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“We have interests, intrinsic and extrinsic, in acquiring knowledge (true belief)
and avoiding error.” (Goldman 1999: 69)
- Epistemology evaluates practices along truth-linked (veritistic) dimensions.
Social epistemology evaluates specifically social practices along these
dimensions.
Competitors to veritism
1. Consensus consequentialism
Pure consequentialism: social practices ought to be evaluated by their ability to
promote agreement.
- In the writings of Jürgen Habermas (1984), John Rawls (1993), Bruce Ackerman
(1989), and, in argumentation theory Frans van Eemeren and Rob
Grootendorst (1984, 2004)
Conceptions of Social Epistemology
Cases against: totalitarian news coverage. Biased jury selection. Belief pill for
scientists.
- If the goal is set for achieving rational agreement, the evaluation is different.
- Why do we want others to agree with us? Is agreement a tell-tale sign of
truth?
Conceptions of Social Epistemology
2. Pragmatism
Social belief-causing mechanisms should be evaluated by the amount of utility
that they would produce.
- One motivation: truth is a notion to be avoided. “Success” as goal
achievement or desire-fulfillment involves something more concrete.
However, in comparison to correspondence theory (for example), it seems to
involve a reference to relation between mind and world, only the direction of fit is
different.
There is no water in the sun-> true if and only there is no H20 in the sun
(Function: reference)
There is no water in the sun-> true if and only if there is no H20 or XYZ in the
sun
(Function: reference*)
…
Objections:
Goldman (1999, 72-73): if this is a real problem, then a similar problem would
beset satisfaction. Namely, there could be satisfaction, satisfaction*,
satisfaction**, …
Alston (1996): Stich confuses truth conditions, i.e. the assigning of propositional
content to bearers of such contents (beliefs), with truth value, i.e. the relation a
given proposition to the world.
Conceptions of Social Epistemology
Stich: we have no general argument for the claim that believing a true claim is
always more beneficial than believing a false claim.
3. Proceduralism
All the previous account are consequentialist: they identify some fundamental aim
(true belief / consensus / utility satisfaction) and evaluate social practices in
relation to achieving this aim. Are there any alternatives that locate the value in
the procedure itself?
Objectivity: Helen Longino (1990: 76) has argued that objectivity is the ultimate
aim, and a scientific communities exhibit objectivity to the degree that they
satisfy four criteria necessary for achieving the transformative dimension of
critical discourse: 1) There must recognized avenues for the criticism of evidence,
of methods, and of assumptions of reasoning; 2) there must exist a shared
standards that critics can invoke; 3) the community as a whole must be responsive
to such criticisms; 4) intellectual authority must be shared equally among
qualified practitioners.
A different challenge issues from Siegel (2005) “…education should strive to foster,
not (just) true belief, but (also) the skills, abilities and dispositions constitutive of
critical thinking, and the rational belief generated and sustained by it.”
- Discusses education but I believe that the issue has wider application, though
does not necessarily extend to all areas of social epistemology.
- Accepts that both aims are important.
- Goldman accepts that critical thinking has value, but emphasizes that the
value is instrumental.
Conceptions of Social Epistemology
1. If mere true belief is the sole aim, then brainwashing, indoctrination, chemical
manipulation etc. would be acceptable methods.
2. They are not acceptable methods.
3. Therefore, true belief is not the sole aim.
The point is that students ought to believe the true, because of the reasons the
teachers think are good reasons for believing the true.
Good reasons are intertwined with education. The object ought to be knowledge in
the strong sense: justified true belief.
Conceptions of Social Epistemology
Assume that two agents, Maria and Mario, have identical beliefs, the only
difference being that one has a rationally held belief and the other does not.
First assume that the belief is true. Is there is a difference? Then assume that
the belief is false. Is there a difference.
In both cases, if Maria’s belief is held rationally and Mario’s belief is a lucky guess,
Maria’s belief seems more commendable.
Conceptions of Social Epistemology
3. Access to truth
For most beliefs, it seems that we have no direct access to their truth: we have to
reason evidentially, i.e. judge whether p is true based on evidence and
reasoning.
But this is not easy; students therefore need to develop skills and dispositions that
allow them to reason well, evaluate evidence well, search for evidence,
construct and evaluate arguments well, etc.
R. Firth: “To the extent that we are rational, each of us decides at any time t
whether a belief is true, in precisely the same way that we would decide at t
whether we ourselves are, or would be, warranted at t in having that belief.”
(1981: 19).
As Siegel notes, even Goldman makes this point: “The usual route to true belief,
of course, is to obtain some kind of evidence that points to the true
proposition and away from the rivals” (1999: 24)
Conceptions of Social Epistemology
Argument here:
1. Truth can be determined only by certain methods.
2. As educators, we want students to be able to determine (i.e. be able and
disposed to seek) the truth.
3. Therefore, in education the ultimate end is not truth per se, but enabling
students to judge or estimate wisely.
Enlarged argument:
1. Truth can be determined only by certain methods m1,…, mn.
2. As educators, we want students to be able to determine (i.e. be able and
disposed to seek) the truth.
3. Therefore, we need to teach the students methods m1,…, mn.
4. Methods in themselves are not sufficient for a critical thinker but also relevant
dispositions (Siegel 1988).
5. Therefore, in education the ultimate end is not truth per se, but enabling the
students to judge or estimate wisely (by giving certain skills and dispositions).
Conceptions of Social Epistemology
So, Siegel concludes: critical thinking can be justified from both within epistemology
and from perspectives outside, without denying the important instrumentalist link.
Conceptions of Social Epistemology