlicesinterchangekey
Alice

m{h(m)}kA

Bob

Nonrepudiation:ifkAisAlicesprivatekey,thisestablishes
thatAlicesprivatekeywasusedtosignthemessage
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1038

BasicDesign:Everything
Confidentiality,integrity,authentication:
Notationsasinpreviousslides
IfkAisprivatekey,getnonrepudiationtoo

Alice

{m}ks||{h(m)}kA||{ks}kB

November1,

Bob

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1039

PracticalConsiderations
LimitsofSMTP
OnlyASCIIcharacters,limitedlengthlines

Useencodingprocedure
1. Maplocalcharrepresentationintocanonicalformat
FormatmeetsSMTPrequirements

2. ComputeandencipherMICoverthecanonicalformat;
enciphermessageifneeded
3. Mapeach6bitsofresultintoacharacter;insert
newlineafterevery64thcharacter
4. AdddelimitersaroundthisASCIImessage
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1040

Problem
RecipientwithoutPEMcompliantsoftwarecannot
readit
Ifonlyintegrityandauthenticationused,shouldbeable
toreadit

ModeMICCLEARallowsthis
Skipstep3inencodingprocedure
Problem:someMTAsaddblanklines,deletetrailing
whitespace,orchangeendoflinecharacter
Result:PEMcompliantsoftwarereportsintegrity
failure
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1041

PEMvs.PGP
Usedifferentciphers
PGPusesIDEAcipher
PEMusesDESinCBCmode

Usedifferentcertificatemodels
PGPusesgeneralweboftrust
PEMuseshierarchicalcertificationstructure

Handleendoflinedifferently
PGPremapsendoflineifmessagetaggedtext,but
leavesthemaloneifmessagetaggedbinary
PEMalwaysremapsendofline

November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1042

IPsec
Networklayersecurity
Providesconfidentiality,integrity,
authenticationofendpoints,replaydetection

Protectsallmessagessentalongapath
dest

IP

IP+IPsec
gw2

IP
gw1

src

securitygateway

November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1043

IPsecTransportMode

IP
header

encapsulated
databody

EncapsulateIPpacketdataarea
UseIPtosendIPsecwrappeddatapacket
Note:IPheadernotprotected
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1044

IPsecTunnelMode

IP
header

encapsulated
databody

EncapsulateIPpacket(IPheaderandIPdata)
UseIPtosendIPsecwrappedpacket
Note:IPheaderprotected
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1045

IPsecProtocols
AuthenticationHeader(AH)
Messageintegrity
Originauthentication
Antireplay

EncapsulatingSecurityPayload(ESP)
Confidentiality
OthersprovidedbyAH
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1046

IPsecArchitecture
SecurityPolicyDatabase(SPD)
Sayshowtohandlemessages(discardthem,
addsecurityservices,forwardmessage
unchanged)
SPDassociatedwithnetworkinterface
SPDdeterminesappropriateentryfrompacket
attributes
Includingsource,destination,transportprotocol
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1047

Example
Goals
DiscardSMTPpacketsfromhost192.168.2.9
Forwardpacketsfrom192.168.19.7withoutchange

SPDentries
src192.168.2.9,dest10.1.2.3to10.1.2.103,port25,discard
src192.168.19.7,dest10.1.2.3to10.1.2.103,port25,bypass
dest10.1.2.3to10.1.2.103,port25,applyIPsec

Note:entriesscannedinorder
Ifnomatchforpacket,itisdiscarded
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1048

IPsecArchitecture
SecurityAssociation(SA)
Associationbetweenpeersforsecurityservices
Identifieduniquelybydestaddress,security
protocol(AHorESP),unique32bitnumber
(securityparameterindex,orSPI)

Unidirectional
Canapplydifferentservicesineitherdirection

SAuseseitherESPorAH;ifbothrequired,2
SAsneeded
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1049

SADatabase(SAD)
EntrydescribesSA;somefieldsforallpackets:
AHalgorithmidentifier,keys
WhenSAusesAH

ESPenciphermentalgorithmidentifier,keys
WhenSAusesconfidentialityfromESP

ESPauthenticationalgorithmidentifier,keys
WhenSAusesauthentication,integrityfromESP

SAlifetime(timefordeletionormaxbytecount)
IPsecmode(tunnel,transport,either)
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1050

SADFields
Antireplay(inboundonly)
WhenSAusesantireplayfeature

Sequencenumbercounter(outboundonly)
GeneratesAHorESPsequencenumber

Sequencecounteroverflowfield
StopstrafficoverthisSAifsequencecounteroverflows

Agingvariables
Usedtodetecttimeouts

November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1051

IPsecArchitecture
Packetarrives
LookinSPD
Findappropriateentry
Getdestaddress,securityprotocol,SPI

FindassociatedSAinSAD
Usedestaddress,securityprotocol,SPI
ApplysecurityservicesinSA(ifany)
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1052

SABundlesandNesting
SequenceofSAsthatIPsecappliesto
packets
ThisisaSAbundle

NesttunnelmodeSAs
Thisisiteratedtunneling

November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1053

Example:NestedTunnels
GroupinA.orgneedstocommunicatewithgroup
inB.org
GatewaysofA,BuseIPsecmechanisms
Buttheinformationmustbesecrettoeveryoneexcept
thetwogroups,evensecretfromotherpeopleinA.org
andB.org

Innertunnel:aSAbetweenthehostsofthetwo
groups
Outertunnel:theSAbetweenthetwogateways
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1054

Example:Systems
gwA.A.org

hostA.A.org

SAintunnelmode
(outertunnel)
SAintunnelmode
(innertunnel)

November1,

hostB.B.org

gwB.B.org

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1055

Example:Packets
IP
header
from
gwA

AH
header
from
gwA

ESP
header
from
gwA

IP
header
from
hostA

AH
header
from
hostA

ESP
header
from
hostA

IP
header
from
hostA

Transport
layer
headers,
data

PacketgeneratedonhostA
EncapsulatedbyhostAsIPsecmechanisms
AgainencapsulatedbygwAsIPsecmechanisms
Abovediagramshowsheaders,butasyougoleft,everythingto
therightwouldbeencipheredandauthenticated,etc.

November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1056

AHProtocol
ParametersinAHheader

Lengthofheader
SPIofSAapplyingprotocol
Sequencenumber(antireplay)
Integrityvaluecheck

Twosteps
Checkthatreplayisnotoccurring
Checkauthenticationdata
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1057

Sender
Checksequencenumberwillnotcycle
Incrementsequencenumber
ComputeIVCofpacket
IncludesIPheader,AHheader,packetdata
IPheader:includeallfieldsthatwillnotchangein
transit;assumeallothersare0
AHheader:authenticationdatafieldsetto0forthis
Packetdataincludesencapsulateddata,higherlevel
protocoldata
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1058

Recipient
AssumeAHheaderfound
GetSPI,destinationaddress
FindassociatedSAinSAD
IfnoassociatedSA,discardpacket

Ifantireplaynotused
VerifyIVCiscorrect
Ifnot,discard
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1059

Recipient,UsingAntireplay
Checkpacketbeyondlowendofslidingwindow
CheckIVCofpacket
Checkpacketsslotnotoccupied
Ifanyoftheseisfalse,discardpacket

currentwindow

November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1060

AHMiscellany
Allimplementationsmustsupport:
HMAC_MD5
HMAC_SHA1
Maysupportotheralgorithms

November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1061

ESPProtocol
ParametersinESPheader

SPIofSAapplyingprotocol
Sequencenumber(antireplay)
Genericpayloaddatafield
Paddingandlengthofpadding
ContentsdependsonESPservicesenabled;maybean
initializationvectorforachainingcipher,forexample
Usedalsotopadpackettolengthrequiredbycipher

Optionalauthenticationdatafield
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1062

Sender
AddESPheader
Includeswhateverpaddingneeded

Encipherresult
DonotencipherSPI,sequencenumbers

Ifauthenticationdesired,computeasfor
AHprotocolexceptoverESPheader,
payloadandnotencapsulatingIPheader
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1063

Recipient
AssumeESPheaderfound
GetSPI,destinationaddress
FindassociatedSAinSAD
IfnoassociatedSA,discardpacket

Ifauthenticationused
DoIVC,antireplayverificationasforAH
OnlyESP,payloadareconsidered;notIPheader
Noteauthenticationdatainsertedafterencipherment,sono
decipheringneedbedone

November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1064

Recipient
Ifconfidentialityused

DecipherencipheredportionofESPheaser
Processpadding
Decipherpayload
IfSAistransportmode,IPheaderandpayload
treatedasoriginalIPpacket
IfSAistunnelmode,payloadisan
encapsulatedIPpacketandsoistreatedas
originalIPpacket
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1065

ESPMiscellany
Mustuseatleastoneofconfidentiality,
authenticationservices
Synchronizationmaterialmustbeinpayload
Packetsmaynotarriveinorder,soifnot,packets
followingamissingpacketmaynotbedecipherable

ImplementationsofESPassumeclassical
cryptosystem
Implementationsofpublickeysystemsusuallyfar
slowerthanimplementationsofclassicalsystems
Notrequired

November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1066

MoreESPMiscellany
Allimplementationsmustsupport(encipherment
algorithms):
DESinCBCmode
NULLalgorithm(identity;noencipherment)

Allimplementationsmustsupport(integrity
algorithms):
HMAC_MD5
HMAC_SHA1
NULLalgorithm(noMACcomputed)

BothcannotbeNULLatthesametime
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1067

WhichtoUse:PEM,IPsec
Whatdothesecurityservicesapplyto?
Ifapplicabletooneapplicationandapplicationlayer
mechanismsavailable,usethat
PEMforelectronicmail

Ifmoregenericservicesneeded,looktolowerlayers
IPsecfornetworklayer,eitherendtoendorlinkmechanisms,
forconnectionlesschannelsaswellasconnections

Ifendpointishost,IPsecsufficient;ifendpointisuser,
applicationlayermechanismsuchasPEMneeded
November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1068

KeyPoints
Keymanagementcriticaltoeffectiveuseof
cryptosystems
Differentlevelsofkeys(sessionvs.interchange)

Keysneedinfrastructuretoidentifyholders,allow
revoking
Keyescrowingcomplicatesinfrastructure

Digitalsignaturesprovideintegrityoforiginand
content
Mucheasierwithpublickeycryptosystemsthanwith
classicalcryptosystems

November1,

IntroductiontoCompu

Slide#1069